Executive Summary of Audits
Conducted in Detroit and Statewide in Relation to the
November 8, 2016 General Election

February 9, 2017

Elections in Michigan are local in nature, conducted by 1,520 city and township clerks. These local officials are responsible for administering elections in compliance with the requirements of Michigan Election Law and instructions from the Secretary of State and Bureau of Elections (BOE). Due to high turnout and intense voter interest, presidential year general elections place the heaviest stress on the election administration infrastructure; on November 8, 2016, over 30,000 precinct workers were deployed to serve in approximately 7,700 precincts and absent voter counting boards (AVCBs) statewide. Thorough preparation and training are essential to conducting any election successfully, but particularly so for the November 8, 2016 general election.

In Michigan, Republican Party nominee President Donald Trump defeated Democratic Party nominee Hillary Clinton by a margin of only 10,704 votes (47.5% to 47.3%) out of approximately 4.8 million votes cast statewide, our state’s closest presidential election in modern times. A statewide recount of votes cast for the office of President of the United States ensued and was partially completed before it was terminated by court order.

Two developments associated with the November 8, 2016 general election required BOE’s analysis: (1) anomalies discovered during the initial canvass and recount of votes cast in Detroit suggested widespread problems with the city’s Election Day operations, and (2) data obtained from Electronic Poll Book (EPB) software used in approximately 90% of cities and townships allowed BOE to determine whether premature preparation of precinct voter lists could have resulted in individuals voting both absentee and in person on Election Day (also referred to as “double voting”). The results of BOE’s analysis into these two separate developments are described in two audit reports released today: “Audit of the City of Detroit’s Administration of the November 8, 2016 General Election,” and “Statewide Audit of Electronic Poll Book Data and Incidence of Double Voting.”

**Detroit Audit Report:** After the county canvass and partial recount of ballots cast in Detroit at the November 8, 2016 general election revealed significant discrepancies in the numbers of voters versus ballots, BOE selected 136 of the city’s most irregular and questionable precincts and AVCBs for audit. BOE’s work focused on the “worst of the worst,” including those having a significant number of misplaced ballots and those with unexplained mismatches of 3 or more in the numbers of voters compared to ballots. BOE interviewed city employees and manually reviewed thousands of election records including voted ballots, ballot containers, ballot transfer
cases, voter applications, precinct poll books and the city’s training materials. As a result of this audit:

- BOE found no evidence of pervasive voter fraud or that widespread voting equipment failure led to the imbalances, yet the audit uncovered a multitude of human errors that prevented (or would have prevented) the presidential recount from proceeding in a significant number of precincts and AVCBs.

- BOE found that nearly half of audited precincts and AVCBs (48%) could have been brought into balance on Election Night had the precinct workers or receiving board taken prompt remedial action to address discrepancies in the number of voters compared to the number of ballots tabulated, or as a last resort, had time permitted the County Board of Canvassers to examine records in greater detail to find and reconcile these differences during the 14-day county canvass period.

- While the majority of audited precincts and AVCBs audited could not be balanced (52%), BOE’s audit significantly reduced the magnitude of the discrepancies between the numbers of voters and ballots by as much as 70%.

- Many of problems encountered in Detroit are attributable to a lack of proficiency in using EPB software or the mishandling of provisional envelope ballots. These mistakes caused a number of errors, most notably in the number of ballots compared to the number of voters.

- In other instances, BOE determined that election workers left counted ballots in the tabulator bin at the end of the night instead of placing all ballots in a sealed container. The example of Precinct 152, widely cited in news media reports, is illustrative. When the sealed ballot container for this precinct was opened at the recount, it was found to contain only 50 ballots despite the fact that the poll book included the names of 306 voters. During the audit, BOE was able to confirm that all but one of the voted ballots had been left behind in the tabulator on Election Night. The audit refutes suspicions that the relatively small number of ballots placed in the ballot container could have been illegally tabulated again and again.

It is important to remember that despite these issues, voters in Detroit can be assured that the ballots cast at the 2016 presidential election were, indeed, counted on Election Night, even if their particular precinct or AVCB was later determined to be unrecountable.

**Statewide Audit Report:** In mid-November, BOE staff initiated a statewide audit and found many jurisdictions that downloaded EPB data weeks early in disregard of BOE’s established procedures. This is problematic primarily because premature downloading does not provide precinct workers with all of the data needed to ascertain whether a voter appearing in the precinct on Election Day previously returned an AV ballot. Consequently, the statewide audit aimed to address two issues: (1) how many jurisdictions downloaded EPB prematurely, and (2) whether this led to incidents of double voting. As a result of this audit:

- BOE examined data retained in the Qualified Voter File (QVF) and EPB software and found that 45 jurisdictions downloaded EPB data more than two weeks before the November 8, 2016 general election, including the City of Detroit.
- BOE also analyzed voter history records statewide and in appropriate cases, obtained individual voters’ absent voter ballot applications and envelopes, and in-person applications to vote. By comparing voters’ identifying information and signatures on the voter applications and envelope and excluding data entry errors by election officials in recording voter history after the election, BOE was able to determine that statewide, at least 31 individuals appear to have voted by both absentee ballot and in the precinct on Election Day at the same election.

It is a felony to vote or attempt to vote more than once at the same election, and BOE has referred each of these individuals to the Attorney General for criminal prosecution.

**Recommendations:** Combined, these two separate audit reports include 8 concrete recommendations for improving election administration statewide and particularly in Detroit, such as:

- Improving the effectiveness of Detroit’s election worker training program.
- Broadening election worker recruitment efforts and building partnerships with area employers, especially the City of Detroit.
- Elevating the performance of Detroit’s receiving boards, which are required to rectify any imbalance issues and ensure that ballot containers are properly sealed on Election Night.
- Improving Detroit election workers’ understanding of the proper use of EPBs.
- Enacting legislation to require counties to disclose the number of out-of-balance precincts in the certified canvass reports.
- Requiring precinct chairpersons to pass a written examination that tests their knowledge of provisional ballot procedures.
- Through legislation, mandating the use of EPB software.
- Regulating the timing of EPB downloads.

In response to the findings from both audit reports, Secretary of State Ruth Johnson has directed BOE staff to work collaboratively with election administrators in Detroit and statewide to address the performance issues described in the reports, and looks forward to working with the legislature to enact needed reforms.
Introduction: The Michigan Department of State, Bureau of Elections (BOE), commenced an audit of the compliance of Detroit precincts with the statutory standards that must be met for a successful recount. The reasons for the audit are:

- The Wayne County Board of Canvassers reported that during the post-election canvass period that concluded on November 22, 2016, approximately 392 precincts appeared to be out of balance;

- The Wayne County Board of Canvassers attempted to recount 263 Detroit precincts and absent voter counting boards (AVCBs) in the abbreviated presidential election recount and determined that 68 precincts and AVCBs (26%) could not be recounted due primarily to the failure to balance the number of voters with the number of ballots;

- At the presidential recount, one Detroit precinct was found to be missing over 250 ballots; and,

- The Department of State was copied on a letter sent by 23 State Senators to the Attorney General voicing concern about the efficacy of Detroit’s administration of the November 8, 2016 general election.

Elections in Michigan are local in nature, conducted by 1,520 city and township clerks. These local officials are responsible for administering elections in compliance with the requirements of Michigan Election Law and instructions from the Secretary of State and Bureau of Elections. Michigan’s 83 county clerks assist local clerks by printing ballots, programming tabulators and training precinct election inspectors in smaller cities and townships.

Due to high turnout and intense voter interest, presidential year general elections place the heaviest stress on the election administration infrastructure, meaning that thorough preparation and training are essential to conducting a successful election. On Election Day, over 30,000 precinct workers are deployed to serve in approximately 7,700 precincts and AVCBs statewide during an exceptionally long and busy day, typically beginning around 6:00 a.m. and ending
between 10:00 p.m. and midnight. The performance of these election workers determines the quality of the election administration in any given election.

This audit looks primarily at the issue of balancing precincts as prescribed by the Michigan Election Law.

**Overview:** The City of Detroit is divided into 490 Election Day precincts and 172 absent voter counting boards (AVCBs) for a total of 662 election units within the city. After the county canvass and partial recount of ballots cast in Detroit at the November 8, 2016 general election revealed significant discrepancies, the Secretary of State’s Bureau of Elections (BOE) identified 136 of the city’s most irregular and questionable precincts and AVCBs for audit. As it was not feasible to audit all 392 precincts that were out-of-balance after the county canvass, BOE focused on the “worst of the worst,” by auditing those precincts and AVCBs with the most obvious deficiencies, including those having a significant number of misplaced ballots and those with unexplained mismatches in the number of voters compared to the number of ballots (plus or minus 3 or more).

Of the 136 precincts and AVCBs selected for audit:

- BOE found no evidence of pervasive voter fraud, yet an abundance of human errors that prevented (or would have prevented) the presidential recount from proceeding in a significant number of precincts and AVCBs.

- Nearly half, or 65 of 136 (48%) precincts and AVCBs audited could have been brought into balance on Election Night had the precinct workers or receiving board recognized that a discrepancy existed in the number of voters compared to the number of ballots tabulated, or as a last resort, had time permitted the County Board of Canvassers to examine records in greater detail to find and reconcile these differences during the 2-week county canvass process. (It is important to note that for the November 8, 2016 general election, the Wayne County Board of Canvassers was responsible for reviewing, combining and certifying election results for 1,680 precincts and AVCBs countywide; when Detroit delivered 392 precincts that were out-of-balance without explanation, it was not possible for the County to reconcile these deficiencies in only 14 days.)

- While 71 of 136 (52%) precincts and AVCBs audited could not be balanced, the magnitude of the discrepancies between the total number of voters recorded in the poll book and number of ballots tabulated was reduced significantly as a result of BOE’s audit:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Review of 136 precincts/AVCBs:</th>
<th>More Ballots than Voters (A)</th>
<th>Fewer Ballots than Voters (B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Audit</td>
<td>+ 432</td>
<td>- 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Audit</td>
<td>+ 128 (70% reduction)</td>
<td>- 88 (43% reduction)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Had BOE’s audit included all 392 of Detroit’s out-of-balance precincts and AVCBs, the remaining discrepancy likely would have been truly minimal.
Many of the discrepancies are attributed to the mishandling of provisional envelope ballots, which are issued to individuals whose names do not appear on the precinct list but who claim to have registered to vote 30 days prior to Election Day. In many precincts, it appears that precinct workers failed to record them correctly in the Electronic Poll Book (EPB).

Other errors were caused by the lack of proficiency in using Electronic Poll Books (EPBs). For example, precinct inspectors failed to properly enter vital data into the EPB such as the names of all voters who received a ballot and did not correctly log all provisional and spoiled ballots. In addition, BOE observed an overall failure of election inspectors to provide adequate notations of exceptions and other irregular situations (i.e., tabulator jams) utilizing the “Remarks” feature of the EPB, and often omitted explanations of how these conditions were resolved. These mistakes caused a number of errors, most notably in the number of ballots compared to the number of voters.

BOE found no widespread failure of voting equipment that accounted for the breadth and depth of problems experienced in Detroit. Of the precincts and AVCBs selected for audit, only 23 (17%) reported tabulator issues on Election Day. However, the majority of these precincts (18 of 23 or 78%) could not be brought into balance during the audit due to multiple errors, another indication that the primary cause of the problems described in this audit report are attributed to human error, not malfunctioning voting machines.

BACKGROUND AND SCOPE

The November 8, 2016 general election featured a closely contested presidential election in which the Republican Party nominee President Donald Trump defeated Democratic Party nominee Hillary Clinton by a margin of only 10,704 votes (47.5% to 47.3%) out of more than 4.8 million votes cast in Michigan. A statewide recount of votes cast for the office of President of the United States was requested by Green Party nominee Jill Stein; under the authority of the Board of State Canvassers, BOE staff conducted a hand recount of approximately 2.1 million ballots before the recount was terminated by court order.

As the presidential recount commenced in Wayne County, it quickly became apparent that problems were causing a number of Detroit precincts and AVCBs to be determined unrecountable at the earliest stages. For example, recount workers observed Detroit precincts where the hand tally of the number of ballots inside the sealed ballot container was lower than the number indicated on the tabulator tape, or where numbers of voters and ballots did not agree and the discrepancies were not explained in writing. In one instance recount workers counted only 50 ballots inside the sealed ballot container but according to the poll book, 306 voters cast ballots on Election Day. (See “Precinct 152” on p. 7 for further information.) Some of these difficulties were initially discovered during the county canvass process, but the recount clearly magnified the scope of the problem.

After the election and during the recount, staff from the Detroit Department of Elections initially identified 22 precincts where the hand count of ballots stored within sealed containers did not
match the number of voters recorded in the poll book or number of ballots tabulated per the tabulator tape, similar to Precinct 152 (noted above and on p.7), suggesting that a substantial number of ballots might be unaccounted for. During the second phase of the audit, BOE staff encountered this problem in 17 additional precincts, bringing the total number of precincts where workers apparently left ballots in the tabulator to 39. BOE first set out to explain these inconsistencies.

The second phase of the audit included precincts and AVCBs identified by staff from the Wayne County Clerk’s Office where the county canvass revealed a discrepancy of 3 or more ballots cast as compared to the number of voters recorded in the poll book. BOE attempted to resolve these discrepancies and when possible, bring these precincts and AVCBs into balance.

In the third audit phase, BOE identified broader problems with the use of Electronic Poll Books in Detroit including downloading precinct lists weeks before Election Day, failing to provide a supplemental list of absent voters who returned voted ballots, and overlooking the need to provide a paper precinct list for use as a backup in the event that poll workers encountered problems operating the EPB. Different types of voter transactions including the issuance of a provisional ballot or the re-issuance of a replacement ballot if the original was spoiled by the voter were found to be incorrectly recorded. Related to the review of the operation of EPBs in Detroit, BOE also considered whether and to what extent tabulator performance issues caused or contributed to the problems uncovered during this audit.

While the first three phases of the audit examined most of the extremely imbalanced precincts and AVCBs and inadequate knowledge of the EPBs, BOE next focused on how Detroit trains its Election Day workers. In this final audit phase, BOE staff obtained training materials prepared by the Detroit Department of Elections and reviewed them for accuracy and completeness.

Pertinent records were obtained from the City of Detroit and Wayne County Clerk’s Office, including ballots and ballot containers, transfer cases, poll books, applications to vote, absent voter ballot applications and return envelopes, county canvass reports, and training materials developed by the Detroit Department of Elections. QVF records were also utilized. Audit activities were conducted in Lansing and Detroit.

This is the first post-election audit of this scale in Michigan, as it included a manual review of thousands of individual ballots, applications and associated records from 136 precincts. In completing this audit BOE sought and obtained the cooperation of local election officials, and BOE extends its appreciation to the Detroit Department of Elections, Chair of the Wayne County Board of Canvassers and Wayne County Clerk’s Office for their professionalism and assistance in this matter. BOE staff worked in collaboration with staff from the Detroit Department of Elections during the second phase of the audit to attempt to reconcile some of the out-of-balance precincts. The remainder of this report explains Michigan’s unique recountability standards, summarizes the results of this audit and includes BOE’s findings and recommendations for improving election administration in Detroit.

Note: Recognizing that readers may not be fully versed in the various election terms, procedures and forms cited in this report, a supplement is attached to provide visual examples. (See pp. 19-24.)
Recounts conducted in our state differ in significant respects from those in other states as Michigan is one of the only states that has enacted stringent recountability standards. Under section 871 of the Michigan Election Law, 1954 PA 116, MCL 168.871, a precinct or AVCB is recountable only if the ballot container seal is in order and the number of ballots is in balance.

1. Before a precinct or AVCB may be recounted, staff designated by the appropriate Board of Canvassers examines the seal on the ballot container to ensure that it is intact and that the serial number matches the number recorded in the poll book. If a discrepancy exists and it is explained in a satisfactory manner (i.e., the seal broke when recount workers attempted to view the attached ballot container certificate or the container was re-sealed on Election Night by the receiving board and the serial number of the new seal matches, etc.), the recount may proceed.

2. Next, staff acting under the direction of the appropriate Board of Canvassers counts the number of ballots in the ballot container and compares it to the number of voter names recorded in the poll book and/or the number of ballots cast according to the tabulator tape. Any discrepancies must be explained in detail in the “Remarks” section of the poll book or to the satisfaction of the Board of Canvassers. If inconsistencies are not found to exist or are sufficiently explained, the precinct or AVCB may be recounted.

In either instance, an unexplained discrepancy or discrepancy for which the explanation is inadequate renders the precinct or AVCB unrecountable and the original tabulation stands.

With respect to the second prong of the recountability standard, a variety of benign factors may explain why the number of ballots in the container does not equal the number of voters recorded in the poll book and/or the number of ballots cast as shown on the tabulator tape. For example, the number of ballots tabulated will be fewer than the number of voters if provisional envelope ballots were issued in the precinct on Election Day. (See example provisional ballot form and instructions on p. 19.) Another reason that may sufficiently explain an inconsistency is a jammed tabulator where precinct inspectors may not be able to discern whether a ballot was...
actually tabulated, an occurrence which must be recorded in the “Remarks” section of the poll book.

It is important to understand that this audit included an examination of some records that are not available for use at a recount; namely, applications to vote and absent voter ballot applications. (See example applications on p. 21-22.) During a recount, determinations regarding the ability to balance are based on a comparison of the physical count of ballots and either the number of voters’ names recorded in the poll book or the number of ballots cast according to the tabulator tape. (See example tabulator tape on p. 21.) BOE relied on these additional materials in order to more fully understand and explain the extent of the problems encountered in Detroit during the November 8, 2016 general election. However, a manual inspection of ballot applications or AV envelopes is too time consuming and labor intensive to be used during the recount process, which must be completed within statutory timeframes, and wouldn’t be necessary if the in-precinct or canvass was completed properly, or the county canvass had ample time to reconcile out-of-balance precincts and AVCBs.

**AUDIT PHASE 1: PRECINCTS WITH BALLOTS LEFT IN TABULATORS**

A total of 39 precincts were selected for audit because a comparison of the number of voted ballots recorded on the tabulator tape and the physical count of the tabulated ballots within sealed ballot containers varied by a substantial margin, perhaps suggesting that voted ballots had been misplaced. This number included the 22 precincts initially identified by the Detroit Department of Elections plus 17 additional precincts discovered by BOE during its audit. BOE staff attempted to ascertain whether the missing ballots could be located.

Staff from the Detroit Department of Elections prepared a partial list of precincts where precinct workers erroneously left ballots in the tabulator instead of placing them in the sealed ballot container on Election Night, compiled from routine post-election inspections of tabulators performed when the equipment is returned to city offices for storage. Staff from the Detroit Department of Elections retrieved these ballots from tabulators and secured them in transfer cases in the days after Election Day. BOE obtained and thoroughly examined the ballot containers, transfer cases, poll books, applications to vote and tabulator tapes for these 39 precincts and largely confirmed that the missing ballots were mistakenly left inside tabulators on Election Night. This audit finding refutes suspicions that the relatively small number of ballots placed in the ballot container could have been illegally cast multiple times.

Twenty-four of these 39 precincts (62%) were brought into balance during the audit, meaning that the number of voted ballots found in transfer cases exactly matched the number of ballots missing from sealed ballot containers. This is not to say that these precincts would have been recountable; the failure to properly store any voted ballots under seal on Election Night renders a precinct unrecountable and preserves the original returns. However, bringing these precincts into balance dispels concerns that a small number of voted ballots could have been illegally tabulated over and over again.
Precincts 83 and 366

These two precincts had the largest number of potentially misplaced ballots, 589 and 340 respectively. In both instances, BOE examined the transfer cases that corresponded to these two precincts and confirmed that an identical number of ballots were incorrectly left in the tabulator when precinct inspectors completed their work for the night. BOE also verified that its manual tally of all of the ballots cast in both precincts matched the total number of voters recorded in the poll book and ballots tabulated on Election Day.

In sum, had the ballots that were erroneously abandoned in the tabulator been placed inside sealed ballot containers on Election Night, these two precincts could have been recounted.

In the remaining 15 precincts (38%), the missing ballots were found left in tabulators on Election Night – in disregard of existing procedures that require precinct workers to empty the tabulator of ballots after polls close and place them in sealed containers – but BOE was unable to reconcile the relatively small, remaining ballot discrepancies for other reasons. In many of these cases, the mishandling of provisional envelope ballots precluded BOE staff from fully resolving these inconsistencies; in others, it appears that precinct workers neglected to obtain applications to vote or record voters’ names in the EPB for some individuals. (See example EPB list of voters on p. 20.)

Precinct 152

The most widely reported discrepancy was found in Precinct 152, the one referenced in the introduction, where the poll book contained the names of 306 voters. When the sealed ballot container was opened at the presidential recount, staff tallied only 50 ballots within the container.

The transfer case associated with Precinct 152 was inspected by BOE and found to contain 255 voted ballots, bringing the total physical count to 305. Although this one-ballot discrepancy could not be resolved definitively, the audit established that results reported for Precinct 152 on Election Night were not fabricated by inserting the 50 ballots stored in the sealed container into the tabulator again and again.

These and similar errors are described in greater detail below under the heading, “Audit Phase 2, Out-of-Balance Precincts and AVCBs.”

AUDIT PHASE 2:
OUT-OF-BALANCE PRECINCTS AND AVCBs

The audit’s second phase included a careful review of precincts and AVCBs where inconsistencies discovered during the county canvassing process indicated that (1) there were 3 or more additional ballots cast than the number of voters indicated, or (2) there were at least 3 fewer ballots tabulated than the number of voters recorded, where the differential was not adequately explained. Most of these precincts and AVCBs (110 out of 136, 81%) represented
the most acute examples of imbalance; the remainder began with smaller discrepancies (none, +/- 1 or +/-2) but experienced other operational errors.\(^1\) In total, BOE methodically examined a total of 136 precincts and AVCBs during this phase of the audit.\(^2\)

There are a host of reasons why a precinct or AVCB could be considered to be out-of-balance, some of which may constitute legitimate explanations that would preserve the ability to perform a recount. The table on page 11 identifies the most common reasons why the number of ballots may not match the number of voters, and whether such a mismatch represents a valid reason that enables a recount of the precinct or AVCB to proceed.

Additionally, it is worth noting that some of the most common errors committed by election workers may be remedied while preserving the recountability of a precinct or AVCB at three separate stages: in the precinct after the close of polls, at the receiving board on Election Night, or during the 14-day county canvass process.

After polls close, election workers are required to compare the number of ballots cast printed on the tabulator tape to the number of voters recorded in the poll book, and rectify any discrepancies by providing a written explanation in the “Remarks” section of the poll book or correcting mathematical errors. Addressing any unexplained discrepancies at this stage will permit a recount to proceed.

In 2012, the Michigan Election Law was amended to require all jurisdictions to establish one or more receiving boards for the purpose of scrutinizing the work done by precinct inspectors after polls close. 2012 PA 271; MCL 168.679a. The receiving board is required to examine the ballot container, poll book and tabulator tape to ascertain whether the container is properly sealed; whether the seal number recorded in the poll book agrees with the serial number printed on the seal; and whether the number of voters recorded in the poll book matches the number of ballots issued. (See example receiving board checklist on p. 24.) As part of this inspection, the receiving board will search the contents of the poll books for remarks or other notations that might explain the discrepancy. The work of the receiving board is performed in the presence of precinct workers, who deliver the materials on Election Night and are required to correct any deficiencies identified by the receiving board and provide a written description of the remedial actions taken in the “Remarks” section of the poll book. While the receiving board is prohibited from opening the ballot box, they must require precinct workers to put explanatory

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\(^1\) Examples of these operational errors include leaving ballots in the tabulator rather than placing them in a secure ballot container, mishandling provisional ballots and/or spoiled ballots, missing or incomplete applications to vote, lists of voters that were only partially complete, and so on.

\(^2\) The total number of precincts and AVCBs examined during phase 2 of the audit (136) encompasses the 39 precincts and AVCBs that were audited during phase 1; they are included here because some of them committed one or more errors in addition to leaving ballots in tabulators on Election Night.
How does a receiving board work?

Under oath, the receiving board members receive the sealed ballot container, poll book and statement of votes (tabulator tape plus write-in tally if applicable) from each precinct after the polls close. Two precinct workers deliver those items properly sealed to the receiving board members after their closing duties have been completed. Precinct workers must remain present until receiving board members verify the seal and that totals agree (or written explanations are provided for any discrepancies).

As a last resort, the Board of County Canvassers is authorized to summon precinct workers to count any uncounted ballots and correct erroneous or incomplete election returns, or under legislation enacted in 2013, the Board may authorize staff from the County Clerk’s Office to perform this work. MCL 168.823; 2013 PA 51. In essence, it is possible to bring precincts and AVCBs into balance during the 2-week period in which the county canvass must be completed. Again, rehabilitating errors at this point will preserve the recountability of the precinct or AVCB.

The receiving board process implemented by the Detroit Department of Elections was quite successful at ensuring that container sealing errors did not adversely affect recountability, as evidenced by the fact that 100% of the 136 precincts and AVCBs selected for audit had seal numbers that were correctly recorded. However, receiving boards operating in Detroit failed to detect and correct imbalance issues that would have thwarted the recount of a substantial number of their precincts and AVCBs, had the presidential recount been completed. Out-of-balance precincts may be readily identified by comparing the number of voters recorded in the poll book to the number of ballots tabulated and reviewing the poll books for remarks or other notations that might explain the discrepancy (i.e., issuance of provisional envelope ballots), yet these differences were not resolved (or comparisons were not made at all) in Detroit’s receiving boards on Election Night.

While the Wayne County Board of Canvassers attempted to rectify some of Detroit’s out-of-balance precincts and AVCBs during its canvass process, the Board did not have adequate time or staff resources to re-canvass all 392 precincts and AVCBs where the number of ballots indicated on the tabulator tape differed from the number of voters recorded in the poll book and the differential was not explained in the “Remarks” section of the poll book.

During this second phase of the audit, BOE examined a total of 136 precincts and AVCBs and successfully balanced 65 (48%) of them. In other words, these precincts and AVCBs could have been brought into balance on Election Night had the precinct workers rectified any unexplained discrepancies that existed between the number of voters compared to the number of ballots tabulated.
Precinct 294

There were 513 names recorded in the poll book, which matched the number of applications to vote. The tabulator tape indicated 517 ballots were tabulated in this precinct on Election Day and the “Remarks” section of the poll book documented numerous instances in which the tabulator jammed. Staff manually counted 513 ballots in the sealed container during the audit, which equaled the number of voters’ names in the poll book and applications to vote. As a result, this precinct would have been recountable and an accurate count of the 513 ballots could have been obtained. This is an example of a properly documented poll book with remarks that gave a clear indication of the problem.

In the 71 (52%) of 136 precincts and AVCBs that could not be brought into balance during the audit, the margin of the discrepancies between the total number of voters recorded in the poll book and number of ballots tabulated was reduced significantly as a result of BOE’s audit. In particular, there was a 70% reduction in the total number of ballots across all 136 precincts that exceeded the total number of voter names recorded in the poll book, from 432 to 128. The audit also reduced by 43% the total number of names recorded in the poll book that exceeded the physical count of all ballots, from 154 to 88. While the audit was unable to balance these precincts and AVCBs, had quick action been taken at the receiving board or during the county canvass, these relatively minor discrepancies might have been resolved in consultation with the specific election workers who managed these precincts and AVCBs on Election Day.

Precinct 327

This precinct included applications to vote for 385 individuals, but only 375 ballots were cast according to the tabulator tape. During the audit, the physical ballot count matched the tabulator tape (375). The 10 ballot discrepancy was reduced to a 1-ballot differential when 9 provisional envelope ballots were found (bringing the total number of ballots accounted for to 384); none of these ballots were recorded in the EPB. This precinct would not have been recountable due to the 1-ballot margin, but the variance decreased by 90% and was largely explained by the failure to properly document provisional envelope ballots in the poll book.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Discrepancy</th>
<th>Is this a valid reason for an imbalance?</th>
<th>Discussion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issuance of provisional envelope ballot</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>Provisional envelope ballots are issued when an individual’s name does not appear on the precinct list but he or she claims to have registered to vote by the deadline. Each provisional envelope ballot is recorded in the EPB and secured in a separate sealed envelope that is not opened and counted unless the individual presents an acceptable form of identification and/or proof of residency within 6 days of the election. The number of provisional envelope ballots issued will cause the number of ballots tabulated to be less than the number of voters, because these ballots are placed in separate envelopes and not inserted into the tabulator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mishandling of provisional envelope ballot</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>A discrepancy will occur if precinct workers mistakenly insert a provisional envelope ballot into the tabulator or fail to record it as such in the EPB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabulator jam</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>When a tabulator jams, it may not be apparent to precinct workers whether the ballot was scanned and tabulated. In some instances precinct workers will reinsert jammed ballots, causing a discrepancy in the number of tabulated ballots compared to the number of voters. Jams must be noted in the “Remarks” section of the poll book.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issuance of replacement ballot when a voter spoils his or her original ballot</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>A voter who spoils a ballot is issued a replacement ballot and the ballot number of the replacement ballot is recorded in the EPB; only the replacement ballot is tabulated. The spoiled ballot is marked “Spoiled,” placed in the “spoiled ballot envelope” and is not tabulated. Assuming each of these steps is followed, no discrepancy will occur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to properly record a spoiled ballot</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>A discrepancy in the number of ballots cast compared to the number of voters will result if precinct workers fail to correctly record the spoiled ballot in the EPB, mistakenly require the voter to complete a second application to vote or wrongly insert the spoiled ballot into the tabulator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of names recorded in poll book does not match number of voter applications</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Every voter whose name is recorded in the poll book must have completed an application to vote prior to receiving a ballot. This includes any individual who is issued a provisional envelope ballot (i.e., the name must be recorded in the poll book even though the ballot is not tabulated on Election Day). A discrepancy will occur if precinct workers fail to record in the EPB the name of every voter who completes an application or neglect to obtain a completed application from every voter.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In order to be considered a valid reason, it must be noted in the EPB and any applicable procedures must be followed.*
Audit results for these 136 precincts and AVCBs reveal:

- 106 precincts (78%) committed errors in operating the EPB and recording exceptions correctly, such as the issuance of provisional envelope ballots, spoiled ballots and jammed tabulators.
  - Most of these were not brought into balance during the audit (44 of 106, or only 42% of precincts experiencing EPB errors balanced).

- 98 precincts and AVCBs (72%) reported a mismatch in the number of names recorded in the EPB compared to the number of applications to vote that were completed during Election Day.
  - Most of these were not able to be balanced during the audit (40 of 98, or only 41% of precincts and AVCBs where the number of voters did not agree were able to be balanced).

- 65 precincts (48%) committed errors in accounting for provisional envelope ballots, either by failing to properly record them in EPB or otherwise processing them incorrectly.
  - Most of these could not be brought into balance during the audit (27 of 65, or only 42% of precincts having provisional ballot errors eventually balanced).

- 39 precincts (29%) left a substantial number of ballots in the tabulator and failed to secure them in a sealed ballot container on Election Night.
  - The majority of these did balance during the audit (24 of 39, or 62% of precincts where ballots were temporarily misplaced balanced).

- 23 precincts (17%) reported tabulator malfunctions on Election Day.
  - Most of these were not able to be balanced during the audit (5 of 23, or only 30% of precincts reporting tabulator issues were balanced). This reinforces the conclusion that other errors unrelated to tabulator performance were the primary reason for imbalance.

Note: The total number of errors does not equal the total number of precincts and AVCBs selected for audit (136) because multiple types of errors could have been found in a single precinct or AVCB.

The audit revealed that many of the discrepancies were caused by the failure to comply with established procedures for issuing and logging provisional envelope ballots. It appears that workers in as many as 11 precincts may have mistakenly inserted provisional envelope ballots into the tabulator, and workers in another 54 precincts failed to correctly record provisional envelope ballots in the EPB. Errors of this type led to precincts that were out-of-balance. In sum, poll workers in 65 of 136 (48%) precincts and AVCBs selected for audit committed errors in issuing and recording provisional envelope ballots.
Similarly, inconsistencies in the number of voters compared with the number of ballots issued related to the failure of some poll workers to record the issuance of a replacement ballot when a voter spoiled his or her original ballot. In some instances, precinct workers instructed voters to complete a second application to vote before issuing the replacement ballot. In others, it appears that workers did not preserve every spoiled ballot in the spoiled ballot envelope.

Another problem repeatedly encountered during BOE’s audit was the divergence between the total number of voter names listed in the EPB versus the number of applications to vote completed by voters. In all, poll workers in 98 precincts neglected to enter the names of all voters into the EPB or failed to ensure that every single voter completed an application prior to receiving a ballot. These errors caused needless discrepancies in the total number of voters and could have rendered a precinct unrecallable.

Finally, BOE reviewed a random sample of approximately 2,500 applications to vote and found that all but 78 (3%) were, indeed, registered to vote in that particular precinct. With respect to the 78 individuals, QVF records indicated that they were not registered to vote anywhere in Michigan, were registered in a different precinct, or registered after the deadline. It is not surprising that Detroit had applications to vote for these individuals, as all of them were eligible to submit a provisional envelope ballot.

In sum, the majority of problems identified during the second phase of the audit can be ultimately attributed to the lack of proficiency or familiarity with EPB among precinct workers, compounded by the fact that provisional and spoiled/replacement ballots were incorrectly issued, recorded or both. These problems were explored in depth in the next phase of the audit.
Among election officials in Michigan, the EPB program is seen as an attractive alternative to the traditional paper poll book as it automates many functions and is designed to significantly reduce the probability of error. However, BOE observed numerous instances in which precinct inspectors failed to properly enter vital data into the EPB such as the names of all voters who received a ballot, instances in which an individual voted by provisional ballot or spoiled their original ballot and received a replacement, or other occurrences that should have been noted in the “Remarks” section (for example, a jammed tabulator, a voter leaving without finishing the voting process, etc.).

The audit revealed that EPB errors were committed in 106 (78%) of the precincts selected for audit. This lack of knowledge in operating EPBs compounded many of the errors found during the second phase of the audit, as incompletely or inaccurately recording certain types of voter transactions led to imbalances in the number of ballots compared to the number of voters.

Part of the post-election closing process includes the sealing and delivery of all required election materials to the appropriate election official. BOE learned that one of Detroit’s receiving boards misdirected many of the poll books it inspected on Election Night, delaying their delivery to the County Board of Canvassers. The Wayne County Board of Canvassers reported that five of these misdirected poll books were never received during the 2-week county canvass process. As a result, the Wayne County Board of Canvassers directed that the names of voters be entered into the EPB using the applications to vote completed and signed by voters on Election Day. All 5 of the precincts for which the original (Election Day) poll book was not found were selected for audit and 3 of them (60%) were eventually brought into balance.

BOE staff believes that the disproportionately high number of audited precincts in which EPB errors occurred (78%) could have been significantly reduced or possibly eliminated if a paper backup had been given to precinct workers on Election Day. Workers who lacked experience or knowledge in how to properly operate the EPB would have benefitted from a paper backup precinct voter list.

What is the electronic poll book (EPB)?

BOE developed computer software that can be used in the polling place on Election Day to process voters and generate precinct reports. The EPB software is a unique download from the Qualified Voter File (QVF) that can be loaded onto a laptop prior to each election.

Once the EPB software is loaded on the laptop, the software allows election workers to look up a voter’s registration record, confirm their registration is correct, and assign a ballot to that voter, essentially automating the typical paper process. After the close of polls, the EPB software will generate reports to complete the official precinct record (the bound paper copy of the poll book).

The EPB software also enables an election official to quickly and efficiently upload a voter history file into the QVF post-election.

The laptops, flash drives and card readers used to operate EPB software were furnished to jurisdictions across the state free of charge under a grant agreement with BOE; as of this writing, over 90% of precincts and AVCBs utilize EPBs.
With respect to ballot tabulating equipment, BOE did not find evidence of widespread tabulator failures that accounted for the breadth and depth of problems experienced in Detroit. Of the precincts and AVCBs selected for audit, only 23 (17%) reported tabulator issues on Election Day according to records compiled by the Detroit Department of Elections. However, the majority of these precincts (18 of 23 or 78%) could not be brought into balance during the audit, an additional signal that the numerous problems Detroit encountered on Election Day are primarily attributable to human error.

**AUDIT PHASE 4: ACCURACY AND COMPLETENESS OF TRAINING MATERIALS**

In view of the errors revealed during the first three phases of the audit, BOE shifted its focus to how well Detroit trains and prepares its precinct and AVCB workers for Election Day. BOE staff requested and obtained relevant training materials prepared by the Detroit Department of Elections then reviewed them for accuracy and completeness.

Overall, BOE found that the training materials used by the Detroit Department of Elections are understandable, accurate, and highlight procedures endorsed by the Michigan Bureau of Elections. The Detroit Department of Elections has organized tasks into separate job types with each having their own set of defined duties and responsibilities to create a hierarchical structure for election workers. This model of organizing precinct workers is best implemented when the most highly skilled workers are identified and assigned to the most complex tasks (i.e., operating the EPB, issuing provisional ballots and handling of other exceptions, identifying and correcting errors as they occur during Election Day rather than after polls close, and so on).

Based on the comprehensive nature of Detroit’s training materials and its tiered approach to assigning duties and responsibilities, election inspectors should be able to successfully manage a polling place on Election Day. For example, the checklist developed by the Detroit Department of Elections for closing the polls is very concise and effectively guides election inspectors through four different steps to ensure all bins in the tabulator are empty and the contents placed into the sealed ballot container.

BOE recognizes that the Detroit Department of Elections conducts training sessions for precinct workers each election year and in spite of the problems noted thus far, commends Detroit for their efforts in this regard. BOE will address some technical training points and opportunities for improvement with the Detroit Department of Elections as it prepares for upcoming city elections later this year.
By and large, the problems and difficulties discovered during this audit can be classified into three areas: worker training and recruitment, receiving boards, and EPBs. Accordingly, BOE’s recommendations are separated into these categories.

**Recommendation #1: Improve the efficacy of Detroit’s election worker training program.** It is apparent that Detroit must make its election worker training sessions more robust with particular emphasis on provisional ballots and other circumstances that may adversely affect the ability to recount a precinct. While BOE readily acknowledges that the Detroit Department of Elections has implemented a training program for precinct workers and conduct more training sessions than required by law, the results of this audit have clearly identified areas of deficiencies that must be the focus of intensive training efforts going forward.

BOE has developed an extensive library of training materials for the use of local election officials and precinct workers which are available in the Michigan Elections eLearning Center at https://mielections.csod.com. These include demonstration videos on a dedicated YouTube channel, Election Day checklists, hands-on training exercises, tips for appointing, training and supporting election workers, and related resources. BOE encourages Detroit to consult these resources and will provide specific suggestions regarding technical training points and changes to the training materials currently in use. Improvements and modifications are needed in the areas of provisional balloting, handling exceptions, resolving balance issues after polls close, and making more detailed notations in the “Remarks” section of the poll book.

*Note:* Additional recommendations associated with critical improvements in the EPB training program are discussed below.

**Recommendation #2: Broaden worker recruitment efforts and build partnerships with area employers, especially the City of Detroit.** Detroit must also implement innovative approaches to recruiting new election workers, prioritizing outreach to individuals who have experience working with computers. New technology is continually being developed and deployed for elections, including the EPB, card readers for state-issued photo IDs, and the introduction later this year of the next generation of ballot tabulators and accessible voting equipment. In addition to learning how to use new electronic equipment, election workers must follow increasingly complex Election Day procedures and serve the state’s largest electorate. These demands must be met with skilled workers who are receptive to training and responsive to new challenges.

BOE supports the outreach efforts of the Detroit Department of Elections, which solicited large employers in advance of the 2016 general election to allow their personnel to work as precinct inspectors in Detroit. BOE encourages Detroit to vigorously pursue and increase collaboration with nearby colleges and universities, large professional associations and other organizations in worker recruitment. For example, it may be possible to make arrangements with the City of
Detroit to recruit city employees\(^3\) to work in precincts on Election Day. The city should also consider pay incentives for workers, including the concept of pay-for-performance. These recommendations are designed to ensure that Detroit will be better positioned to recruit and retain a growing pool of qualified individuals to work the polls from election to election.

**Recommendation #3: Elevate the performance of Detroit’s receiving boards.** Receiving boards are designed to identify and correct any imbalance issues that may render a precinct or AVCB uncountable. Members of the receiving board can work in tandem with precinct workers to obtain and record a satisfactory explanation of an imbalance or rectify errors in the poll book on Election Night. The Detroit Department of Elections must implement a better training program and supervisory system geared specifically toward receiving board members.

In addition, a more comprehensive receiving board checklist is needed to ensure that on Election Night, members are comparing the number of names in the poll book to the number of ballots tabulated and ensuring that any discrepancies are described in sufficient detail in the “Remarks” section of the poll book, as well as taking the appropriate steps to resolve any inconsistencies that are not explained. The importance of the receiving board’s role in ensuring that precincts balance (or that imbalances have a valid explanation) must be emphasized to the same extent as its role in inspecting ballot container seals. BOE also recommends that the Detroit Department of Elections implement a comprehensive process for gathering and analyzing data from receiving board checklists after the election. This exercise will assist Detroit in identifying training deficiencies, as well as identifying and holding accountable any precinct workers, precinct chairs or receiving board members whose performance does not meet expectations.

Receiving board members must also ensure that all required election materials are sealed and delivered to the appropriate election official; ideally receiving boards would operate under the direct supervisory control of a highly trained and experienced employee of the Detroit Department of Elections.

**Recommendation #4: Improve understanding of the proper use of Electronic Poll Books.** Proper use of the EPB is essential to ensuring that the precinct is in balance throughout the election, and that any errors can be promptly discovered and corrected on the spot rather than after polls have closed on Election Day. The EPB is the best record of what occurred during Election Day because it contains the names of all voters who were issued ballots, the number of provisional ballots issued in the precinct, spoiled ballots, any other remarkable circumstances (such as a tabulator malfunction or power outage, or when a voter who previously received an AV ballot surrenders that ballot in the precinct and votes in person on Election Day), and is the record from which the “Ballot Summary Report” is generated when polls close. (See example ballot summary report on p. 23.)

The 2016 election cycle was the first in which all of Detroit’s precincts relied solely on EPBs without a paper poll book, and precinct workers in many of the audited precincts were not prepared to operate it correctly. While the EPB software design is intended to be as straightforward and intuitive as possible for individuals who are familiar with computers, the Detroit Department of Elections should recalibrate the EPB training program for those precinct

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\(^3\) This recommendation is intended to include the city’s clerical and managerial workforce, not its elected officials or their political appointees.
workers it identifies as most capable of operating the software at future elections. A specialized EPB training module should focus on the performance issues highlighted in this report. BOE has already created an EPB user manual and training database for the use of local election officials in training their precinct workers, which are available in the Michigan Elections eLearning Center. BOE will provide specific recommendations on points of emphasis; improvements are most needed in the areas of looking up and recording all voters correctly, recognizing and addressing system-generated alerts, accurately recording provisional and spoiled ballots, generating the ballot summary after the polls close, and making more detailed notations in the “Remarks” section of the poll book.

Increasing precinct workers’ proficiency in using the EPB will go a long way toward preserving recountability, but the Detroit Department of Elections should also provide a paper backup of its precinct voter list in the event that problems occur with EPB processing.

**Recommendation #5: Enact legislation to require counties to disclose the number of out-of-balance precincts in the certified canvass reports.** At present, County Boards of Canvassers are not required to disclose whether their certified election returns include any imbalanced precincts that were not reconciled during the 2-week county canvass process. BOE will modify the County Canvass Report form to include this data for future elections.

**Recommendation #6: Require precinct chairpersons to pass a written examination that tests their knowledge of provisional ballot procedures and other “exceptions” that occur on Election Day.** Legislation may be enacted to require the chairperson of every precinct to receive enhanced training on provisional balloting and to pass a test demonstrating their mastery of the subject. Among other topics precinct chairpersons must be able to differentiate between a provisional envelope ballot and affidavit ballot, recognize which type of provisional ballot should be issued to a voter who does not appear on the precinct voter list, how to confirm that a voter is not registered elsewhere (and should be directed to a different precinct to cast a regular ballot), handling and disposition of provisional ballots after polls close, etc. Under this proposal, precinct chairpersons would act as a provisional ballot subject matter expert in the polling place on Election Day.

**CONCLUSION**

The errors enumerated in this report and found in the recount of the presidential race in other jurisdictions point to the necessity of vigilant compliance with Michigan Election Law and procedure. Precise documentation is the touchstone of a well-run election. Accurate and complete documentation is designed to demonstrate compliance with the election law and procedures, as well as to bolster citizen confidence in the administration and results of Michigan elections. All Michigan election officials must continue to strive to meet these objectives.

BOE is committed to working with the Detroit Department of Elections, Wayne County Board of Canvassers and Wayne County Clerk’s Office in a collaborative manner to improve election administration in the community.
Provisional ballot envelope form:
Sample screen shot of the list of voters entered into the EPB:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Voter Name</th>
<th>Ballots</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mcqvl, Caitlin Lindsey</td>
<td>000000001 000000003</td>
<td>Spoiled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mcqvl, Faith Lynn</td>
<td>000000002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mcqvl, Adrian Louise</td>
<td>000000004</td>
<td>Affidavit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mcqvl, Barbara Elise</td>
<td>000000028</td>
<td>Absentee Ballot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mcqvl, Martha Carol</td>
<td>000000005</td>
<td>Challenged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mcqvl, Jonathan Clark</td>
<td>000000006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mcqvl, Philip Carter</td>
<td>000000007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mcqvl, Rebecca Sandra</td>
<td>000000008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mcqvl, George Andrew</td>
<td>000000009 000000012</td>
<td>Spoiled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mcqvl, Alexander Jon</td>
<td>000000010</td>
<td>Envelope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mcqvl, Daniel Richard</td>
<td>000000011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Mcqvl, Paul Robert</td>
<td>000000013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mcqvl, Kathryn Lauren</td>
<td>000000024</td>
<td>Absentee Ballot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sample tabulator tape:

Tuesday, November 6, 2012
Precinct 1

Number of Ballots Tabulated: 27

Republican Party: 4
Democratic Party: 3
Tisch Party: 2

Governor
James Bradford: 4
All Lerner: 3
Andy Prentis: 2
Write-In: 1

Secretary of State
Amanda Bixby: 3
James Q. McDonald: 4
Lori Scanlon: 2
Write-In: 1

Sample application to vote:

APPLICATION TO VOTE – POLL LIST

Print Name: Sherry McAvy
Date of Birth: 5/10/1968
Residence Address: 205 Miller Ct.

August 13, 2013
Date of Election

For Inspectors Use Only

Approved to Vote by: TMH

Voter No. (Poll Book)
Sample absent voter ballot application:

Complete and return to:

HOBEMA TOWNSHIP
572 ROUSSEAU RD
MASS CITY MI 49948

Application for Absent Voter's Ballot

ELECTION: 11/06/2012

As a United States citizen and a duly qualified and registered elector in the County of CHURCH, Township of HOBBEMA, State of Michigan, I hereby make application for an absent voter ballot to be voted by me at the above indicated election.

CARRIE ANN MCGRAW
26137 DISNIAU RD
MASS CITY MI 49948

Check reason(s) why you are requesting ballot. If reason is not checked for an election, an absent voter ballot will not be issued for that election.

☐ I am 60 years of age or older.
☐ I expect to be absent from the community in which I am registered for the entire time the polls are open on Election Day.
☐ I am physically unable to attend the polls without the assistance of another.
☐ I have been appointed the polls because of the wishes of my religion.
☐ I have been appointed an election judge inspector in a precinct other than the precinct where I reside.
☐ I expect to be absent from the polls because I am confined to bed awaiting a medical or surgical procedure.

SIGN HERE X

NOTE: Michigan law requires that ALL ballots be sent to your registered address unless you are hospitalized, institutionalized, or at an address outside of your community. Complete the following ONLY if you want your ballot sent to an address outside of your community or to a hospital or other institution.

SEND ELECTION BALLOT TO:

Baller No: ____________________________

CARRIE ANN MCGRAW
26137 DISNIAU RD
MASS CITY MI 49948

APPROVED

(Inspector of Election)
Sample ballot summary report:

2/28/2012 - PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY - PAW PAW TOWNSHIP
PRECINCT 00001

BALLOT SUMMARY

**WE CERTIFY THE FOLLOWING:**

**NUMBER OF BALLOTS DELIVERED TO PRECINCT:**

A. Number of official ballots delivered to precinct:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ballot Style</th>
<th>Starting No.</th>
<th>Ending No.</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[None]</td>
<td>00000001</td>
<td>00000200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Number of absent voter return envelopes received by board: 2

C. Total of lines A and B (Must match Line K below): 202

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**NUMBER OF BALLOTS AT CLOSE OF POLLS:**

D. Number of ballots tabulated: 15

E. Number of AV ballot envelopes delivered to precinct which did not contain ballot or were not processed for any reason: 0

F. Number of ballots reissued to voters who spoiled their ballot at the pollin place (spoiled or defective ballots): 2

G. Number of ballots rejected: 0

H. Number of ballots used by election inspectors for ballot duplications: 0

I. Number of PROVISIONAL "envelope" ballots issued: 1

J. Number of UNUSED BALLOTS (excess ballots):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ballot Style</th>
<th>Starting No.</th>
<th>Ending No.</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[None]</td>
<td>00000017</td>
<td>00000200</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

K. Total of Lines D, E, F, G, H, I, and J (Must match Line K above): 202

L. Difference: 0
Sample receiving board checklist:

Receiving Board Checklist

Jurisdiction ________________ Precinct ___________ Election Date ____________

Required:
- ☐ Confirm the Poll Book and Statement of Votes are **not** sealed in the ballot container.
- ☐ Confirm the ballot container is sealed properly
- ☐ Confirm the seal number was recorded properly
- ☐ Confirm the number of names listed in the Poll Book equals the number of ballots tabulated on the tabulator tape and recorded on the Statement of Votes

Correction of any of the above items requires the Receiving Board to direct the election inspectors returning the items to make the necessary corrections. Once corrections are made, full documentation of the corrective action must be written in the remarks of the Poll Book, signed by the election inspectors and witnessed by the Receiving Board inspectors.

Other beneficial items to review for a successful Canvass:

Poll Book
- ☐ Clerk’s Preparation Certificate completed and signed
- ☐ Election Inspectors Preparation Certificate completed and signed by inspectors present when polls opened
- ☐ All inspectors subscribed to the Constitutional Oath of Office
- ☐ Oath administrator signed
- ☐ No lines skipped on the List of Voters
- ☐ All spoiled, affidavit, envelope, challenged, and AV ballots noted
- ☐ Ensure proper recording of write-in votes or a notation of none when applicable
- ☐ Ensure proper recording of challenges
- ☐ Ensure remarks were recorded
- ☐ Certificate of Election Inspectors completed and signed by inspectors present when polls closed
- ☐ Ballot summary is completed and totals are accurate
- ☐ Ballot container seal number is properly recorded

Ballot Container Certificate
- ☐ Dated and signed by two election inspectors of differing party affiliation
- ☐ Seal number properly recorded

Program Container Certificate
- ☐ Dated and signed by two election inspectors of differing party affiliation
- ☐ Seal number properly recorded

Statement of Votes (3 copies required)
- ☐ Totals tape signed by inspectors present when poll closed
- ☐ Write-in votes totaled (if necessary)
- ☐ Seal number of ballot container recorded properly
- ☐ Seal number signed by two inspectors of differing party affiliation
- ☐ Signatures of all inspectors present when polls closed

☐ After completion of the above, replace the Poll Book and Statement of Votes into the appropriate envelopes and initial and seal with a red paper seal. Then sign below.

We, the undersigned members of the Receiving Board, hereby certify the completion of the items checked above.

Republican Receiving Board Inspector ____________________________ Democratic Receiving Board Inspector ____________________________