

STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF MICHIGAN

Plaintiffs-Appellee,

v

RAYMOND CARP,

Defendants-Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 307758

St. Clair Circuit Court No. 06-
001700-FC

BRIEF OF ATTORNEY GENERAL BILL SCHUETTE

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

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COUNTER-STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED

- I. Is the decision in *Miller v Alabama*, ___ US ___; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), retroactively applicable where a juvenile’s conviction is final and no longer subject to direct review?

Appellant’s answer: Yes.

Appellee’s answer: No.

Attorney General’s answer: No.

- II. If a mandatory life sentence without parole for a juvenile is unconstitutional and, under MCL 750.316, life imprisonment is the only designated punishment for first-degree murder, is there authority that would allow a trial court to sentence a juvenile to a term of years for a first-degree murder conviction?

Appellant’s answer: Yes.

Appellee’s answer: No.

Attorney General’s answer: No.

- III. Are the requirements of *Miller v Alabama, supra*, satisfied if a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder is sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, contrary to MCL 791.234(6)(a)?

Appellant’s answer: No.

Appellee’s answer: Yes.

Attorney General’s answer: Yes.

- IV. What process should be used for sentencing juveniles convicted of first-degree murder that would satisfy the requirements of *Miller v Alabama, supra*?

Attorney General’s answer: For cases pending on direct review, individualized sentencing as envisioned by *Miller* in which the court sentences a teenage murderer to either parolable or nonparolable life.

INTRODUCTION

Until June 27, 2012, Michigan law mandated life-without-parole (LWOP) sentences for all defendants – including teenagers – convicted of murder in adult court. MCL 791.234(6)(a). Michigan courts had affirmed these sentences’ constitutionality. In *Miller v Alabama*, 132 S Ct 2455 (2012), the United States Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ claim that LWOP sentences for teenage murderers were categorically invalid. But the Court did announce a new procedural rule: “a judge or jury must have an opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances” before sentencing a teenage murderer to LWOP. 132 S Ct at 2475. The Court did not specify whether *Miller* should apply retroactively, nor did it specify the appropriate remedy when a state has a mandatory LWOP sentencing scheme. Consistent with the principle that this Court should endeavor to give effect to Michigan law within constitutional bounds, the Attorney General answers the questions presented as follows:

First, the *Miller* decision does not apply retroactively because it announces a new rule of procedure. An LWOP sentence for a teenage murderer continues to be a constitutionally-permissible sentence, but only after a hearing that considers the unique attributes of the murderer, including the murderer’s age and age-related characteristics. It is only the mandatory nature of Michigan’s system that is unconstitutional for juveniles. This change in process is not a “watershed” rule that must be applied retroactively as a matter necessary for ordered liberty. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court *never* has found a procedural rule to be a watershed rule under *Teague*, and it has rejected similar claims in analogous settings. See, e.g., *Graham*

v Collins, 506 US 461 (1993) (rejecting retroactive application of a new rule that would prevent a state from limiting a sentencing jury’s ability to consider a 17-year-old’s youth and other mitigating factors before imposing the death penalty).

Second, for a case involving a convicted teenage murderer that is still pending on direct review, there is no authority empowering a sentencing court to impose a term-of-years sentence. Michigan law requires the imposition of a life sentence for all defendants convicted of first-degree murder. Under *Miller*, however, the parole statute foreclosing parole review is unconstitutional as applied to teenage murderers in the absence of an individualized sentencing hearing. Thus, the proper remedy is for the trial court to make an individualized determination under *Miller* of whether the teenage murderer deserves an LWOP sentence. Such a sentence is permissible when the sentencing court considers the relevant mitigating factors.

Third, *Miller*’s requirements are satisfied whenever a convicted teenage murderer is sentenced to life imprisonment with the opportunity for parole. The fact that the parole board has been cautious about granting parole does not change this conclusion. The claim that the parole board will routinely reject a teenage murderer’s request for parole under *Miller* is unfounded and is premature.

Fourth, the process that trial courts should use for sentencing teenage murderers is that which *Miller* requires. The sentencing court should make an individualized determination whether an LWOP sentence for the convicted teenage murderer is appropriate given all the relevant circumstances.

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Attorney General concurs in the statement of facts as prepared by the St. Clair County Prosecutor's Office. (St. Clair County Br, pp 1–13.) To rebut any suggestion that Raymond Carp was merely an unwitting or unwilling participant in this crime, the Attorney General will briefly reiterate Carp's active role in the brutal beating, stabbing, and death of Mary Ann McNeely.

Both Carp and his half-brother, Brandon Gorecki, knew the victim, 43-year-old Mary Ann McNeely. She was stabbed more than 30 times (Vol III, pp 629–636). And she was bludgeoned in the face and head with cups and mugs, sustaining more than 20 distinct blunt force injuries (Vol III, p 651), leaving the prosecutor to explain that her face was “unrecognizable” (Vol II, p 326). Carp was not a bystander to this murderous assault. He admitted to Kelly Smith that he had struck Ms. McNeely (Vol V, p 966), and that he held her down while Gorecki beat her savagely:

Q. Did Butchy [i.e., Raymond Carp] tell you what he did while Brandon was beating Maryann?

A. Held her down.

Q. Who held her down?

A. Butchy [Carp].

Q. Did he tell you exactly what Brandon was doing while Butchy [Carp] held Maryann down?

A. Kneeing her in the face. [Vol V, p 967.]

The blows to Ms. McNeely's face and head alone would have resulted in her death. (Vol III, p 663).

Most critically, Carp handed Gorecki murder weapon, a knife, knowing that Gorecki – who had “prayed over” Ms. McNeely – was going to kill her. (Vol V, p 980.) When Ms. McNeely pleaded to Carp for her life, Gorecki responded that “blood’s thicker than water.” (Vol V, p 975.) And Carp had shut the blinds because McNeely’s screaming was so loud that he feared the police may arrive. (Vol V, pp 964–965.) From the beginning of the trial, the prosecution explained that Carp was “not only an aider and abettor, but was an active participant.” (Vol II, p 323.)

As noted in the Attorney General’s motion to intervene, there are 368 prisoners who were sentenced to LWOP for first-degree murder committed while these murderers were under the age of 18. The brutal nature of this slaying is not isolated. Within the last two months, the Department of Attorney General has been involved in appellate cases involving teenage murderers with facts similarly brutal to those in this case.

In *Tremble v Burt*, 2012 WL 3799145 (CA 6, 2012), released August 31, 2012, the Sixth Circuit reversed a grant of habeas grant for T.J. Tremble who murdered an older married couple, Peter and Ruth Stanley, when he was 14 years old. He shot them so that he could apparently steal a car from their home. See *Tremble*, *2 (“Tremble confessed to killing Peter and Ruth Stanley, stating that he shot them with a .22 rifle while in their bedroom.”).

In *People v Richard Simmons*, 2012 WL 4039691, an unpublished memorandum opinion, released on September 13, 2012 (Case No. 303201, 2012), this Court reversed a grant of relief to 16-year-old Richard Simmons of first-degree

murder during the perpetration of a rape. This Court may take judicial notice of the statement of facts from the Attorney General's brief in that case, filed June 21, 2012, explaining how Simmons broke into the home of 64-year-old Gwendolyn Grams, raped her, and then stabbed her to death. (Br of Attorney General, *People v Simmons*, filed June 21, 2012, p 3.)

And to underscore the violent nature of the offenses for which teenagers have been sentenced to LWOP, the Florida Court of Appeals has become the first court to address *Miller*, holding that *Miller* did *not* apply retroactively to a 16-year old convicted murderer. See *Geter v State*, ___ So 3d ___; 2012 WL 4448860 (2012). The facts are illustrative:

Geter was arrested for first-degree murder in December 2000, on the eve of his seventeenth birthday. Earlier that same day, a rock or stone was thrown through the front window of the victim's home, breaking the window, and allowing Geter to gain entry into the home. The victim, in an attempt to defend her home, her child, and herself, struggled with Geter and struck him in the head with a crowbar. However, Geter was able to overpower the victim. He ripped the victim's panties from her body, raped her, and ejaculated inside her vagina. During the violent struggle between the victim and Geter, the victim's three-year-old son was awoken by his mother's screams.

After the rape, Geter got a butcher knife. He stabbed the victim in the neck eight to twelve times. Geter then cut the victim from her elbow to her wrist so that she would bleed faster and die. When the victim still had not died, Geter finally choked her to death. The victim's three-year old son witnessed the brutal murder of his mother. Before leaving the victim's home, Geter passed by the victim's son and told him to be a good boy. [*Geter*, 2012 WL 4448860, *1.]

ARGUMENT

I. *Miller* is a new rule of procedure and does not apply retroactively to cases that were final on direct review.

A. *Miller* does not apply retroactively under the standards the U.S. Supreme Court set forth in *Teague*.

“Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” *Teague v Lane*, 489 US 288, 309 (1989) (plurality opinion). The retroactive application of new rules to cases on collateral review impedes the effective operation of state criminal justice systems by “continually forc[ing] the States to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards.” *Id.* at 310. By limiting the retroactive application of new rules in collateral review, “the *Teague* principle protects not only the reasonable judgments of state courts but also the States’ interest in finality quite apart from their courts.” *Beard v Banks*, 542 US 406, 413 (2004).

Based on these principles, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that while new rules announced in its decisions apply to all cases that are pending on direct review or not yet final, new rules of *procedure* apply retroactively only if they are “watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” *Schriro v Summerlin*, 542 US 348, 351, 352 (2004). The exceptions to the rule of nonretroactivity have been placed into two categories. “The first exception permits the retroactive application of a new rule if

the rule places a class of private conduct beyond the power of the State to proscribe, or addresses a substantive categorical guarantee accorded by the Constitution, such as a rule prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” *Graham v Collins*, 506 US at 477 (internal quotes and citations omitted). The second exception, which applies to watershed rules, has not yet been fully defined but is “clearly meant to apply only to a small core of rules requiring observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” *Id.* (internal quotes and citations omitted).

In this case, Carp’s conviction and sentence for first-degree murder became final on September 21, 2009.¹ Under *Teague*, *Miller v Alabama* should not be applied retroactively because the rule is new, it is procedural, and it is not one of the few “watershed” rules that is required for ordered liberty. Since establishing this retroactivity framework in 1989, the Supreme Court has not recognized a single “watershed” procedural rule.

1. The rule that the U.S. Supreme Court announced in *Miller* is new.

The first step in the *Teague* analysis is determining whether the rule announced in *Miller* is new. “The ‘new rule’ principle . . . validates reasonable,

¹ Carp’s calculation that the case became final on direct review is mistaken. (Carp Br, p 18.) He provides for one year, plus 90 days from the denial of the application for leave to the Michigan Supreme Court. *Id.* The proper calculation is merely the 90 days in which to file a petition for certiorari. See *Griffith v Kentucky*, 479 US 314, 321 n 6 (1987) (“By ‘final,’ we mean a case in which a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.”).

good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.” *Butler v McKellar*, 494 US 407, 414 (1990). To determine whether the *Miller* rule is, indeed, new, a court ascertains the “legal landscape” at the time the defendant’s conviction became final and asks whether then-existing precedent “compels the rule.” *Beard*, 542 US at 411. “[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.” *Teague*, 489 US at 301 (plurality opinion). A new rule is defined as one that “was not *dictated* by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” *Id.* (emphasis in original).

Here, it cannot be reasonably disputed that the *Miller* rule created a new obligation. At the time the opinion issued, three-quarters of the states and the federal government had life-without-parole sentencing for teenage murderers. Twenty-eight states had mandatory sentencing schemes. And the Supreme Court never before had held that these regimes were subject to an individualized sentencing hearing.

2. The new rule that the U.S. Supreme Court announced in *Miller* is procedural.

The second step in the *Teague* analysis is to determine whether the new rule announced in *Miller* is substantive or procedural. New substantive rules – which generally apply retroactively – include those that “narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms,” as well as those that “place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State’s power to punish.” *Schriro*, 542

US at 351–352 (citations omitted). “In contrast, rules that regulate only the *manner of determining* the defendant’s culpability are procedural.” *Id.* at 353, citing *Bousley v United States*, 523 US 614, 620 (1998) (emphasis in original).

In *Schriro*, the U.S. Supreme Court announced that *Ring v Arizona* established a procedural rule *when* *Ring* held that a jury – not a sentencing judge – must find aggravating circumstances necessary for the imposition of the death penalty. *Schriro*, 542 US at 353. Rejecting an argument that *Ring* created a substantive rule, the Court said that the holding “did not alter the range of conduct Arizona law subjected to the death penalty.” *Id.* Instead, the Court said, “*Ring* altered the range of permissible methods for *determining* whether a defendant’s conduct is punishable by death, requiring that a jury rather than a judge find the essential facts bearing on punishment.” *Id.* (emphasis added).

Likewise, in *Apprendi v New Jersey*, the U.S. Supreme Court held that any fact other than that of a prior conviction that increases a criminal penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. *Apprendi v New Jersey*, 530 US 466, 490 (2000). The federal circuits unanimously have concluded that *Apprendi* does not apply retroactively because it is a procedural rule. See, e.g., *Sepulveda v United States*, 330 F3d 55, 61 (CA 1, 2003) (listing cases).² That is because the *Apprendi* rule “did not

² Accord *Coleman v United States*, 329 F3d 77, 90 (CA 2, 2003); *United States v Swinton*, 333 F3d 481, 485 (CA 3, 2003); *United States v Brown*, 305 F3d 304, 310 (CA 5, 2002); *Goode v United States*, 305 F3d 378, 382 (CA 6, 2002); *Curtis v United States*, 294 F3d 841, 844 (CA 7, 2002); *In re Smith*, 350 US App DC 354; 285 F3d 6, 9 (2002); *United States v Mora*, 293 F3d 1213, 1219 (CA 10, 2002); *United States v*

decriminalize any class of conduct or prohibit a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants.” *McCoy*, 266 F3d at 1256–58.

The same is true here. As in *Schriro* and *Apprendi*, *Miller* did not decriminalize any class of conduct or prohibit a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants. To the contrary, the Court *rejected* the petitioners’ request to categorically ban LWOP sentences for teenage murderers. Rather, the decision “mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain *process* – considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics – before imposing a particular penalty.” *Miller*, 132 S Ct at 2471 (emphasis added). As in *Schriro*, “*the range of conduct punished . . . was the same before [the controlling decision] as after.*” *Schriro*, 542 US at 354 (emphasis added). Although the Court in *Miller* qualified the point by noting that the occasions in which such a sentence is appropriate “will be uncommon,” it cannot be disputed that the States may still impose an LWOP sentence on a teenage murderer. *Miller*, 132 S Ct at 2469.³ But the sentencing court must do so in an

Moss, 252 F3d 993, 997 (CA 8, 2001); *McCoy v United States*, 266 F3d 1245, 1256–57 (CA 11, 2001); *United States v Sanders*, 247 F3d 139, 151 (CA 4, 2001); *Jones v Smith*, 231 F3d 1227, 1236 (CA 9, 2000).

³ The number of cases in Michigan in which the prosecution has moved forward to obtain a first-degree murder conviction for a teenage offender is uncommon. There are currently 368 such prisoners (committed while under the age of 18) who were sentenced to LWOP in the Department of Corrections, the first arising from April 15, 1975. See Motion to Intervene, Appendix A. In this way, there have been approximately 10 teenage murderers sentenced each year to LWOP since then. There are more than 3,000 offenders in the MDOC who were convicted of first-degree murder under MCL 750.316. See 2010 MDOC Annual Report, p C1c, 4 of 11. This report may be found at the following web address:

[http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/2011-08-31 - MDOC Annual Stat Report - Vers 1 0 362197 7.pdf](http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/2011-08-31_-_MDOC_Annual_Stat_Report_-_Vers_1_0_362197_7.pdf) (last visited October 3, 2012).

individual sentencing procedure where there is discretion to consider a “lesser sentence,” which the U.S. Court stated included “life *with* the possibility of parole.” *Id.* at 2460 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the *Miller* rule is procedural.

In arguing that *Miller* applies retroactively, Carp contends that *Miller* is “analogous” to retroactively-applied U.S. Supreme Court cases that banned a category of punishment against juveniles or mentally-retarded defendants. See Carp Br, p 21, citing *Graham v Florida*, 130 S Ct 2011 (2010) (prohibiting LWOP sentences against juveniles for non-homicide offenses); *Roper v Simmons*, 543 US 551 (2005) (prohibiting the death penalty for offenders under the age of 18); *Atkins v Virginia*, 536 US 304 (2002) (prohibiting the death penalty for mentally-retarded defendants); and *Penry v Lynaugh*, 492 US 302, 329–330 (1989) (although overruled on other grounds, the Court stated that prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded would be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review). These cases are all readily distinguishable because the Court was examining in each the prohibition of a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense. If the *Miller* court had categorically banned LWOP sentences for teenage murderers, the new rule would have to be applied retroactively. That is not the case given the *Miller* court’s rejection of a categorical sentencing ban and mere imposition of a new procedural requirement.⁴

⁴ Carp also relies on the decision in *Sumner v Shuman*, 483 US 66 (1987), for the claim that *Miller* should be applied retroactively. (Carp Br, p 18.) But *Sumner* contained no analysis on the issue of retroactivity.

To put it another way, a convicted teenage murderer post *Miller* is still subject to the same possible punishment – life without the opportunity for parole. In contrast, the Court noted in *Penry* that prohibiting the execution of those with mental infirmities would fall under the first exception to *Teague* because the prohibition would preclude a *category* of punishment “regardless of the procedures followed.” *Penry*, 492 US at 330 (“[I]f we held, as a substantive matter, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons such as Penry regardless of the procedures followed, such a rule would fall under the first exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity and would be applicable to defendants on collateral review.”). In contrast, the only change at issue here is the process by which this determination is made.

3. The new procedural rule that the U.S. Supreme Court announced in *Miller* is not a “watershed” change.

If a new U.S. Supreme Court rule is procedural, it has retroactive effect only if the rule constitutes a “watershed rule[] of criminal procedure” that “implicate[s] the fundamental fairness” of criminal proceedings. *Teague*, 489 US at 311, 312 (plurality opinion). The U.S. Supreme Court has stressed repeatedly the limited scope of this exception, noting that it is “clearly meant to apply only to a small core of rules” that “are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” *Beard*, 542 US at 417. The Supreme Court often – and only – has used *Gideon v Wainwright*, 372 US 335 (1963), a landmark case involving the right to counsel, as an example of a rule that

might fall under this exception because it is “fundamental and essential” to fair trials. *Beard*, 542 US at 417.

It is worth beginning the consideration of this issue by noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has never found a procedural rule to meet this “watershed” standard. In rejecting the conclusion that the new procedural rule under *Crawford v Washington* applied retroactively, the Court said:

This exception is “extremely narrow[.]” *Schriro v Summerlin*, 542 US 348, 352 (2004). We have observed that it is “‘unlikely’” that any such rules “‘ha[ve] yet to emerge,’” *ibid.* (quoting *Tyler v. Cain*, 533 U.S. 656, 667, n.7 (2001); internal quotation marks omitted); see also *O’Dell v. Netherland*, 521 US 151, 157 (1997); *Graham, supra*, at 478; *Teague, supra*, at 313 (plurality opinion). And in the years since *Teague*, we have rejected every claim that a new rule satisfied the requirements for watershed status. [*Whorton v Bockting*, 549 US 406, 417–418 (2007).]

Neither have there been any cases post *Bockting* that held a procedural rule to be retroactive in application.

Critically, the Supreme Court cases that are most analogous – those involving new procedural rules for sentencing in death penalty cases – have all found that process changes are not retroactive. See, e.g., *Schriro*, 542 US at 356 (new procedural rule requiring fact-finding by jury for element necessary for the death penalty); *Graham v Collins*, 506 US at 475 (new procedural rule that state cannot “unconstitutionally limit[] the manner in which his mitigating evidence may be considered” during death penalty sentencing phase); *Saffle v Parks*, 494 US 484, 495 (1990) (new procedural rule that would prohibit an instruction telling the jury to avoid the influence of sympathy during death-penalty sentencing phase).

The case that is closest to the facts here is *Graham v Collins*. In that case, the habeas petitioner was sentenced to death for a murder that he committed while he was 17 years old. *Graham v Collins*, 506 US at 463. Graham contended that the three questions that the jury was required to answer in determining whether he should be sentenced to death did not enable the jury to consider his “youth, family background, and positive character traits.” *Id.* This same basic concern underlies the *Miller* decision in its analysis of mandatory sentencing, which prevents the sentencing court from considering the youth and other individual traits of a teenage murderer. *Miller*, 132 S Ct at 2466 (“By removing youth from the balance . . . these laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender”).

Nevertheless, the Court determined that the change – which would prevent any limitation on the ability of a criminal defendant to raise his youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing – did not meet the watershed exception to *Teague*. *Graham v Collins*, 506 US at 478. (“We do not believe that denying Graham special jury instructions concerning his mitigating evidence of youth, family background, and positive character traits ‘seriously diminish[ed] the likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination’ in his sentencing proceeding”). See also *Saffle*, 494 US at 495. The same considerations demonstrate that the *Miller* rule should not apply retroactively.

Moreover, this conclusion is consistent with the requirement that a rule must be sweeping in nature to fall within the second exception. The sweep of the change

in *Miller* is limited. It only modifies the process by which the sentencing court must reach its decision for first-degree murder cases, and only does so for certain offenders. Other, more global changes to the criminal process have not been applied retroactively. The most significant example of this point is the conclusion that the Court did not apply retroactively the case holding that the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment applies to the states under *Duncan v Louisiana*, 391 US 145 (1968). *DeStefano v Woods*, 392 US 631, 635 (1968). The same is true for the *Crawford* decision, see *Whorton*, which may arise in any criminal trial. The Supreme Court provided a list of other rules in *Whorton* that were not given retroactive effect. *Whorton*, 549 U.S. at 418, citing *Beard v Banks*, 542 US 406 (2004) (rejecting retroactivity for *Mills v Maryland*, 486 US 367 (1988)); *O'Dell*, 521 US at 157 (rejecting retroactivity for *Simmons v South Carolina*, 512 US 154 (1994)); *Gilmore v Taylor*, 508 US 333 (1993) (rejecting retroactivity for a new rule relating to jury instructions on homicide); *Sawyer v Smith*, 497 US 227 (1990) (rejecting retroactivity for *Caldwell v Mississippi*, 472 US 320 (1985)). The Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion regarding *Halbert v Michigan*, 545 US 605 (2005), the case creating the constitutional requirement of the appointment of counsel for appeals from plea-based convictions. *Simmons v Kapture*, 516 F3d 450, 451 (CA 6, 2008).

Furthermore, this Court relied on a similar basis in determining whether the new procedural rule in *Padilla v Kentucky*, 130 S Ct 1473 (2010), was retroactive. *People v Gomez*, 295 Mich App 411; ___ NW2d ___ (2012). In *Padilla*, the U.S.

Supreme Court determined that counsel has an obligation to inform his client when a guilty plea will render the defendant subject to automatic deportation; otherwise the plea is constitutionally infirm. *Padilla*, 130 S Ct at 1478. This Court held under *Teague* that this rule does not apply to cases final on direct review because it is not “so implicit in the structure of the criminal proceedings that retroactivity is mandated.” *Gomez*, 2012 WL 468248, *7. That is because the rule only applies to “a subset of criminal defendants who might wish to consider immigration consequences.” *Id.* The same is true here: the procedural rule from *Miller* only applies to a subset of criminal defendants.

The Florida Court of Appeals is the only court to date that has examined the question of *Miller*’s retroactivity. That Court has reached the conclusion that *Miller* is not retroactive:

Miller is a procedural change in law that provides for a new process in juvenile homicide sentencing. Like other decisions that have declined to retroactively apply constitutional determinations, *Miller* does not affect the “determination of guilt or innocence [of a juvenile defendant]’ and ‘does not address a miscarriage of justice or effect a judicial upheaval’ regarding substantive criminal law.” Also, the procedural determination in *Miller* fails to “cast serious doubt on the veracity or integrity of the original trial proceeding.” Because the *Miller* determination is a procedural change in juvenile homicide sentencing, it is merely an “evolutionary refinement[] in criminal law” that does “not compel an abridgement of the finality of judgments.” [*Geter v State*, ___ So 3d ___; 2012 WL 4448860, at *3 (2012) (numerous quotations omitted).]

In reaching this conclusion, the Florida Court of Appeals drew the same analogue to *Apprendi* that the Attorney General has drawn here:

What *Miller* and *Apprendi* do share is that they both concern constitutional determinations implicating procedural changes with unique and narrow applications. Both constitutional determinations

are new procedural rules in criminal law that do not affect the finality of the criminal conviction. Likewise, *Miller* and *Apprendi* do not preclude the sentence from imposing the statutory maximum, but rather require the sentence to follow certain procedures before doing so. Accordingly, the new procedural determination in *Miller* does not warrant retroactive application in postconviction proceedings. [In fact, c]ompared to *Apprendi*, retroactive application is even less warranted with respect to *Miller*. [*Id.* at *6 (numerous citations omitted).]

In sum, the *Miller* rule does not implicate the fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings. It is far more limited in scope than *Gideon*, and its relationship to the accuracy of the sentencing process is far less direct than the right to counsel is to ensuring fair trials. Although the new rule may reduce the number of teenage murderers sentenced to LWOP, such a result is not “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” *Beard*, 542 US at 417. *Miller*, therefore, does not present a “watershed rule.” *Id.*

B. The fact that Jackson’s case in *Miller* was on collateral review is not controlling.

Carp argues that the *Miller* rule is retroactive based on the fact that the Supreme Court applied it in the companion case of *Jackson v Hobbs* to a habeas petitioner whose appeal was taken from state collateral review. Carp’s Brief, pp 18–20. *Teague* suggests that if a new rule is applied retroactively to one defendant, it should be applied evenhandedly to other defendants retroactively. *Teague*, 489 US at 300.

But Carp fails to consider that the defense of retroactivity must be raised by the state or otherwise the issue is waived. The Supreme Court has no obligation to raise *sua sponte* a retroactivity issue the state has not addressed:

Generally speaking, “[r]etroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.” *Teague, supra*, 489 U.S., at 300.

The State of Texas, however, did not address retroactivity in its petition for certiorari or its briefs on the merits, and when asked about the issue at oral argument, counsel answered that the State had chosen not to rely on *Teague*. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4–5. Although the *Teague* rule is grounded in important considerations of federal-state relations, we think it is not “jurisdictional” in the sense that this Court, despite a limited grant of certiorari, must raise and decide the issue *sua sponte*. [*Collins v Youngblood*, 497 US 37, 40–41 (1990) (paragraph break added; parallel cites omitted).]

In brief, where the state fails to raise the retroactivity issue, the argument is waived. See also *United States v Tosh*, 330 F3d 836, 840 n 3 (2003) (“Because the government failed to raise the retroactivity issue on appeal, we deem the issue waived.”).

And in the case that Carp relies on, *Jackson v Hobbs*, Arkansas did not raise the retroactivity issue in its brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari. It did not cite *Teague* or provide any analysis of retroactivity. (Arkansas’ Br in Opp, filed June 1, 2011.⁵) Arkansas’ merits brief likewise did not address *Teague*, retroactivity, or the fact that this was a new rule that should not apply retroactively to a case that was final on direct review. (Arkansas’ Merits Br, filed on February 14, 2012, 2012 WL 523347 (2012).) Any claim about retroactivity was waived. Unsurprisingly, the Court’s opinions in *Miller* and *Jackson* nowhere reference

⁵ This brief may be found at the following web address:

<http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Jackson-USSC-States-BIO-6-1-11.pdf> (lasted visited on October 2, 2012).

Teague or retroactivity. Thus, contrary to Carp’s brief, the fact that the Court applied the new procedural rule to the teenage murderer in *Jackson* does not prohibit state courts from considering the retroactivity issue. To the contrary, in the absence of any controlling statement from the Supreme Court regarding retroactivity, state courts are duty bound to address and resolve the issue.

C. Michigan law also provides that this new rule does not apply retroactively.

This Court’s analysis does not end with the conclusion that *Miller* is not retroactive under federal law. *People v Maxson*, 482 Mich 385, 392; 759 NW2d 817 (2008). That is because a state may give broader effect to a new procedural rule than federal law requires. *Danforth v Minnesota*, 552 US 264, 1046–1047 (2008). “Federal law simply ‘sets certain minimum requirements that States must meet but may exceed in providing appropriate relief.’” *Id.*, quoting *American Trucking Assns., Inc. v Smith*, 496 US 167, 178–179 (1990) (plurality opinion).

Like *Teague*, Michigan generally has declined to apply new criminal procedural rules to final convictions. *Maxson*, 482 Mich at 382–383. The Michigan Supreme Court has articulated a three-part analysis to make that decision. *People v Sexton*, 458 Mich 43, 60–61, 580 NW2d 404 (1998). This Court considers: (1) the purpose of the new rule, (2) the general reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect of retroactive application of the new rule on the administration of justice. *Id.*, citing *People v Hampton*, 384 Mich 669, 674; 187 NW2d 404 (1971).

Under the first *Sexton* prong, a law may be applied retroactively when it “concerns the ascertainment of guilt or innocence.” *Id.* at 63. A new rule of procedure that “does not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process,” on the other hand, only should be applied prospectively. *Id.* Here, the *Miller* rule mandates a certain process before a court may sentence a teenage murderer to LWOP. The procedure does not implicate the fact-finding process and does not concern guilt or innocence in any way. The first *Sexton* prong counsels against *Miller*’s retroactivity.

In examining the second *Sexton* prong, a court determines whether individuals or entities have been “adversely positioned . . . in reliance” on the old rule. Given the mandatory nature of the sentencing scheme in place for many years, it is difficult to conceive how any defendant could have detrimentally (and reasonably) relied on the *Miller* rule. While some number of teenage murderers serving LWOP sentences would receive relief if *Miller* is given retroactive effect, “this would be true of extending any new rule retroactively.” *Maxson*, 482 Mich at 397. Thus, the second prong also counsels against retroactivity.

Under the third and final *Sexton* prong, the retroactive application of the *Miller* rule would have a markedly adverse effect on the administration of justice. The retroactive application of *Miller* would “*continually* force[] the State[] to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards.” *Teague*, 489 US at 310 (emphasis in original). Michigan’s limited judicial resources will be stretched even thinner and its criminal justice system seriously impaired if the courts are

inundated with requests to reevaluate the sentences of more than 350 prisoners who committed the most heinous of crimes. The State's strong interest in finality – an essential concept in the American criminal justice system – will be significantly undermined if *Miller* is applied retroactively. The third *Sexton* prong weighs heavily against retroactivity.

There is another consideration not fully captured by the *Sexton* analysis: the impact on victims' families and friends. For every teenage murderer, there is a network of affected victims who are forced to live every day with the loss of their loved ones, a loss that sometimes occurred in the most heinous and despicable manner possible. When Michigan's 368 teenage murderers initially were convicted and sentenced, the victims' family and friends had no reason to believe that they would ever have to face the perpetrators again.

But if *Miller* is applied retroactively, victims' families and friends will be front and center, testifying about their loss and trying to explain why the murderer never should be given the opportunity for release. And if a trial court orders parole review, these families and friends will be *re-victimized* when they are forced to appear before the parole board every five years to justify the murderer's continued incarceration.

In sum, there is no good reason to apply *Miller* retroactively when *Teague* does not require it. The Attorney General respectfully requests that the Court hold that *Miller* does not apply retroactively.

II. For cases pending on direct review, there is no authority to sentence a teenage murderer convicted of first-degree murder to a term of years. Under Michigan law, as modified by *Miller*, the only option is either parolable life or non-parolable life.

The Michigan sentencing statute for a person convicted of first-degree murder requires that the sentencing court impose a mandatory life sentence:

A person who commits any of the following is guilty of first degree murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life[.] [MCL 750.316.]

There is no statement about whether this sentence is subject to release from parole.

That provision is included in the statutory code governing the Department of Corrections and the parole board, and it provides that a person sentenced to imprisonment for life for first-degree murder “is not eligible for parole,” MCL 791.234(6), but must rely on a reprieve, commutation, or pardon under MCL 791.244. For an offender sentenced to life imprisonment and eligible for parole, that offender becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board after serving 15 years in prison for crimes committed after October 1, 1992, and 10 years for crimes committed before that date. See MCL 791.234(7)(b).

For cases pending on direct review,⁶ the *Miller* decision has rendered infirm the combination of these two statutes as applied to juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder. Significantly, the sentence of life imprisonment itself for juvenile offenders is not infirm, but this punishment without the opportunity for parole is unconstitutional where there was no individual determination. See *Miller*,

⁶ As argued in issue I, because *Miller* should not be applied retroactively, its individualized-sentencing rule applies only to those cases pending on direct review and for cases going forward. *Griffith*, 479 US at 321.

132 S Ct at 2469 (“We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that *mandates* life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”) (emphasis added).⁷ It is the *mandatory* nature of the scheme that makes the punishment constitutionally impermissible.

In light of this fact, the proper remedy to address the constitutional infirmity identified by *Miller* is to require the sentencing court to make an individual determination at the time of imposing the life sentence whether the offender should be eligible for parole. This determination would be an individual one, responding to the *Miller* decision, requiring the court to then indicate whether this life sentence would be with or without parole. This resolution accords most closely with the current Michigan sentencing scheme.

Moreover, this remedy would give effect to Michigan law. As *Miller* makes clear, there is nothing impermissible in itself of the LWOP sentence, but only the process by which this determination is made.⁸ And Michigan law seeks to impose the harshest punishment available under law to the most serious offenders – those who commit first-degree murder. The obligation of the Michigan courts where there has been an intervening U.S. Supreme Court decision rendering some applications

⁷ See also *id.* at 2467:

Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.

⁸ By the same token, the States that impose the death penalty for adult murderers may do so, but must allow considerations of the mitigating factors of the individual offender. See *Lockett v Ohio*, 438 US 586 (1978). The Supreme Court in *Miller* relied on this line of precedent in explaining why the mandatory scheme here was constitutionally problematic. *Miller*, 132 S Ct at 2473.

of Michigan law constitutionally infirm is to give effect to Michigan law “as far as it can” as reflected in Michigan’s public policy. See, e.g., *People v Bricker*, 389 Mich 524, 530; 208 NW2d 172 (1973), quoting Cooley, *Constitutional Limitations*, (5th ed), pp 215–216.

There is nothing in the Michigan law that would allow an offender convicted of first-degree murder to receive a term of years. This would contradict the scheme in a fundamental way that *Miller* does not require. In other words, *Miller* does not require Michigan to allow first-degree murderers who commit their crimes while under the age of 18 to receive a sentence of a term of years.

Carp suggests that because *Miller* states that the circumstances under which the LWOP sentence will be appropriate is “uncommon,” see *Miller*, 132 S Ct at 2469, that the lesser sentence of a term of years should be available. (Carp Br, pp 24-25.) But this is wrong. Even if in the Court’s prudential judgment such a sentence will be uncommon, the sentence of LWOP is nevertheless constitutionally permissible under *Miller*. And Michigan law does not provide for a term of years for first-degree murder.

Carp also argues that the statutory provision that has been rendered inapplicable is MCL 769.1(1)(g) (requiring sentencing a juvenile as an adult for first-degree murder), and therefore that the five-year punishment for common-law offenses should apply. (Carp Br, pp 29-30.) This claim is wrong for two reasons.

First, as already noted, there is nothing constitutionally inappropriate in imposing an LWOP sentence on a juvenile murderer who reflects “irreparable

corruption.” *Miller*, 132 S Ct at 2469. The sentence must be individualized for a juvenile offender. The punishment itself is not infirm.

Second, the suggestion that a juvenile offender who has committed first-degree murder should be sentenced with a five-year maximum under the catch-all common law statute, MCL 750.505, is meritless. First-degree murder is the most serious crime under Michigan law.

III. *Miller’s* requirements are satisfied if a teenage murderer is sentenced to LWOP as long as the sentencing court makes an individualized determination.

The U.S. Supreme Court in *Miller* made clear that the requirement for an LWOP sentence is that the sentencing court be able to consider the individual characteristics of the offender, including the offender’s youth:

Although we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment [of an LWOP sentence] in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison. [*Miller*, 132 S Ct at 2469.]

The Court explained that the loss of discretion in the sentencing court’s decision on which sentence to impose was the constitutional problem. The Court indicated in its example of other options for lesser sentences that a sentence of “life with the possibility of parole” would provide this discretion:

In neither case did the sentencing authority have any discretion to impose a different punishment. State law mandated that each juvenile die in prison even if a judge or jury would have thought that his youth and its attendant characteristics, along with the nature of his crime, made a lesser sentence (for example, life *with* the possibility of parole) more appropriate. [*Id.* at 2460 (emphasis in original).]

The clear import of this example is that a sentencing scheme that allowed the sentencing court to impose a life sentence with the opportunity for parole would meet the requirements of the Eighth Amendment as long as the court considered the individual characteristics of the offender.

Carp argues that the sentence of life with the opportunity for parole would still violate *Miller* because “life means life” as parole is applied by the Michigan Parole Board. (Carp Br, pp 31-33.) This Court should reject Carp’s argument.

To begin, there is no way to determine how the parole board will evaluate whether to grant parole to offenders 15 years from now. This is particularly true where the standards the parole board applies may change significantly without any change in law. In part because of a change in parole policy in the last five years, the number of offenders housed by the Department of Corrections has decreased by almost 9,000 prisoners. The Department’s most recent annual report for 2010 reflects the reduction in prisoners from 51,454 in 2006 to 44,113 in 2010 for the 2006-2010 timeframe – a reduction of more than 7,000 prisoners. See MDOC 2010 Annual Report, p Ca.⁹

More important, even if true that the parole board currently releases relatively few offenders serving parolable life sentences, and there was some reason to believe that this policy would continue indefinitely, there is still no reason to believe that this practice would apply to juvenile offenders when so few have been sentenced to parolable life. The claim that these specific offenders would not be

⁹ See n 3 for the web address.

given a genuine opportunity for parole, particularly in light of *Miller*, is mere speculation. Such a claim is premature and is not ripe for review. *Haring Charter Township v Cadillac*, 290 Mich App 728, 752; 811 NW2d 74 (2010) (“The ripeness doctrine requires the judiciary to refrain from giving advisory opinions on hypothetical issues”). The same is true of Carp’s argument about the “judicial veto” in MCL 791.234(8)(c). (Carp’s Br, pp 33–34.) There is no reason to believe that judges will exercise this mechanism in a systematic way that violates *Miller*’s principles.

IV. The process that should be used for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder is an individualized one in which the court considers the factors identified in *Miller* before determining whether or not to impose LWOP.

As already noted, the sentencing court is required under Michigan law to impose a life sentence under MCL 750.316. After *Miller*, the sentencing court is also required to make an individual determination about whether the juvenile offender should be eligible for parole. This action brings Michigan law into conformity with *Miller*.

This determination should include consideration of the factors that were listed in *Miller*. The Court provided a summary at the end of its opinion:

Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features – among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him – and from which he cannot usually extricate himself – no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures

may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth – for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys.”). [*Miller*, 132 S Ct at 2468.]

This analysis identifies at least two factors that may be aggravating considerations: (1) circumstances of the homicide offense; and (2) extent of the offender’s participation. There are also four mitigating considerations: (1) the nature of youth because of its “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks”; (2) family and home life that may have lessened the offender’s culpability; (3) family and peer pressure in the perpetration of the crime; and (4) whether his youth contributed to his failure to take advantage of a plea agreement or otherwise result in a conviction for a lesser offense.

Because this list did not purport to be exhaustive, the ordinary considerations that govern all discretionary sentencing decisions also would be in play. These considerations obviously include both aggravating and mitigating factors, including the specific factors identified in *Miller*.

Of course, these considerations would not be relevant for Raymond Carp because his case was final on September 21, 2009, and *Miller* should not be applied retroactively. Carp’s sentence should stand.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED

This Court should hold that *Miller* does not apply retroactively and affirm Carp's sentence to life without the possibility of parole for his role in the murder of MaryAnn McNeely. For the benefit of parties, counsel, and the trial courts, this Court should further address *Miller's* implications for teenage murderers who are convicted in the future or whose cases are still on direct appeal. In those cases, the Court should clarify that the sentencing court must conduct an individualized hearing to determine parole eligibility. In doing so, the sentencing court should consider all of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances *Miller* articulated, as well as any other reasonable factors that ordinarily guide all discretionary sentencing decisions. Under no circumstances would a term-of-years sentence be appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

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Dated: October 4, 2012

APPENDIX A

JUVENILES (UNDER AGE 18 AT TIME OF OFFENSE) SERVING LWOP AS OF MARCH 29, 2011

offense I_no	NAME	DOB	Age at Offense	Current Age	Commitment Date	Offense Date	Sentence Date	Offense	Convicted By	Offense Description	County	Current Status	
1	750065	TILLMAN DONTEZ MARC	05/28/1984	14	16	12/04/2009	08/23/2008	12/02/2009	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	63	ACTIVE
2	748694	MCCLOUD THOMAS JAY JR	12/01/1993	14	17	12/04/2009	08/23/2008	12/02/2009	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	63	ACTIVE
3	665309	HAWKINS DEANTE	08/28/1991	14	19	10/30/2007	08/25/2006	10/25/2007	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
4	260818	TREMBLE TJ JAMES	05/18/1982	14	28	12/09/1997	04/19/1997	12/05/1997	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	06	ACTIVE
5	271014	BENTLEY MATTHEW SCOTT	10/04/1982	14	28	08/31/1998	09/02/1997	08/31/1998	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	32	ACTIVE
6	370249	ROBINSON KEVIN	09/16/1984	15	26	06/06/2001	08/30/2000	06/07/2001	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	61	ACTIVE
7	283097	PETTY GREGORY	11/18/1982	15	28	03/16/1999	07/19/1998	03/12/1999	750316B	C	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
8	297874	HALL CHAVEZ	03/19/1983	15	28	10/12/1999	01/27/1999	10/08/1999	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	13	ACTIVE
9	260160	WILLIAMS SHYTOUR TONRAY	04/26/1981	15	29	11/06/1997	01/03/1997	11/05/1997	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	73	ACTIVE
10	252581	MAZE ROBERT JARAR	08/07/1980	15	30	11/01/1996	02/01/1996	10/18/1996	750316B	P	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	41	ACTIVE
11	252582	PELTIER CHRISTOPHER LEE	09/29/1980	15	30	11/01/1996	02/01/1996	10/23/1996	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	41	ACTIVE
12	165840	CLEMONS WILLIE TERRELL	11/03/1979	15	31	09/13/1996	10/16/1995	09/05/1996	750316B	P	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	41	ACTIVE
13	251228	MARTIN BENSON L	01/29/1980	15	31	08/16/1996	10/06/1995	08/07/1996	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	63	ACTIVE
14	251329	PATTON WILLIS L	12/26/1979	15	31	08/23/1996	12/04/1995	08/19/1996	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	63	ACTIVE
15	228465	LONGERBEAM JEREMY LEE	05/24/1976	15	34	12/17/1992	03/16/1992	12/16/1992	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	44	ACTIVE
16	200324	RIDDLE TIMOTHY	05/20/1973	15	37	04/17/1989	07/09/1988	04/14/1989	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	RC	ACTIVE
17	203782	EDWARDS MICHAEL	01/09/1974	15	37	09/12/1989	04/30/1989	12/22/1994	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	25	ACTIVE
18	791561	TAYLOR ROBERT	10/26/1992	16	18	02/11/2011	08/09/2009	02/03/2011	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	50	ACTIVE
19	732378	CINTRON JEAN	11/23/1991	16	19	06/16/2009	09/13/2008	06/15/2009	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	63	ACTIVE
20	705258	MAXEY KEITH LENARD	01/04/1991	16	20	10/22/2008	12/24/2007	10/16/2008	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
21	618518	GILBERT NATHANIEL TYRONE	03/09/1989	16	22	10/06/2006	11/17/2005	09/26/2006	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	50	ACTIVE
22	413732	FERRELL MAURICE	08/17/1985	16	25	06/05/2002	01/16/2002	06/04/2002	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
23	417328	WILLIAMS JOHNNY J	11/08/1985	16	25	07/02/2002	12/17/2001	04/04/2005	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
24	375597	WALKER MARLON DEWAYNE	04/06/1984	16	26	08/17/2001	08/30/2000	08/15/2001	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	61	ACTIVE
25	386035	LATIMER ERIC JONATHAN	04/19/1984	16	26	02/07/2002	07/24/2000	01/11/2002	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	25	ACTIVE
26	358745	BLACK MAURICE D	05/15/1983	16	27	02/14/2001	04/06/2000	02/12/2001	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
27	302122	MCLEMORE PATRICK JAMES	09/28/1982	16	28	02/02/2000	06/14/1999	01/31/2000	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	25	ACTIVE
28	319560	COPELAND CORNELIUS C	12/17/1981	16	29	06/20/2000	03/11/1998	06/09/2000	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	63	ACTIVE
29	263328	NUNEZ JUAN CARLOS	10/24/1980	16	30	04/23/1998	09/17/1997	04/20/1998	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	70	ACTIVE
30	250980	CARTER PAUL	07/17/1979	16	31	08/01/1996	11/12/1995	07/24/1996	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	41	ACTIVE
31	250984	CANTU JUAN	05/31/1979	16	31	08/02/1996	11/12/1995	07/24/1996	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	41	ACTIVE
32	253032	MONDALVO SAULO	01/02/1980	16	31	11/22/1996	02/01/1996	11/06/1996	750316B	P	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	41	ACTIVE
33	253128	JONES DANIEL F	12/06/1979	16	31	12/02/1996	01/14/1996	11/25/1996	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	RC	ACTIVE
34	258660	POWELL SHANNON L	11/07/1978	16	32	08/28/1997	06/29/1995	08/26/1997	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	RC	ACTIVE
35	308045	LOGAN AKIL L	01/24/1979	16	32	04/12/2000	10/06/1995	04/04/2000	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	63	ACTIVE
36	217709	REED FERANDAL S	09/06/1974	16	36	07/03/1991	02/17/1991	07/21/2009	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	RC	ACTIVE
37	217645	PERRY MICHAEL LEE	10/04/1973	16	37	06/28/1991	06/14/1990	06/27/1991	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	73	ACTIVE

offender I_no	NAME	DOB	Age at Offense	Current Age	Commitment Date	Offense Date	Sentence Date	Offense	Convicted By	Offense Description	County	Current Status
38	200600	OSTERHOUT STEVEN ALAN	16	39	04/27/1989	04/12/1988	05/01/1992	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	69	ACTIVE
39	783743	MASALMANI HAB	17	19	11/04/2010	08/09/2009	11/04/2010	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	50	ACTIVE
40	709776	JACKSON DREMARIS ANDREW	17	20	11/18/2008	05/19/2008	11/14/2008	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
41	687570	ORLEWICZ JEAN PIERRE	17	21	05/13/2008	11/07/2007	05/12/2008	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
42	598119	DONALD CORY LEE	17	22	10/24/2006	11/14/2005	10/20/2006	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
43	625984	NICHOLS ADRIAN WENDELL	17	22	12/07/2006	03/29/2006	12/06/2006	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	63	ACTIVE
44	652228	WALKER JERRY O'KEITH	17	22	07/13/2007	01/27/2006	07/10/2007	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	25	ACTIVE
45	516680	FIELDS ANTHONY	17	23	04/05/2005	08/03/2004	03/31/2005	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
46	618415	COLEMAN THOMAS H C	17	23	09/12/2006	10/05/2005	09/07/2006	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
47	487692	BURNS-PERRY BRANDON JUSTI	17	24	03/04/2004	09/02/2003	02/24/2004	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	63	ACTIVE
48	511663	CLARK CHRISTOPHER JR	17	24	06/05/2007	08/29/2004	05/31/2007	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
49	599905	DUPIRE NICOLE ANN	17	24	04/13/2006	04/23/2004	04/06/2006	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	50	ACTIVE
50	403858	DAVIS JAJUAN L	17	26	05/01/2003	06/12/2002	04/14/2003	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	63	ACTIVE
51	379111	HENDRICK KENNETH LEE	17	27	11/09/2001	01/17/2001	10/30/2001	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	73	ACTIVE
52	384572	CHAPMAN ANTHONY JOSEPH	17	27	08/16/2005	04/26/2001	08/15/2005	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	59	ACTIVE
53	387044	JACKSON ROY B	17	27	01/22/2002	12/11/2000	01/18/2002	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
54	401181	SMITH MARIO	17	27	03/16/2002	08/16/2001	03/19/2002	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
55	409968	WILLIAMS FREDERICK	17	27	04/29/2002	01/17/2001	04/26/2002	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
56	424363	POWELL CORDELL	17	27	08/20/2002	11/15/2001	08/14/2002	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
57	656895	MCCONNELL ANGELA RENEE	17	27	12/04/2008	08/31/2000	12/01/2008	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	39	ACTIVE
58	318791	STANFORD JOSEPH KL JR	17	28	08/23/2000	01/18/2000	08/18/2000	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	13	ACTIVE
59	324495	TILLMAN TRAVIS	17	28	11/26/2000	11/26/1999	11/22/2000	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
60	325887	MALESKI CHAD EDWARD JOHN	17	28	12/20/2000	03/15/2000	12/19/2000	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	41	ACTIVE
61	325889	ROGERS JOSHUA	17	28	12/20/2000	03/15/2000	12/19/2000	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	41	ACTIVE
62	318846	BURNS RECHO	17	29	07/21/2000	01/15/2000	07/18/2000	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
63	320502	PRINCE ROBERT SAMPSON	17	29	10/20/2000	01/15/2000	10/11/2000	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	50	ACTIVE
64	270103	MCCRADY TERRENCE LEE	17	30	10/09/1998	05/23/1998	08/31/1998	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	25	ACTIVE
65	277651	WALKER JEROME	17	30	01/08/1999	05/24/1998	01/06/1999	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	RC	ACTIVE
66	282369	WATERS CHARLES WAYNE	17	30	03/04/1999	11/22/1997	02/26/1999	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	13	ACTIVE
67	288794	GONZALEZ DANIEL JESSE	17	30	07/14/1999	02/13/1998	06/15/1999	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	73	ACTIVE
68	256195	MARTIN ALLAN GENE-REEDER	17	31	05/09/1997	11/11/1996	05/06/1997	750316B	P	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	11	ACTIVE
69	259094	GIVENS ANTHONY JOVAN	17	31	09/19/1997	12/02/1996	09/08/1997	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	11	ACTIVE
70	260916	ABBATOY MARK ANTHONY	17	31	12/12/1997	05/07/1997	12/08/1997	750316B	P	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	11	ACTIVE
71	261367	JOHNSON DARNELL DEVON	17	31	01/09/1998	05/03/1997	01/09/1998	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	14	ACTIVE
72	270992	MARTINEZ ANTHONY	17	31	08/31/1998	08/16/1997	08/27/1998	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	82	ACTIVE
73	279609	JACKSON DAMON ANDREW	17	31	03/07/2001	09/03/1997	03/06/2001	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	41	ACTIVE
74	250616	GRANDION BRIAN L	17	32	07/10/1996	10/06/1995	06/25/1996	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	63	ACTIVE
75	254416	BRYANT DIARRA	17	32	02/19/1997	01/31/1996	02/13/1997	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	RC	ACTIVE

offender r_no	NAME	DOB	Age at Offense	Current Age	Commitment Date	Offense Date	Sentence Date	Offense	Convicted By	Offense Description	County	Current Status
76	THOMAS DESHON A	04/15/1978	17	32	06/06/1997	06/29/1995	06/03/1997	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	RC	ACTIVE
77	ADRIAN JAMES EARL	11/15/1977	17	33	01/24/1996	04/27/1995	01/12/1996	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	81	ACTIVE
78	FRAZIER COREY RAMONE	09/27/1977	17	33	03/06/1996	06/21/1995	03/05/1996	750316B	P	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	29	ACTIVE
79	MITCHELL CHRISTOPHER B	03/20/1978	17	33	03/27/1997	11/28/1995	03/27/1997	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	73	ACTIVE
80	FUSON JAMES DEAN	04/29/1976	17	34	07/26/1995	01/24/1994	07/25/1995	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	RC	ACTIVE
81	BURDIS DOMINIC PAUL	07/11/1976	17	34	12/13/1995	06/17/1994	12/11/1995	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	09	ACTIVE
82	JOHNSON SHAVANTE	05/31/1975	17	35	03/24/1994	05/19/1993	03/22/1994	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	RC	ACTIVE
83	REEDY MARK LEE	01/04/1974	17	37	09/11/1992	08/14/1991	09/03/1992	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	73	ACTIVE
84	PATTERSON MICHAEL EARL	03/31/1970	17	40	02/24/2006	03/10/1988	02/22/2006	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	41	ACTIVE
85	MASON GARRON LEON	05/14/1965	17	45	09/18/2003	12/16/1982	09/17/2003	750316B	J	HOMICIDE, FELONY MURDER	41	ACTIVE
86	ELIASON DAKOTAH WOLFGANG	09/23/1995	14	15	10/26/2010	03/07/2010	10/25/2010	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	11	ACTIVE
87	KING CEDRIC	05/23/1983	14	27	12/11/1998	03/27/1998	11/24/1998	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	41	ACTIVE
88	FAVORITE DQUAN	03/26/1992	15	18	01/15/2009	12/10/2007	01/08/2009	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	73	ACTIVE
89	MORTON WILLIAM	01/08/1993	15	18	10/21/2009	10/16/2008	10/15/2009	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
90	MACK CAPRICE LASEAN	12/26/1991	15	19	01/15/2009	12/10/2007	01/08/2009	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	73	ACTIVE
91	CARP RAYMOND CURTIS	10/04/1990	15	20	11/21/2006	05/31/2006	11/20/2006	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	74	ACTIVE
92	PETTY GREGORY	11/18/1982	15	28	03/16/1999	07/19/1998	03/12/1999	750316A	C	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
93	WILLIAMS AHMAD R	07/24/1982	15	28	05/25/1999	01/15/1998	02/28/2002	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	41	ACTIVE
94	WILLIAMS SHYTOUR TONRAY	04/26/1981	15	29	11/06/1997	01/03/1997	11/05/1997	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	73	ACTIVE
95	HAYWOOD LAMAR A	02/11/1982	15	29	08/13/1999	06/08/1997	08/10/1999	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
96	WHITFIELD ROBERT LEE	02/28/1976	15	35	07/24/1992	01/19/1992	07/22/1992	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	33	ACTIVE
97	BELTON JONATHAN	06/30/1992	16	18	12/14/2010	12/28/2008	12/14/2010	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	63	ACTIVE
98	JOHNSON DEQUAVIOUS TRAYON	07/11/1990	16	20	05/23/2008	03/02/2007	05/15/2008	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	73	ACTIVE
99	COMMIRE SHAWN MICHAEL	02/12/1991	16	20	05/15/2008	06/05/2007	05/12/2008	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	09	ACTIVE
100	HERNANDEZ LOUIS FERNANDO	05/09/1989	16	21	09/14/2006	11/27/2005	09/12/2006	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
101	GAINES DEONDRE DEQWAIN	04/07/1989	16	21	11/15/2006	01/03/2006	11/08/2006	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	73	ACTIVE
102	COLLIER LARKETA	02/25/1987	16	24	04/14/2004	09/17/2003	04/13/2004	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
103	KIRKSEY MICHAEL LANCE	02/15/1986	16	25	06/23/2003	09/12/2002	06/16/2003	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	63	ACTIVE
104	WILLIAMS LEON	06/17/1984	16	26	08/09/2001	11/16/2000	08/08/2001	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
105	LATIMER ERIC JONATHON	04/19/1984	16	26	02/07/2002	07/24/2000	01/11/2002	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	25	ACTIVE
106	ESPIE JOHN RONALD	03/23/1982	16	28	09/10/1999	11/25/1998	09/10/1999	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	78	ACTIVE
107	HYNES CHRISTOPHER W	12/11/1982	16	28	09/14/1999	12/17/1998	09/13/1999	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	19	ACTIVE
108	WHITTINGTON ELLIOT LASHON	06/10/1981	16	29	11/18/1998	12/16/1997	11/10/1998	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	73	ACTIVE
109	WEBB OLIVER IV	10/06/1981	16	29	05/24/1999	04/12/1998	05/06/1999	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	73	ACTIVE
110	HAYWOOD LONNELL V	06/23/1980	16	30	08/26/1998	02/12/1997	08/24/1998	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
111	QUALLS YUSEF	04/29/1979	16	31	10/22/1996	10/15/1995	10/18/1996	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	RC	ACTIVE
112	PATTERSON TERRY ALLEN	07/19/1979	16	31	11/05/1996	03/16/1996	11/04/1996	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	74	ACTIVE
113	ROSE JUSTIN EDWARD	07/14/1979	16	31	11/05/1996	03/16/1996	03/08/1999	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	74	ACTIVE

offender_no	NAME	DOB	Age at Offense	Current Age	Commitment Date	Offense Date	Sentence Date	Offense	Convicted By	Offense Description	County	Current Status
114	MATTHEWS EDWARD M	01/02/1980	16	31	06/23/1997	04/28/1996	06/19/1997	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	63	ACTIVE
115	BELL NATHAN GREGORY	01/11/1980	16	31	11/04/1997	09/26/1996	10/30/1997	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	25	ACTIVE
116	BELL NATHAN GREGORY	01/11/1980	16	31	11/04/1997	09/26/1996	10/30/1997	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	25	ACTIVE
117	WILEY CHRISTOPHER	09/27/1977	16	33	12/21/1995	06/22/1994	12/19/1995	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	RC	ACTIVE
118	BOYD KEVIN M	09/26/1977	16	33	08/23/1996	08/06/1994	08/19/1996	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	63	ACTIVE
119	LEAMON ROBERT EUGENE III	11/07/1976	16	34	02/28/1997	07/13/1993	02/14/2000	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	14	ACTIVE
120	BLACK AMY LEE	06/11/1974	16	36	07/05/1991	12/07/1990	07/03/1991	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	61	ACTIVE
121	HERNANDEZ BARBARA P	03/16/1974	16	37	08/26/1991	05/12/1990	08/20/1991	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	63	ACTIVE
122	MOORE MARK DEKHAIRA	12/19/1989	17	21	11/17/2008	09/16/2007	11/10/2008	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
123	BLACKSHERE JUSTIN CHRISTO	08/18/1989	17	21	09/11/2007	01/02/2007	09/07/2007	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
124	ORLEWICZ JEAN PIERRE	03/14/1990	17	21	05/13/2008	11/07/2007	05/12/2008	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
125	CANNON MICHAEL TERENCE	08/11/1988	17	22	01/04/2007	04/25/2006	12/21/2006	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
126	WALKER JERRY O'KEITH	11/11/1988	17	22	07/13/2007	01/27/2006	07/10/2007	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	25	ACTIVE
127	RODGERS EARL	04/27/1987	17	23	07/01/2005	09/12/2004	06/29/2005	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
128	HILLS MICHAEL REID	09/14/1987	17	23	03/01/2006	06/27/2005	02/27/2006	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	74	ACTIVE
129	JACKSON CHRISTOPHER EUGEN	12/11/1987	17	23	02/27/2006	07/05/2005	02/15/2006	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	63	ACTIVE
130	PATTERSON SHARON	05/25/1986	17	24	04/15/2004	09/17/2003	04/13/2004	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
131	SWANIGAN JARRETT WADE	09/18/1986	17	24	07/26/2004	02/01/2004	07/22/2004	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
132	DUPURE NICOLE ANN	07/08/1986	17	24	04/13/2006	04/23/2004	04/06/2006	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	50	ACTIVE
133	JOHNSON TERRILL LAWRENCE	10/21/1984	17	26	10/17/2002	04/30/2002	10/16/2002	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
134	FRENCH ANTONIO	04/13/1984	17	26	08/14/2003	01/07/2002	08/12/2003	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
135	FIELDS FREDERICK	07/22/1983	17	27	07/19/2001	12/15/2000	07/17/2001	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
136	WILLIAMS FREDERICK	09/29/1983	17	27	04/29/2002	01/17/2001	04/26/2002	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
137	HINDS ROBERT T	01/24/1984	17	27	05/03/2002	05/16/2001	05/02/2002	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
138	RUSHELL MARCUS LAMAR	06/10/1983	17	27	08/12/2002	01/13/2001	08/08/2002	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
139	WASHINGTON JAMES III	04/10/1982	17	28	02/24/2000	06/27/1999	02/17/2000	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	73	ACTIVE
140	OSBORNE MARC ANTHONY	07/10/1981	17	29	02/04/2000	05/22/1999	01/31/2000	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	41	ACTIVE
141	HUFFMAN-KING DERONE ALLEN	12/10/1981	17	29	04/20/2001	05/30/1999	04/16/2001	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	39	ACTIVE
142	STEFFENHAGEN GARRY LEE	06/20/1980	17	30	09/28/1998	02/03/1998	09/28/1998	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	29	ACTIVE
143	WATERS CHARLES WAYNE	07/17/1980	17	30	03/04/1999	11/22/1997	02/26/1999	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	13	ACTIVE
144	GONZALEZ DANIEL JESSE	01/16/1981	17	30	07/14/1999	02/13/1998	06/15/1999	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	73	ACTIVE
145	POWELL TIEREE T	03/18/1980	17	31	04/17/1998	08/28/1997	04/01/1998	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	63	ACTIVE
146	WHITE WALTER L	05/26/1978	17	32	07/13/1999	02/29/1996	07/09/1999	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	82	ACTIVE
147	HARRINGTON BRANDON	04/21/1977	17	33	03/18/1996	02/18/1995	03/15/1996	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	RC	ACTIVE
148	SMITH MARK ADAM	09/07/1977	17	33	09/04/1996	07/30/1995	08/29/1996	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	25	ACTIVE
149	WILLIAMS ANTWAN L	01/25/1978	17	33	07/22/1999	08/31/1995	07/22/1999	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	63	ACTIVE
150	DANIEL KYLE DEVON	07/07/1976	17	34	06/14/1995	09/29/1993	06/12/1995	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	RC	ACTIVE
151	MCKINNEY FREDERICK ALLEN	03/28/1976	17	34	06/27/1994	11/26/1993	06/16/1994	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	73	ACTIVE

offender i_no	NAME	DOB	Age at Offense	Current Age	Commitment Date	Offense Date	Sentence Date	Offense	Convicted By	Offense Description	County	Current Status
152	244441 WARE GAMELIEL	01/28/1977	17	34	07/24/1995	02/17/1994	07/20/1995	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	RC	ACTIVE
153	244473 FUSON JAMES DEAN	04/29/1976	17	34	07/26/1995	01/24/1994	07/25/1995	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	RC	ACTIVE
154	246866 BURDIS DOMINIC PAUL	07/11/1976	17	34	12/13/1995	06/17/1994	12/11/1995	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	09	ACTIVE
155	214984 MILLER KISHAN	06/01/1973	17	37	02/25/1991	10/04/1990	02/22/1991	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	RC	ACTIVE
156	211451 ALLORE JERRY ALVIN JR	06/03/1972	17	38	09/06/1990	06/11/1989	09/04/1990	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	73	ACTIVE
157	217711 KNUCKLES DEMETRIUS JERMAI	01/02/1973	17	38	07/03/1991	06/24/1990	06/27/1991	750316A	C	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	RC	ACTIVE
158	165683 GOODYEAR ROBERT	05/18/1970	17	40	10/04/1988	12/20/1987	10/04/1988	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	25	ACTIVE
159	193092 MCNEAL LYNN JR	11/08/1970	17	40	04/01/1988	12/07/1987	03/29/1988	750316A	C	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	RC	ACTIVE
160	182623 WATSON DENNIS MCCANN	06/09/1968	17	42	02/20/1986	06/25/1985	01/29/1986	750316A	J	HOMICIDE, MURDER 1ST DEG-PREMEDITATED	RC	ACTIVE
161	522773 MARSH BRANDON MICHAEL	07/20/1988	15	22	03/02/2005	05/25/2004	04/13/2005	750316C	P	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	09	ACTIVE
162	316482 GONZALEZ MARK AARON	01/10/1984	15	27	07/21/2000	07/20/1999	07/19/2000	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	25	ACTIVE
163	223767 SHOCKLEY CLIFTON D	07/25/1975	15	35	04/17/1992	11/12/1990	04/13/1992	750316C	P	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	63	ACTIVE
164	316488 KENDRICK RYAN ALAN	02/02/1983	16	28	07/21/2000	07/20/1999	07/19/2000	750316C	P	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	25	ACTIVE
165	266511 REYES TYRONE LEE	08/24/1980	16	30	05/15/1998	06/19/1997	05/14/1998	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	25	ACTIVE
166	253728 MELFI DAVID MICHAEL	03/26/1978	16	32	01/09/1997	03/08/1995	01/07/1997	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	25	ACTIVE
167	264578 SEAY JEFFERY LABELL	10/15/1978	16	32	04/06/1998	06/23/1995	04/03/1998	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	23	ACTIVE
168	211512 GRAY PATRICK JAY	03/04/1972	16	39	08/17/2000	12/10/1998	08/14/2000	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	39	ACTIVE
169	791483 RAMSEY ANTONIO DEQUARY	07/29/1992	17	18	02/11/2011	11/07/2009	01/28/2011	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	61	ACTIVE
170	741957 ZUNIGA MIKE TORRES	08/03/1991	17	19	10/14/2010	11/21/2008	10/07/2010	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	41	ACTIVE
171	650857 CASPER GIOVANNI KOESE-ERI	08/06/1989	17	21	07/03/2007	11/12/2006	06/28/2007	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	41	ACTIVE
172	692728 MURRAY ODIES ARDAY	11/08/1989	17	21	07/03/2008	08/27/2007	06/30/2008	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	39	ACTIVE
173	699501 HINTON COUAN MICHAEL	02/16/1990	17	21	03/19/2009	10/09/2007	03/17/2009	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	25	ACTIVE
174	474035 BOYKIN DEMARIOL DONTAYE	04/19/1985	17	25	12/09/2003	01/29/2003	12/04/2003	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	41	ACTIVE
175	485040 SIESLING JON DONALD	06/25/1985	17	25	02/25/2004	01/22/2003	02/23/2004	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	41	ACTIVE
176	365306 MITCHELL ROBERT AZABEURE	07/08/1982	17	28	04/11/2001	05/24/2000	03/26/2001	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	41	ACTIVE
177	266834 WILSON CALVIN GREG	09/24/1980	17	30	05/22/1998	10/13/1997	05/20/1998	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	33	ACTIVE
178	270921 SHUMAN DOUGLAS S	07/05/1979	17	31	08/11/1998	02/12/1997	08/07/1998	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	75	ACTIVE
179	248773 WATTS DEVON RENISE	05/13/1978	17	32	03/29/1996	07/28/1995	03/18/1996	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	62	ACTIVE
180	252806 WYRICK DEVON LEE	05/16/1978	17	32	11/14/1996	01/08/1996	11/12/1996	750316C	J	HOMICIDE, OPEN MURDER-STAT SHORT FM	39	ACTIVE
181	788526 BELTON JONATHAN	06/30/1992	16	18	12/14/2010	12/28/2008	12/14/2010	750316D	J	INVALID KEY	63	ACTIVE
182	165773 ANDERSON MICHAEL	09/21/1978	15	32	09/02/1994	02/03/1994	09/01/1994	750316	P	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	61	ACTIVE
183	240889 DEBARDELABEN WILLIE	06/07/1978	15	32	12/14/1994	02/12/1994	12/14/1994	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	73	ACTIVE
184	236305 CHEEKS CLINTON	01/12/1978	15	33	03/24/1994	09/26/1993	03/22/1994	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
185	237761 PAYNE ANTONIO DUANE	08/27/1977	15	33	06/17/1994	06/13/1993	04/28/1994	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	50	ACTIVE
186	228163 WALKER MARCUS	07/16/1976	15	34	12/02/1992	10/09/1991	12/01/1992	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
187	206166 ARMSTRONG THOMAS JARNAVIS	04/24/1974	15	36	01/05/1990	07/18/1989	01/03/1990	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	25	ACTIVE
188	211016 BROWNLEE TREVOR TREMAINE	04/29/1974	15	36	08/15/1990	10/22/1989	08/10/1990	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	81	ACTIVE
189	224587 PENA AGUSTIN T	02/07/1975	15	36	05/28/1992	07/11/1990	05/19/1992	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	50	ACTIVE

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190	203116 PAREDES EFRAN JR	04/04/1973	15	37	08/18/1989	03/08/1989	08/14/1989	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	11	ACTIVE
191	203339 HINES BOBBY	01/03/1974	15	37	08/30/1989	05/01/1989	08/25/1989	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
192	201721 MARTIN JONATHAN DAVID	12/02/1972	15	38	06/14/1989	09/29/1988	06/06/1989	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
193	192593 THOMAS JAMES DIONE	09/16/1971	15	39	03/08/1988	01/26/1987	03/04/1988	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
194	192749 IVORY BRIAN FRED	01/02/1972	15	39	03/16/1988	06/09/1987	03/14/1988	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
195	194057 BLACK DONYELLE MICHAEL	10/19/1971	15	39	10/05/1988	07/14/1987	10/04/1988	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
196	196334 HARRIS LARONE	03/05/1972	15	39	10/04/1988	08/10/1987	09/22/1988	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
197	198334 TAYLOR JAMES BOISE	09/24/1971	15	39	01/20/1989	07/14/1987	01/17/1989	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
198	191796 WILLIAMS BENNIE RAY	07/17/1969	15	41	01/22/1988	06/21/1985	01/21/1988	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	25	ACTIVE
199	165823 TAYLOR TONY LADON	03/05/1969	15	42	08/15/1986	09/26/1984	08/13/1986	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
200	176424 LASHUAY JERRY WARREN JR	07/17/1968	15	42	06/25/1984	10/26/1983	06/25/1984	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	56	ACTIVE
201	179552 PORTER CHARLES DENNIS JR	03/02/1969	15	42	05/09/1985	06/19/1984	05/09/1985	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	88	ACTIVE
202	182264 TOLLIVER DEXTER	02/27/1969	15	42	01/21/1986	07/31/1984	01/15/1986	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	73	ACTIVE
203	184895 STOREY MARK EVERETT	12/04/1968	15	42	09/05/1986	11/07/1984	09/02/1986	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
204	170722 MOORE RONALD LEE JR	01/26/1966	15	45	11/17/1982	10/31/1981	11/09/1982	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
205	162008 MUSSELMAN RICHARD GERALD	09/09/1964	15	46	09/04/1980	01/03/1980	08/26/1980	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	73	ACTIVE
206	164006 DAVIS SCOTT BRUCE	07/16/1964	15	46	04/08/1981	05/22/1980	04/03/1981	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
207	274787 WHITTINGTON ELLIOT LASHON	06/10/1981	16	29	11/18/1998	12/16/1987	11/10/1998	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	73	ACTIVE
208	248666 TURNER TYKEITH LEROY	07/28/1979	16	31	03/25/1996	08/19/1995	03/22/1996	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
209	261275 CRUZ FEDERICO LUIS	05/24/1978	16	31	01/06/1998	04/25/1996	12/30/1997	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	41	ACTIVE
210	246127 JORDAN DAVID ALLEN	09/15/1978	16	32	10/31/1995	01/28/1995	10/27/1995	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
211	240464 SCOTT MICHAEL	03/31/1977	16	33	12/01/1994	12/14/1993	11/30/1994	750316	P	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
212	241559 FOSTER LEANDER K	05/18/1977	16	33	02/06/1995	05/03/1994	02/02/1995	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
213	243169 SYMONDS JASON BENJAMIN	01/21/1978	16	33	05/05/1995	04/26/1994	05/04/1995	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	13	ACTIVE
214	230698 AVERHEART ULYSSES	04/26/1976	16	34	04/27/1993	07/14/1992	04/23/1993	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
215	233924 WALKER WILLIAM RAY	03/31/1976	16	34	11/01/1993	11/08/1992	10/29/1993	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
216	235827 BLACK RODNEY	09/17/1976	16	34	02/25/1994	09/11/1993	02/24/1994	750316	P	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
217	237168 WILLIAMS DONALD WILLIE	08/24/1976	16	34	05/13/1994	06/13/1993	04/20/1994	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	50	ACTIVE
218	237818 DAVIS CORTEZ	03/07/1977	16	34	06/21/1994	12/14/1993	12/22/1994	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
219	238588 LAUNSBURY STEPHEN N	02/12/1977	16	34	08/05/1994	11/26/1993	07/25/1994	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	41	ACTIVE
220	239128 SANDERS MAURICE MONTRELL	02/17/1977	16	34	09/15/1994	12/07/1993	09/01/1994	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	41	ACTIVE
221	241473 KELLY TERRENCE DEAN	11/05/1976	16	34	02/01/1995	05/04/1993	01/30/1995	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	13	ACTIVE
222	248894 IRVIN LARRY	12/14/1976	16	34	04/05/1996	11/02/1993	04/04/1996	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
223	226959 LEWIS TIMOTHY	06/04/1975	16	35	09/28/1992	03/23/1992	09/24/1992	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
224	228758 SMITH BOSIE LEE	06/28/1975	16	35	01/07/1993	04/13/1992	12/31/1992	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	81	ACTIVE
225	232703 GERMAN ROBERT L	09/17/1975	16	35	08/20/1993	07/14/1992	08/05/1993	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
226	233439 HAYNES DEON LATROY	08/01/1975	16	35	10/05/1993	07/28/1992	09/29/1993	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	73	ACTIVE
227	234255 PRUITT JENNIFER M	11/27/1975	16	35	11/19/1993	08/30/1992	11/15/1993	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE

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228	JARRETT MICHAEL	10/17/1975	16	35	02/11/1994	01/23/1992	02/04/1994	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
229	WILLIAMS LEONARD DEE	12/06/1974	16	36	04/26/1991	12/10/1990	04/24/1991	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	11	ACTIVE
230	WATERFORD VICTOR LAMAR	09/04/1974	16	36	09/09/1991	12/06/1990	09/05/1991	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
231	BASSETT THOMAS	06/09/1974	16	36	12/16/1991	02/05/1991	12/19/1991	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
232	CAMPER OMAIR DAVID	09/30/1974	16	36	03/02/1991	09/03/1991	02/25/1992	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
233	WARNER BRAD TREVOR	12/10/1974	16	36	04/02/1992	04/01/1991	03/31/1992	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	13	ACTIVE
234	BURGOS JOSE	03/21/1975	16	36	06/17/1992	06/10/1991	06/15/1992	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
235	LAYALA ALEXIS	08/11/1974	16	36	07/15/1992	11/29/1990	07/06/1992	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	50	ACTIVE
236	JOHNSON JAMAR DAMON	09/09/1973	16	37	04/11/1990	09/27/1989	04/04/1990	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
237	JOHNSON JAMAR DAMON	09/09/1973	16	37	04/11/1990	09/27/1989	04/04/1990	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
238	MICHAELS BRUCE CHRISTOPH	06/26/1973	16	37	04/25/1990	11/10/1989	04/20/1990	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
239	EVANS RAMON	09/07/1973	16	37	09/30/1991	08/30/1990	09/25/1991	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
240	GILL CLIFTON	07/31/1972	16	38	06/07/1989	12/27/1988	06/02/1989	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
241	CALLOWAY ANDRE M	10/17/1972	16	38	03/28/1990	08/10/1989	03/23/1990	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
242	HAYES JESSIE	09/12/1972	16	38	09/14/1990	03/13/1989	09/05/1990	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
243	OSTERHOUT STEVEN ALAN	09/15/1971	16	39	04/27/1989	04/12/1988	05/01/1992	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	69	ACTIVE
244	ALLEN HERBERT	04/27/1970	16	40	06/10/1987	10/09/1986	06/05/1987	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
245	STRUNK KARL BRYAN	08/24/1970	16	40	01/27/1988	02/08/1987	01/25/1988	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	67	ACTIVE
246	ESPREE ANTONIO	02/21/1971	16	40	08/08/1988	12/29/1987	08/05/1988	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	81	ACTIVE
247	THOMAS TERRANCE	09/29/1970	16	40	10/27/1988	04/15/1987	10/24/1988	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
248	MACHACEK CHRISTOPHER	05/31/1970	16	40	10/28/1988	12/30/1986	10/28/1988	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	81	ACTIVE
249	SIMMONS RICHARD ALLEN	08/04/1969	16	41	08/20/1987	04/13/1986	08/17/1987	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	43	ACTIVE
250	BROWN ERIC	10/25/1969	16	41	09/18/1987	07/26/1986	08/11/1987	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
251	BRYANT WILLIAM	08/25/1968	16	42	02/25/1986	10/14/1984	02/11/1986	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
252	JORDAN TIMOTHY	11/30/1967	16	43	08/15/1986	05/02/1984	08/12/1986	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
253	JACKSON MICHAEL TIMOTHY	03/23/1967	16	43	06/06/1985	12/13/1983	05/31/1985	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	73	ACTIVE
254	RICHEY SHANE PATRICK	07/13/1966	16	44	04/05/1984	07/05/1983	04/05/1984	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	25	ACTIVE
255	RATA SCOTT ANDREW	08/23/1966	16	44	01/07/1986	09/10/1982	01/03/1986	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	50	ACTIVE
256	PORTER JAMES DEWEY IV	09/30/1965	16	45	03/15/1983	04/07/1982	03/14/1983	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	74	ACTIVE
257	JACKSON FONZA DAVID	10/26/1964	16	46	03/18/1982	04/22/1981	03/16/1982	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
258	WILLIAMS RONNIE LYNN	09/18/1964	16	46	03/18/1982	04/22/1981	03/16/1982	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
259	JOHNSON DENNIS LEE	05/24/1964	16	46	06/11/1982	07/16/1980	06/03/1982	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	73	ACTIVE
260	DAVIS DONNIE JAY	10/25/1963	16	47	06/15/1981	10/24/1980	06/08/1981	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	75	ACTIVE
261	DANIEL CHARLES EDWARD	01/25/1964	16	47	09/15/1981	09/05/1980	08/18/1981	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
262	HILL HENRY JR	11/16/1963	16	47	06/11/1982	07/16/1980	06/03/1982	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	73	ACTIVE
263	KINCAID TIMOTHY	12/07/1961	16	49	05/07/1982	06/04/1978	05/05/1982	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
264	JOHNSON DARNELL	05/07/1960	16	50	06/20/1977	08/02/1976	06/16/1977	750316	P	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
265	FINCH CHARLES D	01/15/1960	16	51	05/11/1977	08/15/1976	05/11/1977	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	38	ACTIVE

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266	WILLIAMS KENNETH	09/20/1957	16	53	04/25/1975	09/07/1974	04/22/1975	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
267	MOORE LEECLIFTON JEROME	09/01/1987	17	23	02/22/2006	08/24/2005	02/20/2006	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	41	ACTIVE
268	WILSON ROBERT	06/26/1980	17	30	04/24/1998	08/23/1997	04/20/1998	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	61	ACTIVE
269	DEPALMA ANTHONY ROBERT	05/11/1979	17	31	12/12/1997	05/07/1997	12/09/1997	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	11	ACTIVE
270	LAYTON BENNIE L	11/21/1978	17	32	10/11/1996	01/07/1996	10/04/1996	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
271	HO MING C	09/21/1977	17	33	08/02/1995	10/18/1994	07/31/1995	750316	P	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
272	NEILLY WILLIAM EDWARD	05/31/1976	17	34	12/02/1993	06/10/1993	11/29/1993	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	39	ACTIVE
273	HUGGINS JAMIE LUJIS	06/08/1976	17	34	04/29/1994	12/18/1993	04/28/1994	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
274	WINES GREGORY	04/22/1976	17	34	08/16/1994	11/26/1993	08/02/1994	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	41	ACTIVE
275	WESLEY TAVARES	05/12/1976	17	34	09/27/1994	01/13/1994	09/23/1994	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
276	SCOTT CORTEZ TRAWETS	01/19/1977	17	34	12/22/1994	02/16/1994	12/20/1994	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	25	ACTIVE
277	CLAYTON DAVID LAMAR	01/29/1977	17	34	03/16/1995	08/31/1994	03/13/1995	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	11	ACTIVE
278	CARMICHAEL KARLOS ANTONUO	12/08/1976	17	34	05/08/1995	10/12/1994	05/03/1995	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	73	ACTIVE
279	CARD LAMONT A	09/07/1976	17	34	07/24/1995	02/17/1994	07/20/1995	750316	P	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
280	ISWORD SEAN	08/31/1976	17	34	02/15/1996	03/16/1994	11/06/1995	750316	P	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
281	PEREZ JUAN J	09/17/1976	17	34	04/25/1996	05/23/1994	04/15/1996	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
282	TOBAR CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL	08/21/1975	17	35	06/03/1993	01/30/1993	06/01/1993	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	11	ACTIVE
283	RUCKER WILLIAM LAWRENCE	08/16/1975	17	35	06/09/1993	1/27/1992	06/09/1993	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
284	POTTS CLYDE EUGENE	07/29/1975	17	35	11/03/1993	03/02/1993	11/03/1993	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
285	SHARP JENARD	07/02/1975	17	35	11/23/1993	04/18/1993	11/18/1993	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
286	HARRELL LORENZO J	11/13/1975	17	35	11/23/1993	04/18/1993	11/18/1993	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
287	POLK VICTOR LEE	02/27/1976	17	35	01/10/1994	05/10/1993	01/07/1994	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	25	ACTIVE
288	ADAMS STANLEY JAMES	08/15/1975	17	35	01/10/1994	04/24/1993	12/03/1993	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	25	ACTIVE
289	ELLIOT RODERICK	12/31/1975	17	35	04/26/1994	08/01/1993	04/25/1994	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
290	FOWLE STANLEY RICHARD JR.	09/08/1975	17	35	11/02/1994	08/09/1993	11/02/1994	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	38	ACTIVE
291	KELLY KENNETH	11/19/1974	17	36	06/17/1992	11/25/1991	06/12/1992	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
292	JENNINGS ERVIN LEE	10/04/1974	17	36	06/19/1992	01/08/1992	06/17/1992	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	82	ACTIVE
293	PRINCE SERGIO SHAWTNEZ	07/01/1974	17	36	07/17/1992	10/23/1991	07/15/1992	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	82	ACTIVE
294	SPILLER EDDIE DEMOND	07/25/1974	17	36	10/30/1992	02/01/1992	10/29/1992	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	25	ACTIVE
295	BROWN JAMAL	08/01/1973	17	37	07/31/1992	05/17/1991	07/29/1992	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
296	MERRELL GERALD	05/12/1973	17	37	11/16/1990	07/08/1990	11/14/1990	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
297	SERVANT WILLIE	07/30/1973	17	37	07/08/1991	02/17/1991	07/03/1991	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
298	HOLLAND BEKEIBA	04/26/1973	17	37	09/25/1991	04/12/1991	09/18/1991	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
299	LOEPKE JOHN SEELEY	05/01/1973	17	37	11/15/1991	04/01/1991	11/13/1991	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	13	ACTIVE
300	KRAUSE THOMAS EUGENE II	02/26/1974	17	37	03/27/1992	04/01/1991	03/25/1992	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	13	ACTIVE
301	WILLIAMS ANTONIO	12/21/1973	17	37	05/11/1992	05/19/1991	05/07/1992	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
302	PASSENSO JOSEPH ANDREW	07/13/1972	17	38	04/25/1990	11/10/1989	04/20/1990	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
303	ATKINS JOHN MARSHALL JR	09/23/1972	17	38	05/30/1990	09/27/1989	05/23/1990	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE

offender_no	NAME	DOB	Age at Offense	Current Age	Commitment Date	Offense Date	Sentence Date	Offense	Convicted By	Offense Description	County	Current Status
304	BIBBS COREY	06/07/1972	17	38	09/21/1990	03/11/1990	09/19/1990	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
305	HENDERSON MARIO	11/23/1972	17	38	10/31/1990	01/25/1990	10/29/1990	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
306	LEWIS MARVIN K	09/23/1972	17	38	02/25/1991	07/30/1990	02/21/1991	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
307	BAKER DARYLE	10/03/1972	17	38	05/03/1994	07/22/1990	05/02/1994	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	39	ACTIVE
308	ANDERSON ROBERT D	10/19/1972	17	38	07/17/1992	08/12/1990	07/10/1992	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
309	JEWELL HENRY DUANE	06/07/1971	17	39	06/21/1989	01/16/1989	06/21/1989	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	61	ACTIVE
310	BUCK NORMAN JR	05/24/1971	17	39	06/23/1989	11/07/1988	06/21/1989	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	25	ACTIVE
311	BUCK NORMAN JR	05/24/1971	17	39	06/23/1989	11/07/1988	06/21/1989	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	25	ACTIVE
312	CAMMON ERIC	11/29/1971	17	39	06/23/1989	12/10/1988	06/21/1989	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
313	SEGO NORMAN WAYNE	09/27/1971	17	39	06/29/1989	11/07/1988	06/28/1989	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	25	ACTIVE
314	YOUNGBLOOD KENDRICK	10/30/1971	17	39	10/09/1989	11/21/1988	10/02/1989	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
315	JACKSON JOHN HENRY	11/18/1971	17	39	02/22/1990	04/27/1989	02/21/1990	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	25	ACTIVE
316	BONELLI ANTHONY J	11/19/1971	17	39	06/13/1990	03/16/1989	06/07/1990	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
317	HARRIS SHAWN	01/02/1972	17	39	06/20/1990	11/19/1989	06/18/1990	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
318	RICHARDS TOMMY EDWARD	03/25/1970	17	40	11/10/1987	04/20/1987	11/09/1987	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	11	ACTIVE
319	SIMMONS KIMBERLY ANN	06/21/1970	17	40	08/11/1988	02/10/1988	07/14/1988	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
320	YOUNG PAUL	02/15/1970	17	41	10/16/1987	05/02/1987	09/14/1987	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
321	COLSON GERALD RAY	06/25/1969	17	41	11/18/1987	03/18/1987	11/13/1987	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
322	BENJAMIN WILLIE	11/11/1969	17	41	11/18/1987	06/20/1987	11/16/1987	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
323	WILLIAMS RONALD	08/25/1969	17	41	12/16/1987	01/20/1987	12/11/1987	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	82	ACTIVE
324	BANKS MELVIN	05/28/1969	17	41	02/04/1988	05/08/1987	08/03/1992	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
325	WHILBY CRAIG	12/26/1969	17	41	08/11/1988	12/12/1987	08/05/1988	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
326	STEWART DIANGELO	07/02/1968	17	42	12/10/1986	06/28/1986	12/05/1986	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
327	HAMMOND RONALD CLAYTON	06/26/1968	17	42	07/01/1986	12/03/1985	06/30/1986	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	78	ACTIVE
328	ROSS THOMAS EDWARD	07/26/1968	17	42	08/12/1986	01/25/1986	08/08/1986	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	81	ACTIVE
329	MILLER WALTER	03/18/1969	17	42	08/17/1987	08/26/1986	08/14/1987	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	82	ACTIVE
330	TODD DAMION LAVOIAL	02/07/1969	17	42	01/06/1987	08/17/1986	12/30/1986	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
331	ANDERSON KENNETH	07/13/1968	17	42	10/09/1990	05/18/1986	11/02/1990	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
332	MORRIS TERRY	02/12/1969	17	42	07/30/1987	02/08/1987	07/29/1987	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	25	ACTIVE
333	TIPTON JEMAL EDWARD	03/11/1969	17	42	11/13/1987	02/28/1987	11/10/1987	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
334	DAVIS ERNEST	07/29/1967	17	43	06/10/1985	10/12/1984	06/10/1985	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	80	ACTIVE
335	PEARSON MACHELLE Y	08/31/1966	17	44	07/13/1984		07/13/1984	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	81	ACTIVE
336	SIMPSON YOLANDA	05/15/1966	17	44	11/15/1984	03/19/1984	11/14/1984	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
337	KVAM MICHAEL ALBERT	09/11/1966	17	44	11/28/1984	07/07/1984	11/26/1984	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
338	DONALD RAY	02/21/1967	17	44	05/06/1985	10/12/1984	05/06/1985	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	80	ACTIVE
339	DENMAN KEVIN MARK	07/08/1965	17	45	06/15/1983	11/07/1982	06/15/1983	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	29	ACTIVE
340	GRANGER BRIAN KELLY	10/17/1965	17	45	01/20/1984	06/21/1983	01/20/1984	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	56	ACTIVE
341	MCCRACKEN MICHAEL JOSEPH	01/28/1966	17	45	04/04/1984	07/26/1983	03/28/1984	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	82	ACTIVE

offender_no	NAME	DOB	Age at Offense	Current Age	Commitment Date	Offense Date	Sentence Date	Offense	Convicted By	Offense Description	County	Current Status
342	168355 HOWARD JAMES	09/07/1964	17	46	02/25/1982	10/17/1981	02/23/1982	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	82	ACTIVE
343	170197 SAMEL DAVID A	06/04/1964	17	46	09/20/1982	10/26/1981	09/07/1982	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	41	ACTIVE
344	170935 PORTER DAREN	11/02/1964	17	46	12/08/1982	01/06/1982	12/03/1982	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
345	174162 JOHNSON RENARD SAMUEL	03/12/1965	17	46	11/16/1983	11/15/1982	11/14/1983	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
346	168848 TOLBERT RONALD	09/19/1963	17	47	03/18/1982	04/22/1981	03/16/1982	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
347	169924 POWELL CHRISTOPHER	12/06/1963	17	47	08/11/1982	08/10/1981	08/05/1982	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
348	162243 GARRETT ALBERT LEE	11/30/1962	17	48	12/18/1980	08/20/1980	12/17/1980	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
349	163803 WATERS RONNIE C	11/19/1962	17	48	03/13/1981	05/03/1980	03/05/1981	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
350	166007 DUKES ROBERT LOUIS	01/13/1963	17	48	04/21/1981	09/18/1980	04/14/1981	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	61	ACTIVE
351	166300 HOGUE WILLIAM DAVID	10/11/1962	17	48	06/02/1981	07/07/1980	06/15/1981	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
352	254039 CARIGON TIMOTHY RAY	02/17/1963	17	48	01/29/1997	06/22/1980	01/27/1997	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	34	ACTIVE
353	158292 JONES ANTHONY SHAMONT	12/10/1961	17	49	08/16/1979	01/04/1979	08/13/1979	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	39	ACTIVE
354	158315 ANZURES THOMAS	12/02/1961	17	49	08/24/1979		08/21/1979	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
355	155090 WESLEY JOE FRANK	10/15/1960	17	50	08/09/1979	07/01/1978	07/31/1979	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	25	ACTIVE
356	146778 GARRISON WILLIAM LEE	05/28/1959	17	51	10/04/1976		09/30/1976	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
357	148237 HINTON ROGER WILLIAM	07/07/1959	17	51	02/09/1977	08/15/1976	02/09/1977	750316	P	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	38	ACTIVE
358	149597 CARTER KENNETH RAY	05/07/1959	17	51	04/26/1977	07/29/1976	04/25/1977	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
359	150249 CALVIN MICHAEL	03/19/1960	17	51	02/06/1978		01/31/1978	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
360	150709 LEWIS CHARLES	05/13/1959	17	51	07/29/1977	07/31/1976	07/27/1977	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
361	155318 PETERS GARY	03/05/1960	17	51	09/29/1978	12/12/1977	09/26/1978	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	50	ACTIVE
362	150428 DAWSON MARK S	02/12/1959	17	52	06/30/1977	12/01/1976	06/29/1977	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	78	ACTIVE
363	141545 SANDERS EDWARD	01/08/1958	17	53	02/17/1976	02/21/1975	02/13/1976	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
364	142565 JONES WALTER DAVID	12/05/1957	17	53	09/02/1975	01/21/1975	08/29/1975	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE
365	143039 COOKE WILLIAM RAY	07/17/1957	17	53	10/21/1975	02/17/1975	10/20/1975	750316	C	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	25	ACTIVE
366	141099 ABDALLA DAVID EDWARD	11/19/1956	17	54	04/15/1975	10/07/1974	04/09/1975	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	50	ACTIVE
367	141233 CLARK TIMOTHY	09/15/1956	17	54	04/25/1975	09/07/1974	04/22/1975	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	63	ACTIVE
368	144373 WALTON DAVID LEE	03/15/1957	17	54	02/17/1976	02/21/1975	02/13/1976	750316	J	MURDER, FIRST DEGREE	RC	ACTIVE

TOTAL: 368