BIENNIAL REPORT

of the

ATTORNEY GENERAL

of the

STATE OF MICHIGAN

for the

BIENNIAL PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2010

MICHAEL A. COX
ATTORNEY GENERAL

AUTHORITY

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To the Honorable Legislature of the State of Michigan:

In accordance with the provisions of MCL 14.30, I submit the Report of the Attorney General for the biennial period of January 1, 2009, through December 31, 2010.

MICHAEL A. COX
Attorney General

MICHAEL A. COX

Attorney General

Born in 1961, Cox entered the Marines after graduation from Catholic Central High School in Detroit and went on to graduate from the University of Michigan Law School in 1989. Cox went to work for the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office in Detroit where he prosecuted organized crime cases ranging from public corruption to drug and gang-related homicides. He tried more than 125 jury trials, in addition to hundreds of bench trials, with a conviction rate in excess of 90 percent. In 2000, Cox was appointed the Director of the Wayne County Prosecutor's Homicide Unit, which prosecuted approximately two-thirds of all homicides in Michigan. He and his wife, Laura, a former federal agent, have four children. Cox was sworn in as Attorney General of Michigan, January 1, 2003.

CAROL L. ISAACS

Chief Deputy Attorney General

East Lansing, Michigan. Received Bachelor of Science degree from Michigan State University and Juris Doctorate degree from Thomas M. Cooley Law School, Lansing, Michigan. Admitted to practice law in 1993. First Woman Chief Deputy. Appointed Chief Deputy Attorney General January 2003 to April 2005. Reappointed September 2006.

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ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

APPOINTED

Daniel Leroy ..... July 18, 1836-1837
Peter Morey ..... March 21, 1837-1841
Zephaniah Platt ..... March 4, 1841-1843
Elon Farnsworth ..... March 9, 1843-1845
Henry N. Walker ..... March 24, 1845-1847
Edward Mundy ..... March 12, 1847-1848
George V. N. Lothrop ..... April 3, 1848-1850

ELECTED

William Hale 1851-1854
Jacob M. Howard 1855-1860
Charles Upson 1861-1862
Albert Williams 1863-1866
William L. Stoughton 1867-1868
Dwight May 1869-1872
Byron B. Ball[1] 1873-1874
Isaac Marston ..... April 1, 1874-1874
Andrew J. Smith 1875-1876
Otto Kircher 1877-1880
Jacob J. Van Riper 1881-1884
Moses Taggert 1885-1888
Stephen V. R. Trowbridge[2] 1889-1890
Benjamin W. Houston ..... March 25, 1890-1890
Adolphus A. Ellis 1891-1894
Fred A. Maynard 1895-1898
Horace M. Oren 1899-1902
Charles A. Blair 1903-1904
John E. Bird[3] 1905-1910
Franz C. Kuhn[4] ..... June 7, 1910-1912
Roger I. Wykes ..... September 6, 1912-1912
Grant Fellows 1913-1916
Alex J. Groesbeck 1917-1920
Merlin Wiley[5] 1921-1922
Andrew B. Dougherty[6] 1923-1926
Clare Retan 1926-1926
W. W. Potter[7] 1927-1928
Wilbur M. Brucker 1928-1930
Paul W. Voorhies 1931-1932
Patrick H. O'Brien 1933-1934
Harry S. Toy[8] ..... October 24, 1935-1935

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[1] Resigned April 1, 1874. Isaac Marston appointed to fill vacancy.

[2] Resigned March 25, 1890. Benjamin W. Houston appointed to fill vacancy.

[3] Resigned June 6, 1910. Franz C. Kuhn appointed to fill vacancy.

[4] Resigned September 6, 1912. Roger I. Wykes appointed to fill vacancy.

[5] Resigned January 9, 1923. Andrew B. Dougherty appointed to fill vacancy.

[6] Resigned October 27, 1926. Clare Retan appointed to fill vacancy.

[7] Resigned February 16, 1928. Wilbur M. Brucker appointed to fill vacancy.

[8] Resigned October 14, 1935. David H. Crowley appointed to fill vacancy.

David H. Crowley 1935-1936
Raymond W. Starr 1937-1938
Thomas Read 1939-1940
Herbert J. Rushton 1941-1944
John J. Dethmers[9] 1945-1946
Foss O. Eldred ..... September 9, 1946-1946
Eugene F. Black 1947-1948
Stephen J. Roth 1949-1950
Frank G. Millard 1951-1954
Thomas M. Kavanagh[10] 1955-1957
Paul L. Adams[11] 1958-1961
Frank J. Kelley[12] 1962-1998
Jennifer M. Granholm 1999-2002
Michael A. Cox 2003-2010

[9] Resigned September 9, 1946. Foss O. Eldred appointed to fill vacancy.

[10] Resigned December 31, 1957. Paul L. Adams appointed to fill vacancy.

[11] Resigned December 31, 1961. Frank J. Kelley appointed to fill vacancy.

[12] Appointed December 28, 1961. In 1966 first attorney general elected to 4-year term.

REGISTER OF
DEPARTMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

2009-2010

Attorney General .....MICHAEL A. COX

Chief Deputy Attorney General.....CAROL L. ISAACS

Chief Administration Officer.....MICHAEL J. GARAVAGLIA

Senior Advisor .....STUART M. SANDLER

Solicitor General .....B. ERIC RESTUCCIA

Assistant Attorney General for Law.....HEATHER S. MEINGAST[13]

Child and Family Services Bureau Chief .....WANDA M. STOKES[14]

Consumer and Environmental Protection Bureau Chief.....ROBERT IANNI[15]

Criminal Justice Bureau Chief.....THOMAS C. CAMERON

Governmental Affairs Bureau Chief.....FRANK J. MONTICELLO[16]

Director of Communications.....JOHN B. SELLEK

Director of Legislative Relations .....BRET TOTORAITIS[17]

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[13] Susan I. Leffler served as Assistant Attorney General for Law from November 1, 2002, until she retired on December 31, 2009.

[14] During this biennial period, Wanda M. Stokes served as Child & Family Services Bureau Chief until she became a Division Chief on October 18, 2009.

[15] A. Michael Leffler served as Consumer and Environmental Protection Bureau Chief from January 2005 until he transferred to the Executive Office January 25, 2009.

[16] During this biennial period, Frank J. Monticello served as Governmental Affairs Bureau Chief until he became a Division Chief on October 31, 2010.

[17] During this biennial period, Bret Totoraitis became the Acting Director of Legislative Relations on May 17, 2010. Prior to that date, Rachel Hurley served as Director of Legislative Relations.

OPINION REVIEW BOARD

Heather S. Meingast, Chairperson[18]
Robert Ianni
Patrick F. Isom[19]
Russell E Prins[20]
Thomas F. Schimpf[21]
B. Eric Restuccia
Robert P. Reichel
Kevin T. Smith
Lucille Taylor[22]

[18] During this biennial period, Susan I. Leffler served as Chairperson of the Opinion Review Board until she retired on December 31, 2009.

[19] Retired 12/31/2010.

[20] Retired 10/29/2010.

[21] Retired 10/29/2010.

[22] Special Assistant Attorney General appointed 6/9/2004.

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EDUCATION, AND POLICY BOARD

Robert Ianni, Chairperson
Frank Monticello, Vice Chairperson, Department Ethics Officer
Wanda Stokes
Mike Leffler[23]
Tom Cameron
David Tanay
Margaret Nelson
Holly Gustafson
Doug Bramble, ex-officio member
Valerie Schmidt, Department Training Coordinator

In 2009-2010, the PREP Board, in conjunction with the Department Training Coordinator, presented 125 different training courses. Four of these courses were presented by in-house instructors and were mandatory for staff, including E-Discovery in Litigation, Appellate Training, Performance Evaluations for Attorneys, and Template training. The Board continued its focus on management training by offering 22 management training courses—11 live and 11 recorded. Other training highlights included administrative assistant training offered to support staff, bankruptcy training, negotiation training, and a course on Local Government Legal Issues Impacting State Government. The Board continued its review of Department Policies and a total of 25 policies were created or revised. The Supplies Folder was redesigned and reorganized into a user-friendly system which incorporates an interactive table of contents. A new library database was created to improve publication tracking records. The Board also reviewed several proposed amendments to the Michigan Court Rules and provided recommendations to the Court. The Board in conjunction with the Department Ethics Officer, created a pending Conflicts Wall list in the Supplies Folder to assist in monitoring attorney assignments for potential Division conflicts. In preparation for the Attorney General-elect, the Board developed a standard Department Transition Binder template.

[23] Retired 6/30/2009.

ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL

Stephanie A. Achenbach
Richard M.C. Adams
Todd B. Adams[24]
Syed S. Ahmed[25]
Tonatzin M. Alfaro-Maiz
Danielle R. Allison-Yokom
Cynthia A. Arcaro
Corey A. Arendt[26]
Dan V. Artaev
Rosendo Asevedo, Jr.
Andrea D. Bailey
Susan K. Balkema
Linus R. Banghart-Linn
Elizabeth A. Barash
Cori E. Barkman
Sarah E. Barnes
Patricia S. Barone
Katharyn A. Barron
Margaret A. Bartindale
Denise C. Barton
Robert W. Beach
H. Daniel Beaton, Jr.
Brad H. Beaver[27]
Julia R. Bell[28]
Michael R. Bell
Ross H. Bishop[29]
Philip L. Bladen
E. John Blanchard[30]
Jack A. Blumenkopf[31]
Daniel P. Bock
Henry J. Boynton[32]
Robert L. Brackenbury[33]
Christopher W. Braverman
Sarah K. Brenner
David D. Brickey
Barbara J. Brown[34]
Larry F. Brya[35]
Steven M. Cabadas
Thomas C. Cameron
Christine Mikrut Campbell[36]
William C. Campbell[37]
David C. Cannon
Ray W. Cardew, Jr.[38]
Deborah L. Carley
Kelly A. Carter
Kathleen L. Cavanaugh
William A. Chenoweth[39]
Andea M. Christensen
Suann D. Cochran
Todd H. Cohan[40]
George G. Constance
Laura A. Cook
Felicia M. Courtright
Kevin J. Cox
Richard L. Cunningham
Julius O. Curling
John D. Dakmak[41]
Jessica A. Danou
Mark F. Davidson[42]
Michael R. Dean
Jon M. DeHorn
James P. Delaney
William F. Denner
Brian D. Devlin
Darnelle Dickerson
Allison M. Dietz
Robin E. Dillard[43]
Suzanne R. Dillman[44]
Michael J. Dittenber
Heather L. Donald
Mark E. Donnelly
Jonathan E. Duckworth
Heather M. S. Durian
Bruce H. Edwards
Yasmin J. Elias[45]

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[24] Retired 12/31/2010
[25] Separated 5/14/2010
[26] Laid off 5/29/2009
[27] Separated 8/27/2010
[28] Retired 12/31/2010
[29] Retired 10/29/2010
[30] Retired 1/23/2009
[31] Retired 10/29/2010
[32] Retired 12/31/2010
[33] Transferred 12/20/2010
[34] Retired 12/31/2010
[35] Retired 12/11/2009
[36] Retired 10/29/2010
[37] Retired 12/31/2009
[38] Retired 12/31/2010
[39] Retired 4/30/2009
[40] Retired 12/31/2010
[41] Separated 2/20/2009
[42] Retired 10/29/2010
[43] Separated 7/2/2009
[44] Separated 2/4/2009
[45] Separated 10/02/2009

Kelly K. Elizondo
George M. Elworth
Ronald W. Emery[46]
Donald E. Erickson
Stacy L. Erwin-Oakes[47]
Jason R. Evans
Brian W. Farkas
Ronald H. Farnum
James T. Farrell
Michael P. Farrell[48]
John G. Fedynsky
Chantal B. Fennessey
Elaine D. Fischhoff[49]
Jennifer Fitzgerald
Kathleen P. Fitzgerald
Patrick M. Fitzgerald
Steven B. Flancher
Nathaniel E.B. Forstner[50]
Darrin F. Fowler
Phillip I. Frame
Kevin L. Francart
Moshe Freedman
Michael G. Frezza
Leo H. Friedman[51]
Joseph T. Froehlich
LuAnn C. Frost
Alison A. Furtaw
Debra M. Gagliardi
Brian S. Galin
Kathleen A. Gardiner
Jason A. Geissler
Celeste R. Gill
Carlo P. Ginotti
Kathleen A. Gleeson
James W. Glennie[52]
Howard E. Goldberg[53]
David H. Goodkin
Paul D. Goodrich
Jennifer L. Gordon
Neil D. Gordon
A. Peter Govorchin
Terrence P. Grady[54]
Justin A. Gray
Brian G. Green
Pulvinder K. Grewal
Erik A. Grill
Christina M. Grossi
Socorro Guerrero
Charles D. Hackney[55]
Felepe H. Hall
Linda K. Handren
Wallace T. Hart[56]
Suzanne Hassan
Jason D. Hawkins
Timothy J. Haynes
James W. Heath
Kevin R. Himebaugh
Jessica L. Hodgson[57]
Alan F. Hoffman[58]
Peggy A. Housner[59]
Raymond O. Howd
James C. Howell[60]
Steven D. Hughey
Shannon H. Husband
Roland Hwang
Patrick F. Isom[61]
Dawn C.M. Jack[62]
Jennifer M. Jackson
Christopher M. Jacobson
Molly M. Jason
Robert J. Jenkins
Julie M. Jensen
Tonya C. Jeter
Bruce C. Johnson
Daphne M. Johnson
Thomas C. Johnson
Heidi L. Johnson-Mehney
Jason S. Julian[63]
Katherine A. Kakish
Richard M. Karoub
Serene Katranji-Zeni[64]
Matthew C. Keck
Rhondi B. Keller

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[46] Retired 5/28/2010
[47] Separated 11/10/2010
[48] Separated 7/9/2010
[49] Retired 7/31/2009
[50] Transferred 12/31/2010
[51] Retired 9/30/2009
[52] Retired 10/29/2010
[53] Retired 12/31/2010
[54] Retired 4/17/2009
[55] Retired 3/1/2009
[56] Retired 10/15/2010
[57] Transferred 3/19/2010
[58] Retired 6/30/2010
[59] Retired 10/15/2010
[60] Voluntarily Laid off 6/5/2009
[61] Retired 12/31/2010
[62] Transferred 12/11/2009
[63] Retired 10/30/2009
[64] Separated 9/20/2009

Colleen M. Kelly
Sean D. Kerman
Christopher L. Kerr
Michael O. King, Jr.
Morris J. Klau[65]
Timothy F. Konieczny[66]
Raina I. Korbakis
Peter T. Kotula
Karen K. Kuchek[67]
Thomas A. Kulick[68]
Alan J. Lambert
H. Steven Langschwager
Brian A. Lavictoire
T. David Law
A. Michael Leffler[69]
Susan I. Leffler[70]
Andrew J. Lemke
Melinda A. Leonard
Thomas L. Leonard
John F. Leone
Vincent J. Leone[71]
Jessica E. LePine
Anica Letica
Larry W. Lewis
Mary Elizabeth Lippitt
John R. Liskey[72]
Michael A. Lockman
James E. Long
Iris M. Lopez
Jonathan S. Ludwig
John P. Mack
Thomas E. Maier
S. Peter Manning
Joshua D. Marcum
Mary Kathleen Markman
Thomas S. Marks
Harold J. Martin
Robert J. Martin
Mark W. Matus[73]
Jacquelyn A. McClinton[74]
Emily A. McDonough
Linda P. McDowell
Patrick McElmurry[75]
Donald S. McGehee
Jessica A. McGivney
Joel D. McGormley
Kyle P. McLaughlin
Kelley T. McLean
Julie A. McMurtry[76]
Heather S. Meingast
James W. Metz II
Gerald C. Miller
Jeanmarie Miller
Robert L. Mol
William E. Molner[77]
Laura L. Moody
Michael E. Moody
Susan B. Moody-Frezza
Lamar D. Moreland
William R. Morris
Bradley K. Morton
Shenique A. Moss
Michael F. Murphy
Scott J. Najor
Brian O. Neill
Margaret A. Nelson
Michael S. Newell[78]
Michael A. Nickerson[79]
Patrick J. O'Brien
Linda M. Olivieri[80]
Michael J. Orris
Joseph A. Ortiz
John S. Pallas
Jack M. Panitch
Darryl J. Paquette
D. J. Pascoe
Amy M. Patterson
Oronde C. Patterson
Donna L. Pendergast
Sante J. Perrelli
William F. Pettit
Herman G. Petzold III
Dennis J. Pheney, Jr.
Jonathan C. Pierce[81]
Linda M. Pietroski

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[65] Retired 12/31/2010
[66] Retired 10/29/2010
[67] Retired 5/29/2009
[68] Retired 10/30/2009
[69] Retired 6/30/2009
[70] Retired 12/31/2009
[71] Retired 12/31/2010
[72] Voluntarily Laid off 6/5/2009
[73] Retired 12/31/2010
[74] Transferred 7/9/2010
[75] Retired 5/28/2010
[76] Separated 1/2/2009
[77] Retired 12/31/2010
[78] Transferred 10/2/2009
[79] Retired 11/30/2009
[80] Retired 4/30/2009
[81] Separated 9/25/2009

Joseph P. Pittel[82]
Joseph E. Potchen
Douglas G. Powe
Andrew T. Prins
Russell E Prins[83]
Susan Przekop-Shaw
C. Adam Purnell
Thomas Quasarano
Patricia Terrell Quinn[84]
Dennis J. Raterink
Victoria A. Reardon
Robert P. Reichel
Michael J. Reilly
Louis B. Reinwasser
Stephen M. Rideout
James E. Riley[85]
Santiago Rios
Juandisha H. Robinson
William A. Rollstin
Kandy C. Ronayne
Merry A. Rosenberg[86]
Scott R. Rothermel
Adam S. Rubin
Derek G. Russaw[87]
Sara B. Ryan
Mark G. Sands
Suzan M. Sanford
Spencer A. Sattler
Thomas P. Scallen[88]
Bethany L. Scheib
John C. Scherbarth
Charles C. Schettler, Jr.[89]
Thomas F. Schimpf[90]
Barbara A. Schmidt[91]
Clifton B. Schneider
Mark V. Schoen[92]
Jeffrey M. Schroder
Lauryl A. Scott
Marie Shamraj[93]
James C. Shell
Ann M. Sherman
Patricia L. Sherrod
Andrew L. Shirvell[94]
David W. Silver[95]
Bridget K. Smith
Jarrod T. Smith
Joshua S. Smith
Kevin T. Smith
Kristin M. Smith
Tracy A. Sonneborn
Daniel E. Sonneveldt
Allan J. Soros
Eric M. St. Onge
George N. Stevenson
Pamela J. Stevenson
Rodney D. Stewart
Ronald J. Styka[96]
Polly A. Synk
John F. Szczubelek
David E. Tanay
Debbie K. Taylor
Drew M. Taylor[97]
Scott L. Teter
Kevin M. Thom
John L. Thurber
Bret A. Totoraitis
Kathleen H. Trott
Virginia H. Trzaskoma
Brenda E. Turner[98]
Anne M. Uitvlugt
Elizabeth L. Valentine
Rebekah Visconti-Mason
Martin J. Vittands
Michele M. Wagner-Gutkowski
Deborah Benedict Waldmeir[99]
Thomas D. Warren
Donna K. Welch
Gerald A. Whalen
Mitchell J. Wood
John R. Wright
Michael A. Young
Morrison R. Zack[100]

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[82] Separated 9/10/2010
[83] Retired 10/29/2010
[84] Retired 12/31/2010
[85] Retired 12/31/2010
[86] Retired 12/31/2010
[87] Separated 10/1/2010
[88] Retired 12/31/2010
[89] Retired 10/29/2010
[90] Retired 10/29/2010
[91] Retired 12/31/2010
[92] Retired 1/30/2009
[93] Retired 4/30/2009
[94] Separated 11/8/2010
[95] Retired 12/31/2010
[96] Retired 12/31/2010
[97] Separated 6/4/2010
[98] Retired 10/29/2010
[99] Separated 6/18/2010
[100] Retired 12/31/2010

LEGAL ASSISTANT

Elizabeth M. Rivard

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

Julianna D. DeLeeuw

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

Cynthia A. Aven[101]

SENIOR EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT ASSISTANTS

Cynthia L. Armstrong
Alicia K. Kirkey
Mary F. Zischke[102]

AUDITORS

Stanwood L. Krycinski[103]
Joseph J. Kylman
Richard J. Ruelle[104]
Eric D. Spanogle[105]

DEPARTMENT MANAGER

Patricia A. Conley

DEPARTMENTAL ANALYSTS

Eric R. Bacyinski[106]
Angela E. Branch
Elizabeth A. Cambridge
Carol A. Dane
Nicholaas W. DeLeeuw[107]
Christine S. Dingee
J. Louise Findley
Harmony L. Glashower
Joanne M. Gram
Denise G. Hettinger
Sarah J. Ledford[108]
Marco C. Masciulli[109]
Bethann M. Nurenberg
Cathy M. Pawlus
Andrew H. Phelps
Cindi M. Quinn-Ventura[110]
Robert A. Rankey[111]
Natalie M. Stewart
Gretchen W. Villarreal
Joy E. Yearout

DEPARTMENTAL SPECIALISTS

Jenifer L. Esch
Rachel S. Hurley[112]

DEPARTMENTAL SUPERVISOR

Jane E. Feeley

DEPARTMENTAL TECHNICIANS

Barbara J. Baldwin[113]
Beverly J. Ballinger
Jackie E. Crockett
Nancy L. Davis[114]
Michelle R. Doerr
Beth A. Doyle-Steadman
Chynessia M. Evans
Stephanie L. Grace
Kimberly E. Harps
Margo J. Heinonen[115]
Latasha C. Madison
Mitzi F. Mertens
Melody L. O'Keefe
Margaret M. Perrin

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[101] Retired 12/31/2010
[102] Retired 10/29/2010
[103] Retired 12/31/2010
[104] Retired 12/31/2010
[105] Retired 12/31/2010
[106] Separated 7/1/2009
[107] Separated 3/5/2010
[108] Separated 12/31/2010
[109] Separated 8/11/2010
[110] Separated 12/10/2010
[111] Transferred 12/31/2010
[112] Separated 6/1/2010
[113] Retired 12/31/2010
[114] Retired 12/31/2010
[115] Laid off 6/5/2009

Angelita Ripley
Cynthia A. Scott[116]

DIRECTOR OF CONSTITUENT RELATIONS

Benjamin L. Morlock[117]

FISCAL MANAGEMENT STAFF

James Selleck, Director
Kari L. Anders
Beth L. Ball
Joey R. Bengel
Susan A. Bristol
Cathy D. Knott

HUMAN RESOURCES STAFF

Douglas J. Bramble, Director
Julie A. Campbell
Veronica E. Estrada
Mary V. Joy[118]
Darcelle D. Purves
Valerie A. Schmidt
Irene A. Winter[119]

INVESTIGATORS

Peter B. Ackerly
Lynne M. Barron
Melanie M. Briggs
Donald W. Christy, Jr.
James P. Clickner
Dale E. Collins
Linda L. Damer
Robert L. Dausman, Jr.
William E. Dennis[120]
Thomas C. Fuller[121]
Tracy L. Greenwood
Dennis G. Kapelanski[122]
Robert D. Kraft
Jacquelyn M. Lack[123]
Jessica L. Long[124]
Gordon J. Malaniak
James A. May
Martin J. May
Adolph McQueen, Jr.
DaNeil Mitchell[125]
Stephen C. Morse
Donovan Motley
John C. Mulvaney
Joshua B. Newton
Mike Ondejko
Robert R. Peplinski
David M. Ruiz
Dena L. Smith
Daniel C. Southwell
Rollie E. Stephens[126]
Thomas A. Stroemer[127]
Robert M. Tramel
Rebecca A. Treber[128]
James W. Wood

PARALEGALS

Dana L. Bonaudo[129]
Lindsay D. Burr[130]
Colleen N. Ells
Amy L. Kirksey
Martin J. May
Diane M. Micale
Cathy I. Murray
Jessica P. Orrell[131]
Amy J. Reed

PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS COORDINATING COUNCIL

Thomas M. Robertson, Director
Dan Barnette
Marcia A. Beatty

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[116] Retired 12/31/2010
[117] Separated 12/31/2010
[118] Retired 12/31/2010
[119] Retired 3/30/2010
[120] Retired 6/30/2009
[121] Retired 6/30/2010
[122] Retired 12/31/2010
[123] Retired 12/31/2010
[124] Separated 11/3/2010
[125] Separated 11/12/2010
[126] Separated 1/9/2010
[127] Retired 12/31/2010
[128] Retired 10/29/2010
[129] Laid off 5/29/2009
[130] Separated 9/11/2009
[131] Laid off 5/29/2009

Kim W. Eddie
John P. Goergen[132]
Myra J. Holmi[133]
Louise A. Loftus
Karen G. Maleitzke[134]
Joey K. Schueller[135]
Nancy J. St. Pierre[136]
Beverly A. Thelen
Matthew K. Wade

PURCHASING PROCUREMENT STAFF

Craig A. Farr
Pamela J. Platte[137]

REGULATION AGENT

Mark Kachar

SECRETARIES/CLERICALS

Lisa S. Albro
Stephanie Andreadis[138]
Linda S. Andreas
Deborah S. Andrews
Cheryl L. Anthony[139]
Jodie L. Arnett
Janice K. Atkins[140]
Bobbi J. Ballinger
Brenda L. Barton
Denise A. Beechler
Susan J. Bertram[141]
Virginia K. Beurkens
Tina L. Bibbs
Cheryl S. Bliss
Alyssa R. Bos
Sonya G. Bradley
Patricia J. Braithwaite
Scheryl S. Brooks
Irene D. Brown
Denise J. Bruckman[142]
Danielle M. Bucci[143]
Mary C. Burke-Gianino
Wendy J. Cadwell
Janis L. Cameron[144]
Robbin S. Clickner[145]
Rhonda M. Cole[146]
Kathleen M. Cotter[147]
Michelle I. Courtright[148]
Michelle M. Curtis-Cataline
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Shelene K. Fasnaugh
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Betty A. Gauthier
Mary E. Gee
Julie A. Gerszewski
Nicholas E. Gobbo
Cheryl A. Goff[155]
Amy A. Gonea
Holly L. Gustafson
Sara B. Haase
Erika L. Hamilton
Diana M. Hanks
Carolyn A. Harris
Nancy E. Hart
Kathy A. Hall
Darlene K. Heilner
Alisa S. Hill

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[132] Retired 12/31/2010
[133] Retired 12/31/2010
[134] Retired 12/31/2010
[135] Retired 12/31/2010
[136] Retired 1/29/2010
[137] Transferred 10/30/2009
[138] Retired 4/17/2009
[139] Separated 9/14/2009
[140] Laid off 5/29/2009
[141] Retired 10/30/2009
[142] Retired 12/31/2010
[143] Transferred 5/15/2009
[144] Separated 4/17/2009
[145] Retired 10/29/2010
[146] Transferred 2/6/2009
[147] Transferred 3/6/2009
[148] Laid off 6/26/2009
[149] Transferred 1/9/2009
[150] Laid off 6/5/2009
[151] Separated 4/17/2009
[152] Laid off 5/29/2009
[153] Retired 12/31/2010
[154] 12/31/2010
[155] Retired 12/31/2010

Michael J. Holcomb
Lois J. Hopkins
Karyn B. Howd[156]
Lynne L. Huber
Jackie M. Isaac
Starkema T. Jackson[157]
Cynthia A. Jakus
Tracie L. James[158]
Randalyn G. Jegla[159]
Melissa M. Jenson
Ann J. Jones
Veronica L. Kelly
Laurel E. Kienitz[160]
Marciel E. Kihn[161]
Judy G. Kilduff
Angela K. Kilvington[162]
Patricia A. Klein
Ann T. Lantzy
Rebekah A. LaPan
Michele L. Lemmon
Tracy A. Lewis
Karen E. Lockwood[163]
Sylvia MacGregor
Susan E. Macias
Bertha L. Mathis
Mary E. McGinnis[164]
Joleen A. McQuiston
Vickie A. Miner[165]
Lauren J. Morrish
Annette L. Murphy
Kimborly S. Musser
Laura Nageotte
Aimee L. Nelson
Denise L. O'Brien
Nancy M. O'Shea
Mary A. Pasch[166]
Sharon M. Pavlik[167]
Denise L. Pawloski[168]
DeLynn M. Pettit[169]
Pier M. Piepenbrok
Pamela A. Pung
Clarisse Y. Ramey
Marilyn Reed
Denise R. Richards
Cherie A. Richie
Phyllis I. Ried[170]
Rhonda S. Robison[171]
Cynthia M. Ruff[172]
Cristie A. Schafer[173]
Kelly J. Schumaker
Jeri M. Sherwood[174]
Mary E. Sigfred[175]
Carol L. Simon[176]
Lori L. Smith
Staci J. Sova
Jacqueline M. Szymanski
Myrna L. Tate[177]
Cindy K. Tessman[178]
Barbara A. Teszlewicz
Joan P. Tharp
Jodi M. Thomas[179]
Wendy L. Todd
Meagan R. Touhey
Pamela A. Walters-Whalon
Randy L. Wood
Anna J. Yott

SPECIAL ASSISTANTS TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

Mikhail A. Fedewa[180]
Richard L. Fish[181]

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[156] Transferred 2/20/2009
[157] Transferred 3/19/2010
[158] Transferred 12/25/2010
[159] Retired 10/29/2010
[160] Laid off 6/5/2009
[161] Retired 10/29/2010
[162] Voluntarily Laid off 5/22/2009
[163] Retired 12/31/2010
[164] Appointment Expired 6/5/2009
[165] Transferred 2/20/2009
[166] Transferred 9/17/2010
[167] Retired 12/31/2010
[168] Separated 3/27/2009
[169] Retired 6/26/2009
[170] Retired 10/29/2010
[171] Transferred 10/15/2010
[172] Retired 10/29/2010
[173] Retired 12/31/2010
[174] Retired 1/29/2010
[175] Transferred 9/4/2009
[176] Transferred 3/6/2009
[177] Separated 12/31/2009
[178] Separated 7/8/2009
[179] Laid off 5/29/2009
[180] Separated 10/22/2010
[181] Separated 5/28/2010

STEPHEN R. KLEIN[182]
MICHAEL G. RAAD[183]

STATE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR

MATHEW R. FRENDEWEY[184]

STATE OFFICE ADMINISTRATORS

CHRISTOPHER J. HACKBARTH[185]
GERALD J. HILLS[186]

STOREKEEPER

JANICE J. PLIN

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[182] SEPARATED 6/14/2010

[183] SEPARATED 10/29/2010

[184] SEPARATED 11/26/2010

[185] SEPARATED 9/8/2009

[186] SEPARATED 9/3/2009

THUMBNAIL SKETCHES
OF
ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL

STEPHANIE A. ACHENBACH

Michigan State University, B.A. Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2000. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 2003.

RICHARD M. C. ADAMS

Oakland University, B.A. University of Detroit, M.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1980. Veteran of the Vietnam War. Appointed Assistant Attorney General September 1987.

TODD B. ADAMS

Miami University, B.A. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1984. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 1986 - August 1999. Reappointed December 2002.

SYED S. AHMED

University of Michigan, B.A. Seton Hall University School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Florida 1998; Michigan, January 2004. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 2006.

TONATZIN M. ALFARO-MAIZ

Michigan State University, B.A. Valparaiso Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law August 1984. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 1985.

DANIELLE R. ALLISON-YOKOM

Central Michigan University, B.S. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 2008.

CYNTHIA A. ARCARO

Michigan State University, B.A. Grand Valley State University, M.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1994. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 2004.

COREY A. ARENDT

Carthage College, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 2008. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2008.

DAN V. ARTAEV

Kalamazoo College, B.A. Michigan State University, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2010. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

ROSENDO ASEVEDO, JR.

Michigan State University, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law March 1978. Veteran of the Vietnam War. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1985.

ANDREA D. BAILEY

Western Michigan University, B.S. Eastern Michigan University, M.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 1995. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 1996.

SUSAN K. BALKEMA

University of Michigan, B.A. Loyola University of Chicago, School of Law, J.D. Specialty Certificate in Health Law. Admitted to practice law in Illinois, November 2002; Michigan, November 2003. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 2004.

LINUS R. BANGHART-LINN

Michigan State University, B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2009. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

ELIZABETH A. BARASH

University of California, Los Angeles, B.A. Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 2001. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

CORI E. BARKMAN

University of Michigan, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2003. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 2004.

SARAH E. BARNES

University of Michigan, B.A. DePaul University College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2010. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

PATRICIA S. BARONE

University of Michigan, B.G.S. Antioch School of Law, Washington, D.C., J.D. Admitted to practice law in Washington, D.C., 1978; Michigan, November 1978. Appointed Assistant Attorney General May 1984.

KATHARYN A. BARRON

University of Notre Dame, B.A., J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1991. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1992.

MARGARET A. BARTINDALE

Alma College, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Wayne State University, LL.M. Admitted to practice law July 1988. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 1990. Resigned June 1992. Reappointed November 1995.

DENISE C. BARTON

Michigan State University, B.A. Georgetown University, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Pennsylvania, November 1978; Michigan, September 1988. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1988.

ROBERT W. BEACH

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Toledo College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2009. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2010.

H. DANIEL BEATON, JR.

Marquette University, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1990. Appointed Assistant Attorney General May 1990.

BRAD H. BEAVER

University of Michigan, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1993. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 1996.

JULIA R. BELL

Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Michigan, September 1983; California, 1985. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 1987.

MICHAEL R. BELL

University of Colorado, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law, May 1993. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 2004.

ROSS H. BISHOP

Michigan State University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Veteran of the Vietnam War. Admitted to practice law May 1976. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1978.

PHILIP L. BLADEN

University of Wisconsin, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1997. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 1997.

E. JOHN BLANCHARD

University of Michigan, B.G.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 1978. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1978.

JACK A. BLUMENKOPK

Wayne State University, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 1974. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1974.

DANIEL P. BOCK

University of Michigan, B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 2008.

HENRY J. BOYNTON

Michigan State University, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Michigan, October 1975; Florida, 1975. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1976. Appointed Assistant Solicitor General December 2002.

ROBERT L. BRACKENBURY

Eastern Michigan University, B.S, M.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1999. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 2003.

CHRISTOPHER W. BRAVERMAN

Michigan State University, B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2006. Appointed Assistant Attorney General September 2008.

SARAH K. BRENNER

Grand Valley State University, B.B.A. Grand Valley State University, M.B.A. Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 2003. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 2004.

DAVID D. BRICKEY

Michigan State University, B.A. DePaul University College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1993. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 1999.

BARBARA J. BROWN

University of Vermont, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1987. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 1987. Resigned January 2004. Reappointed January 2008.

LARRY F. BRYA

Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1976. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 1976.

STEVEN M. CABADAS

Western Michigan University, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 1985. Appointed Assistant Attorney General September 2003.

THOMAS C. CAMERON

Western Michigan University, B.B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1996. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 2003.

CHRISTINE M. CAMPBELL

Michigan State University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Michigan May 1980; Florida, 1982. Appointed Assistant Attorney General September 1986.

WILLIAM C. CAMPBELL

Wayne State University, B.A. University of Detroit School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1986. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1988.

DAVID C. CANNON

University of Michigan, B.A. United States Army War College, M.S.S. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1980. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1986.

RAY W. CARDEW, JR.

Wayne State University, B.S. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1972. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 1978.

DEBORAH L. CARLEY

Albion College, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1990. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 2009.

KELLY A. CARTER

Alma College, B.A. University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1996. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 1997.

KATHLEEN L. CAVANAUGH

Michigan State University, B.S. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1985. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1987.

WILLIAM A. CHENOWETH

Alma College, B.A. University of Notre Dame Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 1977. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 1981.

ANDREA M. CHRISTENSEN

University of Michigan, B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 2008. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 2008.

SUANN D. COCHRAN

Eastern Michigan University, B.S., M.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1983. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1984.

TODD H. COHAN

Michigan State University, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1976. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1977.

GEORGE G. CONSTANCE

Albion College, B.A. Central Michigan University, M.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1987. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

LAURA A. COOK

Central Michigan University, B.S. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 1991. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 1999.

FELICIA M. COURTRIGHT

Eastern Michigan University, B.S. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1994. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 2004.

KEVIN J. COX

University of Michigan, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1984. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

RICHARD L. CUNNINGHAM

Eastern Michigan, B.A. University of Detroit School of Law, J.D. Veteran of the Vietnam War. Admitted to practice law May 1979. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 2008.

JULIUS O. CURLING

University of Michigan, B.A. Valparaiso University School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1998. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 2002.

JOHN D. DAKMAK

University of Detroit, B.S. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1998. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2004.

JESSICA A. DANOU

Hillsdale College, B.A. Catholic University of America-Columbus School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law February 2001. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 2005.

MARK F. DAVIDSON

Wayne State University, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1980. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1985.

MICHAEL R. DEAN

Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 2008.

JON M. DEHORN

University of Michigan, A.B. Indiana University, J.D. Admitted to practice law April 1975. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1975.

JAMES P. DELANEY

University of Detroit, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1977. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1978.

WILLIAM F. DENNER

Michigan State University, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2005. Appointed Assistant Attorney General May 2005.

BRIAN D. DEVLIN

University of Michigan, B.G.S. University of Detroit School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1982. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1984. Transferred December 1999. Reappointed May 2005.

DARNELLE DICKERSON

Wayne State University, B.S. University of Detroit Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1983. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 2002.

ALLISON M. DIETZ

University of Toledo, B.S. University of Toledo College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Ohio, November 2002; Michigan, March 2010. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 2010.

ROBIN E. DILLARD

Xavier University of Louisiana, B.A. Wayne State University, M.A. University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 2008.

SUZANNE R. DILLMAN

Butler University, B.S. Indiana University School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Indiana, November 2002; Michigan, May 2004. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 2004.

MICHAEL J. DITTENBER

University of Michigan, B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2008. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

HEATHER L. DONALD

Michigan State University, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1997. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 2003. Separated June 2007. Reappointed April 2010.

MARK E. DONNELLY

University of Michigan, B.G.S. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1986. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1986.

JONATHAN E. DUCKWORTH

Ferris State University, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2005. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 2008.

HEATHER M. S. DURIAN

Calvin College, B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2004. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2004.

BRUCE H. EDWARDS

Oral Roberts University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1983. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

YASMIN J. ELIAS

University of Michigan-Dearborn, B.A. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 1996. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 2002.

KELLY K. ELIZONDO

University of Michigan, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1991. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 2008.

GEORGE M. ELWORTH

Stanford University, A.B. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Served in United States Army 1964-1966. Admitted to practice law in Georgia and Illinois, 1969; Michigan, August 1974. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 1974.

RONALD W. EMERY

Michigan State University, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 1974. Appointed Assistant Attorney General September 1975.

DONALD E. ERICKSON

University of Michigan, B.A., J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1971. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 1978.

STACY L. ERWIN-OAKES

Saginaw Valley State University, Ferris State University, B.A. Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University, J.D. Admitted to practice law February 2002. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 2002.

JASON R. EVANS

Michigan State University, B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2003. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 2005.

BRIAN W. FARKAS

Holy Cross College, A.A. University of Notre Dame, B.A. Ave Maria School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law August 2010. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2010.

RONALD H. FARNUM

Oakland University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1979. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 1980.

JAMES T. FARRELL

Central Michigan University, B.S. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1983. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1998.

MICHAEL P. FARRELL

Grand Valley State University, B.A. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1997. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 2005.

JOHN G. FEDYNSKY

Georgetown University, B.A. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2004. Appointed Assistant Attorney General September 2008.

CHANTAL B. FENNESSEY

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Detroit School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1989. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1989. Resigned 2004. Reappointed November 2010.

ELAINE D. FISCHHOFF

Wayne State University, B.A., J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1974. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 1976.

JENNIFER M. FITZGERALD

University of Richmond, B.A. Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington. Admitted to practice law November 1999. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 2005.

KATHLEEN P. FITZGERALD

Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1980. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 1997.

PATRICK M. FITZGERALD

Kalamazoo College, B.A. University of Toledo, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2006. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2006.

STEVEN B. FLANCHER

Northern Michigan University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1993. Appointed Assistant Attorney General May 1993.

NATHANIEL E.B. FORSTNER

Bowdoin College, B.A. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1998. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 2010.

DARRIN F. FOWLER

Michigan State University, B.A. Notre Dame Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1997. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1997.

PHILLIP I. FRAME

Eastern Michigan University, B.B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1986. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1990.

KEVIN L. FRANCART

University of Michigan, Flint, A.B. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law July 2001. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2003.

MOSHE FREEDMAN

Walsh College, B.A. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2010. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

MICHAEL G. FREZZA

University of Michigan, B.B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1992. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 1997.

LEO H. FRIEDMAN

Eastern Michigan University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1976. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1976.

JOSEPH T. FROEHLICH

Eastern Michigan University, B.S. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 2008. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 2009. Laid off June 2009. Reappointed November 2010.

LUANN CHEYNE FROST

Lake Superior State University, B.S. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1989. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1989.

ALISON A. FURTAW

Oakland University, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1996. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 2008.

DEBRA M. GAGLIARDI

University of Michigan, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1983. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1997.

BRIAN S. GALIN

Michigan State University, B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2000. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 2005.

KATHLEEN A. GARDINER

Wayne State University, Oakland University, B.A. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1991. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 1994.

JASON A. GEISSLER

Michigan State University, B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 2006. Appointed Assistant Attorney General September 2008.

CELESTE R. GILL

Michigan State University, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1996. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 2005.

CARLO P. GINOTTI

Western Michigan University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1988. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 2005.

KATHLEEN A. GLEESON

Michigan State University, B.S. Duquesne University School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1996. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 1997.

JAMES W. GLENNIE

University of Michigan, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1985. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1985.

HOWARD E. GOLDBERG

Wayne State University, B.A., J.D. Admitted to practice law January 1971. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 1971.

DAVID H. GOODKIN

Grand Valley State University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 2006. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 2008.

PAUL D. GOODRICH

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Michigan, M.A. Indiana University, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 1974. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1974.

JENNIFER L. GORDON

Eastern Michigan University, B.S. University of Detroit, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1998. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1998.

NEIL D. GORDON

University of Michigan, B.S. George Washington University, J.D. Admitted to practice law January 1991. Appointed Assistant Attorney General May 1997.

A. PETER GOVORCHIN

Grand Valley State College. Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 1980. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 1980.

TERRENCE P. GRADY

University of Detroit, A.B. University of Detroit School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1969. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1969.

JUSTIN A. GRAY

Northern Michigan University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 2010. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 2010.

BRIAN G. GREEN

Western Michigan University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 2001. Appointed Assistant Attorney General September 2008.

PULVINDER K. GREWAL

University of Michigan, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Loyola University Law School, LL.M. Admitted to practice law November 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 2008.

ERIK A. GRILL

University of Dearborn, B.A. Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2002. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 2002.

CHRISTINA M. GROSSI

Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2004. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

SOCORRO GUERRERO

University of Michigan, B.A. University of Toledo College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Michigan, October 1977; Texas, 1983. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 1989.

CHARLES D. HACKNEY

Kalamazoo College, B.A. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law January 1968. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 1968.

FELEPE H. HALL

Wayne State University, B.A. Ohio Northern University, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1999. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 2004.

LINDA K. HANDREN

Barry University, B.A. Middlebury College, M.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2000. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2000.

WALLACE T. HART

University of Michigan-Flint, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 1977. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1977.

SUZANNE HASSAN

Wayne State University, B.A. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2004. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 2005.

JASON D. HAWKINS

Michigan State University, B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 2008.

TIMOTHY J. HAYNES

Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Michigan, May 1988; Florida, February 1989. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 2006.

JAMES W. HEATH

Michigan State University, B.A. Chicago-Kent College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 2003. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2007.

KEVIN R. HIMEBAUGH

Hope College, B.A. Western Illinois University, M.S. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1998. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1998.

JESSICA L. HODGSON

Oakland University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 2002. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 2004.

ALAN F. HOFFMAN

Ohio Northern University, B.A. Ohio Northern University School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 1974. Appointed Assistant Attorney General May 1977.

PEGGY A. HOUSNER

Saginaw Valley College, Central Michigan University, B.S. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1992. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 1996.

RAYMOND O. HOWD

University of Michigan, B.A. University of Detroit, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 1985. Appointed Assistant Attorney General September 1985.

JAMES C. HOWELL

Saginaw Valley State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1980. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 2005. Resigned April 2006. Reappointed March 2007.

STEVEN D. HUGHEY

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Detroit, J.D. Wayne State University, LL.M. Admitted to practice law December 1980. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1988.

SHANNON H. HUSBAND

University of Michigan, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1999. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 2000.

ROLAND HWANG

University of Michigan, B.S., M.B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D., LL.M. Admitted to practice law February 1981. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1988.

ROBERT IANNI

Wayne State University, B.S. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 1974. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1974.

PATRICK F. ISOM

Wayne State University, B.A. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1972. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1972.

DAWN C. M. JACK

Iowa State University, B.S. Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2002. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2005.

JENNIFER M. JACKSON

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Wisconsin Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Wisconsin and Illinois, 2001; Michigan, July 2004. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 2008.

CHRISTOPHER M. JACOBSON

Western Michigan University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Wayne State University Law School, LL.M. Admitted to practice law November 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

MOLLY M. JASON

University of Notre Dame, B.B.A. Miami University, M.B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1995. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 1997.

ROBERT J. JENKINS

Grand Valley State University, B.S. Northern Illinois University, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 2008.

JULIE M. JENSEN

University of Michigan, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1992. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2003.

TONYA C. JETER

Wayne State University, B.A., J.D. Admitted to practice law July 2000. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 2000.

BRUCE C. JOHNSON

Princeton University, A.B. University of Cincinnati, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law Ohio, October 1984; Pennsylvania, November 1985; North Carolina, May 1991; Michigan, May 2001. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 2006.

DAPHNE M. JOHNSON

Michigan State University, B.A. Western Michigan University, M.P.A. Michigan State University College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2000. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 2002.

THOMAS C. JOHNSON

Western Michigan University, B.S. University of Detroit, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1978. Appointed Assistant Attorney General May 1980.

HEIDI L. JOHNSON-MEHNEY

Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2003. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 2005.

JASON S. JULIAN

Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1986. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 1988.

KATHERINE A. KAKISH

University of Jordan, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2001. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 2004.

RICHARD M. KAROUB

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Detroit, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1984. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 1986.

SERENE KATRANJI-ZENI

University of Michigan-Dearborn, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 2006. Appointed Assistant Attorney General September 2006. Resigned February 2007. Reappointed August 2007.

MATTHEW C. KECK

Albion College, B.A. Duke University School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1999. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1999.

RHONDI B. KELLER

University of Michigan, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1998. Appointed Assistant Attorney General May 2000.

COLLEEN M. KELLY

University of Notre Dame, B.A. Western Michigan University, M.A. University of Michigan, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 2006. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2007.

SEAN D. KERMAN

University of Michigan, B.A. University of Detroit Mercy, M.B.A., J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1996. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 1997.

CHRISTOPHER L. KERR

Michigan State University, B.A. Indiana University, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1997. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 2005.

MICHAEL O. KING, JR.

Binghamton University, B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2008.

MORRIS J. KLAU

University of Michigan, B.G.S. University of Detroit, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1982. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 1983.

TIMOTHY F. KONIECZNY

University of Michigan, Aquinas College, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1976. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1983.

RAINA I. KORBAKIS

Michigan State University, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1996. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1997.

PETER T. KOTULA

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Notre Dame, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1988. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1992.

KAREN K. KUCHEK

Central Michigan University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J. D. Admitted to practice law May 1992. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 2002.

THOMAS A. KULICK

University of Notre Dame, A.B. University of Detroit, M.B.A., J.D. Admitted to practice law August 1971. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 1979.

ALAN J. LAMBERT

Wayne State University, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1993. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1998.

H. STEVEN LANGSCHWAGER

Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1997. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 1997.

BRIAN A. LAVICTOIRE

Michigan State University, B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 2010. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

T. DAVID LAW

University of Notre Dame, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law March 1995. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 2009.

A. MICHAEL LEFFLER

Michigan State University, B.A., M.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 1974. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1974.

Susan I. Leffler

University of Michigan, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1978. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 1980.

Andrew J. Lemke

Elgin Community College, A.L.S. North Central College, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 2008.

Melinda A. Leonard

Taylor University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Indiana, 2000; Michigan, February 2002. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2004.

Thomas L. Leonard

University of Michigan, B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

John F. Leone

University of Michigan, B.G.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 1986. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 1997.

Vincent J. Leone

University of Michigan, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 1974. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1974.

Jessica E. LePine

Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1993. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1997.

Anica Letica

University of Michigan, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 1985. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 2009.

Larry W. Lewis

Virginia State University, B.A. University of Michigan, M.S.W. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law February 1987. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1989.

Mary Elizabeth Lippitt

Michigan State University, B.S. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2006. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 2008.

JOHN R. LISKEY

Michigan State University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1980. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 2005.

MICHAEL A. LOCKMAN

Wayne State University, B.A., J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1967. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1968.

JAMES E. LONG

Michigan State University, B.A. George Mason University School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1995. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 1996.

IRIS M. LOPEZ

Marygrove College, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1977. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 2000.

JONATHAN S. LUDWIG

University of Michigan, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2002. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 2008.

JOHN P. MACK

Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1978. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 1990.

THOMAS E. MAIER

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1982. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

S. PETER MANNING

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law January 1992. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1994.

JOSHUA D. MARCUM

Miami University, B.A. University of Tennessee Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Ohio, November 2002; Michigan, June 2005; Tennessee, December 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 2010.

MARY KATHLEEN MARKMAN

Ohio State University; Wilmington College, B.A. University of Cincinnati College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Ohio, 1974; Michigan, July 1991. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 2005.

THOMAS S. MARKS

Michigan Technological University, B.S. Michigan State University, College of Human Medicine, M.D. Grand Valley State University, M.B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2006. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2006.

HAROLD J. MARTIN

University of Michigan, Michigan State University, B.S. American University, Washington College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1986. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1988.

ROBERT J. MARTIN

Macomb County Community College, A.A. Oakland University, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 1975. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1990.

MARK W. MATUS

Grand Valley State College, B.S. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1984. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1985.

JACQUELYN A. MCCLINTON

University of Phoenix, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D., M.A. Veteran of the Persian Gulf War. Admitted to practice law May 2005. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 2005.

EMILY A. MCDONOUGH

Michigan State University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 2009. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

LINDA P. MCDOWELL

Wayne State University, B.A., J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1978. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1990.

PATRICK MCELMURRY

University of Detroit, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1971. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 1972.

DONALD S. MCGEHEE

Northern Michigan University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1985. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1985.

JESSICA A. MCGIVNEY

Michigan State University, B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2002. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

JOEL D. MCGORMLEY

Miami University, B.A. University of Toledo College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1999. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 2000.

KYLE P. MCLAUGHLIN

University of Michigan, B.A. Wayne State University, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2008. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 2009.

KELLEY T. MCLEAN

Albion College, B.A. University of Detroit, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 1997. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 1998.

JULIE A. MCMURTRY

University of Michigan, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1994. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 1997.

HEATHER S. MEINGAST

Michigan State University, B.A. Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1998. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 2004. Appointed Assistant Attorney General for Law December 2009.

JAMES W. METZ II

Michigan State University, B.A. Michigan State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1998. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 2010.

GERALD C. MILLER

University of Michigan, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 1975. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 1992.

JEANMARIE MILLER

University of Michigan, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1990. Appointed Assistant Attorney General May 2010.

ROBERT L. MOL

University of Michigan, B.G.S. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1984. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 1988.

WILLIAM E. MOLNER

Eastern Michigan University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1976. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1976.

FRANK J. MONTICELLO

Grand Rapids Junior College, A.D., Michigan State University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1984. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1985.

LAURA L. MOODY

Liberty University, B.S. University of Detroit, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1994. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 1997.

MICHAEL E. MOODY

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Detroit Mercy, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1994. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1995.

SUSAN B. MOODY-FREZZA

Michigan State University, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1987. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1988. Resigned June 2004. Reappointed December 2010.

LAMAR D. MORELAND

Wayne State University, B.S. Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law March 1999. Appointed Assistant Attorney General September 2004.

WILLIAM R. MORRIS

University of Michigan, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1980. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1983.

BRADLEY K. MORTON

United States Merchant Marine Academy, B.S. University of Toledo College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1996. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 2006.

SHENIQUE A. MOSS

Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D., LL.M. Admitted to practice law May 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 2008.

MICHAEL F. MURPHY

Wayne State University, B.A. University of Detroit, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1978. Appointed Assistant Attorney General May 1989.

SCOTT J. NAJOR

Michigan State University, B.A. John Marshall Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law July 2006. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 2010.

BRIAN O. NEILL

University of Michigan-Dearborn, B.A. Ohio Northern University, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2001. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 2005.

MARGARET A. NELSON

Nazareth College at Kalamazoo, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1979. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1983.

MICHAEL S. NEWELL

Northern Michigan University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law January 2006. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 2008.

MICHAEL A. NICKERSON

Eastern Michigan University, A.B. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 1975. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1975.

PATRICK J. O'BRIEN

Sacred Heart Seminary College, Wayne State University, B.A. Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1977. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 1977.

LINDA M. OLIVIERI

State University of New York at Brockport, B.S. University of Notre Dame, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 1977. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 1988.

MICHAEL J. ORRIS

Michigan State University, B.A. Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 1996. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 2003.

JOSEPH A. ORTIZ

Adrian College, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2008. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 2009.

JOHN S. PALLAS

University of Michigan-Dearborn, B.S. Wayne State University, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Michigan, May 1989; Florida, June 1999. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 2010.

JACK M. PANITCH

Franklin & Marshall College, B.A. Hofstra University School of Law, J.D. New York University School of Law, LL.M. Admitted to practice law in New York, 1987; District of Columbia, 1992; Pennsylvania, 1997; Michigan, May 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

DARRYL J. PAQUETTE

University of Rhode Island, B.A., M.A. University of South Carolina, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Rhode Island, October 2000; Michigan, February 2010. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 2010.

D. J. PASCOE

Eastern Michigan University, B.B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1995. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1998.

AMY M. PATTERSON

University of Michigan-Flint, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2003. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2005.

ORONDE C. PATTERSON

Michigan State University, B.S. University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1997. Appointed Assistant Attorney General September 2004.

DONNA L. PENDERGAST

University of Michigan, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law February 1988. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2003.

SANTE J. PERRELLI

Michigan State University, University of Michigan, B.G.S. University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1980. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1997.

WILLIAM F. PETTIT

University of Michigan, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1986. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 1999.

HERMAN G. PETZOLD III

University of San Francisco, B.S. University of Notre Dame, M.B.A. Case Western Reserve University, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1988. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 2010.

DENNIS J. PHENEY, JR.

Albion College, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law January 1994. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2008.

JONATHAN C. PIERCE

Michigan State University, B.A. Villanova University, J.D. Admitted to practice law February 1992. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1992.

LINDA M. PIETROSKI

Western Michigan University, B.S. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1993. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 2004.

JOSEPH P. PITTEL

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Detroit Mercy, M.B.A. University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2005. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 2008.

JOSEPH E. POTCHEN

Michigan State University, B.A. Loyola University of Chicago, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Illinois, 1990; Michigan, March 1994. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1994.

DOUGLAS G. POWE

Sacred Heart Seminary College, B.A. Henry Ford Hospital School of Nursing, RN. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1984. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 2008.

ANDREW T. PRINS

Hope College, B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2006. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 2008.

RUSSELL E PRINS

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, S.B. Stanford University, J.D. Admitted to practice law in 1966. Military service 1966-1969. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1970.

SUSAN PRZEKOP-SHAW

University of Michigan, B.S. University of Tennessee, College of Law, Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1979. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1989.

C. ADAM PURNELL

Central Michigan University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1997. Appointed Assistant Attorney General May 2000.

THOMAS QUASARANO

University of Detroit, B.A., M.A. University of South Carolina School of Law, J.D. Wayne State University, LL.M. Admitted to practice law October 1977. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 1988.

PATRICIA T. QUINN

University of Michigan, B.A. Oakland University, M.A.T. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. United States Peace Corps, 1970-1971. United States Teacher Corps, 1972-1974. Admitted to practice law November 1982. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1985.

DENNIS J. RATERINK

Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1995. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 2002.

VICTORIA A. REARDON

Duquesne University, University of Pittsburgh, B.A. University of Akron, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 1988. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1998.

ROBERT P. REICHEL

University of Michigan, B.A., J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1980. Appointed Assistant Attorney General September 1983.

MICHAEL J. REILLY

Kalamazoo College, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1989. Appointed Assistant Attorney General May 2000.

LOUIS B. REINWASSER

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1980. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2008.

B. ERIC RESTUCCIA

University of Pennsylvania, B.A. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1993. Appointed Assistant Attorney General September 2003. Appointed Solicitor General July 2008.

STEPHEN M. RIDEOUT

Alma College, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1986. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 1986.

JAMES E. RILEY

Michigan State University, B.S., M.B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Michigan, August 1974; Florida, 1976. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 1974.

SANTIAGO RIOS

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Notre Dame, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Illinois, 1975; Michigan, June 1993. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1995.

JUANDISHA H. ROBINSON

Western Michigan University, B.B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2002. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 2004.

RON D. ROBINSON

Dartmouth College, B.A. University of Detroit, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1983. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1984.

WILLIAM A. ROLLSTIN

Ferris State University, B.S. University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1987. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 2004.

KANDY C. RONAYNE

Eastern Kentucky University, B.A., M.S. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1984. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 1998.

MERRY A. ROSENBERG

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Minnesota, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1980. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1984.

SCOTT R. ROTHERMEL

Lansing Community College, A.A. Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2007.

ADAM S. RUBIN

University of Michigan, B.A. University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2008. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2008.

DEREK G. RUSSAW

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 2007.

SARA B. RYAN

Western Michigan University, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1992. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

MARK G. SANDS

University of Iowa, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 2004. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2007.

SUZAN M. SANFORD

Central Michigan University, B.S. University of Wisconsin Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1987. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 1988.

SPENCER A. SATTLER

Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 2008.

THOMAS P. SCALLEN

John Carroll University, A.B. University of Detroit School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1973. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1985.

BETHANY L. SCHEIB

Western Michigan University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 1996. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 1997.

JOHN C. SCHERBARTH

University of Michigan, A.B. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law October 1975. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1983.

Charles C. Schettler, Jr.

University of Michigan, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Served in United States Navy 1972-1975. Veteran of the Vietnam War. Admitted to practice law November 1978. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1978.

Thomas F. Schimpf

University of Detroit, B.A. New York University, J.D. Admitted to practice law in New Jersey, 1972; Michigan, December 1973. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1973.

Barbara A. Schmidt

Harper Hospital School of Nursing, R.N. Wayne State University, B.S.N. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1987. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 1988.

Clifton B. Schneider

University of Michigan, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2007.

Mark V. Schoen

Albion College, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1973. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1988.

Jeffrey M. Schroder

Albion College, B.A. Wayne State University, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2001. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

Lauryl A. Scott

Central Michigan University, B.A.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law February 1994. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 2004.

Marie Shamraj

Michigan State University, B.A., M.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1991. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 1992.

James C. Shell

Hope College, Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 1989. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 1989.

Ann M. Sherman

University of South Florida, B.A., M.A. Northwestern University, M.M. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2004. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 2005.

PATRICIA L. SHERROD

University of Detroit, A.B. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1976. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 1979.

ANDREW L. SHIRVELL

University of Michigan, B.A. Ave Maria School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General May 2007.

DAVID W. SILVER

University of Michigan, B.A. University of Kentucky, J.D. Admitted to practice law April 1975. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1975.

BRIDGET K. SMITH

Alma College, B.A. University of Notre Dame Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2007. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

JARROD T. SMITH

Michigan State University, B.S. Michigan State University College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2003. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 2004.

JOSHUA S. SMITH

Oakland University, B.A. Michigan State University, M.A. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2001. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2006.

KEVIN T. SMITH

Northern Michigan University, B.S. University of Michigan, M.S., J.D. Admitted to practice law July 1981. Appointed Assistant Attorney General May 1984.

KRISTIN M. SMITH

Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1992. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 1997.

TRACY A. SONNEBORN

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Munich; Indiana University; University of Michigan Law School, J.D., M.B.A. Admitted to practice law June 1988. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1992.

DANIEL E. SONNEVELDT

Western Michigan University, B.B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2000. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2000.

ALLAN J. SOROS

University of Steubenville, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1990. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1990.

ERIC M. ST. ONGE

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Arkansas at Little Rock, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 1997. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 2010.

GEORGE N. STEVENSON

Wayne State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1986. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 1988.

PAMELA J. STEVENSON

Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1987. Appointed Assistant Attorney General October 1988.

RODNEY D. STEWART

University of Illinois at Chicago, B.S. Michigan State University, B.A. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law December 2005. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 2006.

WANDA M. STOKES

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Detroit-Mercy, J.D. Admitted to practice law April 1990. Appointed Assistant Attorney General September 1999.

RONALD J. STYKA

University of Detroit, A.D. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1971. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1971.

POLLY A. SYNK

University of Michigan, B.A., J.D. Admitted to practice law December 2001. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2005.

JOHN F. SZCZUBELEK

Michigan State University, B.S. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1993. Appointed Assistant Attorney General May 1993.

DAVID E. TANAY

Albion College, B.A. Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1996. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 1996.

DEBBIE K. TAYLOR

Eckerd College, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1999. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 2010.

DREW M. TAYLOR

Georgetown University, B.S. Michigan State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2006. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 2008.

SCOTT L. TETER

Kalamazoo College, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1987. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 2003.

KEVIN M. THOM

Michigan State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 1984. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1985.

JOHN L. THURBER

Kenyon College, University of Edinburgh, B.A. University of Detroit, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1993. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 1996.

BRET A. TOTORAITIS

Grand Valley State University, B.A. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 2009. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 2009.

KATHLEEN H. TROTT

University of Michigan, B.A. University of Detroit, M.B.A. Wayne State University, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1998. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2010.

VIRGINIA H. TRZASKOMA

Wayne State University, B.A. University of Detroit Mercy, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1998. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 2004.

BRENDA E. TURNER

Kalamazoo College, B.A. University of Detroit Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law January 1975. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 1979.

ANNE M. UITVLUGT

Calvin College, B.A. University of the District of Columbia, David A. Clarke School of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law May 2008. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2008.

ELIZABETH L. VALENTINE

Michigan State University, B.A. University of Notre Dame Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law September 1978. Appointed Assistant Attorney General May 1979. Resigned July 1987. Reappointed September 2006.

REBEKAH F. VISCONTI-MASON

Oakland University, B.A. University of Detroit, J.D. Admitted to practice law June 1989. Appointed Assistant Attorney General June 1989.

MARTIN J. VITTANDS

Central Michigan University, B.S. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Veteran of the Vietnam War. Admitted to practice law November 1976. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 1976.

MICHELE M. WAGNER-GUTKOWSKI

University of Central Florida, B.A. Florida State University, College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Florida, September 1990; Michigan, April 1991. Appointed Assistant Attorney General March 2004.

DEBORAH B. WALDMEIR

Western Michigan University, B.A. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law January 2000. Appointed Assistant Attorney General August 2007.

THOMAS D. WARREN

Kansas State University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Michigan, May 1979; Indiana 1999. Appointed Assistant Attorney General November 2004.

DONNA K. WELCH

Michigan State University, B.A. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law August 1983. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1984.

GERALD A. WHALEN

Mercy College of Detroit, B.A. University of Detroit, J.D. Admitted to practice law in Michigan, November 1990; Washington D.C., 1993. Appointed Assistant Attorney General January 1997.

MITCHELL J. WOOD

Michigan State University, B.S. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1989. Appointed Assistant Attorney General July 1996.

JOHN R. WRIGHT

Syracuse University, B.A. Wayne State University Law School, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 2010. Appointed Assistant Attorney General December 2010.

MICHAEL A. YOUNG

Wayne State University, B.S. Detroit College of Law, J.D. Admitted to practice law November 1992. Appointed Assistant Attorney General April 1993.

MORRISON R. ZACK

Wayne State University, B.A., J.D. Admitted to practice law December 1973. Appointed Assistant Attorney General February 1974.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS
2009-2010

County	County Seat	Prosecuting Attorney
Alcona	Harrisville	Thomas J. Weichel
Alger	Munising	Karen A. Bahrman
Allegan	Allegan	Frederick L. Anderson
Alpena	Alpena	Ed Black
Antrim	Bellaire	Charles H. Koop
Arenac	Standish	Curtis G. Broughton
Baraga	L'Anse	Joseph P. O'Leary
Barry	Hastings	Thomas E. Evans
Bay	Bay City	Kurt C. Asbury
Benzie	Beulah	John B Daugherty
Berrien	St. Joseph	Arthur J. Cotter
Branch	Coldwater	Terri A. Norris
Calhoun	Marshall	Susan K. Mladenoff
Cass	Cassopolis	Victor A. Fitz
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Cheboygan	Cheboygan	Daryl P. Vizina
Chippewa	Sault Ste. Marie	Brian A. Peppler
Clare	Harrison	Michelle J. Ambrozaitis
Clinton	St. Johns	Charles D. Sherman
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Genesee	Flint	David S. Leyton
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Hillsdale	Hillsdale	Neal A. Brady
Houghton	Houghton	Michael Makinen
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Ingham	Mason	Stuart J. Dunnings III
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Iosco	Tawas City	Gary W. Rapp
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Isabella	Mt. Pleasant	Larry J. Burdick
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Kalamazoo	Kalamazoo	Jeffrey R. Fink
Kalkaska	Kalkaska	Brian F. Donnelly
Kent	Grand Rapids	William A. Forsyth
Keweenaw	Eagle River	Donna L. Jaaskelainen
Lake	Baldwin	Michael J. Riley
Lapeer	Lapeer	Byron J. Konschuh
Leelanau	Leland	Joseph T. Hubbell
Lenawee	Adrian	Jonathan L. Poer
Livingston	Howell	David L. Morse

Luce	Newberry	Peter Tazelaar II
Mackinac	St. Ignace	Alfred E. Feleppa III
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Marquette	Marquette	Gary L. Walker
Mason	Ludington	Paul R. Spaniola
Mecosta	Big Rapids	Peter M. Jaklevic
Menominee	Menominee	Daniel E. Hass
Midland	Midland	Michael D. Carpenter
Missaukee	Lake City	William J. Donnelly, Jr.
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Montmorency	Atlanta	Terrie Conklin-Case
Muskegon	Muskegon	Tony D. Tague
Newaygo	White Cloud	Robert Springstead
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Oceana	Hart	Terry L. Shaw
Ogemaw	West Branch	LaDonna A. Schultz
Ontonagon	Ontonagon	James R. Jessup
Osceola	Reed City	James J. Sims II
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Otsego	Gaylord	Kyle T. Legel
Ottawa	Grand Haven	Ronald J. Frantz
Presque Isle	Rogers City	Richard K. Steiger
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Saginaw	Saginaw	Michael D. Thomas
Sanilac	Sandusky	James V. Young
Schoolcraft	Manistique	Peter J. Hollenbeck
Shiawassee	Corunna	Randy O. Colbry
St. Clair	Port Huron	Michael D. Wendling
St. Joseph	Centreville	John L. McDonough
Tuscola	Caro	Mark E. Reene
VanBuren	Paw Paw	Juris Kaps
Washtenaw	Ann Arbor	Brian L. Mackie
Wayne	Detroit	Kym L. Worthy
Wexford	Cadillac	Mark Smathers

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL



OPINION POLICY

Michigan law provides that "[i]t shall be the duty of the attorney general, when required, to give his opinion upon all questions of law submitted to him by the legislature, or by either branch thereof, or by the governor, auditor general, treasurer, or any other state officer . . . ."[187] Michigan's Supreme Court has recognized that one of the "primary missions" of the Attorney General is to give legal advice to the Legislature, and to departments and agencies of state government.[188] Although not legally required to do so, the Attorney General may respond to opinion requests from individual members of the Legislature. In deciding whether to grant such requests, the Attorney General takes into account the need to allocate limited resources and other long recognized policy considerations outlined below. County prosecutors may also submit opinion requests provided that they are accompanied by a memorandum of law analyzing the legal question.

Consistent with his primary mission, the Attorney General prioritizes opinion requests that affect the operation of state government. Because the Legislature has authorized local units of government to employ their own legal counsel to provide guidance on matters of local concern, the Attorney General typically does not issue opinions concerning the interpretation of local charters, local ordinances, locally negotiated collective bargaining agreements, and other uniquely local issues.

Upon receipt, all opinion requests are referred to the Assistant Attorney General for Law. Opinion requests are initially evaluated to determine whether to grant the request to issue an opinion. Typical reasons for declining a request are: 1) the requester is not a person authorized to request an opinion under the applicable law; 2) the request seeks an interpretation of proposed legislation that may never become law; 3) the question asked is currently pending before a court or administrative tribunal or is likely to be the subject of litigation in the near future; 4) the request involves the operation of the judicial branch of government or a local unit of government; or 5) the request seeks legal advice on behalf of, or involves disputes between, private persons or entities.

If the request is granted, it is then determined whether the response should be classified as a formal opinion, letter opinion, or informational letter. Formal opinions address questions significant to the State's jurisprudence that warrant publication. Letter opinions involve questions that are appropriately addressed by the Attorney General but are of more limited impact and do not warrant publication. Informational letters address questions that have relatively clear, well-established answers or are narrow in scope. Copies of all pending requests are provided to the Governor's Legal Counsel and to the Senate and House Majority and Minority Counsel, thereby affording notice that the question is under review and the opportunity for input. Any person may submit information regarding pending requests.

If the opinion request is granted, it is assigned to an assistant attorney general having recognized expertise in the relevant area of the law. This attorney is expected to prepare a thoroughly researched and well-written draft. The Assistant Attorney General for Law then reviews the draft to assure it is legally sound and performs any

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[187] MCL 14.32.

[188] *East Grand Rapids School Dist v Kent County Tax Allocation Bd*, 415 Mich 381, 394; 330 NW 2d 7 (1982).

editing that may be needed. The draft also may be circulated to other attorneys within the Department of Attorney General for additional substantive review.

All informational letters, and most letter opinions, are submitted directly to the Chief Deputy Attorney General for review and approval. If the draft does not require further editing, it is submitted to the Attorney General; or, in the case of informational letters, the draft is signed and issued by the Chief Deputy Attorney General. Drafts of most formal opinions and some letter opinions or informational letters are first submitted for consideration and approval by the Attorney General's Opinion Review Board (ORB).

The ORB consists of assistant attorneys general appointed by the Attorney General who have many years of experience and who specialize in diverse subject areas. The ORB reviews draft opinions to assure they are cogently written based upon settled principles of law that will withstand possible legal challenge in the courts. In considering a draft, the ORB may receive input from the drafter as well as other persons outside the department, revise the draft, direct that revisions be made by others, or request that a counter draft be submitted by either the original drafter or by another person.

Upon final ORB approval, draft opinions are submitted to the Chief Deputy Attorney General for review and, if approved, to the Attorney General for his further review, approval, and signature or other appropriate action.

Upon issuance, formal opinions are published and indexed in the Biennial Report of the Attorney General. Formal opinions issued since March 1, 1963, and Biennial Reports dating from the 2001-2002 volume are available on the Attorney General's website: www.michigan.gov/ag. Formal opinions issued since 1977 can be found on both Westlaw and Lexis. Formal and letter opinions, as well as informational letters, are available on request from the Department's Opinions Division.

FORMAL OPINIONS

CONST 1963, ART 5, § 8: Governor's authority to direct the Department of Environmental Quality to impose certain requirements in the processing of applications for air emissions permits for coal-fired power plants

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY:

EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVES:

GOVERNOR:

SEPARATION OF POWERS:

Executive Directive 2009-2(A) and (D), requiring the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to determine whether there are more environmentally protective "feasible and prudent alternatives" to constructing a new coal-fired electricity generating plant when evaluating an air emissions permit application under Part 55 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.5501 *et seq*, and further requiring the DEQ to deny a permit if such alternatives exist, impose requirements that are not found in Part 55 of the NREPA or the other provisions of law cited in the directive. Therefore, Executive Directive 2009-2(A) and (D) attempt to amend substantive law contrary to the separation of powers doctrine of Const 1963, art 3, § 2, and are unenforceable.

Executive Directive 2009-2(B) and (C), requiring the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to make an initial "determination" regarding the "reasonable electricity generation need" of a proposed coal-fired electricity plant and then further requiring the DEQ to consider alternative methods of meeting that need, attempt to impose requirements not found in Part 55 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.5501 *et seq*, or the other provisions of law cited in the directive. Therefore, Executive Directive 2009-2(B) and (C) attempt to amend substantive law contrary to the separation of powers doctrine of Const 1963, art 3, § 2, and are unenforceable.

Although Executive Directive 2009-2 may constitute a formal expression of the Governor's environmental and energy policy preferences, it cannot and does not alter the existing regulatory requirements and procedures applicable to new coal-fired electricity generating plants under Part 55 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.5501 *et seq*.

Opinion No. 7224 February 20, 2009

Honorable Kevin A. Elsenheimer
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI

Honorable Kenneth Horn
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI

You have asked several questions concerning Executive Directive 2009-2 (ED 2009-2), issued February 3, 2009, and afforded immediate effect.[1] The directive instructs the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to make specific determinations when processing applications for the air emissions permits necessary to construct new coal-fired power plants for generating electricity. These permits are issued under Part 55 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.5501 to 324.5542.[2]

ED 2009-2 states, in part:

> A. Before issuing a permit to install under Part 55 of the [Natural] Resources and Environmental Protection Act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.5501 to 324.5542, for the construction of a new coal-fired electricity generating plant, the [DEQ] *shall determine whether there is a feasible and prudent alternative* consistent with the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety, and welfare that would better protect the air, water, and other natural resources of this state from pollution than the proposed coal-fired electricity generating plant. [ED 2009-2(A); emphasis added.]

Before making that determination, however, the directive requires the DEQ to first make a determination that there is, in fact, a need for the electrical capacity of the coal-fired electricity plant:

> B. Before making the determination required by Paragraph A, the Department *shall first determine* whether a reasonable electricity generation need exists in this state that would be served by the proposed coal-fired electricity generating plant. If a reasonable electricity generation need exists in this state, the Department shall estimate the extent of the reasonable electricity generation need. [ED 2009-2(B); emphasis added.]

If the DEQ determines that there is a reasonable need for electricity generation, it must then consider alternative methods of meeting that need:

> C. The Department shall next consider alternative methods of meeting the reasonable electricity generation need, including, but not limited to, each of the following:
>
> 1. Constructing new electricity generating resources that use technologies other than the burning of coal or that generate electricity from coal using technologies that reduce or sequester emissions.
>
> 2. Reducing electricity demand and peak demand through energy efficient programs or load management techniques.
>
> 3. Generating or purchasing electricity from existing electricity generating resources. [ED 2009-2(C).]

If, after following the requirements of paragraphs (A), (B), and (C), the DEQ determines that a more environmentally protective feasible and prudent alternative energy source exists, the DEQ must deny the applicant a permit:

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[1] This opinion addresses only the legality of Executive Directive 2009-2. It does not address the desirability of the purposes sought to be achieved by the directive.

[2] As explained below, air emissions permitting involves both state and federal law.

> D. If the Department determines that a feasible and prudent alternative to the construction of a new proposed coal-fired electricity generating plant exists consistent with the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety, and welfare that would better protect the air, water, and other natural resources of this state than the proposed coal-fired electricity generating plant, *the Department shall not issue a permit to install*. [ED 2009-2(D); emphasis added.]

After reviewing the pertinent language of ED 2009-2, your first three questions regarding the directive may be rephrased and summarized as follows:

> When evaluating an air emissions permit application under Part 55 of the NREPA, may the DEQ be directed to:
>
> 1. Determine whether there are "feasible and prudent alternatives" to constructing the power plant and, if there are, deny the permit?
>
> 2. Determine whether there is a "reasonable need" for electricity generation in the State and, if so, consider alternative methods of meeting that need?

To answer these questions, it is necessary to review the purpose and legal effect of an executive directive. OAG, 2003-2004, No 7157, p 132 (June 2, 2004), is instructive regarding this issue. That opinion addressed questions regarding Executive Directives 2003-12 and 2003-13, relating to the Michigan Public Safety Communications System Act. One of the questions addressed was "whether the Governor has the authority to amend an existing substantive statute by executive directive consistent with the separation of powers doctrine of Const 1963, art 3, § 2." *Id.* p 137.

The opinion noted that the Governor issued those executive directives, as she did here, pursuant to the Governor's power under Const 1963, art 5, § 8, which provides that: "[e]ach principal department shall be under the supervision of the governor unless otherwise provided by this constitution." *Id.* Acknowledging that the plain language of art 5, § 8 does not specifically mention executive directives, OAG No 7157 observed that executive directives "are not provided for as such in the constitution, but rather they have been used historically by governors as one means by which they exercise their supervisory authority" under art 5, § 8 "in the form of internal policy statements." *Id.*[3] The opinion continued by comparing executive *directives* with executive *orders*:

> In contrast to executive *directives*, executive *orders* are specifically provided for in Const 1963, art 5, § 2. This provision was new in the 1963 Constitution and was adopted to facilitate efficiency within the executive branch. *Soap & Detergent Ass'n v Natural Resources Comm,* 415 Mich 728, 745-746; 330 NW2d 346 (1982). The Governor, through the use of executive orders, may "make changes in the organization of the executive branch or in the assignment of functions among its units." Const 1963, art 5, § 2. Unless disapproved in each house of the Legislature, executive orders acquire the force and effect of law. For this reason, art 5, § 2 has been described as expressly vesting "legislative power" in the Governor without running afoul of Const 1963, art 3, § 2. *Soap & Detergent Ass'n*,

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[3] See also *Hendrickson v Wilson*, 374 F Supp 865, 876 (WD Mich, 1973), and <http://www.michigan.gov/gov/0,1607,7-168-36898—-,00.html> (accessed February 17, 2009).

> *supra*, 415 Mich at 752; *House Speaker v Governor*, 443 Mich 560, 578; 506 NW2d 190 (1993). [*Id.* Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.]

Turning to the separation of powers doctrine, OAG No 7157 continued:

> Const 1963, art 3, § 2, provides for the separation of governmental powers, stating that "[n]o person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch *except as expressly provided by this constitution*." No provision of the constitution vests legislative power in the Governor with respect to executive directives. Accordingly, in the absence of a constitutional provision like art 5, § 2 expressly conferring legislative power on the Governor, executive directives cannot amend substantive law. [*Id.* Emphasis in original.]

Applying these principles to ED 2003-12 and ED 2003-13, OAG No 7157 analyzed the language of the two directives, observing that:

> ED 2003-12, as originally issued, used the mandatory "shall" in connection with allowing the installation of Agency equipment upon [Michigan Public Safety Communications System] towers, whereas MCL 28.283(2) uses the permissive "may." The Governor cannot, by executive directive under Const 1963, art 5, § 8, or by executive order under Const 1963, art 5, § 2, change substantive law that does not directly relate to the exercise of her *reorganization* authority. Changing a duty from one involving the exercise of discretion to one purporting to remove such discretion would change substantive law and exceed the Governor's authority. [*Id.* p 138. Citation omitted; emphasis in original.]

The opinion concluded, however, that because ED 2003-12 was superseded by ED 2002-13, and the latter no longer used the mandatory "shall," ED 2003-13 was consistent with MCL 28.281 to 28.283, and thus did not alter substantive law relating to the operation of the Michigan Public Safety Communications System Act:

> It is my opinion, therefore, in response to your second question, that an executive directive issued in the exercise of the Governor's supervisory authority under Const 1963, art 5, § 8, does not have the force and effect of law and cannot amend a state statute consistent with the separation of powers doctrine embodied in Const 1963, art 3, § 2. Executive Directive 2003-13 simply communicates internal policy and procedure regarding the operation of the Michigan Public Safety Communications System by the Director of the Michigan State Police "consistent with . . . MCL 28.281 to 28.283." It does not purport to amend or have the effect of amending a law and, accordingly, does not violate Const 1963, art 3, § 2. [*Id.*]

Returning to your first question, you ask whether the DEQ may be directed to determine whether there are "feasible and prudent alternatives" to constructing a coal-fired power plant within the context of the air emissions permit process under Part 55 of the NREPA and, if there are, be directed to deny the permit. This question focuses primarily on paragraphs (A) and (D) of ED 2009-2. Before an answer is provided, it is helpful to review the applicable permit process.

A new coal-fired power plant qualifies as a "major stationary source"[4] of air pollutants subject to the permit requirements of the federal Clean Air Act, 42 USC 7401

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[4] See 40 CFR 52.21(b)(1)(i) and 2006 AACS, R 336.2801(cc).

et seq, Part 55 of the NREPA, and other associated federal and state rules. The federal Clean Air Act is comprehensive legislation, divided into various subchapters and parts that address air pollution prevention and control.

The DEQ implements certain parts of the Clean Air Act under a delegation of authority from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). When the DEQ exercises delegated federal authority in this way, it acts on behalf of the EPA in implementing that part of the Clean Air Act in Michigan.[5] The DEQ may also administer an "approved state program" with respect to certain other parts of the Clean Air Act. An approved state program is one whose requirements as set forth in its applicable state laws and regulations have been reviewed by the EPA and determined to be sufficiently equivalent to federal law so that the State's program may be applied by the State in place of the federal law.

Michigan's state program for permitting the construction of coal-fired power plants has been "conditionally approved" by the EPA.[6] The EPA has approved all the rules applied by the DEQ for permitting these facilities, Part 18 of Michigan's Air Pollution Control Rules, 2006 AACS, R 336.2801 *et seq*, with one exception not pertinent to the questions you have raised.[7] This office is advised that the DEQ is still acting as a delegated authority for purposes of permitting these facilities. But it is also applying the Part 18 rules that have been approved by the EPA as the equivalent of federal law.[8]

The approved Part 18 rules state, among other things, that a new major stationary source shall not be constructed without a permit requiring the source to apply best available control technology (BACT) for regulated air pollutants it has the potential to emit in significant amounts. 2006 AACS, R 336.2802(3) and 336.2810(2). BACT is defined as an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction for each regulated air pollutant emitted from the proposed source in significant amounts "taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs." 2006 AACS, R 336.2801(f). Also relevant is Rule 1817 of Part 18, which states that the DEQ shall provide an opportunity for a public hearing so that interested persons may appear and submit comments "on the air quality impact of the major source, alternatives to it, the control technology required, and other appropriate considerations." 2006 AACS, R 336.2817(2)(e).[9]

As an administrative agency created by statute, the DEQ has no inherent powers and possesses only those powers that are expressly conferred by the state constitution or state statute or that are granted by necessary and fair implication to fully effectuate the express powers. *Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of*

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[5] Even under a delegation, the DEQ still implements applicable state law.

[6] See, 73 Fed Reg 53366 (September 16, 2008). Once fully approved, the DEQ's program would implement Subchapter I, Part C of the Clean Air Act, "Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality," 42 USC 7470-7492.

[7] The EPA required the DEQ to address deficiencies in R 336.2816, which address impacts to Class I areas (designated areas with higher air quality standards). 73 Fed Reg 53366 (September 16, 2008).

[8] See <http://www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/DEQ-AQD-toxics-CoalFired_Power_Plants_info__242997_7.pdf> (accessed February 19, 2009), and click on links for Permit Applications.

[9] Presently, there are five proposed coal-fired power plants in Michigan involved in the permitting process. The DEQ's website contains "Fact Sheets" for two of the proposed coal-fired power plants (Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc and the Holland Board of Public Works). These provide an outline of the various permitting requirements and the permitting process. See <http://www.deq.state.mi.us/aps/cwerp. shtml#WPSCU> (accessed February 17, 2009), and click on the links for the Fact Sheet - View.

America v Dep't of Community Health, 254 Mich App 397, 403-404; 657 NW2d 162 (2002). See also *Dep't of Public Health v Rivergate Manor*, 452 Mich 495, 503; 550 NW2d 515 (1996). A review of Part 55 of the NREPA and its corresponding rules reveals no provision either empowering the DEQ to make a "determination" within the air emissions permit process that there are "feasible and prudent alternatives" to constructing a proposed coal-fired power plant, or requiring the DEQ to then deny a permit based on a determination that such alternatives exist. Moreover, since the Governor has no authority to amend substantive law by executive directive, the Governor lacks the power to require the DEQ to expand or otherwise alter the permitting process established by the Legislature in Part 55 or to remove an agency's discretion conferred by law.

Because they set forth additional legal authorities that underlie the Executive Directive, it is next appropriate to examine the recitals, that is, the prefatory "whereas" clauses of ED 2009-2, to determine whether any of the statutory provisions identified there provide a legal basis not found in Part 55 for imposing the directives set forth in ED 2009-2.[10]

ED 2009-2 refers to Part 17 of the NREPA, MCL 324.1701-324.1706, the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA), and quotes section 1705(2), MCL 324.1705(2). The directive then observes that Part 17 "is supplemental to existing administrative and regulatory procedures provided by law." (ED 2009-2, Clause 7.)

But a plain reading of section 1705(2) does not provide the DEQ with the authority to make a determination of whether there are "feasible and prudent alternatives" to a proposed coal-fired power plant outside the context of a "proceeding" where particular conduct has been alleged and then determined to pollute, impair, or destroy, or to be likely to pollute, impair, or destroy, natural resources. Under section 1705(2), the evaluation of "feasible and prudent alternatives" does not arise until *after* the predicate allegation followed by a determination of "pollution, impairment, or destruction" of natural resources has been made. Section 1705(1) and (2) provide:

> (1) If administrative, licensing, or other proceedings and judicial review of such proceedings are available by law, the agency or the court may permit the attorney general or any other person to intervene as a party on the filing of a pleading asserting that the proceeding or action for judicial review involves conduct that has, or is likely to have, the effect of polluting, impairing, or destroying the air, water, or other natural resources or the public trust in these resources.
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> (2) In administrative, licensing, or other proceedings, and in any judicial review of such a proceeding, the alleged pollution, impairment, or destruction of the air, water, or other natural resources, or the public trust in these resources, shall be determined, and conduct shall not be authorized or approved that has or is likely to have such an effect if there is a *feasible and prudent alternative* consistent with the reasonable requirements of the

[10] ED 2009-2 cites Const 1963, art 4, §§ 51 and 52, which respectively declare the public health and general welfare of the people, and the conservation and development of the natural resources of this State, to be of primary or paramount public concern. Article 4 is the article relating to the legislative branch. Article 4, § 51 mandates that the Legislature shall pass suitable laws for the protection and promotion of the public health, and § 52 requires the Legislature to provide for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources of the State from pollution, impairment, and destruction. These provisions are a mandate for legislative action and do not, by their terms, confer any independent authority on the Governor.

public health, safety, and welfare. [MCL 324.1705(1) and (2); emphasis added.]

Moreover, the requirement that there be likely pollution, impairment, or destruction of natural resources before an evaluation of feasible and prudent alternatives is performed under section 1705(2) is supported by other provisions of the MEPA. For example, a plaintiff must make "a prima facie showing that the conduct of the defendant has polluted, impaired, or destroyed or is likely to pollute, impair, or destroy the air, water, or other natural resources or the public trust in these resources." MCL 324.1703(1). Thereafter, the defendant may "rebut the prima facie showing by the submission of evidence to the contrary," or the defendant may assert as an affirmative defense that there is "no feasible and prudent alternative to defendant's conduct." MCL 342.1703(1).

Thus, even assuming section 1705(2) applies to the air emissions permit process, as suggested by the reference in ED 2009-2, that section does not authorize the DEQ to determine whether there are "feasible and prudent alternatives" to a particular coal-fired power plant, until there has first been an allegation followed by an individualized determination that that plant will, or is likely to, pollute, impair, or destroy natural resources.

Another prefatory clause in ED 2009-2 broadly asserts that coal-fired plants emit "thousands of tons of air emissions . . . that threaten the air, water, and other natural resources of Michigan." (ED 2009-2, Clause 11.) It is reasonable to conclude that, recognizing MEPA's requirement as explained above, this statement was included in ED 2009-2 in an attempt to provide a blanket threshold determination that the construction of all new coal-fired power plants will pollute, impair, or destroy natural resources, thus permitting or requiring the DEQ to consider feasible and prudent alternatives to all such proposed plants. But the provision of Part 17 relied on by the executive directive contemplates that such a determination will be made in the context of "administrative, licensing, or other proceedings" where "the alleged pollution, impairment, or destruction" is at issue. This clearly contemplates an individualized determination in a proceeding concerning specific conduct. The assertion stated in Clause 11 of ED 2009-2 does not constitute such a determination.

ED 2009-2 also cites section 165(a)(2) of the federal Clean Air Act, 42 USC 7475(a)(2), as providing the DEQ with "the discretion to consider alternatives to proposed sources of air emissions." (ED 2009-2, Clause 10.)[11] The DEQ's approved Part 18 rules contain a rule with language similar to section 165(a)(2).[12] Rule 1817 governs public participation in the permit process by providing an opportunity for inter-

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[11] 42 USC 7475(a)(2) provides:

> (a) Major emitting facilities on which construction is commenced. No major emitting facility on which construction is commenced after the date of the enactment of this part [enacted Aug. 7, 1977], may be constructed in any area to which this part [42 USCS §§ 7470 *et seq*] applies unless—
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> * * *
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> (2) the proposed permit has been subject to a review in accordance with this section, the required analysis has been conducted in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Administrator, and a public hearing has been held with opportunity for interested persons including representatives of the Administrator to appear and submit written or oral presentations on the air quality impact of such source, alternatives thereto, control technology requirements, and other appropriate considerations.

[12] 42 USC 7475(a)(2), unlike Rule 1817, expressly provides for "representatives of the [agency director]" to submit comments and alternatives.

ested persons to submit comments and be heard at a public hearing. After receiving a "technically complete" application, Rule 1817(2), R 336.2817(2), requires the DEQ to do a number of things, including:

> (c) Notify the public, by advertisement in a newspaper of general circulation in each region in which the proposed major source would be constructed, of the application, the preliminary determination [regarding the application], the degree of increment consumption that is expected from the major source or major modification, and of the opportunity for comment at a public hearing as well as written public comment.
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> * * *
>
> (e) Provide opportunity for a public hearing for interested persons to appear and submit written or oral comments on the air quality impact of the major source, alternatives to it, the control technology required, and other appropriate considerations. [R 336.2817(2)(c) and (e).]

By their terms,[13] Rule 1817(2)(c) and (e) require the DEQ to provide public notice and the opportunity for comment by interested persons on, among other things, "alternatives to [the power plant]." Rule 1817(2)(f) and (g) require the DEQ to:

> (f) Consider all written comments submitted within a time specified in the notice of public comment and all comments received at any public hearing in making a final decision on the approvability of the application. The department shall make all comments available for public inspection in the same locations where the department made available preconstruction information relating to the proposed major source or major modification.
>
> (g) Make a final determination whether construction should be approved, approved with conditions, or disapproved.

Subsections (f) and (g) require the DEQ to consider the oral or written comments received at the public hearing, and make a final determination with respect to the application after doing so.

These four pertinent subsections require the DEQ to hold a public hearing at which interested persons may submit oral or written comments, which the DEQ must consider in making a final determination regarding the application. Rule 1817 provides no authority for a blanket mandate requiring the DEQ to determine whether there are more environmentally protective feasible and prudent alternatives to the construction of a proposed coal-fired plant, and, if there are, to deny the permit.

Finally, it is important to recall that ED 2009-2 states that section 165(a)(2) [42 USC 7475(a)(2)] provides the DEQ with "*the discretion* to consider alternatives to proposed sources of emissions." (Emphasis added.) It is acknowledged that the EPA's Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) – an administrative body that reviews certain EPA decisions – has interpreted section 165(a)(2) as authorizing the EPA, in

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[13] In construing administrative rules, courts apply rules of statutory construction. *Detroit Base Coalition for the Human Rights of the Handicapped v Dep't of Social Services*, 431 Mich 172, 185; 428 NW2d 335 (1988). If the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the rule is clear, it must be enforced as written, and nothing may be read into the rule that is not present in the text as written. See *Halloran v Bhan*, 470 Mich 572, 576-578; 683 NW2d 129 (2004).

its discretion, to also consider alternatives not identified in public comment, and to require that an applicant actually pursue alternatives the EPA deems viable or risk denial of a permit. See *In re Prairie State Generating Co*, PSD Appeal No. 05-05, slip op. at 38-40 (EAB, Aug. 24, 2006). Irrespective of whether that decision is supported by the language of section 165(a)(2) or not, the EAB's decisions are not binding beyond the parties to the appeal before it. Moreover, as the directive itself recognizes, the authority under section 165(a)(2) to analyze and impose alternatives is discretionary not mandatory. As such, even assuming the EAB's interpretation of section 165(a)(2) were binding on the DEQ, the Governor cannot make mandatory, as ED 2009-2 does, that which the applicable law makes discretionary. OAG No 7157, p 138.

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your first question, that Executive Directive 2009-2(A) and (D), requiring the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to determine whether there are more environmentally protective "feasible and prudent alternatives" to constructing a new coal-fired electricity generating plant when evaluating an air emissions permit application under Part 55 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.5501 *et seq*, and further requiring the DEQ to deny a permit if such alternatives exist, impose requirements that are not found in Part 55 of the NREPA or the other provisions of law cited in the directive. Therefore, Executive Directive 2009-2(A) and (D) attempt to amend substantive law contrary to the separation of powers doctrine of Const 1963, art 3, § 2, and are unenforceable.

Before addressing your second question – whether the DEQ may be directed to determine if there is a "reasonable need" for electricity generation in the State, the extent of that need, and, if there is such need, to consider "alternative methods" for meeting that need – further review of ED 2009-2 is required. Your second question primarily focuses on paragraphs (B) and (C) of the directive.

Paragraphs (B) and (C) of ED 2009-2, which require the DEQ to engage in a "need and alternative methods" analysis, operate in relation to paragraphs (A) and (D), which require the "feasible and prudent alternatives" analysis described above. It is presumed that the directive intends the "need and alternative methods analysis" to operate in conjunction with the "feasible and prudent alternatives" analysis as a cohesive whole, such that a finding of the existence of a feasible and prudent alternative will provide a basis for a denial under paragraph (D). In other words, a logical reading of these operative provisions indicates that, if the DEQ were to make a determination under paragraph (B) that *no* "reasonable electricity generation need exists in this state that would be served by the proposed coal-fired electricity generating plant," the DEQ's "feasible and prudent alternative" determination under paragraph (A) would be that a "no-build" alternative would better protect the natural resources, thus requiring the permit to be denied under paragraph (D). Similarly, if the DEQ makes a determination under paragraph (B) that there *is* a "reasonable electricity generation need," and upon considering the "alternative methods" set forth in paragraph (C) regarding electricity generation,[14] thereafter finds one of those methods or some other method more favorable, the DEQ must determine for purposes of paragraph (A) that another "feasible and prudent alternative" to the coal-fired plant exists, and must, accordingly, refuse to issue a permit under paragraph (D). Under either circumstance,

[14] To the extent that ED 2009-2(C) does not limit the type or number of alternative methods that may be considered by the DEQ, that aspect is not important to the analysis presented in this opinion.

ED 2009-2 directs the DEQ to deny an air emissions permit to a proposed coal-fired power plant.

Because the "need and alternative methods analysis" can only logically be read as part of a cohesive whole that operates in conjunction with the "feasible and prudent alternatives analysis" required in the directive, the analysis already provided in response to your first question also answers this question.

First, to the extent the DEQ is being directed to undertake the "need and alternative methods analysis" under the broader umbrella of the "feasible and prudent alternatives analysis" the directive contemplates under section 1705(2) of the MEPA, the DEQ lacks the authority to engage in such an analysis. As explained earlier, section 1705(2) does not authorize the DEQ to proceed directly to determining whether there are "feasible and prudent alternatives" to construction of a coal-fired power plant, and deny a permit if there are more environmentally protective alternatives, without first determining, based on specific conduct "alleged" in a "proceeding," that the power plant will or is likely to "pollute, impair or destroy natural resources."

Second, the previous analysis of Part 55, its rules, and the other statutory provisions relied on in the directive, reveals no express or reasonably implied grant of statutory authority by the Legislature to the DEQ that would require the DEQ to make a determination regarding the need for electricity generation in this State, and alternative methods for meeting that need, within the context of deciding whether to grant or deny an air emissions permit.[15] Section 165(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act and R 336.2817(2) only expressly require the opportunity for and consideration of comment by interested persons. Nothing in those provisions can be read to require the DEQ to consider and make determinations regarding the specific alternatives listed in the directive.

To the extent ED 2009-2(B) and (C) impose a sequence of specific factors that must be considered before the DEQ may issue an air emissions permit under Part 55, particularly where the application of the factors may form the basis for denying a permit, ED 2009-2 attempts to amend substantive law and, therefore, for the reasons explained above, violates the separation of powers doctrine in Const 1963, art 3, § 2.

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your second question, that Executive Directive 2009-2(B) and (C), requiring the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to make an initial "determination" regarding the "reasonable electricity generation need" of a proposed coal-fired electricity plant and then further requiring the DEQ to consider alternative methods of meeting that need, attempt to impose requirements not found in Part 55 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.5501 *et seq*, or the other provisions of law

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[15] It is also worth noting that ED 2009-2(B) assigns certain duties to the DEQ that are presently assigned to the Michigan Public Service Commission. With respect to the requirement in paragraph (B) that the DEQ make a determination regarding the "reasonable electricity generation need" to be served by a proposed plant, the directive further states that "[t]he Michigan Public Service Commission shall provide technical assistance to the [DEQ] in making determinations required by this Directive." (ED 2009-2(E)). ED 2009-2 does not itself define "reasonable electricity generation need" or refer to any statute that either utilizes or defines the term. But the Legislature has established a statutory mechanism for utilities regulated by the Commission to seek a determination of the "need" for an electricity generating facility before construction under section 6s of the Michigan Public Service Commission Act, MCL 460.6s. That statute requires the Commission to consider need in the context of an application for a certificate of necessity under MCL 460.6s(3)(a) and (b).

cited in the directive. Therefore, Executive Directive 2009-2(B) and (C) attempt to amend substantive law contrary to the separation of powers doctrine of Const 1963, art 3, § 2, and are unenforceable.

Your final question asks what legal effect should be accorded to ED 2009-2 based upon the answers to your first three questions. Executive Directives cannot alter substantive law. See OAG No 7157, p 138.[16]

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your final question, that, although Executive Directive 2009-2 may constitute a formal expression of the Governor's environmental and energy policy preferences, it cannot and does not alter the existing regulatory requirements and procedures applicable to new coal-fired electricity generating plants under Part 55 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.5501 *et seq*.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

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[16] Additionally, if, as a matter of the DEQ policy, ED 2009-2 were followed as written, and the air emissions permitting process under Part 55 were altered such that the DEQ, in every case, made a formal "determination" whether an energy need existed in this State that would be served by the proposed coal-fired plant and whether a feasible and prudent alternative to the proposed new construction existed where need was found, a further concern might be raised concerning whether this constituted "an agency regulation, statement, standard, policy, ruling, or instruction of general applicability that implements or applies law enforced or administered by the agency" thus falling within the definition of a "rule" that must be promulgated under the procedures set forth in the Michigan Administrative Procedures Act, MCL 24.201 *et seq*. See MCL 24.207 (definition of a "rule") and MCL 24.231-24.264 (describing the process for processing and publishing rules).

GOVERNOR: Force and effect of gubernatorial statements made in line item veto transmittal letters

LEGISLATURE:

SEPARATION OF POWERS:

LINE ITEM VETO:

Upon returning to the Legislature an appropriation bill in which certain line items have been vetoed, the Governor may include in her transmittal letter an expression of her views regarding the unconstitutionality of various boilerplate provisions contained within that bill. The views so expressed however, do not satisfy the requirements for enacting a law, do not amend substantive law, and do not render the identified boilerplate provisions unconstitutional or void.

Opinion No. 7225 February 27, 2009

Honorable Mark C. Jansen
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48909

You have asked two questions relating to gubernatorial line item veto authority. Paraphrasing your questions, you ask whether statements made by the Governor in a veto transmittal letter that certain boilerplate[1] provisions contained within an appropriation bill are "unenforceable" have the legal effect of rendering the boilerplate provision void.[2]

Under America's republican system of government, the power of the federal government is broken into three distinct and equal branches.[3] To ensure a balance of power, the executive is charged with the execution of the laws as passed by the legislative branch and as limited by the interpretation of the courts.[4]

Consistent with each of Michigan's prior Constitutions, the people have incorporated the separation of governmental powers into Michigan's current Constitution.

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[1] In the context of appropriations legislation, "boilerplate" refers to the conditions imposed in the appropriations act on the expenditure of the funds appropriated. See *Detroit Policemen & Firemen Retirement System Bd of Trustees v Detroit*, 143 Mich App 651, 659; 373 NW2d 173 (1985).

[2] In your question, the particular appropriation bill you cite is 2008 PA 251, regarding which the Governor declared in her transmittal letter to the Legislature that sections 337 and 355 are "unenforceable" as amendments by reference. Because your questions refer to the legal effect of the declaration and do not ask whether the cited sections of the public act are constitutional, this opinion does not consider the constitutionality of sections 337 and 355 of 2008 PA 251.

[3] "For this reason that [Constitutional] Convention which passed the ordinance of government, laid its foundation on this basis, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time." The Federalist No. 48 (James Madison).

[4] "But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same [branch], consists in giving to those who administer each [branch], the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others." The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison).

See Const 1963, art 3, § 2; Const 1908, art 4, §§ 1 and 2; Const 1850, art 3, §§ 1 and 2; and Const 1835, art 3, § 1. Under Const 1963, art 3, § 2:

> The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.

As under the Federal Constitution, the executive is charged with the proper execution of the laws. This concept is embodied in Const 1963, art 5, § 8, where the Governor is enjoined to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." The Governor takes an oath of fealty to conform her actions to constitutional requirements or confine them within constitutional limits identical to that taken by the judiciary and the members of the legislative branch. *Straus v Governor,* 459 Mich 526, 532; 592 NW2d 53 (1999), citing Const 1963, art 11, § 1.[5]

Whereas Const 1963, art 5, § 1 vests "[t]he executive power" in the Governor, under Const 1963, art 4, § 1, "[t]he legislative power of the State of Michigan is vested in a senate and a house of representatives." The Governor has no general power to legislate or make laws. See *Wood v State Administrative Bd,* 255 Mich 220; 238 NW 16 (1931), and *People v Dettenthaler*, 118 Mich 595, 602; 77 NW 450 (1898).[6] The Legislature's right to control the public treasury, to determine the sources from which public revenues shall be derived and the objects upon which they shall be expended, and "'to dictate the time, the manner, and the means both of their collection and disbursement, is firmly and inexpugnably established in our political system.'" *Civil Service Comm v Auditor General*, 302 Mich 673, 682; 5 NW2d 536 (1942), quoting *Colbert v State*, 86 Miss 769; 39 So 65 (1905). The Legislature generally can attach to an appropriation any condition it may deem expedient and wise, but this extends only to those conditions the Legislature has the power to make and may lawfully impose. *State Bd of Agriculture v Auditor General*, 226 Mich 417, 425; 197 NW 160 (1924).

The courts, meanwhile, are charged with the final determination of whether a particular statute is unconstitutional. Const 1963, art 6, § 1. "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each." *Marbury v Madison*, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137; 2 L Ed 60 (1803). Under Michigan's Constitution, the ultimate duty to determine the validity of a statute rests with the courts. *Regents of the Univ of Michigan v Michigan Employment Relations Comm,*

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[5] This provision requires "[a]ll officers, legislative, executive and judicial" to take and subscribe to the following oath: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the constitution of this state, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of . . . according to the best of my ability."

[6] Exceptions exist where limited legislative power has been expressly conferred on the Governor. See, e.g., *House Speaker v Governor,* 443 Mich 560, 576-577; 506 NW2d 190 (1993) (explaining the scope of the Governor's express "legislative authority" under Const 1963, art 5, § 2 to effectuate executive reorganization plans).

389 Mich 96, 103; 204 NW2d 218 (1973). Therefore, only the courts may render a law unenforceable by declaring it unconstitutional.[7]

Your question involves a practice that has evolved in connection with the exercise of the Governor's veto powers. Under Const 1963, art 4, § 33, every bill passed by the Legislature must be presented to the Governor for consideration. If the Governor exercises her veto power, then the vetoed bill must be returned to the Legislature:

> If he disapproves, and the legislature continues the session at which the bill was passed, he shall return it within such 14-day period with his objections, to the house in which it originated. [Const 1963, art 4, § 33.]

Const 1963, art 5, § 19 affords the Governor line item veto power in connection with any appropriation bill:

> The governor may disapprove any distinct item or items appropriating moneys in any appropriation bill. The part or parts approved shall become law, and the item or items disapproved shall be void unless repassed according to the method prescribed for the passage of other bills over the executive veto.

Governors have employed the practice of using transmittal letters to communicate their veto actions and objections to the Legislature under these provisions. In addition, Governors recently have used transmittal letters to express their concerns regarding the legality of a particular provision contained within a bill that the Governor signs into law, such as boilerplate language found within an approved appropriation bill.[8] Unless a boilerplate provision appropriates money, rather than merely imposing a condition on an appropriation, it would not be a distinct item appropriating moneys and, therefore, would not be subject to gubernatorial veto under art 5, § 19. See OAG, 1987-1988, No 6544, p 410 (October 27, 1988).

In the particular transmittal letter described in your request, the Governor advised that she signed the appropriations bill for the Department of Labor and Economic Growth for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2009.[9] She also disapproved one item, explaining her reasons for doing so. In the part of her communication that you inquire about, the Governor identified two reinstated boilerplate sections that she indicated "remain unenforceable." The Governor's letter explained:

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[7] Consistent with his common law duties, MCL 14.32 makes it the Michigan Attorney General's duty "to give his opinion upon all questions of law submitted to him by the legislature, or by either branch thereof, or by the governor, auditor general, treasurer or any other state officer." The courts have recognized that, among the primary missions of a state Attorney General is the duty to give advice, including concerning the constitutionality of statutes. *East Grand Rapids School Dist v Kent County Tax Allocation Bd,* 415 Mich 381, 394; 330 NW2d 7 (1982). Attorney General opinions are binding on state agencies and are entitled to respectful consideration by the courts, but they are not binding on the judiciary. *Williams v Rochester Hills,* 243 Mich App 539, 557; 625 NW2d 64 (2000).

[8] See, e.g., 2001 Journal of the Senate 1558-1559 (message from the Governor stating that a section of the Fiscal Year 2002 appropriation bill for the Department of Military and Veterans Affairs "attempts to amend, by reference, the requirements for sale of property under the Michigan Military Act and is, therefore, unconstitutional. I have directed the Department to follow the provisions of the Michigan Military Act in its efforts to dispose of the [property]."

[9] 2008 Journal of the House 1953.

Section 337 attempts to amend by implication powers and duties vested in the Commissioner of the Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation under Michigan law in contravention of Section 25 of Article IV of the Michigan Constitution of 1963. Similarly, Section 355 improperly attempts to amend by implication provisions of the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act, 1974 PA 154, MCL 408.1101 to 408.1094.

Transmittal letters effectuate compliance with Const 1963, art 4, § 33 by operating as the vehicle by which a bill is returned to the Legislature and objections are identified. While any line item vetoes that are discussed in a transmittal letter are exercised and marked on the actual bill that is physically returned to the originating house and ultimately filed with the Secretary of State if not overridden, the transmittal letter is distinct and is not a part of the actual bill. There is no restriction in the Constitution barring the Governor from using a transmittal letter or signing statement to convey to the Legislature the executive's views regarding legislation and to state reasons for concluding that a particular provision within that legislation is unenforceable.

As noted above, the Legislature unquestionably has the power to attach conditions to an appropriation bill – but only such conditions as are within its power to impose lawfully. *State Bd of Agriculture*, 226 Mich at 425. Moreover, where two laws are regarded as conflicting with each other, such as where an appropriations act imposes a condition or mandate on executive action but the corresponding substantive law grants broader discretion, it is for the courts to decide on the operation of each. *Regents of the Univ of Michigan*, 389 Mich at 103. But the Governor also has the duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed and that constitutional mandates be followed consistent with the oath of office subscribed to by all public officers, judicial, legislative, and executive. See Const 1963, art 5, § 8 and art 11, § 1. In reconciling the competing interests involved with this issue, therefore, it is instructive to recall the observation made by the Michigan Supreme Court that, while matters such as these may ultimately remain one of power and politics, "[i]t is fundamental to effective and efficient government that the three branches of government make every effort to harmonize their activities and responsibilities." *Regents of the Univ of Michigan v Michigan*, 395 Mich 52, 70; 235 NW2d 1 (1975).

To repeat, you ask whether, when the Governor sends to the Legislature a transmittal letter in which she communicates her views that a particular boilerplate provision in an appropriation bill fails to comply with the Constitution and is, therefore, unenforceable, such an expression of views concerning unenforceability has any binding legal effect or renders the boilerplate provision void.[10]

It is worth observing that gubernatorial statements concerning the unenforceability of laws have historically represented the Governor's position that a particular provision of a bill presented to the executive is unconstitutional and that a court would so rule, but such statements do not by their own terms purport to carry the force and effect of law. In order for a law to be enacted, it must be embodied in a properly styled bill and progress through the Legislature in accordance with the many requirements of article 4 of the Michigan Constitution. See Const 1963, art 4, §§ 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 33. In contrast, a statement made by the Governor in a transmit-

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[10] Your question relates to the particular factual scenario in which the Governor's statement regarding unenforceability is directed to a provision that is not otherwise subject to line item veto.

tal letter has not been enacted by the Legislature, follows none of the requirements in Const 1963, art 4 for passing laws, and is not exercised as a veto under Const 1963, art 5, § 19. Thus, statements regarding unenforceability made in transmittal letters do not carry the force and effect of law.[11]

It is my opinion, therefore, that, upon returning to the Legislature an appropriation bill in which certain line items have been vetoed, the Governor may include in her transmittal letter an expression of her views regarding the unconstitutionality of various boilerplate provisions contained within that bill. The views so expressed however, do not satisfy the requirements for enacting a law, do not amend substantive law, and do not render the identified boilerplate provisions unconstitutional or void.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

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[11] However, the Governor or the Legislature could secure a definitive determination concerning the enforceability of a boilerplate provision in an appropriation bill by, for example, seeking an advisory opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court under Const 1963, art 3, § 8 or seeking an opinion of the Attorney General in accordance with MCL 14.32.

INCOMPATIBILITY: Whether person serving as township supervisor and city police officer holds incompatible offices

PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS:

A person holding positions as an elected township supervisor and a city police officer does not violate the Incompatible Public Offices Act, MCL 15.181 *et seq*, unless: 1) the township and the city have or are negotiating a contract for police services; or 2) other particularized facts are present that demonstrate the individual cannot faithfully perform the duties of a city police officer and township supervisor in a manner that protects, advances, or promotes the interests of both offices simultaneously.

Opinion No. 7226 March 11, 2009

Honorable Sharon Tyler
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48909

You have asked whether the offices of township supervisor and city police officer are incompatible when both the township and the city in question have existing contracts for matters other than police protection and the potential exists for a contract between the township and city for police protection.

The Incompatible Public Offices Act (Act), 1978 PA 566, MCL 15.181 *et seq*, sets forth the general restriction against public officers or employees simultaneously holding incompatible offices. Specifically, the Act provides that "a public officer or public employee shall not hold 2 or more incompatible offices at the same time." MCL 15.182.

Whether the offices of township supervisor and city police officer are "incompatible" requires consideration of MCL 15.181(b), which defines "incompatible offices" as:

> [P]ublic offices held by a public official which, when the official is performing the duties of any of the public offices held by the official, results in any of the following with respect to those offices held:
>
> (i) The subordination of 1 public office to another.
>
> (ii) The supervision of 1 public office by another.
>
> (iii) A breach of duty of public office.

The first step in determining whether two offices are incompatible requires establishing if the offices are "public offices held by a public official" within the meaning of MCL 15.181(b). While the Legislature did not explicitly define the term "public official" in the Act, the Michigan Supreme Court in *Macomb County Prosecutor v Murphy*, 464 Mich 149; 627 NW2d 247 (2001), concluded that "public offices held by a public official" include "positions of public employment." See *Murphy*, 464 Mich at 157-163. See also *Wayne County Prosecutor v Kinney*, 184 Mich App 681, 683; 458 NW2d 674, lv den 436 Mich 887 (1990), and OAG, 1979-1980, No 5626, p 537, 541 (January 16, 1980). Section 2 of the Act also evinces the

applicability of the Act to public employees by stating "a public officer or public employee shall not hold 2 or more incompatible offices at the same time." MCL 15.182.

A township supervisor is a voting member of the township board. MCL 41.70. As an elected official, a township supervisor is a public officer. MCL 41.1b(a) and 41.1b(b); MCL 15.181(e). Therefore, a township supervisor is subject to the Act. A police officer employed by a city is a public employee, serves in a position of public employment, and is also subject to the Act. MCL 15.181(d).

Townships and cities are distinct units of local government with separate statutory authority and separate governing bodies. A township is governed by a board of trustees and a city is governed by a city council. A township supervisor serves as a voting member of a township board of trustees, whereas a city police officer is not a member of a city council but rather serves as a city employee. Therefore, regarding sections 1(b)(i) and 1(b)(ii) of the Act, the offices of township supervisor and city police officer are neither subordinated to nor supervised by the other. Thus, section 1(b)(iii) of the Act remains as the final consideration in order to determine whether performing the duties of both public positions, in light of an existing or potential contractual relationship, would result in a breach of duty of public office.

Generally, a township supervisor's job includes the responsibility to negotiate contracts the township may enter into with other contracting entities – including cities – and to vote on these contracts when submitted to the township's board of trustees for approval. A city police officer's job functions involve law enforcement activities and do not include the authority to vote on a service contract between the city and the township.[1]

It is well established in cases decided by the Michigan Court of Appeals that, when two public offices occupied by the same person call upon that person to sit on opposite sides of a contractual relationship, there is a breach of duty of public office because the interests on each side are competing and cannot be advanced simultaneously. Further, abstaining from voting on the contract is itself a breach of duty. Only the vacating of one office will solve the public official's dilemma. *Contesti v Attorney General*, 164 Mich App 271, 280-281; 416 NW2d 410 (1987), lv den 430 Mich 893 (1988); *Kinney*, 184 Mich App at 684.

Murphy, decided in 2001, is the most recent Michigan Supreme Court case to address a breach-of-duty issue arising under the Act. The question before the Court was whether a person violated the Act by simultaneously holding positions as an elected member of a township board of trustees and the delinquent property tax coordinator in the county treasurer's office, given that a township can contract with a county for the collection of its delinquent personal property taxes. The person holding both offices faced the possibility of considering and voting on a proposal to have the county, rather than the township, collect the township taxes. The Court of Appeals held that the potential for a conflict between two offices was sufficient to find a breach of duty of public office. *Macomb County Prosecutor v Murphy*, 233 Mich App 372, 382; 592 NW2d 745 (1999). In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals viewed the Act as focused on the possibility that a conflict might arise:

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[1] The extent to which a police officer might benefit from any specific contract, if at all, is not within the scope of this opinion.

> The purpose of the incompatible offices act is to preclude *any suggestion* that a public official is acting out of self-interest or for hidden motives because of a conflict between his two offices. This purpose is served by finding a breach of duty when an issue arises in which one constituency's interests *may* conflict with the interests of a separate constituency represented by the official. [*Murphy*, 233 Mich App at 382; emphasis added.]

In overruling the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court made clear that the Act requires an *actual* breach of public duty to support a finding that incompatibility is present. *Murphy*, 464 Mich at 162-163. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that a breach of duty arises when a public official holding dual offices cannot protect, advance, or promote the interest of both offices simultaneously. But it disagreed that the likelihood an issue "*may* conflict with the interests of a separate constituency represented by the official" was alone sufficient to find incompatibility. *Id*. at 164. (Emphasis added.) Instead, the Court explained, the Court of Appeals "failed to recognize that the statute focuses on the manner in which the official actually performs the duties of public office." *Id*.

The Court provided guidance for persons holding dual public positions who may be called upon to make decisions concerning contracts, explaining when a breach of duty may arise and how such a situation must be handled. With regard to the facts present in *Murphy*, the Court distinguished between preliminary consideration of a contract and actual negotiations:

> [N]o incompatibility exists between defendant's positions until the public entities actually enter into contractual negotiations. A public official in defendant's position may avoid breaching the duty of loyalty by not participating in the preliminary consideration of a possible agreement . . . . [D]efendant's holding of dual offices did not violate the incompatible offices act because the governmental entities never entered into contractual negotiations. [*Murphy*, 464 Mich at 166-167.]

The *Murphy* decision focused on the language of the Act, holding that incompatibility "exists only when the performance of the duties of one of the public offices '*results in*' one of the three prohibited situations" under the Act. *Id.* at 162-163. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the *potential* for a conflict, by itself, is not adequate to determine incompatibility. The performance of a public official's duties with interaction between the two public offices can create incompatibility, but the breach of duty must be actual and not merely possible. Relative to a contractual relationship between two public entities, there must be an existing contract or active negotiations toward a contract that places the dual officeholder at both ends in order to create the incompatibility. *Id.* at 163-164 (citing OAG No 5626 at 542).

In reaching its decision in *Murphy*, the Michigan Supreme Court cited with approval OAG No 5626. *Id.* Based upon its examination of the legislative history associated with enactment of the Incompatible Public Offices Act and the Act's clear departure from the common law incompatibility principle that the *mere potential* for a breach of duty alone was determinative, OAG No 5626 concluded that the Act instead limits incompatibility to situations where the performance of the duties of the two offices *actually results in* a breach of duty. OAG No 5626 at 542, 544; *Murphy*, 464 Mich at 163.

It is important to emphasize the distinction drawn by the Court between a public entity's "preliminary consideration" of an agreement and "actual negotiations"

towards reaching a formal agreement. Abstention will avoid a conflict with regard to decisions on the possibility of entering into negotiations, while vacating one of the offices is necessary upon commencement of negotiations or upon entering into a contract. *Murphy*, 464 Mich at 164 n 13, 166 n 15. This distinction effectively limits the potential for political maneuvering whereby one board member offers a motion that the public entity enter into contract negotiations with another public entity, with the knowledge that a fellow board member serves as a dual officeholder. Incompatibility would exist only if the public entity formally votes and approves the motion to commence contract negotiations. Acknowledging the dual officeholder's loyalty dilemma when the mere possibility of contracting arises, the Court instructed that "[a] public official in defendant's position may avoid breaching the duty of loyalty by not participating in the preliminary consideration of a possible agreement." *Murphy*, 464 Mich at 166. See also OAG No 5626 at 542.

Applying *Murphy*'s principles to your question, where the same person holds public positions as an elected township supervisor and a city police officer and the respective township and city maintain a contractual relationship for non-police services, it cannot be concluded that these positions are inherently incompatible. Unless the township supervisor/city police officer sit on opposite sides of the contract or are positioned on opposite sides of a non-contractual matter that would give rise to competing interests, there is no basis upon which to conclude that the performance of duties of these offices would result in an actual breach of duty requiring the dual officeholder to vacate one of the positions. It also cannot be concluded that the positions are incompatible because the potential exists for a contract involving police services between the township and the city. As noted, the individual serving both entities may avoid breaching the duty of loyalty by abstaining from participating when the mere possibility of contracting is at issue.

Moreover, with respect to any existing contracts between the township and city that do not involve police protection, each contract would have to be analyzed independently to determine its effect on the respective public offices and the dual officeholder. An actual breach of duty must be present to create incompatibility. Assuming that the subject matter of a particular contract does give rise to competing interests, once the township board votes to enter into contract negotiations with the city, incompatibility exists and the township supervisor/city police officer must immediately decide which position to vacate and do so without delay.

The process for determining whether dual offices are incompatible in violation of the Act requires reviewing the particular facts on a case-by-case basis, examining the actual duties performed by the person in each of the positions held, and analyzing whether the circumstances support a conclusion that the person cannot protect, advance, or promote the interests of both offices simultaneously. As observed by the Supreme Court in *Murphy*, the Act's break from the common law's focus on potential conflicts in favor of actual breaches of duty "encourages civic-minded individuals to engage in public service in as many capacities as they choose." *Murphy*, 464 Mich at 164 n 13. But along with this broadened approach is the continued recognition that "[p]ublic officers and employees owe a duty of loyalty to the public" and continued adherence to the principle that all public officers are agents whose powers are fiduciary and rendered in service of the public's interests. *Id.* at 164.

Your question provides an opportunity to review prior opinions of the Attorney General addressing breach-of-duty issues to determine if any issued before 2001 when *Murphy* was decided are now superseded. Several of those opinions pursued similar reasoning to that followed in *Murphy*, concluding that an actual breach of

public duty is required where a member of a voting body of one unit of government simultaneously serves as a non-voting officer or employee of another unit of government. For example, OAG, 1995-1996, No 6903, p 172 (May 28, 1996), found that the position of county commissioner and township police chief are not incompatible unless the county and township enter into a contract on matters affecting the township police department or the county board acts on non-contractual matters affecting the township police department.

Similarly, other opinions have concluded that dual public positions are not incompatible, unless: 1) there is an actual breach of duty as evidenced by a contract or contractual negotiations between one governmental unit where the individual is a member of its governing body and the contract involves the duties of the individual's position within the other governmental unit; or 2) some non-contractual issue arises where the individual cannot protect the interests of both offices simultaneously. See OAG, 2001-2002, No 7119, p 121 (November 20, 2002);[2] OAG, 1995-1996, No 6913, p 197 (August 19, 1996);[3] OAG, 1993-1994, No 6795, p 132 (May 5, 1994);[4] OAG, 1993-1994, No 6794, p 129 (April 12, 1994);[5] OAG, 1993-1994, No 6756, p 27 (May 30, 1993);[6] OAG, 1987-1988, No 6418, p 15 (January 13, 1987);[7] OAG, 1981-1982, No 5955, p 311 (January 12, 1981);[8] OAG, 1979-1980, No 5626, p 537 (January 16, 1980).[9]

However, two pre-*Murphy* Attorney General opinions found incompatibility where a contract was negotiated, even though the officer participated for only one of the public entities and the contract did not affect the officer's employment by the other entity: OAG, 1993-1994, No 6747, p 5 (January 14, 1993),[10] and OAG, 1995-1996, No 6885, p 124 (January 11, 1996).[11] To the extent that the analysis or conclusions

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[2] Township manager and county commissioner are not incompatible provided that the township manager has no responsibility for administering, negotiating, or enforcing contracts between the township and county.

[3] City police chief and county commissioner are not incompatible unless there is a contract for police services or a non-contractual issue arises involving police services.

[4] City council member and county undersheriff are not incompatible unless there is a contract for police services.

[5] Village marshal and county commissioner positions are not incompatible unless there is a village-county contract involving the village marshal.

[6] Township supervisor and county undersheriff are not incompatible unless there is a contract for police services.

[7] City attorney and county commissioner are not incompatible unless there is a contract negotiated or if there is a legal conflict between the city and county.

[8] Deputy sheriff and township trustee are not incompatible unless there is a good faith contract negotiation between the county sheriff and township.

[9] School board member and city superintendent of public works are not incompatible unless there is a contract imposing duties on the city superintendent of public works.

[10] Incompatibility exists if a person simultaneously serves as a county road commissioner and as a deputy township supervisor whenever a contract is negotiated or entered into between these two public entities, regardless of the subject matter of the contract, how the contract impacts the job duties of the deputy township supervisor, and the non-voting capacity of the deputy township supervisor.

[11] The positions of county clerk/register of deeds and member of a university board of trustees are incompatible once a joint contract is negotiated or entered into between the university and the county, without consideration of the subject matter of the contract or the fact that a county clerk/register of deeds does not have the responsibility to vote on contracts.

in OAG No 6747 and OAG No 6885 are inconsistent with this opinion by concluding that incompatibility is present when the potential for a conflict exists absent any conflict or relationship that may create an opportunity for one office to influence the other, they are superseded.

It is my opinion, therefore, that a person holding positions as an elected township supervisor and a city police officer does not violate the Incompatible Public Offices Act, MCL 15.181 *et seq*, unless: 1) the township and the city have or are negotiating a contract for police services; or 2) other particularized facts are present that demonstrate the individual cannot faithfully perform the duties of a city police officer and township supervisor in a manner that protects, advances, or promotes the interests of both offices simultaneously.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

OPEN MEETINGS ACT: Legality of proxy voting under the Open Meetings Act

VOTING:

A provision in the bylaws of a city's downtown development authority that allows board members to vote by proxy violates the Michigan Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 *et seq*, because proxy voting fails to make the important deliberative aspects of the absent board member's decision-making process open to the public when rendering a decision that effectuates public policy.

Opinion No. 7227 March 19, 2009

Honorable Richard E. Hammel
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI

You have asked whether a provision in the bylaws of a city's downtown development authority violates the Michigan Open Meetings Act (OMA or Act), MCL 15.261 *et seq*, by allowing board members to vote by proxy. Generally, proxy voting is a form of absentee voting by which one member delegates to another member of a voting body that member's power to vote. The person so designated to vote for the absent member is called a "proxy."

Information provided with your letter indicates that the bylaws at issue permit a board member to vote by proxy if the member is "unable to attend a meeting at which a vote on a specific issue is to be taken." The bylaws provide that the "vote by proxy

shall be written in such a manner as to clearly state the question as it will be presented to the member and state the answer . . . in the same manner as would be voiced by the member present at the meeting." The bylaws further provide that the vote shall be submitted in a sealed envelope to any officer of the board and that the "secretary shall enter the vote of the absent member into the minutes and clearly [designate] said vote as being a proxy."

The OMA was enacted to promote governmental accountability and to foster openness in government as a means of enhancing responsible decision making. *Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents*, 444 Mich 211, 222, 223; 507 NW2d 422 (1993). To that end, the OMA requires that the deliberation and formulation of public policy and decisions effectuating public policy be conducted at open meetings. Under the OMA, a public body's decision-making process is subject to public scrutiny and accountability. *Esperance v Chesterfield Twp*, 89 Mich App 456, 463; 280 NW2d 559 (1979), quoting *Wexford County Prosecutor v Pranger*, 83 Mich App 197; 268 NW2d 344 (1978).

In accordance with these overarching principles, the OMA requires that "[a]ll meetings of a public body shall be open to the public and shall be held in a place available to the general public." MCL 15.263(1). Public bodies must post notices of their meetings and keep minutes of the meetings that include, among other things, "any decisions made at a meeting open to the public." See MCL 15.264, MCL 15.265, and MCL 15.269. The OMA also includes significant enforcement mechanisms, providing for the invalidation of decisions not adopted in compliance with the Act and for other civil penalties as well as criminal sanctions. See MCL 15.270 and MCL 15.271 through MCL 15.273.

Section 2(b) of the OMA, MCL 15.262(b), defines "meeting" in pertinent part as "the convening of a public body at which a quorum is present for the purpose of deliberating toward or rendering a decision on a public policy." Section 2(d) of the Act, MCL 15.262(d), defines "decision" as "a determination, action, vote, or disposition upon a motion, proposal, recommendation, resolution, order, ordinance, bill, or measure on which a vote by members of a public body is required and by which a public body effectuates or formulates public policy." Subsections 3(2) and (3) of the OMA, MCL 15.263(2) and (3), further mandate, respectively, that "[a]ll decisions of a public body shall be made at a meeting open to the public" and "[a]ll deliberations of a public body constituting a quorum of its members shall take place at a meeting open to the public."

Based on these definitions, the voting process engaged in by a public body must take place in a session open to the public. *Esperance*, 89 Mich App at 463; OAG, 1979-1980, No 5445, p 57 (February 22, 1979).

Before a decision-making board takes up a matter that effectuates public policy, its members first consider and decide in favor of a motion to present the matter for discussion and a vote of the board. An absent board member who submits a proxy vote would not be part of the quorum present to vote on any motion. The absent member also would not be present at the open meeting to discuss and deliberate toward a decision on the particular public policy matter, to participate in a roll-call vote, or to vote on any number of procedural motions that might arise, such as motions to end discussion, to postpone debate, to reconsider a matter, to renew a previous question, to convene in a closed session, or to table an item. These actions all constitute decisions on which a member of a board may be held accountable to the public.

The OMA prohibits a voting procedure at a public meeting that prevents citizens from knowing how members of the public body have voted. OAG, 1977-1978, No 5262, pp 338, 339 (January 31, 1978). While the bylaw at issue does allow citizens to be advised of how the absent member ultimately voted, it nevertheless facilitates a process that denies citizens the equally important opportunity to observe that member's deliberation toward and formulation of that decision. Indeed, voting by proxy effectively forecloses any involvement by the absent board member in the board's public discussion and deliberations before the board votes and, if applicable, public comment on a matter effectuating public policy. Moreover, as recognized by a leading guide on parliamentary procedure, to the extent a board member designates someone else to act in his or her place by proxy voting, this practice is incompatible with the essential characteristics of a deliberative assembly in which membership is individual, personal, and nontransferable.[1]

These basic principles underlie the OMA's core purpose of requiring meetings of public bodies to be open to the public to ensure public participation. Transparency in government results from popular knowledge of how government is serving the people.[2] Indeed, this office has opined that, without explicit statutory authority, the practice of proxy voting is not allowed. OAG, 1993-1994, No 6828, p 212 (December 22, 1994), citing *Dingwall v Detroit Common Council,* 82 Mich 568, 571; 46 NW 938 (1890);[3] OAG, 1975-1976, No 5065, pp 731, 733-734 (December 17, 1976); and OAG, 1965-1966, No 4532, p 320 (June 21, 1966).

It is my opinion, therefore, that a provision in the bylaws of a city's downtown development authority that allows board members to vote by proxy violates the Michigan Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 *et seq*, because proxy voting fails to make the important deliberative aspects of the absent board member's decision-making process open to the public when rendering a decision that effectuates public policy.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

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[1] Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised (10th ed), p 414. The Michigan House and Senate do not allow proxy voting for their members. It warrants mention that proxy voting as discussed in this opinion does not refer to the circumstance where a designee votes for a member as authorized by law.

[2] Inscribed on the James Madison Memorial Building, Washington D.C., are the words of James Madison: "Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: and a people who mean to be their own governours, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." – Madison's Letter to W. T. Barry, August 4, 1822. [Capitalization omitted.]

[3] In the *Dingwall* case, the city council counted and recorded the vote of absent members in appointing election inspectors. The Michigan Supreme Court rejected these appointments, commenting that "the counting of absent members and recording them as voting in the affirmative on all questions, was also an inexcusable outrage."

CRIMINAL LAW: Application of the Sex Offenders Registration Act's Student Safety Zone Exception to Prisoners

LAW ENFORCEMENT:

SEXUAL OFFENDERS:

STUDENT SAFETY ZONES:

For purposes of the exception in section 35(3)(c) of the Sex Offenders Registration Act, MCL 28.735(3)(c), a person who was confined in prison on January 1, 2006, is regarded as "residing within" the prison on that date.

Opinion No. 7228 April 13, 2009

Honorable Michael Switalski
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48909

You have asked two questions concerning the sections of the Sex Offenders Registration Act (Act or SORA), 1994 PA 295, MCL 28.721 *et seq*, that prohibit registered sex offenders from residing within a student safety zone. Section 35(3)(c) of the Act, MCL 28.735(3)(c), provides an exception to that prohibition for individuals who were "residing within" a student safety zone on the Act's effective date, January 1, 2006.

Information received with your request indicates that your questions were prompted by inquiries from a local police department. The department seeks clarification of the Act's application to an individual who was convicted of a SORA crime and sent to prison before the Act took effect and, upon his release from prison after the Act took effect, returned to his previous residence now located in a student safety zone. If the person is regarded as "residing" in prison on the effective date of the Act, then he is subject to prosecution upon his return to his previous residence for residing in a student safety zone. If, however, the person is regarded as still "residing" in his previous residence during his period of incarceration, he would not be subject to prosecution upon his release and return to his previous residence in a student safety zone under the exception set forth in section 35(3)(c) of the SORA. Combining your questions into one, you ask whether such an incarcerated individual is regarded as "residing within" his former residence or the prison on the January 1, 2006, effective date of the SORA.

In the exercise of its police power authority to address critical health and safety concerns, the Michigan Legislature enacted the SORA to better protect "against the commission of future criminal sexual acts by convicted sex offenders." MCL 28.721a. The Legislature sought to assist law enforcement and protect communities by requiring individuals who have been convicted of criminal sexual acts to register with the State. The Legislature was specifically concerned about protecting children when it enacted the Act, as stated in section 1a of the SORA:

> The legislature has determined that a person who has been convicted of committing an offense covered by this act poses a potential serious menace

> and danger to the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people, and *particularly the children*, of this state. [MCL 28.721a; emphasis added.]

With certain exceptions, the Act requires individuals who have committed one of the offenses listed in the Act to be registered in the Sex Offenders Registry. MCL 28.723(1). That Registry is "intended to provide law enforcement and the people of this state with an appropriate, comprehensive, and effective means to monitor those persons who pose such a potential danger." MCL 28.721a. The public registration database provides information to the citizens of this State that allows them to learn where convicted sex offenders reside and if they have recently moved into their communities.

Under sections 34(1)(a) and (b) and 35(1) of the Act, MCL 28.734(1)(a) and (b) and MCL 28.735(1), individuals who are required to register are prohibited from working, loitering, or residing within a "student safety zone," which is defined as "the area that lies 1,000 feet or less from school property." MCL 28.733(f). Section 35 of the SORA states the general prohibition against residing in a student safety zone with several exceptions, the two most pertinent of which provide:

> (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section and section 36, *an individual required to be registered* under article II *shall not reside within a student safety zone*.
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> * * *
>
> (3) *This section does not apply to any of the following*:
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> * * *
>
> (c) *An individual who was residing within that student safety zone on January 1, 2006*. However, this exception does not apply to an individual who initiates or maintains contact with a minor within that student safety zone.
>
> * * *
>
> (e) An individual who resides within a student safety zone because the individual is an inmate or resident of a prison, jail, juvenile facility, or other correctional facility or is a patient of a mental health facility under an order of commitment. However, this exception does not apply to an individual who initiates or maintains contact with a minor within that student safety zone. [MCL 28.735(1) and (3)(c) and (e); emphasis added.]

Under the exception in section 35(3)(c), commonly known as a "grandfather clause,"[1] an individual who resided in a student safety zone on the effective date of the Act, January 1, 2006, was not required to move out of that student safety zone upon the Act taking effect. Your question asks whether a person who was in prison

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[1] A "grandfather clause" is a provision that exempts persons whose existing status or activity would otherwise be made illegal by new legislation.

on January 1, 2006, but who returned to his home in a student safety zone immediately after his period of incarceration, should be considered to have been "residing," on January 1, 2006, in the prison or in the residence he occupied at the time he was incarcerated, for purposes of applying the grandfather clause exception.

Research has disclosed no court case addressing your question.[2] The answer to your question requires employing rules of statutory construction to determine the meaning of the term "residing" in MCL 28.735(3)(c) to establish which location is considered a person's residence while he is in prison.

The foremost rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the statutory language:

> We begin by examining the plain language of the statute; where that language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed—no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written. [*People v Morey*, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999).]

Moreover, "a court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself." *Roberts v Mecosta County General Hosp*, 466 Mich 57, 63; 642 NW2d 663 (2002). Furthermore, "[w]hen a statute specifically defines a given term, that definition alone controls." *Kuznar v Raksha Corp*, 481 Mich 169, 176; 750 NW2d 121 (2008).

While it does not define "residing," the SORA defines the related term "residence," to have the following meaning:[3]

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[2] *People v Zujko*, 282 Mich App 520; 765 NW2d 897 (2008), analyzed the grandfather clause to address a residence issue but in a different factual context than presented in your question. The *Zujko* Court ruled that a person who resided in a school safety zone on January 1, 2006, and was later convicted of a crime requiring registration under the SORA is entitled to remain in that residence under the section 35(3)(c) exception:

> MCL 28.735(1) and MCL 28.735(3)(c), taken together, mean that a registered sex offender shall not reside in a student safety zone unless he resided in that zone as of January 1, 2006.
>
> * * *
>
> We do not agree with plaintiff's contention that the exemption in MCL 28.735(3)(c) applies only to those individuals who were registered sex offenders as of January 1, 2006, and who also resided in a student safety zone as of that date.

The *Zujko* case does not address the present issue of where an individual resides who was incarcerated on the effective date of the SORA.

[3] This definition uses language identical to that used in the definition of "residence" under the Michigan Election Law:

> "Residence", as used in this act, for registration and voting purposes means that place at which a person habitually sleeps, keeps his or her personal effects and has a regular place of lodging. If a person has more than 1 residence, or if a wife has a residence separate from that of the husband, that place at which the person resides the greater part of the time shall be his or her official residence for the purposes of this act. This section shall not be construed to affect existing judicial interpretation of the term residence. [MCL 168.11(1).]

> "Residence," as used in this act, for registration and voting purposes *means that place at which a person habitually sleeps, keeps his or her personal effects, and has a regular place of lodging*. If a person has more than 1 residence, or if a wife has a residence separate from that of the husband, that place at which the person resides the greater part of the time shall be his or her official residence for the purposes of this act. *This section shall not be construed to affect existing judicial interpretation of the term residence*. [MCL 28.722(g); emphasis added.]

During a prisoner's term of imprisonment, the prisoner generally sleeps in prison, eats his meals there, keeps personal effects there, and maintains his place of lodging there. Applying the definition of "residence" in accordance with the plain language of the statute leads to the conclusion that, while incarcerated, a prisoner's "residence" for SORA purposes is the prison itself. The person may continue to keep personal effects at the place where he resided before incarceration, and may otherwise retain the expectation of resuming lodging there, but the place at which he "habitually sleeps . . . and has a regular place of lodging" is the prison. MCL 28.722(g).

The final sentence of the statutory definition of "residence" provides that it "shall not be construed to affect existing judicial interpretation of the term residence." MCL 28.722(g). This language indicates a legislative intent to limit use of the SORA's definition of "residence" to the SORA itself, and to expressly bar any exportation of that definition to other areas of the law. Thus, existing judicial interpretations of the term "residence" developed in other statutory contexts are not affected by any differences in the meaning of that term as it is defined in the SORA.[4]

Additional textual evidence that a person in prison on January 1, 2006, was "residing" there for SORA purposes may be found in another one of the exceptions that directly addresses the circumstance of an inmate in prison. MCL 28.735(3)(e) states that the student safety zone prohibition does not apply to an incarcerated person who resides in a student safety zone simply because the prison itself is located in such a zone:

> (3) *This section does not apply to any of the following:*
>
> * * *
>
> (e) *An individual who resides within a student safety zone because the individual is an inmate or resident of a prison*, jail, juvenile facility, or other correctional facility or is a patient of a mental health facility under an order of commitment. However, this exception does not apply to an individual who initiates or maintains contact with a minor within that student safety zone. [Emphasis added.]

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[4] For example, in *Paprocki v Jackson County Clerk*, 142 Mich App 785, 789; 371 NW2d 450 (1985), the Court decided that, under the Freedom of Information Act, a prisoner "resided" in the last county in which he resided before he was imprisoned and not the county where the prison was located for purposes of determining which court had jurisdiction to hear an action. See also *Fowler v Fowler*, 191 Mich App 318; 477 NW2d 112 (1991) (analyzing where a prisoner resides for purposes of filing a complaint for divorce under the applicable statute).

By its very existence, that exception confirms the Legislature's intent that, for purposes of the SORA, a prisoner is deemed to be "residing within" the prison during his period of incarceration.

It is my opinion, therefore, that, for purposes of the exception in section 35(3)(c) of the Sex Offenders Registration Act, MCL 28.735(3)(c), a person who was confined in prison on January 1, 2006, is regarded as "residing within" the prison on that date.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT: Issues relating to the intentional sinking of a vessel to expand recreational diving opportunities on Great Lakes bottomlands

GREAT LAKES BOTTOMLANDS:

Assuming the appropriate state and federal authorization has been obtained, if the owner of a vessel intentionally sinks it in the Great Lakes, physically deserts the vessel, and publishes a notice stating that the owner intends to completely relinquish title, possession, and control of the vessel, without vesting ownership in any other person, the vessel could be considered abandoned under both Michigan common law and Part 761 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, MCL 324.76101(a). But such actions would not necessarily relieve the person who sunk the vessel from legal responsibilities or liabilities that could arise from the act of sinking.

A vessel intentionally sunk in the Great Lakes does not automatically become property of the State of Michigan when it comes to rest on state bottomlands. The State does, however, reserve to itself a possessory right or title superior to that of a finder to abandoned property of historical or recreational value found on state-owned bottomlands of the Great Lakes. Moreover, pursuant to federal law, the State has title to certain abandoned shipwrecks, including those embedded in Great Lakes bottomlands, as well as other historically significant shipwrecks on Great Lakes bottomlands. In addition, Part 761 provides for the Departments of Environmental Quality and History, Arts, and Libraries to regulate any recovery, alteration, or destruction of abandoned, sunken watercraft, or associated property on Great Lakes bottomlands.

Opinion No. 7229 May 7, 2009

Honorable Michelle A. McManus
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, MI

Honorable Jason Allen
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, MI

You have asked a series of related questions concerning a proposal by an organization to intentionally sink a vessel in order to expand recreational diving opportunities on Great Lakes bottomlands. These questions involve Part 325 (Great Lakes Submerged Lands) of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), 1995 PA 59, MCL 324.32501 *et seq*, and Part 761 (Aboriginal Records and Antiquities) of the NREPA, MCL 324.76101 *et seq*.

Before addressing your specific questions, it is important to note that an intentional sinking may violate both state and federal law. Michigan law generally prohibits the intentional sinking of a vessel in the Great Lakes without state authorization. Part 325 applies to "all of the unpatented lake bottomlands and unpatented made lands in the Great Lakes, including the bays and harbors of the Great Lakes, belonging to the state or held in trust by it."[1] MCL 324.32502. The State of Michigan acquired title to these bottomlands in its sovereign capacity upon its admission to the Union and holds them in trust for the benefit of the people of Michigan. *Illinois Central R Co v Illinois*, 146 US 387; 13 S Ct 110; 36 L Ed 1018 (1892); *Nedtweg v Wallace*, 237 Mich 14; 208 NW 51 (1927). MCL 324.32512(1)(c) prohibits placement of material on Great Lakes bottomland in the absence of a permit or legislative authorization:

> Unless a permit has been granted by the [Department of Environmental Quality] or authorization has been granted by the legislature . . . a person shall not do any of the following:
>
> * * *
>
> (c) Dredge or *place* spoil or *other material* on bottomland. [Emphasis added.]

Since the intentional sinking of a vessel in the Great Lakes necessarily entails its placement on bottomlands, that activity would require a permit under Part 325 unless it is otherwise authorized by statute.

Part 761 of the NREPA addresses various aspects of the State's interests in "abandoned property of historical or recreational value," MCL 324.76102(1), including such property "found on the state owned bottomlands of the Great Lakes." MCL 324.76102(2). Among other things, Part 761 creates an underwater salvage and preserve committee, MCL 324.76103, and directs the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), in consideration of the advice of that committee, to establish by rule Great Lakes bottomlands preserves, to be jointly administered by the DEQ and the Department of History, Arts, and Libraries. MCL 324.76111.[2] This latter section does allow for intentional sinking of vessels, but only under specifically limited circumstances:

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[1] Generally, a land patent is an instrument of conveyance by which the government first conveys fee simple title to public lands. See *Wilcox v Jackson*, 38 US (13 Pet) 498, 516; 10 L Ed 264 (1839); *Glass v Goeckel,* 473 Mich 667, 683 n 11; 703 NW2d 58 (2005); and *People ex rel Brewer v Kidd,* 23 Mich 440, 445-446 (1871).

[2] See 1981 AACS, R 299.6001-R 299.6003; 1985 AACS, R 299.6004; 1987 AACS, R 299.6005; 1988 AACS, R 299.6006-R 299.6007; 1991 AACS, R 299.6008-R 299.6009; 1998-2000 AACS, R 299.6010; 1999 AACS, R 299.6011; and 2008 AACS, R 299.6012, establishing various Great Lakes state bottomland preserves.

> Upon the approval of the [underwater salvage and preserve committee], not more than 1 vessel associated with Great Lakes maritime history may be sunk intentionally within a Great Lakes bottomlands preserve. However, state money shall not be expended to purchase, transport, or sink the vessel. [MCL 324.76111(6).]

In summary, Michigan law forbids the intentional sinking of vessels in the Great Lakes except as authorized by Parts 325 and 761 of the NREPA.[3]

Federal law also constrains the intentional sinking of vessels in navigable waters, including the Great Lakes. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 USC 409, makes it unlawful "to sink, or permit or cause to be sunk, vessels or other craft in navigable channels" and provides for the marking and removal of sunken vessels that obstruct navigation. Another provision of the same statute, 33 USC 403, more generally prohibits the creation of obstructions to the navigable capacity of waters of the United States and the filling of navigable channels except as otherwise authorized by federal law or the United States Army Corps of Engineers. Accordingly, federal as well as state authorization would be required to intentionally sink a vessel in the Great Lakes.[4]

Within this statutory framework, you first ask three closely related questions that may be collectively paraphrased as follows: If an individual or organization that holds title to a vessel intentionally sinks it[5] in the Great Lakes and publishes a statement in a newspaper that it intends to abandon the vessel, would the vessel be considered "abandoned" under Michigan law?

Abandonment under these circumstances is distinctly a question of property law. The term itself has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary (Revised 4th ed) p 9, as:

> The giving up of a thing absolutely, without reference to any particular person or purpose, as throwing a jewel into the highway; leaving a thing to itself, as a vessel at sea; vacating property with the intention of not returning, so that it may be appropriated by the next comer.

The common law of property is well settled that abandonment (as distinguished from loss) consists of two elements: "[A]n intention to relinquish the property and

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[3] Although beyond the scope of your question, there are other legal constraints to intentionally sinking a vessel. For example, the person responsible could also be liable for contamination of the water caused by substances on the vessel, such as residual fuel, under state and federal environmental statutes. Part 31 (Water Resources Protection) of the NREPA, MCL 324.3101 *et seq*; Clean Water Act, 33 USC 1251 *et seq*. The vessel could also be deemed a common law nuisance. *Detroit Bd of Water Comm'rs v Detroit*, 117 Mich 458; 76 NW2d 70 (1898). See also *Wyandotte Transp Co v United States,* 389 US 191; 88 S Ct 379; 19 L Ed 2d 407 (1967) (ruling that the owner of a sunken ship may be held responsible for the removal expenses incurred by the government resulting from the negligent sinking of a ship).

[4] For example, before intentionally sinking a vessel for recreational diving purposes in the Alger Underwater Preserve established in Lake Superior pursuant to Part 761 of the NREPA, the Alger Underwater Preserve Committee, Inc., obtained a permit from the DEQ under Part 325 of the NREPA and a permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 USC 403.

[5] You also ask whether "'scuttling' a vessel is the same as "[i]ntentionally sinking.'" The Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997) offers the following definition of "scuttle": "3. to sink (a vessel) deliberately by opening seacocks or making openings in the bottom." Since the terms are essentially synonymous, the responses to your questions would be the same whether the activity is characterized as "scuttling" or "intentionally sinking."

acts putting that intention into effect, see *Log-Owners' Booming Co v Hubbell*, 135 Mich 65, 69; 97 NW 157 (1903), *Emmons v Easter*, 62 Mich App 226; 233 NW2d 239 (1975)." *Van Slooten v Larsen*, 410 Mich 21, 50; 299 NW2d 704 (1980).

The Michigan Supreme Court recognized in *Rudnik v Mayers*, 387 Mich 379, 384; 196 NW2d 770 (1972), that the intent must be to abandon completely and without reference to another person or purpose [quoting 1 CJS, Abandonment, § 1, p 4]:

> "'Abandonment' of property or a right is the voluntary relinquishment thereof by its owner or holder, with the intention of terminating his ownership, possession, and control, and without vesting ownership in any other person." [Emphasis in original deleted.]

Thus, abandonment is established under the common law of property when the intent to abandon is clearly expressed, and is accompanied by actions indicating relinquishment and no intention to return to assert ownership.

Similar principles apply in determining whether a vessel is "abandoned" for purposes of Part 761. MCL 324.76101(a) defines "abandoned property" in part as:

> [A] watercraft, including a ship, boat, canoe, skiff, raft, or barge; the rigging, gear, fittings, trappings, and equipment of an aircraft or watercraft; the personal property of the officers, crew, and passengers of an aircraft or watercraft; and the cargo of an aircraft or watercraft, which have been deserted, relinquished, cast away, or left behind and for which attempts at reclamation have been abandoned by owners and insurers.

Under this statute, as at common law, property that is permanently relinquished by its owner is "abandoned."[6]

Applying these common law and statutory standards to the situation described in your requests leads to the conclusion that the vessel in question could be deemed abandoned. Specifically, an express public statement of the intent to completely relinquish title, possession, and control of the vessel, without vesting ownership in any other person, together with the physical desertion of the vessel, could establish that the vessel is abandoned.[7]

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your first question, that, assuming the appropriate state and federal authorization has been obtained, if the owner of a vessel intentionally sinks it in the Great Lakes, physically deserts the vessel, and publishes a notice stating that the owner intends to completely relinquish title, possession, and control of the vessel, without vesting ownership in any other person, the vessel could be considered abandoned under both Michigan common law and Part 761 of the NREPA, MCL 324.76101(a). But such actions would not necessarily relieve the person who sunk the vessel from legal responsibilities or liabilities that could arise from the act of sinking the vessel.

You next ask whether a vessel that is intentionally sunk in the Great Lakes automatically becomes property of the State of Michigan when it comes to rest on state

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[6] This opinion does not address any rights or interests that may be asserted by third parties, such as insurers or lien holders.

[7] Again, abandoning a vessel would not necessarily relieve the person responsible for sinking the vessel from legal responsibilities or liabilities that could arise from the act of sinking the vessel.

bottomlands. It appears that this question is based upon MCL 324.76102(2), in which the State "reserves" rights to certain abandoned property of historical or recreational value:

> The state reserves to itself a possessory right or title superior to that of a finder to abandoned property of historical or recreational value found on the state owned bottomlands of the Great Lakes. This property shall belong to this state with administration and protection jointly vested in the department [of Environmental Quality] and the department of history, arts, and libraries.

By its terms, the statute applies only to "abandoned property" that is also "of historical or recreational value." Under Part 761, "historical value" means "value relating to, or illustrative of, Michigan history, including the statehood, territorial, colonial, and historic, and prehistoric native American periods." MCL 324.76101(f). "Recreational value" is statutorily defined as "value relating to an activity that the public engages in, or may engage in, for recreation or sport, including scuba diving and fishing." MCL 324.76101(h). As the Court of Appeals explained in *People v Massey*, 137 Mich App 480, 489-490; 358 NW2d 615 (1984), this law protects:

> [T]he public trust of articles possessing historic and recreational value . . . [and] the state's interest in preserving its heritage for the use and enjoyment of its citizens.

Reading MCL 324.76102(2) according to the plain meaning of the language chosen by the Legislature, it is apparent that the State does not automatically assume title to any vessel or other object found on its Great Lakes bottomlands. MCL 324.76102(2) specifically "reserves" to the State "a possessory right or title *superior to that of a finder*." (Emphasis added.) This language does not automatically and absolutely vest in the State title to all abandoned property of historical or recreational value located on state bottomlands. Rather, it defines the relative rights of the State and a "finder" of the property, that is, a person who locates the abandoned property and who might then attempt to claim, recover, or remove it from the bottomlands without the consent of the State.[8] While the second sentence of MCL 324.76102(2) states that "[t]his property shall belong to this state," that language, like any other provision of a statute, must be read and construed in the context of the entire statute. *Sweatt v Dep't of Corrections,* 468 Mich 172, 179-180; 661 NW2d 201 (2003); *Western Michigan Univ Bd of Control v State*, 455 Mich 531, 538; 565 NW2d 828 (1997). Read in the context of Part 761 as a whole, the phrase "*this property* shall belong to this state" refers back to the State's property interest described in the immediately preceding sentence. (Emphasis added.) The evident purpose of the second sentence is to assign responsibility for the administration and protection of these interests to the DEQ and the Department of History, Arts, and Libraries. Reading the sentences of subsection (2) of MCL 324.76102 together, if a finder encounters abandoned property of historical or recreational value on the Michigan bottomlands of the Great Lakes and seeks to take possession and assert title to it, the State may assert a superior right to the property.

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[8] Under the common law doctrine of finds, which is sometimes applied to long lost and abandoned shipwrecks, a finder may seek to acquire title to such property by demonstrating both the intent to own it and acts designed to establish exclusive control and possession of it. *Columbus-America Discovery Group v Atlantic Mutual Ins Co*, 974 F2d 450, 459-460 (CA 4, 1992).

It is important to note, however, that the State of Michigan's legal and regulatory interests in abandoned property on Great Lakes bottomlands, including shipwrecks, are not limited to the provisions of MCL 324.76102(2). For example, federal law also provides that the State has title to certain abandoned shipwrecks of historical value. In the Abandoned Shipwreck Act, 43 USC 2101 *et seq*, the United States "asserts title to any abandoned shipwreck that is (1) embedded in the submerged lands of a State . . . or (3) on submerged lands of a State and is included in or determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register [of Historic Places]."[9] 43 USC 2105(a). The title of the United States to any such shipwreck is then by law "transferred to the State in or on whose submerged lands the shipwreck is located." 43 USC 2105(c).

Moreover, regardless of whether the State chooses to assert a possessory right or title to certain abandoned property of historical or recreational value on Great Lakes bottomlands under state law, the State retains broad authority to regulate activities pertaining to all abandoned property on Great Lakes bottomlands, including shipwrecks. MCL 324.76107(1) provides:

> Except as provided in section 76108, a person shall not recover, alter, or destroy abandoned property[10] which is in, on, under, or over the bottomlands of the Great Lakes, including those within a Great Lakes bottomlands preserve, unless the person has a permit issued jointly by the department of history, arts, and libraries and the department [of Environmental Quality] under section 76109.

Violations of that requirement are subject to criminal prosecution, MCL 324.76107(4) – (7), as well as civil enforcement. MCL 324.76114(2).[11]

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[9] In *Zych v Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, Believed to be the Seabird, etc.*, 941 F2d 525, 529 (CA 7, 1991), the Court of Appeals explained that the scope of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act is limited:

> Congress only cared to transfer ownership and ensure protection of shipwrecks of "historic significance," House Report at 365, which it estimated to be a mere five to ten percent of the 50,000 abandoned shipwrecks located in the navigable waters of the U.S. House Report at 365. In the ASA [Abandoned Shipwreck Act], the concept of "embeddedness" serves as a proxy for historic value.

[10] "Abandoned property" means:

> [A]n aircraft; a watercraft, including a ship, boat, canoe, skiff, raft, or barge; the rigging, gear, fittings, trappings, and equipment of an aircraft or watercraft; the personal property of the officers, crew, and passengers of an aircraft or watercraft; and the cargo of an aircraft or watercraft, which have been deserted, relinquished, cast away, or left behind and for which attempts at reclamation have been abandoned by owners and insurers. Abandoned property also means materials resulting from activities of historic and prehistoric Native Americans. [MCL 324.76101(a).]

[11] The exception to this permit requirement is limited to recovery of abandoned property that is: (a) outside a Great Lakes bottomlands preserve; (b) not in or associated with a sunken aircraft or watercraft; and (c) recoverable by hand without mechanical or other assistance. MCL 324.76108(1). Under certain conditions, such property recovered without a permit must still be reported to the Department of History, Arts, and Libraries and made available for its inspection to determine its historical value. In addition, MCL 324.76109 prescribes detailed permitting requirements for recovery of abandoned property located on, in, or in the immediate vicinity of and associated with a sunken watercraft. These regulatory requirements are not contingent upon any assertion by the State of title to a sunken vessel.

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your second question, that a vessel intentionally sunk in the Great Lakes does not automatically become property of the State of Michigan when it comes to rest on state bottomlands. The State does, however, reserve to itself a possessory right or title superior to that of a finder to abandoned property of historical or recreational value found on state-owned bottomlands of the Great Lakes. Moreover, pursuant to federal law, the State has title to certain abandoned shipwrecks, including those embedded in Great Lakes bottomlands, as well as other historically significant shipwrecks located on Great Lakes bottomlands. In addition, Part 761 provides for the Departments of Environmental Quality and History, Arts, and Libraries to regulate any recovery, alteration, or destruction of abandoned, sunken watercraft, or associated property on Great Lakes bottomlands.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

SUMMER RESORT OWNERS CORPORATION ACT: Voting rights of members of a summer resort owners corporation created under 1929 PA 137

VOTING:

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS:

A summer resort owners corporation created under 1929 PA 137, MCL 455.201 *et seq*, affords each owner of a freehold interest in property subject to the corporation's jurisdiction membership in the corporation and the right to vote in all its elections. Freeholders include all those holding a fee title or a life estate in real property. Because a member's right to vote is conditioned on ownership of a freehold interest in lands, a summer resort owners corporation may not through adoption of a bylaw deny or limit that right of suffrage based upon the nonpayment of assessments or dues. A bylaw disenfranchising members for nonpayment of assessments is unenforceable.

Each freeholder holding lands within the corporate jurisdiction of a summer resort owners corporation created under 1929 PA 137 is entitled to one vote in elections held under that act. An association bylaw allowing other than one vote per member freeholder is unenforceable.

1929 PA 137, MCL 455.201 *et seq*, does not authorize summer resort owner corporations formed under that act to withdraw the status of membership and deny the right to vote based on a member's failure to pay dues or levied assessments or comply with other bylaw requirements.

Opinion No. 7230 May 27, 2009

Honorable Kate Ebli
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48909

You have asked three questions regarding the voting rights of members of corporations incorporated under the Summer Resort Owners Corporation Act, 1929 PA 137, MCL 455.201 *et seq*. Those questions are:

> 1. Can association bylaws allow for the removal of the right to vote for nonpayment of assessments, or for any other reason other than alienation of the property of a member?
>
> 2. Can association bylaws allow more than one vote per member other than one vote each for husband and wife owning property by the entireties? If there is more than one owner of a piece of property other than husband and wife, are all members entitled to one vote each?
>
> 3. If members are not in good standing because of nonpayment of assessments or other bylaw requirements, do they count in the number of all members? (Even though the association bylaws state "*members not in good standing shall forfeit all privileges and voting rights*.")

These questions arise against a backdrop of constitutional principles, statutory provisions, prior judicial decisions, and Attorney General opinions.

The Summer Resort Owners Corporation Act (1929 PA 137 or Act) permits ten or more persons to form a summer resort owners corporation "for the better welfare of said community and for the purchase and improvement of lands to be occupied for summer homes and summer resort purposes." MCL 455.201. The incorporators "may, with their associates and successors, become a body politic and corporate, under any name by them assumed in their articles of incorporation." MCL 455.201.

Each "freeholder of land" within the resort community may voluntarily become a member of the corporation upon written consent. MCL 455.206. Jurisdiction over lands within the resort community owned by freeholders who have not voluntarily joined the corporation may be obtained by an election held under the provisions of the Act. MCL 455.206. "Persons eligible to membership in said corporation, at any and all times, must be *freeholders of land* in the county of its organization and such land must be contiguous to the resort community in which the corporation is organized." MCL 455.206 (emphasis added). Under MCL 455.208, "[m]embership shall terminate upon the alienation of the property of a member." Only "members" are entitled to vote in connection with various corporate matters. See, e.g., MCL 455.205 ("majority vote of the members" may authorize the trustees to convey property); MCL 455.208 ("[e]ach member shall be entitled to 1 vote" in the election of trustees at the annual meeting of the association); MCL 455.219 ("vote of a majority of all of the members" is required to authorize annual dues and assessments unless a majority of the members provide for approval by a majority of votes cast by members voting).

The term "freeholder" has an ancient lineage in property law and encompasses any person or legal entity holding an interest in the fee or a life estate in lands. MCL

554.1, 554.2, and 554.5.[1] In *Starkweather v Chatfield*, 149 Mich 443, 444; 112 NW 1071 (1907), the Michigan Supreme Court held that a land contract vendee possessed an "estate of inheritance" and therefore was a "freeholder." In addition, every tenant by the entireties is a "freeholder." *Hinkley v Bishopp*, 152 Mich 256, 261; 114 NW 676 (1908). Because a deed made to two persons who are husband and wife creates a tenancy by the entireties, both a husband and wife holding title to lands jointly are "freeholders" of those lands.[2] Thus, there is no basis for distinguishing between those who own an undivided interest in fee and those who are joint tenants or tenants in common when determining their status as "freeholders." Each joint tenant, tenant in common, tenant by the entireties, land contract vendee, and person who holds an undivided interest in fee, as well as each life tenant, is a "freeholder," and each such freeholder is eligible for membership in a summer resort owners corporation and granted the right to vote under the Act.

That the Legislature in 1929 PA 137 granted each "freeholder" one vote as a "member" is further evidenced by comparing the voting provisions adopted in the Summer Resort Owners Corporation Act with the voting provisions adopted in other earlier enacted statutes. For example, the Legislature allowed one vote per lot or per share in 1887 PA 69, MCL 455.101 *et seq*,[3] one vote per share in 1897 PA 230, MCL 455.1 *et seq*,[4] and one vote per member in 1889 PA 39, MCL 255.51 *et seq*.[5] The differences between these various acts demonstrates that the Legislature made conscious distinctions when defining the right to vote in each, and in 1929 PA 137, the Legislature tied membership in the corporation to one's status as a "freeholder" and granted each such member one and only one vote. Unlike in earlier acts, the Legislature did not grant a vote for each lot or each share in the corporation.

The persons associating as a summer resort owners corporation under the Act "shall become and be a body politic and corporate, under the name assumed in their articles of association and shall have and possess all the general powers and privileges and be subject to all the liabilities of a municipal corporation and become the local governing body." MCL 455.204. As summarized by the Michigan Supreme Court in *Home Owners' Loan Corp v Detroit,* 292 Mich 511, 515; 290 NW 888 (1940), a municipal corporation possesses only those powers expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied as incident to those express powers, and those essential or indispensable to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation.[6] See also *Toebe v Munising,* 282 Mich 1, 16; 275 NW 744 (1937).

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[1] MCL 554.1 states: "Estates in lands are divided into estates of inheritance, estates for life, estates for years, and estates at will and by sufferance."

MCL 554.2 states: "Every estate of inheritance shall continue to be termed a fee simple, or fee; and every such estate, when not defeasible or conditional, shall be a fee simple absolute, or an absolute fee."

MCL 554.5 states: "Estates of inheritance and for life shall be denominated estates of freehold; estates for years shall be denominated chattels real; and estates at will or by sufferance shall be chattel interests, but shall not be liable as such to sale on executions."

[2] See Letter Opinion of Attorney General Frank J. Kelley to Representative Thomas G. Sharpe, dated March 2, 1971, citing: *Hinkley*; *Dowling v Salliotte*, 83 Mich 131; 47 NW 225 (1890); *Hoyt v Winstanley*, 221 Mich 515; 191 NW 213 (1922); and *DeYoung v Mesler*, 373 Mich 499; 130 NW2d 38 (1964).

[3] 1887 PA 69 authorizes the incorporation of suburban homestead, villa park, and summer resort associations. See MCL 455.105.

[4] 1897 PA 230 provides for the formation of summer resort and park associations. See MCL 455.5.

[5] 1889 PA 39 authorizes the formation of summer resort and assembly associations. See MCL 455.56.

[6] Consistent with the quasi-governmental character of summer resort owners corporations, for example, in OAG, 1997-1998, No 6942, p 40 (July 3, 1997), the Attorney General concluded that a corporation formed under 1929 PA 137 is a "public body" subject to the Freedom of Information Act, 1976 PA 442, MCL 15.231 *et seq,* and to the Open Meetings Act, 1976 PA 267, MCL 15.261 *et seq*.

For purposes of filing its articles of association and paying fees to the State, a summer resort owners corporation shall be classified as nonprofit. MCL 455.203.[7] Additionally, the Business Corporation Act, 1972 PA 284, MCL 450.1101 *et seq*, specifically applies to summer resort associations. MCL 450.1123.

The board of trustees of a summer resort owners corporation has authority to enact bylaws for particular purposes, subject to repeal or modification by the members at any regular or special meeting. MCL 455.212.[8] Subject to the approval of the members, the board of trustees may require that the members pay annual dues and special assessments for purposes authorized under the Act. MCL 455.219(1).[9] The penalties for nonpayment of dues and assessments are specified in the statute. MCL 455.219(1)(c).

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[7] Section 1 of the Act refers to articles of "incorporation" and section 3 of the Act refers to articles of "association." Compare MCL 455.201 and 455.203. There is no indication, however, that the Legislature intended these references to be anything but synonymous.

[8] MCL 455.212 states:

> The board of trustees shall have the authority to enact by-laws, subject to repeal or modification by the members at any regular or special meeting, calculated and designed to carry into effect the following jurisdiction over the lands owned by the corporation and its members, viz.: To keep all such lands in good sanitary condition; to preserve the purity of the water of all streams, springs, bays or lakes within or bordering upon said lands; to protect all occupants from contagious diseases and to remove from said lands any and all persons afflicted with contagious diseases; to prevent and prohibit all forms of vice and immorality; to prevent and prohibit all disorderly assemblies, disorderly conduct, games of chance, gaming and disorderly houses; to regulate billiard and pool rooms, bowling alleys, dance halls and bath houses; to prohibit and abate all nuisances; to regulate meat markets, butcher shops and such other places of business as may become offensive to the health and comfort of the members and occupants of such lands; to regulate the speed of vehicles over its streets and alleys and make general traffic regulations thereon; to prevent the roaming at large of any dog or any other animal; to compel persons occupying any part of said lands to keep the same in good sanitary condition and the abutting streets and highways and sidewalks free from dirt and obstruction and in good repair.

While the statute hyphenates the word "by-law," this opinion will use the non-hyphenated form of the word found in the Business Corporation Act.

[9] MCL 455.219 states:

> (1) The board of trustees may require that the members of a corporation pay annual dues and special assessments for any purpose authorized under this act. All of the following apply to an assessment of annual dues or a special assessment under this subsection:
>
> (a) The approval of the members under subsection (2) is required.
>
> (b) With the approval of the members under subsection (2), the board of trustees shall prescribe the time and manner of payment and manner of collection of the annual dues or special assessment.
>
> (c) With the approval of the members under subsection (2), the board of trustees may provide that delinquent annual dues or assessments shall become a lien upon the land of the delinquent member and may provide the manner and method of enforcing that lien.
>
> (2) Unless the members by a vote of a majority of all of the members have by resolution specifically provided for approval by a majority of the votes cast by the members voting, the vote of a majority of all of the members of the corporation is required to approve an action of the board under subsection (1).

But it is important to recognize that significant limitations apply when evaluating the enforceability of a bylaw of a summer resort owners corporation. For example, the Business Corporation Act, MCL 450.1231(1), requires that bylaws be consistent with the law: "The bylaws may contain any provision for the regulation and management of the affairs of the corporation *not inconsistent with law* or the articles of incorporation." (Emphasis added.) This requirement was analyzed in OAG, 2003-2004, No 7164, p 165 (October 7, 2004), where the Attorney General was asked whether a summer resort corporation's bylaw authorizing the assessment of annual dues by a vote of a majority of the voting members was inconsistent with section 19 of the Act, MCL 455.219, and therefore unenforceable. The then current version of section 19 allowed the corporation to assess annual dues "against its members, by a vote of a majority thereof."[10] Finding that this language was clear and unambiguous in requiring a majority vote of all members, and not fewer than a majority as allowed in the bylaw, the Attorney General concluded the bylaw was unenforceable because, contrary to the requirement stated in MCL 450.1123(1), the bylaw was inconsistent with MCL 455.219.

In addition to statutory requirements, the obligation of a summer resort owners corporation to comply with constitutional requirements was confirmed in *Baldwin v North Shore Estates Ass'n*, 384 Mich 42, 52; 179 NW 2d 398 (1970). In *Baldwin*, the Michigan Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the voter eligibility provisions contained in section 6c of the Act, MCL 455.206c, which governed elections held to extend the jurisdiction of a summer resort owners corporation to lands of nonmembers without their consent. Noting the constitutional requirement that there must be a relation between statutory classifications and the purposes of the act in which the classifications are found, the Court struck down on equal protection grounds the Act's requirement that qualified voters must have resided in the area affected by an election during the four weekends prior to the election. The Court reasoned that, contrary to the Act's purpose to benefit all freeholders in the affected area, the residency requirement split freeholders into two differently treated subclasses:

> The general validity of a reasonable period of residence in a community as a qualification for the exercise of one's franchise therein is beyond question. And since corporations authorized by the statute in question clearly possess many quasi-governmental characteristics, it is appropriate that the constitutional principles governing voter qualifications for similar local elections be generally applicable to elections conducted under § 6 of the act. Accordingly, the weekend residency requirement of § 6c would appear to be less stringent than the parallel requirements for most other local elections if it were considered without regard to the peculiar type of community (resort) envisioned by the act and without regard to the peculiar type of residency (bodily presence) required by the act.
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> But we cannot ignore these distinctions. In contrast to the usual local election situation, we deal here with residency *away* from the permanent domiciles of many potential voters, and we deal with the harsh requirement of "bodily presence" in the community. The facts giving rise to the present controversy make it abundantly clear that in the case of an election held in

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[10] Section 19 of the Act was amended by 2006 PA 44 to ratify OAG No 7164 "concerning the appropriate vote of the members required to approve an action of the board under section 19." See 2006 PA 44, enacting section 1.

> a resort area, many potential voters–whose interests will be vitally affected by the election results–cannot *reasonably* be expected to meet the weekend residency requirement of § 6c. As a result, contrary to the object of the legislation, which is to benefit all freeholders in an affected resort area, the residency requirement of § 6c has the practical effect of splitting, for election purposes, the natural class of area freeholders into two differently treated subclasses: those who are more or less permanent residents of the area and those who occasionally use their resort property.
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> * * *
>
> We hold that the residency requirement of § 6c was from the beginning, and is now, constitutionally invalid, since it constitutes a denial to the plaintiffs and others like them of equal protection of the laws under the Michigan and United States Constitutions. It grants privileges and benefits to a portion of the class of freeholders while denying them to the remaining class of freeholders. [384 Mich at 52-54; citations and footnote omitted.]

Applying the applicable severability statute, MCL 8.5,[11] the Court further concluded that the invalid residency requirement was severable from the rest of the statute and that the act's other provisions remained valid. *Id*. at 54. In dicta, however, the *Baldwin* Court signaled its concerns about other provisions of the Act. Before striking down the Act's weekend residency requirement, the Court made the observation that the "entire act borders on unconstitutionality by reason of its vagueness," expressing the view that several of the Act's basic terms ("resided weekends," "summer resorts," "resort community," and "summer resort owners") were not defined, raising a vagueness issue. But the Court found it unnecessary to address the vagueness concern, addressing the narrower equal protection issue instead. *Id*. at 49-50.

Nearly 35 years later, in *Whitman v Lake Diane Corp,* 267 Mich App 176; 704 NW2d 468 (2005), the Michigan Court of Appeals addressed a due process challenge to two other provisions of the Act governing elections held to extend the jurisdiction of a resort owners corporation to lands of non-members without their consent – sections 6c and 6d, MCL 455.206c and 455.206d. After noting the general vagueness concerns raised by the Supreme Court in *Baldwin* and that Court's reasons for striking down the weekend residency requirement, the Court of Appeals addressed other perceived shortcomings in the statutory language of these two sections, focusing in particular on the property interest involved and the possibility that an election could result in the involuntary annexation of that property to the jurisdiction of a summer resort corporation. Given the "lack of specificity" concerning who was entitled to vote on the expansion of jurisdiction and when the election was to take place, the Court held that the election provisions of sections 6c and 6d violated the due process rights of those whose property interests would be affected by such an election. 267 Mich App at 183.

Whitman dealt only with the specific election provisions relating to an involuntary annexation of territory to a summer resort owners corporation. The Court did not

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[11] MCL 8.5 states:

> If any portion of an act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances shall be found to be invalid by a court, such invalidity shall not affect the remaining portions or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid portion or application, provided such remaining portions are not determined by the court to be inoperable, and to this end acts are declared to be severable.

determine that other provisions of the Summer Resort Owners Corporation Act were inoperable. Thus, in accordance with the severability statute, MCL 8.5, and consistent with the principle applied in *Baldwin*, 384 Mich at 54, it cannot be said that other election procedures involving summer resort owners corporations are constitutionally invalid.[12] When evaluating the validity of the actions of a summer resort owners corporation, however, it is apparent that the corporation's authority must comport with constitutional and legal requirements.

To summarize the principles relevant to your inquiry: MCL 455.206 provides that freeholders are members of a summer resort owners corporation and MCL 455.208 provides that membership terminates upon the alienation of the property of a member. Each joint tenant, tenant in common, tenant by the entireties, land contract vendee, and person who holds an undivided interest in fee, as well as each life tenant, is a freeholder. In *Baldwin*, 384 Mich at 53, the Supreme Court held that the object of the Summer Resort Owners Corporation Act is "to benefit all freeholders in an affected resort area." The corporation has only those powers expressly conferred by the Legislature or necessarily implied from those express powers, and the powers of the corporation, including the power to adopt and enforce bylaws, is subject to constitutional and statutory limitations. With these background considerations in mind, your specific questions may now be reviewed.

You first ask whether association bylaws may allow for the removal of the right to vote for nonpayment of assessments or for any reason other than the alienation of the property of a member.

In *Baldwin*, 384 Mich at 52-53, the Supreme Court explained that, because summer resort owner corporations "clearly possess many quasi-governmental characteristics, it is appropriate that the constitutional principles governing voter qualifications for similar local elections be generally applicable to elections conducted under [MCL 455.206]." The Court held that the object of the legislation was to benefit all freeholders in an affected resort area but that the residency requirement had "the practical effect of splitting, for election purposes, the natural class of area freeholders into two differently treated subclasses," and was, therefore, unconstitutional. 384 Mich at 53.

The Act grants the right to vote to members who are freeholders; no other statutory qualification is placed on the right to vote by the Legislature. A corporation formed under the Act has no authority to alter the terms or conditions for voting except those specifically consistent with law. The penalties for nonpayment of dues and assessments are specified in the Act under section 19(1)(c), MCL 455.219(1)(c). Nonpayment of an assessment gives rise to a debt owing to the corporation. It may be enforced by an action in circuit or district court seeking a money judgment against the non-paying owners. Just as in *Baldwin*, 384 Mich at 52-53, an association bylaw disenfranchising certain freeholders for nonpayment of assessments would create two differently treated subclasses, contrary to the object of the legislation, which is to benefit all freeholders. Moreover, it has long been clear that the right to vote in elections cannot be conditioned on the payment of a poll tax. See *In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71*, 479 Mich 1, 36-42; 740 NW2d 444 (2007) (upholding statute being challenged as tantamount to an unconstitutional poll tax because it did not condition the right to vote on the payment of any

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[12] The deficiencies identified by the Courts in *Baldwin* and *Whitman* with respect to elections to extend corporate jurisdiction over lands of freeholders involuntarily have not – to date – been addressed by the Legislature.

fee), citing US Const, Am XXIV. Similarly, the right to vote in a summer resort corporation election cannot be conditioned on the payment of dues or assessments.

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your first question, that a summer resort owners corporation created under 1929 PA 137, MCL 455.201 *et seq*, affords each owner of a freehold interest in property subject to the corporation's jurisdiction membership in the corporation and the right to vote in all its elections. Freeholders include all those holding an interest in fee or a life estate in real property. Because a member's right to vote is conditioned on ownership of a freehold interest in lands, a summer resort owners corporation may not through adoption of a bylaw deny or limit that right of suffrage based upon the nonpayment of assessments or dues. A bylaw disenfranchising members for nonpayment of dues or assessments is unenforceable.

Your second question asks whether association bylaws may allow more or less than one vote per member, and, if there is more than one owner of a piece of property other than husband and wife, whether all members are entitled to one vote each.[13]

MCL 455.208 specifies the manner of voting at the annual meeting: "Each member shall be entitled to 1 vote. Husbands and wives, owning property by entireties, shall each be entitled to 1 vote. Membership shall terminate upon the alienation of the property of a member."[14] MCL 455.206 describes who is eligible to become a "member": "Persons eligible to membership in said corporation, at any and all times, must be freeholders of land in the county of its organization."

As discussed in answer to your first question, each joint tenant, tenant in common, tenant by the entireties, land contract vendee, and person who holds an undivided interest in fee, as well as each life tenant, is a "freeholder," and each such freeholder is a "member" of a summer resort owners corporation as long as the person continues to hold that interest. According to the plain language of the operative provisions, each such freeholder member is entitled to one and only one vote. These provisions are clear and unambiguous and must therefore be enforced as written to effectuate the Legislature's intent. *Tryc v Michigan Veterans' Facility*, 451 Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642 (1996). No language may be added to these provisions that the Legislature itself did not choose to include. *AFSCME v Detroit*, 468 Mich 388, 412; 662 NW2d 695 (2003). Unlike the voting provisions included in other similar and earlier enacted statutes that granted voting rights based on corporate shares or lots held, the Legislature in 1929 PA 137 granted each member of the corporation one vote based solely on the member's status as a freeholder. The differences among these statutes suggest that the Legislature would have specified different qualifications for voting, other than freeholder status alone, if the Legislature had intended such a result in 1929 PA 137. See *South Haven v Van Buren County Bd of Comm'rs,* 478 Mich 518, 530 n 16; 734 NW2d 533 (2007).

This conclusion is consistent with that provided by the Attorney General in 1970 in response to questions concerning voting in annual or special meetings of a summer resort corporation formed under 1929 PA 137. Addressing whether two or more people, including a husband and wife, who own one lot of property jointly each have one

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[13] It should be noted that the Court of Appeals raised concerns about similar issues in *Whitman v Lake Diane Corp,* 267 Mich App at 182-183, when striking down the Act's provisions governing elections for involuntary annexation. As explained above, however, under the statutory principle of severability, MCL 8.5, as applied in *Baldwin*, 384 Mich at 54, it cannot be said that the Court held other summer resort corporation election procedures unconstitutional.

[14] MCL 455.210 permits members to vote at special meetings as well as annual meetings.

or more votes, the Attorney General opined that each freeholder member is entitled to one vote:

> Section 6 of Act 137 provides that all "freeholders" in the county of organization can become members of the corporation. Therefore, if both the husband and the wife have some form of freehold estate in the property, both have a separate vote. Section 5 of Chapter 62, R.S. 1846, as amended, MSA § 26.5, MCLA § 554.5, provides that freehold estates are all those "estates of inheritance and for life * * *." Thus, if the husband and wife hold their property by the entireties (specifically mentioned in § 8 of Act 137), in common, jointly or in any other manner such that they both have a minimum of life interest, they are both freeholders.
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> [T]he answer given [above] would apply equally to Question 3. All the joint owners having a freehold estate in the lot are entitled to a separate vote. [Letter Opinion of Attorney General Frank J. Kelley to Senator John E. McCauley, dated September 22, 1970.]

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your second question, that each freeholder holding lands within the corporate jurisdiction of a summer resort owners corporation created under 1929 PA 137 is entitled to one vote in elections held under that act. An association bylaw allowing other than one vote per member freeholder is unenforceable.

Your final question is whether members not in good standing because of nonpayment of assessments or other bylaw requirements count in the number of all members.

The answer to this question is closely related to the answers to your other questions. MCL 455.206 provides that "[p]ersons eligible to membership in said corporation, at any and all times, must be freeholders." MCL 455.208 describes the manner of voting, for example at the annual meeting: "Each member shall be entitled to 1 vote. . . . Membership shall terminate upon the alienation of the property of a member." The object of the Act is "to benefit all freeholders in an affected resort area." *Baldwin*, 384 Mich at 53.

MCL 455.219(1)(b) and (c) provide for dues and assessments and penalties for nonpayment. Nonpayment of dues or an assessment gives rise to a debt owing to the corporation. It may be enforced by an action in circuit or district court seeking a money judgment against the non-paying owners. The Act affords the corporation no power to enforce payment of dues and assessments by denying a member voting rights. The Act makes freeholders members and gives the right to vote to members; there is no other statutory qualification. A corporation formed under the Act has no authority to alter the terms or conditions for voting, and its actions must be consistent with governing legal principles. MCL 450.1231; OAG No 7164; *Baldwin*; and *Whitman*.

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your third question, that 1929 PA 137, MCL 455.201 *et seq*, does not authorize summer resort owner corporations formed under that act to withdraw the status of membership and deny the right to vote based on a member's failure to pay dues or levied assessments or comply with other bylaw requirements.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

COUNTIES: Responsibility for costs associated with mental health treatment provided to inmates at county jails

COUNTY JAILS:

INMATES:

MENTAL HEALTH CODE:

The costs incurred providing mental health services to an inmate incarcerated in a county jail are ultimately the responsibility of the county under MCL 801.4. The community mental health program serving the county in which that jail is located must nevertheless seek to obtain payment from available insurance or other sources before resorting to the county for payment in accordance with MCL 801.4(2).

The costs incurred in providing mental health services to an inmate in a county jail rests with the county, regardless of the type of treatment or mental health service being delivered.

Opinion No. 7231 May 27, 2009

Honorable Steven Lindberg
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI

You have asked two questions relating to responsibility for the costs incurred providing mental health services to inmates incarcerated at county jails. Your first question asks whether the county or the local community mental health authorities must bear the financial burden of providing mental health services to inmates in a county jail who are in need of mental health care while incarcerated.

County jails are under the supervisory jurisdiction of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). Section 62(3) of the Corrections Code, MCL 791.262(3), states:

> The department shall supervise and inspect jails and lockups that are under the jurisdiction of the county sheriff to obtain facts concerning the proper management of the jails and lockups and their usefulness. The department shall promulgate rules and standards promoting the proper, efficient, and humane administration of jails and lockups that are under the jurisdiction of the county sheriff pursuant to the administrative procedures act.

The MDOC has promulgated administrative rules in fulfillment of this statutory directive. These rules impose various requirements upon county jails relating to the physical and mental health of persons in their custody. Rule 28, 1998-2000 AACS, R 791.728, includes a requirement to ensure that matters relating to the psychiatric needs of an inmate shall be left to the medical judgment of the appropriate health professional:

> A facility shall establish and maintain written policy, procedure, and practice which provide that all medical, psychiatric and dental inmate matters involving medical judgment are the sole province of the responsible physician, dentist or other qualified health professional.

Under Rule 31, 1998-2000 AACS, R 791.731, a trained facility staff member is required to perform an initial mental health screening to determine whether or not each new inmate will be housed within the jail's general population.

Within fourteen days of this initial health screening, a more detailed health appraisal is then required. Under Rule 32, 1998-2000 AACS, R. 791.732, a more thorough physical and mental health work-up must be completed by "a trained health care person."

Michigan's Mental Health Code, MCL 330.1001 *et seq*, addresses who is to provide mental health services to inmates in county jails. Section 1002a of the Mental Health Code, MCL 330.2002a, states:

> For a person confined in a place of detention operated by a political subdivision of the state and who requests mental health services, mental health services shall be provided by the appropriate community mental health program pursuant to the responsibilities described in section 206 [MCL 330.1206[1]].

Thus, the Mental Health Code makes clear that the community mental health program shall provide the requested mental health services. But it is silent concerning whether that program or the county has primary responsibility for the financial burden associated with providing those services. The answer to this question can be found, however, within the Michigan statutes regulating county jails, chapter 171 of the Revised Statutes of 1846. Specifically, section 4 of chapter 171, MCL 801.4, assigns such responsibility to the counties, with health care providers assigned a related duty to seek reimbursement under the described circumstances:

> (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) and sections 5 and 5a,[2] *all charges and expenses of safekeeping and maintaining prisoners and persons charged with an offense*, *shall be paid from the county treasury*, the accounts therefor being first settled and allowed by the county board of commissioners.
>
> (2) If medical care or treatment is provided to an individual described in subsection (1), the health care provider shall make a reasonable effort to determine whether that individual is covered by a health care policy, a certificate of insurance, or other source for the payment of medical expenses. If the county sheriff who has custody over the individual is aware that the individual is covered by any health care policy, certificate of insurance, or other source of payment, the sheriff shall provide that information to the

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[1] A "community mental health [services] program" is defined under the Mental Health Code to include mental health authorities. See MCL 330.1100a(16). Section 206(1), MCL 330.1206(1), provides that the purpose of a community mental health services program "shall be to provide a comprehensive array of mental health services appropriate to conditions of individuals who are located within its geographic service area, regardless of an individual's ability to pay."

[2] Sections 5 and 5a authorize a county board of commissioners to provide for reimbursement for medical attendance supplies and to seek reimbursement for expenses incurred in providing medical care and treatment. MCL 801.5(3) and MCL 801.5a(1)-(3).

> health care provider. If the health care provider determines that the individual, at the time of admission or treatment, is a medicaid recipient or a beneficiary of any health care policy, certificate of insurance, or other source for the payment of some or all of those expenses, the health care provider shall first seek reimbursement from that source, subject to the terms and conditions of the applicable health care policy, certificate of insurance, or medicaid contract, before submitting those expenses to the county. When submitting an invoice to the county for the payment of medical expenses under this section, a health care provider shall provide a statement that the health care provider has made a reasonable effort to determine whether the individual was covered by a health care policy, certificate of insurance, or other source for the payment of medical expenses. A county may enter into agreements with health care providers to establish procedures for the submission of invoices for medical expenses under this section and the payment of those invoices. [Emphasis added.]

MCL 801.4 has been consistently applied to hold counties liable for the costs of medical care provided to county jail inmates. See, e.g., *Univ Emergency Services, PC v Wayne County*, 141 Mich App 512, 520-521; 367 NW2d 344 (1984); *St. Mary's Hosp v Saginaw County*, 139 Mich App 647, 649; 363 NW2d 32 (1984); and *Zieger Osteopathic Hosp, Inc v Wayne County*, 139 Mich App 630, 632; 363 NW2d 28 (1984). As the Court stated in *Zieger Osteopathic Hosp, Inc,* "[t]his statute reflects the general principle that counties are responsible for the costs of enforcement of state criminal laws."

A basic principle governing statutory construction is that statutes covering the same subject matter should be read *in pari materia*. In *Apsey v Memorial Hosp*, 477 Mich 120, 129 n 4; 730 NW2d 695 (2007), quoting *Detroit v Michigan Bell Tel Co*, 374 Mich 543, 558; 132 NW2d 660 (1965), the Michigan Supreme Court explained how this principle is applied:

> Statutes *in pari materia* are those which relate to the same person or thing, or the same class of persons or things, or which have a common purpose. It is the rule that in construction of a particular statute, or in the interpretation of its provisions, all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read in connection with it, as together constituting one law, although enacted at different times, and containing no reference one to the other.

Reading MCL 330.2002a together with MCL 801.4 leads to the conclusion that mental health services for inmates in a county jail shall be provided by the community mental health program and paid for by the county. This conclusion is, of course, subject to the exception set forth in MCL 801.4(2), which operates to require the community mental health program providing services to an inmate covered by any health care policy, insurance, or other source of payment, to make a reasonable effort to receive payment from that source before resorting to the county for payment.

To the extent the county does pay such costs, section 5a of chapter 171 of the Revised Statutes of 1846, MCL 801.5a, provides the county with a mechanism to attempt to seek reimbursement from inmates for mental health and other medical costs:

> (1) The county board of commissioners may seek reimbursement for expenses incurred in providing medical care and treatment pursuant to sections 4 to 5. If a county board of commissioners seeks reimbursement pur-

suant to this section, reimbursement shall be sought only in the following order:

(a) From the prisoner or person charged.

(b) From insurance companies, health care corporations, or other sources if the prisoner or person charged is covered by an insurance policy, a certificate issued by a health care corporation, or other source for those expenses.

(2) A prisoner in a county jail shall cooperate with the county in seeking reimbursement under subsection (1) for medical expenses incurred by the county for that prisoner.

(3) A prisoner who willfully refuses to cooperate as provided in subsection (2) shall not receive a reduction in his or her term under section 7 of Act No. 60 of the Public Acts of 1962, being section 801.257 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your first question, that the costs incurred providing mental health services to an inmate incarcerated in a county jail are ultimately the responsibility of the county under MCL 801.4. The community mental health program serving the county in which that jail is located must nevertheless seek to obtain payment from available insurance or other sources before resorting to the county for payment in accordance with MCL 801.4(2).

Your second question asks whether the financial burden associated with providing mental health services to inmates incarcerated in county jails may shift from one party to another depending on what type of treatment is being delivered, such as initial screening, emergency care, and long term treatment.

Under R 791.731, the initial mental health screening to be performed on an inmate must be completed by a trained staff member. Under MCL 801.4(1) and (2), "all" charges and expenses of safekeeping and maintaining prisoners "shall be paid from the county treasury," subject to a health care provider's obligation to attempt to seek recovery from available insurances and other similar sources. "All" is a term clearly synonymous with each and every. In its ordinary and natural meaning, there is no broader classification than the word "all"; it leaves no room for exceptions. *People v Monaco*, 474 Mich 48, 55; 710 NW2d 46 (2006). Thus, these provisions require that all expenses associated with maintaining the inmate, including those incurred to fulfill the requirement to perform the initial screening through a jail staff person, are the obligation of the county.

Regarding other mental health services, as explained above, the financial burden for providing them will rest with the county rather than the community mental health program, except to the extent that the community mental health program is successful in obtaining payment from a third-party source as anticipated by MCL 801.4(2).

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your second question, that the costs incurred in providing mental health services to an inmate in a county jail rests with the county, regardless of the type of treatment or mental health service being delivered.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

INCOMPATIBLE PUBLIC OFFICES ACT: Incompatibility of offices of general law township trustee and fire chief of a jointly administered fire department

PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES:

A trustee of a township with a population less than 25,000 that is a party to an intergovernmental agreement creating a joint fire department may not simultaneously serve as the fire chief of the joint fire department.

Opinion No. 7232 May 27, 2009

Honorable Goeff Hansen
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, Michigan

You have asked if a trustee of a general law township with a population less than 25,000 may simultaneously serve as the fire chief of a fire department jointly administered by the township and a general law village.

Information supplied with your request indicates that the township and a village within that township's boundaries have entered into an intergovernmental agreement for the operation, funding, and maintenance of a joint fire department.[1] The township has a population less than 25,000. A trustee of the township is currently serving as the fire chief of the joint fire department.

The Intergovernmental Agreement was created pursuant to the Intergovernmental Contracts Between Municipal Corporations Act (Intergovernmental Contracts Act), 1951 PA 35, MCL 124.1 *et seq,* and the Police and Fire Protection Act, 1951 PA 33, MCL 41.801 *et seq.* While the Police and Fire Protection Act authorizes the formation of a joint fire administrative board, the Intergovernmental Agreement does not create such a board. Rather, it provides that the governing bodies of the township and the village "shall be responsible for the overall operation, management and oversight of the Fire Department."[2] The oversight by the township board, therefore, includes participation in reviewing and approving the fire department's budget, invoices, rules, and regulations, each of which is prepared by the fire chief.[3] In addition, the township and village boards approve the selection of the fire chief and may institute disciplinary action against the fire chief.[4]

The Incompatible Public Offices Act (IPOA), 1978 PA 566, MCL 15.181 *et seq*, prohibits the same person from simultaneously holding two or more incompatible public offices. Section 2(1), MCL 15.182(1), provides: "Except as provided in section 3, a public officer or public employee shall not hold 2 or more incompatible

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[1] The agreement is entitled "Intergovernmental Agreement for the Operation, Funding, and Maintenance of the Pentwater Fire Department" and will be referred to in this opinion as the Intergovernmental Agreement.

[2] Intergovernmental Agreement, Article III, section 3.1.

[3] Intergovernmental Agreement, Article V, sections 5.1, 5.2(b), 5.4, and Article IX, section 9.5.

[4] Intergovernmental Agreement, Article VII, section 7.1 and Article IX, section 9.6.

offices at the same time." Section 1(b) of the IPOA, MCL 15.181(b), defines incompatible public offices as follows:

> "Incompatible offices" means public offices held by a public official which, when the official is performing the duties of any of the public offices held by the official, results in any of the following with respect to those offices held:
>
> (i) The subordination of 1 public office to another.
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> (ii) The supervision of 1 public office by another.
>
> (iii) A breach of duty of public office.

The Michigan Supreme Court has construed the phrase "public offices held by a public official" to include not only public offices but also positions of public employment. *Macomb County Prosecutor v Murphy,* 464 Mich 149, 158-162; 627 NW2d 247 (2001). Thus, the elected office of township trustee as well as the employment position of fire chief are each deemed to be public offices subject to the IPOA.

The exception provided in section 3 of the IPOA must also be considered to fully address your question. By 1992 PA 10, the Legislature amended section 3 to enable communities with limited populations to avail themselves of the services of public officials and employees in several different capacities in order to fill all available public positions. See OAG, 1993-1994, No 6748, pp 7, 8 (February 2, 1993), citing Senate Legislative Analysis, HB 4262 and HB 4263, February 13, 1992. The amendatory language in section 3(4) of the IPOA created, among others, the following exceptions to the prohibition against incompatible office-holding:

> (4) Section 2 does not do any of the following:
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> * * *
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> (b) Prohibit public officers or public employees of a city, village, township, or county having a population of less than 25,000 from serving, with or without compensation, as a firefighter in that city, village, township, or county *if that firefighter is not any of the following:*
>
> (*i*) A full-time firefighter.
>
> (*ii*) *A fire chief.*
>
> (*iii*) A person who negotiates with the city, village, township, or county on behalf of the firefighters. [MCL 15.183(4)(b)(*i*)-(*iii*); emphasis added.]

Thus, under MCL 15.183(4)(b)(*ii*), the prohibition against holding dual incompatible offices in section 2 of the IPOA does not prohibit a public officer or public employee of a local governmental unit with a population less than 25,000 from also serving as a firefighter in that same local unit provided that the firefighter is not the fire chief.

In OAG, 2001-2002, No 7094, p 63 (November 27, 2001), the Attorney General concluded that the positions of township trustee and assistant township fire chief in the same township are incompatible due to the supervisory and subordinate nature of

the two positions.[5] OAG No 7094 noted that the township trustee there served on the township board, which was authorized to appoint, fix compensation for, and terminate fire department personnel, as well as adopt rules for the fire department's operation. OAG No 7094 at 64.

Similarly, the positions of township trustee and fire chief of the jointly administered fire department underlying your question are incompatible as defined by section 1(b) of the IPOA due to the supervisory and subordinate nature of the two positions. Although the Intergovernmental Agreement provides that the fire department shall be jointly administered, the township's governing board, along with that of the village, remains responsible for the overall operation, management, and oversight of the fire department. The township board on which the township trustee sits reviews and approves the fire department's budget, invoices, rules, and regulations, each of which is prepared by the fire chief. In addition, the township board approves the selection of the fire chief and may institute disciplinary action against the fire chief. Thus, in carrying out their respective duties under the Intergovernmental Agreement, the township board acts in a supervisory capacity over the fire chief and the fire chief is subordinate to the township board. Moreover, because the exception stated in section 3(4)(b) of the IPOA expressly excludes the position of fire chief from the dual office holding it authorizes in small communities, the positions of township trustee and fire chief of a department administered by that same township remain incompatible regardless of the fact that the township's population is less than 25,000.

Material forwarded with your request suggests that section 3(4)(c) of the IPOA could be read to allow for the simultaneous holding of the offices of township trustee and fire chief of a jointly administered fire department. Section 3(4)(c) of the IPOA provides the following additional exception to the prohibition stated in section 2:

> Section 2 does not do any of the following:
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> * * *
>
> (c) Limit the authority of the governing body of a city, village, township, or county having a population of less than 25,000 to authorize a public officer or public employee to perform, with or without compensation, other additional services for the unit of local government. [MCL 15.183(4)(c).]

Several rules of statutory construction apply in ascertaining the meaning of this provision. A section of a statute does not stand alone but must be read in the context of the entire act in which it appears, and the words and phrases used there must be assigned such meanings as are in harmony with the whole of the statute, construed in the light of history and common sense. *Baraga County v State Tax Comm,* 466 Mich 264, 275 n 6; 645 NW2d 13 (2002); *Arrowhead Development Co v Livingston County Rd Comm,* 413 Mich 505, 516; 322 NW2d 702 (1980). Moreover, in construing a statute, effect must be given to every part of it. One part must not be so construed in such a way as to render another part nugatory, or of no effect. *State Farm Fire & Casualty Co v Old Republic Ins Co,* 466 Mich 142, 146; 644 NW2d 715 (2002).

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[5] The positions of city councilperson and paid volunteer firefighter are compatible in a city with a population of less than 25,000 provided the individual is not the fire chief. OAG, 1991-1992, No 6738, p 193 (November 13, 1992).

To conclude that subsection 3(4)(c) of the IPOA permits the governing body of a municipality to authorize dual office holding that is expressly prohibited by subsection 3(4)(b) would render subsection 3(4)(b) nugatory contrary to the governing rule of construction. One subsection cannot be read to entirely negate the effect of another subsection. In addition, exceptions operate to restrict the general applicability of legislative language and are, therefore, strictly construed. *People v Brooks,* 184 Mich App 793, 797; 459 NW2d 313 (1990), citing *Grand Rapids Motor Coach Co v Public Service Comm,* 323 Mich 624; 36 NW2d 299 (1949). The "other additional services" that may be authorized under the section 3(4)(c) exception to the section 2 general prohibition, therefore, cannot be read so broadly as to extend to services that are specifically excluded from that result under subsection 3(4)(b)(*ii*). The exception in MCL 15.183(4)(c) does not apply to allow the dual office holding involved in your request.

The two offices at issue here are incompatible under the IPOA, and, therefore, the prohibitions of that act apply absent a specific constitutional or other statutory exception. Therefore, examination of your question does not end the analysis.

Const 1963, art 7, § 28 empowers the Legislature to authorize municipalities to enter into intergovernmental agreements to provide services and administer functions that each party to the intergovernmental agreement would have the power to perform separately. Const 1963, art 7, § 28 states:

> *The legislature by general law shall authorize two or more counties, townships, cities, villages or districts, or any combination thereof among other things to: enter into contractual undertakings or agreements with one another or with the state or with any combination thereof for the joint administration of any of the functions or powers which each would have the power to perform separately*; share the costs and responsibilities of functions and services with one another or with the state or with any combination thereof which each would have the power to perform separately; transfer functions or responsibilities to one another or any combination thereof upon the consent of each unit involved; cooperate with one another and with state government; lend their credit to one another or any combination thereof as provided by law in connection with any authorized publicly owned undertaking. [Emphasis added.]

Art 7, § 28 further permits local governmental officers and employees to serve on or with any governmental body established in accordance with the above provision:

> Any other provision of this constitution notwithstanding, *an officer or employee of the state or any such unit of government or subdivision or agency thereof, except members of the legislature*, *may serve on or with any governmental body established for the purposes set forth in this section* and shall not be required to relinquish his office or employment by reason of such service. [Emphasis added.]

Thus, an officer or employee of a municipality that is a party to an intergovernmental agreement may serve on or with the governmental body of the intergovernmental entity established for the purposes set forth in Const 1963, art 7, § 28.[6]

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[6] See also the Address to the People and Constitutional Convention Debates at 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3394; 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 1060, Report of Delegate Elliott, Chair of Committee on Local Government; Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 1061, Remarks of Delegate Allen; 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 1081, Remarks of Delegate Elliott.

Prior opinions of the Attorney General analyzing Const 1963, art 7, § 28 have concluded that this constitutional provision allowed the member of the municipal governing body at issue to also serve on the governmental body of the particular intergovernmental entity, reasoning that dual service expressly allowed by the Constitution is not prohibited under general notions of incompatibility. For example, a person may simultaneously serve as a member of a city council and a member of the board of a public transportation authority of which the city is a member because Const 1963, art 7, § 28 permits such dual office holding. OAG, 1999-2000, No 7054, p 121 (May 17, 2000). A city commissioner or city manager of a city participating as a member of a regional sewer authority may serve on the sewer authority's board of trustees without violating the IPOA, because this dual service is expressly allowed by the Constitution. A city attorney for a city participating as a member of a regional sewer authority may simultaneously serve as attorney for the sewer authority. OAG, 1997-1998, No 6959, p 80 (October 17, 1997). In addition, elected state, county, or city officers, except state legislators, may serve as members and member-officers of a governing board of a port authority organized by a city and a county. OAG, 1987-1988, No 6440, p 96 (June 2, 1987). A member of a county board of commissioners may serve on the board of an intergovernmental public agency. OAG, 1983-1984, No 6260, p 423 (December 5, 1984). Each of these officers "serve on or with [a] governmental body established for the purposes set forth" in art 7, § 28, and, accordingly, may serve in the other public offices held.

An examination of the terms of the subject Intergovernmental Agreement, however, reveals that there is no "governmental body established" under the agreement to administer the joint fire department. Rather, the joint fire department is administered jointly by the governing bodies of the participating township and village. Therefore, the fire chief employed to serve the joint fire department does not, in that capacity, "serve on or with" a governmental body established under art 7, § 28.

The absence of an interlocal governmental body to administer the joint fire department renders Const 1963, art 7, § 28 inapplicable. But even assuming that a governmental body had been created by the Intergovernmental Agreement, the fire chief of the joint fire department would be an employee of and, thus, subordinate to the governmental body and not one serving "on or with" the governmental body itself. Research reveals no authority to permit dual office holding under these circumstances. Therefore, the Michigan Constitution does not provide an exception from the prohibitions against incompatible office holding under the IPOA for the factual scenario you present.

In further support of this conclusion are the two statutes implementing Const 1963, art 7, § 28 and pursuant to which the joint fire department was created: 1) the Intergovernmental Contracts Act, which authorizes municipal corporations to contract with one another to provide for the ownership, operation, or performance of services that each would have the power to own, operate or perform separately; and 2) the Police and Fire Protection Act, which authorizes a township to contract with other townships, certain incorporated villages, and certain cities for fire and police protection. The Intergovernmental Contracts Act is a general authorizing statute, while the Police and Fire Protection Act specifically governs township police and fire departments. Thus, it must be ascertained whether the Police and Fire Protection Act contains an exception that would permit a township trustee to simultaneously serve as the fire chief in a jointly administered fire department.

The Police and Fire Protection Act contains language strikingly similar to that found in section 3 of the IPOA, MCL 15.183(4)(b)(*ii*). Sections 11(1) and 12(2) of the Police and Fire Protection Act expressly prohibit a member of a joint or individual fire administrative board from serving as an employee of the fire department. MCL 41.811(1) ("a member of a joint administrative board shall not be an employee of a police or fire department of a participating township, village, or qualified city") and MCL 41.812(2) ("A member of the board shall not be a member of the police or fire department of the township").

While the Intergovernmental Agreement does not create a joint or individual fire administrative board as permitted by the Police and Fire Protection Act, it is instructive to note that the Legislature created parallel prohibitions against an individual simultaneously holding dual positions of township fire department administrative board member and township fire department employee. Thus, the Police and Fire Protection Act does not contain an exception to the prohibitions in the IPOA against simultaneously serving as a township trustee and township fire chief, but rather it reinforces the statutory prohibition against an individual holding both positions.

Pursuant to both Const 1963, art 7, § 28 and the Intergovernmental Contracts Act, a township and a village may exercise only those powers that each might lawfully exercise individually. Therefore, since a township trustee is prohibited by the IPOA from simultaneously serving as township fire chief, the same prohibition applies where the township creates a joint fire department under the Intergovernmental Contracts Act and the Police and Fire Protection Act.

It is my opinion, therefore, that a trustee of a township with a population less than 25,000 that is a party to an intergovernmental agreement creating a joint fire department may not simultaneously serve as the fire chief of the joint fire department.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: Whether the post-mortem creation of a conservation easement exempts property burdened by the easement from uncapping for real property tax purposes otherwise occasioned by the death of the owner

GENERAL PROPERTY TAX ACT:

NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT:

PROPERTY:

TAXATION:

The General Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 *et seq*, mandates that the taxable value of real property shall be uncapped when a "transfer of ownership" occurs. For purposes of the GPTA, a "transfer of ownership" that results in uncapping includes transfers by will to the deceased owner's devisees or by intestate succession to the deceased owner's heirs. Title to a decedent's real property passes at the time of his or her death, whether by will or by intestate succession. If, however, the land that passes at the time of death is, at that time, subject to a "conservation easement" as defined by section 2140 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, MCL 324.2140, or is eligible for a deduction as a "qualified conservation contribution" under section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 USC 170(h), that transfer of land, but not buildings or structures located on the land, is exempt from uncapping. But a "conservation easement" or a deduction for a "qualified conservation contribution" that is not created until after the death of a property owner will not avoid uncapping of the property's taxable value for the transfer that occurred at death. Finally, qualified agricultural property is exempt from taxes levied for school operating purposes under MCL 211.7ee, and a transfer of such property is exempt from the uncapping of its taxable value under MCL 211.27a(7)(n).

Opinion No. 7233 June 16, 2009

Honorable Michelle A. McManus
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48909

You have asked several questions concerning particular property conveyances occurring at or after the death of an owner that may constitute exceptions to "transfers of ownership" under the applicable tax laws, so as to exempt those transfers from the "uncapping" of their taxable value for property tax purposes.

Michigan voters adopted Proposal A in 1994, amending Const 1963, art 9, § 3 to generally limit increases in property taxes on a parcel of property, as long as it remains owned by the same party, by capping the amount that the "taxable value" of the property may increase each year, even if the property's "true cash value," that is, its actual market value, rises at a greater rate. *Toll Northville Ltd v Northville Twp*, 480 Mich 6, 12; 743 NW2d 902 (2008). Const 1963, art 9, § 3 states in relevant part:

> The legislature shall provide for the uniform general ad valorem taxation of real and tangible personal property not exempt by law except for taxes levied for school operating purposes. The legislature shall provide for the determination of true cash value of such property; the proportion of true cash value at which such property shall be uniformly assessed, which shall not, after January 1, 1966, exceed 50 percent; and for a system of equalization of assessments. For taxes levied in 1995 and each year thereafter, the legislature shall provide that the taxable value of each parcel of property adjusted for additions and losses, shall not increase each year by more than the increase in the immediately preceding year in the general price level, as defined in section 33 of this article, or 5 percent, whichever is less until ownership of the parcel of property is transferred. *When ownership of the parcel of property is transferred as defined by law, the parcel shall be assessed at the applicable proportion of current true cash value.* [Emphasis added.]

Thus, when ownership of a parcel is transferred as defined by law, the capping required by art 9, § 3 is lifted, and the property is levied for taxes in an amount equal to not more than 50% of true cash value, subject to an equalizing process, multiplied by the total mills assessed within the taxing jurisdictions within which the property is located.

The General Property Tax Act (GPTA), 1893 PA 206, MCL 211.1 *et seq*, further addresses these matters. "Capping" is accomplished by annually establishing a taxable value for property, a value that initially equals 50% of true cash value (subject to equalization), the State Equalized Value (SEV). From year to year thereafter, however, subject to adjustments for losses and additions, the taxable value shall not increase by more than 5% or the inflation rate, whichever is less, and shall in no case exceed the SEV for the tax year. MCL 211.27a(2).[1] Taxes are then levied in an amount equal to the taxable value, multiplied by the total millage.

The cap on taxable value so established, however, is subject to being lifted or "uncapped" when there is a "transfer of ownership" of the property. When uncapped, the taxable value of property is again equal to its SEV. MCL 211.27a(3).[2]

The GPTA defines "transfer of ownership" for purposes of the act to mean "the conveyance of title to or a present interest in property, including the beneficial use of the property, the value of which is substantially equal to the value of the fee interest."

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[1] Section 27a of the GPTA states in relevant part:

> (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, property shall be assessed at 50% of its true cash value under section 3 of article IX of the state constitution of 1963.
>
> (2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3), for taxes levied in 1995 and for each year after 1995, the taxable value of each parcel of property is the lesser of the following:
>
> (a) The property's taxable value in the immediately preceding year minus any losses, multiplied by the lesser of 1.05 or the inflation rate, plus all additions. For taxes levied in 1995, the property's taxable value in the immediately preceding year is the property's state equalized valuation in 1994.
>
> (b) The property's current state equalized valuation.

[2] "Upon a transfer of ownership of property after 1994, the property's taxable value for the calendar year following the year of the transfer is the property's state equalized valuation for the calendar year following the transfer."

MCL 211.27a(6). Transfers of ownership that result in uncapping include "[a] conveyance by distribution under a will or by intestate succession, except if the distributee is the decedent's spouse." MCL 211.27a(6)(f).

Exemptions from uncapping for conservation easements and conservation contributions

Section 27a(7) of the GPTA, MCL 211.27a(7), identifies a number of transfers that are *not* included within a covered "transfer of ownership." To this list of exempt transfers, 2006 PA 446 added two provisions relevant to your question, subparagraphs 27a(7)(p)(*i*) and (*ii*), which state:

> (7) Transfer of ownership does not include the following:
>
> * * *
>
> (p) Beginning on the effective date of the amendatory act that added this subdivision, a transfer of land, but not buildings or structures located on the land, which meets 1 or more of the following requirements:
>
> (*i*) The land is subject to a conservation easement under subpart 11 of part 21 of the natural resources and environmental protection act [NREPA], 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.2140 to 324.2144. As used in this subparagraph, "conservation easement" means that term as defined in section 2140 of the natural resources and environmental protection act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.2140.
>
> (*ii*) A transfer of ownership of the land or a transfer of an interest in the land is eligible for a deduction as a qualified conservation contribution under section 170(h) of the internal revenue code, 26 USC 170. [MCL 211.27a(7)(p)(*i*) and (*ii*).]

In other words, the described transfer of ownership of land, but not buildings or structures located on the land, is exempt from uncapping if, at the time of transfer, the land "is subject to" a conservation easement or the transfer "is eligible for" a deduction as a qualified conservation contribution.

You ask whether the creation or transfer post-mortem (that is, after the death of an owner) of a "conservation easement" under the NREPA or a deductible "qualified conservation contribution" under the federal Internal Revenue Code serves to avoid the uncapping of the taxable value of the affected real property that would otherwise occur as a result of the owner's death.

This question involves first considering the timing by which a decedent owner's property interests are deemed to be transferred to those acquiring title to or an interest in the transferred property. Subject to any probate administration that may occur if real property assets are needed to satisfy debts of the decedent's estate, title to a decedent's real property generally passes at the time of his or her death to any devisees named in the decedent's will (testate succession) or, in the case of an owner who dies without a will (intestate succession), to the heirs as determined by the statutes of descent and distribution.[3]

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[3] Other transfers of land or interests in land are effective at the time an instrument of conveyance (properly executed and acknowledged) is delivered to, and accepted by, the grantee. *Resh v Fox*, 365 Mich 288; 112 NW2d 486 (1961); *Taft v Taft*, 59 Mich 185; 26 NW 426 (1886); and *Thatcher v St Andrews Church*, 37 Mich 264 (1877).

As summarized in Land Title Standard 7.1 of the State Bar of Michigan's Michigan Land Title Standards, 6th Edition (2007),[4] title to an intestate decedent's property is vested as of the time of death in the heirs at law, subject to: the rights to homestead, exempt property, and family allowances; the widow's right to elect dower; the personal representative's right and duty to possess the real property and to receive the income from that property; the possibility of sale for any purpose permitted by the Estates and Protected Individuals Code, MCL 700.1101 *et seq*; liens for any federal or Michigan estate tax; and any federal or state tax that must be paid before the estate can be closed.[5] See *Diel v Diel*, 298 Mich 127; 298 NW 478 (1941), *Fowler v Cornwell*, 328 Mich 89; 43 NW2d 73 (1950), and *Pardeike v Fargo*, 344 Mich 518; 73 NW2d 924 (1955). Similarly, in the case of a testate decedent, his or her will, when probated, conveys the decedent's title to real property as of the time of death, subject to the same rights and contingent events as apply in the context of intestate transfers but subject to the additional right of the surviving spouse to elect a statutory share. See *In re Allen's Estate*, 240 Mich 661; 216 NW 446 (1927), and *Stewart v Hunt*, 303 Mich 161; 5 NW2d 737 (1942), cited in Michigan Land Title Standard 7.2.

With regard to post-mortem transfers of land, the powers of a personal representative are only those given by statute or in the will. The personal representative has certain fiduciary responsibilities, including protecting the rights of devisees under the will or heirs at law. The personal representative has no inherent right to donate assets of the decedent to others. Neither has the personal representative any inherent right to diminish the value of real property assets of a decedent's estate by granting easements or encumbrances to others. Thus, when considering the timing by which an interest in property passes for tax purposes, it is useful to recall that the authority to sell or encumber the estate can only be exercised where, and in the manner, it is given in the will or by state law. See *Parkhurst v Trumbull*, 130 Mich 408; 90 NW 25 (1902). See generally, 16 *Michigan Law and Practice, Estates*, § 144.

The first of the two types of exempt transfers identified in MCL 211.27a(7)(p)(*i*) and (*ii*) protects from uncapping a transfer of land that, at the time title passes, "is subject to" a conservation easement under Part 21, Subpart 11 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), MCL 324.2140 to 324.2144, which was added by 1995 PA 60, effective May 24, 1995. Part 21, Subpart 11, entitled "Conservation and Historic Preservation Easement," permits the creation, enforcement, transfer, and assignment of certain easements in gross,[6] (as well as restrictions, covenants and conditions) defined as a "conservation easement" or an "historic preservation easement."[7]

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[4] Available at <https://www.michbar.org/realproperty/LTS6/Chapter%207.pdf> (accessed April 20, 2009).

[5] Concerning the possibility of sale during administration, see MCL 700.3617 (intestate decedent) and MCL 700.3902 (testate decedent).

[6] While an easement commonly benefits one tract of land to the detriment of another tract of land (an easement appurtenant), an "easement in gross," such as those created by Part 21, is an easement that encumbers one tract of land without benefiting another tract of land. Easements in gross are not assignable at common law, except those which are commercial in nature, such as an easement for pipelines, telephone or telegraph lines, or railroads. See *Stockdale v Yerden*, 220 Mich 444; 190 NW 225 (1922), and *Johnston v Mich Consolidated Gas Co*, 337 Mich 572; 60 NW2d 464 (1953), cited in Michigan Land Title Standards, 6th Edition, Standard 14.2. See also *Mumaugh v Diamond Lake Area Cable TV Co*, 183 Mich App 597; 456 NW2d 425 (1990) (suggesting that an electric power line easement is an assignable easement in gross).

[7] This part succeeds 1980 PA 197 (effective March 31, 1981), MCL 399.251, which it repeals.

MCL 324.2140 defines a conservation easement as:

> [A]n interest in land that provides limitation on the use of land or a body of water or requires or prohibits certain acts on or with respect to the land or body of water, whether or not the interest is stated in the form of a restriction, easement, covenant, or condition in a deed, will, or other instrument executed by or on behalf of the owner of the land or body of water or in an order of taking, which interest is appropriate to retaining or maintaining the land or body of water, predominantly in its natural, scenic, or open condition, or in an agricultural, farming, open space, or forest use, or similar use or condition.[8]

Section 2141 of the NREPA, MCL 324.2141, renders a conservation easement "granted to a governmental entity or to a charitable or educational association, corporation, trust, or other legal entity" enforceable against the owner of the land or body of water encumbered by the easement "despite a lack of privity of estate or contract, a lack of benefit running to particular land or a body of water, or the fact that the benefit may be assigned to another governmental entity or legal entity, including a conservation easement executed before March 31, 1981."[9] Additionally, an interest in a conservation easement may be exempt from all real property taxes so long as it is held by:

(a) The United States, MCL 211.7;

(b) The State of Michigan, MCL 211.7*l*;

(c) A governmental entity, MCL 211.7m; or

(d) A qualifying charitable or educational association, MCL 211.7n and MCL 211.7o.

Generally speaking, when an owner grants a conservation easement on his property, he is voluntarily giving up his right to develop his property while retaining his other rights concerning that property. These retained rights may include, for example, the right to transfer the land, to exclude others from the property, to possess and use the land, and allow others to use the land. Thus, an owner could grant an easement limiting the use of the land for forestry purposes but retaining a right to cut timber in restricted quantities or from selected places on the property, or an owner could grant an easement to maintain open spaces on the property, free of any development, while retaining the right to farm the property for a given number of years, and countless other scenarios. Whenever a property interest is retained by the owner, assessors assign separate values for the conveyed conservation easement and for the fee or other interest retained by the owner; the values of both the retained interest and the conservation easement remain capped.

Under section 27a(7)(p)(*i*) of the GPTA, MCL 211.27a(p)(7)(*i*), a "transfer of ownership" does not include a transfer of land subject to a conservation easement under Part 21, Subpart 11, of the NREPA. Thus, the creation of a "conservation ease-

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[8] See, for example, the Farmland and Open Space Preservation Act, Part 361 of the NREPA, MCL 324.36101, former 1974 PA 116, MCL 554.701 (before its codification into the NREPA).

[9] March 31, 1981, is the effective date of former 1980 PA 197 (former MCL 339.251), which was recodified in 1995 as Part 21, Subpart 11, of the NREPA. At common law, an easement in gross could not be assigned. This statute altered the common law by providing that a non-appurtenant conservation easement or easement in gross may be created, freely assigned, and enforced. This provision would validate conservation easements created both before or after the 1980 enabling act.

ment" by gift, grant, purchase, or eminent domain, or the conveyance of lands subject to (that is, burdened by) a conservation easement, will not result in uncapping the values of the interests held or encompassed in the "conservation easement"[10] or the interests in the underlying fee, so long as the "conservation easement" is continued.

The second type of exempt transfer identified in MCL 211.27a(7)(p) is one that is eligible for a deduction as a qualified conservation contribution under section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 USC 170(h). As summarized in the 2009 U.S. Master Tax Guide, CCH, ¶ 1063, p 373:

> Generally, no charitable deduction is allowed for gifts to charity of the rent free use of property and other nontrust gifts where less than the taxpayer's entire interest in the property is contributed, except in the following cases: . . . (3) a qualified conservation contribution.

The 2009 U.S. Master Tax Guide further illuminates how the qualified conservation contribution works:

> *Qualified Conservation Contributions*. A qualified conservation contribution is a contribution of a qualified real property interest to a qualified organization exclusively for conservation purposes that are protected in perpetuity. Qualified real property includes a donor's entire interest in real property (other than an interest in subsurface oil, gas or other minerals, and the right to access to such minerals), a remainder interest, and a restriction granted in perpetuity on the property's use (i.e., an easement). A qualified organization includes certain governmental units, public charities that meet certain public support tests, and certain supporting organizations. A qualified conservation purpose includes: (1) preserving land, for outdoor recreation by or the education of the general public; (2) protecting a relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants; (3) preserving open space for the public's scenic enjoyment or under a governmental conservation policy that will yield a significant public benefit; and (4) preserving an historically important land area or a certified historic structure. (Code Sec. 170(h)). [Footnote omitted.]

Thus, under MCL 211.27a(7)(p)(*ii*), a qualified conservation contribution made by an owner exempts the transfer of land, a part of which qualifies for the deduction under 26 USC 170(h), from uncapping. The GPTA does not, however, exempt from uncapping subsequent transfers of any interests in the land that were retained and not included in the qualified conservation easement. In that respect, an exemption under MCL 211.27a(7)(p)(*ii*) differs from an exemption under MCL 211.27a(7)(p)(*i*). Subsequent transfers of retained interests in land for which a deduction for a qualified conservation contribution was previously taken, may be made exempt from uncapping, however, if that subsequent transfer qualifies as one that is subject to a conservation easement under MCL 211.27a(7)(p)(*i*).

Reducing a decedent's "gross estate" for estate tax purposes

Your request also asks about section 2031 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 USC 2031.[11] This provision defines a decedent's "gross estate" and its valuation for feder-

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[10] The State of Michigan, as well as local units of government, may acquire interests qualifying as a conservation easement under the Farmland and Open Space Preservation Program, provided for under Part 361 of the NREPA, MCL 324.36101.

[11] For the complete text of 26 USC 2031, see Appendix A to this opinion.

al estate tax purposes. The section permits the reduction of the value of an estate, and the resulting federal estate tax liability, by the value of certain qualifying post-mortem grants of qualified conservation easements. The relevant provisions of section 2031 specify how the value of the gross estate shall be determined, how the estate tax due shall be calculated, and how easements granted after death shall be treated. They also include definitions of applicable terms.

But 26 USC 2031 does not affect the GPTA. It does not make it competent for any person not otherwise authorized under state laws or the will of a decedent or trust instrument to effectuate a grant of a trust in land. It does not in any way affect either the date on which a conveyance is effective to pass title to devisees or heirs or the validity of any conveyance. When title passes free from any "conservation easement," the taxable value is uncapped. The post-mortem creation of a conservation easement that encumbers lands, title to which previously vested in heirs or devisees at the time of the decedent prior owner's death, does not serve to avoid the uncapping that occurred because of the conveyance at the time of death. Thus, while the creation of a conservation easement after the death of the property owner may be accomplished consistent with 26 USC 2031 in such a way as to reduce liability for federal (and any corresponding state) estate taxes, the process by which a particular conveyance qualifies as exempt from uncapping under the GPTA is entirely separate and unrelated.

Exemption of qualified agricultural property from school operating taxes and uncapping

You also ask about the provisions of the GPTA that exempt "qualified agricultural property" from taxes levied by a local school district for school operating purposes and that permit successive owners of qualifying property to enjoy the same exemption from school operating millages. See MCL 211.7dd(d) and MCL 211.7ee.

Section 7ee(1) of the GPTA, MCL 211.7ee(1), provides an exemption from taxes imposed for school operating purposes:

> Qualified agricultural property is exempt from the tax levied by a local school district for school operating purposes to the extent provided under section 1211 of the revised school code, 1976 PA 451, MCL 380.1211, according to the provisions of this section.

"Qualified agricultural property" is defined by section 7dd(d) of the GPTA which refers to the definition in MCL 324.36101:

> "Qualified agricultural property" means unoccupied property and related buildings classified as agricultural, or other unoccupied property and related buildings located on that property devoted primarily to agricultural use as defined in section 36101 of the natural resources and environmental protection act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.36101. Related buildings include a residence occupied by a person employed in or actively involved in the agricultural use and who has not claimed a principal residence exemption on other property. Property used for commercial storage, commercial processing, commercial distribution, commercial marketing, or commercial shipping operations or other commercial or industrial purposes is not qualified agricultural property. A parcel of property is devoted primarily to agricultural use only if more than 50% of the parcel's acreage is devoted to agricultural use. An owner shall not receive an exemption for that portion of the total state equalized valuation of the property that is used

for a commercial or industrial purpose or that is a residence that is not a related building. [MCL 211.7dd(d).]

An "owner" of such property is defined in relevant part by section 7dd(a) of the GPTA, MCL 211.7dd(a), to include a person whose ownership is acquired when the property passes by will or intestacy:

(*i*) A person who owns property or who is purchasing property under a land contract.

(*ii*) A person who is a partial owner of property.

(*iii*) A person who owns property as a result of being a beneficiary of a will or trust or as a result of intestate succession.

In addition to that exemption from taxes levied for school operating purposes, section 27a(7)(n) of the GPTA specifies that, for uncapping purposes, a "transfer of ownership" does not include a transfer of qualified agricultural property under the following circumstances:

A transfer of qualified agricultural property, if the person to whom the qualified agricultural property is transferred files an affidavit with the assessor of the local tax collecting unit in which the qualified agricultural property is located and with the register of deeds for the county in which the qualified agricultural property is located attesting that the qualified agricultural property shall remain qualified agricultural property. The affidavit under this subdivision shall be in a form prescribed by the department of treasury. An owner of qualified agricultural property shall inform a prospective buyer of that qualified agricultural property that the qualified agricultural property is subject to the recapture tax provided in the agricultural property recapture act, 2000 PA 261, MCL 211.1001 to 211.1007, if the qualified agricultural property is converted by a change in use. If property ceases to be qualified agricultural property at any time after being transferred, all of the following shall occur:

(*i*) The taxable value of that property shall be adjusted under subsection (3) as of the December 31 in the year that the property ceases to be qualified agricultural property.

(*ii*) The property is subject to the recapture tax provided for under the agricultural property recapture act, 2000 PA 261, MCL 211.1001 to 211.1007. [MCL 211.27a(7)(n).]

To continue to qualify for the tax treatment associated with the ownership and use of "qualified agricultural property," successor owners, including those acquiring the qualified lands by testate or intestate succession, must continue to devote the property to agricultural use as defined by section 36101 of the NREPA, MCL 324.36101.[12]

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[12] MCL 211.27a(11)(f) provides that, "'[q]ualified agricultural property' means that term as defined in section 7dd." MCL 211.7dd(d) defines "qualified agricultural property" by reference to section 36101 of the NREPA, MCL 324.36101.

Section 27a(7)(n) of the GPTA, MCL 211.27a(7)(n), provides that the transfer of qualified agricultural property is an exempt transfer, "if the person to whom the qualified agricultural property is transferred files an affidavit with the assessor of the local tax collecting unit," as provided in that subsection. Section 7ee of the GPTA, MCL 211.7ee, spells out the circumstances for which an affidavit must be filed to maintain the exemption from school operating taxes.

It is my opinion, therefore, that the General Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 *et seq*, mandates that the taxable value of real property shall be uncapped when a "transfer of ownership" occurs. For purposes of the GPTA, a "transfer of ownership" that results in uncapping includes transfers by will to the deceased owner's devisees or by intestate succession to the deceased owner's heirs. Title to a decedent's real property passes at the time of his or her death, whether by will or by intestate succession. If, however, the land that passes at the time of death is, at that time, subject to a "conservation easement" as defined by section 2140 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, MCL 324.2140, or is eligible for a deduction as a "qualified conservation contribution" under section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 USC 170(h), that transfer of land, but not buildings or structures located on the land, is exempt from uncapping. But a "conservation easement" or a deduction for a "qualified conservation contribution" that is not created until after the death of a property owner will not avoid uncapping of the property's taxable value for the transfer that occurred at death. Finally, qualified agricultural property is exempt from taxes levied for school operating purposes under MCL 211.7ee, and a transfer of such property is exempt from the uncapping of its taxable value under MCL 211.27a(7)(n).

MIKE COX
Attorney General

Att.

APPENDIX A

26 USC 2031

§ 2031. Definition of gross estate

(a) General. – The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including to the extent provided for in this part the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated.

(b) Valuation of unlisted stock and securities. – In the case of stock and securities of a corporation the value of which, by reason of their not being listed on an exchange and by reason of the absence of sales thereof, cannot be determined with reference to bid and asked prices or with reference to sales prices, the value thereof shall be determined by taking into consideration, in addition to all other factors, the value of stock or securities of corporations engaged in the same or a similar line of business which are listed on an exchange.

(c) Estate tax with respect to land subject to a qualified conservation easement. –

(1) In general. – If the executor makes the election described in paragraph (6), then, except as otherwise provided in this subsection, there shall be excluded from the gross estate the lesser of –

(A) the applicable percentage of the value of land subject to a qualified conservation easement, reduced by the amount of any deduction under section 2055(f) with respect to such land, or

(B) the exclusion limitation.

(2) Applicable percentage. – For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "applicable percentage" means 40 percent reduced (but not below zero) by 2 percentage points for each percentage point (or fraction thereof) by which the value of the qualified conservation easement is less than 30 percent of the value of the land ([1]determined without regard to the value of such easement and reduced by the value of any retained development right (as defined in paragraph (5)). The values taken into account under the preceding sentence shall be such values as of the date of the contribution referred to in paragraph (8)(B).

(3) Exclusion limitation. – For purposes of paragraph (1), the exclusion limitation is the limitation determined in accordance with the following table:

In the case of estates of decedents dying during:	The exclusion limitation is:
1998	$100,000
1999	$200,000
2000	$300,000
2001	$400,000
2002 or thereafter	$500,000

(4) Treatment of certain indebtedness. –

(A) In general. – The exclusion provided in paragraph (1) shall not apply to the extent that the land is debt-financed property.

(B) Definitions. – For purposes of this paragraph –

(i) Debt-financed property. – The term "debt-financed property" means any property with respect to which there is an acquisition indebtedness (as defined in clause (ii)) on the date of the decedent's death.

(ii) Acquisition indebtedness. – The term "acquisition indebtedness" means, with respect to debt-financed property, the unpaid amount of –

(I) the indebtedness incurred by the donor in acquiring such property,

(II) the indebtedness incurred before the acquisition of such property if such indebtedness would not have been incurred but for such acquisition,

(III) the indebtedness incurred after the acquisition of such property if such indebtedness would not have been incurred but for such acquisition and the incurrence of such indebtedness was reasonably foreseeable at the time of such acquisition, and

[1] So in original. No closing parenthesis was enacted.

(IV) the extension, renewal, or refinancing of an acquisition indebtedness.

(5) Treatment of retained development right. –

(A) In general. – Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the value of any development right retained by the donor in the conveyance of a qualified conservation easement.

(B) Termination of retained development right. – If every person in being who has an interest (whether or not in possession) in the land executes an agreement to extinguish permanently some or all of any development rights (as defined in subparagraph (D)) retained by the donor on or before the date for filing the return of the tax imposed by section 2001, then any tax imposed by section 2001 shall be reduced accordingly. Such agreement shall be filed with the return of the tax imposed by section 2001. The agreement shall be in such form as the Secretary shall prescribe.

(C) Additional tax. – Any failure to implement the agreement described in subparagraph (B) not later than the earlier of –

(i) the date which is 2 years after the date of the decedent's death, or

(ii) the date of the sale of such land subject to the qualified conservation easement,

shall result in the imposition of an additional tax in the amount of the tax which would have been due on the retained development rights subject to such agreement. Such additional tax shall be due and payable on the last day of the 6th month following such date.

(D) Development right defined. – For purposes of this paragraph, the term "development right" means any right to use the land subject to the qualified conservation easement in which such right is retained for any commercial purpose which is not subordinate to and directly supportive of the use of such land as a farm for farming purposes (within the meaning of section 2032A(e)(5)).

(6) Election. – The election under this subsection shall be made on or before the due date (including extensions) for filing the return of tax imposed by section 2001 and shall be made on such return. Such an election, once made, shall be irrevocable.

(7) Calculation of estate tax due. – An executor making the election described in paragraph (6) shall, for purposes of calculating the amount of tax imposed by section 2001, include the value of any development right (as defined in paragraph (5)) retained by the donor in the conveyance of such qualified conservation easement. The computation of tax on any retained development right prescribed in this paragraph shall be done in such manner and on such forms as the Secretary shall prescribe.

(8) Definitions. – For purposes of this subsection –

A) Land subject to a qualified conservation easement. – The term "land subject to a qualified conservation easement" means land –

(i) which is located in the United States or any possession of the United States,

(ii) which was owned by the decedent or a member of the decedent's family at all times during the 3-year period ending on the date of the decedent's death, and

(iii) with respect to which a qualified conservation easement has been made by an individual described in subparagraph (C), as of the date of the election described in paragraph (6).

(B) Qualified conservation easement. – The term "qualified conservation easement" means a qualified conservation contribution (as defined in section 170(h)(1) of a qualified real property interest (as defined in section 170(h)(2)(C), except that clause (iv) of section 170(h)(4)(A) shall not apply, and the restriction on the use of such interest described in section 170(h)(2)(C) shall include a prohibition on more than a de minimis use for a commercial recreational activity.

(C) Individual described. – An individual is described in this subparagraph if such individual is –

(i) the decedent,

(ii) a member of the decedent's family,

(iii) the executor of the decedent's estate, or

(iv) the trustee of a trust the corpus of which includes the land to be subject to the qualified conservation easement.

(D) Member of family. – The term "member of the decedent's family" means any member of the family (as defined in section 2032A(e)(2)) of the decedent.

(9) Treatment of easements granted after death. – In any case in which the qualified conservation easement is granted after the date of the decedent's death and on or before the due date (including extensions) for filing the return of tax imposed by section 2001, the deduction under section 2055(f) with respect to such easement shall be allowed to the estate but only if no charitable deduction is allowed under chapter 1 to any person with respect to the grant of such easement.

(10) Application of this section to interests in partnerships, corporations, and trusts. – This section shall apply to an interest in a partnership, corporation, or trust if at least 30 percent of the entity is owned (directly or indirectly) by the decedent, as determined under the rules described in section 2057(e)(3).

(d) Cross reference. – For executor's right to be furnished on request a statement regarding any valuation made by the Secretary within the gross estate, see section 7517.

FIRST CLASS SCHOOL DISTRICTS: Whether a community college may authorize a charter school within the boundaries of the Detroit Public Schools if it no longer meets the threshold pupil membership count required to qualify as a "first class school district"

PUBLIC SCHOOL ACADEMIES:

REVISED SCHOOL CODE:

STATE SCHOOL AID ACT:

If a community college with geographic boundaries located within the boundaries of the Detroit Public Schools, or a federal tribally controlled community college, submits a contract to the Michigan Department of Education in which the college's governing board has authorized a public school academy to operate within the boundaries of the Detroit Public Schools, the Department must assign the academy a "district code," enabling it to receive state school aid. While section 502(2)(c) of the Revised School Code, MCL 380.502(2)(c), precludes a community college's governing board from authorizing public school academies in a first class school district, community colleges with geographic boundaries located within a general powers school district's boundaries and federal tribally controlled community colleges may authorize public school academies and compete for students in a general powers school district. Because the Detroit Public Schools' pupil membership on the most recent pupil membership count day did not reach the threshold required of a first class school district under section 402 of the Revised School Code, MCL 380.402, the Detroit Public Schools does not qualify as a first class school district under the Code and is, therefore, a general powers school district.

Opinion No. 7234 July 20, 2009

Mr. Michael P. Flanagan
Superintendent of Public Instruction
Michigan Department of Education
608 West Allegan Street
Lansing, MI 48909

You have asked whether, if a community college submits a contract to the Michigan Department of Education (Department) in which the college's governing board has authorized a public school academy to operate within the boundaries of the Detroit Public Schools, the Department must assign the academy a "district code," enabling it to receive state school aid.

As background, your request indicates that the Detroit Public Schools has operated as a first class school district in the State, and that the current law does not allow the board of a community college to authorize a contract for a public school academy to operate within the boundaries of a first class school district. You further advise that the pupil membership count in the Detroit Public Schools has recently fallen below the 100,000 threshold required by law to qualify as a first class school district. In anticipation of receiving a contract for a public school academy to operate within the boundaries of the Detroit Public Schools given these changed circumstances, you ask whether you must assign a district code to the public school academy.

Both the Revised School Code (Revised School Code or Code), 1976 PA 451, MCL 380.1 *et seq*, and the State School Aid Act (School Aid Act), 1979 PA 94, MCL 388.1601 *et seq*, are relevant in analyzing your question.

The Revised School Code provides for the organization, regulation, and maintenance of schools, school districts, public school academies, and intermediate school districts. In 1993 PA 362, the Legislature enacted Part 6A of the Revised School Code, MCL 380.501 – 380.507, governing the creation and operation of public school academies, commonly known as charter schools.

Section 501(1) of the Revised School Code, MCL 380.501(1), defines a public school academy as a "public school" and a "school district" for purposes of state school aid. In order to organize and operate a public school academy, section 502(3) of the Code, MCL 380.502(3), requires a person or entity to obtain a contract from an authorizing body. Section 501(2)(d) of the Code defines "contract" to mean "the executive act taken by an authorizing body that evidences the authorization of a public school academy" and that "confirm[s] the status of a public school academy as a public school in this state." This contract is often referred to as a "charter."[1]

An "authorizing body" is defined to include any of the following boards that issue a contract as provided in Part 6A: (1) the board of a school district that operates grades K to 12; (2) the board of an intermediate school district; (3) the board of a community college; and (4) the governing board of a state public university. MCL 380.501(2). But the board of a community college may *not* issue a contract for a public school academy to operate in a school district organized as a school district of the first class under MCL 380.502(2)(c), which states in pertinent part:

> [E]xcept as otherwise provided in this subdivision, *the board of a community college shall not issue a contract for a public school academy to operate in a school district organized as a school district of the first class*, a public school academy authorized by the board of a community college shall not operate in a school district organized as a school district of the first class, the board of a community college shall not issue a contract for a public school academy to operate outside the boundaries of the community college district, and a public school academy authorized by the board of a community college shall not operate outside the boundaries of the community college district. [Emphasis added.][2]

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[1] MCL 380.502(6) provides:

> An authorizing body shall not charge a fee, or require reimbursement of expenses, for considering an application for a contract, for issuing a contract, or for providing oversight of a contract for a public school academy in an amount that exceeds a combined total of 3% of the total state school aid received by the public school academy in the school year in which the fees or expenses are charged. An authorizing body may provide other services for a public school academy and charge a fee for those services, but shall not require such an arrangement as a condition to issuing the contract authorizing the public school academy.

[2] Community colleges are limited to chartering schools within their jurisdiction. A public school academy authorized by a federal tribally controlled community college is subject to the geographical limitations contained in section 502(2)(c) of the Revised School Code and must therefore be located within the boundaries of the tribal community college district in Michigan. OAG, 2001-2002, No 7090, p 51 (September 18, 2001). In the case of Bay Mills Community College, a federal tribally controlled community college, the boundary is the entire State.

The School Aid Act governs the appropriation, allocation, and distribution of state funds to local school districts and public school academies. Section 3(6) of the School Aid Act, MCL 388.1603(6), includes public school academies in the definition of "district." State school aid payments are made on the basis of the number of pupils in membership in the district or public school academy as defined in section 6(4) of the State School Aid Act. MCL 388.1606(4). Districts and public school academies receive funds based on a per pupil membership "foundation allowance" calculated as provided in section 20 of the State School Aid Act, MCL 388.1620. In order to receive the foundation allowance, the Department assigns a district code to each school district.

Section 8b(1) of the School Aid Act, MCL 388.1608b(1), addresses the assignment of district codes to public school academies by the Department for funding purposes:

> The department *shall* assign a district code to each public school academy that is authorized under the revised school code and is eligible to receive funding under this act within 30 days after a contract is submitted to the department by the authorizing body of a public school academy. [MCL 388.1608b(1); emphasis added.]

Use of the word "shall" in this context denotes a mandatory provision. *Roberts v Mecosta County General Hosp*, 466 Mich 57, 65; 642 NW2d 663 (2002).

Before returning to your question, it is also helpful to review the provisions of the Revised School Code that relate to school districts of the first class. As amended by 1995 PA 289, section 11 of the Code, MCL 380.11, provides that "[e]ach school district, except a school district of the first class, shall be organized and conducted as a general powers school district."[3] Part 6 of the Code, MCL 380.401–380.485, provides for the organization and operation of first class school districts. Section 402 of the Code, MCL 380.402, defines a first class school district based on pupil enrollment on "count day":

> A school district that *has* a pupil membership of at least 100,000 enrolled on the most recent pupil membership count day is a first class school district governed by this part. [Emphasis added.]

The Detroit Public Schools has been the only district operating as a first class school district in Michigan.[4]

In contrast, the School Aid Act provides a different definition of first class school district. But that definition only applies for school aid purposes. Section 6(11)

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[3] 1995 PA 289 revised the School Code, 1976 PA 451, to consolidate and clarify the laws relating to elementary and secondary education, effective July 1, 1996. It rewrote section 11, which formerly provided that each school district, except those governed by a local act or chapter of a local act, shall be organized and conducted as a primary school district, or a school district of the fourth, third, second, or first classes. 1995 PA 289 repealed Parts 2 through 5 of the School Code of 1976, which related to primary school districts and school districts of the second, third, and fourth class.

[4] The next largest school district is Utica with 29,000 students. House Legislative Analysis, HB 4047 (H-1), March 23, 2009. As passed by the House, HB 4047 would amend the Revised School Code to specify that a school district having a first class school district designation as of September 1, 2008, would continue to have that designation until July 1, 2010, regardless of its pupil membership. HB 4047 (H-1) was referred to the Senate committee on education.

of the School Aid Act, MCL 388.1606(11), defines "school district of the first class," "first class school district," and "district of the first class" as "a district that *had* at least 60,000 pupils in membership for the immediately preceding fiscal year." (Emphasis added.) The threshold 60,000 pupil count and use of the past tense "had" in the School Aid Act's definition of first class school district applies solely for purposes of determining the school aid that a first class district is entitled to receive and related matters under that act and has no bearing on the question whether a school district qualifies as a first class school district for the purposes addressed in the School Code. The School Aid Act contains several provisions relating to grants, funding, and use of school aid funds specific to first class school districts.[5] Declining enrollment in a first class school district will not have School Aid Act implications unless enrollment falls below 60,000 pupils in membership.

Generally, the Code grants first class school districts all the powers of general powers school districts. MCL 380.401a. But the Code contains several provisions that distinguish first class school districts from general powers school districts. For instance, the Detroit Public Schools are governed by an 11-member board. The board is composed of four members elected at large plus seven members elected from voting districts. MCL 380.403a; MCL 380.410; MCL 380.411a; and MCL 380.412a.[6] In a general powers school district, the number of board members "shall remain the same as for that school district before July 1, 1996 [the effective date of 1995 PA 289]," unless changed by the school electors of the district at a regular or special school election. MCL 380.11a(7). The practice was, and has remained, to elect those members at large.

The Code imposes several restrictions on first class school districts that are not imposed on general powers school districts. First class school district board member compensation is set at $30.00 per diem. MCL 380.417a(2). The Code expressly prohibits a first class school district board member from direct or indirect interest in a contract with the board. MCL 380.417a(1).[7] At least seven of a first class school district's regular board meetings must be held in different voting districts of the first class school district each year. MCL 380.418a(1). The first class school district's board must also have a complete annual audit of its financial transactions conducted. MCL 380.418a(3).

The Code also grants first class school districts specific powers not granted to general powers school districts. A first class school district may, with the consent of the legislative body of the city, authorize the financial officers of the district to borrow for not more than one year, on the best terms obtainable, sums necessary to pay awards in condemnation proceedings. MCL 380.441. A first class school district may use proceeds from the sale of first class school district bonds for the remodeling of existing buildings of the school district if the board determines the remodeling will contribute positively to the health, security, or welfare of the pupils of the school dis-

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[5] For instance, a first class school district can use up to 15% of its additional funding for at risk pupils to pay for school security. MCL 388.1631a(7).

[6] Part 6 of the Code contains a requirement that the residents of the first class district vote whether to have a nine-member school board elected by voting district or an 11-member school board with seven members elected by district and four at large members. MCL 380.410(2). In November 2004, the electors of the Detroit Public Schools voted in favor of an 11-member board.

[7] Other laws and legal principles may restrict or prohibit such contracts for board members of general powers school districts. See, e.g., 1968 PA 317, MCL 15.321 *et seq*.

trict and if the uses are approved by the superintendent of public instruction. MCL 380.443(1). First class school districts are exempt from property insurance requirements imposed on general powers school districts and public school academies. MCL 380.1269.

The Code defines a first class school district in terms of enrollment on the most recent "pupil membership count day." MCL 380.402. Section 5(8) of the Code, MCL 380.5(8), defines "pupil membership count day" as that term is defined in section 6 of the School Aid Act, MCL 388.1606(7). The pupil membership count day is the fourth Wednesday after Labor Day each school year. MCL 388.1606(7). September 24, 2008, was the pupil membership count day for the 2008-2009 school year.

Section 5(2) of the Code, MCL 380.5(2) defines membership:

> "Membership" means the number of full-time equivalent pupils in a public school as determined by the number of pupils registered for attendance plus pupils received by transfer and minus pupils lost as defined by rules promulgated by the state board.

The administrative rules on school district pupil accounting for distribution of state aid govern the procedures for counting and reporting pupil membership. Rule 7(1), 2008 AACS, R 304.7(1), requires that computation of full-time equivalency must comply with certain provisions of the School Aid Act, including section 6(4). Section 6(4) sets forth criteria and provides that all pupil counts are as determined by the Department and as corrected by a subsequent department audit. MCL 388.1606(4).

The School Aid Act provides detailed procedures for the application of those provisions to the establishment of pupil membership. Section 101(1) of the School Aid Act, MCL 388.1701(1), requires each school district to file a certified and sworn copy of the number of pupils enrolled as of the pupil membership count day for the current school year with the intermediate school district superintendent not later than the fifth Wednesday after the pupil membership count day. For the 2008-2009 school year, the deadline was October 29, 2008. Not later than the seventh Wednesday after the pupil membership count day, the intermediate school district is required to forward the unaudited counts to the Center for Educational Performance and Information (CEPI). MCL 388.1701(1).[8] For the 2008-2009 school year, the deadline was November 12, 2008.

Each district's financial and pupil accounting records must be audited annually, typically by the intermediate district superintendent. MCL 388.1618(3).[9] The audit and pupil accounting reports are subject to requirements established in the Department's auditing and accounting manuals.[10] The intermediate school district must forward the audited enrollment and attendance number for the pupils of its con-

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[8] The Center for Educational Performance and Information is within the Office of the State Budget Director in the Michigan Department of Management and Budget. The center coordinates the collection of all data required by state and federal law from all entities receiving school aid funds. MCL 388.1694a.

[9] A first class school district's audit may also be prepared by the auditor general of the city. MCL 388.1618(3).

[10] "The pupil accounting records and reports, audits, and management letters are subject to requirements established in the auditing and accounting manuals approved and published by the department." MCL 388.1618(3).

stituent districts to the CEPI no later than the twenty-fourth Wednesday after the pupil membership count day. MCL 388.1701(2). For the 2008-2009 school year, this date was March 11, 2009.

Information supplied with your request indicates that, as of September 24, 2008 (the pupil membership count day for the 2008-2009 school year), both the pupil membership submitted by the Detroit Public Schools and the audited pupil membership from the most recent pupil membership count day were below 100,000.[11]

With this background, your question can now be analyzed. Relevant to your question, the Code precludes the board of a community college from authorizing a contract for a public school academy to operate within the geographical boundary of a first class school district. MCL 380.502(2)(c). In contrast, community colleges with geographic boundaries located within a general powers school district's boundaries and federal tribally controlled community colleges may authorize charter schools and compete for students in that general powers school district.

While MCL 380.502(2)(c) prohibits a community college from issuing a contract for a public school academy to operate in a district "organized" as a first class district, the Code does not specify how districts are organized other than by classification. A review of statutory changes adopted over the years, however, provides insight into the meaning of this term.

Historically, school districts were organized by classification based on population. For instance, Chapter 1 of the school code enacted in 1927 was titled "[c]lassification" and contained only one subsection titled "[o]rganization of school districts." 1927 PA 319. This section required that school districts "shall be organized and conducted" within one of seven classifications. 1929 CL 7094. At that time, township boards were authorized to organize each township into school districts. 1929 CL 7095. However, each city was considered a school district where district classifications were based on general population within that city. Each school district with a population of more than 500,000 constituted a first class school district. 1929 CL 7266. If population changed, the school district classification and governance also changed. 1929 CL 7358. And the school district's board of education was required to take action to effectuate the change, including electing a proper board of education, at the next annual meeting or election. 1929 CL 7358.

In the School Code of 1955, 1955 PA 269, the Legislature adopted a slightly different structure. Schools were classified based on enrollment as determined by a "school census." Districts retained the classification they held at the time 1955 PA

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[11] The unaudited full time equivalent (FTE) pupil membership Detroit Public Schools submitted and the [FTE] pupil membership as audited were as follows:

	Unaudited FTEs (DS4061)	Findings	Audited FTEs (DS4120)
General Education	85,689.49	-591.08	85,098.41
Special Education	8,364.21	-5.60	8,358.61
Total	94,053.7		93,457.02

(State Aid Membership Audit Report, 2008-09 Fall Count, Detroit City School District, 82-010, March 12, 2009.)

269 was enacted. For instance, each school district organized as a first class school district when the School Code of 1955 first took effect continued to be a first class school district. 1970 CL 340.181.

But the provisions for district reclassification changed. If the school census *increased* to a requisite number, the board of that school district could submit the question of reclassifying a district to the district electors. 1970 CL 340.142. If approved, the School Code of 1955 provided the board of education the power to operate the school district until the next general election and provided for the reduction or increase in board membership based on the reclassification. 1970 CL 340.332 – 340.334.

However, in contrast to the prior version of the school code where school district classification and organization changed if the population *decreased*, in the School Code of 1955, the Legislature specifically provided that once a district attained a classification, the classification did not change if the school census decreased. 1970 CL 340.144. The School Code of 1955 provided that "[e]ach city which hereafter *attains* a school census of 120,000 or more" became a first class school district. 1970 CL 340.182 (emphasis added). Thus, the Legislature's emphasis in 1955 was on attaining a certain classification. Once attained, the school district's classification did not revert if enrollment declined.

As originally enacted, the School Code of 1976 retained this general system of classification. School electors could choose to reclassify districts as pupil membership increased. 1979 CL 380.303. But there was no provision for reclassifying school districts as pupil membership decreased. Moreover, the Legislature continued to provide that a district became a first class district when it "*attains* a pupil membership of 120,000 enrolled on the latest pupil membership count day." 1979 CL 380.402 (emphasis added). The Legislature did not provide for a change in classification if the pupil membership fell below the statutory threshold.

In 1995 PA 289, the Legislature repealed the previous classification system in favor of a system where all school districts, except first class school districts, are general powers school districts:

> Each school district, except a school district of the first class, shall be organized and conducted as a general powers school district regardless of previous classification. [MCL 380.11.][12]

In 1999 PA 10, the Legislature added Part 5A, MCL 380.371–380.376, to the Code effectively transferring control over the only existing first class school district, the Detroit Public Schools, from the district's board of education to a school reform board. The Legislature also amended the definition of a first class district in section

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[12] Prior to the amendment the section provided:

> Each school district except a district governed by a local act or chapter of a local act, shall be organized and conducted as:
>
> (a) A primary school district.
> (b) A school district of the fourth class.
> (c) A school district of the third class.
> (d) A school district of the second class.
> (e) A school district of the first class.

402 of the Code. MCL 380.402. This amendment was introduced in 1999 SB 297. The bill amended the definition of first class district as follows:

> A school district ~~which attains~~ THAT HAS a pupil membership of ~~120,000~~ AT LEAST 100,000 enrolled on the ~~latest~~ MOST RECENT pupil membership day ~~shall become~~ IS a single FIRST CLASS school district governed by this part.[13]

Thus, in addition to reducing the pupil membership requirement from 120,000 to at least 100,000, the Legislature changed the definition of a first class district from a district that "attains" a specified pupil membership to a district that "has" the requisite pupil membership and changed "shall become" to "is."[14] Both changes demonstrate that the Legislature intended to consider pupil enrollment on the most recent pupil membership day in determining whether a school district possesses first class school district classification, regardless of whether it had previously attained that status.

"It is axiomatic that when the Legislature effects a change in the provisions of a statute, a presumption arises that the Legislature intends a substantive change in the law." *People v Wright*, 432 Mich 84, 92; 437 NW2d 603 (1989) (citations omitted). Amendments of a statute must be construed harmoniously with other provisions of the statute and a change in the statutory language is presumed to reflect a change in meaning. *Michigan Millers Mut Ins Co v W Detroit Bldg Co*, 196 Mich App 367, 373; 494 NW2d 1 (1992) (citations omitted). "The chosen wording is presumed intentional." *People v Perkins*, 473 Mich 626, 650; 703 NW2d 448 (2005). The statutory language must be read and understood in its grammatical context, unless it is clear that something different was intended. *Herman v Berrien County,* 481 Mich 352, 366; 750 NW2d 570 (2008).

The foremost rule of statutory construction requires courts to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. *Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare System*, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). Where language used by the Legislature in a statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, it must be assumed that the Legislature intended its plain meaning and the provision must be enforced as written. *Lash v Traverse City,* 479 Mich 180, 187; 735 NW2d 628 (2007). As a necessary corollary to this principle, nothing may be read into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself. *Roberts*, 466 Mich at 63; *Omne Financial, Inc v Shacks, Inc*, 460 Mich 305, 311; 596 NW2d 591 (1999).

In contrast to previous versions, the plain language of the definition of first class school district in the current Code requires that a school district presently possess the requisite pupil membership on the most recent pupil membership day in order to be properly so classified. The Code emphasizes the current requirements that a district must possess to be presently considered a first class school district rather than conditions a district must achieve to become a first class school district.

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[13] New language is indicated in uppercase and removed language is stricken. In 2000 PA 230, the Legislature removed the word "single" from the definition.

[14] "Attain" means to reach or succeed in reaching (a goal). *Webster's New World Dictionary,* 4th Edition. "Has," on the other hand, is the third person singular, *present indicative*, verb tense of "have." *Webster's New World Dictionary,* 4th Edition. (Emphasis added.)

Moreover, section 11 of the Code provides, "[e]ach school district, except a school district of the first class, shall be organized and conducted as a general powers school district regardless of previous classification." MCL 380.11. Thus, by operation of law, a school district that fails to have the requisite pupil membership on the most recent pupil membership count day is a general powers school district. Nothing in the current School Code evidences a legislative intent to perpetuate the organizational status of a school district that had previously attained status as a first class school district where the district is reclassified due to declining enrollment. To the contrary, the plain language of MCL 380.11 demonstrates that school districts that do not qualify as first class school districts on the most recent pupil membership count day shall be organized and conducted as general powers school districts.

This conclusion is supported by the fact that while Part 5A of the Code contains specific procedures governing the structure and operation of school districts that qualify as first class school districts due to increasing enrollment, the Legislature did not provide a mechanism for restructuring a school district that no longer has the required pupil membership of a first class district. Instead, MCL 380.11 controls and, by operation of law, the school district is "organized and conducted as a general powers school district regardless of previous classification" and prospectively may only exercise those powers granted to a general powers school district. Therefore, a school district that no longer has a pupil membership of at least 100,000 enrolled on the most recent pupil membership count day is no longer organized as a first class district governed by Part 6 of the Code and must be operated as a general powers school district.

Based on the information supplied with your request, the Detroit Public Schools' pupil membership on the most recent pupil membership count day was 93,457.02 full time equivalent pupils. It did not, therefore, have the threshold count sufficient to qualify as a first class school district under the plain language of section 402 of the Code (only a school district "that has a pupil membership of at least 100,000 enrolled on the most recent pupil membership count day" is a first class school district). MCL 380.402. Rather, this membership count caused the Detroit Public Schools to become a general powers school district under the similarly plain language of MCL 380.11 ("[e]ach school district, except a school district of the first class, shall be organized and conducted as a general powers school district.") The language used by the Legislature in these operative provisions specifies two – and only two – qualifying factors to ascertain first class school district status for purposes of the Revised School Code: 1) a numerical factor (enrolled pupil membership of at least 100,000); and 2) a temporal factor (on the most recent count day). No other qualifying factor may be read into the statute that the Legislature did not itself include.[15]

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[15] The Code does not specifically address restructuring the board of education, continuation of powers, or election of members when a school district loses its classification as a first class school district due to declining enrollment. These issues, and any other issues of administration and transition, should be clarified and may only be addressed by the Legislature. In the meantime, the current members of the board of education of the Detroit Public Schools act as *de facto* officers pending appointment or election of successor board members. See *Greyhound Corp v Public Service Comm'n*, 360 Mich 578; 104 NW2d 395 (1960); *Cantwell v City of Southfield*, 95 Mich App 375; 290 NW2d 151 (1980); OAG, 1979-1980, No 5812, p 1067 (November 6, 1980). Under these circumstances, the current board of education should only exercise those rights, powers, and duties properly exercised by a general powers school district.

Accordingly, it must be concluded that the Detroit Public Schools does not currently qualify as a first class school district for purposes of the Revised School Code.[16] As a result, the limitation in MCL 380.502(2)(c), stating that a community college "shall not issue a contract for a public school academy to operate in a school district organized as a school district of the first class," does not apply to the Detroit Public Schools. Section 8b(1) of the School Aid Act, MCL 388.1608b(1), directs that the Department "*shall* assign a district code to each public school academy that is authorized under the revised school code and is eligible to receive funding under this act." Thus, the statute requires the Department to assign a district code under the circumstances described in your request, provided that the public school academy is otherwise properly authorized under the Code and otherwise eligible to receive funding under the School Aid Act.

It is my opinion, therefore, that, if a community college with geographic boundaries located within the boundaries of the Detroit Public Schools, or a federal tribally controlled community college, submits a contract to the Michigan Department of Education in which the college's governing board has authorized a public school academy to operate within the boundaries of the Detroit Public Schools, the Department must assign the academy a "district code," enabling it to receive state school aid. While section 502(2)(c) of the Revised School Code, MCL 380.502(2)(c), precludes a community college's governing board from authorizing public school academies in a first class school district, community colleges with geographic boundaries located within a general powers school district's boundaries and federal tribally controlled community colleges may authorize public school academies and compete for students in a general powers school district. Because the Detroit Public Schools' pupil membership on the most recent pupil membership count day did not reach the threshold required of a first class school district under section 402 of the Revised School Code, MCL 380.402, the Detroit Public Schools does not qualify as a first class school district under the Code and is, therefore, a general powers school district.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

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[16] To reiterate, for purposes of school aid, the School Aid Act defines a first class school district as a district that had at least 60,000 pupils in membership for the immediately preceding year. MCL 388.1606(11). Thus, for purposes of the School Aid Act, the Detroit Public Schools continues to fall within the definition of a first class school district.

OPEN MEETINGS ACT: Permissible activity under the Open Meetings Act where a city council's committee of the whole meets to hear testimony

QUORUM:

A city council "committee of the whole" may listen to testimony from the public and city administrative staff when it properly notices a meeting under the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 *et seq,* but lacks a quorum when it actually convenes.

A city council "committee of the whole" may ask questions or make comments when it properly notices a meeting under the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 *et seq,* but lacks a quorum when it actually convenes. The city council's committee of the whole may not, however, render any decision in the absence of a quorum.

Opinion No. 7235 October 9, 2009

Honorable Hansen Clarke
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, Michigan

You have asked three related questions, which collectively inquire whether, under the Michigan Open Meetings Act (OMA or Act), MCL 15.261 *et seq*, a city council "committee of the whole" may listen to testimony from the public and city administrative staff if it properly notices a meeting but lacks a quorum when it actually convenes.

The OMA was enacted to promote governmental accountability and to foster openness in government as a means of enhancing responsible decision making. *Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents*, 444 Mich 211, 222-223; 507 NW2d 422 (1993). Its primary purpose is to ensure that public bodies conduct all their decision-making activities in open meetings "and not simply hold open meetings where they rubber-stamp decisions that were previously made behind closed doors." *Schmiedicke v Clare School Bd*, 228 Mich App 259, 264; 577 NW2d 706 (1998). To that end, unless an exception applies, the OMA requires public body meetings to be open to the public, and to be preceded by public notice of the time and place of the meeting.

"Public body" is defined in section 2(a) of the OMA, MCL 15.262(a), as "any state or local legislative or governing body, including a board, commission, committee, subcommittee, authority, or council, which is empowered . . . to exercise governmental or proprietary authority or perform a governmental or proprietary function." As a public body, a city council may create various committees to assist the council in the performance of its duties. You indicated that city council members in this particular instance met as a "committee of the whole" to listen to testimony from the public and city administrative staff. The information you provided, however, does not indicate the committee's scope of authority nor the nature of the testimony to be heard. A "committee of the whole" generally refers to a committee composed of all of the members of the public body, rather than a committee composed of some lesser number. See *American Heritage College Dictionary, 3rd Edition* (1997) and *Arnold Transit Co v City of Mackinac Island*, 99 Mich App 266, 274; 297 NW2d 904 (1980).

"Meeting" is defined in section (2)(b) of the OMA, MCL 15.262(b), as "the convening of a public body at which a quorum is present for the purpose of deliberating toward or rendering a decision on a public policy." A "meeting" of a public body, as contemplated by the OMA, consists of three elements: (1) a quorum, (2) deliberation or rendering of a decision[1], (3) on a matter of public policy. *Ryant v Cleveland Twp,* 239 Mich App 430, 434; 608 NW2d 101 (2000) (citing OAG, 1979-1980, No 5437, p 36 (February 2, 1979)).

The term "quorum" is not defined in the OMA. In the absence of a statutory definition, it is appropriate to consult a dictionary for the ordinary meaning of a statutory term. *Peters v Gunnell, Inc*, 253 Mich App 211, 220; 655 NW2d 582 (2002). The *American Heritage College Dictionary*, defines a quorum as the minimal number of officers and members of a committee or organization who must be present for the valid transaction of business. Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed) p 1284, defines a quorum as the minimum number of members (usually a majority of all the members) who must be present for a deliberative assembly to legally transact business. Based on the information you provided, a quorum for the nine-member city council is five members.

By definition, a gathering of less than a quorum of a public body generally does not constitute a "meeting" within the meaning of the OMA and need not comply with the requirements set forth in the OMA. Likewise, the Act does not apply to committees and subcommittees composed of less than a quorum of the full public body if they "are merely advisory or only capable of making 'recommendations concerning the exercise of governmental authority.'" OAG, 1977-1978, No 5183, p 21, 40 (March 8, 1977). See also OAG, 2001-2002, No 7087, p 45 (August 21, 2001); OAG, 1997-1998, No 6935, p 18 (April 2, 1997); and OAG, 1993-1994, No 6799, p 147 (May 18, 1994).

Where a committee or subcommittee is empowered to act on matters in such a fashion as to deprive the full body of the opportunity to vote on the matter, the committee's decision "is an exercise of governmental authority which effectuates public policy" and the committee proceedings are subject to the OMA. OAG, 1977-1978, No 5222, p 216 (September 1, 1977). The Attorney General opined in OAG, 1997-1998, No 7000, p 197 (December 1, 1998), that a meeting of a standing committee of a county board of commissioners, composed of less than a quorum of the full board, is subject to the OMA when the committee is effectively authorized to determine what items of county business are referred for action by the full board. In a similar vein, where a city council "effectively authorized" a committee to perform a governmental function and the committee held public meetings to solicit public input, the committee was subject to the OMA despite the fact that the committee was not capable of rendering a final decision. *Morrison v East Lansing*, 255 Mich App 505, 517-520; 660 NW2d 395 (2003).

Returning to your question, the OMA does not specifically address what a public body may lawfully do absent a quorum, but section 3(2) and (3) of the OMA, MCL 15.263(2) and (3), does state that "[a]ll decisions of a public body shall be made at a meeting open to the public" and "[a]ll deliberations of a public body constituting a quorum of its members shall take place at a meeting open to the public."

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[1] The term "decision" is defined in section 2(d) of the OMA, MCL 15.262(d), as "a determination, action, vote, or disposition upon a motion, proposal, recommendation, resolution, order, ordinance, bill, or measure on which a vote by members of a public body is required and by which a public body effectuates or formulates public policy."

A public body does not engage in the act of deliberating or deciding public business merely by listening to testimony from the public. Where less than a quorum is present and there are citizens and administrative staff who wish to address the public body, it is permissible for the members who are present to listen to their comments.[2] In OAG, 1977-1978, No 5364, p 606, 607 (September 7, 1978), where a quorum *was* present, it was noted:

> [T]he members may listen to presentations by their constituents or observe demonstrations at the gathering without the need to comply with the [A]ct.

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your first question, that a city council "committee of the whole" may listen to testimony from the public and city administrative staff when it properly notices a meeting under the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 *et seq,* but lacks a quorum when it actually convenes.

The answer to your first question means that no answer is required for your second question.

Your final question asks whether a properly noticed meeting of the city council "committee of the whole" violates the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 *et seq,* if members ask questions or make comments when the meeting lacks a quorum.

To repeat, under circumstances where a quorum is present, OAG No 5364 concluded that a public body does not violate the public notice provisions of OMA when its members meet for the sole purpose of listening to testimony from the public. OAG No 5364 cautioned, however, that, "if a gathering designed to provide information develops into deliberations on matters of public policy or leads to decisions on matters within the jurisdiction of the council, the members will have crossed the boundary of the exemption in section 3(10) of the Open Meetings Act" from providing public notice of the meeting. OAG No 5364 at p 607.

That, however, is not an issue in the situation outlined in your request. The meeting was properly noticed and, thus, the public would have "the opportunity to be present so that they *can observe the manner in which public bodies transact public business*. *Haven v City of Troy*, 39 Mich App 219; 197 NW2d 496 (1972)." OAG, 1977-1978, No 5183, p 21, 32 (March 8, 1977) (emphasis in original).

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your final question, that a city council "committee of the whole" may ask questions or make comments when it properly notices a meeting under the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 *et seq,* but lacks a quorum when it actually convenes. The city council's committee of the whole may not, however, render any decision in the absence of a quorum.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

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[2] Even if a quorum is not present when a meeting is scheduled to begin, it may be prudent to keep a record of the meeting. The record would be useful to document that the meeting was called to order at the time and place specified in the notice. The names of those in attendance could be noted, along with what topics, if any, were discussed and any actions that were taken to obtain a quorum. The record could also include the time of adjournment, to document that those in attendance attempted to meet as scheduled and waited a reasonable time for absentees to arrive.

APPOINTMENT: A person appointed to a local planning commission may not assume the duties of office before the appointment is approved by the municipality's governing body

OATH OF OFFICE:

MICHIGAN PLANNING ENABLING ACT:

PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES:

Under section 15(1) of the Michigan Planning Enabling Act, 2008 PA 33, MCL 125.3815(1), while a person appointed to a planning commission may take his or her oath of office before the appointment is approved by the legislative body of the municipality, he or she may not assume the duties of that office until after the appointment is approved by a majority vote of the members of the municipality's legislative body elected and serving.

Opinion No. 7236 November 3, 2009

Honorable Lesia Liss
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48913

You have asked a question arising under the Michigan Planning Enabling Act, 2008 PA 33, MCL 125.3801 *et seq*. Paraphrasing your question, you ask whether an individual appointed by a municipality's chief elected official as a member of the municipality's planning commission may assume the duties of that office immediately upon taking the oath of office or must wait to assume the duties of office until after his or her appointment is approved by a majority vote of the municipality's legislative body.

In the Michigan Planning Enabling Act (Act), 2008 PA 33, MCL 125.3801 *et seq,* the Legislature consolidated the State's myriad land use planning laws that previously lacked uniformity and rendered land use practices and projects difficult to implement. The Act provides that a local unit of government may adopt an ordinance creating a planning commission. MCL 125.3811. Section 15(1) of the Act, MCL 125.3815(1), provides for the appointment of members to a planning commission of a municipality:

> In a municipality, the chief elected official shall appoint members of the planning commission, *subject to approval by a majority vote of the members of the legislative body elected and serving*. [Emphasis added.[1]]

Const 1963, art 11, § 1 requires all public officers to take an oath of office before entering upon the duties of their respective offices:

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[1] The Act defines municipality as "a city, village, or township." MCL 125.3803(h). However, MCL 125.3815(1) does not apply to the appointment of members of a planning commission established by a city or home rule village charter provision. MCL 125.3881(2).

> All officers, legislative, executive and judicial, *before entering upon the duties of their respective offices*, shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of this state, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of . . . . . according to the best of my ability. No other oath, affirmation, or any religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust. [Emphasis added.]

Similarly, MCL 15.151 states:

> All persons now employed, or who may be employed by the state of Michigan or any governmental agency thereof, and all other persons in the service of the state or any governmental agency, shall, as a condition of their employment, take and subscribe to the oath or affirmation required of members of the legislature and other public officers by section 2 of article 16 of the constitution of 1908 of the state of Michigan [see now Const 1963, art 11, § 1].

It is clear that a member of a local planning commission is an officer subject to this requirement, and that taking the oath of office is a condition precedent to entering upon the duties of planning commission member.[2] Your question is understood as asking whether, assuming an individual takes his or her oath of office upon being appointed to the municipality's planning commission by the municipality's chief elected officer, that individual may assume the duties of that office before his or her appointment has been approved by the municipality's legislative body.

Section 15 of the Act provides that an appointment to the planning commission is "subject to approval" by a majority vote of the members of the legislative body elected and serving. The Legislature has not defined "subject to approval" as used in the Act. Therefore, well established principles of statutory interpretation must be utilized in ascertaining the meaning of undefined statutory terms. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. "If the intent is clear, and the statute is unambiguous, the statute must be read as the Legislature wrote it." *Dewan v Khoury*, 477 Mich 888, 889; 722 NW2d 215 (2006). Undefined statutory terms are to be given their plain and ordinary meanings. *Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co.,* 460 Mich 243, 248-249; 596 NW2d 574 (1999). See also MCL 8.3a ("All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language"). Under that circumstance, dictionary definitions may be consulted to provide guidance concerning the commonly accepted meaning of words. *Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc,* 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002).

Although the word "subject" has several meanings and uses, each can be understood in a common sense depending on the context. The *American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition* (1991), defines the word "subject" when used as an adjective to mean: "Contingent or dependent: *subject to approval*." *Id.* at 1211. The Webster's on-line dictionary defines "subject to" when used in the context of

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[2] See *Meiland v Wayne Probate Judge*, 359 Mich 78, 87; 101 NW2d 336 (1960) (identifying the five "indispensible" elements in determining whether a position is a "public office of a civil nature"); *People v Freeland*, 308 Mich 449, 457; 14 NW2d 62 (1944). Nothing in the Act or the 1963 Constitution prohibits an appointee from taking the oath of office prior to the appointment's approval by the legislative body.

qualification as "conditioned upon" and in the context of uncertainty as "contingent on" and "dependent on."[3]

These definitions are consistent with the longstanding historical application of the term "subject to approval" in the area of appointment of public officers. For example, in Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, § 114, p 46 (1890),[4] the general rule was stated:

> What constitutes Appointment.?Where the power of appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once. *Where, however, the assent or confirmation of some other officer or body is required, the commission can issue or the appointment be complete only when such assent or confirmation is obtained.*
>
> *In either case the appointment becomes complete when the last act required of the appointing power is performed.* [Emphasis added.]

The Mechem Treatise, § 124, pp 59-60, further explains that the approval of the legislative body is required before an appointment that is subject to such approval may be deemed complete and before the appointee may be regarded as qualified to commence official duties:

> Discretion of appointing Power.?Where the authority to make appointments is absolute, the appointing power is subject to no other condition or qualification than that it shall be exercised at the time, in the manner and to the extent prescribed by law, and that the appointee shall be eligible. *Where, however, it can be exercised only by and with the consent and approval of the senate or other similar body, its exercise has no effect unless such consent or approval be given.* [Emphasis added.]

More contemporary legal encyclopedias state the same governing principles today:

> Constitutional or statutory provisions may require that appointments to public office or to certain designated offices be approved or confirmed by somebody other than the appointing power, and until this is done, the appointee may not be legally entitled to the office.
>
> There is a distinction between a confirmation of an appointment to public office and the appointment itself. In this regard, in confirming the appointment the legislature or other body does not in any sense choose the appointee; confirmation is a separate and distinct function that makes the appointment of a qualified candidate valid and final, vesting entitlement to the office for the entire statutory term in that appointed person. [63C Am Jur 2d, Public Officers and Employees, § 103.]

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[3] See <http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definition/subject+to> (accessed October 16, 2009).

[4] The Michigan Supreme Court and Michigan Court of Appeals have relied on various editions of the Mechem treatise when deciding cases. See, e.g., *Doyle v Dearborn*, 370 Mich 236, 240-241; 121 NW2d 473 (1963); *Krajewski v City of Royal Oak*, 126 Mich App 695, 698; 337 NW2d 635 (1983).

In addition, prior opinions of the Attorney General have described as "well established" the principle that, where the law requires the approval or confirmation of an appointment by a governing legislative body, the appointment is not complete until the approval or confirmation is made. See, e.g., OAG, 1939-1940, pp 141, 142 (July 7, 1939), cited in OAG, 2007-2008, No 7200, p 15 (February 23, 2007); OAG, 1965-1966, No 4531, p 393 (December 27, 1966).[5] This is in contrast to legal provisions that indicate an appointment is subject to the *disapproval* of a particular legislative body. For example, Const 1963, art 5, § 6 defines "[a]ppointment by and with the advice and consent of the senate" to mean appointment "subject to disapproval" by a majority vote of the members of the Senate elected and serving. This definition was included by the framers of the 1963 Michigan Constitution to alter the prevailing practice under which gubernatorial appointments that required the advice and consent of the Senate had been considered. As summarized in OAG, 1963-1964, No 4329, pp 494, 495 (November 3, 1964), under the 1908 Michigan Constitution, the law in Michigan was clear that a person appointed by the Governor to fill a vacancy while the Senate was in session "was not entitled to assume office unless and until confirmation was had" by the Senate.[6]

Thus, construing MCL 125.3815(1) according to the common and approved usage of the language leads to the conclusion that the Legislature intended to require the approval of a majority of the members of the legislative body of the municipality before an appointment to a planning commission is complete and effective.

It is my opinion, therefore, that, under section 15(1) of the Michigan Planning Enabling Act, 2008 PA 33, MCL 125.3815(1), while a person appointed to a planning commission may take his or her oath of office before the appointment is approved by the legislative body of the municipality, he or she may not assume the duties of that office until after the appointment is approved by a majority vote of the members of the municipality's legislative body elected and serving.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

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[5] To the extent OAG, 1961-1962, No 4081, p 486 (August 3, 1962), concludes otherwise, it is superseded by this opinion.

[6] While no Michigan cases directly on point have been located, other states' courts have construed the explanatory phrase "subject to approval" to mean "contingent upon" that approval. See, e.g., *Huyett v Idaho State Univ*, 140 Idaho 904, 909; 104 P3d 946 (2004).

IMPLIED CONSENT LAW: Whether a prosecutor may gain access to blood alcohol test results before initiating a prosecution against a suspected drunk driver

MICHIGAN VEHICLE CODE:

PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS:

Under subsection (6)(e) of section 625a of the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.625a(6)(e), an actual criminal prosecution need not be pending before a prosecutor may obtain the results of blood alcohol tests taken by a medical facility in the course of providing medical treatment to a driver involved in a motor vehicle accident.

Opinion No. 7237 November 10, 2009

Karen A. Bahrman
Alger County Prosecuting Attorney
Alger County Courthouse
101 E. Varnum Street
Munising, Michigan 49862

You have asked whether, under subsection (6)(e) of section 625a of the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.625a(6)(e), an actual criminal prosecution must be pending before a prosecutor may obtain the results of blood alcohol tests taken by a medical facility in the course of providing medical treatment to a driver involved in a motor vehicle accident. You advise that you have consistently interpreted this section as authorizing a prosecutor to secure blood alcohol test results *before* seeking a warrant where an accident occurred that involved other evidence of intoxication while driving.

Section 625a of the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.625a, is part of what is known as the Implied Consent Law.[1] As explained by the Michigan Supreme Court in *Collins v Secretary of State*, 384 Mich 656, 668; 187 NW2d 423 (1971), the long-range purpose of this law is to prevent intoxicated persons from driving on the highways. The specific language in subsection 6(e) of section 625a, MCL 257.625a(6)(e), was enacted by 1982 PA 310 as part of reform legislation that, among other things, added a *per se* alcohol-related offense to the Vehicle Code.[2] MCL 257.625a(6)(e) addresses how various chemical tests taken in connection with providing medical treatment to one involved in a motor vehicle accident may be used:

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[1] See sections 625 through 626c of the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.625- 257.626c, which are captioned "Driving While Intoxicated, and Reckless Driving." Section 625c of the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.625c, states that, under the circumstances specified in the section, a person "who operates a vehicle upon a public highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within this state is considered to have given consent to chemical tests of his or her blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the amount of alcohol or presence of a controlled substance or both in his or her blood or urine or the amount of alcohol in his or her breath."

[2] See Mueller, *Analysis of Michigan's 1982 Drunk Driving Reform Legislation*, 62 Mich Bar J 18 (January, 1983).

> (6) The following provisions apply with respect to chemical tests and analysis of a person's blood, urine, or breath, other than preliminary chemical breath analysis:
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> * * *
>
> (e) If, after an accident, the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident is transported to a medical facility and a sample of the driver's blood is withdrawn at that time for medical treatment, the results of a chemical analysis of that sample are admissible in any civil or criminal proceedings to show the amount of alcohol or presence of a controlled substance or both in the person's blood at the time alleged, regardless of whether the person had been offered or had refused a chemical test. *The medical facility or person performing the chemical analysis shall disclose the results of the analysis to a prosecuting attorney who requests the results for use in a criminal prosecution as provided in this subdivision.* A medical facility or person disclosing information in compliance with this subsection is not civilly or criminally liable for making the disclosure. [Emphasis added.]

The question becomes whether the words "for use in a criminal prosecution as provided in this subdivision" mean that a prosecutor may only request blood alcohol test results *after* having filed a criminal complaint to prosecute a suspected drunk driver or whether a prosecutor may request blood alcohol test results to use in deciding whether to bring a prosecution in the first instance. Because no appellate court cases or Attorney General opinions were found that address your question, it may be analyzed using well established principles of statutory construction.

The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. *Title Office, Inc v Van Buren County Treasurer*, 469 Mich 516, 519; 676 NW2d 207 (2004). That process begins with the language of the statute, ascertaining the intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words chosen by the Legislature. *Lash v Traverse City*, 479 Mich 180, 187; 735 NW2d 628 (2007). Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be assumed that the Legislature intended its plain meaning and the statute must be enforced as written. A "necessary corollary" of these principles is that nothing may be read into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself. *Halloran v Bhan*, 470 Mich 572, 577-578; 683 NW2d 129 (2004). Moreover, language may not be read in a vacuum. It must be read in context and assigned such meaning as is "in harmony with the whole of the statute, construed in the light of history and common sense." *Sweatt v Dep't of Corrections*, 468 Mich 172, 179; 661 NW2d 201 (2003), quoting *Arrowhead Dev Co v Livingston County Rd Comm*, 413 Mich 505, 516; 322 NW2d 702 (1982). Words are to be considered in light of the general purpose sought to be accomplished or the evil sought to be remedied by the statute. *Altman v Meridian,* 439 Mich 623, 636; 487 NW2d 155 (1992).

Reading the operative words of MCL 257.625a(6)(e) in context, the phrase "for use in a criminal prosecution as provided in this subdivision [subdivision (e) of subsection (6)]" plainly operates as a limitation on the purpose for which the test results may be used by a prosecutor who requests them, but it does not impose a particular time frame within which a request for results must be made or imply the stage of criminal proceedings that must have been reached before results may be requested or disclosed. That is, once requested, the results of a chemical analysis must be dis-

closed in order for a prosecutor to use them "to show the amount of alcohol or presence of a controlled substance or both in the person's blood at the time alleged" in a criminal proceeding. Had the Legislature intended the phrase to only apply in connection with a "pending" criminal prosecution, it could have included this qualifier; in the absence of language providing this additional temporal requirement, however, one may not be implied. *Halloran*, 470 Mich at 577-578.

This conclusion is consistent with the purpose of MCL 257.625a(6)(e) and affords the language a common sense meaning. As explained by the Court in *People v Stoney*, 157 Mich App 721, 726; 403 NW2d 212 (1987), quoted approvingly in *People v Perlos*, 436 Mich 305, 332-333; 462 NW2d 310 (1990), the purpose of MCL 257.625a(6)(e) is "to ease the prosecution of drunk drivers [who have been involved in an accident] by making the results of blood alcohol tests performed by hospitals available to prosecutors, without the use of otherwise cumbersome procedures." In order for a driving while intoxicated charge to be sustained, evidence of intoxication must be presented. In fact, it would be improper for a charge to be issued before any evidence of intoxication is determined. While there are other signs that might lead to such a determination, such as slurred speech, an odor suggesting the use of alcohol, a swerving vehicle, or glassy eyes, nevertheless the most reliable and significant indicator of intoxication is blood alcohol level. Thus, an interpretation requiring a pending charge *before* a prosecutor may request and gain access to blood alcohol results would be contrary to the Legislature's intent as well as logic.

Further, as a matter of sound public policy, affording a prosecutor access to blood alcohol results in advance of filing a criminal case enhances the government's ability to avoid bringing weak cases and protects the accused from having to face questionable charges. If MCL 257.625a(6)(e) could not be used in the *investigation* of drunk driving cases, the ability to obtain a conviction in meritorious cases would be significantly jeopardized. For example, in a serious accident where a driver is driving under the influence of alcohol or other controlled substance but is rendered unconscious or severely injured, other evidence of intoxication, such as slurred speech or hampered motor skills, will not be obtainable. Rather, the choice facing a prosecutor under such circumstances would be to forego prosecution due to insufficient available evidence or to charge the driver on a lesser evidentiary basis in order to obtain the blood alcohol test results with the expectation that the evidence will later support the charges. Interpreting MCL 257.625a(6)(e) in accordance with its plain language, on the other hand, allows the use of blood alcohol test results as an investigative tool, and makes the most reliable evidence available to the prosecutor before a charging decision is made, whether inculpatory or exculpatory.

Finally, *People v Perlos* lends further support to the conclusion that MCL 257.625a(6)(e) affords prosecutors access to blood alcohol test results taken in the course of providing medical treatment *before* a criminal prosecution is brought. In *Perlos*, the Michigan Supreme Court granted leave in six consolidated cases to determine the constitutionality of what was then subsection (9) of section 625a of the Michigan Vehicle Code, now subsection (6)(e), and to decide whether disputed blood test results obtained without a warrant should have been suppressed. In upholding the constitutionality of this provision, the Court observed that it was a "carefully tailored statute" that only allows test results to be turned over to the State under narrowly defined circumstances: there must be "an accident, a person must be taken to a medical facility, the person must have been the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident, and medical personnel must order a chemical analysis, on their own initiative, for medical treatment." 436 Mich at 328. Notably, although in each of the cases the

results of the chemical analyses were provided before the commencement of a criminal prosecution, the Michigan Supreme Court did not include a pending criminal charge as among the necessary conditions precedent to a proper request and disclosure. *Id.* at 335 n 2 (J. Levin, *dissenting*).

It is my opinion, therefore, that, under subsection (6)(e) of section 625a of the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.625a(6)(e), an actual criminal prosecution need not be pending before a prosecutor may obtain the results of blood alcohol tests taken by a medical facility in the course of providing medical treatment to a driver involved in a motor vehicle accident.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

CHARTER TOWNSHIP ACT: Circumstances under which a charter township official's salary may be reduced

CHARTER TOWNSHIPS:

LOCAL OFFICIALS COMPENSATION COMMISSION:

PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES:

In accordance with the mandates set forth in section 6a of the Charter Township Act, MCL 42.6a, an elected official of a charter township may not consent to a reduction in his or her salary during the official's term of office unless the consent is in writing and there is a corresponding reduction in the officer's responsibilities and requirements.

If an elected township official's salary has been improperly reduced, the township should pay the unpaid portion minus the applicable payroll deductions. The official may then voluntarily return to the township all or a portion of any compensation received.

Opinion No. 7238 December 1, 2009

Honorable Bruce Patterson
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48933

You have asked whether elected officials in a charter township may lawfully consent to a reduction in a salary that has been established under section 6a of the

Charter Township Act, MCL 42.6a. You further ask how to remedy a circumstance where a reduction in salary has been implemented by mere consent of an elected official.[1]

According to information provided with your request, the township created a local officials compensation commission (Commission) by ordinance.[2] The Commission passed a resolution establishing the compensation for elected officials as provided in MCL 42.6a(1)(b). In the exercise of its statutory disapproval authority, the township board failed to adopt a resolution rejecting the salaries established by the Commission. Yet, over the next two months, the township supervisor, the township treasurer, and three township trustees submitted written requests to have their salaries reduced for 2009.

The common law rule is that a public official's acceptance of compensation less than the prescribed amount is void as against public policy. The official retains the right to recover the unpaid portion of his or her salary.[3] 4 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed, 1992 rev), § 12.191, pp 83-84 explains the legal principle:

> At common law, acceptance by a public officer of an amount less than his or her salary does not represent a waiver, estoppel or accord and satisfaction. Accordingly, the courts have frequently held that an agreement by an officer to accept a less sum than the prescribed salary of an office is void, as against public policy, and the officer is not precluded from recovering, in an appropriate action brought for that purpose, the full amount of compensation due.

Citing a long line of Michigan cases, the Supreme Court in *Brown v Dep't of Military Affairs,* 386 Mich 194, 200-201; 191 NW2d 347 (1971), cert den 405 US 990; 92 S Ct 1256; 31 L Ed 2d 457 (1972), held that a public officer's waiver of salary established by law, rather than by contract, is void:

> Salaries of public officers which are established by law are not determined by contract or agreement between the parties. The public employer cannot pay more than the law allows. The public employee cannot accept less.

This common law principle was followed in OAG, 1997-1998, No 6961, pp 85, 86 (November 5, 1997), where the Attorney General concluded that a planning commission member could not refuse compensation but could return the compensation to the township**,** subject to applicable tax consequences:

> While a township planning commission member may not refuse to accept compensation provided by the township board, such compensation may subsequently be returned to the township. If a planning commission

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[1] You have also asked whether the charter township's compensation commission ordinance has been violated by a voluntary reduction in salary. Historically, this office has not issued opinions regarding compliance with and enforcement of local ordinances. Therefore, this opinion will not address that portion of your request.

[2] Under section 6a(1), the township may follow the ordinance procedure "[i]n place of the procedure in section 6 [MCL 42.6]." MCL 42.6a(1). This opinion does not address the circumstance where a township follows the procedure in section 6.

[3] Of course, the official's claim may be subject to defenses, such as the running of the statute of limitations. Brown, 386 Mich 194, 201-202; 191 NW2d 347 (1971), cert den 405 US 990; 92 S Ct 1256; 31 L Ed 2d 457 (1972).

member, however, elects to return compensation earned for public service, he or she should consider the tax consequences of such action.

The method for establishing compensation for elected officials in a charter township is provided in the Charter Township Act (Act), 1947 PA 359, MCL 42.1 *et seq.* Section 6a provides for the creation of a local officials compensation commission, which must meet in each odd-numbered year. MCL 42.6a(1)(a) and (c). Subject to rejection by a two-thirds vote of the township board, the Commission shall determine salaries for elected township officials to take effect 30 days after the filing of its determination:

> The commission *shall* determine the salary of each township elected official which determination *shall be the salary* unless the township board by resolution adopted by 2/3 of the members elected to and serving on the board rejects the determination. A determination of the commission shall be effective 30 days following its filing with the township clerk unless rejected by the township board. If a determination is rejected, the existing salary *shall prevail*. [MCL 42.6a(1)(b); emphasis added.]

The use of the word "shall" makes a statutory provision mandatory. *Browder v Int'l Fidelity Ins Co*, 413 Mich 603, 612; 321 NW2d 668 (1982). Therefore, absent a statutory exception, the salary for an elected official in a charter township, determined by that section 6a(1)(b) process, *shall be the salary* of that official. The elected official has no authority to reduce that salary.

However, under specified circumstances, section 6a(6) of the Act authorizes a township to institute a decrease in an elected official's salary for the current term of office:

> The salary of an elected township official shall not be decreased during the official's term of office as long as the responsibilities and requirements of that office are not diminished during the term of the official's term of office, *and* the salary of an elected township official shall not be decreased during the official's term of office unless the official consents in writing to the reduction in salary. Notwithstanding the above, if a township in setting a township supervisor's salary has designated a portion of the supervisor's salary to be paid the supervisor for directly performing the property tax assessing function within the township and the supervisor subsequently fails to perform that function, the salary of the supervisor may be reduced by that portion of the supervisor's salary designated for the direct performance of the property tax assessment function; provided that in no event may that portion of a supervisor's salary designated for nonassessment functions be decreased during the supervisor's term of office without the supervisor's written consent. [MCL 42.6a(6); emphasis added.][4]

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[4] This procedure was intended to afford elected officials in charter townships the same protection against arbitrary salary reductions during their term of office as their counterparts in general law townships. House Legislative Analysis, HB 5641, May 11, 1982. The General Law Township Act provides in relevant part: "The salary of an elected township official or an official appointed to fill a vacancy shall not be decreased during the official's term of office unless the responsibilities and requirements of that office are diminished and the official consents in writing to the reduction in salary." MCL 41.95(2).

Thus, the circumstances under which a salary reduction may occur include those where the responsibilities and requirements of the office are diminished *and* the official consents in writing to the reduction in salary. In *Michigan Public Service Co v Cheboygan*, 324 Mich 309, 341; 37 NW2d 116 (1949), the Court explained that: "'And' is a conjunctive, used to denote a joinder, a union." *Karaczewski v Farbman Stein & Co*, 478 Mich 28, 732 NW2d 56 (2007) stated: "Plainly, the use of the conjunctive term 'and' reflects that *both* requirements must be met."

A reduction in salary may also occur without consent where a township supervisor's salary is established based upon the expectation that the supervisor will perform the assessing function and the supervisor, in fact, does not do so. But the remaining portion of the supervisor's salary, based upon the remaining duties he or she is expected to perform, may not be reduced without the supervisor's consent. This proviso, however, does not conversely mean that a supervisor may, without a corresponding reduction in his remaining responsibilities, reduce his or her salary merely by consent, nor does it apply to any officer other than a township supervisor.

Section 6a(1)(b) is clear – a salary established by a compensation commission *shall be the salary* absent timely rejection by two thirds of the members elected to and serving on the township board. Based upon the information provided with your request, the township board did not so reject the salaries established by the Compensation Commission for 2009, nor have you provided any information that the responsibilities and requirements of the various offices in question have been reduced.

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your first question, that, in accordance with the mandates set forth in section 6a of the Charter Township Act, MCL 42.6a, an elected official of a charter township may not consent to a reduction in his or her salary during the official's term of office unless the consent is in writing and there is a corresponding reduction in the officer's responsibilities and requirements.

You also ask, if an official's salary was improperly reduced, what action may be taken to remedy the matter.

As opined in OAG No 6961, recognizing that there may be tax consequences, there is no law preventing an official from voluntarily returning a portion of his or her salary to the township.

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your second question, that if an elected township official's salary has been improperly reduced, the township should pay the unpaid portion minus the applicable payroll deductions. The official may then voluntarily return to the township all or a portion of any compensation received.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

CONST 1963, ART 5, § 2: Whether the Governor may compel or authorize the director of a state agency to institute an admission fee for the Michigan Historical Museum and exhibits pursuant to her reorganization authority under Const 1963, art 5, § 2

EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION ORDERS:

GOVERNOR:

The Governor may neither compel nor authorize the head of a principal department of state government or other state agency to institute an admission fee for a museum facility and its exhibits pursuant to gubernatorial reorganization authority under Const 1963, art 5, § 2 where the power to institute such a fee has not previously been conferred upon the transferred or receiving department or agency by the Legislature. Thus, as amended by Executive Order 2009-43, Executive Order 2009-36 does not empower the Director of the Department of Natural Resources to institute an admission fee at the Michigan Historical Museum and its exhibits.

Opinion No. 7239 December 2, 2009

Honorable Bill Rogers
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI

You have asked whether the Governor may compel or authorize the head of a principal department of state government to institute an admission fee for the Michigan Historical Museum facilities and exhibits pursuant to her reorganization authority under Const 1963, art 5, § 2.

Your question is based on the language in Executive Order (EO) No 2009-36, as amended by Executive Order (EO) No 2009-43, which instructs the Director of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to implement cost-saving and revenue-generating measures including, but not limited to, a possible admission fee for museum facilities and exhibits. The specific language in question is found in section II.H.7 of EO 2009-36, as amended by EO No 2009-43,[1] and provides:

> The Director of the Department of Natural Resources shall supervise and administer the assigned functions transferred to the Department of Natural Resources under Section II.H of this Order in such ways as to promote efficient administration and shall make internal organizational changes as may be administratively necessary to complete the realignment of responsibilities under this Order. To achieve efficient administration and effectuate necessary cost savings consistent with appropriations provided by law, the Director shall evaluate and implement measures designed to reduce expenditures, eliminate duplicative services, and generate revenue while protecting the core functions of the former Department of History, Arts, and Libraries transferred to the Department of Natural Resources.

[1] EO No 2009-43 provides that it is to take effect 60 days after September 9, 2009, its date of issuance.

> The guiding purpose of any and all such measures, consistent with the purpose and intent of this Order, shall be to strike a careful and prudent balance between the goal of achieving efficient administration and necessary cost savings and that of preserving and maintaining public access to the important and unique collections and resources entrusted to the former Department of History, Arts, and Libraries, including, but not limited to, Michigan's Civil War and the other military flags. *Unless the Director determines it to be impracticable, the measures may include, but shall not be limited to, all of the following*:
>
> a. *Instituting an admission fee for museum facilities and exhibits*.[2] [Emphasis added.]

Among other things, EO 2009-36 abolished the Department of History, Arts and Libraries (HAL) and distributed its functions to different state departments. With the exception of those changes made by EO 2009-43, EO 2009-36 took effect on October 1, 2009.

In order to answer your question, it is helpful to review the purpose and legal effect of an executive reorganization order. The Governor's constitutional power to reorganize the executive branch is found in Const 1963, art 5, § 2:

> All executive and administrative offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the executive branch of state government and their respective functions, powers and duties, except for the office of governor and lieutenant governor and the governing bodies of institutions of higher education provided for in this constitution, shall be allocated by law among and within not more than 20 principal departments. They shall be grouped as far as practicable according to major purposes.
>
> Subsequent to the initial allocation, *the governor may make changes in the organization of the executive branch or in the assignment of functions among its units* which he considers necessary for efficient administration. Where these changes require the force of law, they shall be set forth in executive orders and submitted to the legislature. Thereafter the legislature shall have 60 calendar days of a regular session, or a full regular session if of shorter duration, to disapprove each executive order. Unless disapproved in both houses by a resolution concurred in by a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house, each order shall become

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[2] Before it was amended, EO 2009-36 made the imposition of a fee mandatory rather than discretionary:

> The Director of the Department of Natural Resources shall supervise and administer the assigned functions transferred to that Department under Section II.H of this Order in such ways as to promote efficient administration and shall make internal organizational changes as may be administratively necessary to complete the realignment of responsibilities under this Order. In order to achieve efficient administration and effectuate necessary cost savings consistent with available appropriated resources, the Director shall implement cost-saving measures designed to reduce expenditures and generate revenue while protecting the core mission of the former Department of History, Arts, and Libraries transferred to the Department of Natural Resources. Unless the Director determines it to be impracticable, these measures *shall* include, but shall not be limited to, all of the following:
>
> a. Instituting an admission fee for museum facilities and exhibits. [Emphasis added.]

> effective at a date thereafter to be designated by the governor. [Emphasis added.]

Under Const 1963, art 5, § 2, the Governor may alter the organization of the executive branch or change the assignment of the functions of the units within the executive branch. Executive reorganization orders must be distinguished from executive directives, as explained in a recent Attorney General opinion:

> In contrast to executive *directives*, executive *orders* are specifically provided for in Const 1963, art 5, § 2. This provision was new in the 1963 Constitution and was adopted to facilitate efficiency within the executive branch. The Governor, through the use of executive orders, may "make changes in the organization of the executive branch or in the assignment of functions among its units." Unless disapproved in each house of the Legislature, executive orders acquire the force and effect of law. For this reason, art 5, § 2 has been described as expressly vesting "legislative power" in the Governor without running afoul of Const 1963, art 3, § 2. [OAG, 2003-2004, No 7157, pp 132, 137 (June 2, 2004); emphasis in original; footnote and citations omitted.]

The Michigan Constitution thus authorizes the Governor to *reorganize* or *reassign* functions in the executive branch, but it does not give the Governor the authority to *create* new powers or duties within the executive branch. In other words, the Governor is prohibited from using an executive reorganization order to "change substantive law that does not directly relate to the exercise of [his or] her *reorganization* authority." OAG No 7157, p 138. (Emphasis in original.)

The Executive Organization Act of 1965, MCL 16.101 *et seq*, implemented the first paragraph of Const 1963, art 5, § 2. *House Speaker v Governor*, 443 Mich 560, 587-590; 506 NW2d 190 (1993); *Soap & Detergent Ass'n v Natural Resources Comm*, 415 Mich 728, 748; 330 NW2d 346 (1982), citing *McDonald v Schnipke*, 380 Mich 14, 26; 155 NW2d 169 (1968). In the Executive Organization Act, the transfer of the executive and administrative agencies of state government may be accomplished using three distinct methods: a Type I, Type II, or Type III transfer. MCL 16.103(a)-(c). EO 2009-36, section II.H.1, and EO 2009-43 effectuate the transfer of the authority, powers, and duties "relating to the promotion of history and the preservation of the state's historical resources" from HAL to the DNR by "Type II" transfer as defined in the Executive Organization Act, which provides in relevant part:

> Under this act a type II transfer means transferring of an existing department, board, commission or agency to a principal department established by this act. Any department, board, commission or agency assigned to a type II transfer under this act shall have all its statutory authority, powers, duties and functions, records, personnel, property, unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations or other funds, including the functions of budgeting and procurement, transferred to that principal department. [MCL 16.103(b).]

Under a Type II transfer, the transferred agency, department, board, or commission continues to exist but its functions are carried out under the supervision and control of the receiving department or agency. OAG, 1965-1966, No 4479A, p 262 (May 2, 1966). The Governor may only assign, and the principal department may only receive, the authority, powers, duties, and functions possessed by the transferred agency, department, board, or commission.

Addressing the question of whether the Governor or the head of a department transferred by a Type II transfer had the authority to fill a vacancy in that department, OAG No 4479A stated:

> [T]here is nothing in the language of [the Executive Organization Act] that indicates any legislative intent that additional or new appointive power is conferred upon the governor. In my opinion he [the Governor] retains the appointive power theretofore conferred on him by the basic statutes as reviewed above. [*Id*. p 268.]

The opinion further explained that a "careful reading of [MCL 16.103(b)] will disclose that the powers, duties and functions transferred by a Type II transfer are the powers, duties and functions of the existing department, board, commission or agency to which the transfer is applied." Accordingly, with respect to the particular power at issue there, the power to fill vacancies arising in the membership of any department, board, commission, or agency transferred to a principal department by a Type II transfer, the opinion concluded the vacancies were to be filled in the manner prescribed in the basic act relating to the creation of the agency subject only to any amendment to the basic act. *Id*. p 269.

The Executive Organization Act does not confer any new power, duty, function, or independent action not granted in the originating statutes. OAG, 1965-1966, No 4479, p 209 (March 9, 1966). Thus, in order to determine whether the Director of the DNR has the authority to charge an admission fee to the Michigan Historical Museum or exhibits, it is necessary to determine the powers and duties granted to and possessed by HAL in the originating statutes.

The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. *Brown v Detroit Mayor*, 478 Mich 589, 593; 734 NW2d 514 (2007). Legislative intent is discerned from the statutory text. *People v Lively*, 470 Mich 248, 253; 680 NW2d 878 (2004). The first step is to review the language of the statute. *Brown*, 478 Mich at 593. If the statute is unambiguous on its face, it is presumed that the Legislature intended the meaning expressed. *Id.*

The Michigan Historical Commission Act, MCL 399.1 *et seq*, confers on the Michigan Historical Commission certain powers and duties with respect to obtaining, preserving, and promoting historical materials. See MCL 399.3, 399.4, 399.6 and 399.7. It also permits HAL to conduct specific revenue-generating activities at the Michigan Historical Center. Section 7a provides that HAL may establish and operate a store at the center to sell items pertaining to the collections or purpose of the historical center. MCL 399.7a(1). That same section also creates the "museum operations fund" into which the money collected from the museum store sales must be deposited. MCL 399.7a(3). No provision of the law empowered HAL to institute an admission fee for the Michigan Historical Museum or exhibits.

In contrast, the Legislature has expressly authorized the charging of admission fees to certain other state museums. See MCL 399.408(1)(a) and (b) (authorizing a reasonable admission fee for entry into the Michigan Maritime Museum and the establishment of a retail sales store); MCL 399.508(1)(a) and (b) (authorizing a reasonable entry fee into the Michigan Railroad History Museum and the establishment of a retail sales store); MCL 324.76506 (authorizing the levy and collection of fees to use the facilities at the Fort deBaude historical site); and MCL 324.76702(d) (authorizing the Mackinac Island State Park Commission to establish charges for admission to the facilities under its jurisdiction). Under the rule of statutory construction hold-

ing that courts cannot assume that the Legislature inadvertently omitted from one statute the language that it placed in another statute, and then, on the basis of that assumption, apply language that is not there, the authority to charge an admission fee for the Michigan Historical Museum and its exhibits cannot be implied. See *Grimes v Dep't of Transportation*, 475 Mich 72, 85 n 43; 715 NW2d 275 (2006).

As you indicate in your letter, both EO 2009-36 and EO 2009-43 contain language in Section II.H.7.a providing for the Director of the DNR to institute an admission fee for the Michigan Historical Museum and its exhibits. EO 2009-36, as originally issued, used mandatory terms in providing that, unless the Director determined it to be impracticable, the cost-saving measures to be employed "shall" include instituting an admission fee. As amended by EO 2009-43, however, EO 2009-36 no longer included the mandatory "shall," stating instead that the DNR Director "may" institute an admission fee for museum facilities and exhibits as a revenue-generating measure if he or she does not find it to be impracticable. This distinction is unimportant here, however, since the Director of the DNR may neither be required nor permitted to charge an admission fee to the Michigan Historical Museum or its exhibits since that power did not exist in the basic authorizing statutes for the Governor to transfer.[3]

It is my opinion, therefore, that the Governor may neither compel nor authorize the head of a principal department of state government or other state agency to institute an admission fee for a museum facility and its exhibits pursuant to gubernatorial reorganization authority under Const 1963, art 5, § 2 where the power to institute such a fee has not previously been conferred upon the transferred or receiving department or agency by the Legislature. Thus, as amended by Executive Order 2009-43, Executive Order 2009-36 does not empower the Director of the Department of Natural Resources to institute an admission fee at the Michigan Historical Museum and its exhibits.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

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[3] The Governor's executive staff has advised this office that it was not the Governor's intent to bestow upon the Director of the DNR the authority to impose an admission fee to the museum or its exhibits, if that authority did not exist under current law.

MICHIGAN CAMPAIGN FINANCE ACT: Whether campaign funds may be used to pay an elected officeholder's legal fees incurred to defend against criminal charges

PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES:

CANDIDATE COMMITTEES:

Under sections 9(1) and 21a of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, MCL 169.209(1) and 169.221a, the candidate committee of an elected official is permitted to make an expenditure for an incidental expense to pay for legal fees incurred by the officeholder to defend against criminal charges, but only if the expense is an ordinary and necessary business expense of the elected official as described under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 USC 162, and is paid or incurred in carrying out the business of an elective office. To qualify as such an ordinary and necessary business expense, the source of the charge or the character of the conduct from which the charge stems must arise in the course of carrying out the business of being a public official. Expenses incurred to defend against charges that originate from personal activity unrelated to performing the functions of the public official's office will not so qualify.

Opinion No. 7240 December 15, 2009

Honorable Gilda Jacobs
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, Michigan 48909

You have asked whether the Michigan Campaign Finance Act (MCFA or Act), MCL 169.201 *et seq*, permits an "elected officeholder" to "use campaign finance funds from his or her candidate committee to pay for legal fees and expenses incurred in defending against criminal charges brought against the officeholder."

Under the MCFA, an individual who becomes a candidate for state, judicial, county, city, township, village, and certain school offices must form a candidate committee, and register the committee with either the Secretary of State or the county clerk's office, depending on the office sought. MCL 169.203(1) and (2); MCL 169.221. The candidate committee is under the direction and control of the candidate, MCL 169.203(2), and its purpose is to accept contributions and make expenditures on behalf of the candidate's election to office, and to disclose such contributions and expenditures by filing forms and reports with the appropriate official. MCL 169.203(2) and (4); 169.225; 169.226; 169.233; 169.235.[1]

With respect to money or resources received, the MCFA limits the purposes for which candidate committees may use such money or resources to making a "contri-

[1] Once a candidate is elected to office, his or her candidate committee remains active in order to receive contributions and make expenditures regarding the candidate's next election effort, and the committee generally remains subject to the Act's reporting requirements.

bution"[2] or "expenditure." MCL 169.203(2) and (4); MCL 169.221.[3] Relevant to your question is the committee's ability to make expenditures. The term "expenditure" means:

> [A] payment, donation, loan, or promise of payment of money or anything of ascertainable monetary value for goods, materials, services, or facilities in assistance of, or in opposition to, the nomination or election of a candidate, or the qualification, passage, or defeat of a ballot question. [MCL 169.206(1).]

The MCFA allows different types of expenditures, including an expenditure for an "incidental expense" under section 21a:

> A candidate committee of a candidate who is elected or appointed to an elective office may make an expenditure for an incidental expense for the elective office to which that candidate was elected or appointed. [MCL 169.221a.][4]

Thus, a candidate committee may make expenditures as that term is defined in the Act, and for those candidates already in office, the committee may make an expenditure for an incidental expense. The only other method for expending or disbursing money or resources from a candidate committee is set forth in MCL 169.245, which allows a candidate committee to "transfer any unexpended funds" to another candidate committee or certain other identified committees, tax-exempt charitable organizations, or to return the funds to contributors, when the committee and its assets are no longer needed or available to the candidate.

Turning to your question, the MCFA does not specifically address whether the candidate committee of an elected officeholder may disburse monies for the payment of attorney fees incurred by the officeholder in defending against criminal charges. But because candidate committees are limited to disbursing money or resources as "expenditures" under the Act, a committee may only make such disbursements if the payment of attorney fees qualifies as an "expenditure" as that term is defined in the MCFA.

To constitute an expenditure under section 6(1) of the MCFA, MCL 169.206(1), a "payment . . . for . . . services" must be "in assistance of . . . the *nomination or election of a candidate*." (Emphasis added.) The plain language of section 6(1) limits its application, as relevant here, to disbursements that assist in the nomination or election of a candidate.[5] Because your request and accompanying materials focus chiefly

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[2] The term "contribution" means:

> [A] payment, gift, subscription, assessment, expenditure, contract, payment for services, dues, advance, forbearance, loan, or donation of money or anything of ascertainable monetary value, or a transfer of anything of ascertainable monetary value to a person, made for the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of a candidate, or for the qualification, passage, or defeat of a ballot question. [MCL 169.204(1).]

[3] While the MCFA does not expressly state that a candidate committee may only make contributions or expenditures, the Act provides for no manner of receiving or disbursing money or resources received by a committee other than through receiving contributions and making expenditures as those terms are defined in the Act.

[4] The Act also provides definitions for an "in-kind contribution or expenditure," MCL 169.209(3), and an "independent expenditure," MCL 169.209(2), but neither of these forms of expenditure is pertinent to your inquiry. A candidate committee may also make small expenditures using petty cash. See MCL 169.223.

[5] For purposes of the MCFA, an elected officeholder is presumed to be a "candidate for reelection to that same office" unless the officeholder is otherwise barred from seeking reelection. See MCL 169.203(1).

on the purposes for which an elected officeholder may expend his or her candidate committee funds, this letter will not address whether, and under what circumstances, legal fees may qualify as "expenditures" under section 6(1).

However, as noted above, section 21a of the MCFA expressly authorizes an elected officeholder's candidate committee to make an expenditure for an "incidental expense." MCL 169.221a. Section 21a was added to the MCFA by 1994 PA 411. Previously, elected officeholders could establish an officeholder expense fund (OEF) to be used for "expenses incidental to the person's office." MCL 169.249 (repealed by 1999 PA 224); 1989 AACS, R 169.62.[6] The Secretary of State's accompanying administrative rule, R 169.62, provided in subsection (1) that an OEF could "be used only for disbursements which are incidental to the office of the elected public official who established the fund," explaining that a disbursement was incidental if it was "traditionally associated with, or necessitated by, the holding of a particular public office" *and* if it was included within one or more of numerous categories of allowable expenses listed in the rule. Under subsection (2) of the rule, a disbursement from an OEF that was an "ordinary and necessary business expense of a public official as a public official as authorized by the internal revenue code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 1 *et seq*.," was presumed to qualify as an incidental expense. R 169.62(2). The Secretary of State's office interpreted former section 49 and R 169.62(1) as allowing an official to use his or her OEF to pay legal fees if the requisite showing could be made (Interpretive Statement to William J. O'Neil, December 20, 1991).[7]

Subsequently, due to concerns over how OEFs were utilized, the Legislature determined it was necessary to eliminate OEFs, and it implemented a more regulated approach to the use of campaign funds for non-campaign related activities. See House Legislative Analysis, HB 4837, January 17, 1995. It enacted section 21a, MCL 169.221a, and amended section 9, MCL 169.209, to allow expenditures for incidental expenses by candidate committees. In doing so, the Legislature essentially codified R 169.62 in the definition of "incidental expense" now set forth in section 9(1) of the MCFA but with a few modifications pertinent to your question.

The Legislature eliminated the prior rule's independent requirement that the expense be "traditionally associated with or necessitated by" holding of office, opting instead to define incidental as meaning "ordinary and necessary" as described in a specific section of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (IRC or Code), section 162. While it chose to also include a finite list of allowable incidental expenses similar to the prior rule, unlike the prior rule it made that list non-exclusive rather than limited to those expressly identified:

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[6] Before its repeal, MCL 169.249 provided, in part:

> (1) An elected public official may establish an officeholder expense fund. The fund may be used for expenses incidental to the person's office. The fund may not be used to make contributions and expenditures to further the nomination or election of that public official.

[7] The O'Neil Interpretive Statement only discusses whether the fees were payable under subsection (1) of R 169.62. There are two older interpretive statements addressing whether legal fees were payable out of an officeholder's OEF, but these statements were issued before the adoption of R 169.62. See Interpretive Statement to Senator Jack Welborn, February 1, 1980 (attorney fees not payable from OEF for pursuing lawsuit involving personal money damages), and Interpretive Statement to Harold Dunne, October 28, 1988 (attorney fees payable from OEF for pursuing litigation regarding city charter).

MCL 169.215(2) authorizes the Secretary of State to issue declaratory rulings and interpretive statements. In an interpretive statement, the Secretary of State provides an informational response to the question presented.

> "Incidental expense" means an expenditure that is an ordinary and necessary expense, as described in section 162 of the internal revenue code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. 162, paid or incurred in carrying out the business of an elective office. Incidental expense includes, but is not limited to, any of the following [expenses listed in subsection (1)(a)-(p)]. [MCL 169.209(1).]

In addition, while former section 49(3) made it a misdemeanor to improperly use an OEF, the Legislature did not retain this enforcement tool when it enacted section 21a. Other provisions in the MCFA contain specific criminal penalties to deter violations, such as corporate contributions under MCL 169.254,[8] but the Legislature chose not to make unauthorized expenditures for incidental expenses subject to criminal sanctions.

None of the categories of allowable expenses listed in section 9(1) expressly refer to the payment of attorney fees incurred by a candidate or officeholder to defend against criminal charges. MCL 169.209(1)(a)-(p).[9] Thus, the question becomes

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[8] The Supreme Court is currently reconsidering whether the prohibition against corporate contributions violates the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. *Citizens United v Federal Elections Comm*, No. 08-205, argued September 9, 2009.

[9] In this respect, MCL 169.209(1) is similar to former R 169.62. See December 20, 1991, Interpretive Statement, *supra*. The categories listed in section 9(1) of the MCFA include:

> (a) A disbursement necessary to assist, serve, or communicate with a constituent.
>
> (b) A disbursement for equipment, furnishings, or supplies for the office of the public official.
>
> (c) A disbursement for a district office if the district office is not used for campaign-related activity.
>
> (d) A disbursement for the public official or his or her staff, or both, to attend a conference, meeting, reception, or other similar event.
>
> (e) A disbursement to maintain a publicly owned residence or a temporary residence at the seat of government.
>
> (f) An unreimbursed disbursement for travel, lodging, meals, or other expenses incurred by the public official, a member of the public official's immediate family, or a member of the public official's staff in carrying out the business of the elective office.
>
> (g) A donation to a tax-exempt charitable organization, including the purchase of tickets to charitable or civic events.
>
> (h) A disbursement to a ballot question committee.
>
> (i) A purchase of tickets for use by that public official and members of his or her immediate family and staff to a fund-raising event sponsored by a candidate committee, independent committee, political party committee, or a political committee that does not exceed $100.00 per committee in any calendar year.
>
> (j) A disbursement for an educational course or seminar that maintains or improves skills employed by the public official in carrying out the business of the elective office.
>
> (k) A purchase of advertisements in testimonials, program books, souvenir books, or other publications if the advertisement does not support or oppose the nomination or election of a candidate.
>
> (*l*) A disbursement for consultation, research, polling, and photographic services not related to a campaign.
>
> (m) A fee paid to a fraternal, veteran, or other service organization.
>
> (n) A payment of a tax liability incurred as a result of authorized transactions by the candidate committee of the public official.
>
> (*o*) A fee for accounting, professional, or administrative services for the candidate committee of the public official.
>
> (p) A debt or obligation incurred by the candidate committee of a public official for a disbursement authorized by subdivisions (a) to (*o*), if the debt or obligation was reported in the candidate committee report filed for the year in which the debt or obligation arose. [MCL 169.209(1)(a)-(p).]

whether an expenditure for attorney fees incurred by an elected official in defending against criminal charges may be considered an "ordinary and necessary expense" under 26 USC 162 that was "paid or incurred in carrying out the business of an elective office."

By defining an incidental expense as one that is "an ordinary and necessary expense, as described in section 162 of the internal revenue code of 1986," the Legislature made MCL 169.209(1) a "reference" statute. As the Supreme Court explained in *Pleasant Ridge v Governor*, 382 Mich 225, 245; 169 NW2d 625 (1969), quoting *Haveman v Kent County Rd Comm'rs*, 356 Mich 11, 18; 96 NW2d 153 (1959): "It is an established rule that when one statute adopts by reference a definition in a former statute such definition becomes a part of the later statute." In upholding a Michigan statute that was found to incorporate federal law by reference, the Court further relied upon a congruent principle of federal statutory construction: "The adoption of an earlier statute by reference, makes it as much a part of the later act as though it had been incorporated at full length." *Id.* at 246 quoting *Engel v Davenport*, 271 US 33, 38; 46 S Ct 410; 70 L Ed 813 (1926). Thus, the language of section 162 of the Code describing "an ordinary and necessary expense" is regarded as part of the MCFA which, therefore, makes that federal statutory language subject to the principles of statutory construction applicable to Michigan statutes.

The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, looking first to the language of the statute. *Burton v Reed City Hosp Corp*, 471 Mich 745, 751; 691 NW2d 424 (2005). In *Chambers v Trettco, Inc*, 463 Mich 297, 313-314; 614 NW2d 910 (2000), the Supreme Court addressed the relevance of federal interpretations of a counterpart federal statute when construing a Michigan law:

> We are many times guided in our interpretation of [a Michigan law] by federal court interpretations of its counterpart federal statute. However, we have generally been careful to make it clear that we are not compelled to follow those federal interpretations. Instead, our primary obligation when interpreting Michigan law is always "to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature, . . . 'as gathered from the act itself.'" Although there will often be good reasons to look for guidance in federal interpretations of similar laws, particularly where the Legislature has acted to conform Michigan law with the decisions of the federal judiciary, we cannot defer to federal interpretations if doing so would nullify a portion of the Legislature's enactment. [Quoting *McJunkin v Cellasto Plastic Corp*, 461 Mich 590, 598; 608 NW2d 57 (2000); citations omitted.]

Section 162 of the IRC does not define the term "ordinary and necessary expense." Rather, section 162(a) provides for a deduction from gross income for ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses:

> In general. There shall be allowed as a deduction all the *ordinary and necessary expenses* paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any *trade or business* . . . . [26 USC 162(a); emphasis added.]

For purposes of section 162, the term "trade or business" includes the "performance of the functions of a public office." 26 USC 7701(a)(26).

The specific issue of attorney fees is not addressed in section 162 of the IRC. There is, however, considerable federal case law regarding what constitutes an "ordi-

nary and necessary" business expense,[10] including case law addressing whether attorney fees qualify as such an expense. As noted above, it is appropriate to consider those interpretations, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the terms of the MCFA.

The basic principle concerning the deductibility of legal expenses was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in *United States v Gilmore*, 372 US 39; 83 S Ct 623; 9 L Ed 2d 570 (1963), which held that legal expenses incurred by a taxpayer in defending against a claim affecting valuable business and property rights in a divorce case were not deductible because the claim flowed from the divorce, rather than from a business matter. In formulating what is now called the "origin of the claim" test, the Court stated that "the characterization, as 'business' or 'personal,' of the litigation costs of resisting a claim depends on whether or not the claim *arises in connection with* the taxpayer's profit-seeking activities." *Gilmore*, 372 US at 47-48. "[T]he origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense was incurred, rather than its potential consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer, is the controlling basic test" of whether the expense was business-related or personal, and thus whether it is deductible. *Gilmore*, 372 US at 49. The origin of the claim is identified by analyzing all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the litigation. *Gilmore*, 372 US at 47-48. See also *Boagni v Comm'r*, 59 TC 708, 713 (1973) (factors to be analyzed include "the issues involved, the nature and objectives of the litigation, the defenses asserted, the purpose for which the claimed deductions were expended, the background of the litigation, and all facts pertaining to the controversy") (citation omitted).

Three years after deciding *Gilmore*, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether legal fees incurred by a taxpayer in defending against criminal charges were deductible under section 162 of the IRC.[11] In *Internal Revenue Comm'r v Tellier*, 383 US 687; 86 S Ct 1118; 16 L Ed 2d 185 (1966), the Court held that legal expenses incurred by a securities dealer in the unsuccessful defense of a criminal prosecution for fraud arising from his business activities were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162(a) of the Code. In reaching this decision, the *Tellier* Court relied on *Gilmore's* "origin of the claim" test, and concluded, although it was not disputed by either party, that "[t]he criminal charges against the respondent found their source in his business activities as a securities dealer. The respondent's legal fees, paid in defense against those charges, therefore clearly qualify under *Gilmore* as 'expenses paid or incurred . . . in carrying on any trade or business' within the meaning of § 162(a)." *Tellier*, 383 US at 689.[12]

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[10] The meaning of the terms "ordinary" and "necessary" for purposes of section 162 is well-established. "[T]he term 'necessary' imposes 'only the minimal requirement that the expense be 'appropriate and helpful' for 'the development of the [taxpayer's] business,' . . . [and] to qualify as 'ordinary' the expense must relate to a transaction 'of common or frequent occurrence in the type of business involved.'" *INDOPCO, Inc v Comm'r*, 503 US 79, 85-86; 112 S Ct 1039; 117 L Ed 2d 226 (1992) (internal citations omitted).

[11] Although the Supreme Court has addressed whether a public official's campaign-related expenses are deductible under section 162, see *McDonald v Comm'r*, 323 US 57; 65 S Ct 96; 89 L Ed 68 (1944), the Court has not addressed whether one engaged in the business of holding public office may deduct legal expenses incurred in defending against civil or criminal proceedings under the Code. For a general discussion of issues relating to the tax consequences of deducting legal fees, see Dorocak, *The Clintons' Legal Defense Fund: Income from Payment of Legal Expenses by Another and Deductability of Such Expenses,* 104 W Va L Rev 1 (2001).

[12] Although *Gilmore* addressed deductions under a prior section of the Code, the test the Court applied in *Gilmore* is applicable to section 162. See *Tellier*, 383 US 687; *Nadiak v Comm'r*, 356 F2d 911 (CA 2, 1966).

In so stating, the Court rejected the argument that upholding deductions for legal fees incurred in defending against criminal charges violated public policy. The Court observed that "the federal income tax is a tax on net income, not a sanction against wrongdoing." *Tellier*, 383 US at 691, 694-695. After reviewing several other cases in which the Court addressed similar arguments, the *Tellier* Court commented:

> No public policy is offended when a man faced with serious criminal charges employs a lawyer to help in his defense. That is not "proscribed conduct." It is his constitutional right. In an adversary system of criminal justice, it is a basic of our public policy that a defendant in a criminal case have counsel to represent him. [*Id.* at 694; citations omitted.]

In its decision, the Supreme Court drew no distinction between legal fees incurred in a civil proceeding and those incurred in a criminal proceeding for purposes of 26 USC 162.

Accordingly, for purposes of determining whether a public official's attorney fees paid in defending against charges brought in a criminal prosecution constitute an "ordinary and necessary expense" under section 9(1) of the MCFA, one must look to the source of the claim or charge, or the character of the conduct from which the claim or charge stems. If the source of the criminal charge arose out of the business activities of the public official, the legal expenses will qualify as an "ordinary and necessary expense" as described in 26 USC 162. If the charge originates from personal activity – activity unrelated to the performance of the functions of the public official's office – the expenses will not so qualify.

This approach is consistent with that followed in Revenue Ruling 74-394, 1974-2 CB 40, where the Internal Revenue Service addressed whether a state court judge could deduct attorney fees he incurred in defending against a civil removal proceeding based on an allegation that he used his office to advance the private commercial interests of another. Relying on *Gilmore* and *Tellier*, the Service concluded that "[s]ince the charges brought against the taxpayer arose out of the allegation that he used the prestige of his office to advance the private commercial interests of others, such charges have their origin in the conduct of his duties as a judge." Thus, the fees were deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses. See also Revenue Ruling 71-470; 1971-2 CB 121 (concluding that legal fees incurred by an elected official in defending against a voter recall effort were deductible under section 162(a)).

But determining that a public official's legal expenses would be deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses as described in section 162 of the Code does not alone answer whether these fees would qualify as "incidental expenses" under section 21a of the MCFA, and therefore constitute permissible expenditures by a candidate committee. This is because the definition of the term "incidental expense" under section 9(1) of the MCFA does not end with its reference to 26 USC 162. In order to satisfy every element of the definition, the attorney fees must be ordinary and necessary expenses as described in section 162 of the Code that were "*paid or incurred in carrying out the business of an elective office*." MCL 169.209(1) (emphasis added).

Again, the primary goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. *Burton,* 471 Mich at 751. To determine legislative intent, the plain meaning of the words used must be considered, taking into account the context in which the words are used. *Sweatt v Dep't of Corrections*, 468 Mich 172, 179; 661 NW2d 201 (2003). Of particular relevance here, however, is the additional rule of statutory construction that all language in a statute must be given meaning so as to

avoid rendering any part of the text chosen by the Legislature nugatory or surplusage. See *Herald Co v Eastern Michigan Univ Bd of Regents*, 475 Mich 463, 470; 719 NW2d 19 (2006).

Under this latter rule, the words "paid or incurred in carrying out the business of an elective office" in section 9(1) may not be regarded as merely repetitious of the meaning conveyed by the words that precede it referring to 26 USC 162. And yet it is difficult to immediately discern a difference in meaning between that which is paid or incurred in carrying out the business of an elective office and that which would qualify as an ordinary and necessary business expense under 26 USC 162 as construed by court decisions. Both would appear to require a clear demonstration that the expense was business-related and not personal.

This difficulty is resolved when one recalls that the words "paid or incurred . . . in carrying on any trade or business" in section 162(a) of the Code do not themselves make clear that they encompass the business of holding elective office. Indeed, it is in an entirely different section of the Code, 26 USC 7701(a)(26), where the Congress extended the term "trade or business" to the functions of an elective office. The apparent intent of the Legislature in including the phrase "paid or incurred in carrying out the business of an elective office" in section 9(1) of the MCFA was to make clear that, while the type of incidental expenses that would qualify as "ordinary and necessary" could be determined by reference to an established standard developed under section 162(a) of the Code, to qualify as "incidental expenses" for campaign finance purposes, they must have been paid or incurred in carrying out the business of holding elective office notwithstanding any inconsistent federal authority.

The final step in analyzing your question is determining whether attorney fees incurred by an elected official in Michigan to defend against criminal charges can be considered as having been paid or incurred "in carrying out the business of an elective office." This may only be determined on a case-by-case basis through examining the particular facts involved.[13] No appellate court decision has been discovered interpreting the phrase "carrying out the business of an elective office" for purposes of MCL 169.209, nor does any other Michigan statute use similar terminology to examine as guidance. As noted above, while federal precedent interpreting 26 USC 162 is not *determinative* of the meaning of this phrase, the Legislature's adoption of the federal statutory standard in the MCFA to determine permissible expenditures makes it entirely appropriate to consult federal precedent as guidance.

Moreover, the "origin of the claim" test adopted by the United States Supreme Court is consistent with the language of the MCFA to allow expenses "paid or incurred in carrying out the business of an elective office."[14] Thus, to the extent the

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[13] Although you included with your request background materials concerning former Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick's use of campaign funds to pay for legal fees incurred in defending against a criminal case brought against him, your request is framed more generally and does not ask this office to review the Office of the Secretary of State's interpretive statement regarding his use of those funds or the local filing official's determination made after that ruling was issued. Moreover, it is the longstanding policy of this office to decline to provide an opinion on questions that are factual in nature, because such issues fall outside the scope of the opinions process established by MCL 14.32. See *Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n v Attorney General*, 142 Mich App 294, 300-302; 370 NW2d 328 (1985).

[14] The purpose of the MCFA is not the same as that of the tax code. The purpose of the MCFA is to regulate and require the disclosure of all monies and resources received and disbursed in political campaigns. See *People v Weiss*, 191 Mich App 553, 563; 479 NW2d 30 (1991). While that difference must be borne in mind when applying the MCFA to particular circumstances, the "origin of the claim" test conforms to the express terms of the MCFA.

federal courts and agencies have concluded that the phrase "carrying on any trade or business" in 26 USC 162 includes expenses for legal costs incurred in defending actions arising in the carrying out of a taxpayer's business activities, including a public official's business in being a public official, it is reasonable to conclude, in the absence of any express authority to the contrary, that the phrase "paid or incurred in carrying out the business of an elective office" in MCL 169.209(1) similarly encompasses such expenses.

In fact, when the Legislature amended the MCFA in 1994, *Gilmore* and *Tellier* had been precedent for over 20 years, and the principle that attorney fees arising out of business activities may qualify for deduction as ordinary and necessary expenses was thus well-established. Moreover, in providing the definition of "incidental expense" in MCL 169.209(1), the Legislature rejected retaining the more limited categories of allowable expenses that were formerly identified by R 169.62, in favor of a broader general category – those expenses that would be ordinary and necessary under 26 USC 162 – followed by a list that included, but was "not limited to," categories of expenses the Legislature expressly authorized.[15]

It is recognized that some States have decided, under their specific statutes that do not incorporate section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, that campaign funds may not be used to pay for attorney fees incurred in defending against criminal charges.[16] Furthermore, some have argued it may be inconsistent with donor intent to allow the use of campaign contributions for that purpose.[17] But the analysis here must be faithful to the language of the MCFA as currently written. As the policy-making branch of state government, the Legislature is free to change Michigan law in this area to restrict or otherwise prohibit that which is currently allowed as an incidental expense. As long as Michigan law continues to be based upon a standard drawn from established federal tax law and decisions, however, this office is constrained to honor that standard even where a different policy outcome might be preferred.

In addition, as others have observed, there are competing policy reasons that support permitting elected officials to use unexpended campaign funds to offset the costs of defending themselves against charges involving their official actions. It is not uncommon for persons holding elective office to become the subjects of investi-

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[15] In *In re Forfeiture of $5,264*, 432 Mich 242, 249-250, 253 n 7; 439 NW2d 246 (1989), the Supreme Court construed the language "any thing of value . . . including but not limited to" followed by a listing of specific items. Rejecting the argument that, under the doctrine of *ejusdem generis*, the general words "any thing of value" should be understood as limited in meaning to items of the same general kind or class as the listed items, the Court held: "[W]e do not view the proviso, 'including but not limited to,' to be one of limitation. Rather, we believe the phrase connotes an illustrative listing, one purposefully capable of enlargement." 432 Mich at 255. See also *Williams v Teck*, 113 P3d 1255, 1258 (Colo App, 2005) (concluding that a candidate committee could use unexpended campaign funds to pay legal fees, noting that the words "including, but not limited to" in CRS 1-45-106(1)(b)(V) merely illustrated the kinds of expenses that may be regarded as directly related to an elected official's duties).

[16] See, e.g., *In re Election Law Enforcement Comm Advisory Opinion No 01-2008,* 960 A2d 413 (NJ Super, 2008), *petition for certification granted*, 198 NJ 473; 968 A2d 1189 (March 10, 2009), and *Ohio v Ferguson*, 709 NE2d 887 (Ohio App, 1998).

[17] See Clark, *Paying the Price for Heightened Ethics Scrutiny: Legal Defense Funds and Other Ways That Government Officials Pay Their Lawyers*, 50 Stan L Rev 65, 122-123 (1997).

gations for civil or criminal wrongdoing.[18] Yet it is axiomatic that under state and federal law persons are accorded a presumption of innocence when they stand accused of criminal wrongdoing. See *Clark v Arizona*, 548 US 735, 766; 126 S Ct 2709; 165 L Ed 2d 842 (2006) ("The first presumption is that a defendant is innocent . . . .") Moreover, as noted in *Tellier*, defendants are entitled to the assistance of a lawyer in presenting a defense. *Tellier*, 383 US at 694. Whether such investigations result in criminal convictions or the official is exonerated, substantial legal fees typically become necessary in mounting a defense, and it is the origin of the claim, rather than its ultimate consequences to the official, that forms the basis for the relevant test. See *Gilmore*, 372 US at 47-48.[19]

Further, it is instructive to briefly examine federal campaign finance law, because, while it differs from the MCFA in some respects, it is similar in pertinent ways that provide guidance in analyzing your question. As interpreted by the Federal Election Commission (FEC), federal law permits the use of campaign funds to pay for attorney fees incurred in defending against criminal charges, so long as the charges relate to "the candidate's campaign activities or duties as a Federal officeholder." FEC Advisory Opinion 2005-11; FEC Advisory Opinion 2003-17. As with the MCFA, federal law does not specifically address legal fees. Rather, the law permits officeholders to use campaign funds for a number of purposes, including "for ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in connection with duties of the individual as a holder of Federal office," 2 USC 439a(2), and for "any other lawful purpose," 2 USC 439a(6). In addition, while it does so more directly than the MCFA, federal law makes the same distinction that is embedded in the MCFA between business-related and non-business uses by prohibiting officeholders from converting campaign funds for "personal use," which occurs if a contribution is used to fulfill any "expense . . . that would exist irrespective of the candidate's election campaign or individual's duties as a holder of Federal office." 2 USC 439a(b).

Given the federal statutory scheme, the FEC addresses the appropriateness of paying legal fees using campaign funds on a "case-by-case basis," to determine whether such a payment would constitute a prohibited "personal use" or would otherwise be permitted, 11 CFR 113.1(g)(1)(i), and in some of those cases, the FEC has examined attorney fees incurred in defending against criminal charges. For example, in Advisory Opinion 2005-11, the FEC concluded that California Representative Randall "Duke" Cunningham was permitted to use campaign funds to pay for legal fees incurred during a grand jury investigation into allegations that a federal defense contractor paid an above-market price for Cunningham's home and allowed Cunningham to live rent-free on his yacht:

> According to the media reports you submitted, the grand jury investigation appears to focus on allegations that Representative Cunningham obtained benefits (*i.e.*, the sale of his house at an above-market price and a rent-free

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[18] 50 Stan L Rev at 67-70. Notably, in *In re Election Law Enforcement Comm Advisory Opinion No 01-2008*, *supra*, although the New Jersey Court concluded that an officeholder could *not* use funds from his candidate committee to pay for legal fees incurred to defend against criminal charges, that Court specifically emphasized that its holding was limited to the defense of charges filed by federal or state law enforcement agencies alleging corruption in office. The Court did "not address, for example, criminal complaints filed by private citizens against a candidate during the heat of a political campaign." *In re Election Law Enforcement*, 960 A2d at 419 n 5.

[19] 50 Stan L Rev at 67-72.

> stay on a yacht) from Mr. Wade because of his status as a U.S. Representative and his position on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee. Thus, based on the representations made in your request and the submitted news articles, the Commission concludes that the legal fees and expenses associated with the grand jury investigation would not exist irrespective of Representative Cunningham's campaign or duties as Federal officeholder. Accordingly, the Committee may use campaign funds to pay for legal fees and expenses incurred in connection with the grand jury investigation and legal proceedings that may arise from this investigation. [Advisory Opinion 2005-11, p 3, citing Advisory Opinions 2003-17, 1998-1, 1997-12, 1996-24, 1995-23.]

See also Advisory Opinion 2009-10 (FEC reaffirmed its treatment of the legal fees issue, concluding that Indiana Representative Peter Visclosky was permitted to use campaign funds to pay fees incurred in connection with a federal investigation into improper contributions made to Visclosky's campaign by a lobbyist and appropriations earmarks related to the lobbyist made by Visclosky).

Therefore, federal campaign finance law, like federal tax law, recognizes that legal fees incurred by an officeholder to defend against criminal charges may relate to the business of holding office and may, therefore, qualify as an appropriate campaign expenditure.

Thus, under sections 9(1) and 21a of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, MCL 169.209(1) and 169.221a, the candidate committee of an elected official is authorized to make an expenditure for an incidental expense to pay for legal fees incurred by the officeholder to defend against criminal charges provided that the expense is an ordinary and necessary business expense of the elected official as described under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 USC 162, and is paid or incurred in carrying out the business of an elective office. To qualify as such an ordinary and necessary business expense, the source of the charge or the character of the conduct from which the charge stems must arise in the course of carrying out the business of being a public official.[20]

Notably, the Office of the Secretary of State reached a similar conclusion in a recent interpretive statement addressing whether the MCFA "'explicitly or implicitly prohibit[s] the use of campaign finance funds to pay direct or indirect legal expenses associated with the office holder.'" Interpretive Statement to Cathy Garrett (July 8, 2009). Citing *Gilmore* and *Tellier*, the statement concluded that the MCFA does not prohibit such expenditures, and further determined that such expenditures are permitted under section 21a and 9(1) as incidental expenses if the fees would qualify as ordinary and necessary business expenses of the official under section 162 of the Code.

The Secretary's office further stated, however, that an elected official who seeks to use candidate committee funds to pay for legal fees as incidental expenses "must"

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[20] In the event an elected official cannot demonstrate that his or her attorney fees are "incidental expenses" under section 9(1) or otherwise elects not to use candidate committee funds to pay for legal expenses, the official may consider establishing a legal defense fund under the recently enacted Legal Defense Fund Act, 2008 PA 288, MCL 15.521 *et seq.*

or "ought" to be required to submit to the appropriate filing official documentation supporting such a claim, specifically a written ruling from the IRS determining that the fees are ordinary and necessary expenses under the Code, because the "Department is not expert in the application of federal tax law." According to the interpretive statement, if the IRS concludes the fees are deductible under 26 USC 162, the filing official should accept that ruling and allow the elected official's expenditures as incidental expenses. This aspect of the statement is problematic.

By incorporating section 162 of the IRC into section 9(1) of the MCFA, the Legislature did not defer resolution of the ultimate question regarding what constitutes an incidental expense under the MCFA to a federal agency. Rather, by incorporating section 162 into the MCFA, the Legislature took advantage of an established and predictable framework within which to analyze a set of facts to resolve whether an expenditure is an incidental expense under the MCFA. See *Pleasant Ridge v Governor,* 382 Mich at 243-248 (statutes that incorporate existing federal statutes by reference are valid and constitutional); *Radecki v Worker's Disability Compensation Bureau Director*, 208 Mich App 19, 23; 526 NW2d 611 (1994). While obtaining a written ruling from the IRS may be helpful and provide guidance, the Legislature did not require it, nor could any ruling so received be automatically deemed determinative. It would remain necessary to ensure that the interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent embodied in the MCFA. See *Chambers,* 463 Mich at 313-314.[21]

Moreover, the test for determining whether an elected official's legal fees will qualify as ordinary and necessary business expenses under 26 USC 162, while fact intensive, is not so complicated or mired in the intricacies of the tax code that a determination could not be made upon the presentation of a reasonably complete statement of facts. The test, as enunciated in *Gilmore* and *Tellier*, is whether the source of the criminal charge, in other words the activity forming the basis of the charge, arose in the context of carrying out the official's business as an officeholder. Determining whether particular activity engaged in by a public official relates to carrying out his or her business of serving as a public official does not require expertise in tax law.[22]

A few illustrative examples demonstrate how the applicable test might be applied in a given fact situation. For example, where an elected official is the subject of civil removal proceedings and retains legal counsel to defend his entitlement to continue to hold office against claims of misusing the office, the nexus to the business of holding office is direct and fees so incurred may qualify as incidental expenses. See Revenue Ruling 74-394, *supra*. In addition, as in the *Tellier* case (where a securities broker's legal fees to defend against criminal fraud charges were deemed

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[21] Moreover, as a matter of practicality, the process for obtaining some type of written ruling from the Internal Revenue Service is burdensome, generally requires the payment of a significant fee, and comes with no guarantee that the Service will actually issue any written guidance, particularly where the question and answer will not involve any real federal tax consequences. See <http://www.irs.gov/faqs/faq/0,,id=199552,00.html> and <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb07-01.pdf> (accessed December 1, 2009).

[22] While the Legislature's use of the word "business" as opposed to "duties" in section 9(1) connotes an intent to include a broad category of expenses, there can be no doubt that the word "business" includes the traditional duties of a particular elective office. For instance, in *Diggs v Comm'r,* 715 F2d 245, 252 (CA 6, 1983), the Sixth Circuit observed that the business of a congressman "clearly includes the 'representation' of constituents." See also *Chappie v Comm'r*, 73 TC 823, 833 (1980) (business of a state legislator is to represent constituents). This is only one example of many other functions or activities that would fall within the "business" of being an elected official. See also MCL 169.209(1)(a)-(p) for a non-exhaustive listing of other allowable incidental expenses.

deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses), an officeholder alleged to have violated criminal law in performing the business of his or her office who incurs legal fees to defend against the charge, may likewise establish the necessary nexus to demonstrate the fees were incurred as incidental to holding office.

On the other hand, where an officeholder is called upon to defend against charges unrelated to carrying out the business of the elected office, such as, for example, in a case arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated or an incident involving domestic violence, the nexus to the business of the office will likely be too remote to qualify any legal fees so expended as an incidental expense under the MCFA.[23] Rather, such claims will likely be more appropriately characterized as personal in nature and fail to provide a basis for payment out of campaign funds as an incidental expense under section 21a of the MCFA.[24]

Again, while the inquiry is fact intensive, upon analyzing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the relevant proceedings or litigation in each case, and with reference as necessary to the well-established body of case law, a determination regarding whether a particular official's legal fees will qualify as incidental expenses for purposes of section 21a and section 9(1) of the MCFA is possible. While an IRS ruling may be helpful in that analysis, such a ruling may not be required as a basis for resolving the issue, and may not be regarded as solely determinative.

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[23] The background materials you provided to this office, along with a supplementary memorandum provided by Professor Emeritus Maurice Kelman, indicate that one of the specific issues of interest to you includes the possible use of campaign funds by the Kwame M. Kilpatrick for Mayor Candidate Committee to defend against the criminal charge of assaulting or obstructing a public officer. While factual disputes may not be resolved in the opinions process established under MCL 14.32, the facts of this particular criminal charge are well known to this office, as a result of the two-count felony complaint I authorized against Kwame Kilpatrick for Assaulting or Obstructing a Public Officer in violation of MCL 750.479, *People v Kilpatrick*, Wayne County Circuit Court Case No. 08-10777-01-FH, which led defendant Kilpatrick to enter a plea of guilty on September 4, 2008.

Utilizing the test set forth in this Opinion, the source of the claim or charge in the *Kilpatrick* case was the defendant's interference with an attempt made by a detective and an investigator from the Wayne County Sheriff's Department to serve a subpoena on a witness in a pending criminal case. The facts underlying the charge were that the defendant, while yelling obscenities, grabbed the detective by both shoulders and shoved him into the investigator, knocking both of them off balance. These charges cannot reasonably be regarded as arising out of the office-related activities of an elected official. Thus, any campaign funds used to defend against the charges brought in Wayne County Case No. 08-10777-01-FH would constitute improper expenditures under the MCFA.

The Secretary of State is charged with implementing and enforcing the MCFA. See MCL 169.215(1). This office is aware that the Wayne County Clerk, after receiving guidance requested from and provided by the Secretary of State's Office, concluded that the Kilpatrick Committee's campaign finance funds spent on legal fees were proper expenditures under the MCFA. But the July 8, 2009 Interpretive Statement to Cathy Garrett provided by the Secretary of State's Office has been superseded by the legal analysis in this Opinion. Improper expenditures by a candidate committee may be redressed through the complaint and investigation process described in section 15 of the MCFA, MCL 169.215. Accordingly, a copy of this Opinion is being provided to the Secretary of State for whatever action she deems appropriate.

[24] As noted above, the Legislature did not impose a criminal penalty for making an improper expenditure for an incidental expense. While it is primarily a disclosure statute, *People v Weiss*, 191 Mich App at 562, the MCFA does contain a general civil enforcement provision in MCL 169.215(14), which provides that a person who violates a provision of the Act is subject to a civil fine of not more than $1,000 for each violation, unless otherwise specified in the MCFA.

It is my opinion, therefore, that under sections 9(1) and 21a of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, MCL 169.209(1) and 169.221a, the candidate committee of an elected official is permitted to make an expenditure for an incidental expense to pay for legal fees incurred by the officeholder to defend against criminal charges, but only if that the expense is an ordinary and necessary business expense of the elected official as described under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 USC 162, and is paid or incurred in carrying out the business of an elective office. To qualify as such an ordinary and necessary business expense, the source of the charge or the character of the conduct from which the charge stems must arise in the course of carrying out the business of being a public official. Expenses incurred to defend against charges that originate from personal activity unrelated to performing the functions of the public official's office will not so qualify.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

CITY CHARTERS: The meaning of the term "in default" in the Home Rule City Act that renders a person ineligible for city contracts or appointments

HOME RULE CITY ACT:

PUBLIC OFFICERS:

The phrase "in default to the city" as used in section 5(f) of the Home Rule City Act, 1909 PA 279, MCL 117.5(f), which disqualifies one from receiving a city contract or appointment, means that, at the point in time the contract or appointment is to be made or given, the person has failed to meet a financial, contractual, or other obligation to the city after adequate notice of the obligation and an opportunity to cure it were provided to the person and the obligation is not the subject of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding.

Opinion No. 7241 February 10, 2010

Honorable John Espinoza
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48909

You have asked about the meaning of the term "in default" as it is used in section 5 of the Home Rule City Act (HRCA or Act), 1909 PA 279, MCL 117.5.

The HRCA empowers cities to conduct their own affairs subject to the Constitution and general laws of the State. *Rental Property Owners Ass'n of Kent County v Grand Rapids,* 455 Mich 246, 254; 566 NW2d 514 (1997). The Act iden-

tifies various subjects that cities are required to include in their charters as well as those that are discretionary. MCL 117.3 and MCL 117.4a -117.4r. Section 36 of the HRCA, MCL 117.36, provides that no provision of a city charter shall conflict with or contravene any general law of this State.

Your question involves section 5, which sets forth a number of restrictions on the powers of a city. In particular, subsection 5(f) provides that a city does not have the power to "make a contract with, or give an official position to, one who is *in default* to the city." MCL 117.5. (Emphasis added.)

Most city charters include a provision acknowledging this limitation on their powers that typically restates the requirements of section 5. Some city charters contain standards to guide the city in awarding contracts and granting official city positions, but such provisions may be no less stringent than those provided in state law. For example, a city charter may provide that a default does not occur until a specified period of time after an obligation, debt, or payment is due or that a default will not occur while the obligation, debt, or payment is being contested in an administrative tribunal or court of law.

The Legislature has not defined the term "in default" in the HRCA; therefore, it is subject to interpretation in accordance with well-established rules of statutory construction.[1] The foremost rule, and the primary task in construing a statute, is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. *DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp*, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300 (2000). As summarized in *Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc,* 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002):

> When interpreting statutory language, our obligation is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute. *Wickens* v *Oakwood Healthcare System,* 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). . . .
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> * * *
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> Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute, and must avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. *Wickens, supra* at 60. Further, we give undefined statutory terms their plain and ordinary meanings. *Donajkowski* [*v Alpena Power Co.,* 460 Mich 243, 248-249; 596 NW2d 574 (1999)]*; Oakland Co Road Comm'rs v Michigan Property & Cas Guaranty Ass'n,* 456 Mich. 590, 604; 575 NW2d 751 (1998). In those situations, we may consult dictionary definitions. *Id.*

Moreover, statutory language must be read in context with the entire act, giving consideration to both the plain meaning of the critical phrase or word and its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme. *Sweatt v Dep't of Corrrections*, 468 Mich 172, 179; 661 NW2d 201 (2003). Because even the most common word can have a number of different meanings, context is helpful to determine which of the ordinary meanings found in a dictionary is the one intended in the statute under review. *Bio-*

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[1] In contrast, under the General Law Village Act, 1895 PA 3, MCL 62.1 *et seq*, the Legislature has provided that a person in default to the village is not eligible for any office in the village, defining "in default" to mean "delinquent in payment of property taxes or a debt owed to the village" under specified circumstances. MCL 62.7(2).

Magnetic Resonance Inc v Dep't of Public Health, 234 Mich App 225, 229-231; 593 NW2d 641 (1999).

Legal encyclopedias have commented on the difficulty of defining the word "default" when used as a noun:

> There is perhaps no larger or looser word. It is a purely relative term, like "negligence," and means nothing more, and nothing less, than not doing what is reasonable under the circumstances – not doing something which one ought to do, having regard to the relations which one occupies toward the other persons in the transaction. It has been said that the word obviously has two meanings, one relating to a failure to perform, the other to conversion or misappropriation of that which belongs to another. [26A CJS, Default, pp 126-127.]

Section 5(f) of the HRCA states in plain terms that a city lacks the power to *make* a contract with, or *give* an official position to, one who is in default to the city. These words are forward-looking in nature, leading to the conclusion that the prohibition in section 5(f) applies only to prospective contracts and office holders rather than to existing contracts and existing office holders.[2]

OAG, 1935-1936, No 120, p 316 (October 29, 1935), examined a charter provision that excluded from elective office a candidate who was in default to the city, concluding that an element over and above a mere failure to perform was necessary to establish a default: "The term 'in default to the city', as here used, implies more than a mere civil debt or liability. There must exist a willful omission to account or pay over funds belonging to the city with a corrupt intention." *Id.* p 316. OAG No 120 was followed in Letter Opinion of Attorney General Frank J. Kelley to acting City Attorney Don E. Hiltunen, dated September 26, 1974, which concluded that a provision of the Hancock City Charter prohibiting a person who was in default to the city from being elected to city office "cannot be construed to apply to one who merely has delinquent tax assessments owing the city."

In determining whether these opinions remain viable, it is necessary to reiterate that the overarching principle of statutory construction is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature based on the plain language of a statute, with due regard to the context in which the words are used. The *American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition* (1991), defines "default" in several ways:

> 1. To fail to do what is required. 2. To fail to pay money when it is due. 3. *Law*. **a.** To fail to appear in court when summoned. **b.** To lose a case by not appearing.

The third of these definitions is easily dismissed as inapplicable in the context presented by section 5(f) of the HRCA because it applies to court procedures. The first and second definitions, however, both appear relevant because each could reasonably apply to disqualify a person from consideration to hold a position of public trust or perform a public contract.

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[2] It should be noted that many home rule city charters preclude elected office holders from continuing to hold elective city office if they are in default to the city. See, for example, section 15 of Chapter V of the Fourth Class City Act, MCL 85.15, which serves as the charter of former fourth class cities that became home rule cities on January 1, 1980, pursuant to MCL 81.1c, until those cities adopt their own charter. See also, OAG, 1979-1980, No 5721, p 826 (June 13, 1980), and OAG, 1979-1980, No 5525, p 248 (July 13, 1979).

The first of the above definitions ("[t]o fail to do what is required") clearly applies in the context of one charged with an existing duty, who is regarded as defaulting in the performance of that duty, or to a person who has failed to perform a contractual or other obligation. Such an application of the term "default" is found in the case of *Lansing School District v City of Lansing*, 260 Mich 405, 412; 245 NW 449 (1932), which involved a school district's attempt to recover losses resulting from a city treasurer's negligent conduct. The statute at issue made the city liable for any loss sustained by the "default" of the officer in the discharge of any duty imposed by the statute. The *Lansing* Court noted the following definitions of the word "default" in holding the city liable to the school district:

> A default is defined as "The nonperformance of a duty, whether arising under a contract or otherwise" (1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary [Rawle's 1st Rev.], p. 527); as "The omission or failure to fulfil a duty, observe a promise, discharge an obligation, or perform an agreement" (Black's Law Dictionary [2d Ed.], p. 342); as "To fail in fulfilling a contract, agreement, or duty." "Neglect to do what duty or law requires" (Webster's International Dictionary). [*Id.* p 412.]

The second *American Heritage Dictionary* definition ("[t]o fail to pay money when it is due") represents a subcategory of the first definition – focusing on failures to do what is required in the context of meeting financial obligations. It offers a common sense meaning of "in default," which would render a person disqualified from participating in a city's government as an appointed official or realizing the benefits of a contract with the city where the person had been determined to owe money to the city. Such financial obligations to a city that would reasonably be encompassed within the term include income taxes, property taxes,[3] utility bills, and other liquidated sums.

Consistent with *Lansing School District v City of Lansing* and the plain and ordinary meaning of the word as used in MCL 117.5, "default" means the failure to fulfill a duty, whether arising from contract or otherwise, that the person owes to the city.

In addition, the statutory language selected by the Legislature – "in default" – makes plain that an "alleged" default or a "challenged" default would not qualify. This is consistent with the rule of statutory construction requiring that meaning be given to each word and prohibiting a court from reading anything into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself. *Omne Financial, Inc v Shacks,* 460 Mich 305, 311; 596 NW2d 591 (1999). Thus, for a person to be "in" default within the meaning of MCL 117.5, the defaulted status must have been fairly determined; it must reflect an actual and uncontested failure to perform an obligation to the city at the point in time that the contract or appointment is to be made or given. Thus, construing the phrase "in default to the city," the defaulter must have been given adequate notice and a reasonable time to cure the default, and the obligation, debt, or payment must not be the subject of a pending court contest or administrative proceeding. See, for example,

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[3] See the General Property Tax Act, MCL 211.47, which was amended by 1988 PA 202 to allow for the seizure and sale of personal property to collect delinquent real property taxes; *Detroit v Walker,* 445 Mich 682; 520 NW2d 135 (1994), holding that the city was permitted to maintain a personal action against the debtor for collection of unpaid property taxes where such method was not expressly excluded by city charter; and *Corrigan v City of Newaygo,* 55 F3d 1211 (CA 6, 1995), which dismissed a constitutional challenge to a ballot access ordinance which prevented delinquent taxpayers access to the ballot as candidates.

Golliday v Benton Harbor, 216 BR 407, (Bankr WD Mich 1998) (holding that MCL 117.5(f) could not be enforced by the city council because the debtor's bankruptcy status overrode the city charter provision which would void the debtor's election to the city council).[4]

It is my opinion, therefore, that the phrase "in default to the city" as used in section 5(f) of the Home Rule City Act, 1909 PA 279, MCL 117.5(f), which disqualifies one from receiving a city contract or appointment, means that, at the point in time the contract or appointment is to be made or given, the person has failed to meet a financial, contractual, or other obligation to the city after adequate notice of the obligation and an opportunity to cure it were provided to the person and the obligation is not the subject of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

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[4] While neither OAG No 120 nor Letter Opinion to Acting City Attorney Hiltunen address the definition of "in default" as that term is used in section 5(f) of the HRCA, to the extent those Opinions could be understood as permitting a person who is in default, as that term is defined in this Opinion, to be eligible for a city contract or office, they are superseded.

INSURANCE CODE: Corporate insurance agency's use of the word "insurance" in company name

CORPORATIONS:

Section 213(1) of the Business Corporation Act, 1972 PA 284, MCL 450.1213(1), does not require a corporate insurance agency that includes the word "insurance" in its name to also include the word "agency," and a corporate agency is free to use the word "insurance" in its name so long as the name, taken as a whole, does not imply that the agency is an insurance or surety company.

Opinion No. 7242 February 10, 2010

Mr. Ken Ross
Commissioner
Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation
611 W. Ottawa Street, 3rd Floor
Lansing, MI 48933

You have asked whether the Business Corporation Act, 1972 PA 284, MCL 450.1101 *et seq*, requires that a corporate insurance agency include the word "agency" in its name if the corporation's name includes the word "insurance."

Corporate insurance agencies generally market and sell the insurance products offered by insurance companies, but these corporations do not themselves write insurance or indemnify against risks. Because corporate insurance agencies are simply marketing and sales organizations, Michigan law has long prohibited these agencies from assuming names that might imply to consumers that they are actually the insurer issuing coverage.

For example, when it was enacted in 1931, section 6 of the former General Corporation Act, 1931 PA 327, MCL 450.6, as amended by 1961 PA 15, prohibited any corporation that was not an insurance company from using the word "insurance" in its corporate name, providing in pertinent part:

> And provided further, That *no corporation formed or existing under or subject to the provisions of this* act shall assume any name which implies that it is a banking corporation, *an insurance or surety company* or a trust company, *and no such corporation shall use the words*, "bank", "industrial bank", "deposit", "*insurance*", "surety", "security", "trust", "trust company", or "guaranty" or "building and loan" *in its corporate name*, or use any combination of letters or words along with other letters or words in its corporate name to indicate or convey the idea of a bank or banking or industrial banking activity or security: And provided further, That any nonprofit corporation formed or existing under or subject to the provisions of this act as a bona fide insurance trade association shall be entitled to use the word insurance as a part of it corporate name: Provided, That such name clearly indicates that the nonprofit corporation is an insurance trade association and is not engaged in the insurance business. [Emphasis added.]

Shortly after its enactment, the Attorney General, in OAG, 1931-1932, p 601 (June 10, 1932), interpreted this section as prohibiting any corporation that was not an insurance company from using the word "insurance" in its name.

The request that triggered the issuance of that opinion asserted that the purpose underlying section 6 of the General Corporation Act was to prevent corporations other than insurance companies from assuming names that might deceive the public into believing they were insurance companies. The request further asserted that, in light of this purpose, a corporate insurance agency should be allowed to include the words "insurance agency" in its name because the word "insurance" when combined with the word "agency" would not imply that the corporation was an insurance company.

The opinion acknowledged that the combination of the words "insurance" and "agency" might be sufficient to prevent any confusion about the nature of an insurance agency's business. But the Attorney General rejected the suggestion that this made use of the word "insurance" allowable in light of the statute's clear prohibition. Instead, the opinion concluded that pursuant to the plain language of the General Corporation Act, corporations subject to that act were prohibited from using the word "insurance" in their names, even if "insurance" was combined with the word "agency." OAG, 1931-1932 at 603.

The General Corporation Act was repealed by the Business Corporation Act, which took effect on January 1, 1973. The new Business Corporation Act continued to set certain requirements for corporate names in Michigan. Specifically, section 212(1)(a) of the Act, MCL 450.1212(1)(a), prevents corporations from using misleading words in their names:

> (1) The corporate name of a domestic or foreign corporation formed or existing under or subject to this act shall conform to all of the following:
>
> (a) Shall not contain a word or phrase, or abbreviation or derivative of a word or phrase, which indicates or implies that the corporation is formed for a purpose other than 1 or more of the purposes permitted by its articles of incorporation.

Section 212 also states that a corporate name "[s]hall not contain a word or phrase, an abbreviation, or derivative of a word or phrase, the use of which is *prohibited or restricted* by any other statute of this state, unless in compliance with that restriction." MCL 450.1212(1)(c) (emphasis added).

One such prohibition or restriction on corporate names is in section 213(1) of the Business Corporation Act, MCL 450.1213(1). Section 213 prohibits a corporation that is not an insurance company from assuming a name that implies it is an insurance company, but it does not include the absolute prohibition against the use of the word "insurance" that was contained in section 6 of the repealed General Corporation Act. Section 213(1) provides:

> *A corporation formed or existing under or subject to this act* other than a bank holding company registered or to be registered as a bank holding company under the bank holding company act of 1956, chapter 240, 70 Stat. 133, *shall not assume a name that implies that it is* a banking corporation, *an insurance or surety company*, or a trust company, and the corporation shall not use the word "bank", "industrial bank", "deposit", "surety", "security", "trust", or "trust company" in its corporate name or use a combination of the letters or words with other letters or words in its corporate name to indicate or convey the idea of a bank or banking or industrial banking activity or security unless from the other words constituting the name it

> is clear that the business conducted does not include the business of banking. [Emphasis added.][1]

Unlike its predecessor – section 6 of the General Corporation Act – section 213(1) does not contain any prohibition on the use of the term "insurance," other than the general restriction that a corporation not use the term in a misleading manner.

After section 6 of the General Corporation Act was repealed and replaced by section 213 of the Business Corporation Act, the Attorney General was again asked whether a corporate insurance agency was precluded from using the word "insurance" in its corporate name. In OAG, 1979-1980, No 5756, p 922 (August 19, 1980), the Attorney General acknowledged the 1932 opinion, and its conclusion under the General Corporation Act then in effect that there was an absolute prohibition against using the word "insurance" in the name of a corporation that was not an insurance company, making no exception for its use in combination with the word "agency." The Attorney General then considered the new language of section 213(1) of the Business Corporation Act and its legislative history, and observed that the bill that became the Business Corporation Act initially proposed including the word "insurance" among those words that a corporation was absolutely prohibited from using. But after the bill was referred to committee, "insurance" was stricken from the list of prohibited words, and was not included among the words prohibited by section 213(1) when 1972 PA 284 was enacted. Consequently, the Attorney General opined that "1972 PA 284, § 213 . . . does not preclude the use of the word 'insurance' in the name of a corporate insurance agency, provided that the word 'insurance' is used in conjunction with the word 'agency' so as not to mislead the public or imply that the corporation is an insurance company." OAG No 5756 at 923 (emphasis added).

You advise that since the issuance of OAG No 5756, this section has been interpreted to require that the word "agency" be used in conjunction with the word "insurance" in a corporate insurance agency's name. You note that this interpretation has caused numerous problems in the intervening years and that insurance agency naming conventions have changed significantly in the thirty years since OAG No 5756 was issued. While the inclusion of "agency" in corporate insurance agency names was ubiquitous in 1980, corporate insurance agencies formed in other States today frequently omit the word "agency." Further, insurance agencies increasingly conduct business on a multistate or even multinational basis. Thus, many multistate or multinational insurance agencies based outside of Michigan that conduct business under previously assumed names that omit the word "agency" have been required to include the word "agency" in their Michigan licensed companies in order to do business here. You indicate that this process is expensive and, in some cases, a disincentive to doing business in this State. Additionally, imposing the opinion's requirement has created problems for your office in complying with the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 106 PL 102; 113 Stat 1338 (November 12, 1999), which calls for uniformity and reciprocity among the States in regulating the insurance industry.

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[1] A casual reading of section 213(1) or section 6, its predecessor under the General Corporation Act, might suggest that its prohibitions apply to all corporations, including insurance companies. This is not the case because section 213(1) applies only to corporations "formed or existing under or subject to" the Business Corporation Act, which "does not apply to insurance, surety, savings and loan associations, fraternal benefit societies, and banking corporations." MCL 450.1123(2). Those industries are all governed by specific statutory schemes, such as the Insurance Code, MCL 500.100 *et seq*.

In light of these circumstances, you ask whether the inclusion of the word "agency" when the term "insurance" is used in a corporate name is actually mandated by section 213(1).

When interpreting a statute, the primary goal is to determine the Legislature's intent, which is best determined by the statutory language itself. *In re Petition of Attorney General for Investigative Subpoenas*, 274 Mich App 696, 704; 736 NW2d 594 (2007). Additionally, nothing should be read into a statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature, as gathered from the statute itself. *In re Marin,* 198 Mich App 560, 564; 499 NW2d 400 (1993). It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that "'a clear and unambiguous statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation.'" *Massey v Mandell*, 462 Mich 375, 380; 614 NW2d 70 (2000), quoting *Coleman v Gurwin*, 443 Mich 59, 65; 503 NW2d 435 (1993). Instead, "when the Legislature has unambiguously conveyed its intent in a statute, the statute speaks for itself and there is no need for judicial construction; the proper role of a court is to apply the terms of the statute to the circumstances in a particular case." *Massey*, 462 Mich at 380.

Examining the plain language of section 213(1) reveals that the Legislature's intent was to prohibit a corporate insurance agency that is not an insurance company from assuming a name that "implies that it is . . . an insurance or surety company." But there is nothing in the unambiguous language of section 213(1) that suggests a manifest intent on the part of the Legislature to mandate any particular word, or combination of words, be used in agency names.

This conclusion is reinforced by the history of the Business Corporation Act. The Business Corporation Act replaced the General Corporation Act, which had expressly prohibited the use of the word "insurance" in the name of any corporation but an insurance company. This prohibition was removed when the Business Corporation Act was enacted. If the Legislature had intended to place any specific limits on corporations' use of the word "insurance" beyond the broader, more general prohibition against corporations assuming names that imply that they are insurance companies, it could have done so. The Legislature did not do so, and reading such a requirement into the Business Corporation Act clearly violates well-established principles of statutory construction.

Similarly, continuing to include the words "bank," "industrial bank," "deposit," "surety," "security," "trust," and "trust company," in the list of words that may not be used by a corporation formed under the Business Corporation Act implies that the Legislature did not intend to exclude the use of other words, such as "insurance," which were not included in the list. This conclusion follows from another canon of statutory construction that the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others not expressed – "*expressio unius est exclusio alterius*." *Miller v Allstate Ins Co,* 481 Mich 601, 611; 751 NW2d 463 (2008); *Sebewaing Industries Inc v Village of Sebewaing*, 337 Mich 530, 548; 60 NW2d 444 (1953); *Taylor v Michigan Public Utilities Comm*, 217 Mich 400, 402-403; 186 NW 485 (1922). Accordingly, a corporate insurance agency may include the word "insurance" in its name as long as the name it assumes, taken as a whole, does not imply that the agency is an insurance or surety company.[2]

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[2] This opinion clarifies OAG, 1979-1980, No 5756, p 922 (August 19, 1980).

It is my opinion, therefore, that section 213(1) of the Business Corporation Act, 1972 PA 284, MCL 450.1213(1), does not require a corporate insurance agency that includes the word "insurance" in its name to also include the word "agency," and a corporate agency is free to use the word "insurance" in its name so long as the name, taken as a whole, does not imply that the agency is an insurance or surety company.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF NEED: Certificate of need for heart transplant services

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH:

PUBLIC HEALTH CODE:

Currently there are only two approved heart, heart/lung or lung transplantation services existing in Michigan, and thus there is one available certificate of need for these services under section 4(1) of the Certificate of Need Review Standards for Heart/Lung and Liver Transplantation Services.

Opinion No. 7243 February 11, 2010

Honorable Bill Hardiman
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, MI

Honorable Roger Kahn, M.D.
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, MI

You have asked whether a certificate of need application to initiate a new heart transplant service in Michigan must be denied on the basis that approving such application would result in more than three heart transplant services in the State, which is the maximum number allowed under section 4(1) of the Certificate of Need Review Standards for Heart/Lung and Liver Transplantation Services.

The Michigan Department of Community Health (Department) reviews certificate of need requests for certain health facilities and clinical services described in Part 222 of the Public Health Code (Code), 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.22201 *et seq*.[1] Section 22209 (1)(c) of the Code lists activities for which certificates of need are necessary, and provides that a person shall not initiate a covered clinical service without first obtaining a certificate from the Department. MCL 333.22209(1)(c). A covered clin-

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[1] Part 222 was added to the Public Health Code by 1988 PA 332, and replaced Part 221 as the chapter governing the certificate of need process.

ical service is defined to include extrarenal organ transplantation services, such as heart or heart/lung transplants. MCL 333.22203(10)(iii).[2]

For purposes of administering the Code, the Certificate of Need Commission (Commission) develops and approves standards for the initiation of covered clinical services. MCL 333.22215(b). The Commission has issued Certificate of Need Review Standards for Heart/Lung and Liver Transplantation Services (Review Standards), the most recent of which became effective in June 2004. Section 4(1) of the standards governing heart transplant services states that "not . . . more than three (3) heart or heart/lung or lung transplantation services" shall be approved "in the planning area," which is defined as the entire State of Michigan. See Review Standards, section 2(1)(m). This cap of three heart transplant services has existed, in some form, since the 1980s.

Information included with your request reveals that on December 26, 1986, the Department approved four applicants to provide heart transplant services – William Beaumont Hospital, Henry Ford Hospital, Detroit Medical Center,[3] and the University of Michigan Hospital. The Department's approval, however, required one of the four entities to refrain from implementing its project to stay within the cap of three services. (December 26, 1986, letter from Gloria R. Smith, Department of Public Health). Based on the materials you provided, the Detroit Medical Center did not implement its project, which allowed William Beaumont Hospital, University of Michigan Hospital, and Henry Ford Hospital to proceed with their projects.

In 1993, the Commission revised the Review Standards to provide for the approval of joint sharing arrangements between licensed sites that were not part of a single legal entity for the provision of heart transplant services.[4] Section 4(5) was added to the standards and provided that:

> (5) An application which proposes a joint sharing arrangement for a heart or heart/lung or lung transplantation service which involves more than one licensed site, where the licensed sites in the joint sharing arrangement are not part of a single legal entity authorized to do business in Michigan, *shall not be required to meet Section 4(1) of these standards,* if an applicant can demonstrate all of the following:
>
> (i) each licensed site in the joint sharing arrangement is party to a written joint venture agreement and each licensed site has jointly filed as the applicant for the Certificate of Need;
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> (ii) all licensed sites in the joint sharing arrangement are geographically close enough so as to facilitate cost-effective sharing of resources;
>
> (iii) the application contains a formal plan for the sharing of services, staff and administrative functions related to the transplantation service

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[2] Under the applicable review standards, "heart, heart/lung or lung transplantation" is regulated as a single service. Information included with your request indicates that the common term used for this related or combined activity is "heart transplant," which term will be used for purposes of this opinion.

[3] The Detroit Medical Center's application was for the provision of services at two sites – Harper Hospital for adult transplant services, and Children's Hospital for pediatric services.

[4] The standards previously provided for joint sharing arrangements only between licensed sites that were part of a single legal entity. See Standards for Heart/Lung and Liver Transplantation Services, section 3(3).

including but not limited to: patient review, patient selection, donor organ retrieval and patient care management;

(iv) an applicant has designated a single licensed site where all of the adult transplantation procedures will be performed and a single licensed site where all of the pediatric transplantation procedures will be performed, provided that both licensed sites are part of the joint sharing arrangement;

(v) the licensed site at which the pediatric transplantation service will be provided shall have admitted or discharged at least 7,000 pediatric patients during the most recent 12 month period for which verifiable data are available to the Department;

(vi) *the licensed site that is designated as the site at which adult procedures will be performed is authorized under former Part 221 or Part 222, at the time the application is submitted to the Department, to perform adult heart or heart/lung or lung transplantation services;*

(vii) the applicant shall agree that the two licensed sites will jointly apply to perform transplantation procedures under the same OPTN certification; and

(viii) the applicant projects a minimum of 12 adult and 10 pediatric heart or heart/lung or lung transplantation procedures in the second 12 months of operation following the date on which the first heart or heart/lung or lung transplant procedure is performed, and annually thereafter. [1993 Review Standards; emphasis added.]

In light of this new joint sharing arrangement provision for unrelated legal entities, section 4(1) of the standards was revised to state:

Approval of an application proposing to provide heart or heart/lung or lung transplantation services shall not result in more than three (3) heart or heart/lung or lung transplantation services in the planning area. *In evaluating compliance with this subsection, an application submitted or a certificate approved pursuant to Section 4(5) of these standards shall be considered as a single service*. [1993 Review Standards; emphasis added.]

Accordingly, after the 1993 amendments, two separately licensed and unrelated entities could enter into a joint sharing arrangement for the provision of adult and pediatric transplant services, and receive a certificate of need to operate in such a fashion, as long as the site offering the adult services was already or would be operating under a previously issued certificate of need at the time the joint application was filed. In addition, such a joint sharing arrangement would only count as a single service for purposes of the cap, although services were to be provided at two licensed sites.

In 1996, Henry Ford Hospital, a holder of one of the original certificates approved by the Department in 1986 for the provision of adult transplant services, filed a joint application with Children's Hospital of Detroit to provide adult and pediatric transplant services through a joint sharing agreement under section 4(5) of the standards. The Department approved this arrangement, and granted a certificate of need in a letter dated October 24, 1996. The letter observes that Henry Ford was previously granted a certificate in 1986, and that subsequently the standards were revised in 1993 to allow for joint sharing arrangements. It goes on to state:

> Section 4(5), specifically subsection 4(5)(vi), requires that the licensed site designated to perform adult heart transplant procedures be authorized to do so under former Part 221 or Part 222 at the time the joint sharing application is submitted to the Department. As discussed . . . above, Henry Ford Hospital presently operates an adult heart transplant program and is identified as the licensed site that will perform adult heart transplant procedures under the joint sharing agreement.
>
> Also under the revised standards, specifically Section 4(1), only three heart, heart/lung or lung transplantation programs are allowed in the planning area (state). In the decision issued for Comparative Review No. 86-0021 on December 26, 1986, four applicants were approved to provide heart, heart/lung or lung transplantation services. Only three of those services, however, are active (William Beaumont, Henry Ford, and University of Michigan). The program at Harper Hospital has not provided services over the last 12 months and, thus, is no longer considered an approved provider for . . . services.
>
> Approval of this application (No. 96-0010) will not result in an increase in the number of providers for heart, heart/lung or lung transplantation services in the state, and the number of providers will remain at three. [October 24, 1996, letter from James K. Haveman, Jr., Director, Department of Community Health.]

The letter further provided that, "[i]n the event the joint sharing arrangement is terminated for any reason . . . Henry Ford Hospital will continue to be authorized to perform . . . transplantation services under the provisions of its *original* Certificate of Need . . . ." *Id.* (Emphasis added.)

Thus, after the Department's approval of the joint sharing arrangement between Henry Ford and Detroit Children's Hospital in 1996, there continued to be three services in the State – William Beaumont Hospital, University of Michigan Hospital, and the new Henry Ford/Detroit Children's Hospital arrangement.

In September 2008, the Department administratively closed William Beaumont Hospital's heart transplant certificate of need because the hospital had not performed the service for a number of years.[5] In light of this development and the circumstances described above, your question may be restated as whether, under the current Review Standards for Heart/Lung and Liver Transplantation Services, there are only two approved heart transplant services active in the State.

MCL 333.22215(1)(b) authorizes the Commission to adopt review standards by which the Department determines whether to grant a certificate of need.[6] These standards are proposed by the Commission; reviewed by a joint legislative committee;

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[5] Section 2(f) of the review standards, in effect, provides for a certificate of need to lapse if "the service did not perform a transplant procedure during any consecutive 12-month period." In October 2009, Spectrum Health Hospital of Grand Rapids filed an application (CON ID No. 09-0228) for a certificate of need to initiate heart, heart/lung or lung transplant services.

[6] "(1) The commission shall do all of the following: . . . (b) "Develop, approve, disapprove, or revise certificate of need review standards that establish for purposes of section 22225 the need, if any, for the initiation, replacement, or expansion of covered clinical services, . . . including conditions, standards, assurances, or information that must be met, demonstrated, or provided by a person who applies for a certificate of need." MCL 333.22215(1)(b).

and then submitted to the Governor and the Legislature for disapproval within 45 days of submission. MCL 333.22215(1), (3)-(4). If not disapproved, the standards become "effective and binding on all persons affected." MCL 333.22215(4). Under subsection 7(l) of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), MCL 24.201 *et seq*, certificate of need review standards are not considered to be rules[7] and, therefore, need not be promulgated under the APA procedures to become "effective and binding."

Given that the review standards have the general effect of rules, in that they provide binding standards governing the issuance of certificates of need under section 22225 of the Public Health Code, MCL 333.22225, it is appropriate to apply the principles of statutory construction when seeking to determine the meaning and effect of the review standards.[8] The first step is to review the language employed. If the language is unambiguous, it is accorded the meaning expressed. *Brown v Detroit Mayor*, 478 Mich 589, 593; 734 NW2d 514 (2007). Where the language employed is plain and unambiguous the provision must be enforced as written. *Lash v Traverse City*, 479 Mich 180, 187; 735 NW2d 628 (2007).

Since 1993, the standards governing heart transplants have been revised, most recently in 2004, but no significant changes were made to sections 4(1) and 4(5). More specifically, section 4(1) continues to impose a cap of three transplant services statewide, and provides that applications or certificates approved under section 4(5) only count as a single service for purposes of the cap:

> In evaluating compliance with this subsection [relating to the cap of three] an application submitted or a certificate approved pursuant to Section 4(5) of these standards shall be considered as a single service. [2004 Review Standards.]

Similarly, section 4(5) still provides, in part, that:

> An application which proposes a joint sharing arrangement for a heart or heart/lung or lung transplantation service which involves more than one licensed site . . . shall not be required to meet Section 4(1) of these standards. [2004 Review Standards.]

These standards are clear. Section 4(5) expressly states that an application is not subject to the cap of three set forth in section 4(1) if: (1) it proposes a joint sharing arrangement for a heart transplant service; (2) it involves more than one licensed site; (3) the licensed sites are not part of a single legal entity authorized to do business in Michigan; and (4) the joint applicants meet the remaining criteria in the section. Section 4(1) makes clear that an application submitted or a certificate approved for a joint sharing arrangement under section 4(5) "shall be considered as a single service," even though the participants in the joint venture provide services at two separate locations.

In 1996, the Department granted a certificate of need to Henry Ford/Children's Hospital under section 4(5). In its letter granting the application, the Department expressly recognized that an application approved under that section counts as a single service for purposes of assessing compliance with the three-service cap set forth

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[7] Section 7(m)(ii) of the Administrative Procedures Act, MCL 24.207(m)(ii), provides that: "Rule does not include any of the following: . . . Certificate of need review standards."

[8] "In construing administrative rules, courts apply principles of statutory construction." *Detroit Base Coalition for Human Rights of Handicapped v Dep't of Social Services*, 431 Mich 172, 185; 428 NW2d 335 (1988).

in section 4(1). The Department concluded that, at the time of the application by Henry Ford/Children's Hospital, there were only three active services, which included Henry Ford. The Department further determined that in granting the new certificate of need under the joint sharing agreement, the number of services remained at three. In essence, the new Henry Ford/Children's Hospital service assumed the place of the Henry Ford Hospital service.

The Department's interpretation and application of the standards in its 1996 letter is consistent with the plain language of both the 1993 and 2004 standards. The Department confirmed that since 1996, no new certificates of need for heart transplant services have been granted. The only significant change in circumstances occurred in 2008, when William Beaumont Hospital's certificate of need was closed by the Department. Because William Beaumont Hospital was one of the three holders of a certificate of need for heart transplant services, the closing of its certificate means that there is one certificate of need available for heart, heart/lung or lung transplant services.

It is my opinion, therefore, that currently there are only two approved heart, heart/lung or lung transplantation services existing in Michigan, and thus there is one available certificate of need for these services under section 4(1) of the Certificate of Need Review Standards for Heart/Lung and Liver Transplantation Services.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: Public access to the minutes of a public body's open meetings

OPEN MEETINGS ACT:

PUBLIC RECORDS:

After receiving a request, a public body must make open meeting minutes available for inspection within the time periods specified in the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 *et seq*. The public body may, under rules established and recorded by the public body, request advance notice of and require supervision of any inspection of the public body's record copy of open meeting minutes to protect the record from "loss, unauthorized alteration, mutilation, or destruction." MCL 15.233(3). Generally, neither advance notice nor supervision should be required for the inspection of copies of open meeting minutes.

Opinion No. 7244 March 3, 2010

Honorable Alma Wheeler Smith
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI

You have asked several questions relating to a person's right of access to a public body's meeting minutes under the Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL 15.261 *et seq*. Rephrasing your questions, you ask whether a public body may require a person to make an appointment to inspect a public body's meeting minutes and supervise the inspection of the minutes, and whether a public body may provide copies of the minutes in lieu of allowing a person to personally inspect the "original" minutes on demand during normal business hours.[1]

Section 9(2) of the OMA, MCL 15.269(2), provides that "[m]inutes are public records open to public inspection, and a public body shall make the minutes available at the address designated on posted public notices pursuant to section 4." Section 9(2) further provides that the public body "shall make copies of the minutes available to the public at the reasonable estimated cost for printing and copying." MCL 15.269(2).

Section 9(3) of the OMA establishes time limits within which minutes must be made available for public inspection:

> A public body shall make proposed minutes available for public inspection within 8 business days after the meeting to which the minutes refer. The public body shall make approved minutes available for public inspection within 5 business days after the meeting at which the minutes are approved by the public body. [MCL 15.269(3).]

Section 9(1) of the OMA, MCL 15.269(1), requires that corrected minutes be "available at or before the next subsequent meeting after correction." Thus, the public has a right to inspect minutes of open meetings. On the other hand, closed session minutes shall only be disclosed to the public if required in a civil action filed under sections 10, 11, or 13 of the OMA, MCL 15.270, 15.271, and 15.273. *Local Area Watch v City of Grand Rapids*, 262 Mich App 136, 145-146; 683 NW2d 745 (2004); OAG, 1985-1986, No 6353, p 255 (April 11, 1986).

The OMA contains no provisions requiring an appointment to inspect minutes or restricting the inspection to copies of minutes nor does it address how a public body is to accommodate a request to inspect minutes or copies of minutes. In applying the provisions of a statute, consideration must be given to the statute's purpose or intent, and then apply a reasonable construction that best accomplishes the purpose or intent. *People v Adair*, 452 Mich 473, 479-480; 550 NW2d 505 (1996). The broad, inclusive language employed in the OMA attests to its pro-disclosure nature and its purpose to promote government accountability. *Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents*, 444 Mich 211, 221-224, 230; 507 NW2d 422 (1993).

Minutes of open meetings also are subject to disclosure as public records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 *et seq*. *Hubka v Pennfield Twp,* 197 Mich App 117, 123; 494 NW2d 800 (1992). Because the OMA and FOIA share a similar purpose – to make governmental functions transparent – the FOIA's disclosure provisions provide guidance in answering these questions.

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[1] Your request uses the term "original minutes." The OMA does not use the term "original minutes," and it is understood that by using this terminology, you mean to refer to the record copies of minutes officially retained by a public body. This opinion will therefore use the term "record copy," as opposed to "original minutes," where appropriate.

Section 3(3) of the FOIA, MCL 15.233(3), provides for a reasonable opportunity for inspection and examination of public records during usual business hours, and permits a public body to "make reasonable rules necessary to protect its public records and to prevent excessive and unreasonable interference with the discharge of its functions." Section 3(3) also requires a public body to "protect public records from loss, unauthorized alteration, mutilation, or destruction." The protection of public records from mutilation or destruction also is provided for in section 491 of the Michigan Penal Code, MCL 750.491. The Michigan Supreme Court has observed that "[a] statute must be read in conjunction with other relevant statutes to ensure that the legislative intent is correctly ascertained." *Bush v Shabahang*, 484 Mich 156, 167; 772 NW2d 272, 279 (2009), citing *Wayne County v Auditor General*, 250 Mich 227, 233; 229 NW 911 (1930). These provisions from the FOIA and the Penal Code should therefore guide a public body in fulfilling its obligations under the OMA.

In complying with its obligations under the OMA to provide the public access to meeting minutes, the public body must also discharge its other public functions and duties. To that end, a rule of reasonableness is applicable in providing a public body an adequate opportunity to meet the request to inspect minutes. A public body must make at least a copy of its minutes available for inspection as provided in MCL 15.269(2) of OMA. A public body must avoid undue delay in meeting a request, and is obligated to comply with the response periods of the FOIA, and the specific provisions of the OMA, such as section 9(3) for proposed and approved minutes. But to protect the integrity of its official records, and to allow sufficient time to retrieve such records, if necessary, it may be reasonable for a public body to require advance notice of, and supervision of, the inspection of a record copy of meeting minutes.

It is my opinion, therefore, that, after receiving a request, a public body must make open meeting minutes available for inspection within the time periods specified in the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 *et seq*. The public body may, under rules established and recorded by the public body, request advance notice of and require supervision of any inspection of the public body's record copy of open meeting minutes to protect the record from "loss, unauthorized alteration, mutilation, or destruction." Generally, neither advance notice nor supervision should be required for the inspection of copies of open meeting minutes.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVACY ACT: Obligations of school or school district under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act pertaining to photographs and video of students

Photographs or video recordings of students participating in school activities will qualify as education records for purposes of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 USC 1232g, and that Act's prohibition on the release of such records, if they contain information directly related to a student, and are maintained by the school or district.

A school or district may designate photographs and video recordings of students engaged in school activities as a category of "directory information" that may be disclosed without written consent under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 USC 1232g, as long as the school or district provides the required notice to parents that such media will be considered directory information, and further provides parents with a reasonable opportunity to opt out or deny consent to the release of such information.

A school or district has no legal responsibility under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 USC 1232g, with respect to photographs or video recordings of students participating in school activities taken by a person not acting on behalf of the school or district, unless the photographs and video recordings are "maintained" by the school or district under 20 USC 1232g(a)(4)(A)(ii).

Opinion No. 7245 March 29, 2010

Honorable Sarah Roberts
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48909

You have asked several questions regarding the requirements that a school district must comply with in the creation and use of photographs and visual recordings of students in the district. These questions may be condensed and restated as follows:

(1) Is a photograph or video recording taken by a person acting for the school or school district of a student participating in a school activity an education record for purposes of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 USC 1232g?

(2) If so, may a school designate such photographs or video recordings as directory information subject to disclosure under FERPA without written consent?

(3) What obligations may a school have under FERPA if a photograph or video recording is taken of a student participating in a school activity by a person not acting on behalf of the school?

As background, you indicate that a certain school district takes photographs and creates video recordings of students participating in various school activities, and that such photographs or video recordings may appear in newspapers, in school publica-

tions, on the school website, on community access cable television, or on digital video discs (DVDs). You also indicate that the DVDs may occasionally be sold by various school groups as part of fundraising efforts. Your questions arise from a school district's inquiry as to its legal obligations under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 USC 1232g, commonly known as FERPA.[1]

You first ask whether a photograph or video recording taken by a person acting for the school or district of a student participating in a school activity is an education record for purposes of FERPA.

FERPA is a federal law that protects the privacy of student education records. Although the statute lacks a statement of purpose, its dual purpose has been explained as:

> (1) to create a right of access to student records for parents and students; and (2) to protect the privacy of those records by preventing unauthorized access by third parties. See 120 Cong. Rec. 39,858, 39,862-39,863 (December 13, 1974); 121 Cong. Rec. 7974 (May 13, 1975). [*United States v Miami Univ*, 91 F Supp 2d 1132, 1140 (SD Ohio, 2000).]

The law applies to all educational agencies or institutions meaning "any public or private agency or institution," including kindergarten through grade 12 (K-12) schools, which receives funds under an applicable program of the United States Department of Education. 20 USC 1232g(a)(3).[2]

The requirements FERPA imposes on schools as conditions of funding focus on "education records." FERPA first requires that schools allow parents "the right to inspect and review the education records of their children." 20 USC 1232g(a)(1)(A). FERPA next requires that a school allow parents to challenge the contents of their children's education records by providing an opportunity for a hearing. 20 USC 1232g(a)(2). Finally, FERPA prohibits schools from having "a policy or practice of permitting the release of *educational records* (or *personally identifiable information* contained therein . . .) of students without the written consent of their parents." 20 USC 1232g(b)(1).

FERPA defines "education records" as:

> [T]hose records, files, documents, and other materials which –
>
> (i) contain information *directly related* to a student; and
>
> (ii) are *maintained* by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution. [20 USC 1232g(a)(4)(A); emphasis added.][3]

The term "education records" is thus not limited to records related to academic matters, but broadly includes information "directly related" to a student and "main-

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[1] Although questions regarding the creation and use of images of students may implicate other privacy and property rights, this opinion is limited to the specific obligations of a school district under FERPA with respect to photographs and video recordings of students participating in school activities.

[2] Because your questions pertain to a K-12 school district, for ease of reference, this analysis will refer to schools or districts.

[3] 20 USC 1232g(a)(4)(B) identifies four exceptions that are not included in the term "education records." These exceptions are not relevant to your questions.

tained" by the school or district. *United States v Miami Univ*, 91 F Supp 2d at 1149.[4] Neither FERPA nor case law interpreting the statute defines or describes how information qualifies as "directly related" to a student, and therefore qualifies as an education record. FERPA, however, links the prohibition of disclosure of education records to "personally identifiable information contained therein." 20 USC 1232g(b)(1).

Rules adopted by the United States Department of Education provide that the term "personally identifiable information" "includes, but is not limited to":

> (a) The student's name;
>
> (b) The name of the student's parent or other family members;
>
> (c) The address of the student or student's family;
>
> (d) A personal identifier, such as the student's social security number, student number, or biometric record;
>
> (e) Other indirect identifiers, such as the student's date of birth, place of birth, and mother's maiden name;
>
> (f) *Other information that, alone or in combination, is linked or linkable to a specific student that would allow a reasonable person in the school community, who does not have personal knowledge of the relevant circumstances, to identify the student with reasonable certainty*; or
>
> (g) Information requested by a person who the educational agency or institution reasonably believes knows the identity of the student to whom the education record relates. [34 CFR 99.3; emphasis added.]

Photographs or video recordings of students participating in school activities, alone or in combination with other information, may be linked or linkable to a specific student, and could allow a reasonable person in the school community without personal knowledge of the relevant circumstances, to identify the student. 34 CFR 99.3(f). Under those circumstances, such media would fall within the definition of "personally identifiable information."

Because FERPA creates a link between the disclosure of "personally identifiable information" and "education records" – defined to mean "information directly related to a student" – it is a fair conclusion that if information qualifies as "personally identifiable information," it will also qualify as "information directly related to a student," and thus an "education record." Accordingly, photographs and video recordings that qualify as "personally identifiable information" under 34 CFR 99.3, may qualify as "information directly related to a student," and therefore an "education record" under 20 USC 1232g(a)(4)(A)(i), as long as one additional requirement is met.

As noted above, to come within the statutory definition of "education records" the information must not only be directly related to a student, but be "*maintained* by

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[4] The Secretary of the United States Department of Education has promulgated administrative regulations to implement FERPA. See 34 CFR Part 99.1 *et seq*. The term "record" has been interpreted to mean "any information recorded in any way, including, but not limited to, handwriting, print, computer media, video or audio tape, film, microfilm, and microfiche." 34 CFR 99.3.

an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution." 20 USC 1232g(a)(4)(A)(ii). *Owasso Independent School Dist No I-011 v Falvo*, 534 US 426, 433-435; 122 S Ct 934; 151 L Ed 2d 896 (2002). FERPA does not define the word "maintained." The United States Supreme Court, however, addressed its meaning in conjunction with determining whether student- or peer-graded assignments were educations records "maintained" by a school:

> The ordinary meaning of the word "maintain" is "to keep in existence or continuance; preserve; retain." Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1160 (2d ed. 1987). . . . The word "maintain" suggests FERPA records will be kept in a filing cabinet in a records room at the school or on a permanent secure database, perhaps even after the student is no longer enrolled. The student graders only handle assignments for a few moments as the teacher calls out the answers. It is fanciful to say they maintain the papers in the same way the registrar maintains a student's folder in a permanent file. [*Owasso Independent School Dist No I-011*, 534 US at 433.]

Following the Supreme Court's guidance in *Owasso*, if photographs or video recordings of students participating in school activities are kept, preserved, or retained by the school or district they fit the definition of education records set forth in 20 USC 1232g(a)(4)(A)(i)-(ii). Conversely, if a school or district does not keep or preserve such photographs or video recordings, they are not education records for purposes of FERPA.

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your first question, that photographs or video recordings of students participating in school activities will qualify as education records for purposes of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 USC 1232g, and that Act's prohibition on the release of such records, if they contain information directly related to a student, and are maintained by the school or district.

You next ask whether photographs and video recordings that qualify as education records may be designated as "directory information," and therefore subject to disclosure under FERPA without written consent.

FERPA prohibits schools from having a policy of releasing "educational records (or personally identifiable information contained therein *other than directory information* . . .) of students" without written consent. 20 USC 1232g(b)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the act contains an exception to the general prohibition on release without written consent for information that qualifies as "directory information."[5] FERPA defines "directory information" relating to a student to "include[ ] the following":

> [T]he student's name, address, telephone listing, date and place of birth, major field of study, participation in officially recognized activities and sports, weight and height of members of athletic teams, dates of attendance, degrees and awards received, and the most recent previous educational agency or institution attended by the student. [20 USC 1232g(a)(5)(A).]

As an initial matter, this exception for "directory information" is only relevant if photographs and video recordings of students participating in school activities indeed qualify as directory information. The statute does not expressly identify a student's image as captured by a photograph or video recording as "directory information."

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[5] 20 USC 1232g(b) identifies a list of exceptions to the consent requirement that are not relevant to your questions.

However, this list of information is non-exclusive as it is preceded by the word "includes." See *Burgess v United States*, 553 US 124; 128 S Ct 1572, 1578 n 3; 170 L Ed 2d 478 (2008) ("[T]he word 'includes' is usually a term of enlargement, and not of limitation." 2A Singer § 47:7, p 305 (some internal quotation marks omitted)). The United States Department of Education has interpreted the section similarly, defining "[d]irectory information" to "mean[ ] information contained in an education record of a student that would not generally be considered harmful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed," and:

> [*It*] *includes, but is not limited to*, the student's name, address, telephone listing; electronic mail address; *photograph;* date and place of birth; major field of study; grade level; enrollment status (e.g., undergraduate or graduate, full-time or part-time); dates of attendance; participation in officially recognized activities and sports; weight and height of members of athletic teams; degrees, honors and awards received; and the most recent educational agency or institution attended. [34 CFR 99.3; emphasis added.][6]

While the Department did not identify video recordings as "directory information," since this list too is non-exclusive, and videos are similar in nature to photographs in that they capture a student's image, it is reasonable to conclude that video recordings of students engaged in school activities may be considered "directory information" for purposes of 20 USC 1232g(a)(5)(A).

Accordingly, photographs and video recordings of students engaged in school activities may be considered "directory information," and thus disclosed without written consent. However, before a school or district discloses directory information, it must comply with certain requirements. FERPA provides that a school or district must identify the categories of information that it will consider directory information; publish its version of directory information; and allow parents a reasonable opportunity to opt out – in other words, to deny consent to the release of such information as it pertains to their children:

> Any educational agency or institution making public directory information shall give public notice of the categories of information which it has designated as such information with respect to each student attending the institution or agency and shall allow a reasonable period of time after such notice has been given for a parent to inform the institution or agency that any or all of the information designated should not be released without the parent's prior consent. [20 USC 1232g(a)(5)(B).]

Notably, FERPA does not specify what information *must* be designated as directory information. Rather, it gives a school or district discretion to determine which categories, if any, will be considered directory information by the school or district.[7]

With respect to the notice requirement, FERPA further requires that educational agencies or institutions provide parents of students annual notification of their rights

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[6] 34 CFR 99.3 also describes categories of information that are not subject to disclosure under the directory information standards, e.g., social security numbers and, to some extent, student identification numbers and disciplinary information.

[7] If a school or district has concerns regarding whether their written policies and practices are FERPA compliant, the school or district could request affirmative consent from parents to disclose personally identifiable information contained in education records. 34 CFR 99.30 provides details regarding the signed and dated consent required to disclose personally identifiable information about a student.

under FERPA. 20 USC 1232g(e). The means of notification is left to the discretion of each school under 34 CFR 99.7(b), which requires only that the notice be by means "that are reasonably likely to inform the parents or eligible students of their rights."[8]

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your second question, that a school or district may designate photographs and video recordings of students engaged in school activities as a category of "directory information" that may be disclosed without written consent under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 USC 1232g, as long as the school or district provides the required notice to parents that such media will be considered directory information, and further provides parents with a reasonable opportunity to opt out or deny consent to the release of such information.

You next ask what obligations a school or district may have under FERPA if a photograph or video recording is taken of a student participating in a school activity by a person not acting on behalf of the school or district.

FERPA imposes obligations on schools, identified in the statute as "educational agencies or institutions." The obligations are specific to education records. A record need not be created by the school itself in order to be an "education record" subject to FERPA. The record need only contain information "directly related" to a student, and be "maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution" to come under the protections of FERPA. 20 USC 1232g(a)(4)(A)(i)-(ii).

As discussed above, photographs or video recordings of students participating in school activities, including those taken by persons not acting on behalf of a school or district, will likely contain information "directly related" to a student, and thus meet the first prong of the definition of "education record." However, if the photograph or video recording is not also "maintained" by the school or district, it does not meet the second prong of the definition and therefore is not an "education record," and thus not addressed by FERPA.

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your third question, that a school or district has no legal responsibility under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 USC 1232g, with respect to photographs or video recordings of students participating in school activities taken by a person not acting on behalf of the school or district, unless the photographs and video recordings are "maintained" by the school or district under 20 USC 1232g(a)(4)(A)(ii).

MIKE COX
Attorney General

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[8] Along with the administrative regulations promulgated by the Department of Education to implement FERPA, 34 CFR Part 99.1 *et seq*, another resource available to help guide school districts in drafting and implementing their policies for FERPA compliance is the Family Policy Compliance Office (FPCO) of the United States Department of Education. FPCO is the office specifically responsible for administering FERPA, and guidance from FPCO is available on the Department's website. See <http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/index.html> (accessed February 10, 2010). A model notice of directory information can be found on the Michigan Department of Education website (http://www.michigan.gov/mde/), which was issued by the Department of Education in 2008.

DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ACT: Taxing jurisdiction's ability to "opt out" of a tax increment financing district

TAX INCREMENT FINANCING DISTRICT:

A taxing jurisdiction, the property of which is subject to the tax capture of a municipality's Downtown Development Authority Tax Increment Financing District, may "opt out" of the tax capture under MCL 125.1653(3) if the district's boundaries are altered or amended, but only with respect to property being added to the district.

Opinion No. 7246 March 29, 2010

Honorable Michael D. Bishop
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48913

You have asked whether a taxing jurisdiction, the property of which is subject to the tax capture of a municipality's Downtown Development Authority Tax Increment Financing District, may "opt out" of the tax capture under MCL 125.1653(3) if the district's boundaries are altered or amended.

The Downtown Development Authority Act (DDA Act), 1975 PA 197, MCL 125.1651 *et seq*, provides for the establishment of a Downtown Development Authority (DDA) by cities, villages and townships, and, *inter alia*, authorizes the levy and collection of taxes and the use of tax increment financing to finance DDA activities. After a DDA is established, it may "capture" all or a portion of *ad valorem* taxes assessed against property by the municipality and other taxing authority (including certain specific taxes) associated with the increase in the assessed or taxable value of properties in the district, realized since the district's creation. MCL 125.1651a.

A municipality that determines a DDA should be created within its jurisdiction initiates the procedures for establishing a DDA by adopting a resolution declaring the municipality's "intention to create and provide for the operation of an authority," under section 3 of the DDA Act. MCL 125.1653(1).

The resolution of intent must "set a date for the holding of a public hearing on the adoption of a proposed ordinance creating the authority and designating the boundaries of the downtown district." MCL 125.1653(2). The municipality must then follow specific notice requirements regarding the holding of the public hearing, including notification to the governing bodies of taxing jurisdictions that levy taxes that would be subject to capture by the proposed district. MCL 125.1653(2). The DDA Act provides that "[a] citizen, taxpayer, or property owner of the municipality or an official from a taxing jurisdiction with millage that would be subject to [tax] capture has the right to be heard in regard to the establishment of the authority and the boundaries of the proposed downtown district." MCL 125.1653(2).[1]

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[1] A municipality cannot incorporate land into a DDA district that is "not included in the description contained in the notice of public hearing, but it may eliminate described lands from the downtown district in the final determination of the boundaries." MCL 125.1653(2).

After public hearing, the municipality, if it elects to proceed, must adopt by majority vote of the members of its governing body, an ordinance "establishing the authority and designating the boundaries of the downtown district within which the authority shall exercise its powers." MCL 125.1653(4). The ordinance, if adopted, must then be filed promptly with the Secretary of State, and its text must be published in a qualifying "newspaper of general circulation in the municipality." MCL 125.1653(4).

In addition to detailing the requirements for creating a DDA, section 3 of the DDA Act provides an opportunity for other taxing authorities levying taxes on property within the proposed district to exempt their taxes from capture by the DDA. MCL 125.1653(3). Section 3(3) provides:

> Not more than 60 days after a public hearing held after February 15, 1994, the governing body of a taxing jurisdiction levying ad valorem property taxes that would otherwise be subject to capture *may exempt its taxes from capture by adopting a resolution to that effect and filing a copy with the clerk of the municipality proposing to create the authority*. The resolution takes effect when filed with that clerk and remains effective until a copy of a resolution rescinding that resolution is filed with the clerk. [MCL 125.1653(3); emphasis added.]

Finally, section 3(5) of the DDA Act provides for the extension of a development district's jurisdiction to include additional lands, or for the contraction or exclusion of lands from within its jurisdiction:

> The governing body of the municipality may alter or amend the boundaries of the downtown district to include or exclude lands from the downtown district *pursuant to the same requirements for adopting the ordinance creating the authority*. [MCL 125.1653(5); emphasis added.]

Against this statutory backdrop, you ask whether a taxing jurisdiction subject to the tax capture of a DDA's financing district would be able to exercise its right under section 3(3) to "opt out" of the tax capture if a municipality seeks to alter or amend the district under section 3(5) to include or exclude land. In other words, may a taxing jurisdiction that did not originally take advantage of its right to opt out of the tax capture during the 60-day period set forth in section 3(3), do so in the context of amending the district's boundaries under section 3(5) so as to exempt the taxing jurisdiction from tax capture even within the original district.

In construing or applying the provisions of a statute, the first step is determining the legislature's intent in adopting them. The intent, if possible, is determined by the words of the statute alone. "The words of a statute provide 'the most reliable evidence of its intent.'" *Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward*, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999), quoting *United States v Turkette*, 452 US 576, 593; 101 S Ct 2524; 69 L Ed 2d 246 (1981). If the provisions are unambiguous, as written, there is no room for "construction." *Lake Carriers Ass'n v Dep't of Natural Resources Director*, 407 Mich 424, 429; 286 NW2d 416 (1979). The words and provisions are to be applied as enacted. *Dewan v Khoury*, 477 Mich 888, 889; 722 NW2d 215 (2006). Further, words and phrases must be read in context and a statute must be read in its entirety. *Sweatt v Dep't of Corrections*, 468 Mich 172, 179; 661 NW2d 201 (2003).

The term "pursuant to the same requirements" used in section 3(5) is a clear reference to, and incorporation of, the same actions commanded of a municipality for creating an authority. Thus, the requirements for altering or amending a district are

those set forth in section 3(1), (2), (3), and (4). In *Village of Holly v Holly Twp*, 267 Mich App 461, 475-476; 705 NW2d 532 (2005), the Court of Appeals construed these same provisions, concluding:

> Read as a whole, § 3 of the Act establishes the procedure for creating a DDA or amending the boundaries of an existing DDA. MCL 125.1653(1) and (5). Subsections 2, 3, and 4 of § 3 all dovetail harmoniously and indicate that "a public hearing held after February 15, 1994," in subsection 3 must refer to the public hearing necessary for purposes of subsections 1 or 5. Subsection 2 requires notice "to the governing body of each taxing jurisdiction levying taxes that would be subject to capture if the authority is established and a tax increment financing plan is approved" of "a public hearing to be held after February 15, 1994 . . . ."
>
> Subsection 3 provides an opt-out opportunity within sixty days of a public hearing described in the same manner as in subsection 2: "a public hearing held after February 15, 1994 . . . ." Further, the sixty-day opt-out window of subsection 3 exactly corresponds to the sixty-day waiting period of subsection 4 before a municipality may adopt an ordinance creating a DDA or amending an existing DDA's boundaries as permitted by subsection 5. We therefore conclude that the most reasonable interpretation of these interlocking provisions is that "a public hearing to be held after February 15, 1994," in subsection 2 and "a public hearing held after February 15, 1994," in subsection 3, both refer to the same public hearing, one held to create a DDA or modify the boundaries of a DDA. Indeed, subsections 2, 3, and 4 provide the logical time sequence of establishing a DDA or modifying an authority's boundaries: (1) notice to taxpayers and taxing jurisdictions of a public hearing, (2) a public hearing, (3) a sixty-day period during which taxing jurisdictions may opt out and during which the governing body desiring to create or amend a DDA may not act, and (4) adoption of an ordinance creating a DDA or amending its boundaries.

Thus, the requirements or process for altering or amending a district include the "opt out" provision set forth in section 3(3).

The Court of Appeals in *Village of Holly*, however, did not address whether, in the context of altering or amending a district, the "opt out" opportunity applies to the entire district or simply to the lands added in the case of an expansion, or the lands remaining within the district after an exclusion of lands from the district.

While section 3 does not expressly address this issue, nothing in the text of the statute suggests that the Legislature intended the later process of altering or amending districts to provide a taxing jurisdiction with a *second* opportunity to "opt out" with respect to lands encompassed within an original district. It is with regard to including new land in an existing downtown district that subsections (3) and (5) extend an "opt-out" opportunity, just as an "opt-out" opportunity was allowed for land originally included in the district. Thus, in the case of an expansion, a taxing jurisdiction would only have the opportunity to "opt out" with respect to lands being added to the district. In the case of an exclusion or contraction of the district, the "opt-out" provision becomes irrelevant since the land being excluded from the district would no longer be subject to tax capture.[2]

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[2] The Michigan Department of Treasury has interpreted these statutes similarly. See <http:// www.michigan.gov/taxes/0,1607,7-238-43876-154689—F,00.html> (accessed March 4, 2010).

It is my opinion, therefore, that a taxing jurisdiction, the property of which is subject to the tax capture of a municipality's Downtown Development Authority Tax Increment Financing District, may "opt out" of the tax capture under MCL 125.1653(3) if the district's boundaries are altered or amended, but only with respect to property being added to the district.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

ELECTIONS: Access to ballots voted at an election under the Freedom of Information Act

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT:

PUBLIC RECORDS:

SECRETARY OF STATE:

Voted ballots, which are not traceable to the individual voter, are public records subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 *et seq*. The Secretary of State, in her role as the Chief Elections Officer, or the Director of Elections through the authority vested in that office, may exercise supervisory authority over local elections officials responding to a Freedom of Information Act request for voted ballots by issuing directions for the review of the ballots in order to protect their physical integrity and the security of the voted ballots.

A person must be allowed to inspect or examine voted ballots, which are not traceable to the individual voter, and to receive copies of the ballots upon request subject to reasonable restrictions prescribed by the Secretary of State. The public body may charge a fee for the copying of the voted ballots as provided for in section 4 of the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.234.

A person requesting access to voted ballots, which are not traceable to the individual voter, under the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 *et seq*, is entitled to a response from a public body granting or denying the request within 5 to 10 business days. MCL 15.235(2). However, the public body in possession of the voted ballots may not provide access to the ballots for inspection or copying purposes until 30 days after certification of the election by the relevant board of canvassers. 1979 AC, R 168.790.

Opinion No. 7247 May 13, 2010

Honorable Patricia L. Birkholz
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, MI

You have asked several questions concerning a request made under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA or Act), MCL 15.231 *et seq*, to review voted ballots. Your reference to a "voted ballot" is understood to mean a ballot cast by an elector during an election, either at the polls or by absent voter ballot, and which is not traceable to the individual voter. Information supplied with your request indicates that several jurisdictions within Allegan County received a FOIA request from an individual seeking to review the ballots cast during the November 2008, general election.[1]

Before turning to your questions, it is helpful to understand the sequence of events that surround the casting of ballots on election day. Numerous security measures are in place to protect both the elector's right to secrecy of the ballot under the Michigan Constitution,[2] and the State's obligation to ensure that each ballot is counted and then properly secured for the appropriate time period.

On election day, before being issued a ballot, a voter at the polls completes an application to vote form by printing the voter's name, street address, and birth date on the form, and signing the form. The voter then presents the application to vote form and a piece of photographic identification to an election inspector. MCL 168.523(1). After verifying the identity of the voter, the election inspector initials the application to approve the issuance of a ballot to the voter. Each ballot is printed with a perforated detachable stub that bears a unique ballot serial number.[3] The election inspector enters that unique serial number on the voter's application to vote form. MCL 168.523(2). Each voter's name is entered in a poll book along with the unique serial number that appears on the ballot issued to the voter. The election inspector retains the application to vote form and issues the voter a ballot. MCL 168.735(1).

The ballot is contained within a "secrecy sleeve" to preserve the privacy of the voter's selections. After voting the ballot, the voter places the ballot in the secrecy sleeve and proceeds to the polling station's optical scan tabulator. Before placing the ballot in the tabulator, the voter presents the ballot, which remains in the secrecy sleeve, to an election inspector stationed near the tabulator. The election inspector checks the serial number on the ballot stub which extends outside the secrecy sleeve against the ballot serial number recorded on either the voter's application to vote form or the poll book, detaches and retains the stub bearing the serial number, and hands the ballot back to the voter. The voter then feeds the ballot into the electronic tabulator. MCL 168.797a. Notably, once the stub is detached and the ballot is deposited in the tabulator, the voted ballot cannot be traced to the voter.

The ballot remains in the tabulator's ballot receptacle until the close of the polls at 8:00 p.m. After the polls close, the election inspectors use the tabulator to gener-

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[1] Although your request and the information supplied with it refer only to ballots voted at the November 2008, general election, the analysis set forth in this opinion applies to ballots voted at any recent or upcoming election.

[2] "The legislature shall enact laws to preserve the purity of elections, [and] to preserve the secrecy of the ballot . . . ." Const 1963, art 2, § 4.

[3] The serial numbers printed on the stubs run in consecutive order. MCL 168.569 and 168.570; 1979 AC, R 168.772(1).

ate a tape showing the precinct's vote totals. This tape functions as the precinct's statement of votes. MCL 168.801. The ballots are removed from the tabulator's ballot receptacle and placed in an approved ballot container that is then sealed by two election inspectors with a tamper-proof election seal that bears a unique serial number. Before the container is sealed, a "ballot tag" is affixed to the seal. The ballot tag records the date the container was sealed, name of the individuals who sealed the container, and the serial number on the seal used to secure the container. The seal serial number is also recorded in the poll book and on the statement of votes. The sealed ballot containers are returned to the clerk's office where they are maintained in a secure place. MCL 168.805.

During the county canvass, the ballots remain in the local clerk's office unless summoned by the board of county canvassers due to the identification of an error in the documents prepared by the precinct's election inspectors. The board of county canvassers has the authority to direct the precinct's election inspectors to count the ballots if necessary to correct the error. If the ballots are unsealed during the canvass, they are resealed after the examination and returned to the custody of the clerk for safekeeping. MCL 168.823. If a recount is requested, the sealed ballot containers are delivered to the recount site. A precinct is not recountable unless the seal on the precinct's ballot container is intact, the serial number on the seal is accurately documented, and the number of ballots in the container balances with the number of names entered in the precinct's poll book. MCL 168.871(2).[4]

Against this statutory backdrop, you first ask whether voted ballots are public records under the FOIA, and if so, whether they are exempt from disclosure. As a corollary to that question, you ask whether the Department of State may control the process of review in the event voted ballots are not exempt from disclosure.

Requests to access public records are governed by the FOIA. The FOIA regulates and sets requirements for the disclosure of public records by all public bodies in the State. The core purpose of the FOIA is stated at section 1(2) of the Act, MCL 15.231(2), which provides in pertinent part:

> It is the public policy of this state that all persons . . . are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and public employees, consistent with this act. The people shall be informed so that they may fully participate in the democratic process.

Michigan courts have interpreted the policy of the FOIA as one of full disclosure of public records absent a legislatively created exemption. See *Swickard v Wayne County Medical Examiner*, 438 Mich 536, 544; 475 NW2d 304 (1991). To that end, the FOIA provides that a person who submits a written request that describes a public record sufficiently to enable the public body to find the public record, has a right to inspect, copy, or receive a copy of an existing, nonexempt public record in the possession of the public body. MCL 15.233 and 15.235.

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[4] Absent voter ballots are returned to the local clerk by mail or in person by the voter or someone assisting the voter. Similar security and privacy precautions are taken by the local clerk with respect to these ballots as with ballots voted on election night. As with in-person voting, once the stub with the serial number is removed from an absent voter ballot, the ballot is no longer traceable back to the original voter. On election day, these ballots are fed into a tabulator to be counted, and then secured in approved containers.

The FOIA defines "public body" to mean a state officer, employee, agency, department, division, bureau, board, commission, council, authority, or other body in the executive branch of state government, and includes a county, city, township, village, or intercounty, or any other body that is created by statute or local authority or that is primarily funded by or through state or local authority. MCL 15.232(d). The Department of State is within the executive branch and is administered by the Secretary of State. See Const 1963, art 5, § 2; MCL 16.125 and 16.126. The Secretary of State has supervisory control over local election officials in the performance of their duties. MCL 168.21. The Department of State, the Secretary of State, and local city, township or county election clerks are all public bodies.

The FOIA defines "public record" in relevant part as "a writing prepared, owned, used, in the possession of, or retained by a public body in the performance of an official function, from the time it is created." MCL 15.232(e). The Act defines a "writing" to include:

> [H]andwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, photocopying, and every other means of recording, and includes letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or combinations thereof, and papers, maps, magnetic or paper tapes, photographic films or prints, microfilm, microfiche, magnetic or punched cards, discs, drums, or other means of recording or retaining meaningful content. [MCL 15.232(h).]

A ballot is a paper document upon which a voter affixes a mark or symbol to indicate the voter's selections as to candidates and ballot proposals. Voted ballots evidence the electors' preferences, and ultimately support the election or defeat of candidates and the approval or disapproval of ballot proposals in an election. They are the primary source for election results. Therefore, voted ballots are "writings" that record meaningful content and constitute "public records" for purposes of the FOIA.[5] Importantly, the question you pose does not raise "secrecy of the ballot" concerns because, as described above, a ballot is no longer traceable to the elector who voted it once the stub with its unique serial number is removed and the ballot is placed in the tabulator. Once placed in the tabulator, the voter's ballot and the selections recorded upon it become anonymous.

Again, public records must generally be disclosed after a public body receives a written request that describes the record sufficiently to enable the public body to locate the record. MCL 15.233(1). But the FOIA provides a number of exemptions in section 13(1) that allow public bodies to withhold from disclosure certain records and information. MCL 15.243(1)(a) – (y). These exemptions must be narrowly construed. *Detroit Free Press, Inc v Dep't of Consumer & Industry Services*, 246 Mich App 311, 315; 631 NW2d 769 (2001). A public body that denies a FOIA request has the burden of showing that the requested information falls within one of the exemptions found in section 13 of the Act. MCL 15.243; *State Employees Ass'n v Dep't of Management & Budget*, 428 Mich 104, 109-110; 404 NW2d 606 (1987). The FOIA does not prevent disclosure of public records that are covered by these exemptions;

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[5] Consistent with that fact voted ballots are included in the Michigan Department of State's mandatory retention and disposal policy, which applies to public records. See Department of State Retention and Disposal Schedule, General Retention Schedule #23 – Election Records, items 306 – Ballots (Federal Offices) and 307 – Ballots (State and Local Offices); see also MCL 399.5 and 750.491 (requiring that public records be kept to satisfy administrative, legal, fiscal, and historical needs).

rather, it authorizes nondisclosure at the agency's discretion. *Herald Co v Bay City*, 463 Mich 111, 119 n 6; 614 NW2d 873 (2000).

In determining whether voted ballots are exempt from disclosure, only two of the enumerated exceptions in section 13(1) need be examined. The first is section 13(1)(a), which exempts from disclosure "[i]nformation of a personal nature if public disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual's privacy." MCL 15.243(1)(a). Known as the privacy exemption, this exemption has two prongs that the information sought to be withheld from disclosure must satisfy. First, the information must be "of a personal nature." Second, it must be the case that the public disclosure of that information "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual's privacy." *Michigan Federation of Teachers v Univ of Michigan*, 481 Mich 657, 675; 753 NW2d 28 (2008). Because voted ballots are untraceable to a specific voter, they do not contain "[i]nformation of a personal nature," and, therefore, do not implicate the privacy exemption.[6]

The second exemption to be examined is section 13(1)(d) of the FOIA, which exempts from disclosure "[r]ecords or information specifically described and exempted from disclosure by statute." MCL 15.243(1)(d). Applying the language of the exemption and keeping in mind that FOIA exemptions must be narrowly construed, it must be determined whether any statute specifically describes and exempts voted ballots from disclosure.

Federal law requires the retention of election ballots and other matter related to elections where federal candidates were voted on for 22 months, and authorizes access to these materials by federal officials. 42 USC 1974. It does not, however, specifically exempt these election materials from disclosure at the state level. Thus, this statute cannot serve as the source for a section 13(1)(d) exemption, and research disclosed no other federal law relevant to this issue.

Turning next to state law, no statutes specifically describe and exempt voted ballots from disclosure under the FOIA. MCL 168.794c mandates that the Secretary of State promulgate rules concerning electronic voting records;[7] MCL 168.799a discuss-

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[6] This conclusion is supported by the Court of Appeals' decision in *Korn v Southfield City Clerk*, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided July 27, 2004 (Docket No. 251827), lv den 472 Mich 867; 692 NW2d 839 (2005), cert den 546 US 1076; 126 S Ct 831; 163 L Ed 2d 707 (2005). The issue there was whether the release of absent voter ballot jacket information, which contained voter name, address and signature, *along with the individual's vot*e, would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy under FOIA. The Court held that the jacket information separated from the voting record was not personal in nature and, thus, did not fall under the privacy exemption. The Court reiterated, however, that how a person votes is intimate, and therefore personal in nature. Accordingly, the Court held that while the release of the ballot jacket information absent the voting record would not fall within the privacy exemption, release of the jacket with the voting information would fall within the exemption. In other words, election material is not personal in nature where the vote is not traceable to the voter.

[7] MCL 168.794c provides that:

> The provisions of sections 794 to 799a control with respect to elections where electronic voting systems are used, and shall be liberally construed so as to carry out the purpose of the provisions. A provision of law relating to the conduct of elections that conflicts with sections 794 to 799a does not apply to the conduct of elections with an approved electronic voting system. The secretary of state shall promulgate rules to implement the provisions of sections 794 to 799a, in accordance with the administrative procedures act of 1969, Act No. 306 of the Public Acts of 1969, being sections 24.201 to 24.328 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.

es the release of ballots; and MCL 168.847 empowers the Secretary of State to "authorize the release of all ballots." None of these statutes specifically describes and exempts voted ballots from disclosure under the FOIA. Accordingly, there are no state statutes that may serve as the basis for a section 13(1)(d) exemption under the FOIA. Voted ballots are not exempt from disclosure.

While the FOIA imposes the disclosure requirement, and sets the parameters for responding to a request for records, the Michigan Election Law and other related statutes impose constraints with respect to the release of voted ballots that must be accounted for in responding to any request under the FOIA.

As part of your first question you ask whether the Department of State may control the process by which a person may seek to review a voted ballot. Under the FOIA, a public body may "make reasonable rules necessary to protect its public records" and must "protect public records from loss, unauthorized alteration, mutilation, or destruction." MCL 15.233(3). The protection of public records from mutilation or destruction also is provided for in section 491 of the Michigan Penal Code, MCL 750.491. As the chief election officer of the State, the Secretary of State is authorized to supervise local election officials in the performance of their duties. MCL 168.21. Accordingly, the Secretary of State is authorized to supervise local election officials with regard to the public review of voted ballots. Therefore, an election clerk – under the supervision of the Secretary of State – may control the process for reviewing voted ballots to the extent necessary to protect the physical integrity of the ballots, and to ensure chain of custody.

This conclusion is supported by the federal retention law, 42 USC 1974, which requires the retention and preservation of ballots and all other records that are requisite to voting in elections where federal candidates were voted upon for a period of 22 months. The purpose of this federal retention law is to maintain election ballots and other materials as evidence in the detection and prosecution of election crimes and federal civil rights offenses. Section 1974 requires that covered election documentation be retained either physically by election officials themselves, or under the direct administrative supervision of election officers. 42 USC 1974. A United States Department of Justice publication on ballot retention underscores the duty of election officers to retain and safeguard these documents:

> Section 1974 requires that administrative procedures be in place giving election officers ultimate management authority over the retention and security of those election records. Those administrative procedures should ensure that election officers retain ultimate responsibility for the retention and security of covered election documents and records, and that election officers retain the right to physically access and dispose of them.[8]

In accordance with Michigan Election Law and consistent with 42 USC 1974 and the FOIA, the Director of Elections instructed Allegan County election officials that, in responding to a FOIA request, no person other than the election clerk of the

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[8] See Donsanto, Craig C., Director of the Election Crimes Branch in the Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice, *Retention of Voting Records under 42 USC 1974*, Appendix 2 to "Election Document Retention in an Age of High Technology" published in 1994 by the Federal Election Commission, National Clearinghouse on Election Administration, the duties and functions of which were transferred to the United States Election Assistance Commission in 2002. Available at <http://www.eac.gov/election/quick-start-management-guides/fec-publications> (accessed April 12, 2010).

relevant jurisdiction or office staff designated by that clerk may have any unsupervised access to the ballots, ballot containers, or ballot bags.[9]

More specifically, the Director instructed these local clerks that 1) the clerk or office staff designated by the clerk shall be present in the room where the inspection takes place for the entire time the ballots are being examined; 2) the person or persons inspecting the ballots shall not be permitted to touch or handle the ballots, touch or handle the container or ballot bag in which the ballots are secured, or be left unattended in the room where the examination is carried out; and 3) any photocopying is to be performed by the clerk or office staff designated by the clerk, and during the photocopying process the person or persons requesting the photocopies may not be permitted to touch or handle the ballots, touch or handle the container ballot bag in which the ballots are secured, or be left unattended in the room where secured or unsecured ballots are present.[10] These instructions are reasonable, and designed to ensure the physical integrity and security of the voted ballots.

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your first question that voted ballots, which are not traceable to the individual voter, are public records subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 *et seq*. The Secretary of State, in her role as the Chief Elections Officer, or the Director of Elections through the authority vested in that office, may exercise supervisory authority over local elections officials responding to a FOIA request for voted ballots by issuing directions for the review of the ballots in order to protect their physical integrity and the security of the voted ballots.

You next ask whether a public body must only allow inspection and examination of the voted ballots, or whether the public body must also provide copies of the voted ballots upon request and for a charge.

Under the FOIA, a person may ask to inspect, copy, or receive a copy of a public record that is subject to disclosure. MCL 15.233(1). Thus, a person may ask to copy or receive copies of voted ballots. However, as stated above, a public body may "make reasonable rules necessary to protect its public records" and must "protect public records from loss, unauthorized alteration, mutilation, or destruction." MCL 15.233(3). Accordingly, if a person seeks or requests copies of the ballots, this process may be subject to any procedures for ballot handling prescribed by the Secretary of State. A public body may also charge a fee for the necessary copying of a public record for inspection or for providing a copy of a public record as set forth in MCL 15.234 of the FOIA.[11]

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[9] By law, the Director of Elections is "vested with the powers and shall perform the duties of the secretary of state under his supervision, with respect to the supervision and administration of the election laws." MCL 168.32. The duties of the Secretary of State, as Chief Elections Officer, MCL 168.21, include issuing "instructions" for the conduct of elections in accordance with Michigan Election Law, MCL 168.31(1)(a), which certainly includes providing for the security of voted ballots. Thus, it is within the Director's authority to issue instructions to local elections officials as to how ballots should be handled and disclosed in response to a FOIA request.

[10] See September 29, 2009, memorandum from Christopher Thomas, Director of Elections, Michigan Department of State, to Allegan County Election Officials. This office has been advised that if it is concluded that voted ballots are public records subject to mandatory disclosure under the FOIA, it is the intent of the Director of Elections to issue the same instructions to all local elections officials. (A copy of the memorandum is attached to this opinion as an Appendix.)

[11] The FOIA allows those who are indigent or receiving public assistance to acquire copies of public records without charge for the first $20 of the fee for each request. MCL 15.234.

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your second question that a person must be allowed to inspect or examine voted ballots, which are not traceable to the individual voter, and to receive copies of the ballots upon request subject to reasonable restrictions prescribed by the Secretary of State. The public body may charge a fee for the copying of the voted ballots as provided for in section 4 of the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.234.

Finally, you ask whether federal law, specifically 42 USC 1974, or a rule promulgated by the Michigan Department of State, 1979 AC, R 168.790, controls the timing of when a ballot voted in an election may be disclosed or released. This question is understood as asking when a public body must provide a person requesting access to voted ballots under the FOIA with an opportunity to inspect or receive copies of the ballots.

Under the FOIA, a public body has five business days within which to respond to the FOIA request by either granting or denying the request, granting or denying the request in part, or invoking an additional ten days for responding to the request. MCL 15.235(2). However, federal and state election laws impose time constraints on when access to voted ballots may be had for inspection and copying purposes.

42 USC 1974 requires that ballots cast for federal candidates in a state-run election be held for 22 months after the election.[12] Section 1974 provides that the election official, or state-designated custodian, must make the ballots available to the United States Attorney General for inspection, reproduction and copying upon written demand by the United States Attorney General that contains a statement of the basis and purpose for the inspection and copying. 42 USC 1974b.

Rule 168.790(19), promulgated by the Michigan Department of State, provides:

> *Ballots used at an election may be destroyed after 30 days following the final determination of the board of canvassers with respect to the election, unless their destruction has been stayed by an order of a court or the secretary of state.* Ballots shall not be released for examination, review or research unless prior approval is obtained by the board of state canvassers. [Emphasis added.]

The first sentence of this rule provides for the retention of ballots for a minimum of 30 days. While this state administrative rule may appear to conflict with the federal statute, the two are easily reconciled. In state elections involving federal candidates, voted ballots must be retained for 22 months. In all other state-run elections, voted ballots must be retained, at a minimum, for 30 days following the final deter-

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[12] The statute provides:

> Every officer of election shall retain and preserve, for a period of twenty-two months from the date of any general, special, or primary election of which candidates for the office of President, Vice President, presidential elector, Member of the Senate, Member of the House of Representatives, or Resident Commissioner from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are voted for, all records and papers which come into his possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting in such election, except that, when required by law, such records and papers may be delivered to another officer of election and except that, if a State or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico designates a custodian to retain and preserve these records and papers at a specified place, then such records and papers may be deposited with such custodian, and the duty to retain and preserve any record or paper so deposited shall devolve upon such custodian. . . . [42 USC 1974.]

mination of the board of canvassers with respect to the election subject to the applicable retention and disposal schedule.[13]

While these provisions establish how long voted ballots must be *retained*, they do not – for purposes of answering your question – address the timing of *release or disclosure* of voted ballots required under state FOIA law.

With respect to release or disclosure, the Michigan Election Law provides:

> The secretary of state may authorize the release of all ballots, ballot boxes, voting machines, and equipment *after 10 days following certification of an election by the board of state canvassers* in a precinct other than a precinct in which 1 or more of the following occur:
>
> (a) A petition for recount has been filed with the board of state canvassers.
>
> (b) A petition has been filed pursuant to section 879.
>
> (c) A court of competent jurisdiction has issued an order restraining interference with ballots, ballot boxes, voting machines, and equipment. [MCL 168.847; emphasis added.]

The administrative rules provide that:

> The clerk in charge of the election shall secure the container containing the programs, test deck, accuracy test results, and other related materials, and the original edit listing *until 30 days following the certification of the election* if a recount has not been requested or until a date prescribed by the secretary of state. [R 168.790(18); emphasis added.][14]

The Board of State Canvassers is charged with examining the returns for state and federal elections. MCL 168.841. If state or federal offices are not involved, the board of county canvassers is charged with examining the election returns. MCL 168.821 and 168.822. The Board of State Canvassers is required to meet on or before the twentieth day following an election to examine the returns, and certify the election results. MCL 168.842 and 168.845. A board of county canvassers must meet within five days of an election to examine the returns, and certify the election results. MCL 168.821.

Reading these provisions together, with respect to elections in which federal candidates appear on the ballot, the earliest date that voted ballots could be released or disclosed for purposes of allowing an inspection or making copies pursuant to a FOIA request would be 30 days following the Board of State Canvassers' certifica-

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[13] Under the Department of State's retention and disposal schedule, voted ballots in elections involving federal offices must be retained for 22 months, while voted ballots in elections involving only state and local offices must be retained until 30 days after the canvass of the election is completed, until a recount is completed, until a court order or a Secretary of State order to suspend destruction is lifted, or until an investigation into defective ballots or voting equipment is completed. Department of State Retention and Disposal Schedule, General Retention Schedule #23 – Election Records, item 306 – Ballots (Federal Offices) and item 307 – Ballots (State and Local Offices). See also n 5, *supra*.

[14] This office is advised that the Secretary of State interprets R 168.790(18) to include voted ballots as "other related materials," and thus subject to the 30-day retention period. This interpretation is entitled to "respectful consideration." See *In re Complaint of Rovas*, 482 Mich 90, 102-103; 754 NW2d 259 (2008).

tion on or before the twentieth day after the election.[15] It is noted, however, that if a petition for recount is filed,[16] if certification is otherwise delayed, or a court order is issued, the time period might extend beyond 30 days after certification. MCL 168.842(1); MCL 168.847(a)-(c).

Regarding all other elections, the earliest date that voted ballots could be released or disclosed for purposes of allowing an inspection or making copies pursuant to a FOIA request would be 30 days following the board of county canvassers' certification on or before the fifth day after the election. Again, this date would be subject to extension if a petition for recount was filed,[17] if certification is otherwise delayed, a court order is filed, or the Secretary of State prescribed a different date.

At this point, it is necessary to place into context Rule 168.790(19), which provides, in part, that "[b]allots shall not be released for examination, review, or research unless prior approval is obtained by the board of state canvassers." Statutes and rules must be interpreted in a manner that ensures they work in harmony with an entire statutory scheme. *Walters v Leech*, 279 Mich App 707, 709-710; 761 NW2d 143 (2008); see also *Wayne County v Auditor Gen*, 250 Mich 227, 233; 229 NW 911 (1930). Harmonizing Rule 168.790(19) with the election rules and statutes discussed above, as well as the FOIA, leads to the conclusion that its application is limited to the ballot security time period. In other words, subsection (19)'s requirement that the Board of State Canvassers approve any review of ballots only applies during the time period within which voted ballots cannot be disclosed for purposes of the FOIA. Once the security periods lapse, voted ballots are subject to disclosure in response to a FOIA request without approval by the Board of State Canvassers.

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your third question that a person requesting access to voted ballots, which are not traceable to the individual voter, under the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 *et seq*, is entitled to a response from a public body granting or denying the request within 5 to 10 business days. MCL 15.235(2). However, the public body in possession of the voted ballots may not provide access to the ballots for inspection or copying purposes until 30 days after certification of the election by the relevant board of canvassers. 1979 AC, R 168.790.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

Att.

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[15] While section 847 indicates that the Secretary of State "may authorize" the release of ballots ten days after certification, Rule 168.790(18) states that a clerk "shall secure" the ballots for 30 days. In light of the rule's use of the mandatory term "shall," the Secretary of State must exercise the discretion accorded her under MCL 168.847 consistent with Rule 168.790(18).

[16] With respect to elections certified by the Board of State Canvassers, a petition for recount must be filed within 48 hours of certification of the election. MCL 168.879 and 168.880.

[17] Regarding elections certified by boards of county canvassers, a petition for recount must be filed within six days of the board's certification. MCL 168.866. "All recounts shall be completed for a primary election not later than the twentieth day and for any other election not later than the thirtieth day immediately following the last day for filing counter petitions or the first day that recounts may lawfully begin." MCL 168.875.

STATE OF MICHIGAN
TERRI LYNN LAND, SECRETARY OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
LANSING

MEMORANDUM

DATE: September 29, 2009
TO: Allegan County Election Officials
FROM: Christopher M. Thomas, Director of Elections
SUBJECT: Requirements for Handling Voted Ballots if Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

Questions have recently been raised regarding the applicability of Michigan's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et. seq., to requests to inspect or receive copies of voted ballots secured under the 22-month Federal retention law. While this directive does not address whether such ballots are subject to disclosure under FOIA, it does provide direction to election officials on how the disclosure must be handled should their jurisdiction determine that ballots must be disclosed under FOIA. The manner in which disclosure is carried out is critical given the Federal retention law, 18 U.S.C. §1974, which is designed to maintain election ballots and other materials as evidence should a criminal investigation occur.

The United States Department of Justice publication on this subject states:

> "Section 1974 requires that administrative procedures be in place giving election officers ultimate management authority over the retention and security of those election records. Those administrative procedures should ensure that election officers retain ultimate responsibility for the retention and security of covered election records, that they also retain the right to physically access and dispose of them, and that the terms and conditions of storage conform to the retention requirements of the statute." (Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses, Seventh Edition, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/docs/electbook-rvs0807.pdf)

Evidence for a criminal investigation requires a verifiable chain of custody to ensure that the evidence has not been compromised. Securing ballots under seal and recording the seal numbers are essential to the protection and maintenance of the chain of custody. Should ballots be disclosed under FOIA, it is absolutely critical that no person, other than the clerk or office staff designated by the clerk, have any form of direct or indirect access to the ballots, ballot containers or ballot bags.

Ballot Disclosure Procedures

A city, township or village clerk who honors a request from a person to inspect or receive copies of ballots voted in an election shall proceed as follows:

- In an instance where the person wishes to inspect the voted ballots, the clerk having custody of the ballots or office staff designated by the clerk shall be present in the room where the inspection takes place for the entire time the ballots are being examined. At no time during

the course of the examination shall the person or persons inspecting the ballots be permitted to touch or handle the ballots, touch or handle the container or ballot bag in which the ballots are secured or be left unattended in the room where the examination is carried out when secured or unsecured ballots are present.

- In an instance where the person wishes to receive copies of the voted ballots, the clerk having custody of the ballots or office staff designated by the clerk shall perform the necessary photocopying. At no time during the course of the photocopying shall the person or persons requesting the photocopies be permitted to touch or handle the ballots, touch or handle the container or ballot bag in which the ballots are secured or be left unattended in the room where the photocopying is taking place when secured or unsecured ballots are present.

- The clerk shall maintain a complete written record of the measures taken to protect and preserve the integrity of the ballots including the following information: 1) the serial numbers appearing on the election seals removed from the ballot containers or ballot bags involved 2) the serial numbers appearing on the election seals used to reseal the ballots into the ballot containers or ballot bags after the conduct of the ballot examination or the photocopying of the ballots 3) the names and titles of the authorized individual or individuals who removed and replaced the election seals 4) the date and time the seals were removed and replaced 5) the names and addresses of any individuals who witnessed the removal and replacement of the election seals and 6) the names and titles of the authorized individual or individuals who supervised the examination of the ballots and/or performed any necessary photocopying of the ballots. The record shall be maintained in a secure place by the clerk having custody of the ballots.

A city, township or village clerk who receives a request from a person to inspect or receive copies of voted ballots should consult the jurisdiction's legal counsel for advice in connection with responding to a particular FOIA request, including whether to recover any actual costs associated with retrieving any information that may be disclosed pursuant to FOIA.

Nothing provided under this directive shall be construed to allow the public disclosure of voted ballots prior to 1) the release of the ballots under Michigan's ballot security provisions or 2) the conduct and completion of any recounts requested after the election.

Questions?

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions regarding this directive. Bradley Wittman of this office is also available to assist with any questions you may have.

Mailing address: Michigan Department of State
Bureau of Elections
PO Box 20126
Lansing, MI 48901-0726

Phone: (517) 373-2540
Email: elections@michigan.gov
Fax: (517) 373-0941

CLEAN, RENEWABLE, AND EFFICIENT ENERGY ACT: Qualifications for renewable energy credits under the Clean, Renewable, and Efficient Energy Act

RENEWABLE ENERGY CREDITS:

PLASMA ARC GASIFICATION FACILITY:

MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE INCINERATOR:

A gasification facility, including a plasma arc gasification facility, that uses municipal solid waste or biomass as feedstock may qualify as a renewable energy system eligible to receive renewable energy credits under Michigan's Clean, Renewable, and Efficient Energy Act, 2008 PA 295, MCL 460.1001 *et seq*, provided that the facility meets the other requirements of that Act.

Opinion No. 7248 May 26, 2010

Honorable Michael D. Bishop
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, MI

You have asked whether the use of municipal solid waste or biomass as feedstock by a gasification facility may qualify the facility for renewable energy credits under Michigan's Clean, Renewable, and Efficient Energy Act (CREEA or Act), 2008 PA 295, MCL 460.1001 *et seq*.

Your request states that a company proposes to build a facility that will use "a high-tech, high-heat 'plasma torch' to create electricity by converting . . . municipal and bio waste" into electricity. Information obtained in connection with your request reveals that "gasification" is a thermochemical process that uses high heat that, when directed at a fuel source such as municipal solid waste or biomass, is so intense that it breaks the chemical bonds that hold the molecules of the fuel source together, and produces synthesis gas.[1] A "plasma torch" is one type of device used to create the high heat necessary for gasification, and involves passing inert gases through an electric arc generated between two powerful electrodes. The plasma torch converts organic compounds instantaneously into a gas comprised of the elemental components of the original molecules, and inorganic compounds melt into a "slag" byproduct. The resulting gases are used to turn a gas turbine or to heat water to power a steam turbine and thereby generate electricity.

The CREEA specifically contemplates the use of "plasma torch" facilities and other related technologies within its regulatory scheme. Section 7(a) defines the term "gasification facility," providing:

> "Gasification facility" means a facility located in this state that uses a thermochemical process that does not involve direct combustion to produce

[1] The website for the United States Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, contains information on the process of gasification and other processes. See <http://www1.eere.energy.gov/biomass/thermochemical_processes.html> (accessed May 17, 2010).

> synthesis gas, composed of carbon monoxide and hydrogen, from carbon-based feedstocks (such as coal, petroleum coke, wood, biomass, hazardous waste, medical waste, industrial waste, and solid waste, including, but not limited to, municipal solid waste, electronic waste, and waste described in section 11514 of the natural resources and environmental protection act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.11514) and that uses the synthesis gas or a mixture of the synthesis gas and methane to generate electricity for commercial use. . . . Gasification facility includes . . . *a plasma arc gasification facility*. [MCL 460.1007(a); emphasis added.]

Section 9(b) of the CREEA defines "plasma arc gasification facility" as "a gasification facility that uses a *plasma torch* to break substances down into their molecular structures." MCL 460.1009(b) (emphasis added).

In construing or applying the provisions of a statute, the first step is determining the Legislature's intent in adopting them. The intent, if possible, is determined by the words of the statute alone. "The words of a statute provide 'the most reliable evidence of its intent.'" *Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward*, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999), quoting *United States v Turkette*, 452 US 576, 593; 101 S Ct 2524; 69 L Ed 2d 246 (1981). If the provisions are unambiguous, as written, there is no room for construction. *Lake Carriers' Ass'n v Dep't of Nat'l Resources Director*, 407 Mich 424, 429; 286 NW2d 416 (1979). The words and provisions are to be applied as enacted. *Dewan v Khoury*, 477 Mich 888, 889; 722 NW2d 215 (2006). Further, words and phrases must be read in context and a statute must be read in its entirety. *Sweatt v Dep't of Corrections*, 468 Mich 172, 179; 661 NW2d 201 (2003). "When a statute specifically defines a given term, that definition alone controls." *Kuznar v Raksha Corp*, 481 Mich 169, 176; 750 NW2d 121 (2008).

The CREEA was enacted, in part, to encourage energy producers to move toward producing energy using renewable resources. MCL 460.1001. To further that goal, the Act provides for the earning of "renewable energy credits," MCL 460.1039, that may be traded, transferred, or sold by the producers who earn the credits. MCL 460.1041. Section 39 of the Act provides:

> (1) Except as otherwise provided in section 35(1), 1 *renewable energy credit* shall be granted to the owner of a *renewable energy system* for each megawatt hour of electricity generated from the renewable energy system, subject to all of the following:
>
> (a) If a renewable energy system uses both a renewable energy resource and a nonrenewable energy resource to generate electricity, the number of renewable energy credits granted shall be based on the percentage of the electricity generated from the renewable energy resource.
>
> (b) Renewable energy credit shall not be granted for renewable energy generated from a municipal solid waste incinerator to the extent that the renewable energy was generated by operating the incinerator in excess of the greater of the following, as applicable:
>
> (i) The incinerator's nameplate capacity rating on January 1, 2008.
>
> (ii) If the incinerator is expanded after the effective date of this act to an approximate continuous design rated capacity of not more than 950 tons per day pursuant to the terms of a final request for proposals issued not later than October 1986, the nameplate capacity rating required to accommodate that expansion.

> (c) A renewable energy credit shall not be granted for renewable energy the renewable attributes of which are used by an electric provider in a commission-approved voluntary renewable energy program. [MCL 460.1039; emphasis added.]

Under this section, to earn a renewable energy credit, the electricity must be produced by a "renewable energy system." The CREEA defines a "renewable energy system" to mean "a facility, electric generation system, or set of electricity generation systems that use 1 or more *renewable energy resources* to generate electricity." MCL 460.1011(k) (emphasis added). Accordingly, to qualify as a renewable energy system, the facility must use "renewable energy resources" to generate electricity. The Act defines "renewable energy resource" to mean:

> (i) [A] resource that naturally replenishes over a human, not a geological, time frame and that is ultimately derived from solar power, water power, or wind power. Renewable energy resource does not include petroleum, nuclear, natural gas, or coal. A renewable energy resource comes from the sun or from thermal inertia of the earth and minimizes the output of toxic material in the conversion of the energy and *includes, but is not limited to*, *all of the following*:
>
> *(i)* *Biomass*.
>
> *(ii)* Solar and solar thermal energy.
>
> *(iii)* Wind energy.
>
> *(iv)* Kinetic energy of moving water . . . .
>
> * * *
>
> *(v)* Geothermal energy.
>
> *(vi)* *Municipal solid waste*.
>
> *(vii)* Landfill gas produced by municipal solid waste. [MCL 460.1011(i); emphasis added.]

Under section 11, biomass[2] and municipal solid waste[3] are identified as renewable energy resources.

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[2] The term "biomass" is defined in MCL 460.1003(f) as "any organic matter that is not derived from fossil fuels, that can be converted to usable fuel for the production of energy, and that replenishes over a human, not a geological, time frame," and includes a list of examples.

[3] The CREEA does not specifically define the term "municipal solid waste." It does, however, define "municipal solid waste incinerator" in accord with the definition given in Part 115 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), Solid Waste Management, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.11501 *et seq*. Part 115 defines the term "municipal solid waste incinerator," to mean an incinerator that "receives solid waste from off site and burns only household waste from single and multiple dwellings, hotels, motels, and other residential sources, or this household waste together with solid waste from commercial, institutional, municipal, county, or industrial sources that, if disposed of, would not be required to be placed in a disposal facility licensed under part 111." MCL 324.11504(7)(a). Part 115 further defines the term "solid waste" to mean "garbage, rubbish, ashes, incinerator ash, incinerator residue, street cleanings, municipal and industrial sludges, solid commercial and solid industrial waste, and animal waste other than organic waste generated in the production of livestock and poultry." MCL 324.11506(1).

Returning to your question and applying these statutory definitions, a facility that uses biomass or municipal solid waste to produce electricity falls within the definition of "renewable energy system," and may qualify for a "renewable energy credit" under section 39 of the CREEA, MCL 460.1039, provided that the facility meets any other requirement of the Act, and is not otherwise precluded from receiving the energy credits.

Section 11 of the Act does except certain facilities from qualifying as a renewable energy system:

> (k) "Renewable energy system" . . . *does not include* any of the following:
>
> (i) A hydroelectric pumped storage facility.
>
> (ii) A hydroelectric facility that uses a dam constructed after the effective date of this act unless the dam is a repair or replacement of a dam in existence on the effective date of this act or an upgrade of a dam in existence on the effective date of this act that increases its energy efficiency.
>
> (iii) An *incinerator* unless the incinerator is a municipal solid waste incinerator as defined in section 11504 of the natural resources and environmental protection act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.11504, that was brought into service before the effective date of this act, including the following:
>
> (A) Any upgrade of such an incinerator that increases energy efficiency.
>
> (B) Any expansion of such an incinerator before the effective date of this act.
>
> (C) Any expansion of such an incinerator on or after the effective date of this act to an approximate design rated capacity of not more than 950 tons per day pursuant to the terms of a final request for proposal issued on or before October 1, 1986. [MCL 460.1011(k); emphasis added.]

This section only excludes certain hydroelectric facilities and incinerators other than municipal solid waste incinerators that pre-exist the effective date of the CREEA, from qualifying as a renewable energy system. This raises the question regarding whether a plasma arc gasification facility is an "incinerator" for purposes of the prohibition in section 11.

Unlike the terms "gasification facility" and "plasma arc gasification facility," the CREEA does not define the term "incinerator." The Act does, however, incorporate the definition of "municipal solid waste incinerator" from Part 115 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA). MCL 324.11504(7) provides that a "municipal solid waste incinerator" is a facility that "burns" waste, and defines "municipal solid waste incinerator ash" to mean "the substances remaining after *combustion* in a municipal solid waste incinerator." MCL 324.11504(8) (emphasis added).[4] Thus, a municipal solid waste incinerator is a facility that burns or combusts waste reducing the waste to ashes.

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[4] Administrative rules promulgated under Part 115 of the NREPA define "incinerator" to mean "a device which is specifically designed for the destruction, by *burning*, of garbage or other combustible refuse or waste material, or both, and in which the products of combustion are emitted into the outer air by passing through a stack or chimney." 1999 AACS, R 299.4103(m) (emphasis added).

As defined in the CREEA, a "gasification facility," including a "plasma arc gasification facility," uses a "thermochemical" process other than "direct combustion" to generate electricity. MCL 460.1007(a). In contrast to the definition of "municipal solid waste incinerator" adopted from Part 115 of the NREPA, MCL 324.11504(7), the definition of "gasification facility" does not refer to "incineration" or "burning." Based on these specific definitions, the Legislature distinguished gasification facilities from incinerators. Accordingly, gasification facilities, or more specifically plasma arc gasification facilities, are not expressly excluded from qualifying as a renewable energy system. See, e.g., *Miller v Allstate Ins Co*, 481 Mich 601, 611; 751 NW2d 463 (2008) (under the well-established rule of *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another").

Had the Legislature intended to preclude gasification facilities from qualifying as a renewable energy system it could have done so. The Legislature did not. Moreover, section 43(1) of the CREEA expressly recognizes that gasification facilities may qualify as a renewable energy system eligible to receive renewable energy credits:

> If a facility or system, such as a *gasification facility* using biomass as feedstock, qualifies as both an advanced cleaner energy system and *a renewable energy system*, at the owner's option, either an advanced cleaner energy credit or a renewable energy credit, but not both, may be granted for any given megawatt hour of electricity generated by the facility or system. [MCL 460.1043(1); emphasis added.][5]

In addition, the definition of "gasification facility" expressly contemplates that such a facility may use "municipal solid waste" and "biomass" as feedstock. MCL 460.1007(a). Reading all of the statutes together, and in harmony with one another, leads to the conclusion that a plasma arc gasification facility that uses municipal solid waste or biomass as feedstock may qualify as a "renewable energy system" eligible to receive "renewable energy credits" provided that it meets the remaining conditions set forth in section 39, MCL 460.1039, and elsewhere, in the Act.[6]

It is my opinion, therefore, that a gasification facility, including a plasma arc gasification facility, that uses municipal solid waste or biomass as feedstock may qualify as a renewable energy system eligible to receive renewable energy credits under Michigan's Clean, Renewable, and Efficient Energy Act, 2008 PA 295, MCL 460.1001 *et seq*, provided that the facility meets the other requirements of that Act.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

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[5] Notably, as indicated in section 43(1), gasification facilities may also qualify as "advanced cleaner energy systems," MCL 460.1003(c)(i), and may earn "advanced cleaner energy credits," MCL 460.1003(b), that may be traded, sold, or transferred. MCL 460.1043(3).

[6] This opinion does not address other legal requirements regulating the construction and operation of a gasification facility, such as, permitting under Part 55 of the NREPA, Air Pollution Control, MCL 324.5501 *et seq.*

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT: School district contracts for noninstructional support services

PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYERS:

SCHOOL DISTRICTS:

Under section 15(3)(f) of the Public Employment Relations Act, MCL 423.215(3)(f), as amended by 2009 PA 201, if, and only if, the public school employer decides that the bargaining unit that represents employees providing noninstructional support services will be given an opportunity to bid on a third-party contract for those services on an equal basis as other bidders, the subjects of (1) the decision of whether to contract with a third party for one or more noninstructional support services, (2) the procedures for obtaining the contract for noninstructional support services, (3) the identity of the third party, and (4) the impact of the contract on individual employees or the bargaining unit, are prohibited subjects of collective bargaining. Section 15(3)(f) does not, however, prohibit collective bargaining over the ability of the bargaining unit to have an opportunity to bid on a contract for those services on an equal basis as other bidders, should the public school employer decide to contract with a third party for one or more noninstructional support services.

Opinion No. 7249 June 15, 2010

Honorable Wayne Kuipers
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, MI

You have asked several questions concerning 2009 PA 201, which amended section 15 of the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act (PERA), MCL 423.201 *et seq.*

Materials included with your request reveal that school districts around the State have received letters from various bargaining units asking to bargain over the bidding process the school district uses to contract with a third party for noninstructional support services.[1] These units seek to bargain the specific content of any Request for Proposal (RFP) the school district develops for noninstructional support services; the procedures to be followed if and when bidding occurs; the scope of the contract between the school district and any potential third-party bidder; the administrative oversight to be provided; and any other matter concerning the overall bidding process. The bargaining units point to section 15(3)(f) of PERA, MCL 423.215(3)(f), in support of their argument.

You ask whether section 15(3)(f) of PERA, as recently amended, allows bargaining units to use the collective bargaining process to help craft an RFP, and otherwise assist in developing the competitive bidding process for noninstructional support services in Michigan public school districts, and then bid on the RFP. You also ask whether such involvement in developing the bidding process would preclude the bar-

[1] Noninstructional support services include transportation, food services, and custodial or maintenance services.

gaining unit from then bidding on the contract, "on an 'equal basis' as other bidders," as provided in section 15(3)(f) of PERA.

Before the 2009 amendment to PERA, bargaining units had no legal right to bid on any contract for noninstructional support services, and this was a prohibited subject of collective bargaining. Section 15 of PERA, as amended by 1994 PA 112, provided in relevant part:

> (2) A public school employer has the responsibility, authority, and right to manage and direct on behalf of the public the operations and activities of the public schools under its control.
>
> (3) Collective bargaining between a public school employer and a bargaining representative of its employees *shall not include* any of the following subjects:
>
> * * *
>
> (f) The decision of whether or not to contract with a third party for 1 or more noninstructional support services; or the procedures for obtaining the contract; or the identity of the third party; or the impact of the contract on individual employees or the bargaining unit.
>
> * * *
>
> (4) The matters described in subsection (3) are *prohibited subjects of bargaining* between a public school employer and a bargaining representative of its employees, and, for the purposes of this act, are within the sole authority of the public school employer to decide. [Emphasis added.]

Section 15 of PERA was amended by 2009 PA 201, one of five bills tie-barred in a school reform package, commonly known as the Race to the Top legislation.[2] 2009 PA 201 added the following italicized language to section 15 of PERA, MCL 423.215, which now provides in pertinent part:

> (2) A public school employer has the responsibility, authority, and right to manage and direct on behalf of the public the operations and activities of the public schools under its control.
>
> (3) Collective bargaining between a public school employer and a bargaining representative of its employees shall not include any of the following subjects:
>
> * * *

[2] The Race to the Top fund is a competitive federal grant program created under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The program is designed to encourage and reward States that are creating the conditions for education innovation and reform; achieving significant achievements in student outcomes; and implementing ambitious plans in core education reform areas. (Race to the Top Program Executive Summary, U.S. Department of Education, November 2009, p 2.) See <http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf> (accessed June 3, 2010).

(f) The decision of whether or not to contract with a third party for 1 or more noninstructional support services; or the procedures for obtaining the contract for noninstructional support services *other than bidding described in this subdivision;* or the identity of the third party; or the impact of the contract for noninstructional support services on individual employees or the bargaining unit. *However, this subdivision applies only if the bargaining unit that is providing the noninstructional support services is given an opportunity to bid on the contract for the noninstructional support services on an equal basis as other bidders*.

* * *

(4) *Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3)(f),* the matters described in subsection (3) are prohibited subjects of bargaining between a public school employer and a bargaining representative of its employees, and, for the purposes of this act, are within the sole authority of the public school employer to decide. [Emphasis added.]

Before the 2009 PA 201 amendment, the first sentence of subdivision (f) listed four items that were prohibited subjects of collective bargaining: (1) "the decision of whether or not to contract with a third party for 1 or more noninstructional support services;" (2) "the procedures for obtaining the contract;" (3) "the identity of the third party;" and (4) "the impact of the contract on individual employees or the bargaining unit." The italicized words added to the first sentence by 2009 PA 201 created an exception listed in the second prohibited subject of bargaining, "other than bidding described in this subdivision." You ask what that exception means.

The answer to your question requires the application of several rules of statutory construction. The foremost rule of statutory construction requires courts to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. *Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare System*, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). The statutory language must be read and understood in its grammatical context, unless it is clear that something different was intended. *Herman v Berrien County,* 481 Mich 352, 366; 750 NW2d 570 (2008). Courts consider the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase and its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme. *Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward*, 460 Mich 230, 237; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). Statutory provisions are not to be read in isolation; rather, context matters, and statutory provisions must be read as a whole. *Robinson v City of Lansing*, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (April 8, 2010), (Docket No. 138669), 2010 Mich LEXIS 694, p 22. "It is the general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation." *Kales v City of Oak Park*, 315 Mich 266, 271; 23 NW2d 658 (1946), quoting *Hopkins v Hopkins*, 287 Mass 542; 192 NE 145; 95 ALR 1286 (1934). Amendments of a statute must be construed harmoniously with other provisions of the statute, and a change in the statutory language is presumed to reflect a change in meaning. *Michigan Millers Mut Ins Co v West Detroit Bldg Co*, 196 Mich App 367, 373; 494 NW2d 1 (1992). Courts presume that every word of a statute should be given meaning and no word should be treated as surplusage or rendered nugatory if at all possible. *Altman v Meridian Charter Twp*, 439 Mich 623, 635; 487 NW2d 155 (1992).

The exception in question appears in the first sentence of subdivision (f) as an exception to the second-listed prohibited subject of collective bargaining: "the pro-

cedures for obtaining the contract for noninstructional support services *other than bidding described in this subdivision.*" Grammatically, given its placement in the sentence, the exception is to that second-listed prohibited subject – not to the other three prohibited subjects of collective bargaining.

To fully discern the meaning of the exception, however, consideration must be given to the second sentence of subdivision (f) that was also added by 2009 PA 201:

> (3) Collective bargaining between a public school employer and a bargaining representative of its employees shall not include any of the following subjects:
>
> * * *
>
> (f) The decision of whether or not to contract with a third party for 1 or more noninstructional support services; or the procedures for obtaining the contract for noninstructional support services other than bidding described in this subdivision; or the identity of the third party; or the impact of the contract for noninstructional support services on individual employees or the bargaining unit. *However, this subdivision applies only if the bargaining unit that is providing the noninstructional support services is given an opportunity to bid on the contract for the noninstructional support services on an equal basis as other bidders*. [MCL 423.215(3)(f); emphasis added].

The plain language of that second sentence provides a condition that must be satisfied before the prohibitions in the first sentence apply: "[T]he bargaining unit that is providing the noninstructional support services [must be] given an opportunity to bid on the contract for the noninstructional support services on an equal basis as other bidders." Stated differently, unless the bargaining unit is given an opportunity to bid on an equal basis as other bidders, none of the prohibited subjects of collective bargaining in subdivision (f) apply.

Standing alone, the language of the second sentence allows the public school employer to decide *whether* to allow the bargaining unit to bid on an equal basis. Deciding how to select a third party to provide noninstructional support services, including whether to adopt a process in which the bargaining unit will be allowed to bid on an equal basis with other bidders, falls within "the procedures for obtaining the contract for noninstructional support services" – a prohibited subject of collective bargaining under the first sentence of subdivision (f). By inserting the words, "other than bidding described in this subdivision," the Legislature carved out an exception to that particular prohibited subject of collective bargaining. The only "bidding described in this subdivision," is the bidding described in the second sentence. There are no other references to bidding in subdivision (f). Thus, subdivision (f) does not prohibit collective bargaining on the narrow subject of *whether* a public school employer that decides to contract with a third party for noninstructional support services will allow the bargaining unit to bid on the contract on an equal basis as other bidders. With that narrow exception, if the bargaining unit that is providing the noninstructional support services is given an opportunity to bid on the contract for those services on an equal basis as other bidders – whether as a consequence of collective

bargaining or otherwise – the prohibitions against collective bargaining on the four listed subjects in subdivision (f) apply.[3]

The legislative intention to otherwise retain the prohibitions against collective bargaining on the subjects listed in subdivision (f) is shown not only by the plain language of that subdivision, but by the introductory clause added by 2009 PA 201 to subsection (4), and the remainder of subsection (4), which recognized the newly-created exception and the retention otherwise of the prohibitions:

> (4) *Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3)(f), the matters described in subsection (3) are prohibited subjects of bargaining* between a public school employer and a bargaining representative of its employees, and, for the purposes of this act, are within the sole authority of the public school employer to decide. [Emphasis added.]

Finally, if the collective bargaining units were allowed to bargain over all of the procedures for obtaining a contract for noninstructional support services, or more, it would be impossible for them to participate in bidding on the contract, "on an equal basis as other bidders." The procedures developed in that collective bargaining process would create the appearance, if not the substance, of a competitive advantage for the collective bargaining unit. That would render subdivision (f) meaningless because its prohibitions only apply if the bargaining unit is given an opportunity to bid on an *equal* basis as other bidders.

It is my opinion, therefore, that under section 15(3)(f) of the Public Employment Relations Act, MCL 423.215(3)(f), as amended by 2009 PA 201, if, and only if, the public school employer decides that the bargaining unit that represents employees providing noninstructional support services will be given an opportunity to bid on a third-party contract for those services on an equal basis as other bidders, the subjects of (1) the decision of whether to contract with a third party for one or more noninstructional support services, (2) the procedures for obtaining the contract for noninstructional support services, (3) the identity of the third party, and (4) the impact of the contract on individual employees or the bargaining unit, are prohibited subjects of collective bargaining. Section 15(3)(f) does not, however, prohibit collective bargaining over the ability of the bargaining unit to have an opportunity to bid on a contract for those services on an equal basis as other bidders, should the public school employer decide to contract with a third party for one or more noninstructional support services.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

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[3] This construction of the statute is consistent with the events leading to passage of HB 4788 by the House and Senate and signed into law as 2009 PA 201. The House passed HB 4788 on June 25, 2009, with the language of MCL 423.215(3)(f) completely stricken. This would have eliminated the four listed prohibited subjects of collective bargaining. On December 9, 2009, the Senate passed a version of HB 4788 with MCL 423.215(3)(f) reinstated. The bill was referred to the conference committee. 2009 Journal of the House 2572 (No. 110, December 17, 2009). On December 19, 2009, the Senate adopted the conference report with the amendatory language in section 15(3). 2009 Journal of the Senate 2547 (No. 106, December 19, 2009). The amended language thus appears to be a compromise between the House, which favored deleting the prohibitions of section 15(3)(f) entirely, and the Senate, which favored retaining all of section 15(3)(f), with no exceptions.

MEDICAL MARIHUANA ACT: Authority of Michigan Department of Community Health to enter into an agreement with a private or public contractor for the purpose of administering the Medical Marihuana Program

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH:

The Michigan Medical Marihuana Act, Initiated Law 1 of 2008, MCL 333.26421 *et seq,* does not prohibit the Department of Community Health from entering into an agreement or contract with an outside vendor to assist the department in processing applications, eligibility determinations, and the issuance of identification cards to patients and caregivers, if the Department of Community Health retains its authority to approve or deny issuance of registry identification cards.

2009 AACS, R 333.121(2) promulgated by the Department of Community Health under the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act, Initiated Law 1 of 2008, MCL 333.26421 *et seq,* which provides that the confidential information "may only be accessed or released to authorized employees of the department," prevents the Department of Community Health from entering into a contract with an outside vendor to process registry applications or renewals.

Opinion No. 7250 August 31, 2010

Honorable Roger Kahn, M.D.
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48909

You have asked two questions regarding the authority of the Michigan Department of Community Health (DCH) to contract out certain of its responsibilities under the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMA or Act), Initiated Law 1 of 2008, MCL 333.26421 *et seq.*

The MMA was an initiative approved by a majority of Michigan voters in November 2008, and which became effective December 4, 2008. See Const 1963, art 2, § 9. Under the MMA, "[t]he medical use of marihuana is allowed under state law to the extent that it is carried out in accordance with the provisions of this act." MCL 333.26427(a). The Act protects qualifying patients with debilitating medical conditions, and their primary caregivers, if any, from arrest, prosecution, and penalty for the medicinal use of a limited amount of marihuana in accordance with the MMA. MCL 333.26424(d)(1) and (2). In order to receive the protections of the MMA, patients and caregivers must apply for and receive a registry identification card issued by DCH. MCL 333.26424(a).

You ask whether DCH is prohibited under the MMA from contracting with an outside vendor to handle the processing of applications, eligibility determinations, and the issuance of registry identification cards to patients and caregivers.

Because the Act was a citizen initiative under Const 1963, art 2, § 9, it must be interpreted in light of the rules governing the construction of citizen initiatives. "There is no essential difference in the construction of statutes enacted directly by the people and those enacted by the Legislature." OAG, 1985-1986, No 6370, pp 310, 313-314 (June 10, 1986). "[A] study of all of the provisions of the initiated statute" may reveal the intent of the electorate. *Id.*

The key inquiry in construing an initiative is "the collective intent of the people," and the people's intent may be measured by their "common understanding . . . of the purpose of the initiated law." *Id*. The language of the ballot proposal itself and, when appropriate, the arguments set forth during the campaign regarding the initiative should be consulted in discerning the people's intent. *Id*.

The Michigan Court of Appeals has explained that initiatives should be "liberally construed to effectuate their purposes" and to "facilitate rather than hamper the exercise of reserved rights by the people." *Welch Foods v Attorney General*, 213 Mich App 459, 461; 540 NW2d 693 (1995). In addition, the words of an initiated law should be given their "ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by the voters." *Id.* To the extent that the initiative contains any ambiguity, it must be constructed in light of the purpose of the initiative. *Id.* at 462.

The MMA is silent with respect to whether DCH may contract with a third party to carry out its duties to process applications and issue registry identification cards. The Act defines the term "department" as used in the Act to mean "the state department of community health," or DCH. MCL 333.26423(b). Section 6(a) of the Act provides, in part, that "[t]he department shall issue registry identification cards to qualifying patients . . . ." MCL 333.26426(a). Section 6(c) states that "[t]he department shall verify the information contained in an application or renewal submitted pursuant to this section, and shall approve or deny an application or renewal within 15 days of receiving it." MCL 333.26426(c). Similarly, section 6(e) directs that "[t]he department shall issue registry identification cards within 5 days of approving an application or renewal, which shall expire 1 year after the date of issuance." MCL 333.26426(e). Nowhere in the language of these sections – or the other relevant provisions of the Act – does the MMA refer to or authorize an entity other than DCH to perform its statutory duties.

However, by specifically designating DCH as the state department charged with carrying out the duties of the MMA, the Act implicitly incorporated the administrative or ministerial powers and authority that enable the department to function as a department. Part 22 of the Public Health Code (Code), 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.2201 through 333.2264, describes the general powers and duties of the Department of Public Health, now DCH, and its director. MCL 333.2226(c) provides that "[t]he department may" "[e]nter into an agreement, contract, or arrangement with governmental entities or other persons necessary or appropriate to assist the department in carrying out its duties and functions." This section clearly authorizes DCH to engage the services of a third party to assist the department in performing its duties.[1] Pursuant to the MMA, the processing and issuance of medical marihuana registry identification cards are now duties or functions of DCH. Reading the Act and section 2226(c) of the Code in harmony with one another leads to the reasonable conclusion that DCH may exercise its authority to contract with a third party to assist the department in carrying out its new functions and duties under the MMA. See, e.g., *Edmond v Dep't of Corrections*, 254 Mich App 154, 157-158; 656 NW2d 842 (2002).

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[1] Notably, this section does not restrict its application to duties or functions assigned by the Code, as other sections do. See MCL 333.2205(1), which states "[a] function assigned by this code to the department vests in the director or in an employee or agent of the department designated by the director, or in any employee or agent of the department who is assigned the function in accordance with internal administrative procedures of the department established by the director."

This interpretation is consistent with the principle that initiatives should be "liberally construed to effectuate their purposes" and to "facilitate rather than hamper the exercise of reserved rights by the people." *Welch Foods*, 213 Mich App at 461. Allowing DCH to utilize an outside vendor to process registry applications furthers the purpose of the Act by helping ensure the efficient processing of current and future applications and renewals.

There is a caveat, however. While DCH may enter into an agreement with an outside vendor to "assist" the Department in processing registry applications, DCH cannot delegate its discretionary authority to make a final determination with respect to the issuance of registry identification cards. In OAG, 1979-1980, No 5639, p 580 (January 31, 1980), the Attorney General concluded that the Barrier Free Design Board could not delegate its duties to grant or deny exceptions to the barrier free design requirements "because administrative agencies may not delegate the exercise of discretionary acts unless they have been granted legislative authority to do so." *Id.* at 581. The Barrier Free Design Board had not been granted such authority.

Similarly, the MMA only empowers DCH to grant or deny applications for registry identification cards. Thus, it would constitute an improper delegation of the department's authority if an outside vendor were charged with the ultimate task of granting or denying registry identification cards. Ultimately DCH – through its authorized employees – must make the final decision whether to grant or deny an identification card under the Act. DCH, however, may delegate "ministerial duties" such as receiving and processing patient applications to an outside vendor. *Id.*

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your first question, that the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act, Initiated Law 1 of 2008, MCL 333.26421 *et seq,* does not prohibit the Department of Community Health from entering into an agreement or contract with an outside vendor to assist the department in processing applications, eligibility determinations, and the issuance of identification cards to patients and caregivers, if the Department of Community Health retains its authority to approve or deny issuance of registry identification cards.

You next ask whether the confidentiality provisions in the MMA have the effect of preventing DCH from entering into a contract with an outside vendor for the purpose of assisting the department in administering the Medical Marihuana program.

The MMA's confidentiality provisions apply to a "person," including DCH and other state agencies and local units of government, as well as law enforcement agencies. Section 6(h) of the Act specifically describes the information deemed confidential or expressly exempted from public disclosure:

> (1) Applications and supporting information submitted by qualifying patients, including information regarding their primary caregivers and physicians, are confidential.
>
> (2) The department shall maintain a confidential list of the persons to whom the department has issued registry identification cards. Individual names and other identifying information on the list is confidential and is exempt from disclosure under the freedom of information act, 1976 PA 442, MCL 15.231 to 15.246.
>
> (3) The department shall verify to law enforcement personnel whether a registry identification card is valid, without disclosing more information than is reasonably necessary to verify the authenticity of the registry identification card.

> (4) A person, including an employee or official of the department or another state agency or local unit of government, who discloses confidential information in violation of this act is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or both. [MCL 333.26426(h).][2]

While names, other personal identifying information, applications and information regarding patients, primary caregivers or physicians are deemed confidential and must not be disclosed contrary to the Act, DCH is implicitly authorized to disclose this information to the extent necessary to fully perform its duties under the Act.[3] For example, in verifying the information contained in the application, DCH would need to disclose the name of the applicant to the physician listed on the application. Similarly, the MMA would not prohibit DCH from sharing the information with an outside vendor under contract with DCH to assist it in carrying out the application and registration process, so long as the contractual arrangement protected the confidentiality of the information. Under the MMA, any person who gains access to the confidential information would be required to protect its confidentiality under threat of criminal fines and incarceration: "A person . . . who discloses confidential information in violation of this act is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or both." MCL 333.26426(h)(4).

DCH has addressed the subject of confidentiality in duly promulgated administrative rules. Section 5(b) of the MMA provides that: "the department shall promulgate rules . . . that govern the manner in which it shall consider applications for and renewals of registry identification cards for qualifying patients and primary caregivers." MCL 333.26425(b). Acting under that authority, DCH promulgated the following rule to implement the requirement to keep information confidential:

> (1) Except as provided in subrules (2) and (3) of this rule, Michigan medical marihuana program information shall be confidential and not subject to disclosure in any form or manner. Program information includes, but is not limited to, all of the following:
>
> (a) Applications and supporting information submitted by qualifying patients.
>
> (b) Information related to a qualifying patient's primary caregiver.
>
> (c) Names and other identifying information of registry identification cardholders.

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[2] The MMA does require DCH to make public, via an annual report to the Legislature, certain information:

> (1) The number of applications filed for registry identification cards.
> (2) The number of qualifying patients and primary caregivers approved in each county.
> (3) The nature of the debilitating medical conditions of the qualifying patients.
> (4) The number of registry identification cards revoked.
> (5) The number of physicians providing written certifications for qualifying patients. [MCL 333.26426(i).]

[3] The Supreme Court has ruled: "The absence of an explicit grant of authority is not dispositive. This Court, in *Coffman v State Bd of Examiners in Optometry*, 331 Mich 582, 590; 50 NW2d 322 (1951), said 'powers [of administrative boards] are limited by the statutes creating them to those conferred expressly *or by necessary or fair implication*.' Quoting 42 Am Jur, § 26, pp 316 ff (emphasis added)." *Public Health Dep't v Rivergate Manor*, 452 Mich 495, 503; 550 NW2d 515 (1996).

(d) Names and other identifying information of pending applicants and their primary caregivers.

(2) *Names and other identifying information made confidential* under subrule (1) of this rule *may only be accessed or released to authorized employees of the department as necessary to perform official duties of the department* pursuant to the act, including the production of any reports of non-identifying aggregate data or statistics.

(3) The department shall verify upon a request by law enforcement personnel whether a registry identification card is valid, without disclosing more information than is reasonably necessary to verify the authenticity of the registry identification card.

(4) The department may release information to other persons only upon receipt of a properly executed release of information signed by all individuals with legal authority to waive confidentiality regarding that information, whether a registered qualifying patient, a qualifying patient's parent or legal guardian, or a qualifying patient's registered primary caregiver. The release of information shall specify what information the department is authorized to release and to whom. [2009 AACS, R 333.121; emphasis added.]

The plain terms of the rule only allow employees of DCH to have access to the confidential information as necessary to perform the department's duties under the MMA, which include the processing of applications, eligibility determinations and issuance of registry identification cards. An agency is legally bound by its own valid administrative rules. *Detroit Base Coalition for Human Rights v Social Services Dep't*, 431 Mich 172, 189; 428 NW 2d 335 (1988). Accordingly, the next question to be determined is whether R 333.121 is valid.

In *Luttrell v Dep't of Corrections*, 421 Mich 93, 100; 365 NW2d 74 (1984), the Court adopted the following test for determining the validity of agency rules, citing *Chesapeake & Ohio R Co v Public Service Comm*, 59 Mich App 88, 98-99; 228 NW2d 843 (1975):

"Where an agency is empowered to make rules, courts employ a three-fold test to determine the validity of the rules it promulgates: (1) whether the rule is within the matter covered by the enabling statute; (2) if so, whether it complies with the underlying legislative intent; and (3) if it meets the first two requirements, when [*sic*] it is neither arbitrary nor capricious."

An agency's construction of a statute "is entitled to respectful consideration and, if persuasive, should not be overruled without cogent reasons," but "the court's ultimate concern is a proper construction of the plain language of the statute." *In re Rovas Complaint*, 482 Mich 90, 108; 754 NW2d 259 (2008). "[T]he agency's interpretation cannot conflict with the plain meaning of the statute." *Id.*

The MMA provides strict confidentiality requirements, violations of which are criminal offenses. In an effort to ensure compliance with the requirement, subsection (2) of the Rule provides that confidential information may only be accessed or released to DCH *employees* for purposes of performing official duties under the

MMA.[4] That rule would not allow DCH to contract with an outside vendor, giving the vendor's employees access to the confidential information. Although stricter than required by the MMA, the rule is a reasonable implementation of the confidentiality provisions of the MMA and in the absence of any provision providing for release of confidential information to third-party vendors, is not inconsistent with the intent of the voters. Accordingly, DCH may not contract with an outside vendor to process registry applications since it may not give the vendor access to the necessary information.[5]

To remedy this situation, DCH could promulgate a new rule as provided in MCL 24.241 and 24.242, or issue an emergency rule if appropriate under MCL 24.248, to allow DCH to pursue contracts with outside vendors permitting access to confidential information under terms that protect the confidentiality. Alternatively, the Legislature could act to amend or rescind the rule, MCL 24.231(5), 24.251, or specifically amend the MMA to allow DCH to pursue contracts with outside vendors. Const 1963, art 2, § 9.

It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your second question, that 2009 AACS, R 333.121(2) promulgated by the Department of Community Health under the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act, Initiated Law 1 of 2008, MCL 333.26421 *et seq,* which provides that the confidential information "may only be accessed or released to authorized employees of the department," prevents the Department of Community Health from entering into a contract with an outside vendor to process registry applications or renewals.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

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[4] DCH may also disclose confidential information to law enforcement personnel to verify whether an identification card is valid, "without disclosing more information than is reasonably necessary to verify the authenticity of the registry identification card." MCL 333.26426(h)(3).

[5] It is worth observing that R 333.121(4), which authorizes the release of confidential information to additional persons if a waiver is obtained, does not provide a mechanism for allowing DCH to contract with an outside vendor because nothing in the MMA suggests that the processing of an application can be contingent upon a patient's waiver of his or her right to confidentiality. There are also practical concerns with obtaining the necessary waivers from all of the appropriate individuals on a case-by-case basis.

HIGHWAYS: Use of rights-of-way for pedestrian pathways

EASEMENTS:

PEDESTRIAN PATHWAYS:

A pedestrian and bicycle pathway may be established within the right-of-way of a county road built on an easement granted for highway purposes, without first obtaining the consent of each owner of property abutting the highway.

Opinion No. 7251 October 21, 2010

Honorable Jason Allen
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48909-7536

You have asked whether a county road commission must obtain consent from the abutting property owners before establishing a pedestrian and bicycle pathway within the right-of-way of a county road built on an easement granted for highway purposes.

The "use of an easement must be strictly confined to the purposes for which it was granted or reserved." *Delaney v Pond*, 350 Mich 685, 687; 86 NW2d 816 (1957). Determining the purposes to which an easement may be put begins with a review of the text of the instrument conveying that easement. *Little v Kin*, 468 Mich 699, 700; 664 NW2d 749 (2003). Your question refers to an easement granted for "highway purposes," a common description of the purposes for which property is acquired or dedicated for use as a highway.[1]

The general scope of such an easement has long been settled law. In *People v Eaton*, 100 Mich 208, 211; 59 NW 145 (1894), the Michigan Supreme Court addressed whether the statutory authority of a telegraph company to install telegraph poles along a public highway placed "an additional servitude upon the land of the adjacent proprietor," so as to constitute an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation. The Court explained that highway easements are intended to give the general public the largest practicable benefit, and that, absent a restriction, the use of a highway is not restricted to any particular mode of use but is open to all suitable methods of public use:

> Public highways are under legislative control. They are for the use of the public in general, for passage and traffic, without distinction. The restrictions upon their use are only such as are calculated to secure to the general public the largest practicable benefit from the enjoyment of the easement. *When the highway is not restricted in its dedication to some particular mode of use, it is open to all suitable methods*. It has been settled in this State that *lands taken or granted for public highways are so taken or grant-*

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[1] The description "highway purposes," is generally used to describe the property acquired for use as a highway, whether the property is acquired by voluntary conveyance (*Church v State Highway Dep't*, 254 Mich 666; 236 NW 900 (1931)), dedication (*DeFlyer v Oceana County Rd Comm'rs*, 374 Mich 397, 402; 132 NW2d 92 (1965)), statutory user (*Eager v State Hwy Comm'r*, 376 Mich 148, 155; 136 NW2d 16 (1965)), or condemnation (*State Highway Comm'r v Eilender*, 373 Mich 46; 127 NW2d 890 (1964)).

> *ed for all the purposes for which they may be used for the benefit of the public, for the passing and repassing of travelers thereon*, and for the transportation of passengers by stage coach, omnibus, or street cars propelled by horses, steam, or electricity, and that the laying of tracks for such street cars is not an additional servitude upon the lands of adjacent proprietors. [*Eaton*, 100 Mich at 211; citations omitted; emphasis added.]

The Court added that the uses to which highway easements may be put evolve over time, in recognition of technological developments and the changing needs of the public:

> When these lands were taken or granted for public highways, they were not taken or granted for such uses only as might then be expected to be made of them, by the common methods of travel then known, or for the transmission of intelligence by the only methods then in use, but for such methods as the improvement of the country, or the discoveries of future times, might demand. [*Eaton*, 100 Mich at 212-213.]

The Legislature has specifically authorized constitutionally dedicated transportation funds to be used for "nonmotorized transportation." MCL 247.660k(2). In fact, the Legislature recently amended the law to encourage the use of highway rights-of-way by pedestrians and bicyclists. 2010 PA 134 and 135 amended the Michigan Planning Enabling Act, 2008 PA 33, MCL 125.3801 *et seq,* and 1951 PA 51, MCL 247.651 *et seq*, to require planning for such use:

> 2) A master plan shall also include those of the following subjects that reasonably can be considered as pertinent to the future development of the planning jurisdiction:
>
> * * *
>
> (b) The general location, character, and extent of all of the following:
>
> (*i*) *All components of a transportation system and their interconnectivity including* streets and bridges, public transit, *bicycle facilities, pedestrian ways*, freight facilities and routes, port facilities, railroad facilities, and airports, to provide for the safe and efficient movement of people and goods in a manner that is appropriate to the context of the community and, as applicable, considers *all legal users of the public right-of-way*. [MCL 125.3833(2); emphasis added.]

Similarly, MCL 247.660p(1), which requires the development of a "complete streets" model for use by cities and counties, sets forth the following definitions:

> (a) "Complete streets" means *roadways planned, designed, and constructed to provide appropriate access to all legal users* in a manner that promotes safe and efficient movement of people and goods whether by car, truck, transit, assistive device, *foot, or bicycle*.
>
> (b) "Complete streets policy" means a document that provides guidance for the planning, design, and construction of roadways or an interconnected network of transportation facilities being constructed or reconstructed and designated for a transportation purpose that promotes complete streets . . . . [MCL 247.660p(1)(a) and (b); emphasis added.]

Various other statutes recognize that highways may be used by pedestrians and bicyclists. For example, under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, MCL 691.1401 *et seq*, "'[h]ighway' means a public highway, road, or street that is open for public travel and includes bridges, sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, and culverts on the highway." MCL 691.1401(e). Section 60 of the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.1 *et seq*, defines "[s]idewalk" to mean, "that portion of a street between the curb lines, or the lateral lines of roadway, and the adjacent property lines intended for the use of pedestrians." MCL 257.60. Section 655 of the Code requires that: "Where sidewalks are provided, a pedestrian shall not walk upon the main traveled portion of the highway." MCL 257.655. With regard to bicyclists using sidewalks, section 660c(1) provides: "An individual operating a bicycle upon a sidewalk or a pedestrian crosswalk shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians and shall give an audible signal before overtaking and passing a pedestrian." MCL 257.660c(1). Section 656(3) recognizes that paths may be set aside for bicycle use: "The regulations applicable to bicycles under sections 656 to 662 shall apply when a bicycle is operated upon a highway or upon a path set aside for the exclusive use of bicycles, subject to those exceptions stated in sections 656 to 662." MCL 257.656(3).

This Attorney General has opined that nonmotorized facilities that are "reasonably appurtenant" to the portion of a highway designed for motorized vehicles can enhance highway safety by separating the motorized vehicles from bicyclists, hikers, cross-country skiers, and other pedestrians. See OAG, 1979-1980, No 5723, p 837 (June 19, 1980). And in *In re Petition of Carson*, 362 Mich 409, 412; 107 NW2d 902 (1961), the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that a footpath was a contemplated use of a roadway, quoting and adopting the following definition of "highway" from a decision of the Georgia Supreme Court, "[a] highway is a public way open and free to any one who has occasion to pass along it on foot or with any kind of vehicle."[2]

In light of these statutory provisions and precedents, a path for use by pedestrians and bicyclists is a proper use of an easement granted for highway purposes.[3] Because it is a proper use within the scope of an easement granted for highway purposes, a county road commission need not obtain the consent of property owners abutting the easement before establishing a pedestrian and bicycle pathway within the right-of-way.

It is my opinion, therefore, that a pedestrian and bicycle pathway may be established within the right-of-way of a county road built on an easement granted for highway purposes, without first obtaining the consent of each owner of property abutting the highway.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

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[2] *Schlesinger v City of Atlanta*, 161 Ga 148, 159; 129 SE 861 (1925); *Eyde v Eaton County Drain Comm'r*, 427 Mich 271, 283; 398 NW2d 297 (1986) ("A highway easement is in the public and cannot be limited by individual perceptions of what the scope of that easement should be").

[3] Among the other proper uses of highway rights of way are: snowmobiling (MCL 324.82119); parking (*Cleveland v Detroit*, 324 Mich 527, 536; 37 NW2d 625 (1949)); and, above- and below-ground public utilities (Const 1963, art 7, § 29; MCL 247.183; OAG, 1979-1980, No 5746, p 892 (July 25, 1980); *Eyde*, 427 Mich at 286.

POSTSECONDARY ENROLLMENT OPTIONS ACT: Responsibility for conducting criminal history background checks of employees of higher education institutions who provide instruction to K-12 students

REVISED SCHOOL CODE:

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS:

The provisions of the Revised School Code, 1976 PA 451, MCL 380.1 *et seq*, do not impose any obligations on a higher education institution to require criminal history checks or fingerprints of its employees who provide instruction to K-12 students.

The board of a school district or intermediate school district, or the governing body of a public school academy or nonpublic school is obligated to obtain a criminal history check of employees of a higher education institution who provide instruction to any K-12 students if such instruction is provided: 1) pursuant to a contract with the school board or governing body of the K-12 institution; 2) regularly and continuously – on more than an intermittent or sporadic basis; and 3) "at school," meaning "in a classroom [or] elsewhere on school property," as provided in MCL 380.1230a(15).

Opinion No. 7252 October 21, 2010

Honorable Joan Bauer
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48909

You have asked whether higher education institutions that are engaged in providing instruction to K-12 students are required to conduct criminal background checks and obtain fingerprints of their employees who come into contact with K-12 students.

Higher education institutions may provide instruction to high school students who are eligible for dual enrollment under the Postsecondary Enrollment Options Act (PEOA), 1996 PA 160, MCL 388.511 *et seq*. The PEOA provides that eligible high school students may enroll in courses or programs in eligible postsecondary institutions.[1] This is commonly known as "dual enrollment."

In September of 2005, the Governor signed into law a series of public acts, 2005 PA 121-139, that comprise the Michigan School Safety Legislation (School Safety Legislation). Taken together, these acts amended: the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1927 PA 175, MCL 760.1 *et seq*; the Revised School Code, 1976 PA 451, MCL 380.1

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[1] To be considered "eligible," a postsecondary institution must be located in Michigan and must choose to comply with the PEOA. MCL 388.513(1)(e). To be considered an "eligible student," a student must be enrolled in at least one high school class in at least grade 11 in a school district in this State. In addition, a student who has taken the Michigan merit examination must have achieved a qualifying score in all subject areas on the examination, and a student who has not taken the Michigan merit examination must have achieved a qualifying score in all subject areas on a readiness assessment. The student must not have been enrolled in high school for more than four school years. MCL 388.513(1)(f).

et seq; the Teacher Tenure Act, 1937 PA 4, MCL 38.71 *et seq*; and the Sex Offender Registration Act, 1994 PA 295, MCL 28.721 *et seq*. Your question centers on whether higher education institution instructors who teach high school students under the PEOA are subject to the School Safety Legislation.

The PEOA applies to eligible students in grades 11 and 12. MCL 388.513(f). Thus, students in those grades are most likely to come into contact with higher education institution instructors. However, as discussed later, the School Safety Legislation is generally applicable to individuals who work on school property. So this opinion, while most likely relevant to students in grades 11 and 12, is nonetheless applicable to any students in grades K-12.[2]

Provisions of the School Safety Legislation relevant to your question include sections 1230 and 1230a of the Revised School Code, which require the board of a school district or intermediate school district or the governing body of a public school academy or nonpublic school[3] to request a criminal history check from the Michigan State Police upon an offer of initial employment to an individual, or when school officials learn that an individual has been assigned to "regularly and continuously work under contract in any of its schools." MCL 380.1230(1) and MCL 380.1230a(1).[4] The school "shall not . . . allow" the individual to work in its schools until after it has received the results of the criminal records check. The school board is also directed to "require the individual to submit his or her fingerprints to the department of state police for that purpose." MCL 380.1230a(1).[5]

The plain language of section 1230a(1) of the Code specifies two classes of persons subject to the criminal history checks: (1) applicants or individuals hired for full or part-time employment in a school; and (2) individuals who "regularly and continuously work under contract" in a school. Section 1230a(15)(d) defines "[r]egularly and continuously work under contract" to include individuals who work at the school under a direct contract or who work for or own an entity under contract with the school:

> (i) To work *at school* on a more than intermittent or sporadic basis as an owner or employee of an entity that has a contract with a school district, intermediate school district, public school academy, or nonpublic school to provide food, custodial, transportation, counseling, or administrative serv-

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[2] As used in this opinion, "K-12 school" means a public school, public school academy, or nonpublic school as those terms are defined in section 5 of the Revised School Code, MCL 380.5, and the term "K-12 student" means a pupil enrolled and in regular attendance at a public school, public school academy, or nonpublic school.

[3] For ease of reference, "board of a school district or intermediate school district or the governing body of a public school academy or nonpublic school" will be hereafter identified collectively as "school board" throughout this opinion.

[4] MCL 380.1230a imposes the criminal history check requirement for employees or contract workers hired after the legislation took effect. MCL 380.1230g imposed the same obligations on the school board for employees or contract workers already employed as of December 1, 2005, and required those checks to be completed by July 1, 2008. Because the operative time period for MCL 380.1230g has passed, references will be to the requirements imposed by MCL 380.1230a.

[5] The legislation does not address who must pay the fees associated with the background checks. However, the onus is on prospective employees as a condition of employment to supply the State Police with fingerprints and written consent. *Owczarek v Michigan*, 276 Mich App 602, 610; 742 NW2d 380 (2007).

ices, or to provide instructional services to pupils or related and auxiliary services to special education pupils.

(ii) To work *at school* on a more than intermittent or sporadic basis as an individual under a contract with a school district, intermediate school district, public school academy, or nonpublic school to provide food, custodial, transportation, counseling, or administrative services, or to provide instructional services to pupils or related and auxiliary services to special education pupils. [MCL 380.1230a(15)(d)(i) and (ii); emphasis added.]

If the other requirements of the statute are met, employees of higher education institutions who teach courses to any K-12 students at a K-12 school are covered by section 1230a(15)(d) of the Code when they provide instructional services to pupils on a more than intermittent or sporadic basis. The critical statutory element, however, is that the services are provided "at school."

MCL 380.1230a(15) provides:

(a) "At school" means in a classroom, elsewhere on school property, or on a school bus or other school-related vehicle.

* * *

(e) "School property" means that term as defined in section 33 of the sex offenders registration act, 1994 PA 295, MCL 28.733.

MCL 28.733(d) defines school:

"School" means a public, private, denominational, or parochial school offering developmental kindergarten, kindergarten, or any grade from 1 through 12. School does not include a home school.

MCL 28.733(e) defines school property:

"School property" means a building, facility, structure, or real property owned, leased, or otherwise controlled by a school, other than a building, facility, structure, or real property that is no longer in use on a permanent or continuous basis, to which either of the following applies:

(i) It is used to impart educational instruction.

(ii) It is for use by students not more than 19 years of age for sports or other recreational activities.

MCL 380.1230a applies when a school board offers an individual full or part-time employment in any of its schools, or when an individual is initially assigned to regularly and continuously work under contract in any of its schools as provided for in these definitions. The Revised School Code does not apply where the work is not performed on K-12 school property.

The language used by the Legislature in these statutes is plain and unambiguous. Accordingly, construction is neither necessary nor permitted, and the provisions must be enforced as written. *Lash v Traverse City,* 479 Mich 180, 187; 735 NW2d 628 (2007). The school board of a K-12 school is responsible for ensuring compliance with the Student Safety Legislation. The school board is required to request a crim-

inal history check from the Michigan State Police upon an offer of initial employment to an individual, or when school officials learn that an individual has been assigned to regularly and continuously work under contract in any of its schools. The school board must request a criminal records check and must require an individual to submit fingerprints for the purpose of the background check. MCL 380.1230a(1). The school board shall not employ an individual or allow an individual to regularly and continuously work under contract in any of its schools until after it receives the results of the criminal records check. MCL 380.1230a(1).[6]

The Student Safety Legislation does not, however, place any requirements on the higher education institutions to request a criminal history check of its employees who may provide instruction to any K-12 students. By its own terms, the Code is an act to address issues specific to elementary and secondary schools.[7] Thus, in the absence of any provisions imposing obligations on them, higher education institutions that employ individuals who provide instruction to high school students are not required to comply with the Revised School Code, including the provisions requiring criminal history checks.

Although your question pertains to instructional services provided to both post-secondary and K-12 students by instructors from higher education institutions, the criminal record check requirement imposed on a school board by the Code applies to any person who, pursuant to a contract with a school board, provides instructional services to any K-12 students on a regular and continuous basis in a classroom or elsewhere on school property regardless of the purpose of the instruction and irrespective of the service provider who enters into the contract with the school board.

For example, Part 20A of the Code, MCL 380.1471 through 380.1475, allows a school board to provide college level equivalent courses[8] to its students either directly or in cooperation with other educational providers. Nothing in Part 20A suggests that instruction offered under this Part is exempt from the criminal record check requirements for instructors of K-12 students on school property.

It is my opinion, therefore, that the provisions of the Revised School Code, 1976 PA 451, MCL 380.1 *et seq*, do not impose any obligations on a higher education institution to require criminal history checks or fingerprints of its employees who provide instruction to K-12 students.

It is my further opinion, that the board of a school district or intermediate school district, or the governing body of a public school academy or nonpublic school is obligated to obtain a criminal history check of employees of a higher education institution who provide instruction to any K-12 students if such instruction is provided: 1) pursuant to a contract with the school board or governing body of the K-12 insti-

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[6] Although your question pertains to instructional services, per MCL 380.1230a(15)(d), the criminal record check requirement of the Code applies to persons who provide any of the following services at school on a regular and continuous basis pursuant to a contract with a school board: "food, custodial, transportation, counseling, or administrative services, or . . . instructional services to pupils or related and auxiliary services to special education pupils."

[7] See Title to the Code, MCL 380.1, as amended by 1995 PA 289.

[8] A college level equivalent course is "a course offered in high school, for which a pupil receives high school credit, that is taught at a postsecondary instruction level and is designed to prepare a pupil for a college level equivalent credit examination in a particular subject area." MCL 380.1471.

tution; 2) regularly and continuously – on more than an intermittent or sporadic basis; and 3) "at school," meaning "in a classroom [or] elsewhere on school property," as provided in MCL 380.1230a(15).

MIKE COX
Attorney General

FIREARMS: Possession of a firearm that shoots shotgun shells, has not been modified from a shotgun, and has a barrel length of less than 18 inches, and an overall length of less than 26 inches

FIREARMS ACT:

MICHIGAN PENAL CODE:

SHORT-BARRELED SHOTGUN:

A person in Michigan may lawfully possess a weapon that fires shotgun shells; has not been constructed from a modified shotgun; has an overall length of less than 26 inches and a barrel length of less than 18 inches; and is not designed or intended to be fired from the shoulder, if the person complies with the purchase and registration requirements for owning a pistol set forth in the Firearms Act, 1929 PA 372, MCL 28.421 *et seq*.

Opinion No. 7253 October 26, 2010

Honorable Phillip Pavlov
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48909

You ask whether a person may legally own a weapon that fires shotgun shells; was not constructed from a modified shotgun; has an overall length of less than 26 inches and a barrel length of less than 18 inches; and is registered as a pistol.

Answering your question requires addressing two initial issues. The first is whether the weapon you have described is an unlawful short-barreled shotgun. MCL 750.224b(1) provides that "[a] person shall not manufacture, sell, offer for sale, or possess a short-barreled shotgun or short-barreled rifle." Violation of this prohibition is a felony punishable by up to five years imprisonment or a fine of up to $42,500. MCL 750.224b(2).[1] Short-barreled shotgun is defined in MCL 750.222(i) as:

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[1] MCL 750.224b(3) exempts from the prohibition short-barreled shotguns that have been deemed by the United States Secretary of Treasury to be a "curio, relic, antique, museum piece, or collector's item" and not likely to be used as a weapon, and the owner has registered the weapon as a pistol in accordance with MCL 28.422 and 28.422a.

> [A] *shotgun* having 1 or more barrels less than 18 inches in length or a weapon made from a *shotgun*, whether by alteration, modification, or otherwise, if the weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches. [Emphasis added.]

The term "shotgun" is defined as "a firearm designed or redesigned, made or remade, and *intended to be fired from the shoulder* and designed or redesigned and made or remade to use the energy of the explosive in a fixed *shotgun shell* to fire through a smooth bore either a number of ball shot or a single projectile for each single function of the trigger." MCL 750.222(h) (emphasis added).

The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the plain language of the statute. *Brown v Detroit Mayor*, 478 Mich 589, 593; 734 NW2d 514 (2007); *Houdek v Centerville Twp*, 276 Mich App 568, 581; 741 NW2d 587 (2007). "[I]f the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, no interpretation is necessary and the court must follow the clear wording of the statute." *American Alternative Ins Co v Farmers Ins Exchange,* 470 Mich 28, 30; 679 NW2d 306 (2004).

Based on the plain language of the definitions quoted above, an illegal short-barreled shotgun is either a firearm: (1) designed or intended to be fired from the shoulder and having a barrel length of less than 18 inches; or (2) modified from a shotgun to be less than 26 inches in overall length. MCL 750.222(i) and 750.222(h); *People v Walker*, 166 Mich App 299, 301; 420 NW2d 194 (1988). A number of unmodified weapons fire shotgun shells, have barrel lengths of less than 18 inches, but are not designed or intended to be fired from the shoulder, and therefore do not fall within the statutory definition of "short-barreled shotgun."[2] It is, however, illegal to possess a weapon with a barrel length of less than 18 inches or an overall length of less than 26 inches created by modifying a shotgun originally designed or intended to be fired from the shoulder.

The second issue is whether a weapon that fires shotgun shells but does not meet the definition of a shotgun, and which has a barrel length of less than 18 inches and an overall length of less than 26 inches, may be possessed in Michigan. In other words, if such a weapon is not a shotgun, how should it be classified for purposes of ownership in Michigan.

MCL 750.222(e) defines a "pistol" as "a loaded or unloaded *firearm* that is 30 inches or less in length, or a loaded or unloaded firearm that by its construction and appearance conceals itself as a firearm." (Emphasis added.) "Firearm" is defined as "a weapon from which a dangerous projectile may be propelled by an explosive, or by gas or air." MCL 750.222(d).

Based on the plain language of these definitions, the weapon described in your request is plainly a "firearm" since it is a weapon that projects or fires shotgun shells. It also falls within the definition of "pistol" because it is a firearm with an overall length of less than 30 inches. The weapon is not designed or intended to be fired from

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[2] An example of such a weapon is the "Super-Shorty" manufactured by Serbu Firearms, Inc. The company describes the weapon as a short 12-gauge pump shotgun available with pistol grips (its overall length is 16.5 inches), and markets the firearm as being concealable. Its overall design reveals that it is not designed or intended to be fired from the shoulder. See <http://www.serbu.com/top/superShorty.php> (accessed October 20, 2010).

the shoulder and is concealable. This further supports a conclusion that the weapon is a pistol under Michigan law.

As a pistol, the weapon you describe may not be owned or lawfully possessed unless the requirements of the Firearms Act, 1929 PA 372, MCL 28.421 *et seq*, are met. Under that Act, "a person shall not purchase, carry, possess, or transport a pistol in this state without first having obtained a license for the pistol as prescribed in this section." MCL 28.422(1).[3]

It is my opinion, therefore, that a person in Michigan may lawfully possess a weapon that fires shotgun shells; has not been constructed from a modified shotgun; has an overall length of less than 26 inches and a barrel length of less than 18 inches; and is not designed or intended to be fired from the shoulder, if the person complies with the purchase and registration requirements for owning a pistol set forth in the Firearms Act, 1929 PA 372, MCL 28.421 *et seq*.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

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[3] The federal government treats pistols with a smooth barrel as an "any other weapon" (AOW), rather than a pistol. 26 USC 5845(e). However, Michigan law makes no such distinction over barrel rifling. Thus, for federal purposes the weapon is taxed as an AOW, while for state purposes it is a pistol.

CONST 1963, ART 1, § 6: Restrictions on right to bear arms under Const 1963, art 1, § 6

FIREARMS:

NATURAL RESOURCES COMMISSION:

Const 1963, art 1, § 6 provides a constitutional right in Michigan to bear firearms for self defense, subject to reasonable regulation by the State.

The firearm and ammunition restrictions set forth in Wildlife Conservation Order section 2.1(3) dealing with the possession of a rifle or shotgun in areas frequented by deer during the five-day period immediately preceding the beginning of firearm deer season are a reasonable exercise of the State's police power, and do not violate the right to bear arms established by Const 1963, art 1, § 6.

The Legislature may, by statute, amend or repeal the firearm and ammunition restrictions set forth in Wildlife Conservation Order section 2.1(3).

Opinion No. 7254 October 26, 2010

Honorable Michael Prusi
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48909

You have asked two questions regarding a provision within the Wildlife Conservation Order (WCO)[1] that restricts possession of certain firearms and types of ammunition during the five days preceding opening day of Michigan's firearm deer season on November 15.

The WCO is issued under Part 401, Wildlife Conservation, of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.40101 *et seq*. Part 401 vests the authority for managing wild birds and mammals in the Department of Natural Resources and Environment (Department),[2] and the Natural Resources Commission (Commission). Section 40113a of the NREPA, MCL 324.40113a, shifted primary responsibility for one aspect of wildlife management, regulating the taking of game, to the Commission from the Department:

> The commission of natural resources shall have the exclusive authority to regulate the taking of game as defined in section 40103 in this state. The commission of natural resources shall, to the greatest extent practicable, utilize principles of sound scientific management in making decisions

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[1] The Wildlife Conservation Order is actually made up of numerous orders that have been issued and amended over the course of many decades. It may be viewed by accessing the Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment website at: <http://michigan.gov/documents/Wcao_134367_7.html> (accessed August 19, 2010).

[2] All statutory functions and authorities of the former Department of Natural Resources were transferred to the new Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment by Executive Order 2009-45, effective January 17, 2010.

> regarding the taking of game. Issuance of orders by the commission of natural resources regarding the taking of game shall be made following a public meeting and an opportunity for public input. [MCL 324.40113a(2).][3]

The particular provision of the WCO identified in your request is found in Chapter II, section 2.1, which states:

> (1) Unless otherwise specified in this order, a person shall not do any of the following:
>
> * * *
>
> (3) During the five days immediately preceding November 15, transport or possess in an area frequented by deer a rifle or shotgun with buckshot, slug load, ball load, or cut shell. A person may transport a rifle or shotgun to or from a hunting camp if the rifle or shotgun is unloaded and securely encased or carried in the trunk of a vehicle. This section shall not prohibit a resident who holds a fur harvester's license from carrying a rimfire firearm .22 caliber or smaller while hunting or checking a trap line during the open season for hunting or trapping furbearing animals.

The origins of this provision can be found in an amendment to the Game Law, 1929 PA 286, by 1947 PA 326, which stated, in part, in Chapter IV, section 6, 1948 CL 314.6:

> *Provided further*, That during the 5 days immediately preceding the opening of the season for the taking of deer with firearms it shall be unlawful to transport or possess in any area frequented by deer a rifle larger than .22 caliber rim fire, or shotgun with buckshot, or slug load or ball load or cut shell. [Emphasis in original.]

This statutory provision and other sections of the Game Law were repealed by 1980 PA 86, the Hunting and Fishing License Act. That Act, however, included a prohibition similar to 1948 CL 314.6 at Article 8, section 805, MCL 316.805:

> During the 5 days immediately preceding the opening of the earliest season for the taking of deer with firearms, a person shall not transport or possess in any area frequented by deer a rifle or shotgun with buckshot, slug load, ball load, or cut shell. A person may transport a rifle or shotgun to or from a hunting camp if the rifle or shotgun is unloaded and locked in the trunk of a motor vehicle or otherwise inaccessible to an occupant of the motor vehicle from the interior of the vehicle.

The authority of the Commission was later expanded by 1988 PA 256, the Wildlife Conservation Act, which stated that the Commission "shall manage animals in this state," and authorized the Commission to "issue orders" to do so, including orders establishing the lawful time, place, and method of hunting. The Act also required the Commission to issue orders that would take the place of the remaining

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[3] Section 40113a was added to Part 401 by 1996 PA 377. In the past, the Department's and the Commission's authority were indistinguishable because the Commission was the head of the Department. But through a series of Executive Orders, beginning in 1991, the Commission's role has changed, and it now only retains certain authority including authority over the taking of game.

sections of the Game Law, effectively repealing those sections. These changes consolidated the various game regulations under the Commission, and were intended to provide for the more consistent and efficient management of the State's wildlife resources. Senate Fiscal Analysis, SB 374, July 12, 1988, p 1.

Subsequently, many of the regulations in the Hunting and Fishing License Act, 1980 PA 86, were repealed by 1993 PA 144. This included MCL 316.805, which was described as having been superseded by the earlier Wildlife Conservation Act, 1988 PA 256. Senate Fiscal Analysis, SB 147, August 8, 1994, pp 2-3. 1993 PA 144 was signed by the Governor on August 13, 1993, and took immediate effect. On September 9, 1993, the Department issued amendment 19 to the WCO, adding section 2.1(3).

This history reveals that the ammunition and firearm restrictions set forth in section 2.1(3), or at least similar provisions, have been in force since 1947. As your letter acknowledges, the Department's position is that section 2.1(3) was intended to, and does, help prevent the poaching of deer during the five days preceding opening day. This intent is demonstrated by the fact that the types of ammunition and firearms subject to the five-day period are those typically used when hunting deer. Furthermore, embedded within the protection against poaching immediately before the season opens are the concepts of fair play and a level playing field for hunters. The restriction helps ensure that all hunters enter the season with an equal opportunity for the taking of game.

You first ask whether this provision of the WCO violates an individual's right to bear arms as established by Const 1963, art 1, § 6.

Section 6 states: "Every person has a right to keep and bear arms for the defense of himself and the state." Const 1963, art 1, § 6. It was preceded by Const 1908, art 2, § 5, which provided: "Every person has a right to bear arms for the defense of himself and the state." Because of the similarity of the provisions and since the Convention Comment to Const 1963, art 1, § 6 indicates no intent to reduce the protection of the right to bear arms granted by the 1908 Constitution, the rights guaranteed under both provisions have been viewed as identical. *People v Swint*, 225 Mich App 353, 359, n 2; 572 NW 2d 666 (1997).

Const 1963, art 1, § 6 is similar to the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides that "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." In *McDonald v Chicago*, 561 US ___; 130 S Ct 3020, 3042; 177 L Ed 2d 894, 921 (2010), the United States Supreme Court confirmed that this provision provides a "fundamental" and "basic" right of self defense, and that it is applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution:

> In sum, it is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.

In reaching that conclusion, however, the Supreme Court recognized that the right was not without limits. Quoting from its decision in *District of Columbia v Heller*, 554 US ___; 128 S Ct 2783; 171 L Ed 2d 637 (2008), the *McDonald* Court stated:

> It is important to keep in mind that *Heller*, while striking down a law that prohibited the possession of handguns in the home, recognized that the

> right to keep and bear arms is not "a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose." 554 US, at ___; 128 S Ct 2783; 171 L Ed 2d at 678. We made it clear in *Heller* that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as "prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill," "laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms." *Id*., at ___; 128 S Ct 2783; 171 L Ed 2d at 678. We repeat those assurances here.

Consistent with *McDonald*, the Michigan Supreme Court construed former Const 1908, art 2, § 5, which created a right to bear arms for specific purposes, as being subject to the reasonable exercise of the State's police power. In *People v Brown*, 253 Mich 537, 539-541; 235 NW 245 (1931) (citations omitted), the Court observed:

> It is generally recognized that the constitutional declaration, in both Federal and State constitutions, of the right to bear arms had its origin in the fear of the American colonists of a standing army and its use to oppress the people, and in their attachment to a militia composed of all able-bodied men. Probably the necessity of self-protection in a frontier society also was a factor.
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> * * *
>
> *The protection of the Constitution is not limited to militiamen nor military purposes, in terms, but extends to "every person" to bear arms for the "defense of himself" as well as of the State.* This includes the right of a foreigner to possess a revolver for the legitimate defense of his person and property, *subject, however, to the valid exercise of the police power of the State to regulate the carrying of firearms.* [Emphasis added.]

More recently, the Court of Appeals in *People v Swint*, recognizing the State's police power, upheld as constitutional under Const 1963, art 1, § 6, a statute that restricted the right of felons to possess firearms.

Applying the *Brown* and *Swint* Courts' reasoning to the WCO's prohibition on possessing certain types of firearms and ammunition in the field before the opening day of deer season, the restriction does not violate Const 1963, art 1, § 6. The WCO imposes a restriction of short duration that only applies to a limited number of specifically described firearms and ammunition, which are typically used to hunt deer. A person subject to section 2.1(3) may otherwise possess a handgun for self defense. Consequently, the WCO would not violate the Second Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in *Heller* and *McDonald*. As there is a legitimate police power justification for the WCO – the prevention of poaching and the assurance of a level playing field for all hunters awaiting opening day – and it only places reasonable limits on the right to carry firearms, it is not unconstitutional.

It is my opinion, therefore, that Const 1963, art 1, § 6 provides a constitutional right in Michigan to bear firearms for self defense, subject to reasonable regulation by the State. The firearm and ammunition restrictions set forth in Wildlife Conservation Order section 2.1(3) dealing with the possession of a rifle or shotgun in areas frequented by deer during the five-day period immediately preceding the begin-

ning of firearm deer season are a reasonable exercise of the State's police power, and do not violate the right to bear arms established by Const 1963, art 1 § 6.

You next ask whether the Legislature may "rescind" section 2.1(3) of the WCO by legislation. It is a general rule of law that: "An agency has no inherent power. Any authority it may have is vested by the Legislature, in statutes, or by the Constitution." *Deleeuw v Bd of State Canvassers*, 263 Mich App 497, 500; 688 NW2d 847 (2004), quoting *Belanger & Sons, Inc v Dep't of State,* 176 Mich App 59, 62-63; 438 NW2d 885 (1989).

The Commission's authority to adopt section 2.1(3) is not derived from the Michigan Constitution. The Commission was vested with exclusive authority to regulate the taking of game by the enactment of 1996 PA 377, which was submitted by the Legislature to the electors for vote under the referendum process provided for in Const 1963, art 4, § 34. It was approved by a majority of the electors on November 5, 1996. While a citizen initiated law under art 2, § 9 of the Constitution expressly requires the votes of three-fourths of the members of each house of the legislature to amend or repeal it, art 4, § 34 lacks that requirement and thus laws adopted through referendum may be amended at any time by a simple majority vote of the Legislature:

> No law initiated or adopted by the people shall be subject to the veto power of the governor, and no law adopted by the people at the polls under the initiative provisions of this section shall be amended or repealed, except by a vote of the electors unless otherwise provided in the initiative measure or by three-fourths of the members elected to and serving in each house of the legislature. Laws approved by the people under the referendum provision of this section may be amended by the legislature at any subsequent session thereof. [Const 1963, art 2, § 9.]

OAG, 1997-1998, No 6990, p 161 (August 10, 1998), addressed the Legislature's power to make, amend or repeal a law:

> Const 1963, art 4, § 1, provides that: "The legislative power of the State of Michigan is vested in a senate and a house of representatives." This legislative power has been described as plenary and equivalent to the legislative powers asserted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, except so far as the people of this state have limited it. *Harsha v Detroit*, 261 Mich 586, 590; 246 NW 849 (1933); *Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1976 PA 240*, 400 Mich 311; 254 NW2d 544 (1977); and *Sessa v State Treasurer*, 117 Mich App 46, 54; 323 NW2d 586 (1982).

The Legislature has plenary authority, except where specifically limited by the Constitution. The WCO was issued by the Commission under authority granted it by the Legislature and the voters through the referendum process. That authority can be altered or repealed entirely by the Legislature and the Governor through the process for passage of a bill.[4]

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[4] For example, the Legislature previously used its authority to override a firearms rule promulgated by the then Department of Natural Resources when it enacted 2004 PA 129 and 130. That law exempted persons licensed to carry concealed pistols or otherwise exempt from licensure under 1927 PA 372 from a rule that prohibited the possession of firearms while hunting deer during "bow and arrow" season. Editors Note, OAG, 2003-2004, No 7123, p 4, 7 (February 11, 2003).

It is my opinion, therefore, that the Legislature may, by statute, amend or repeal the firearm and ammunition restrictions set forth in Wildlife Conservation Order section 2.1 (3).

MIKE COX
Attorney General

GENERAL PROPERTY TAX ACT: Acquisition and disposal of real property by county land bank fast track authority

LAND BANK FAST TRACK ACT:

LAND BANK FAST TRACK AUTHORITY:

TAX REVERTED CLEAN TITLE ACT:

A county land bank fast track authority established under the Land Bank Fast Track Act, 2003 PA 258, MCL 124.751, *et seq,* may acquire title to property from a private owner and reconvey that property to the same owner making that property exempt from ad valorem property taxes during the period that title is held by the county land bank fast track authority, and for the five-year period after it is reconveyed. For those tax consequences to attach, the county land bank fast track authority must obtain and reconvey actual title, with recognized indicia of ownership.

Opinion No. 7255 December 17, 2010

Honorable Chuck Moss
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, Michigan

You have asked whether a county land bank fast track authority (county land bank) acting under the Land Bank Fast Track Act, 2003 PA 258, MCL 124.751 *et seq* (Land Bank Act), may acquire property from a private owner, hold that property for a period of time, and then reconvey the property to the same owner, making that property exempt from ad valorem property taxes during the period that title is held by the county land bank, and for a five-year period after it is reconveyed.

The Land Bank Act addressed a "need to strengthen and revitalize the economy of this state and local units of government." MCL 124.752. The Legislature found that it was in the best interests of the State and local units of government to empower local units of government to assemble and dispose of property "in a coordinated manner to foster the development of that property and to promote economic growth." MCL 124.752.

To carry out these purposes, the Legislature created the Michigan Land Bank Fast Track Authority (State Authority) as a public body corporate within the Department of Energy, Labor and Economic Growth, and authorized the State Authority to enter into intergovernmental agreements with local units of government to create local land bank fast track authorities. MCL 124.765, MCL 124.773.[1]

A local county land bank is a public body corporate, MCL 124.773(6)(a), created through an intergovernmental agreement between a county treasurer, acting as a foreclosing governmental unit under section 78(7)(a)(i) and (ii) of the General Property Tax Act, MCL 211.78(7)(a)(i) and (ii), and the State Authority with the approval of the county board of commissioners. If the county has an elected county executive, the concurrence of the county executive is also required. MCL 124.773(4). Subject to the terms of its intergovernmental agreement, a county land bank is authorized to acquire, assemble, dispose of, and quiet title to property in accordance with the Land Bank Act. MCL 124.754, MCL 124.757(1), and MCL 124.773.

Property purchased or acquired by a county land bank, along with its income and operations, "are exempt from all taxation by this state or any of its political subdivisions." MCL 124.754(5), MCL 124.763, and MCL 211.7gg(1). Because the taxable status of real property is determined on December 31 of the immediately preceding year, MCL 211.2(2), property held by a county land bank on December 31st remains exempt from taxes for the ensuing year,[2] even if the property is conveyed to a private party during that year. However, any property conveyed is still subject to MCL 211.181(1), which provides:

> Except as provided in this section, if real property exempt for any reason from ad valorem property taxation is leased, loaned, or otherwise made available to and used by a private individual, association, or corporation in connection with a business conducted for profit, the lessee or user of the real property is subject to taxation in the same amount and to the same extent as though the lessee or user owned the real property.

Additionally, when a county land bank sells or otherwise conveys property, that property becomes exempt from taxation under the General Property Tax Act, "beginning on December 31 in the year in which the property is sold or otherwise conveyed by the land bank fast track authority until December 31 in the year 5 years after the December 31 on which" that exemption commenced. MCL 211.7gg(2). During that five-year time period, however, the property "is subject to the specific tax levied under the tax reverted property clean title act." MCL 211.7gg(4).

Under the Tax Reverted Clean Title Act, MCL 211.1021 *et seq*, the alternative tax is the same amount of tax that would have been collected under the General Property Tax Act, payable at the same time, in the same installments, and to the same officers as taxes imposed under the General Property Tax Act. MCL 211.1025(2). During that five-year period, fifty percent of that tax is payable to the local taxing units, and fifty percent is payable to the county land bank, as provided in the Tax Reverted Clean Title Act. MCL 211.1025(4)(a) and (b).

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[1] An intergovernmental agreement is a contract between governmental agencies. It includes interlocal agreements under the Urban Cooperation Act, MCL 124.501 *et seq*, to jointly exercise any power, privilege, or authority that the agencies share in common and that each might exercise separately. MCL 124.753(h).

[2] "The taxable status of persons and real and personal property for a tax year shall be determined as of each December 31 of the immediately preceding year . . . ." MCL 211.2(2).

Returning to your question, you ask whether a county land bank may acquire property from a private owner, hold that property for a period of time, and then reconvey the property to the same owner, making that property exempt from ad valorem property taxes during the period that title is held by the county land bank, and for a five-year period after it is reconveyed.

As a county agency, a county land bank draws its legal life from the law authorizing its creation. As a creature of the Legislature, it has no power save that which has been conferred by law. *Arrowhead Development Co v Livingston County Rd Comm*, 413 Mich 505, 512; 322 NW2d 702 (1982). In construing the statutory powers of such an agency, the primary goal is to determine and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. If the statute is unambiguous, the plain and ordinary meaning of its words reveals the intent of the Legislature. *Herald Co v Bay City*, 463 Mich 111, 117; 614 NW2d 873 (2000). The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning those words plainly express. *DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp*, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300 (2000).

The Legislature has given specific direction for interpreting the powers of a county land bank under the Land Bank Act. Thus, section 14(1), MCL 124.764(1), directs that the Act is to be construed liberally to effectuate legislative intent and all powers granted shall be broadly interpreted to effectuate the intent and purposes:

> *This act shall be construed liberally to effectuate the legislative intent* and the purposes as complete and independent authorization for the performance of each and every act and thing authorized by this act, *and all powers granted shall be broadly interpreted to effectuate the intent and purposes* and not as a limitation of powers. In the exercise of its powers and duties under this act and its powers relating to property held by the authority, *the authority shall have complete control as fully and completely as if it represented a private property owner* and shall not be subject to restrictions imposed on the authority by the charter, ordinances, or resolutions of a local unit of government. [Emphasis added.][3]

The Land Bank Act expressly authorizes a county land bank to acquire property on terms and conditions that it considers proper for any purpose the land bank considers necessary[4] to carry out the purposes of the Act:

> (1) Except as provided in section 4(8), *an authority may acquire by gift, devise, transfer, exchange, foreclosure, purchase, or otherwise* on terms and conditions and in a manner the authority considers proper, real or personal property, or rights or interests in real or personal property.
>
> (2) Real property acquired by an authority by purchase may be by purchase contract, lease purchase agreement, installment sales contract, land contract, or otherwise, except as provided in section 4(8). *The author-*

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[3] Under the Land Bank Act, the term "authority" means a county land bank fast track authority. MCL 124.753(a).

[4] A county land bank's power to acquire property is not without restriction. It cannot exercise the power of eminent domain. MCL 124.754(8). And it is not authorized to accept "a deed in lieu of foreclosure or sale of the tax lien attributable to taxes levied by a local unit of government or other taxing jurisdiction without the written approval of all taxing jurisdictions and the foreclosing governmental unit that would be affected." MCL 124.756(4). The intergovernmental agreement may further constrain a county land bank's discretion. MCL 124.773(4) and (6).

> *ity may acquire real property or rights or interests in real property for any purpose the authority considers necessary to carry out the purposes of this act*, including, but not limited to, 1 or more of the following purposes:
>
> (a) The use or development of property the authority has otherwise acquired.
>
> (b) To facilitate the assembly of property for sale or lease to any other public or private person, including, but not limited to, a nonprofit or for profit corporation.
>
> (c) To protect or prevent the extinguishing of any lien, including a tax lien, held by the authority or imposed upon property held by the authority. [MCL 124.755(1)-(2); emphasis added.]

Property may be acquired or held by a county land bank from the "state, a foreclosing governmental unit, a local unit of government, an intergovernmental entity . . . or any other public or private person . . . ." MCL 124.755(4).

A county land bank is similarly authorized to dispose of property it has acquired or holds on terms and conditions it considers proper, except as otherwise restricted or provided for by agreement[5]:

> Except as an authority otherwise agrees by intergovernmental agreement or otherwise, on terms and conditions, and in a manner and for an amount of consideration an authority considers proper, fair, and valuable, including for no monetary consideration, the authority may convey, sell, transfer, exchange, lease as lessor, or otherwise dispose of property or rights or interests in property in which the authority holds a legal interest to any public or private person for value determined by the authority. [MCL 124.757(1); emphasis added.]

Under section 4 of the Land Bank Act, a county land bank may do all things necessary or convenient to implement the purposes, objectives, and provisions of this act. MCL 124.754. Numerous express powers are specified, including the following:

> (1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, *an authority may do all things necessary or convenient to implement the purposes, objectives, and provisions of this act*, and the purposes, objectives, and powers delegated to the board of directors of an authority by other laws or executive orders, *including, but not limited to, all of the following*:
>
> * * *
>
> (d) *Enter into contracts and other instruments necessary, incidental, or convenient to the performance of its duties and the exercise of its pow-*

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[5] As with its power to acquire real property, a county land bank's power to dispose of property is not without restriction. For example, it may not assist or expend any funds for the development of a casino. MCL 124.754(6). It may not convey certain contaminated property until the Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment (formerly Department of Environmental Quality) has determined that the acute threat to public health, safety, welfare, or environment has been eliminated and that conveyance will not interfere with any response activities by the department. MCL 124.757(1). The disposition of property by a county land bank may also be limited by the terms of its intergovernmental agreement. Consistent with the Land Bank Act, the terms of an intergovernmental agreement shall provide, for example, for the "distribution of proceeds" received by a county land bank and "[a]ny other matters considered advisable by the participating governmental agencies." MCL 124.773(6)(f) and (h).

> *ers*, including, but not limited to, interlocal agreements under the urban cooperation act of 1967, 1967 (Ex Sess) PA 7, MCL 124.501 to 124.512, for the joint exercise of powers under this act. [Emphasis added.]

The purposes of the Land Bank Act are stated in its title, in part as, "to facilitate the use and development of certain property; [and] to promote economic growth." Section 2 explains the purpose of creating and empowering a county land bank under the Act, beginning with finding the need to strengthen and revitalize the economy and determining it to be in the public interest to assemble and dispose of property to foster the development of that property and to promote economic growth:

> The legislature finds that there exists in this state a continuing need to strengthen and revitalize the economy of this state and local units of government in this state and that *it is in the best interests of this state and local units of government in this state to assemble or dispose of public property*, including tax reverted property, *in a coordinated manner to foster the development of that property and to promote economic growth* in this state and local units of government in this state. It is declared to be a valid public purpose for a land bank fast track authority created under this act to acquire, assemble, dispose of, and quiet title to property under this act. It is further declared to be a valid public purpose for a land bank fast track authority created under this act to provide for the financing of the acquisition, assembly, disposition, and quieting of title to property, and for a land bank fast track authority to exercise other powers granted to a land bank fast track authority under this act. The legislature finds that a land bank fast track authority created under this act and powers conferred by this act constitute a necessary program and serve a necessary public purpose. [MCL 124.752; emphasis added.]

Under these various and broad statutory provisions, a county land bank is authorized to enter into an agreement to acquire real property from a private owner under terms and conditions the land bank considers necessary or appropriate. Since there are no restrictions regarding to whom a county land bank may dispose of or convey its real property, the property may be conveyed back to the original owner in a manner and for an amount of consideration the land bank considers proper.

The Legislature, however, has provided that if the property is acquired by the land bank before, and reconveyed after, December 31, that property is exempt from ad valorem taxation while title is held by the land bank, and for the year in which it is reconveyed. To secure these tax consequences, it is important to ensure that the transaction between the county land bank and the owner is in fact a conveyance, and not a sham transaction for purposes of avoiding taxation.

MCL 124.763 provides:

> Property of an authority is public property devoted to an essential public and governmental function and purpose. Income of the authority is considered to be for a public and governmental purpose. *The property of the authority and its income and operation are exempt from all taxes and special assessments of this state or a local unit of government of this state*. [Emphasis added.]

This section is implemented in the General Property Tax Act by MCL 211.7gg, which states "[p]roperty, the *title* to which is held by a land bank fast track authority under the land bank fast track act, is exempt from the collection of taxes under this act."

(Emphasis added.) Reading these sections together, a county land bank must acquire property and hold title to it in order for the property to become tax exempt.

Neither the Land Bank Act nor the General Property Tax Act defines the words "acquire" and "title." Where words are not defined in a statute, they must be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language. MCL 8.3a. To determine that meaning, it is appropriate to consult dictionary definitions. *Title Office, Inc v Van Buren County Treasurer*, 469 Mich 516, 522-523; 676 NW2d 207 (2004). While a lay dictionary may be consulted to define a common word or phrase that lacks a unique legal meaning; "a legal term of art . . . must be construed in accordance with its peculiar and appropriate legal meaning." *Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc,* 482 Mich 269, 276; 753 NW2d 207 (2008).

The word "acquire" has not developed a unique legal meaning, and may be accorded its common meaning: "to get or gain by one's own efforts or actions . . . to come to have as one's own; get possession of." *Webster's New World Dictionary, Third College Edition* (1988). The term "title," however, has a unique legal meaning when used in reference to real property. *Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed)* p 1522, defines "title" generally as:

> *The union of all elements (as ownership, possession, and custody) constituting the legal right to control and dispose of property*; the legal link between a person who owns property and the property itself . . . Legal evidence of a person's ownership rights in property; an instrument (such as a deed) that constitutes such evidence. [Emphasis added.]

The concept of "title" is fluid, and there are various permutations of what constitutes "title." See 63C Am Jur 2d, Property, § 25. Whether a county land bank acquires title to property will depend upon the terms of a particular transaction. However, under any transaction, the land bank must acquire the traditional incidents of title such as possession, use, and control. Thus, the terms of the transaction must evidence the intent to actually convey and acquire the property. For example, an agreement that allows the original owner of the property to retain control and responsibility over the property, and prohibits the county land bank from selling or transferring any rights, title, or interest in the property to a third party, would not result in a conveyance of title to the land bank.

The Michigan Supreme Court has recognized that a purported conveyance of property that does not also convey elements of possession and control over the property is insufficient to establish the right to a tax exemption. In *H M Loud & Sons Lumber Co v Elmer Twp*, 123 Mich 61; 81 NW 965 (1900), the original property owner conveyed property to a person to render the property tax exempt, but retained the right to possess and control the property, including the ability to use it for timber production and to control any subsequent sale. The township refused to assess the property taxes to the new owner, which would have resulted in no taxes being owed, and instead assessed the taxes to the original owner. The original owner paid the taxes under protest and filed suit to recover the monies paid. Ruling that the original owner remained liable for the taxes, the Court held that the deed "was a mere subterfuge, and made for the very purpose of escaping taxation."[6] *H M Loud*, 123 Mich

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[6] *H M Loud* is currently cited by the treatise *Michigan Law & Practice,* 30 Michigan Law & Practice 2d, Taxation, § 46, for the principle "[t]he courts will frown on a conveyance designed to evade taxation where it is a mere subterfuge, and in such a case it will be ineffective."

at 66. Also instructive is *Gray v Finn*, 96 Mich 62, 64; 55 NW 615 (1893), where the Court found that, when personal property is transferred but the original owner retained possession of the property and received no consideration, it was a "pretended sale" for the purpose of defeating the collection of the tax.

This is consistent with the law regarding tax exemptions as well. Exemptions must first be conferred by the Legislature before another unit of government may exempt property from taxation. See OAG, 1977-1978, No 5277, p 385 (March 13, 1978), quoting 2 Cooley, The Law of Taxation (4th ed), § 670, p 1398. Similarly, a person seeking exemption from taxation under the laws of the State of Michigan must establish that the law unambiguously provides for an exemption, and that the person falls within the provisions affording such an exemption. *In re Smith Estate*, 343 Mich 291, 297; 72 NW2d 287 (1955). And in reviewing particular tax exemptions, the Michigan Courts "narrowly" construe such statutes "because tax exemptions upset the desirable balance achieved by equal taxation." *Wexford Med Group v City of Cadillac*, 474 Mich 192, 204; 713 NW2d 734 (2006) (citations omitted).

Based on these precedents, the terms of any agreement between a county land bank and a property owner must demonstrate that the land bank is acquiring title to the property, and not engaging in a sham transaction. Otherwise the transaction will fail to render the property tax exempt under MCL 124.763 and MCL 211.7gg(1) because title to the property is not actually acquired by the county land bank.

This is significant because if the county land bank does not acquire title to the property at the acquisition stage, the property will not be eligible for the five-year exemption from general taxation upon its disposition by the land bank.

MCL 211.7gg provides, in part:

> (1) Property, the *title to which is held* by a land bank fast track authority under the land bank fast track act, is exempt from the collection of taxes under this act.
>
> (2) . . . *[R]eal property sold or otherwise conveyed* by a land bank fast track authority under the land bank fast track act *is exempt* from the collection of taxes under this act beginning on December 31 in the year in which the property is *sold or otherwise conveyed* by the land bank fast track authority until December 31 in the year 5 years after the December 31 on which the *exemption* was initially granted under this subsection.
>
> * * *
>
> (4) Property exempt from the collection of taxes under subsection (2) is subject to the *specific tax levied under the tax reverted property clean title act*. [Emphasis added.]

As noted previously, under the Tax Reverted Clean Title Act, fifty percent of the eligible tax reverted property specific tax is disbursed to the county land bank that sold or otherwise conveyed the property under the Land Bank Act. MCL 211.1025(4)(b). The county land bank may then use those funds for the purposes authorized under the land bank act or to repay a loan. MCL 211.1025(4)(b)(i) and (ii).

Under subsection 7gg(2), the five-year exemption from taxation under the General Property Tax Act only operates if title to the property is first held by the county land bank. MCL 211.7gg(2). The conveyance of title to the county land bank must transfer the recognized indicia of property ownership and must not be a sham transaction for purposes of avoiding taxation.

It is my opinion, therefore, that a county land bank fast track authority established under the Land Bank Fast Track Act, 2003 PA 258, MCL 124.751 *et seq,* may acquire title to property from a private owner and reconvey that property to the same owner making that property exempt from ad valorem property taxes during the period that title is held by the county land bank fast track authority, and for the five-year period after it is reconveyed. For those tax consequences to attach, the county land bank fast track authority must obtain and reconvey actual title, with recognized indicia of ownership.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

ASSESSOR: Appointment of city board of review members

BOARD OF REVIEW:

CITY COUNCIL:

GENERAL PROPERTY TAX ACT:

HOME RULE CITY ACT:

INCOMPATIBLE PUBLIC OFFICES ACT:

MAYOR:

Under the General Property Tax Act, 1893 PA 206, MCL 211.28(4), a city may provide for the size, composition, and manner of appointment of the city's board of review by charter, and a city's charter provision will govern such appointments unless the charter contravenes other provisions of law. MCL 117.36.

A city charter that provides for the appointment of the city assessor, mayor, and three city council members to the board of review conflicts with the Incompatible Public Offices Act, 1978 PA 566, MCL 15.181 *et seq*, and renders these positions incompatible because the office of board of review member ultimately supervises the work of the office of city assessor and because the charter makes the office of board of review member subordinate to, or under the supervision of, the offices of mayor or city council member.

If, however, a city has a population of less than 25,000 and the city's governing board authorizes the appointment of these public officers to the board of review, such officers may serve as board of review members regardless of the incompatibility. MCL 15.183(4)(c).

Opinion No. 7256 December 21, 2010

Honorable Raymond Basham
State Senator
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48909-7536

You have asked two questions regarding the composition and appointment of members to the City of Ecorse's Board of Review.

Section 28 of the General Property Tax Act (GPTA), 1893 PA 206, MCL 211.28, provides for the creation of a board of review by each township, city or village. This board hears protests from property owners disputing the valuations and classifications established by local assessors for property tax purposes or claiming entitlement to an exemption from taxation. An appeal to the local board of review is a necessary prerequisite to a subsequent appeal by the protestor or the assessing city, village, or township to the Michigan Tax Tribunal. Tax Tribunal Act, 1973 PA 186, MCL 205.731 and 205.735a.

Your questions, taken together, essentially ask whether a city may, consistent with the GPTA, provide for the appointment of its board of review pursuant to a city charter provision, and if the city may do so, whether the charter provisions control the size, composition, and manner of appointment of the board.

With respect to city boards of review, section 28(4) of the GPTA, MCL 211.28(4), provides:

> *The size, composition, and manner of appointment of the board of review of a city may be prescribed by the charter of a city*. In the absence of or in place of a charter provision, the governing body of the city, by ordinance, may establish the city board of review in the same manner and for the same purposes as provided by this section for townships. [Emphasis added.]

This section provides that a city may prescribe the manner of appointing its board of review by charter, and does not impose any restrictions on the board's size, composition, or manner of appointment.

Consistent with the GPTA, the City of Ecorse established the size, composition, and manner of appointment of its board of review by charter. Ecorse Charter, ch XII, Finance and Taxation, § 7, provides:

> There shall be a Board of Review consisting of the *Mayor*, *Assessor*, and *three (3) Councilmen*, to be appointed by the City Council prior to the first of February each year, and whose term shall commence on the first day of March next following and shall continue for the term of one year. [Emphasis added.]

Because the GPTA authorizes cities to provide for the appointment of boards of review by charter, and imposes no limitations on who may serve, the Ecorse Charter

provision controls the appointment of the City's Board of Review unless it contravenes any other provision of law.[1]

Section 36 of the Home Rule City Act, 1909 PA 279, MCL 117.36, provides that "[n]o provision of any city charter shall conflict with or contravene the provisions of any general law of the state." See also *Livonia Hotel, LLC v City of Livonia*, 259 Mich App 116, 138; 673 NW2d 763 (2003) (holding that the state zoning statute prevailed over conflicting city charter provision). While the Ecorse Charter provision quoted above does not conflict with the GPTA, additional relevant statutes must be reviewed.[2]

The Incompatible Public Offices Act (IPOA or Act), 1978 PA 566, MCL 15.181 *et seq*, sets forth the general restriction against public officers or employees simultaneously holding incompatible offices. Specifically, the Act provides that "a public officer or public employee shall not hold 2 or more incompatible offices at the same time." MCL 15.182. Whether the offices of mayor, city council member, assessor, and board of review member are "incompatible" requires consideration of MCL 15.181(b), which defines "incompatible offices" as:

> [P]ublic offices held by a public official which, when the official is performing the duties of any of the public offices held by the official, results in any of the following with respect to those offices held:
>
> (i) The subordination of 1 public office to another.
>
> (ii) The supervision of 1 public office by another.
>
> (iii) A breach of duty of public office.

The first step in determining whether these offices are incompatible requires establishing if the offices are "public offices held by a public official" within the meaning of MCL 15.181(b).

While the Legislature did not explicitly define the term "public official" in the Act, the Michigan Supreme Court in *Macomb County Prosecuting Attorney v Murphy*, 464 Mich 149, 157-163; 627 NW2d 247 (2001), concluded that "public offices held by a public official" include "positions of public employment." See also *Wayne County Prosecutor v Kinney*, 184 Mich App 681, 683; 458 NW2d 674, lv den 436 Mich 887 (1990), and OAG, 1979-1980, No 5626, p 537, 541 (January 16, 1980). Section 2 of the Act also evinces the applicability of the Act to public employees by stating "a public officer or public employee shall not hold 2 or more incompatible offices at the same time." MCL 15.182. With respect to the Ecorse Charter provi-

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[1] If a city does not appoint its board of review by charter, it may follow the procedures applicable to townships for establishing a board of review. MCL 211.28(4). The statute applicable to township boards of review restricts who may serve. MCL 211.28(1), provides, in part:

> Those electors of the township appointed by the township board shall constitute a board of review for the township. . . . A member of the township board is not eligible to serve on the board or to fill any vacancy. A spouse, mother, father, sister, brother, son, or daughter, including an adopted child, of the assessor is not eligible to serve on the board or to fill any vacancy. . . .

[2] Your request also notes that the Ecorse Charter provides for meeting times of the Board of Review different from those specified in the GPTA. As noted above, applicable statutory provisions take precedence over conflicting charter provisions. But the GPTA does authorize the local governing body to adopt an ordinance or resolution establishing alternative meeting dates. MCL 211.30.

sion, the elected positions of mayor, city council member, and assessor,[3] and the appointed position of board of review member are all public officers or employees within the meaning of the IPOA. MCL 15.181(e)(ii).

Pursuant to section 29 of the GPTA, MCL 211.29, the purpose of a local board of review is to examine, review, and if necessary correct, a local unit of government's assessment roll that has been prepared by the local assessor pursuant to section 24 of the GPTA. MCL 211.24. The Ecorse Charter imposes the following specific duties upon its Board of Review:

> The Board of Review shall have power, and it shall be its duty, to amend and correct any assessment or valuation, and to place upon the assessment roll of the city any taxable property, real or personal, not already assessed, and to strike from said rolls any property, real or personal, wrongfully thereon. Any person considering himself aggrieved by reason of any assessments may complain thereof either verbally or in writing to said Board and said Board shall review the assessment complained and of may alter and correct the same, and may in its discretion increase or decrease any assessment. . . . [Ecorse Charter, ch XII, Finance and Taxation, § 10, p 50.]

After the Board of Review finalizes the tax roll, it is delivered to the Ecorse City Council, which confirms the roll as submitted. (Ecorse Charter, ch XII, Finance and Taxation, § 11, p 50.)

As noted above, a local assessor prepares the tax roll for the relevant unit of government pursuant to section 24 of the GPTA. MCL 211.24. Under the Ecorse Charter, the assessor is charged with the following specific duties:

> The City Assessor shall perform such duties in relation to assessing property and levying taxes in the City as are prescribed by this Charter. He is hereby authorized and required to perform the same duties that supervisors of townships under the general laws of the State are required to perform in relation to the assessing of property and levying of taxes for State, County and School purposes. He shall also perform all other duties which are prescribed by this Charter or may be required by ordinance or resolution of the Council.
>
> It shall be the duty of the Assessor at least once each year to make a personal view of each lot or parcel of land and all buildings thereon and of all industrial, manufacturing or mercantile property in the City and to set a valuation thereon. He shall cause to be published notice of meetings of the Board of Review as required by this Charter.
>
> He shall assist the Treasurer in the office of the Treasurer for the thirty (30) days next following the date when the State, County and City tax rolls are turned over to the Treasurer for collection for the purpose of mailing tax statements to taxpayers. He shall attend all meetings of the Board of Review. [Ecorse Charter, ch IV, Elective Officers, Salaries and Duties, § 13, p 12.]

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[3] See Ecorse Charter, ch IV, Elective Officers, Salaries and Duties, § 1.

The Charter provisions demonstrate that the office of City Assessor is subordinate to, or supervised by, the Board of Review to the extent the Board is expressly authorized to amend or correct property valuations, or make other changes to the tax roll as initially determined by the City Assessor. Indeed, as a Board of Review member, the City Assessor sits in judgment of his or her original determinations. Under these circumstances, the office of City Assessor for the City of Ecorse and member of the City of Ecorse Board of Review are incompatible within the meaning of MCL 15.181. See, e.g., OAG, 1983-1984, No 6126, p 41 (February 15, 1983) (concluding that offices of township treasurer and assessor for the same township are incompatible because the treasurer exercised supervisory power over the office of assessor).[4]

Turning to the office of mayor, the Ecorse Charter describes the duties of the mayor:

> He shall preside at the meetings of the Council, shall be a member of the Council and have the right to vote on all questions to offer resolutions, introduce ordinances and exercise all other rights, powers and privileges of a members of said Council but shall have no power of veto. He shall from time to time give the Council information concerning affairs of the City and see that the laws relating to the City and the ordinances and regulations of the Council are enforced. [Ecorse Charter, ch IV, Elective Officers, Salaries and Duties, § 9, p 10.]

Under the Charter the Ecorse City Council, which includes the Mayor, establishes compensation for appointive officers such as the Board of Review (Ecorse Charter, ch VI, Administrative Departments, Appointive Officers, Powers and Duties, § 8, p 18), and may suspend or remove such officers. (Ecorse Charter, ch VII, General Provisions Relating to Officers, § 16, p 32.)

Accordingly, under the Charter, the Mayor, as a member of City Council, participates in his or her appointment to the Board of Review, as well as establishing his or her compensation as a Board member, and may potentially be called upon to participate in his or her removal from the Board. These circumstances render the offices of Mayor and Board of Review member incompatible because they result in the subordination or supervision of one office by another. See, e.g., OAG, 1981-1982, No 6030, p 534 (January 21, 1982) (offices of mayor and city assessor are incompatible where the mayor appoints the city assessor, and may also participate in removal proceedings); OAG No 6126, p 41 (offices of township treasurer and assessor for the same township are incompatible because the treasurer exercises supervisory power over the office of assessor, including the power of appointment and the determination of compensation); OAG, 1989-1990, No 6618, p 50 (February 13, 1989) (offices of township trustee and township assessor are incompatible).

The same analysis applies to the Ecorse City Council and the Board of Review. Under the Charter, City Council members participate in their own appointments to the Board of Review, as well as establishing their compensation as Board members, and may potentially be called upon to participate in their removal from the Board. Thus, it must be concluded that the IPOA's prohibitions against holding a public office that is subordinate to or supervised by another public office result in the positions of

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[4] Notably, with respect to township boards of review, by operation of law the assessor for a township cannot serve as a member of a board of review, but rather serves as secretary for the board of review. See MCL 211.28(1), 41.2(4), 41.70, and 41.61(1).

Ecorse City Council member being incompatible with membership on the Ecorse Board of Review.

Nonetheless, the prohibition on holding incompatible offices is not absolute. As noted above, section 2 of the IPOA states that "[e]xcept as provided in section 3" an individual shall not hold 2 or more incompatible offices at the same time. Section 3(4) of the IPOA provides that:

> Section 2 does not do any of the following:
>
> * * *
>
> Limit the authority of the governing body of a city, village, township, or county having a population of less than 25,000 to authorize a public officer or public employee to perform, with or without compensation, other additional services for the unit of local government. [MCL 15.183(4)(c).]

The population of the City of Ecorse is less than 25,000.[5] The "governing body" of the City of Ecorse is the City Council. Thus, pursuant to section 3(4)(c) of the IPOA, with the approval of the Ecorse City Council, the Assessor, the Mayor, and three City Council members may sit on the Ecorse Board of Review, despite those positions being otherwise "incompatible." See also OAG, 2001-2002, No 7105, p 86 (April 17, 2002).[6] If the Ecorse City Council does not authorize these officers to sit on the Board of Review, such positions are incompatible.[7]

It is my opinion, therefore, that under the General Property Tax Act, 1893 PA 206, MCL 211.28(4), a city may provide for the size, composition, and manner of appointment of the city's board of review by charter, and a city's charter provision will govern such appointments unless the charter contravenes other provisions of law. MCL 117.36. A city charter that provides for the appointment of the city assessor, mayor, and three city council members to the board of review conflicts with the Incompatible Public Offices Act, 1978 PA 566, MCL 15.181 *et seq*, and renders these positions incompatible because the office of board of review ultimately supervises the work of the office of city assessor and because the charter makes the office of board of review member subordinate to, or under the supervision of, the offices of mayor or city council member. If, however, a city has a population of less than 25,000 and the

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[5] MCL 8.3v requires that "[t]he population of the state or any political subdivision thereof shall be determined, unless otherwise specifically provided, on the basis of the latest federal decennial census preceding the time as of which the population is to be determined." The population of the City of Ecorse for the Year 2000 census was 11,229. See population statistics for 1990-2000 <www.michigan.gov/documents/PopByPlace_26771_7.pdf> (accessed November 9, 2010).

[6] Your request does not include any facts raising an issue other than the question of incompatibility of offices. However, it is important to note MCL 15.183(6), which provides that section 3 of the IPOA "does not allow or sanction activity constituting *conflict of interest* prohibited by the constitution or laws of this state." (Emphasis added). See also *Contesti v Attorney General*, 164 Mich App 271, 281; 416 NW2d 410 (1987), quoting 63 Am Jur 2d, Public Officers and Employees, § 79, p 728 (explaining difference between incompatibility and conflict of interest). Thus, public officials or employees serving in incompatible positions under the IPOA, like the City of Ecorse officials, remain subject to general conflict of interest statutes and laws.

[7] The incompatibility of these offices is tempered to some degree by the fact that the Mayor, City Council members, and Assessor are popularly elected under the Ecorse Charter. (Ecorse Charter, ch IV, Elective Officers, Salaries and Duties, § 1.) Moreover, decisions by the Ecorse Board of Review may be appealed to the Michigan Tax Tribunal. MCL 205.731 and 205.735a.

city's governing board authorizes the appointment of these public officers to the board of review, such officers may serve as board of review members regardless of the incompatibility. MCL 15.183(4)(c).

MIKE COX
Attorney General

REVISED SCHOOL CODE: Merit systems for public school employees

CONST 1963, ART 11, § 6:

SCHOOL DISTRICTS:

Section 1250 of the Revised School Code, MCL 380.1250, does not conflict with Const 1963, art 11, § 6. Article 11, § 6 does not prohibit the Legislature from enacting or amending legislation requiring that a school district, public school academy, or intermediate school district establish a performance-based compensation method for teachers under contract or tenure. In carrying out this statutory mandate, a school district, public school academy, or intermediate school district does not violate art 11, § 6.

Opinion No. 7257 December 21, 2010

Honorable Kevin Elsenheimer
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI

Honorable Bill Caul
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI

You both ask whether section 1250 of the Revised School Code (Code), MCL 380.1250, as amended, conflicts with Const 1963, art 11, § 6, which authorizes local governing bodies to adopt merit systems with respect to public employment.

In January 2010, the Governor signed into law a series of public acts, 2009 PA 201-205, which comprise the "Race to the Top" legislation. These acts amended the Revised School Code, 1976 PA 451, MCL 380.1 *et seq*, the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act, 1947 PA 336, MCL 423.201 *et seq,* and the State School Aid Act, 1979 PA 94, MCL 388.1601 *et seq*.

2009 PA 205 added section 1249 and amended section 1250 of the Code to require that school boards, working with teachers and school administrators, implement a rigorous, transparent, and fair performance evaluation system that does all of the following:

> (a) Evaluates the teacher's or school administrator's job performance at least annually while providing timely and constructive feedback.

(b) Establishes clear approaches to measuring student growth and provides teachers and school administrators with relevant data on student growth.

(c) Evaluates a teacher's or school administrator's job performance, using multiple rating categories that take into account data on student growth as a significant factor. For these purposes, student growth shall be measured by national, state, or local assessments and other objective criteria.

(d) Uses the evaluations, at a minimum, to inform decisions regarding all of the following:

(i) The effectiveness of teachers and school administrators, ensuring that they are given ample opportunities for improvement.

(ii) Promotion, retention, and development of teachers and school administrators, including providing relevant coaching, instruction support, or professional development.

(iii) Whether to grant tenure or full certification, or both, to teachers and school administrators using rigorous standards and streamlined, transparent, and fair procedures.

(iv) Removing ineffective tenured and untenured teachers and school administrators after they have had ample opportunities to improve, and ensuring that these decisions are made using rigorous standards and streamlined, transparent, and fair procedures. [MCL 380.1249.]

Section 1250, as amended, requires school districts, public school academies, and intermediate school districts to implement and maintain methods of compensation for teachers and administrators that include job performance and job accomplishments as significant factors in determining compensation and additional compensation, the measure of which factors will be based on objective criteria, including student growth data:

A school district, public school academy, or intermediate school district shall implement and maintain a method of compensation for its teachers and school administrators that includes job performance and job accomplishments as a significant factor in determining compensation and additional compensation. *The assessment of job performance shall incorporate a rigorous, transparent, and fair evaluation system that evaluates a teacher's or school administrator's performance at least in part based upon data on student growth as measured by assessments and other objective criteria*. [MCL 380.1250(1); emphasis added.]

With respect to your question, Const 1963, art 11, § 6, provides that:

By ordinance or resolution of its governing body which shall not take effect until approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon, unless otherwise provided by charter, *each county, township, city, village, school district and other governmental unit or authority may establish, modify or discontinue a merit system for its employees other than teachers under contract or tenure*. The state civil service commission may on request furnish technical services to any such unit on a reimbursable basis. [Emphasis added.]

Against this statutory and constitutional framework, you ask whether section 1250 of the Code conflicts with the merit system exception for teachers under contract or tenure contained in Const 1963, art 11, § 6. Your question calls for an interpretation of Const 1963, art 11, § 6.

When interpreting a constitutional provision, the goal is to give effect to the common understanding of the text:

> "A constitution is made for the people and by the people. The interpretation that should be given it is that which reasonable minds, the great mass of the people themselves, would give it. 'For as the Constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be conveyed.'" [*Wayne County v Hathcock*, 471 Mich 445, 468; 684 NW2d 765 (2004), quoting *Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General*, 384 Mich 390, 405; 185 NW2d 9 (1971) (emphasis in original omitted), quoting Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 81.]

OAG, 1965-1966, No 4534, p 313, 315, 319 (June 13, 1966), reviewed Const 1963, art 11, § 6, and determined that it was a self-executing provision authorizing local governing bodies to implement by ordinance or resolution the establishment, modification, or discontinuance of a merit system for its employees upon a majority vote of the electorate approving such ordinance or resolution.

In *Sloan v Warren Civil Service Comm*, 26 Mich App 555, 563-564; 182 NW2d 815 (1970), the Court ruled that, once a local unit exercises its powers under Const 1963, art 11, § 6, the Legislature may not enact a conflicting state law:

> The defendants argue that under the PERA, enacted in 1965, collective bargaining agreements must prevail over civil service provisions. . . . We do not agree.
>
> The flaw in defendants' argument is their contention that the state legislature has modified the civil service provisions applying to employees of cities by the enactment of the PERA. It is hornbook law that statutes are to be read in conformity with the constitution. *We do not accept the proposition inherent in defendants' argument that what the constitution gives the legislature can take away.* We conclude that the commission had jurisdiction in the instant case to determine the skills and abilities needed for various jobs and the equality of the different job classifications. [Emphasis added.]

In *Council 23, AFSCME v Wayne County Civil Service Comm*, 32 Mich App 243, 248; 188 NW2d 206 (1971), the Court cited *Sloan* for the proposition:

> The language of art 11, § 6 is permissive. Local governments may establish civil service systems. Once those systems are established they are independent of legislative control.

The plain and unambiguous words of Const 1963, art 11, § 6 empower local governmental units and authorities, including school districts, to "establish, modify or discontinue a merit system for its employees other than teachers under contract or

tenure." If a local unit elects to exercise that power, the Legislature may not enact laws purporting to override the terms of the local merit system.

But with regard to teachers under contract or tenure, Const 1963, art 11, § 6 expressly does *not* empower local units to adopt a merit system. Unlike a law for employees generally, a law concerning a merit system for teachers under contract or tenure could not conflict with the powers conferred on local units, including school districts, by Const 1963, art 11, § 6.

Additionally, the plain language of Const 1963, art 11, § 6 does not purport to restrict the Legislature, in contrast to local units, from enacting a merit system for teachers under contract or tenure. In the absence of a constitutional restriction, the Legislature is free to legislate in any area of public interest. "The Michigan Constitution is a limitation on the Legislature's power, not a grant of power to it." *Federated Publications, Inc v Michigan State Univ Bd of Trustees*, 460 Mich 75, 83; 594 NW2d 491 (1999). Neither Const 1963, art 11, § 6 nor any other provision of the constitution precludes the Legislature from enacting laws pertaining to a merit system for teachers under contract or tenure.

In *Council 23,* the Court of Appeals recognized the authority of the Legislature to enact laws concerning merit systems, so long as doing so does not conflict with a merit system duly adopted by a local unit of government under art 11, § 6:

> Article 11, § 6 must be read to intend the plain meaning of its words. Its words do not, in their plain meaning, prevent the legislature from amending statutes which organize local civil service systems not organized under art 11, § 6. [*Council 23*, 32 Mich App at 248.]

Since local merit systems for teachers under contract or tenure would not be established under art 11, § 6, the Legislature remains free to enact or modify laws concerning such systems.

This conclusion based on the plain language of Const 1963, art 11, § 6 is further supported by the circumstances surrounding its adoption. See, e.g., *Federated Publications, Inc,* 460 Mich at 85 (A provision's meaning may also be clarified by considering the circumstances surrounding the provision's adoption and its intended purpose). The constitutional convention comments for § 6 (Committee Proposal 76) indicate that teachers were excluded because their employment was considered subject to other regulations or laws, like the Teachers' Tenure Act, MCL 38.71 *et seq*, or were otherwise controlled by contract. 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 1754-1758, 1763. For example, Delegate Bentley observed:

> [I]t is pretty clearly understood that this [committee proposal] would not conflict with the teachers' tenure act, this would only apply to so called nonteaching employees in an administrative or custodial capacity [.] [1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 1755.]

In summary, art 11, § 6's exclusion for teachers under contract or tenure does not purport to limit the Legislature's ability to enact or amend legislation authorizing or requiring school employers to establish a performance-based compensation method for teachers under contract or tenure. The Legislature, not the local unit, has the constitutional authority to prescribe a merit system for teachers under contract or tenure. Such legislative authorization for a merit system is independent of any constitutional authorization under art 11, § 6. By carrying out the terms of MCL 380.1249 and 380.1250, the school districts are not establishing, modifying, or discontinuing a civil

service merit system for teachers under contract or tenure in violation of art 11, § 6. Rather, the school districts will be fulfilling the independent mandate of the Legislature that they establish a performance-based compensation method for their teacher employees.

It is my opinion, therefore, that section 1250 of the Revised School Code, MCL 380.1250, does not conflict with Const 1963, art 11, § 6. Article 11, § 6 does not prohibit the Legislature from enacting or amending legislation requiring that a school district, public school academy, or intermediate school district establish a performance-based compensation method for teachers under contract or tenure. In carrying out this statutory mandate, a school district, public school academy, or intermediate school district does not violate art 11, § 6.

MIKE COX
Attorney General

DIVISION REPORTS

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Carol L. Isaacs
Chief Deputy Attorney General

The Executive Office, headed by the Chief Deputy Attorney General, consists of executive level staff. The Chief Deputy reports directly to the Attorney General as his legal advisor, and she is responsible for the implementation of the Attorney General's goals for the office, including consumer protection, Internet crime cases, child support, child safety, health care quality, senior protection, examining energy costs, protecting the environment, as well as a host of other legal issues facing the State. The Chief Deputy also manages most of the executive staff and all of the Bureau Chiefs.

The Executive Office includes four offices: the Office of Legislative Relations, Office of Communications, Office of Fiscal Management, and Office of Human Resources.

The Office of Legislative Relations works as the Attorney General's liaison to the Legislature and general public. The Office of Legislative Relations works with the Legislature on statutory issues regarding the Department's budget, to implement the legislative goals proposed by the Attorney General, and assist legislators with constituent issues.

The Office of Communications responds to press inquiries and operates as the spokesperson for the Attorney General and the Department as a whole. The Office of Communications also handles public speaking requests, prepares speeches for the Attorney General, and prepares informational pamphlets for the Department.

The Office of Fiscal Management is responsible for managing the Department of Attorney General's budget, as well as advising the Attorney General on fiscal matters of concern to the Department. The Office of Fiscal Management works closely with the Office of Legislative Affairs in order to accurately convey the budgetary needs of the Department in order to function and serve the State of Michigan and the citizens of Michigan.

The Office of Human Resources serves the employees of the Department of Attorney General. The Office of Human Resources processes all necessary paperwork regarding hiring employees, employee benefits, employee compensation, as well as various other roles that enable the Department of Attorney General to function properly.

CONSUMER & ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION BUREAU

Robert Ianni
Bureau Chief

This Bureau began the biennial period as the Consumer and Environmental Protection Bureau with the following four divisions: Consumer Protection Division; Environment, Natural Resources, and Agriculture Division; Licensing and Regulation Division; and the Tobacco and Special Litigation Division. As a result of a Department reorganization during the biennial period, the following divisions were added to the bureau: Corporate Oversight Division; Health, Education & Family Services Division; Labor Division; and the Public Administration Division. Also, the Tobacco and Special Litigation Division was incorporated into the Environment, Natural Resources, and Agriculture Division.

The Bureau's primary civil responsibilities include the protection of consumers and businesses from unscrupulous commercial practice; enforcement and oversight of tobacco and utility law; the regulation of certain professions, occupations, and services; and the protection of Michigan's natural resources. Attorneys in the Bureau practice in virtually all state and federal courts as well as state administrative tribunals. The Bureau serves as house-counsel for the Departments of Agriculture, Environmental Quality, and Natural Resources as well as various licensing boards and commissions. The Bureau provides legal representation in matters affecting such diverse areas as education, social services, health law, labor/workforce issues, and provides legal advice and representation to state agencies and officials to secure compliance with Michigan law in corporate, insurance, and securities matters.

The Bureau Chief and two Division Chiefs within the Bureau serve as the Department's emergency management coordinators and regularly train and provide legal advice at the State Police Emergency Operations Center on issues arising during state declared disasters and emergencies. The emergency management coordinators also provide legal training to first responders, state and local emergency management directors, judges, and attorneys responsible for advising local agencies during an emergency. A CD entitled "Public Health Law Bench Book for Michigan Courts," which provides an extensive compilation of emergency public health law was developed within the Bureau and is widely distributed to all courts and legal practioners.

Consumer Protection Division

Katharyn Barron, Division Chief

The principal function of the Consumer Protection Division is investigating and mediating consumer complaints and encouraging compliance with consumer protection laws. The division administers or enforces more than 35 state statutes. Under many of these statutes, the Consumer Protection Division has exclusive or primary compliance and enforcement jurisdiction.

By statutory prescription, the division issues licenses to charities and professional fundraisers acting on their behalf; registers charitable trusts, public safety organizations and their fundraisers, and is a necessary party to many probate estates having a residuary devise to a charitable entity. Franchisors must provide the division with notice of their intent to offer or sell franchises. Those offering for sale a "business opportunity," must also provide the division with notice. The division also enforces consumer laws against offerors of product based pyramid scams. The division educates consumers through speeches, seminars, workshops, coalitions, and task forces.

The Michigan Cyber Safety Initiative (Michigan CSI) is an Internet safety education program with presentations for kindergarten through eighth-grade students and a community seminar. Michigan CSI was piloted in the spring of 2007, and fully launched during the 2007-2008 school year. During calendar year 2009, 183,997 students and adults participated in the programming, while in calendar year 2010, the program reached an additional 178,854 people.

The Senior Brigade program consists of 30 minute presentations tailored to seniors and their caregivers. The seminars were launched in September 2009 and 85 presentations were provided in the remainder of calendar year 2009. In calendar year 2010, 566 seminars were conducted.

Finally, the division also handles miscellaneous matters at the direction of the Attorney General.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
Municipal Ct	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
District Ct	3	0	3	0	0	0	0
Probate Ct	201	33	105	129	49	61	117
Circuit Ct	14	8	12	10	5	8	7
Ct of Claims	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ct of Appeals	4	3	2	5	1	3	3
Supreme Ct	1	1	2	0	2	1	1
Total	**223**	**45**	**124**	**144**	**57**	**73**	**128**
Out-of-State State Courts	2	0	1	1	0	1	0
US Courts							
District Ct	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Circ Ct of App	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Supreme Ct	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bankruptcy Ct	2	0	2	0	0	0	0
Total	**4**	**0**	**4**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**

Monies Paid To the State and Other Significant Activities:	**2009**	**2010**
Consumer complaints	17,445	14,503
Money recovered for consumers	$1,720,737.48	$1,859,957.04
Civil penalties, investigative, and other costs/income	$2,227,428.52	$76,395.31
Franchise registrations (new & renewal)	1,271	1,271
Business opportunity registrations	5	9
Franchise fees	$317,750.00	$317,750.00

	2009	**2010**
New Files Opened: Charitable organizations, professional fundraisers, public safety organizations, dissolution requests, trusts	2001	1912
Nonprofit corporate dissolutions closed	416	337

Charitable solicitation licenses issued	6950	7473
Charitable solicitation professional fundraiser licenses issued	299	350
Public safety registrations issued	78	82
Public safety professional fundraiser registrations issued	7	15
Registered charitable trusts as of year end	12,133	13,003

Corporate Oversight Division

Suzan M. Sanford, Division Chief

The Corporate Oversight Division provides general representation and counsel to the Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation (OFIR) within the Department of Energy, Labor & Economic Growth (renamed the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs effective April 25, 2011). Corporate Oversight represents OFIR in matters involving banking, insurance, and securities, including the Michigan Insurance Code, Patient's Right to Independent Review Act, Blue Cross Act (Nonprofit Health Care Corporation Reform Act), Banking Code of 1999, Mortgage Brokers, Lenders & Servicers Licensing Act, Consumer Financial Services Act, Uniform Securities Act, and numerous other consumer finance related laws. In addition, the Division acts as counsel to the OFIR Commissioner in receivership, rehabilitation, and liquidation proceedings involving insurance companies, health maintenance organizations, banks, and other regulated entities.

The Division also provides representation to the Corporation Division of the Bureau of Commercial Services within the Department of Energy, Labor & Economic Growth. In this capacity, the Division provides general legal advice, selective document review, and representation in all litigation pertaining to the organizational documents for business corporations, nonprofit corporations, limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and limited liability partnerships to be formed, and for foreign entities to obtain a certificate of authority to transact business in the State, as required by Michigan law.

The Division further protects consumers through the enforcement of state and federal antitrust laws, Michigan's price gouging statute, and predatory lending laws. The Division also investigates and criminally prosecutes financial, charitable, and consumer fraud.

Finally, the Division represents the Michigan Retirement Systems, which invest on behalf of the Michigan Public School Employee, State Employees, State Police, and Michigan Judges, in security fraud matters involving violations of state and federal security laws.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
Municipal Ct	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
District Ct	0	8	0	8	34	31	11
Probate Ct	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Circuit Ct	19	20	9	30	35	11	54
Ct of Claims	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ct of Appeals	5	5	1	9	6	6	9
Supreme Ct	4	4	2	6	4	4	6
Total	**28**	**37**	**12**	**53**	**79**	**52**	**80**

Out-of-State State Courts	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
US Courts							
District Ct	10	5	3	12	7	8	11
Circ Ct of App	1	1	1	1	2	0	3
Supreme Ct	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bankruptcy Ct	5	1	0	6	0	1	5
Total	**16**	**7**	**4**	**19**	**9**	**9**	**19**
Administrative Actions							
State	3	3	2	4	1	4	1
Federal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	**3**	**3**	**2**	**4**	**1**	**4**	**1**

Monies Paid To/By the State:	**2009**	**2010**
All Judgments/Settlements paid TO State	$27,744,168.12	$7,029,115.37
All Judgments/Settlements paid BY State	0	$121,794.65

Environment, Natural Resources, and Agriculture Division

S. Peter Manning, Division Chief

The Environment, Natural Resources, and Agriculture Division's primary client agencies are the Department of Natural Resources and Environment, and the Department of Agriculture. The division advises and represents these agencies in matters involving environmental protection, natural resource management, and agricultural development and oversight. The division also represents various state agencies in matters involving Native American treaty issues and gaming, and it represents the Department of Energy, Labor, and Economic Growth regarding Land Division Act matters.

Beginning in 2009[1] the division assumed responsibility for representing the public in utility rate proceedings before the Public Service Commission. The division appeared in all significant rate cases involving the largest utilities, and in cost recovery proceedings under 1982 PA 304. The division also oversees compliance with the Master Settlement Agreement in the national tobacco settlement, including enforcement of statutes governing non-participating tobacco manufacturers. The division also handles other matters at the direction of the Attorney General, including matters involving Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan.

The Division also serves as legal counsel to or as the Attorney General's representative on the following Commissions:

- Agriculture Commission
- Natural Resources Commission
- Great Lakes Commission
- Mackinac Island State Park Commission
- State Waterways Commission
- State 911 Commission
- Great Lakes Fishery Trust
- Utility Consumer Participation Board

[1] In September of 2009 the former Tobacco and Special Litigation Division was merged with the Environment, Natural Resources, and Agriculture Division.

Division attorneys appear in state administrative proceedings and in virtually all state and federal trial and appellate courts.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
Municipal Ct	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
District Ct	1	0	0	1	1	0	2
Probate Ct	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Circuit Ct	207	96	108	195	91	95	191
Ct of Claims	4	2	2	4	4	2	6
Ct of Appeals	25	23	13	35	21	23	33
Supreme Ct	16	4	12	8	11	10	9
Total	**253**	**125**	**135**	**243**	**128**	**130**	**241**
Out-of-State State Courts	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
US Courts							
District Ct	21	1	4	18	6	10	14
Circ Ct of App	11	2	8	5	3	0	8
Supreme Ct	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
Bankruptcy Ct	16	17	4	29	3	6	26
Total	**49**	**21**	**17**	**53**	**12**	**17**	**48**
Administrative Actions							
State	95	65	55	105	60	66	99
Federal	67	0	0	67	3	1	69
Total	**162**	**65**	**55**	**172**	**63**	**67**	**168**

Monies Paid To/By the State:	**2009**	**2010**
All Judgments/Settlements paid TO State	327,148,430.39	277,017,957.96
All Judgments/Settlements paid BY State	38,371.43	35,357.04

Other Significant Division Activity:	**2009**	**2010**
Client Referrals/Requests for Assistance received:	135	140
Citizen Inquiries Processed:	359	206

Health, Education & Family Services Division

Raymond O. Howd, Division Chief

The Health, Education & Family Services (HEFS) Division was created in July 2009 and consists of the former Education & Social Services and Community Health Divisions. The HEFS Division represents and provides legal counsel to the Michigan Department of Community Health (MDCH), Michigan Department of Education (MDE), Michigan Department of Human Services (MDHS) and several independent boards and commissions within these Departments. The Division also represents the Library of Michigan, which is now within the Department of Education as a result of the Governor's Executive Order 2009-36.

As counsel to the MDCH, the Division provides legal advice and representation in matters concerning the Public and Mental Health Codes, the Medicaid program and other state health payment programs. The Division assists MDCH in recovering overpayments to Medicaid providers, and intervenes in personal injury lawsuits to recover Medicaid payments arising from third party liability. The HEFS Division also enforces laws, rules, and regulations through administrative and court actions against nursing homes, hospitals, homes for the aged, substance abuse service providers, emergency medical services, medical waste producers, certain licensed and certified care providers, and grocery stores that serve as vendors in nutritional food programs (WIC).

The Division is involved with state health planning through the Certificate of Need Program and with Medicaid funding of mental health programs. It also provides legal services related to the collection and preservation of vital statistics and health records and the administration of medical services for crippled children.

As counsel to the MDE, the HEFS Division provides legal advice and representation to the Michigan Department of Education, the State Board of Education, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the State Tenure Commission, and the Michigan Merit Award Board. The Division also represents the Michigan School for the Blind and Deaf, the Department of Treasury in matters relating to the State School Bond Loan Fund, and the Center for Educational Performance & Information ("CEPI") in the Department of Technology, Management & Budget. In October 2009, the Division began representing the Library of Michigan in library millage issues, rules promulgation, and other matters.

As counsel to the MDHS, the HEFS Division provides legal advice and representation arising from MDHS' statutory responsibilities for the administration of the various state and/or federal welfare programs, including Medicaid and the cash grant and food assistance programs, and disability services. MDHS also administers many programs concerning children and youth services including, juvenile delinquency, adoption, adult and children protective services, and termination of parental rights outside of Wayne County. The HEFS Division further represents and provides legal counsel to the Bureau of Children and Adult Licensing (BCAL) within MDHS. BCAL licenses and regulates child foster care homes and organizations, adoption agencies, day care homes and institutions, and adult foster care homes/facilities.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
Municipal Ct	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
District Ct	1	4	4	1	7	5	3
Probate Ct	9	5	10	4	3	4	3
Circuit Ct	238	257	263	232	273	260	245
Ct of Claims	6	1	5	2	2	2	2
Ct of Appeals	12	21	15	18	29	29	18
Supreme Ct	6	9	10	5	7	3	9
Total	**272**	**297**	**307**	**262**	**321**	**303**	**280**
Out-of-State State Courts	5	2	5	2	1	1	2
US Courts							
District Ct	19	12	16	15	19	19	15
Circ Ct of App	9	1	8	2	1	0	3

Supreme Ct	2	0	2	0	1	0	1
Bankruptcy Ct	1	5	3	3	5	2	6
Total	**31**	**18**	**29**	**20**	**26**	**21**	**25**
Administrative Actions							
State	208	244	315	137	132	176	93
Federal	8	3	1	10	2	8	4
Total	**216**	**247**	**316**	**147**	**134**	**184**	**97**

Monies Paid To/By the State:	**2009**	**2010**
All Judgments/Settlements paid TO State	$2,912,877.70	$7,119,110.92
All Judgments/Settlements paid BY State	$6,390,539.58	$342,474.48

Other Significant Division Activity:

The HEFS Division responds to an enormous number of opinion and information requests from legislators, public officials, local officials, client agency personnel, and the public. The HEFS Division represented or provided legal counsel to the clients on a number of significant matters including, the Adair Headlee litigation, Race to the Top school reform legislation, the Smoking Ban law, the Medical Marijuana Law, Emergency Financial Managers appointed for school districts, and class action lawsuits involving Medicaid and general assistance policy matters. The HEFS Division recovered $10,031,988.62 for the State during this period.

Labor Division

Susan Przekop-Shaw, Division Chief

The Labor Division provides legal advice and representation to 18 state entities that afford workforce opportunities, regulate the workforce, or provide workforce benefits in accordance with the Michigan Constitution and more than 34 state and federal statutes and associated rules and regulations. The Division also represents the state's executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government in workers' disability compensation claims filed against them by their employees. The Division is comprised of two units: Labor and Unemployment with offices in Lansing, Grand Rapids, and Detroit. The Labor Unit consists of three sections: Funds Administration, Regulatory, and State Claims.

The State Claims Section defends all State of Michigan executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government in workers' disability compensation litigated cases filed by State of Michigan employees under the Michigan Workers' Disability Compensation Act of 1969, 1969 PA 317, as amended. The State Claims Section also serves as primary legal advisor in workers' compensation matters to the Office of State Employer and the State's Third Party Administrator.

The Funds Administration Section provides legal counsel and represents three statutory trust funds: Self-insurers' Security Fund, Second Injury Fund, and the Silicosis, Dust Disease and Logging Industry Compensation Fund, and as required by statute, provides legal advice to the Funds' Board of Trustees appointed by the Governor. The Funds Administration Section protects the Funds' interest and preserves trusts funded by insurance carriers and self-insured employers in bankruptcy, receivership, or other cases filed in United States Bankruptcy Court and Michigan Courts.

The Regulatory Section offers legal advice and represents state entities charged with regulating employment conditions, licenses, and workplace performance. This Section enforces many statutory provisions, including Stille-DeRossette-Hale Single State Construction Code Act, 1972 PA 230; the Fire Prevention Code, 1941 PA 207; the Payment of Wages and Fringe Benefits Act, 1978 PA 390; the Minimum Wage Law of 1964, 1964 PA 154; Youth Employment Standards Act, 1978 PA 90; Wages of Persons Working on State Projects Act, 1965 PA 166; the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act, 1974 PA 154, as amended; the Blind and Visually Disabled Persons Act, 1978 PA 260; the federal Randolph-Sheppard Act as to the vending facility program for the blind, 20 USC §§ 107 – 107f; the Employment Relations Commission Act, 1939 PA 176; and the Workers' Disability Compensation Act of 1969, 1969 PA 317, as amended. This Section also represents the Civil Service Commission that controls the employment terms and conditions for all state classified employees under Const 1963, art 11, § 5 and the Michigan State Board of Ethics that oversees the ethical conduct of public officers and the executive branch employees under the State Ethics Act, 1973 PA 196.

The Unemployment Section is counsel to the Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA) and represents its Office of Trust Fund, Tax & Field Audit Division, and Office of Benefits Services in all civil actions maintained in state and federal courts. This Section represents the UIA as statutory party to all actions arising under the Michigan Employment Security Act, 1936 PA 1, as amended. In tax collection and benefit restitution actions, the Section sues to recover delinquent unemployment taxes or improperly received unemployment benefits and defends the UIA's proofs of claim filed in federal bankruptcy courts and state probate and circuit courts.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
District Ct	1,212	806	794	1,224	584	773	1,035
Probate Ct	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Circuit Ct	315	565	538	342	575	551	366
Ct of Claims	2	1	2	1	0	1	0
Ct of Appeals	27	35	26	36	34	44	26
Supreme Ct	17	12	22	7	11	16	2
Total	**1,573**	**1,419**	**1,382**	**1,610**	**1,205**	**1,386**	**1,429**
Out-of-State State Courts	9	0	2	7	0	1	6
US Courts							
District Ct	5	2	4	3	8	4	7
Circ Ct of App	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
Supreme Ct	2	4	2	4	0	1	3
Bankruptcy Ct	187	104	82	209	77	83	203
Total	**196**	**111**	**90**	**217**	**87**	**89**	**215**
Administrative Actions							
State	1,065	979	764	1,280	770	688	1,362
Federal	0	1	0	1	1	1	1
Total	**1,065**	**980**	**764**	**1,281**	**771**	**689**	**1,363**

Monies Paid To/By the State:	**2009**	**2010**
All Judgments/Settlements paid TO State	$4,499,309.02	$3,702,437.07

Other Significant Division Activity:	**2009**	**2010**
Citizen letters responded to:	372	318
Fines/penalties paid TO State (Workers' Compensation Administrative Revolving Fund)	$437,706.57	$345,857.45
Actual monies collected (Wage & Hour Division) Wages, Interest, Costs, Civil Penalties	$189,500.55	$183,151.70
Actual monies collected (Unemployment Unit)		
Restitution	$421,495.16	$388,581.14
Contribution	$437,805.82	$518,384.02
Employer Bankruptcy	$607,523.45	$504,640.85
TOTAL	**$1,466,824.43**	**$1,411,606.01**
Monies saved the State in defense of workers' disability compensation claims filed by state employees:	$7,316,464.01	$6,943,997.02

The Labor Division, on behalf of the Workers' Compensation Agency and the Funds Administration, protected the workers' disability compensation benefits due to injured workers and the stability of the Self-Insurers' Security Fund in the automobile bankruptcy cases filed in 2009 by Chrysler, Delphi, and General Motors, and negotiated settlements where the new entities that emerged assumed these obligations estimated to be worth $1,787,440,000.

Licensing & Regulation Division

Wanda M. Stokes, Division Chief

The Division provides legal services to two state agencies. The Division represents the Department of Community Health, Bureau of Health Professions and the 21 health regulatory boards created under the Public Health Code, and the Department of Energy, Labor, and Economic Growth, Bureau of Commercial Services and Bureau of Commercial Codes and the 31 occupational regulatory licensing boards created under the Occupational Code. The responsibilities include providing day-to-day legal advice as well as representing the agencies in civil and administrative licensing proceedings and regulatory actions. Currently the division consists of 20 staff, comprised of 15 attorneys and five legal secretaries. The Division operates principally out of Lansing, but has a satellite office in Cadillac Place in Detroit.

The health regulatory boards the Division represents include the Board of Medicine, Board of Osteopathic Medicine & Surgery, Board of Nursing, and Board of Pharmacy. Many of the disciplinary cases involve healthcare providers who have injured patients, are incompetent, have sexually abused patients, have prescribed excessive amounts of controlled substances, and other similar conduct. The occupational licensing boards include residential builders, real estate salespersons, real estate appraisers, unarmed combat, and other similar licensing boards.

The Division also represented the DELEG's Construction Lien Fund. This Fund was created by the Construction Lien Act to protect the rights of lien claimants to receive payment for labor and materials, and to protect homeowners from paying twice for the same services. The Fund was repealed in August 2010. The Division is resolving the remaining pending cases.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
Municipal Ct	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
District Ct	2	2	4	0	0	0	0
Probate Ct	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Circuit Ct	483	250	317	416	73	450	39
Ct of Claims	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ct of Appeals	5	13	7	11	10	15	6
Supreme Ct	1	2	2	1	0	1	0
Total	**491**	**267**	**330**	**428**	**83**	**466**	**45**
Out-of-State State Courts	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
US Courts							
District Ct	1	0	0	1	0	1	0
Circ Ct of App	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supreme Ct	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bankruptcy Ct	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	**1**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**0**
Administrative Actions							
State	476	374	498	352	346	408	290
Federal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	**476**	**374**	**498**	**352**	**346**	**408**	**290**

Monies Paid To/By the State:	**2009**	**2010**
All Judgments/Settlements paid TO State	2,665,037.89	1,268,479.84
All Judgments/Settlements paid BY State	1,301,870.01	1,459,655.43
Amount Saved State	11,933,520.09	21,078,095.74

Other Significant Division Activity:	**2009**	**2010**
Investigations and requests for advice received	193	220
Memoranda of advice and investigation files closed by funneling to administrative litigation or by memorandum of advice	245	212
Citizen letters closed	446	303

Public Administration Division

Rebekah F. Mason-Visconti, Division Chief[2]

The Public Administration Division involves the probate of estates in which the heirs are unknown, and in guardianship and conservatorship proceedings in which the protected person has no presumptive heirs. The State Public Administrator supervises local county public administrators in the administration of decedent estates in the 83 Michigan counties. Litigation in this area involves determining the validity of questionable wills, determining heirs in estates, resisting fraudulent claims, and ensuring distributions as provided by law. The State Public Administrator also provides legal services for the Department of Treasury's Abandoned and Unclaimed Property Division.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
Probate Ct	54	67	60	61	35	47	49
Circuit Ct	1	1	1	1	1	2	0
Ct of Claims	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Total	**56**	**68**	**62**	**62**	**36**	**49**	**49**
US Courts							
District Ct	3	2	5	0	2	2	0

Monies Paid To/By the State:	**2009**	**2010**
All Judgments/Settlements paid TO State	$411,229.99	$244,274.07
All Judgments/Settlements paid BY State	0.00	0.00

CRIMINAL JUSTICE BUREAU

Thomas C. Cameron
Bureau Chief

The Criminal Justice Bureau includes six divisions: Alcohol and Gambling Enforcement Division; Child Support Division; Children & Youth Services Division; Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Division; Criminal Division; and Health Care Fraud Division. A departmental reorganization during the biennial period moved the Children & Youth Services Division from the Child & Family Services Bureau to the Criminal Justice Bureau. In the criminal area, the Bureau's responsibilities include the investigation and prosecution of a broad array of criminal matters, with a particular emphasis on public corruption, cold case homicides, abuse and neglect of seniors in nursing homes, health care fraud, casino related crimes, non-payment of child support, and child abuse and neglect cases arising out of Wayne County. The Bureau also handles issues involving civil matters in its representation of the Department of Civil Rights, Liquor Control Commission, the Michigan Gaming Board, and the Michigan Department of State in driver license restoration matters.

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[2] Division Chief Brenda Turner retired on November 1, 2010.

Alcohol & Gambling Enforcement Division

Donald S. McGehee, Division Chief

Created through a large division merger, the Alcohol and Gambling Enforcement Division (AGED) has existed since 2002. The AGED represents several state agencies and navigates diverse areas of law. Included in the AGED's collection of well-served clients are the Michigan Gaming Control Board, the Executive Director of the Gaming Control Board, the Executive Director of Horse Racing, the Bureau of State Lottery, the Charitable Gaming Division, the Liquor Control Commission, various units of the Michigan State Police, Department of Treasury jeopardy tax assessment unit, and the Michigan Sheriff's Coordinating and Training Council. AGED has offices in Southfield and Lansing. Numerous administrative hearings are conducted at each of the offices.

The AGED's talented and versatile staff consists of twelve attorneys and six secretaries. Although AGED is divided into two sections—gaming and liquor—the AGED's attorneys routinely handle assignments outside their area of expertise. Until reorganization a few years ago, the AGED also handled criminal prosecutions in casino-related and illegal gambling cases and prosecutions in tax-enforcement and civil-forfeiture actions under the Tobacco Products Tax Act. Further, from 2003-2005, the AGED's Division Chief also served as the State's Public Administrator.

The AGED's attorneys devote most of their time to assisting the state's liquor and gaming agencies with a wide variety of tasks. Their efforts often involve providing legal guidance during in-depth regulatory investigations such as background investigations for licensing and those uncovering statute or rule violations at licensed establishments. The AGED also carries the responsibility of prosecuting the thousands of administrative violation cases these agencies pursue each year. Well over 50,000 gaming and liquor licensees are regulated by AGED.

The AGED's clients also benefit from its general counsel services, which often involve providing written advice on complex legal questions and serving as counsel to public bodies during public meetings. Its attorneys devote significant resources to analyzing transactional matters that require regulatory approval, such as multi-billion dollar casino mergers, financing transactions, or ownership transfers, and purchases of global companies having contracts with the State Lottery. Attorneys in AGED also step up to represent their clients in state and federal courts when their interests are implicated, handling all stages of litigation, including appellate representation. These lawsuits sometime involve significant state and federal constitutional issues that can have nationwide impact.

The AGED's services are also always available to the Department's Executive and Opinions Divisions. The AGED's attorneys have drafted multiple Opinions of the Attorney General and have analyzed numerous issues for Executive staff, including proposed legislation and Executive Orders.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
Probate Ct	0	3	3	0	1	0	1
Circuit Ct	24	15	20	19	20	23	16
Ct of Appeals	7	1	4	4	5	5	4
Supreme Ct	2	1	2	1	1	1	1
Total	**33**	**20**	**29**	**24**	**27**	**29**	**22**

US Courts							
District Ct	7	1	5	3	1	2	2
Circ Ct of App	2	1	2	1	1	0	2
Bankruptcy Ct	9	3	2	10	0	0	10
Total	**18**	**5**	**9**	**14**	**2**	**2**	**14**
Administrative Actions							
State	326	2,667	2,779	214	2,658	2,428	444

Monies Paid To/By the State:	**2009**	**2010**
Amount Awarded TO State/Citizens	$1,223,780.43	$1,145,204.00
All Judgments/Settlements paid BY State	$120,000.00	0.00
Value of Closed Financial Transactions TO State	$1,774,465,192.00	$2,179,075,500.00
Amount Saved State	$1,000,000.00	0.00

Other Significant Division Activity:	**2009**	**2010**
General Assignment - Memorandum of Advice cases	310	367

Child Support Division

Patrick J. O'Brien, Division Chief

Attorney General Mike Cox created the Child Support Division in April 2003. It was the nation's first statewide child support enforcement unit. The Division continues to serve as a model for states seeking to recover unpaid child support. The Division focuses its enforcement efforts on those parents who have the economic ability to pay child support, but refuse to do so.

In its eight years of operation, the Division has collected over $98,000,000.00 that has directly benefited more than 8,500 children. During the time the Division has been in operation, Michigan has led the nation in reducing the number of cases where custodial parents are owed child support arrears. The Division is currently comprised of six attorneys, ten investigators, four secretarial staff, a departmental supervisor/victim advocate, one temporary word processor, a departmental technician, and a paralegal. The Child Support Division investigates and prosecutes felony non-support cases throughout the State of Michigan.

The Division acts as legal counsel for the Office of Child Support's Central Enforcement Unit in their efforts to obtain the assets of non-payers of child support arrearages. The Child Support Division has litigated and resolved the legal issues related to the collection and prosecution of child support cases in the Michigan appellate courts.

Funding for the Child Support Division is provided, in part, by federal IV-D grant money administered in Michigan by the Department of Human Services of the Office of Child Support. The grant monies reimburse the Department of Attorney General for 66% of all Division expenses.

Division Caseload:

	Pending[3] 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
District Ct	568	871	564	875	841	815	901
Circuit Ct	862	525	705	682	573	681	574
Ct of Appeals	2	5	1	6	2	5	3
Supreme Ct	0	1	0	1	1	0	2
Total	**1,432**	**1,402**	**1,270**	**1,564**	**1,417**	**1,501**	**1,480**
Out-of-State State Courts	1	0	1	0	0	0	0

Other Significant Division Activity:	**2009**	**2010**
Number of investigations opened	2,306	1,817
Number of warrants issued	866	810
Number of arrests made	746	733
Amount of child support collected	$15,412,188.04	$17,066,779.55
Number of children helped	1,434	1,243
Number of citizen letters opened	232	187
Extraditions	189	180

Children & Youth Services Division

Deborah L. Carley, Division Chief

The Children & Youth Services Division provides legal advice and representation to the Department of Human Services in litigation and appellate work involving child abuse and neglect cases in Wayne County.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
Circuit Ct	3,423	980	1,717	2,686	901	1,320	2,267
Ct of Appeals	94	92	139	47	107	99	55
Supreme Ct	1	6	6	1	3	3	1
Total	**3,518**	**1,078**	**1,862**	**2,734**	**1,011**	**1,422**	**2,323**

Other Significant Division Activity:	**2009**	**2010**
Petitions handled by division	1,493	1,368
Children involved in the petitions referenced above	2,768	2,388
Hearings attended	20,975	19,880
Trials completed	1,960	1,735
Responsive pleadings filed in the Court of Appeals	120	86

[3] The Child Support Division converted from one database to another in mid-2008, which accounts for the change in pending 12/31/08 figure.

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Division

Ron D. Robinson, Division Chief

The Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Division advises and represents the Michigan Civil Rights Commission (MCRC) and the Michigan Department of Civil Rights (MDCR) and cooperates with other state departments and agencies in addressing civil rights and civil liberties related matters.

The division prepares and files formal charges of discrimination by the MDCR alleging civil rights violations and represents the MDCR at formal administrative hearings and in appeals taken. In cases which the Attorney General determines present issues of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State and in which the MCRC is not a party, the division represents the MCRC as an intervener or amicus curiae.

The division brings court proceedings to enforce orders issued by the MCRC or the MDCR and seeks injunctive relief in cases of unlawful discrimination in the areas of housing and public accommodation.

The division also supervises the Driver License Restoration Section (DLRS). The DLRS represents the Michigan Secretary of State in driver license restoration matters in Wayne, Oakland, and Washtenaw counties, and handles out-county appeals referred by the Secretary of State. Effective April 5, 2010, the section assumed representation of the Secretary of State in Macomb County.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
District Ct	4	4	7	1	1	2	0
Circuit Ct	2,083	557	1,407	1,233	907	614	1,526
Ct of Appeals	10	6	10	6	3	2	7
Supreme Ct	4	0	2	2	1	1	2
Total	**2,101**	**567**	**1,426**	**1,242**	**912**	**619**	**1,535**
US Courts							
District Ct	0	2	1	1	0	1	0
Circ Ct of App	2	0	1	1	2	1	2
Supreme Ct	2	3	2	3	0	1	2
Total	**4**	**5**	**4**	**5**	**2**	**3**	**4**
Administrative Actions							
State	0	0	0	0	2	2	0
Other Significant Division Activity:							
Citizen Letters	77	221	245	53	141	144	50
Gen. Assignments	14	38	26	26	28	33	21

Criminal Division

Richard L. Cunningham, Division Chief

The Criminal Division prosecutes criminal cases based on the Attorney General's common law and statutory duties as Michigan's chief law enforcement offi-

cer and his statutory responsibility to supervise Michigan's 83 prosecuting attorneys. In order to carry out its mission, the Criminal Division employs 13 full-time attorneys, 2 contractual attorneys, 7 full-time Special Agent Investigators, and 5 full-time support staff, along with law student support when available.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
District Ct	350	424	415	359	357	404	312
Circuit Ct	221	436	435	222	1,136	1,111	247
Ct of Claims	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Ct of Appeals	1	1	1	1	2	1	2
Total	**573**	**861**	**852**	**582**	**1,495**	**1,516**	**561**
Criminal Investigations	**119**	**62**	**65**	**116**	**118**	**66**	**168**

Monies Paid To/By the State:	**2009**	**2010**
All Judgments/Settlements paid TO State	$10,944,592.29	$5,223,184.76

Other Significant Division Activity:

The attorneys and investigators of this division conduct extensive and complex investigations on suspected criminal activity prior to the initiation of criminal charges.

Health Care Fraud Division

David Tanay, Division Chief[4]

The Attorney General's Health Care Fraud Division investigates and prosecutes Medicaid provider fraud and complaints of abuse and neglect in residential care facilities. The Health Care Fraud Division is one of 49 federally certified Medicaid Fraud Control Units. It is a self-contained investigation and prosecution division with attorneys, auditors, and investigators on staff. Medicaid fraud investigations and prosecutions can include false billings, unlawful delivery of controlled substances, practicing medicine without a license, kickbacks, and bribery schemes. Abuse and neglect investigations and prosecutions may include physical assault, criminal sexual conduct, identity theft, theft of residents' property and funds, and harmful neglect in Michigan resident care facilities. The division also has authority to initiate civil actions for Medicaid overpayments. In conducting its activities, it may also work with other agencies such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, Michigan State Police, state regulatory agencies, local law enforcement agencies, and private health insurance companies.

[4] Division Chief Wallace Hart retired on November 1, 2010.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
District Ct	97	24	40	81	18	22	77
Circuit Ct	24	27	29	22	17	21	18
Ct of Appeals	1	2	1	2	1	1	2
Supreme Ct	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Total	**123**	**53**	**71**	**105**	**36**	**44**	**97**
US Courts							
District Ct	124	63	28	159	108	33	234

Monies Paid To/By the State:	**2009**	**2010**
All Judgments/Settlements paid TO State	$27,445,109.82	$63,563,044.15

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS BUREAU

Frank J. Monticello
Bureau Chief

The Bureau of Governmental Affairs began the biennial period with the following divisions: Corrections Division; Finance Division; Public Administration Division; Public Employment, Elections, and Tort Division; Revenue and Collections Division; State Operations Division; and Transportation Division. A Department reorganization during the biennial period moved the Public Administration Division to the Consumer & Environmental Protection Bureau and added the Public Service Division to the Governmental Affairs Bureau.

Attorneys assigned to these divisions practice in a wide-range of legal fields and specialties, appearing in all levels of state and federal courts and an array of administrative tribunals. The Bureau handles complex civil litigation, a variety of regulatory matters, and provides general legal counsel to nearly all state agencies. Following are the details and statistics for each division.

Corrections Division

James E. Long, Division Chief

The Corrections Division provides legal advice and representation to the Michigan Department of Corrections and the Michigan Parole Board. While the majority of the workload consists of the representation of the Department of Corrections and the Michigan Parole Board and their employees in the federal and state court systems, the Division also provides legal advice and consultation regarding employment issues, contracts, etc., as well as interpretation of state and federal constitutions, statutes and rules, agency decisions, policies, and procedures. Commencing June 1, 2004, the Division assumed the review of all extraditions and interstate rendition requests received by the Governor's Office. Additionally, commencing August 16, 2004, the Corrections Division assumed the review of all petitions to set aside conviction (expungements) filed with the state courts, and the rep-

resentation of the Michigan State Police (MSP) concerning the litigation of orders for setting aside convictions that the MSP contests.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
Municipal Ct	0	1	0	1	1	0	2
District Ct	931	639	791	779	243	523	499
Probate Ct	34	26	24	36	13	36	13
Circuit Ct	2,412	1,587	1,705	2,294	1,233	1,992	1,535
Ct of Claims	13	6	13	6	1	5	2
Ct of Appeals	99	105	94	110	98	149	59
Supreme Ct	25	33	32	26	29	43	12
Total	**3,514**	**2,397**	**2,659**	**3,252**	**1,618**	**2,748**	**2,122**
US Courts							
District Ct	418	220	279	359	204	256	307
Circ Ct of App	131	141	162	110	113	97	126
Supreme Ct	9	33	32	10	10	13	7
Bankruptcy Ct	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
Total	**558**	**395**	**473**	**480**	**327**	**367**	**440**
Administrative Actions	99	214	246	67	154	198	23

Monies Paid To/By the State:	**2009**	**2010**
All Judgments/Settlements paid TO State	$7,383.24	$6,757.52
All Judgments/Settlements paid BY State	$17,507,154.20	$10,106,225.24

Other Significant Division Activity:	**2009**	**2010**
Extraditions	146	129
Expungements and Questioned Orders Not Included in Legal Files	942	2,513

Finance Division

Patricia T. Quinn, Division Chief

The Finance Division serves as general counsel and issuers' counsel on all bond or note issuances by the State or any of its agencies, departments, authorities, or instrumentalities. The division also provides legal services in connection with state surplus funds and state pension fund investments. The division prepares loan, grant, and investment documentation, bond documents, financial assurance documentation, and generally any and all types of documentation necessary or appropriate to the transactional, investment, and borrowing needs of the State.

The authorities served by the Finance Division consist of the Michigan State Housing Development Authority, Michigan Strategic Fund, State Building Authority, Michigan Finance Authority, and the Michigan Land Bank Fast Track Authority.

The Finance Division also handles municipal finance and local governmental matters relating to counties, cities, villages, townships, districts, authorities, and other local governmental organizations. Representation is provided to: a) the Local Audit

& Finance Division of the Department of Treasury, b) the Local Emergency Financial Assistance Loan Board, and c) the State Boundary Commission. Advice is provided to the Governor on city and village charter, charter amendments, ballot questions, and Intergovernmental Agreements under the Urban Cooperation Act. This division answers questions dealing with municipal infrastructure, contracts, finance, powers, utilities and zoning, and divisional representatives sit as the Attorney General's designee on the Boards of the State Employees' Retirement System, Judges' Retirement System, and the Michigan State Police Retirement System.

Other Significant Division Activity:	**2009**	**2010**
Financial Transactions	419	497
Principal Amount	$7,069,494,292.65	$9,582,113,824.00
Number of opinion requests	10	12
City & Village Charters	4	1
Charter Amendments	113	77
Interlocal Amendments	3	7

Public Employment, Elections, & Tort Division

Denise C. Barton, Division Chief

The Public Employment, Elections, & Tort Division (PEET) is currently composed of thirteen attorneys and four secretaries who handle employment, civil rights, and tort litigation in state and federal courts throughout Michigan for all branches of state government. This practice also includes a substantial appellate docket in the Michigan Court of Appeals and Supreme Court and the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals involving significant state and federal law constitutional issues impacting all citizens of the State. The Division provides legal advice and representation to state agencies' officers and employees in all branches of state government (with the exception of the Department of Transportation and certain prisoner litigation cases) when sued in civil lawsuits based on personal injury, property damage, or other theories of liability under either state or federal law. The Division's staff also provides representation to state agencies, principally the Department of Corrections, in the administrative and arbitration forums allowed under the Civil Service Collective Bargaining Agreements and Rules.

In addition to this primary litigation responsibility, the Division advises and represents the Office of the State Employer with respect to collective bargaining and other employment matters relating to the state classified civil service, and the Auditor General and the Department of Military and Veterans Affairs on all transactional and legal matters. The Division also advises and represents the Secretary of State and Board of State Canvassers in election matters, including all related litigation, involving the state's election laws, the Michigan Campaign Finance Act and Lobby Registration Act. Division legal staff also provides informal assistance to local officials throughout the State who are charged with election responsibilities and respond to citizen inquiries and letters on election matters. The Division also reviews and handles certain enforcement from the Secretary of State related to campaign finance or lobby registration law violations. The Division has taken enforcement actions in hundreds of referrals from the Secretary of State.

In addition, the Division continues to handle special assignments involving complex litigation or research and drafting of opinions, amicus briefs, or other legal writ-

ings involving significant constitutional and statutory issues. Division legal staff also serves as a training resource and participates on committees formulated to develop policy or practice protocols for department staff.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
District Ct	4	11	15	0	12	10	2
Probate Ct	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Circuit Ct	96	110	139	67	126	111	82
Ct of Claims	15	13	19	9	17	12	14
Ct of Appeals	41	41	55	27	29	26	30
Supreme Ct	13	11	16	8	19	20	7
Total	**169**	**186**	**244**	**111**	**203**	**179**	**135**
US Courts							
District Ct	94	83	83	94	85	76	103
Circ Ct of App	38	25	38	25	19	15	29
Supreme Ct	1	4	4	1	1	1	1
Bankruptcy Ct	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	**133**	**112**	**125**	**120**	**105**	**92**	**133**
Administrative Actions							
State	17	2	13	6	5	7	4

Monies Paid To/By the State:	**2009**	**2010**
All Judgments/Settlements paid TO State	$1,000.00	$0.00
All Judgments/Settlements paid BY State	$2,124,460.39	$2,239,235.00

Other Significant Division Activity:

Due to the litigation expertise in the Public Employment, Elections, & Tort Division, the division has handled special assignments involving constitutional challenges to state statutes, policies and procedures, constitutionality of Proposal 2 and the indigent defense counsel system, defense of the Secretary of State and the Board of State Canvassers in election cases and campaign finance litigation.

Public Service Division

Steven D. Hughey, Division Chief

The Public Service Division provides legal counsel and representation to the Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC) in the Michigan circuit courts, Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court; and the federal district courts, Court of Appeals, (primarily the D.C. Circuit and Sixth Circuit), and Supreme Court. The division also represents both the State of Michigan and the MPSC in proceedings before federal departments and agencies, including the Department of Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Highway Administration, and in appeals from these agencies to the federal courts. The Public Service Division also represents the MPSC staff in administrative proceedings.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
District Ct	1	0	0	1	0	1	0
Circuit Ct	0	0	0	0	2	2	0
Ct of Appeals	26	6	14	18	27	18	27
Supreme Ct	4	5	4	5	5	5	5
Total	**31**	**11**	**18**	**24**	**34**	**26**	**32**
US Courts							
District Ct	4	1	2	3	2	3	2
Circ Ct of App	7	2	3	6	0	2	4
Supreme Ct	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
Bankruptcy Ct	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Total	**12**	**3**	**6**	**9**	**4**	**5**	**8**
Administrative Actions	148	241	268	120	205	192	133

Monies Paid To/By the State:	**2009**	**2010**
All Judgments/Settlements paid TO State	$300,000.00	$21,500.00
All Judgments/Settlements paid BY State	0.00	0.00

Revenue and Collections Division

Bradley K. Morton, Division Chief[5]

The Revenue and Collections Division acts as legal counsel to the Department of Treasury in all matters pertaining to the administration of state taxes and supervision of local taxes. It also represents all state departments in the collection of delinquent accounts throughout the State of Michigan and in all other states of the United States.

The above representation of state interests includes the prosecution and defense of matters in both state and federal courts, as well the Michigan Tax Tribunal, and involves state taxes for which the state annually receives in excess of $24.3 billion. The Division also represents the State Tax Commission which, since the Executive Organization Act of 1965, has acted as a State Board of Equalization of local property tax assessments and as the State Board of Assessors, centrally appraising and taxing railroad, telephone, and telegraph companies. Additionally, the commission administers statutes that grant tax exemptions for industrial and commercial facilities, water and air pollution control facilities, and energy conservations devices. The total monies raised by local property taxes annually exceed $10 billion.

This Division also represents the State Treasurer in actions brought in 13 counties as the foreclosing unit of government for delinquent real property taxes and in defense of claims brought against the State arising from foreclosure actions.

The figures reported below include not only substantive tax cases but also those involved with the collection of delinquent state accounts. The pending cases that involve substantive tax issues represent claims against the State in judicial and

[5] Division Chief Russell E Prins retired on October 31, 2010.

administrative proceedings in excess of $500 million. During the biennium, $13,794,566.29 was collected on delinquent accounts. This includes $4,648,997.74 that was collected during the period on prisoner reimbursement accounts. The amount of claims for tax and other delinquencies for which payment is sought by the State of Michigan in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings currently exceeds $194 million.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
Tribal Ct.	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
District Ct	35	36	29	42	42	41	43
Probate Ct	35	17	13	39	14	11	42
Circuit Ct	503	345	213	635	365	352	648
Ct of Claims	260	58	81	237	45	67	215
Ct of Appeals	70	49	32	87	40	22	105
Supreme Ct	14	12	7	19	15	14	20
Total	**917**	**517**	**375**	**1059**	**522**	**507**	**1074**
Out-of-State State Courts	3	3	2	4	5	4	5
US Courts							
District Ct	21	14	6	29	19	17	31
Circ Ct of App	1	6	0	7	2	6	3
Supreme Ct	1	0	1	0	2	0	2
Bankruptcy Ct	3397	1632	1221	3808	1565	1907	3466
Total	**3420**	**1652**	**1228**	**3844**	**1588**	**1930**	**3502**
Administrative Actions							
State	596	258	239	615	105	136	584

Monies Paid To the State:	**2009**	**2010**
Judgments/Settlements paid TO State Tax and State Agency Accounts	4,051,081.70	5,094,486.85
Prisoner Reimbursement	2,334,446.26	2,314,551.48
Total	**6,385,527.96**	**7,409,038.33**

State Operations Division

Frank Monticello, Division Chief[6]

State Operations has very diverse responsibilities. State Operations has seven state departments as clients: the Department of Information Technology; the Department of Management & Budget; the Department of State; the Department of History, Arts, and Libraries; the Department of Energy, Labor & Economic Growth (for job training and adult education matters); the Department of Natural Resources

[6] Thomas F. Schimpf retired on October 31, 2010.

and Environment (for real estate conveyances); and the Department of Military and Veterans' Affairs (for real estate matters).[7]

In addition, we provide legal counsel to: the Michigan Strategic Fund; the Strategic Economic Investment and Commercialization Board; the Michigan Economic Growth Authority; the Michigan State Housing Development Authority; the Michigan Next Energy Authority; the Michigan Film Office; the Michigan Education Trust; and Michigan Education Savings Program within the Department of Treasury; the Land Bank Fast Track Authority (in cooperation with the Finance and Revenue and Collection Divisions); the Michigan Exposition and Fairgrounds Authority (i.e., the State Fair); the Michigan State Public Safety Communications System within the Department of Technology, Management, and Budget; the Small Business Pollution Prevention Loan Program within the Department of Natural Resources and Environment; the Office of the Children's Ombudsman; the Governor's office; and the State Court Administrator's Office.[8] We advise all state departments, agencies, and commissions as to the Freedom of Information Act and Open Meetings Act, and provide legal representation in actions filed under these acts. In addition, we provide litigation representation for the State Administrative Board, the State Court Administrative Office, and for the clients of the Finance Division, in particular, the Michigan State Housing Development Authority and the Department of Treasury's Bureau of Investments. We also serve as the Department's point of contact with the Michigan Economic Development Corporation.

Our Retirement Section provides legal counsel for: the State Employees' Retirement System; the Public Schools Employees' Retirement System; the Judges' Retirement System; the State Police Retirement System; the Legislative Retirement System; and the State Social Security Administrator.

Our General Counsel Section coordinates all requests submitted to the Department under the Freedom of Information Act and handles general citizen letter responsibilities. We are also responsible for managing the information technology operations of the Department.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
District Ct	2	5	5	2	8	5	5
Probate Ct	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
Circuit Ct	76	82	63	95	64	65	94
Ct of Claims	4	7	1	10	9	3	16
Ct of Appeals	23	18	18	23	16	6	33
Supreme Ct	7	5	8	4	4	2	6
Total	**112**	**117**	**95**	**134**	**103**	**81**	**156**
Out-of-State State Courts	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
US Courts							
District Ct	4	6	2	8	8	7	9

[7] The Department of Information Technology and the Department of Management and Budget were combined by E.O. 2009-55; the Department of History, Arts, and Libraries was eliminated by E.O. 2009-36.

[8] The Strategic Economic Investment and Commercialization Board was eliminated by E.O. 2010-8; the Michigan Exposition and Fairgrounds Authority (i.e., the State Fair) was eliminated by E.O. 2009-4.

Circ Ct of App	1	2	1	2	1	2	1
Supreme Ct	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bankruptcy Ct	4	4	1	7	2	0	9
Total	**9**	**12**	**4**	**17**	**12**	**9**	**20**
Administrative Actions							
State	114	73	100	87	74	59	102

Monies Paid To/By the State:	**2009**	**2010**
All Judgments/Settlements paid TO State	$92,155.11	$825,765.19
All Judgments/Settlements paid BY State	$991,948.42	$666,430.69
Amount Saved the State	$73,950,089.72	$190,943,929.95
Value of Transactions	$2,369,096,136.62	$7,327,859,428.65

Other Significant Division Activity:

		Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Transactions	112	202	202	112	277	227	162	
General Assignments		358	701	692	367	591	542	416

Transportation Division

Patrick F. Isom, Division Chief

The Transportation Division is organized into two sections: Torts & Condemnation Section and Contracts & General Counsel Section. The Transportation Division advises and represents the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT), Michigan State Transportation Commission, the Mackinac Bridge Authority, the International Bridge Administration, the Aeronautics Commission, and the Michigan Truck Safety Commission, each of which has constitutional and/or statutory responsibilities in an area of transportation, in all areas of the law and litigation except municipal bonding.

MDOT constructs and maintains state trunk line highways throughout the State and administers a comprehensive transportation program involving travel by watercraft, bus, railroad car, aircraft, rapid transit vehicle, or other means of public conveyance. In addition, MDOT administers numerous funding and grant programs under which municipalities, local transit agencies, and others carry out transportation programs. MDOT's regulatory responsibilities include the areas of highway advertising, driveways, and rail safety. Attorneys in this division represent MDOT and each of its agencies in all lawsuits and administrative proceedings; assist in the development, review, and interpretation of contracts; and, advise regarding the interpretation of state and federal laws. The Division also represents MDOT in all its condemnation and tort litigation. The areas of litigation range from contract and tort litigation; to employment/ discrimination claims; to lawsuits to collect damages from motorists, insurance companies and others responsible for damage to MDOT property; to appellate litigation in all areas of civil practice.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
District Ct	18	11	12	17	6	16	7

Circuit Ct	58	23	32	49	30	29	50
Ct of Claims	29	22	16	35	17	28	24
Ct of Appeals	19	15	15	19	10	19	10
Supreme Ct	1	5	1	5	5	7	3
Total	**125**	**76**	**76**	**125**	**68**	**99**	**94**
US Courts							
District Ct	0	2	1	1	6	1	6
Circ Ct of App	1	0	1	0	2	1	1
Total	**1**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**8**	**2**	**7**
Administrative Actions							
State	10	20	17	13	10	9	14

Monies Paid To/By the State:	**2009**	**2010**
All Judgments/Settlements paid TO State	$622,950.77	$748,447.80
All Judgments/Settlements paid BY State	$660,737.18	$3,260385.18

Other Significant Division Activity:
Contract review for 2009 and 2010:

2009: Approximately 2,024 contracts — 921 construction contracts totaling approximately $1,351,245,777; approximately 1,103 contracts from Real Estate, Maintenance Division, Design, Planning, and Multimodal.

2010: Approximately 2,139 contracts — 988 construction contracts totaling approximately $1,321,990,789; approximately 1,151 contracts from Real Estate, Maintenance Division, Design, Planning, and Multimodal.

The Division administers a program to collect compensation from motorists and insurance companies for damages done to guardrail, bridges, and other elements of highway infrastructure. Often this can be done without litigation. In 2009, the amount collected without litigation was $960,723.61. In 2010, the amount collected without litigation was $745,580.98.

Additionally, both with and without litigation, attorneys in the Division assist MDOT in recovering compensation, or having payment made to injured parties who could otherwise hold MDOT liable, from contractors, consultants, insurance companies, and others that have contractual or other legal liability to MDOT or an agency within MDOT. For the 2009-2010 period, the amount either collected or paid to injured parties was $133,447.10.

SOLICITOR GENERAL BUREAU

B. Eric Restuccia
Solicitor General

The Solicitor General Bureau includes two divisions: Appellate Division and Opinions Division. The Assistant Solicitor General, Henry Boynton, serves as the First Assistant to the Solicitor General. The Assistant Attorney General for Law is the Division Chief of the Opinions Division, and the Appellate Division is supervised by its own Division Chief.

For the Department, the Solicitor General and the attorneys within the Bureau review, edit, and approve all documents filed in the appellate courts; prepare original briefing and amicus briefs in significant and special cases; review all formal and informal legal opinions prepared on behalf of the Attorney General; conduct trainings for appellate writing and opinion writing; coordinate requests from the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) for joining amicus filings; respond to habeas corpus petitions in the federal courts filed by state prisoners claiming their federal constitutional rights were violated in their state criminal proceedings; and is responsible for the criminal appellate work by filing appeals for the People of the State of Michigan in defending felony convictions for the 56 county prosecutors in counties with populations below 75,000 residents.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
District Ct	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Circuit Ct	1	0	0	1	3	0	4
Ct of Appeals	0	3	1	2	1	2	1
Supreme Ct	1	3	1	3	2	3	2
Total	**3**	**6**	**3**	**6**	**6**	**5**	**7**
Out-of-State State Courts	1	0	0	1	0	1	0
US Courts							
District Ct	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
Circ Ct of App	0	2	2	0	4	1	3
Supreme Ct	0	12	0	12	7	16	3
Total	**0**	**14**	**2**	**12**	**14**	**17**	**9**

Other Significant Division Activity:	**2009**	**2010**
Appellate Court Briefs Filed	741	642
Appellate Court Briefs Reviewed	260	248
U.S. Supreme Court Petitions Granted	3	1
NAAG Recommendations	88	104

Appellate Division

Joel McGormley, Division Chief

The Appellate Division has two primary functions for the Department of Attorney General: (1) represents the state prison wardens in civil federal habeas corpus litigation brought in the federal courts and (2) represents the county prosecutors for Michigan's 56 smallest counties with populations 75,000 or less and the Department's Criminal Division in direct appeals from felony convictions. Grants of habeas corpus relief in federal court and reversal of state court convictions in state appellate courts may result in release or retrial of convicted felons.

In performing its habeas function, the Appellate Division: responds to habeas petitions filed in federal district court that challenge the constitutionality of the underlying state court convictions through significant briefing; conducts evidentiary hear-

ings in federal district court; drafts supplemental briefing, motion, and motion responses; prosecutes and defends appeals taken from grants and denials of habeas relief in federal district court in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit through comprehensive briefing and oral argument; seeks review of select habeas grants in the United States Supreme Court; and coordinates with county prosecutors, state courts, and victims of crime.

In performing its state criminal appeal function, the Appellate Division: handles comprehensive briefing and oral argument in the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court; files amicus curiae briefs on select criminal issues at the direction of the Attorney General and Solicitor General; serves as a legal resource to county prosecutors and the Criminal Division; and coordinates with county prosecutors and victims of crime.

In addition to these functions, the Appellate Division serves as counsel for the Crime Victim Services Commission and handles administrative hearings for the Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement Standards.

Division Caseload:

	Pending 12/31/08	Opened 2009	Closed 2009	Pending 12/31/09	Opened 2010	Closed 2010	Pending 12/31/10
Michigan Courts							
Circuit Ct	1	0	0	1	0	1	0
Ct of Appeals	201	95	155	141	90	134	97
Supreme Ct	15	34	18	31	32	48	15
Total	**217**	**129**	**173**	**173**	**122**	**183**	**112**
Out-of-State State Courts	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
US Courts							
District Ct	1,378	590	627	1,341	423	621	1,143
Circ Ct of App	294	399	331	362	427	357	432
Supreme Ct	2	10	6	6	8	8	6
Total	**1,674**	**999**	**964**	**1,709**	**858**	**986**	**1,581**
Administrative Actions							
State	2	8	5	5	6	3	8

Other Significant Division Activity:	**2009**	**2010**
Habeas Filings:		
Answers filed in federal district court	685	589
Briefs filed in the Sixth Circuit	114	109
Responses in the United States Supreme Court	17	15
State Criminal Appellate Filings:		
Briefs filed in the Michigan Court of Appeals	132	74
Applications/Briefs filed in the Michigan Supreme Court	9	8

Opinions Division

Heather S. Meingast, Assistant Attorney General for Law
Division Chief

The Opinions Division is responsible for assigning, coordinating, and reviewing all formal and informal legal opinions prepared on behalf of the Attorney General and for handling special assignments as directed by the Chief Deputy Attorney General and Attorney General. The Division Chief serves as the Chair of the Attorney General's Opinion Review Board and conducts opinion-writing training for the Department.

The division also advises the Attorney General concerning requests to initiate quo warranto actions and related inquiries, and it serves as appellate adviser in selected cases where a conflict wall has been established in the office. The Opinions Division also coordinates departmental efforts necessary to compile, publish, and distribute the Attorney General's Biennial Report.

Other Significant Division Activity:	**2009**	**2010**
Number of opinion requests	120	99

REPORT OF PROSECUTIONS

Child Support Division – Prosecutions 2009 - 2010

PEOPLE v DWAYNE ABBEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/05/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $47,169.20; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v IQBAL ABDULLA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/06/2009, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 182 days county Jail; Jail Suspended: 59 days; Court Costs: $68.00.

PEOPLE v THOMAS CHARLES ABSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/11/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 52 days; Jail Suspended: 52 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $5,543.12.

PEOPLE v LANCE RYAN ADAMS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/09/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 36 months; Restitution - Amount: $7,750.00.

PEOPLE v STEAVEN KELLY ADAMS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/02/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $11,3711.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM J AINSWORTH, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 08/11/2010, 72nd District Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $13,500.00.

PEOPLE v KRISTEN ALDRIDGE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/08/2010, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 55 days; Probation: 1 year; Restitution - Amount: $2,420.78.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER ALIAPOULIOS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 02/18/2009, 15th District Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $28,060.90.

PEOPLE v RICHARD HENRY ALIGHIRE, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/15/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $30,211.72.

PEOPLE v GEORGE ALLEN, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/26/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $14,544.00.

PEOPLE v JOSE ALONZO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/02/2009, 48th Circuit Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 24 months.

PEOPLE v BRIAN JOSEPH ALTMANN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/12/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 48

Months; Restitution - Amount: $10,527.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $480.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v JAYSON ERIC ALVIAR, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/10/2010, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 47 days; Jail Suspended: 47 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $9,942.65.

PEOPLE v DAVID AMADOR, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/05/2009, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Jail: 190 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 190 days; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v CHARLES AARON ANDERSON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/20/2010, 68th District Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $28,125.57.

PEOPLE v CHARLES AARON ANDERSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/22/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 4 years.

PEOPLE v JEFFERY SCOTT ANDERSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/09/2009, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 5 months; Jail Suspended: 4 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $22,109.72; Court Costs: $568.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JONATHAN REY ANDERSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/08/2010, 9th Circuit Court-Kalamazoo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 180 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 17 days; Probation: 4 years.

PEOPLE v LAVERN ANDERSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/18/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 18 months; Restitution - Amount: $4,507.24; Court Costs: $1,238.00.

PEOPLE v JOHN NELSON ANDREAS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/10/2010, 27th Circuit Court-Oceana County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 180 days; Jail Suspended: 27 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $44,665.26.

PEOPLE v AVERY CORNELIUS ANDREWS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/23/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $13,603.63; Court Costs: $828.00.

PEOPLE v ORLIN DIMITROV ANGELOV, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 09/08/2010, 72nd District Court-St. Clair County, Desertion/Abandonment/Non-Support.

PEOPLE v JESUS ANGUIANO, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/17/2009, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $28,325.51.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH ARCE, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 06/25/2009, 56th Circuit Court-Eaton County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v MAURICE LAMONT ARMSTEAD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/21/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $30,000.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DEBRA ANN ARMSTRONG, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 10/29/2009, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $15,000.00.

PEOPLE v GAIL ARMSTRONG, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 03/09/2010, 2A District Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $19,380.96.

PEOPLE v GARYLIND LILY ARNOLD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/01/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $78,447.06; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES ARNOLD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/27/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 1 year; Restitution - Amount: $2,920.98.

PEOPLE v ERIC JOE ARQUETTE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/16/2010, 77th District Court-Mecosta County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 3 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 8 days; Probation: 2 years.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM ASTALOS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/26/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $32,598.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v TODD LAWRENCE AURES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/29/2010, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $19,702.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $728.00.

PEOPLE v SHAUN AUSBERRY, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 02/24/2009, 50th District Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $16,851.15.

PEOPLE v ROBERT AUSLANDER, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/09/2009, 50th District Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $36,517.09.

PEOPLE v ROBERTO AVILA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/26/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 48 months; Restitution - Amount: $10,075.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $480.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v PERRY LEE BAILEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/10/2010, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 61 days; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v STEVEN FRANK BAILEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/09/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $67,602.47.

PEOPLE v JEFFERY JAY BAKER, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/29/2010, 50th District Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL ANDREW BALKO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/05/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $31,045.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $700.00.

PEOPLE v LARRY BALL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/28/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $20,623.41; Court Costs: $828.00.

PEOPLE v ANDRE BALLARD, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/30/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $4,983.60.

PEOPLE v PETER RANDOLPH BANKERT, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/16/2009, 15th District Court-Washtenaw County, Disorderly Person - Non-Support; Restitution - Amount: $5,251.98.

PEOPLE v DERELL WYMAN BANKS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/02/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 180 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 63 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $11,3501.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $900.00; Court Costs: $778.00.

PEOPLE v SHANNON BANNER, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 05/21/2010, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $15,586.94.

PEOPLE v SHANNON BANNER, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 05/21/2010, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $6,051.30.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL SHANE BARGO, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/03/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $5,687.00.

PEOPLE v THOMAS BARKMAN, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 09/08/2010, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v ALBERT GEORGE BARNARD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/13/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $17,246.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,128.00.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH BARNES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/03/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 Months;

Restitution - Amount: $44,386.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v ALVIN BARRETT, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 06/14/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v JEFFERY BASSO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/22/2009, 41st Circuit Court-Dickinson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 60 months; Court Costs: $480.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v PAUL BATCH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/20/2009, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months; Jail Suspended: 122 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $76,881.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,360.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DONALD CLIFFORD BATEMAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/20/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Jail: 60 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 2 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $17,525.46; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v RICHARD BATES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/17/2009, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $1,846.06.

PEOPLE v NAZIH BAYDOUN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/11/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $13,627.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v HASSANE BAZZI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/18/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 Months; Restitution - Amount: $14,000.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $660.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v BRENT BEAMAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/02/2010, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 2 days; Jail Suspended: 2 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $53,923.21.

PEOPLE v KENNEDY PATRICK BEAMON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/14/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $45,289.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v FLOYD WILSON BEARD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/26/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $39,531.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v MARVIN BEARDEN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/09/2009, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 40 days; Jail Suspended: 40 days; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v MONTY BEAUDRY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/08/2009, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $9,223.50.

PEOPLE v SALOMON RIDRIGO BECERRA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/21/2010, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 26 days; Jail Suspended: 26 days; Probation: 24 months; Restitution - Amount: $19,683.81; Court Costs: $400.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES ALAN BEDEN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/25/2009, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $16,616.44.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER BELL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/03/2010, 56th Circuit Court-Eaton County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 18 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 18 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $38,493.89; Court Costs: $1,330.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES WALTER BELL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/28/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $43,230.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v DAVID ALLEN BENEDICT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/09/2010, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $1,326.50.

PEOPLE v ANDRE BENJAMIN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/25/2009, 30th Circuit Court-Ingham County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 111 days; Jail Suspended: 111 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $17,8699.51; Court Costs: $2,968.75.

PEOPLE v MATTHEW BENKERT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/22/2009, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 270 Days; Jail Suspended: 127 days credit; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $18,593.00.

PEOPLE v JODY LIND BENNETT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/06/2009, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $29,106.45; Other Costs: $747.37.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL JOHN BENT, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 03/03/2010, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $14,674.30.

PEOPLE v GREGORY BENTLEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/20/2009, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 300 days; Jail Suspended: 76 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $40,114.40.

PEOPLE v BOHDAN BEREZECKY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/04/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $29,841.21; Court Costs: $828.00.

PEOPLE v DANIEL HORACE BERGER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/04/2010, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 3 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 3 days; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v QUN BERISHA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/27/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 36 months; Restitution - Amount: $6,891.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $360.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL BERNIER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/25/2009, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County, Disorderly Person - Non-Support; Court Costs: $320.00; CVR Fee: $50.00.

PEOPLE v KENNETH LOYD BERRY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/12/2010, 5th District Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 33 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 33 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $18,830.24.

PEOPLE v REGINALD LITZ BIEN-AIME, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/26/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $69,745.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v DANIEL RODGER BILETH, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/08/2009, 57th District Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $12,080.04.

PEOPLE v TODD BIRCHFIELD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/02/2010, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 300 days; Jail Suspended: 13 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $66,751.28.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL STEVEN BISHOP, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/17/2010, 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $67,971.72.

PEOPLE v RONALD BRIAN BISHOP, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/25/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $31,587.00.

PEOPLE v MARTIN BLAIR, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/09/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $23,066.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v HOWARD BLAKELY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/14/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $19,5315.00; Court Costs: $668.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $400.00.

PEOPLE v EDWARD BLANZY, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 08/02/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v BENTON BLEVINS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/24/2009, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $50,000.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v TEDDY BLEVINS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/18/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $14,796.99.

PEOPLE v ROBERT BOISVERT, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 11/16/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL DENNIS BOOKER, Plea Agreement, 01/29/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v MATTHEW CURTIS BOOMS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/17/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $11,692.67.

PEOPLE v RODERIC DERONN BOONE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/11/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $21,191.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT ALAN BOOSO, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/11/2009, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $48,397.03.

PEOPLE v ROBERT BORGMAN, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/01/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $10,885.27.

PEOPLE v DAVID BRUCE BOTTOMLEY, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/22/2009, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $7,403.47.

PEOPLE v MICKEY BOUSCHOR, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/04/2009, 50th Circuit Court-Chippewa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 365 days; Jail Suspended: 72 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $23,562.65.

PEOPLE v PAUL DOUGLAS BOUVRETTE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/26/2009, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 6 months; Restitution - Amount: $13,567.96.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER BOUWENS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/15/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $33,499.87.

PEOPLE v CRAIG BENTLEY BOWEN, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 01/27/2010, 15th District Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v EDWARD BOYD, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 01/15/2009, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $3,000.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT BOYER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/12/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $25,707.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v DONYELL BOYNTON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/05/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $15,886.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DONYELL BOYNTON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/05/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $19,902.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v EDDIE BRACY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/26/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $45,845.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v CURTIS BRALOCK, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 06/24/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Desertion/Abandonment/Non-Support; Restitution - Amount: $41,500.91.

PEOPLE v DAVID ALAN BRANDON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/29/2010, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 2 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 2 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $55,583.27.

PEOPLE v JARED BRANHAM, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/31/2009, 36th Circuit Court-Van Buren County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $26,013.51.

PEOPLE v LEAMAN BRAXTON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/20/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $69,000.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $728.00.

PEOPLE v KENNETH BREAUX, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/29/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $7,412.00; Court Costs: $1,399.00.

PEOPLE v GARY RAY BRECHT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/14/2010, 49th Circuit Court-Mecosta County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Court Costs: $378.00.

PEOPLE v RONALD BRESETT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/04/2009, 48th Circuit Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 12 days; Jail Suspended: 12 days; Probation: 18 months.

PEOPLE v OLIVER BRIDGEMON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/21/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 34 days; Jail Suspended: 34 days; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $768.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v FRASER SCOTT BROWN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/16/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 270 days jail; Jail Suspended: 78 days credited - suspended; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v HECTOR BROWN, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 03/22/2010, 3-B District Court-St. Joseph County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $34,437.46.

PEOPLE v IRIS DEAN BROWN, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/03/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $14,000.00.

PEOPLE v JUSTIN BROWN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/25/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $14,880.78; Court Costs: $953.00.

PEOPLE v KEAVELIN RAMONE BROWN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/01/2009, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-4, Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $17,545.81; Court Costs: $428.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL JEROME BROWN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/06/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $65,219.83; Court Costs: $968.00.

PEOPLE v STEPHEN PINCKEY BROWN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/14/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $69,903.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v STEVEN ERIC BROWN, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/10/2009, 84th District Court-Wexford County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $11,058.61.

PEOPLE v RONALD ERIC BROWNER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/10/2009, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 300 days; Jail Suspended: 105 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $54,010.68.

PEOPLE v DENNIS BROWNLEE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/29/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $43,367.56; Court Costs: $600.00; Supervision Fee: $960.00.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY THOMAS BRYANT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/23/2010, 27th Circuit Court-Newaygo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 1 year; Jail Suspended: 68 days served; remainder suspended; Restitution - Amount: $10,856.52.

PEOPLE v SCOTT E BUCHHEISTER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/01/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 1 year; Restitution - Amount: $9,598.93.

PEOPLE v JEFFREY BUCK, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/11/2010, 49th Circuit Court-Mecosta County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 5 months county jail; Probation: 1 year.

PEOPLE v BENJAMIN ALAN BUCKMASTER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/19/2010, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months county jail suspended; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $62,668.16.

PEOPLE v BRYAN JOSEPH BUGANSKI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/20/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $34,449.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY BUMGARNER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/17/2009, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 4 days; Jail Suspended: 1 day; Probation: 36 months; Restitution - Amount: $39,879.23.

PEOPLE v KEVIN BURCROFF, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 03/19/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v RAYMOND JOSEPH BURGE, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 05/19/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $35,283.43.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM DONALD BURNS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/02/2010, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 1 day county jail; Jail Suspended: 1 day; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $38,017.96.

PEOPLE v RANDALL JOSEPH BURRI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/20/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Jail: 113 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 113 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $37,048.00; Court Costs: $2,069.00.

PEOPLE v CALVIN BURT, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 04/13/2010, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v MARIO LORENZO BURTON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/17/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $768.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIE BURTON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 08/05/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Restitution - Amount: $13,876.68.

PEOPLE v TERRANCE BUTLER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/30/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-4, Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $9,560.99; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v WESLEY BUTLER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/25/2010, 49th Circuit Court-Osceola County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 36 days; Court Costs: $678.00.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER BYRD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/15/2010, 43rd Circuit Court-Cass County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 150 days; Jail Suspended: 122 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $40,191.67; Other Restitution - Amount: $1,902.15.

PEOPLE v DESHAWN BYRD, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 10/23/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v TAURUS LEONARD BYRD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/14/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $24,723.00; Court Costs: $668.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v RAYNALDO R CABRERA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/01/2009, 48th Circuit Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 80 days; Jail Suspended: 80 days; Probation: 18 months; Restitution - Amount: $52,205.44.

PEOPLE v KALVIN CADE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/29/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $44,734.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $428.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM CADY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/15/2010, 56th Circuit Court-Eaton County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 86 days; Jail Suspended: 86 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $30,291.71; Court Costs: $2,037.60.

PEOPLE v FRANK ARTHUR CALHOUN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/15/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $26,687.01.

PEOPLE v MARK ALLAN CAMPBELL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/08/2009, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 30 months; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v NATHAN CAMPBELL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/03/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $19,609.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Other Costs: $600.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT JAMES CAPPS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 10/14/2009, 74th District Court-Bay County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $23,254.36.

PEOPLE v JIMENEZ, CARMELO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/25/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 4 years.

PEOPLE v THEODORE CARROLL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/11/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $13,7242.19; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v DARNELL ALLEN CARRUTHERS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/04/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 48 months; Restitution - Amount: $4,162.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $480.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v ROMARO CARSWELL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/23/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $10,685.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v OLIVER CARTER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/30/2010, 46th Circuit Court-Kalkaska County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 39 days; Court Costs: $933.60.

PEOPLE v RICKY ALLEN CARTER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/23/2009, 27th Circuit Court-Newaygo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 360 days; Jail Suspended: 187 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $12,653.77.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM AUSTIN CASH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/12/2009, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Jail: 365 days; Jail Suspended: 35 days.

PEOPLE v TRACY CASSITY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/11/2010, 11th Circuit Court-Schoolcraft County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 12 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 4 months; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $42,709.04.

PEOPLE v ERIC CASTLES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/21/2010, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 1 day; Jail Suspended: 1 day; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $28,967.16.

PEOPLE v MARK CAYCE, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 11/13/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Desertion/Abandonment/Non-Support.

PEOPLE v ERIC DESHONE CHAMBERS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/26/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 48 months; Restitution - Amount: $8,894.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $480.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v WAYNE CHAMPINE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/23/2009, 41-B District Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $3,1600.00; Court Costs: $660.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $650.00; Other Costs: $600.00.

PEOPLE v DANNY CHANDLER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/15/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 13 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $27,150.60; Court Costs: $780.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v AENOI CHANTHARANGSY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/23/2010, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 1 year; Restitution - Amount: $22,234.03; Court Costs: $535.00.

PEOPLE v WINSLOW CHAPMAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/14/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 105 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $31,823.28; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v GEOFFREY CHARBENEAU, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/14/2010, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $64,881.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $728.00.

PEOPLE v JEFFREY CHASKIN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/05/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $43,531.64; Court Costs: $7,763.00.

PEOPLE v JOHN CHATFIELD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/07/2009, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 4 months; Jail Suspended: 43 days; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DORIAN CHEATHAM, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 02/16/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v GARY LEE CHRISTLE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/05/2009, 8th Circuit Court-Montcalm County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 9 months; Jail Suspended: 79 days; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $118.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY CHRISTY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/11/2010, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $18,668.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $1,200.00; Court Costs: $1,328.00.

PEOPLE v PATRICK WILLIAM CLAY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/20/2010, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 196 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 196 days; Probation: 12 months; Court Costs: $490.00.

PEOPLE v DERRICK CLERK, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/30/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 36 months; Restitution - Amount: $9,718.79; Other Restitution - Amount: $360.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JEFFREY CLYBURN, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 10/27/2009, 15th District Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $5,000.00.

PEOPLE v MAURICE COCKROFT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/20/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 30 months; Restitution - Amount: $21,698.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $300.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v BRIAN LEE COFFMAN, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 05/19/2009, 50th District Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $13,711.86.

PEOPLE v RICHARD COLBERT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/19/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 53 days; Jail Suspended: 53 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $217,367.82; Court Costs: $956.00.

PEOPLE v RICHARD COLBERT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/19/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $6,477.77; Court Costs: $956.00.

PEOPLE v DARRELL GLEAN COLEMAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/29/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $109,409.33; Court Costs: $2,168.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v REGINALD COLEMAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/28/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $43,529.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v TOMMY COLEMAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/18/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $29,091.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v VICTOR ALVARADO COLLADO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/28/2010, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v RYNOLD ONEIL COLLINS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/05/2009, 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 Days; Jail Suspended: 60 Days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $31,619.30.

PEOPLE v JAMES CONNER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/08/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $41,317.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v DONALD MARTIN CONRAD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/15/2010, 48th Circuit Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 109 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 109 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $32,013.77; Court Costs: $558.00.

PEOPLE v ALAN DAVID COOK, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/01/2010, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 days; Jail Suspended: 55 days; Probation: 18 months; Restitution - Amount: $9,807.40.

PEOPLE v DEREK WAYNE COOKE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/14/2010, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $18,909.27; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v LEROY MICHEAL COOPER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/04/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 1 year; Restitution - Amount: $31,160.61; Court Costs: $538.00.

PEOPLE v PATRICK COOPER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/12/2009, 38th Circuit Court-Monroe County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $71,434.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $665.00.

PEOPLE v DARRELL CORDER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/19/2010, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 18 months.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY EDWARD CORKINS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/15/2010, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 2 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $24,056.53.

PEOPLE v LARRY ROBERT CORNELL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/29/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $91,266.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DAVID L CORNFORD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/19/2010, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v JONATHAN COSTANZO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/12/2009, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $26,468.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $48.00; CVR Fee: $53.00.

PEOPLE v CHARLES HOWARD COURTNEY, Plea Agreement, 04/02/2009, 48th Circuit Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $13,000.00.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY COY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/17/2010, 46th Circuit Court-Kalkaska County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $13,987.55; Court Costs: $864.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DONALD ALBERT CRANER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/15/2010, 18th Circuit Court-Bay County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 154 days; Jail Suspended: 154 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $15,135.35; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v KIRK CRANER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/08/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 1 year; Restitution - Amount: $19,018.80; Court Costs: $210.00.

PEOPLE v BILLY CROSSNO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/25/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $112,951.17; Court Costs: $908.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v ANTONIO CRUZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/27/2009, 5th Circuit Court-Barry County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Jail: 9 months; Jail Suspended: 9 months; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $918.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL CULBERTSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/25/2010, 38th Circuit Court-Monroe County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days; Jail Suspended: 3 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $25,721.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $868.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JEFFREY CUNMULAJ, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 05/21/2010, 53rd District Court-Howell Division, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $15,456.00.

PEOPLE v JEFFREY CUNMULAJ, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/23/2009, 53rd District Court-Howell Division, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $10,000.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/01/2010, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v GLOYD LORENCO CURD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/19/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $22,799.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v TERRANCE CURRY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/28/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support-Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $12,620.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL CURTIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/21/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $57,233.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v DAVID DAFOE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/08/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 4 months county jail; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $24,105.05; Court Costs: $298.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DUAINE DAFT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/14/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Jail: 5 months; Jail Suspended: 1 day; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $23,381.00.

PEOPLE v KEITH ALAN DAHLKE, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/11/2009, 72nd District Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $12,263.52.

PEOPLE v TODD ARON DALLEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/04/2010, 5th Circuit Court-Barry County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $28,728.96; Court Costs: $878.00.

PEOPLE v FREDERICK DALTON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/24/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years;

Restitution - Amount: $28,405.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v RONALD DANCER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/19/2010, 51st Circuit Court-Mason County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 120 days; Probation: 12 months; Court Costs: $368.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY DANNHAUSEN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/18/2009, 41-B District Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 24 months; Court Costs: $288.00; CVR Fee: $50.00.

PEOPLE v GREGORY DASGUPTA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/20/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 24 Months at $10/month; Restitution - Amount: $6,167.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $240.00; Court Costs: $45.00; CVR Fee: $50.00.

PEOPLE v REX LEE DAVIDSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/09/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $16,965.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v CLARENCE DAVIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/15/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-4, Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $41,321.00.

PEOPLE v DACHUEL DAVIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/16/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $134,540.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v KARL DAVIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/28/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $99,302.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v MARK DAVIS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/24/2009, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $63,370.39.

PEOPLE v MARSHAHN D DAVIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/02/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 10 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 54 days; Restitution - Amount: $76,178.48; Court Costs: $2,228.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL DAVIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/08/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $46,230.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v ROLAND LUTHER DAVIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/27/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $14,091.87; Court Costs: $1,028.00.

PEOPLE v TERRY DAVIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/16/2009, 5th District Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $52,563.97.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM DAVIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/13/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $33,806.00; Court Costs: $168.00.

PEOPLE v GRANVILLE DAVIS-COLLINS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/05/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $47,772.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL DENNIS DAWES, JR., Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/08/2010, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Jail: 10 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 13 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $31,082.27; Court Costs: $160.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM DEAN, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 07/09/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v DANIEL ISAAC DELOR, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/26/2009, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $18,870.45; Court Costs: $308.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JONATHAN DEMAAGD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/21/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 150 days; Jail Suspended: 150 days; Probation: 3 years; Court Costs: $828.00.

PEOPLE v RONALD DEPUNG II, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/07/2009, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 30 months; Restitution - Amount: $32,696.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JEFFREY DERKATCH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/10/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $57,861.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JEREMY DERON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/04/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $8,608.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $745.00.

PEOPLE v GREGORY KOSROV DER-STEPANIAN, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/09/2010, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Restitution - Amount: $18,548.44.

PEOPLE v PHILIP LONNIE DIAZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/01/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $46,141.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v CLAUDE DINKINS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/05/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 120 days - held in abeyance until 6/4/10; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $44,918.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00.

PEOPLE v CLAUDE DINKINS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/05/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 120 days - held in abeyance until 6/4/10; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $55,169.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JEROME VINCENT DIXON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/11/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 2 days and 1 weekend; Jail Suspended: 2 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $25,373.89.

PEOPLE v ROY ANTHONY DIXON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/05/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $4,649.07.

PEOPLE v RANDALL DOAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/05/2009, 56th Circuit Court-Eaton County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 5 days; Jail Suspended: 5 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $8,000.00.

PEOPLE v DARREN DOBSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/02/2010, 41st Circuit Court-Iron County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 9 months; Jail Suspended: 31 days; Probation: 2 years.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM DOLAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/21/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $27,279.00.

PEOPLE v ELGIN JERMAINE DOSS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/26/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 5 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 5 days; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $828.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL KENNETH DOUGHERTY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/16/2010, 9th Circuit Court-Kalamazoo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 4 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 4 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $46,283.55.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM JOSEPH DOVE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/08/2010, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $23,932.89; Court Costs: $560.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT DRIVER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/19/2010, 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $71,221.55.

PEOPLE v CHRISTINE BETH DUDA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/24/2009, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 5 months; Jail Suspended: 43 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $51,413.76.

PEOPLE v MARK CRAIG DUNCAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/15/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $31,442.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $428.00.

PEOPLE v PATRICK ARTHUR DUNHAM, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/06/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $56,243.45; Court Costs: $628.00.

PEOPLE v JOHN DUNN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/08/2009, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 4 days; Jail Suspended: 4 days; Probation: 2 years.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY DUNN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/10/2009, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $9,717.51; Court Costs: $568.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v TROY KERNS DUQUETTE, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/03/2009, 66th District Court-Shiawassee County, Restitution - Amount: $12,000.00.

PEOPLE v KRISTIAN LEE DUWE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/09/2010, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 45 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 45 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $14,416.96; Court Costs: $968.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JEFFREY THOMAS DWYER, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 08/03/2009, 15th Circuit Court-Branch County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $18,541.54.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL DYSINGER, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/22/2009, 80th District Court-Clare County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $6,864.24.

PEOPLE v TRAVIS ORLANDO EATON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/02/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $65,510.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v IVAN EAVES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/09/2009, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 13 – 96 months; Restitution - Amount: $22,251.10.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY EAVEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/15/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $30,459.57; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v BARTON DALE EBY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/29/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $16,984.30.

PEOPLE v MARK JAMES EISENLOHR, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/10/2009, 54-A District Court-Ingham County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $45,994.59.

PEOPLE v MARC EIZELMAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/07/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $55,519.03; Court Costs: $900.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v CHIKAH ELECHI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/03/2010, 9th Circuit Court-Kalamazoo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Jail: 90 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 30 days; remainder suspended; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $18,946.78.

PEOPLE v MOHAMMAD ELKOUR, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/03/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $18,489.62; Court Costs: $1,628.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v CHRISTIAN EMELOGU, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/13/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $50,838.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v DAVID ENTERKIN, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 09/24/2009, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER ERNI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/26/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $18,282.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v GILLERMO LEE ESPINOZA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/19/2010, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 4 years; Restitution - Amount: $16,885.56.

PEOPLE v NATHANIEL ESTELLE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/14/2010, 15th District Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $891.00.

PEOPLE v BRADLEY ETCHISON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/05/2010, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $73,234.24.

PEOPLE v STEPHEN BERNARD EUSEARY, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 03/11/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER EUWING, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/13/2009, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $20,462.78.

PEOPLE v DEAN WESLEY EVANS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/28/2010, 29th Circuit Court-Gratiot County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $3,378.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT GLENN EVANS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/24/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 1 - 8 years in state prison; Restitution - Amount: $11,8647.91; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v TABRA EVANS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/17/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $102,399.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v TODD EVANS, Plea Agreement, 06/18/2009, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v JASON PAUL EZELL, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/08/2009, 68th District Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $37,484.96.

PEOPLE v JASON PAUL EZELL, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/08/2009, 68th District Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $10,537.27.

PEOPLE v EDWARD FAIRCHILD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/09/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $7,453.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $103.00.

PEOPLE v RICHARD FALK, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/18/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL FARTHING, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/11/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $27,126.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v PAMELA JO FAST, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/26/2010, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 71 days; Jail Suspended: 71 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $30,188.94; Court Costs: $786.06.

PEOPLE v KEVIN WILLIAM FECTEAU, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/08/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $18,902.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,128.00.

PEOPLE v JASON SCOTT FELDMAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/05/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $22,496.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES FELKE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/03/2009, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 189 days; Jail Suspended: 189 days; Probation: 4 years; Court Costs: $1,145.53.

PEOPLE v ERNEST FELTZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/08/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $31,207.15; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v BRIAN DAVID FERGUSON SR., Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/19/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $47,251.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH PATRICK FERGUSON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/23/2009, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $7,831.53.

PEOPLE v KEVIN JEROME FERGUSON, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 12/27/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v ROBERT FERGUSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/03/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $28,606.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v JASON FINLEY, Settled, 05/06/2010, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $46,100.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL V FINNESY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/02/2009, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 81 days; Jail Suspended: 81 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $58,570.66; Court Costs: $608.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v NICK FINTIKIS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/13/2010, 79th District Court-Mason County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $11,752.49.

PEOPLE v JAMES FISHER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/17/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $27,261.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v BRYAN ROBERT FOLEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/30/2010, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 5 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 76 days; Restitution - Amount: $17,644.47; Court Costs: $60.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL KEVIN FORD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/02/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $30,000.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $728.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT LEE FORD, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/01/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay, Restitution – Amount: $11,726.03.

PEOPLE v DONALD EDDIE FOSTER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/19/2010, 5th District Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 34 days; Jail Suspended: 34 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $25,617.33.

PEOPLE v EUGENE FOSTER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/17/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $107,000.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $400.00.

PEOPLE v EVERETT LANE FOSTER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/22/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 120 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 100 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $57,258.25; Court Costs: $760.00.

PEOPLE v KOFIE AMEER FOWLER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/09/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $19,002.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v CECIL FRAILEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/06/2009, 9th Circuit Court-Kalamazoo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $19,273.37.

PEOPLE v JERRY FRAME, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/09/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $58,611.44; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JEFFERY FRANCIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/19/2009, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $99,088.31; Court Costs: $1,320.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES EARL FRAZIER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/02/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 76 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 76 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $22,836.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,378.00.

PEOPLE v RICHARD FRAZIER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/11/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $22,622.47; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v SAMUEL FRETENBOROUGH, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/17/2009, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $79,751.55.

PEOPLE v RONALD SCOTT FULK, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/29/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $56,133.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES MICHAEL FULLER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/17/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $12,653.13; Court Costs: $1,568.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v REX FULLER, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 03/15/2010, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v CHERYL JEAN FUQUA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/02/2010, 2A District Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 1 year; Restitution - Amount: $715.55.

PEOPLE v ALAN HENRY GALLANT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/16/2009, 41-B District Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months; Jail Suspended: 48 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $21,426.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $968.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v FREDERICK GANT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/17/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months; Jail Suspended: 57 days; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v CHARLES GARCIA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/07/2009, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 9 months deferred; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $21,525.78.

PEOPLE v MIGUEL LEE GARCIA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/18/2009, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 180 days; Jail Suspended: 153 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $32,172.19.

PEOPLE v DARNELL GARDNER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/23/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $17,807.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v THEOPHILISIE GARFIELD, Plea Agreement, 01/29/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v ERIC GARNER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/16/2010, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $50,410.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $700.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v JONATHAN GARR, Plea Agreement, 05/04/2009, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v JAMES FRANKLIN GARRISON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/21/2010, 5th District Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Court Costs: $285.00.

PEOPLE v JACK GARWOOD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/30/2010, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 92 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 92 days; Probation: 36 months; Court Costs: $1,089.00.

PEOPLE v ALFONSO GATICA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/19/2009, 5th Circuit Court-Barry County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Jail: 9 months; Jail Suspended: 8 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $9,514.99.

PEOPLE v JASON ELMER GAW, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/18/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $20,524.96.

PEOPLE v JACK CLINT GAYHEART, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/15/2010, 57th District Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 105 days; Jail Suspended: 105 days; Restitution - Amount: $57,660.14; Court Costs: $134.44.

PEOPLE v DAVID A GEBHART, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/24/2009, 53rd Circuit Court-Cheboygan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 days; Jail Suspended: 14 days; Probation: 36 months; Restitution - Amount: $67,586.17; Court Costs: $1,148.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v CORY GENTILE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/06/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $13,931.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $428.00.

PEOPLE v FREDERICK GHIST, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/25/2010, 48th Circuit Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $14,322.71.

PEOPLE v RICHARD GIBSON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/16/2009, 55th Circuit Court-Clare County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $46,696.48.

PEOPLE v JOHN GILBERT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/25/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v ROBERT GIROUX, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/18/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $79,577.83; Court Costs: $513.00.

PEOPLE v JEREMY JAMES GLASCO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/20/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 1 day; Jail Suspended: 1 day; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $24,697.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v GARY GLENN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/20/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 36 months; Restitution - Amount: $8,766.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $360.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM GLOSSON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/19/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $11,394.00.

PEOPLE v KORIE AL-LYNN GOCHA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/17/2010, 33rd Circuit Court-Charlevoix County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 40 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 40 days.

PEOPLE v TONY DEAN GOFF, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/03/2010, 87th District Court-Otsego County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 6 months; Court Costs: $618.00.

PEOPLE v KEITH GOKEN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/22/2009, 45th Circuit Court-St. Joseph County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 59 days; Jail Suspended: 59 days credit; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $37,769.00.

PEOPLE v LAWRENCE GOLEMBIEWSKI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/06/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 1 year; Restitution - Amount: $55,044.77; Court Costs: $695.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM FRANK GOLOVERSIC, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 07/09/2009, 78th District Court-Oceana County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $33,215.80.

PEOPLE v CHRYSTAL GONZALES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/19/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-4, Jail: 1 - 4 years State Prison; Jail Suspended: 189 days; Restitution - Amount: $20,373.60.

PEOPLE v KRISTEN DEANNE GONZALEZ, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 03/17/2009, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $13,778.06.

PEOPLE v DANIEL JOHN GOODALL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/25/2010, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-4, Jail: 1 year; Jail Suspended: 89 days; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $706.50.

PEOPLE v RAYMOND C. GOODEN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/27/2010, 13th Circuit Court-Grand Traverse County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 12 months.

PEOPLE v BRENDA LEE GOODMAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/29/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $15,822.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DAVID GOODWIN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/19/2009, 18th Circuit Court-Bay County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $74,019.16; Other Restitution - Amount: $2,060.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY MICHAEL GORDON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/10/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 2 days; Jail Suspended: 2 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $8,466.00; Court Costs: $823.00.

PEOPLE v TERRY DONTA GOREE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/03/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 150 days; Jail Suspended: 100 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $21,738.17.

PEOPLE v JEFFREY GOUDREAU, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 07/29/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v JOHNNY GORDON GRAHAM, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/28/2010, 61st District Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $44,623.23; Court Costs: $1,278.90.

PEOPLE v LORIE GALE GRANDY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/31/2009, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 72 days; Jail Suspended: 72 days; Probation: 24 months; Court Costs: $488.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DENIS GRANT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/07/2009, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 9 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 15 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $18,322.80.

PEOPLE v TERRY ALLAN GRANT, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/22/2009, 65-A District Court-Clinton County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $10,760.53.

PEOPLE v THOMAS LEE GRAVELYN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/23/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 36 months; Restitution - Amount: $22,000.75; Court Costs: $700.00.

PEOPLE v JOHN FRAZIER GRAVES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/23/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $39,515.71; Court Costs: $658.00.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY GRAY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/29/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 1 year; Restitution - Amount: $19,891.40; Court Costs: $360.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $480.00.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY GRAY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/17/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 30 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 4 days; Restitution - Amount: $4,725.17; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v CALVIN SCOTT GRAYSON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/16/2010, 90th District Court-Charlevoix County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $12,672.43.

PEOPLE v CHARLES ANTHONY GRAYSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/17/2009, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 days county jail; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $103,479.00.

PEOPLE v DENNIS F GREEN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/25/2009, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 1 day served, remainder suspended; Restitution - Amount: $54,600.62.

PEOPLE v JOSHUA GREENE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/20/2010, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months; Jail Suspended: 6 months; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $10,902.26.

PEOPLE v RANDY GRIFFIN, Plea Agreement, 03/17/2009, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 365 days; Jail Suspended: 165 days.

PEOPLE v ROBERT LEE GRIFFIN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/22/2010, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $22,708.27; Court Costs: $4,224.00.

PEOPLE v JEFFREY EDWARD GRIMES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/13/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Bond - Absconding Or Forfeiting; Jail: 80 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 80 days; Court Costs: $68.00.

PEOPLE v LOREN GROOTEGOED, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/15/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $74,120.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JAMIE GROSSETT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/26/2010, 64-B District Court-Montcalm County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months; Jail Suspended: 6 months; Court Costs: $47.50; CVR Fee: $53.00.

PEOPLE v CHARLES GUNN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/14/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: First 90 days at county jail; Jail Suspended: 19 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $56,728.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v THOMAS GUSCINSKI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/01/2009, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $41,000.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL FREMONT GUTHRIE, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/04/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $25,000.00.

PEOPLE v EDWARD ALLEN HACKWORTH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/04/2010, 42nd Circuit Court-Midland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 28 days; Jail Suspended: 28 days.

PEOPLE v KEITH MAURICE HADLEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/26/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 48 months; Restitution - Amount: $17,105.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $480.00; Court Costs: $648.00; CVR Fee: $53.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES HAGER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/13/2010, 9th Circuit Court-Kalamazoo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 30 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $82,253.97.

PEOPLE v JEFFREY ALAN HAIR, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/13/2010, 18th Circuit Court-Bay County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $13,231.59.

PEOPLE v HAROLD HALL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/20/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support-Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $25,011.75; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $48.00; CVR Fee: $53.00.

PEOPLE v LINDA LOUISE HAMILTON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/14/2010, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $60,740.52; Court Costs: $2,442.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIE JAMES HAMILTON, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 07/28/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v SAMUEL PAUL HANSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/21/2010, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 96 days; Jail Suspended: 96 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $24,710.72; Court Costs: $1,777.50.

PEOPLE v DANIEL EDWARD HARDWICK, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/26/2010, 5th District Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days; Jail Suspended: 31 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $37,538.33.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL LEE HARLEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/09/2010, 29th Circuit Court-Clinton County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $61,336.97; Court Costs: $2,178.00.

PEOPLE v JEFFERY HARMON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/31/2009, 1st District Court-Monroe County, Child Support- Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months; Jail Suspended: 58 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $57,988.00; Court Costs: $1,518.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JOHN HARP, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 02/12/2009, 5th Circuit Court-Barry County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Restitution - Amount: $10,947.45.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH HARP, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/10/2009, 15th Circuit Court-Branch County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $7,725.28.

PEOPLE v TERRY CHARLES HARPER, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 03/03/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $12,370.75.

PEOPLE v AALON HARRIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/08/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $27,512.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v BRADLEY HARRIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/22/2009, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $35,992.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,268.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DAVID HARRIS, Plea Agreement, 04/02/2009, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $20,000.00.

PEOPLE v FRANK HARRIS, III, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/09/2009, 15th District Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $103,111.61; Court Costs: $1,792.00.

PEOPLE v FRANK HARRIS, III, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/09/2009, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $93,362.25; Court Costs: $1,792.00.

PEOPLE v RICHARD ALLEN HARRIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/24/2009, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $77,753.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT HARRIS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/25/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $10,804.14.

PEOPLE v RONALD LEE HARRIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/10/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $53,040.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v THOMAS HARRISON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/09/2009, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $35,000.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v STEVEN KEITH HARSHMAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/29/2010, 5th Circuit Court-Barry County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 2 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 2 months; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $8,772.72.

PEOPLE v DANIEL BRYAN HARTER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/02/2009, 38th Circuit Court-Monroe County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 30 days; Jail Suspended: 17 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $23,987.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $658.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v RICHARD DAVID HARTER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/13/2009, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 9 months; Jail Suspended: 41 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $14,352.43.

PEOPLE v RICHARD DAVID HARTER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/13/2009, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Other Restitution – Amount: $1,071.75; Restitution - Amount: $13,710.53.

PEOPLE v SHAWN HARTSHORN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/23/2009, 49th Circuit Court-Osceola County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Court Costs: $845.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES HARVIN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/02/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $11,057.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v DESMOND HATEN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/13/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $22,041.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JACK HATT, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/03/2009, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Restitution - Amount: $19,000.00.

PEOPLE v DONTAYE LAVELLE HATTER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/11/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $21,193.25; Court Costs: $725.40.

PEOPLE v KYLE PATRICK HAYDEN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/22/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $7,700.94; Court Costs: $840.00.

PEOPLE v BERNARD HAYES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/31/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $157,851.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v GLENN LLOYD HAYES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/18/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $52,695.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v LAWRENCE RICHARD HAYES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/14/2010, 29th Circuit Court-Clinton County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 1 year county jail; Jail Suspended: 168 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $34,047.21; Court Costs: $414.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES HAYNES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/01/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 48 months; Restitution - Amount: $16,089.29; Other Restitution - Amount: $480.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v GREGORY JOHN HAYWARD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/20/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 150 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 97 days; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $740.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT LEN HEATHERLY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/11/2010, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60

months; Restitution - Amount: $36,875.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,328.00.

PEOPLE v DEREK HEILIGH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/02/2009, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 2 years; Court Costs: $620.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $960.00; Other Costs: $500.00.

PEOPLE v DAVID HENDON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/19/2009, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $58,405.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $138.00.

PEOPLE v MODESTO HERNANDEZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/20/2009, 38th Circuit Court-Monroe County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days; Jail Suspended: 90 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $13,801.22; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,640.50; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v VICTOR HERNANDEZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/06/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $13,181.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v STEPHEN WADE HERRING, Dismissed, 07/01/2010, 50th Circuit Court-Chippewa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v RANDY HESSLER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/13/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $128,146.49; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JEFFERY HESTER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/04/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $35,046.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY HEYDT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/27/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $6,435.25; Court Costs: $1,560.00.

PEOPLE v JASON ALAN HILL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/28/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 120 days; Jail Suspended: 53 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $70,575.76; Court Costs: $2,228.00.

PEOPLE v LORI HILL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/12/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $13,955.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v JASON HILLS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 08/07/2009, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $20,843.38.

PEOPLE v JAMES HILTON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/24/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $52,124.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH DALE HINDENACH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/30/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Jail: 60 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 2 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $11,280.19; Court Costs: $828.00.

PEOPLE v DONALD L. HITT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/25/2010, 5th Circuit Court-Barry County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months county jail; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $28,781.91; Court Costs: $1,161.00.

PEOPLE v LINH ANH HO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/16/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $47,826.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v RICKY ALLEN HOBAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/13/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $24,062.32; Court Costs: $1,328.00.

PEOPLE v DAVONNE LAMONT HODGES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/08/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 76 days; Jail Suspended: 76 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $78,454.15.

PEOPLE v JEFFREY HOFFMAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/18/2009, 27th Circuit Court-Oceana County, Disorderly Person - Non-Support; Jail: 76 days; Jail Suspended: 76 days.

PEOPLE v PAUL ERICK HOLLEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/04/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $27,051.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v ERIC VINCENT HOLLOWAY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/26/2010, 5th Circuit Court-Barry County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 9 months; Jail Suspended: 31 days served; remainder suspended; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $56,591.00; Court Costs: $961.20.

PEOPLE v JAMES HOLLOWAY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/26/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $32,079.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JERMAINE HOLLOWAY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/09/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $30,357.69; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,128.00.

PEOPLE v MARK HOLLOWAY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/11/2009, 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $22,830.50.

PEOPLE v BRIAN HOLLOWOOD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/23/2009, 41st Circuit Court-Iron County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 4 months; Jail Suspended: 103 days; Probation: 2 years.

PEOPLE v DAVID HOLMES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/02/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $30,621.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $928.00.

PEOPLE v ROY ANDRE HOLMES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/23/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $54,254.45; Court Costs: $700.00.

PEOPLE v DAVID ALLEN HOLTZ, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 03/17/2009, 2A District Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $18,000.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL HOOD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/04/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $61,586.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v ERIC MICHAEL HOOPER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/21/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $5,585.61; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JEFFREY MICHAEL HOOPER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/12/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $62,610.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v STEVEN HOOSE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/20/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $26,358.24; Court Costs: $2,100.00.

PEOPLE v DOUGLAS HOPKINS, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 06/24/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $11,156.38.

PEOPLE v DANNY HOULE, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 05/08/2009, 40th Circuit Court-Lapeer County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v MALCOLM LASEAN HOWARD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/21/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $40,976.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $528.00.

PEOPLE v MATTHEW HOWARD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/19/2009, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 120 days; Jail Suspended: 15 days; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $499.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v SHANE HOWARD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/31/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $52,831.14; Court Costs: $743.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DENNIS HOWE, 02/25/2009, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 16 days; Jail Suspended: 10 days; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v CY HOWELL, Plea Agreement, 04/20/2009, 50th Circuit Court-Chippewa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Restitution - Amount: $2,000.00.

PEOPLE v PAUL HOWER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/08/2010, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 16 days; Restitution - Amount: $17,303.41.

PEOPLE v DAMONE HUFF, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/10/2010, 43rd Circuit Court-Cass County, Child Support - Failing To Pay, Probation: 5 years; Jail: 10 months; Jail Suspended: 51 days credited.

PEOPLE v DEANDRE HULETT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/18/2009, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $1,200.00.

PEOPLE v PATRICK HURD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/18/2009, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months; Jail Suspended: 33 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $48,471.87.

PEOPLE v DAMON DWJUANE HURESKIN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/16/2009, 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 47 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $13,850.12.

PEOPLE v JAMES HENRY HUTCHENS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/14/2010, 18th Circuit Court-Bay County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Jail: 148 days; Jail Suspended: 148 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $57,438.13.

PEOPLE v SHAWN DAVID HUTCHINSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/30/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 100 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $17,889.12; Court Costs: $968.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL HUYSER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/09/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Disorderly Person - Non-Support; Probation: 1 year.

PEOPLE v MARCO IACOPELLI, JR., Order - Other, 07/14/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v IAN ALAN IDE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/10/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 days; Jail Suspended: 2 days credited; 45 suspended with payment; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $16,744.07.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM NEAL INGLES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/19/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-4, Jail: 180 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 64 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $58,813.73.

PEOPLE v BRIAN IRELAND, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/11/2010, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v HENRY IWENOFU, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 09/02/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v NDUBISI IWUOHA, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 01/04/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v DURAND JACKSON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/03/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $14,463.00.

PEOPLE v KEITH JACKSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/16/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $23,499.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v KEITH JACKSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/29/2010, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 75 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 75 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $60,280.74.

PEOPLE v MARTEZ JACKSON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/18/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $1,123.81.

PEOPLE v MINDY M JACKSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/03/2010, 34th Circuit Court-Ogemaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 1 year.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY STEVEN JAMES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/28/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $67,430.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v TERESA JEBB, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/29/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $42,068.07.

PEOPLE v GEORGE MICHAEL JEWELL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/25/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 80 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 80 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $25,799.85.

PEOPLE v RAYMOND E JEWELL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/12/2009, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-4, Jail: 1 year suspended; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $8,546.75.

PEOPLE v STEPHEN G JEWETT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/04/2010, 11th Circuit Court-Schoolcraft County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 4 months county jail; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $928.00.

PEOPLE v ALBERT DARNELL JOHNSON, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 07/07/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v BRIAN KEITH JOHNSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/26/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 3 months; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $99,195.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $268.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v DERRICK JOHNSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/17/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 5 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 78 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $15,892.12.

PEOPLE v DERRICK JOHNSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/23/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 36 months; Restitution - Amount: $9,400.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $360.00; Court Costs: $1,068.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DONALD FITZROY JOHNSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/26/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $15,830.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v ROGER JOHNSON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/23/2009, 15th District Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $12,816.52.

PEOPLE v RYAN DAVID JOHNSON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 10/27/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v VICTOR JOHNSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/14/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $35,924.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v WAYNE WILLIAM JOHNSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/08/2010, 46th Circuit Court-Kalkaska County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 41 days county jail; Court Costs: $778.00.

PEOPLE v CHARLES JONES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/08/2010, 26th Circuit Court-Alpena County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 5 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 62 days; Probation: 12 months; Court Costs: $760.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DAMON JONES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/09/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $34,369.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v DONNELL JONES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/13/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $29,389.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,128.00.

PEOPLE v EARNEST LEE JONES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/02/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $47,386.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v WALTER JONES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/19/2009, 53rd Circuit Court-Cheboygan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 180 days; Jail Suspended: 47 days; Probation: 24 months; Restitution - Amount: $38,683.36; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v WAYMAN D JONES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/01/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $70,735.06; Court Costs: $908.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES JOSHUA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/25/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Court Costs: $403.00.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH JOSLYN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/15/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $20,359.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v MATTHEW ALAN JUDD, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 10/15/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $5,116.60.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM JUREK, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 03/06/2009, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Desertion/Abandonment/Non-Support; Hab-4, Restitution - Amount: $40,000.00.

PEOPLE v MARK JOSEPH KAMP, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 05/07/2009, 5th District Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $12,444.38.

PEOPLE v GREG KATER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/12/2009, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 139 days; Jail Suspended: 139 days; Probation: 18 months.

PEOPLE v THOMAS KAYE, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 08/14/2009, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $3,784.00.

PEOPLE v MARIO LAMONT KEATON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/27/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $66,649.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v BRANDON MARK KELLER, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 08/12/2009, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Restitution - Amount: $16,484.87.

PEOPLE v NEIL DAVID KELLER, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 09/09/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $26,564.00.

PEOPLE v KENNETH ALBERT KELLEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/06/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $11,843.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM LEON KELLEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/19/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $38,337.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v KEVIN ALLEN KENNEDY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/22/2010, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 120 days county jail; Probation: 4 years; Restitution - Amount: $72,834.89.

PEOPLE v RICHARD BOYD KERNS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/22/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 30 months; Restitution - Amount: $7,669.88; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v NAYEL MESHAL KHATIB, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/16/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $29,081.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v ARTHUR DAVID KILBURN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/27/2010, 49th Circuit Court-Osceola County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Court Costs: $758.00.

PEOPLE v GLEN KILGORE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/08/2010, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Attempted Desertion/Abandonment/Non-Support; Hab-2, Jail: 30 days; Jail Suspended: 30 days; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v KENNETH GENE KIMBRELL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/29/2010, 1st District Court-Monroe County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 180 days; Jail Suspended: 53 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $12,002.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,448.00.

PEOPLE v BARBARA JANE KING, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 08/13/2010, 15th District Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v ERIC DWAYNE KING, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/21/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $14,197.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v GARY KING, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 05/12/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay, Restitution - Amount: $15,000.00.

PEOPLE v RONALD EDWARD KING, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/10/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $12,914.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v STEPHEN KLECZYNSKI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/14/2010, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 120 days; Jail Suspended: 62 days; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v STEVEN KLEIN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/30/2009, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 24 months; Restitution - Amount: $64,712.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $240.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DUANE STEWART KNIGHT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/17/2010, 21st Circuit Court-Isabella County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Jail: 10 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 100 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $22,373.11.

PEOPLE v MYRON KNIGHT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/01/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $11,165.40; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v BRYAN KENNETH KOLASINSKI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/28/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $25,450.23; Court Costs: $1,560.00.

PEOPLE v GEORGE STEPHEN KOMAR, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/26/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $65,191.14.

PEOPLE v DANIEL ROBERT KOSCIELSKI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/14/2010, 48th Circuit Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 30 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 4 days; Probation: 3 years; Court Costs: $1,128.00.

PEOPLE v DUANE KOZLOWSKI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/10/2010, 55th Circuit Court-Clare County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $1,128.00.

PEOPLE v FRANCIS KRAEMER, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 03/16/2009, 41st Circuit Court-Dickinson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $39,805.01.

PEOPLE v JAMES KRAMER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/24/2009, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months;

Restitution - Amount: $36,770.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,318.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v EARL ROBERT KRANZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/13/2009, 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Disorderly Person - Non-Support; Court Costs: $285.00.

PEOPLE v ALAN KRAUSS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/25/2009, 70th District Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $12,332.24.

PEOPLE v RONALD KREITNER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/01/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $58,160.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v GLENN DAVID KRIEGER, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/02/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $13,721.70.

PEOPLE v SAMUEL LEE KROHN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/10/2010, 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 1 year; Restitution - Amount: $11,589.26.

PEOPLE v STEVEN SCOTT KRUGER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/14/2010, 56th Circuit Court-Eaton County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 75 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 75 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $11,653.23.

PEOPLE v RONALD KRULL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/10/2009, 50th Circuit Court-Chippewa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 180 days; Jail Suspended: 118 days; Probation: 24 months.

PEOPLE v MARTIN LABEAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/02/2010, 26th Circuit Court-Alpena County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 1 year.

PEOPLE v DONALD LAFLEURE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/08/2010, 8th Circuit Court-Montcalm County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2; no probation or court costs entered by the Court.

PEOPLE v SCOTT ALLEN LAMING, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/01/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $22,692.27.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL LAMONTAGNE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/14/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $16,996.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v KIRBY LANE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/19/2009, 53rd Circuit Court-Cheboygan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 100 days; Jail Suspended: 81 days; Probation: 24 months; Restitution - Amount: $14,445.20; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v KEVIN EDWARD LANGDON, Plea Agreement, 04/14/2009, 56th Circuit Court-Eaton County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v LARRY LANKFORD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/28/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $91,084.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT LAPARL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/17/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 36 months; Court Costs: $567.96; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JEROME LARKINS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/06/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $33,303.12; Court Costs: $1,260.00.

PEOPLE v JENNIFER LARSON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 08/06/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $14,481.42.

PEOPLE v DARIUS LASSITTER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/17/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $31,921.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $728.00.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER LEE LAWENS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/04/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 49 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 49 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $67,529.24; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JOHN ALAN LAWRENCE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/09/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 1 year; Jail Suspended: 31 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $110,986.57; Court Costs: $1,620.00; CVR Fee: $120.00; Supervision Fee: $1,500.00.

PEOPLE v WESTON LAWRENCE, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 07/13/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support – Failing To Pay; Restitution – Amount: $19,187.87.

PEOPLE v ROBERT LEAL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/09/2010, 46th Circuit Court-Crawford County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days; Jail Suspended: 42 days with remainder suspended; Probation: 1 year.

PEOPLE v JAMIE RONALD LEE, Verdict - Jury - Convicted, 08/28/2009, 43rd Circuit Court-Cass County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days; Jail Suspended: 73 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $48,017.56; Other Costs: $1,885.00.

PEOPLE v KEVIN MICHAEL LEISTER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/03/2010, 45th Circuit Court-St. Joseph County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 2 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 2 days county jail.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL EDWARD LEITZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/19/2010, 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $11,986.75.

PEOPLE v FREDERIC GARY LEMBERG, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/30/2009, 10th District Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $7,132.91.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM NOAH LEMLEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/08/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $75,378.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $48.00; CVR Fee: $53.00.

PEOPLE v SHAWN JAMES LEMM, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/19/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation 48 months; Court Costs: $768.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v ROBIN LEE LETSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/06/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 24 months; Restitution - Amount: $9,209.59; Court Costs: $2,678.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL MATTHEW LEVARIO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/16/2010, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v FREDERICK LEWIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/17/2010, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 71 days in jail; Jail Suspended: 71 days; Probation: 4 years; Restitution - Amount: $44,297.41; Court Costs: $2,157.00.

PEOPLE v NIKKIELI LEWIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/29/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $94,405.56; Court Costs: $1,460.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v CEDELL LIDDELL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/03/2010, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 1 year.

PEOPLE v REX PO LIM, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/18/2009, 58th District Court-Grand Haven, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $7,400.00.

PEOPLE v JOSE LINDO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/22/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $33,804.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v PAULO SERGIO LINS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/04/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $4,000.00.

PEOPLE v MARVIN JOHN LINTEMUTH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/29/2010, 49th Circuit Court-Mecosta County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 12 months; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Fines: $250.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL LIPAROTO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/08/2009, 38th Circuit Court-Monroe County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 235 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 12 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $23,873.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,453.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY LITTLE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/03/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $54,387.00; Court Costs: $368.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DWIGHT LITTLE, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/25/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Disorderly Person - Non-Support; Restitution - Amount: $29,347.27.

PEOPLE v JOSE LUIS LOPEZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/26/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $14,675.52; Court Costs: $768.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v ERIC WALTER LOVE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/06/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $21,239.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM LOVE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/11/2009, 9th Circuit Court-Kalamazoo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $34,179.74.

PEOPLE v CHARLES LOVEJOY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/02/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $46,415.42; Court Costs: $1,060.00.

PEOPLE v THOMAS HUGH LOWING, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/03/2009, 61st District Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $15,936.32.

PEOPLE v JUSTIN LOZZI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/08/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 68 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 68 days; Probation: 3 years.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL LUBANSKI, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 03/03/2010, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL V LUBE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/03/2010, 87th District Court-Otsego County, Probation: 6 months; Court Costs: $618.00.

PEOPLE v PAUL SCOTT LUCAS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 07/29/2009, 48th Circuit Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $14,059.00.

PEOPLE v TORREY RANIER LUCAS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/28/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 6 months; Restitution - Amount: $16,872.16; Court Costs: $338.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM LUCAS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/12/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $27,078.37; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v TROY AZAD LUCASSIAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/06/2009, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 days work release if eligible; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $34,356.00; Court Costs: $1,260.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Other Costs: $1,200.00.

PEOPLE v ALVIS LUCY, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 03/01/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v ERIC LUHTANEN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/05/2009, 28th Circuit Court-Wexford County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Jail: 365 days; Jail Suspended: 159 days; Restitution - Amount: $49,323.12; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v FRANK LUKITSCH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/08/2009, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $8,143.00; Court Costs: $2,500.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v KENT LUMM, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/11/2010, 53rd Circuit Court-Cheboygan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 133 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 133 days; Restitution - Amount: $28,843.37.

PEOPLE v CECIEL LUMPKINS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/07/2009, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 30 days; Probation: 3 years; Court Costs: $608.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DAVID LYALL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/04/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $20,692.18; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $660.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v HARRY LYNAM, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/26/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 159 days; Jail Suspended: 159 days; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $760.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JOHN WILLIAM LYNCH, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/01/2009, 15th District Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $42,212.32.

PEOPLE v KENNETH LYNCH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/13/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $45,312.95; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v HOWARD MABRY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/14/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 36 months; Restitution - Amount: $11,316.72; Other Restitution - Amount: $360.00; Court Costs: $2,003.00.

PEOPLE v RONALD MACHUS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/26/2009, 1st District Court-Monroe County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 4 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 3 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $30,089.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $168.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $350.00; Fines: $100.00.

PEOPLE v STEPHEN CONRAD MACLEAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/30/2009, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 68 days; Jail Suspended: 68 days; Probation: 2 years; Court Costs: $318.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DAMON MAURICE MADDOX, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/21/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $23,483.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v SUE ANN MADDOX, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/20/2009, 49th Circuit Court-Osceola County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Court Costs: $573.32; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v ORRICE MAGEE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/20/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months.

PEOPLE v JAMES MAHER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/14/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $53,127.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v QUENTIS JAMES MAHONE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/13/2009, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 18 months; Court Costs: $468.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v GREGORY MALOY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/29/2010, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 119 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 119 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $29,190.32.

PEOPLE v SOKOL MARKAJ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/27/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $36,394.21; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Other Costs: $600.00.

PEOPLE v PHILLIP DAVID MARQUIS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 07/08/2010, 71-A District Court-Lapeer County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $31,379.45.

PEOPLE v JASON MARSHALL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/16/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $52,858.84; Court Costs: $700.00.

PEOPLE v GEORGE MARTIN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/28/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $25,383.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,128.00.

PEOPLE v TERRANCE MARTIN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/12/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $51,013.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v TERRANCE MARTIN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/12/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $35,155.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00.

PEOPLE v GUILLERMO MARTINEZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/13/2009, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 days; Jail Suspended: 57 days; Probation: 24 months; Court Costs: $721.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v VICTOR MASON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/03/2009, 50th Circuit Court-Chippewa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days; Jail Suspended: 113 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $67,233.13.

PEOPLE v ALVIN WENDELL MATHENEY, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 07/28/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $35,316.00.

PEOPLE v CAROL LEE MATHEWS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/28/2009, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 30 months; Court Costs: $338.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT GARY MATHIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/30/2009, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 46 days; Jail Suspended: 46 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $83,524.66.

PEOPLE v JOHN MATTESON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/01/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $26,009.57.

PEOPLE v ROBERT MATTHEWS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/11/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $29,947.72; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v STEPHONE JAMES MAYO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/10/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 18 months; Restitution - Amount: $43,459.36; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM JOSEPH MAZZOLA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/04/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $54,246.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v LANCE MCBRIDE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/13/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $21,014.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $528.00.

PEOPLE v EDDIE MCCARY, Plea Agreement, 03/04/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v CALVIN MCCASKILL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/30/2010, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 180 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 82 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $14,938.51.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY MCCLENNEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/19/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $23,836.99; Court Costs: $968.00.

PEOPLE v STANLEY RAY MCCUDDY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/05/2010, 5th District Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 days county jail; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $46,669.84.

PEOPLE v RICKY MCDONALD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/16/2010, 88th District Court-Alpena County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days; Jail Suspended: 90 days; Court Costs: $240.00.

PEOPLE v MARCHAUNT MCEADY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/06/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 48 months; Restitution - Amount: $8,285.61; Other Restitution - Amount: $480.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v BRADFORD LAMAR MCGHEE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/21/2009, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $88,569.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,068.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v VONZELL LAJAUNE MCGREW, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/16/2010, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 63 days; Jail Suspended: 63 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $37,950.00; Court Costs: $400.00.

PEOPLE v RICHMOND MCKENZIE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/19/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $54,121.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,068.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM STANLEY MCKENZIE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/21/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $20,091.56; Court Costs: $828.00.

PEOPLE v SCOTT MCMATH, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 06/14/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v NORMAN EMMITT MCMILLON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/03/2010, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $18,997.25.

PEOPLE v JASON MICHAEL MCMURTRIE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/08/2010, 48th Circuit Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 days; Jail Suspended: 37 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $15,117.22; Court Costs: $1,128.00.

PEOPLE v DAVID MCNAIR, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/20/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $27,874.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v RANDY WARREN MCNEIL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/04/2010, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Jail: 180 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 81 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $32,138.39; Court Costs: $1,004.40.

PEOPLE v RODNEY DESHAWN MCRIPLEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/03/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $13,824.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $368.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v RICHARD GEORGE MENGYAN, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 10/27/2009, 56-B District Court-Barry County, Desertion/Abandonment/Non-Support; Restitution - Amount: $13,000.00.

PEOPLE v EDWIN MERCID, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/21/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $77,364.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v DANNY WAYNE MERRIWEATHER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/19/2010, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years.

PEOPLE v DAVID BRIAN MESSER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/18/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $9,435.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $668.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v STEVIE EUGENE METZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/27/2009, 5th District Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 36 days; Jail Suspended: 36 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $18,085.23.

PEOPLE v RICKY SCOTT MEYERS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/15/2010, 56th Circuit Court-Eaton County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 190 days; Jail Suspended: 190 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $20,675.46; Court Costs: $1,735.20.

PEOPLE v TYRONE MICHAEL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/12/2009, 38th Circuit Court-Monroe County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 180 days; Jail Suspended: 21 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $17,252.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $868.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JEFFREY LYN MILETICH, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 06/23/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v EDWIN JON MILLER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/20/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 180 days; Jail Suspended: 71 days; Probation: 4 years; Restitution - Amount: $66,821.99; Court Costs: $1,748.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v GORDON MILLER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/05/2010, 27th Circuit Court-Newaygo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 270 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 13 days; Probation: 18 months; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v KEVIN JAY MILLER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/10/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 2 years; Court Costs: $528.00.

PEOPLE v MATTHEW B. MILLER, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 07/10/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $16,635.55.

PEOPLE v RICHARD MATTHIAS MILLER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/21/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 1 year; Restitution - Amount: $36,323.24; Court Costs: $270.00.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY MILLER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/19/2009, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $58,003.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES RICHARD MILLS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/11/2009, 50th District Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $85,493.37.

`PEOPLE v ANDRE MILTON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/15/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 30 days; Jail Suspended: 12 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $23,647.22; Court Costs: $3,068.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v VICTOR GORDON MILTON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/21/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 24 months; Restitution - Amount: $56,669.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $1,911.00; Court Costs: $768.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL ANTHONY MINTZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/10/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay;

Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $22,712.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $728.00.

PEOPLE v KENNETH MIRCH, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/30/2009, 50th District Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $53,648.44.

PEOPLE v ROBERT EDWARD MITCHELL, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 03/17/2009, 65-A District Court-Clinton County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $17,340.00.

PEOPLE v SCOTT ALAN MITCHELL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/10/2010, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 9 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 2 months; remainder suspended; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $45,444.86.

PEOPLE v VICTOR MODENA, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 05/01/2009, 27th Circuit Court-Newaygo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v STEPHEN MOHR, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/18/2009, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v DAVID MOLOCINIUC, Plea Agreement, 06/18/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support – Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v DAVID MONTGOMERY, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/19/2010, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $14,787.34.

PEOPLE v ALPHONSO MOORE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/13/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 1 - 15 years state prison; Restitution - Amount: $131,852.00; Court Costs: $168.00.

PEOPLE v DAWAIN MOORE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/12/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $13,103.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,068.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v SHARON MOORE, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 05/19/2009, 49th Circuit Court-Osceola County, Desertion/Abandonment/Non-Support; Restitution - Amount: $42,096.01.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY JAMES MOORE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/29/2010, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 150 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 3 days; remainder suspended; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $8,291.93.

PEOPLE v SCOTT MOOS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/27/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 12 months; Restitution - Amount: $1,746.26; Other Restitution - Amount: $120.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v EDWARD MOREFIELD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/11/2010, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $27,070.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $868.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v BRADLEY SEAN MORRIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/20/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $60,167.24; Court Costs: $1,328.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH MORRIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/27/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 120 days suspended pending receipt of $1,000 by 06/01/09, if not paid, jail time to be served; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $92,469.63; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Other Costs: $600.00.

PEOPLE v SAMUEL MORRIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/18/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $42,899.90; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,128.00.

PEOPLE v TROY ALLEN MORRIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/20/2010, 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Jail: 60 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 60 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $27,482.50; Court Costs: $1,063.80.

PEOPLE v WAYNE MORRIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/13/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $28,928.31; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v TYSON ROBERT MORRISSETTE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/18/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $112,656.91.

PEOPLE v CARRIE ANN MOSHER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/19/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Court Costs: $1,167.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT E MOSHER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/16/2010, 41st Circuit Court-Dickinson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 100 days; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v DANIEL EDWARD MOSS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/18/2009, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Jail: 206 days; Jail Suspended: 206 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $112,040.91.

PEOPLE v ROBERT MOSS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/13/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $44,283.85; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v RICHARD J MOYA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/15/2010, 41st Circuit Court-Menominee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $1,926.00; Court Costs: $398.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v BRIAN MUHAMMAD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/09/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 12 months; Restitution - Amount: $27,833.74.

PEOPLE v MAURICE LAMONT MUHAMMAD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/21/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 120 days; Jail Suspended: 11 days; Restitution - Amount: $28,084.72.

PEOPLE v DANIEL MARK MULLEN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/26/2010, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 3 days; Jail Suspended: 3 days; Court Costs: $190.00.

PEOPLE v MARKO MURILLO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/23/2009, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years.

PEOPLE v LIAM MURTAGH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/04/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $65,864.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v GERALD MUSSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/13/2010, 55th Circuit Court-Clare County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $932.18.

PEOPLE v KENNETH LEE MYERS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 03/22/2010, 2A District Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $17,000.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL MYLES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/03/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-4, Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $16,954.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v BRIAN NALLI, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 11/04/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY NANCE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/21/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $54,707.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES ARTHUR NASH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/22/2010, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 52 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 52 days; Probation: 3 years.

PEOPLE v RICHARD NEFF, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 10/05/2010, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v MELVIN TROY NELSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/28/2010, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Jail: 300 days; Jail Suspended: 2 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $14,397.48.

PEOPLE v MILFORD NETTERVILLE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/10/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 5 months; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $48,168.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES WILLIAM NICHOLSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/02/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $80,285.46; Court Costs: $960.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $360.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM NIENOW, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 03/27/2009, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $41,973.41.

PEOPLE v BLAKE GERALD NIESWAND, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/10/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v RONALD MELVIN NOLAND, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/26/2010, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $21,018.00; Court Costs: $368.00.

PEOPLE v CARLTON NORTHERN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/13/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $160,680.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v FELIX NUNLEY, IV, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/08/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $27,200.70; Court Costs: $240.00.

PEOPLE v JOACHIM NWOGU, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/19/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $36,000.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v GLENN NYPIUK, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/03/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $32,321.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES O'BRIEN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/09/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $53,162.18; Court Costs: $1,620.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v SAMUEL ARTHUR OCAMPO, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 05/21/2010, 5th District Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $40,323.82.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL JAY OETMAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/11/2010, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $35,481.95.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM OLIVER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/17/2009, 61st District Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 270 days; Jail Suspended: 104 days credit; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v ROY CHRISTOPHER O'NEIL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/19/2010, 56th Circuit Court-Eaton County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 39 days; Jail Suspended: 39 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $27,228.24.

PEOPLE v JOHN ORDWAY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/19/2010, 48th Circuit Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 99 days; Jail Suspended: 99 days; Probation: 18 months.

PEOPLE v GILBERT FERNAND ORTIZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/25/2009, 48th Circuit Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 71 days; Jail Suspended: 71 days; Probation: 18 months; Restitution - Amount: $14,257.70.

PEOPLE v BRADLEY OSBORNE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/12/2009, 38th Circuit Court-Monroe County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $53,768.00; Court Costs: $160.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Fines: $100.00; Other Costs: $600.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM HARRY OSGOOD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/10/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Probation: 36 months; Court Costs: $428.00.

PEOPLE v LONNY OSTERHOUDT, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/13/2009, 72nd District Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $11,093.03.

PEOPLE v RAMON OTERO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/26/2009, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 12 months; Court Costs: $446.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JOHN MICHAEL OTIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/22/2010, 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 60 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $31,612.57.

PEOPLE v JOSE OYERVIDEZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/23/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 18 months; Restitution - Amount: $19,078.84; Court Costs: $450.00; Supervision Fee: $180.00.

PEOPLE v JOEL PAASCH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/05/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $768.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DONALD OLIVER PACQUETTE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/27/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $25,713.65; Court Costs: $645.20.

PEOPLE v KURTISS PADGETT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/13/2010, 81st District Court-Arenac County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Court Costs: $755.00.

PEOPLE v GARY GUS PAGELS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/01/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $19,271.37.

PEOPLE v JOHN DAVID PALEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/16/2010, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 24 months; Restitution - Amount: $40,032.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $240.00; Court Costs: $950.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v BRENT PALMER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/07/2009, 26th Circuit Court-Alpena County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 109 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 109 days; Court Costs: $624.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DESHAWN AKINS PARHAM, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/11/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $49,712.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v KEVIN LEE PARISH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/16/2009, 36th Circuit Court-Van Buren County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $26,292.56.

PEOPLE v GLORIANA PARKER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/11/2009, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $16,726.77.

PEOPLE v JERRY EDWARD PARKER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/02/2009, 5th District Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 42 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $117,652.72.

PEOPLE v JOHN PARKER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/10/2010, 49th Circuit Court-Mecosta County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Court Costs: $700.00.

PEOPLE v CHARLES PORTER PARKES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/22/2010, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $43,255.76.

PEOPLE v GERALD CHARLES PARTEE, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 10/12/2010, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $9,852.70.

PEOPLE v DAVID GEORGE PASSENIER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/10/2010, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $17,655.11.

PEOPLE v SARAH PASSOW, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/30/2009, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution – Amount: $4,149.24.

PEOPLE v CORNEL ANTHONY PATE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/20/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Court Costs: $1,560.00.

PEOPLE v SCOTT THOMAS PATTEN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/16/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $27,032.28; Court Costs: $828.00.

PEOPLE v FRED ALEX PATTERSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/27/2010, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $24,441.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,453.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES CARL PAULI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/23/2010, 38th Circuit Court-Monroe County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $10,175.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $986.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v BRYAN MURIL PAULIN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/29/2010, 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $18,753.60.

PEOPLE v PIERRE PAYMENT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/16/2009, 50th Circuit Court-Chippewa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 73 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $13,504.21.

PEOPLE v LEE PAYMON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/30/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 36 months; Restitution - Amount: $12,808.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $360.00; Court Costs: $960.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JOHNNY PAYNE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/15/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Other Restitution - Amount: $679.00; Court Costs: $768.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v PATRICK PAYNE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/23/2009, 41-B District Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $19,791.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v PHILLIP BRUCE PAYNE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/19/2010, 36th Circuit Court-Van Buren County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-4, Jail: 60 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 28 days served remainder suspended; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $25,512.03.

PEOPLE v MAURICE PEARSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/17/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $54,716.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Other Costs: $600.00.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER PECK, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/15/2010, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 9 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 9 days; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $728.00.

PEOPLE v BYRON KEITH PEE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/14/2010, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v KENNETH PELLEGATA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/20/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $5,100.70; Court Costs: $1,800.00.

PEOPLE v GERARDO PENA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/14/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $11,240.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $60.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES PENNINGTON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/03/2009, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Court Costs: $1,100.00.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY ROBERT PEREZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/15/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 270 days; Jail Suspended: 24 days; Restitution - Amount: $67,938.97.

PEOPLE v BART PERKEY, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 05/11/2010, 41-B District Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v ROBERT PERKINS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/23/2010, 46th Circuit Court-Crawford County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 180 days; Jail Suspended: 62 days.

PEOPLE v ROBERT PERNA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/28/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Attempted Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $14,771.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $753.00.

PEOPLE v TIRRELL PERRY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/19/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $18,276.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DAVID PETERSEN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/02/2009, 64-B District Court-Montcalm County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 1 year; Jail Suspended: 71 days.

PEOPLE v ALAN DALE PETERSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/09/2009, 41st Circuit Court-Dickinson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Court Costs: $1,730.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v HANS PETERSON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 03/22/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $8,400.00.

PEOPLE v VU ANH PHAM, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/15/2010, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-4, Jail: 60 days; Jail Suspended: 54 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $25,094.29; Court Costs: $512.00.

PEOPLE v DERRICK SEAN PHILLIPS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/25/2009, 12th District Court-Jackson County, Disorderly Person - Non-Support; Jail: 90 days; Jail Suspended: 90 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $6,500.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $12,000.00.

PEOPLE v LEE PIAZZA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/22/2009, 9th Circuit Court-Kalamazoo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $17,842.87.

PEOPLE v PIERRE ANDRE PICHOT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/03/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $27,912.64; Court Costs: $478.00.

PEOPLE v JERRY PIERCE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/10/2009, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER PIHAYLIC, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/23/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 36 days; Jail Suspended: 36 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $38,520.97; Court Costs: $968.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $360.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM HENRY PINSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/27/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $36,888.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $728.00.

PEOPLE v BRYANT PLUMLEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/14/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $49,666.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JEREMY TAYLOR POE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/07/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $17,583.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v JODY LYNN POLISE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/05/2010, 27th Circuit Court-Newaygo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 20 days; Probation: 24 months; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v LONNIE DUANE POLK, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/21/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-4, Jail: 5 months; Jail Suspended: 100 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $15,856.61.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER POOLE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/08/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months;

Restitution - Amount: $98,995.24; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v MARK SCOTT PORTER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/03/2010, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $26,198.11; Court Costs: $428.00.

PEOPLE v ROLANDO POSADA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/18/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 1 year; Restitution - Amount: $27,347.39.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL DAVID POWELL, Verdict - Jury - Convicted, 04/06/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Desertion/Abandonment/Non-Support; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $67,968.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $668.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DAVID PRECORD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/08/2010, 26th Circuit Court-Alpena County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 24 months; Court Costs: $1,260.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM PRENDERGAST, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/28/2010, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days; Probation: 30 months; Restitution - Amount: $43,254.78.

PEOPLE v DONALD EVERETT PRICE, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 08/04/2009, 72nd District Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $20,635.95.

PEOPLE v JERRY JEROME PRICE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/28/2010, 5th District Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 23 days; Jail Suspended: 23 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $63,465.41.

PEOPLE v JUAN DWANYE PRICE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/17/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $22,539.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v SHAMOND PRICE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/23/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $22,394.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $48.00; CVR Fee: $53.00.

PEOPLE v ROY JAMES PRIDE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/06/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $70,815.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v ROY JAMES PRIDE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/06/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $14,795.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $728.00.

PEOPLE v JOHN DAVID PRIMM, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/19/2010, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 3 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 3 days; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v RICHARD PROCHOWSKI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/02/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 5 days; Restitution - Amount: $52,485.09.

PEOPLE v JOHN STEPHEN PROFFITT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/14/2009, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days; Jail Suspended: 80 days; Probation: 2 years; Court Costs: $1,488.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JOSHUA ANTHONY PRZEBIENDA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/26/2010, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 37 days; Jail Suspended: 37 days; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $1,334.00.

PEOPLE v GARY PUHL, JR., Verdict - Court – Convicted, 11/03/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $18,958.00; Court Costs: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JONAS PUIDOKAS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/21/2009, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Court Costs: $980.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL TODD PULVER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/02/2010, 45th Circuit Court-St. Joseph County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 5 months; Jail Suspended: 16 days; Probation: 2 years.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY ROBERT RACEY, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/09/2009, 50th District Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $17,815.20.

PEOPLE v STEVEN ALAN RACHETER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/17/2009, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $52,558.66; Other Restitution - Amount: $803.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v MARK ALLEN RAJALA, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/22/2009, 97th District Court-Houghton County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $39,561.70.

PEOPLE v GARY LEE RAMSEY, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 12/27/2010, 87th District Court-Kalkaska County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY RASKA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/01/2009, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 15 days; Jail Suspended: 15 days; Restitution - Amount: $80,235.00; Court Costs: $645.00; CVR Fee: $50.00.

PEOPLE v DEAN RAY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/04/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $19,440.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v WADE EDWARD RAY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/01/2009, 46th Circuit Court-Kalkaska County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 12 months; Jail

Suspended: 3 days; Probation: 24 months; Restitution - Amount: $10,957.85; Court Costs: $360.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $350.00.

PEOPLE v STANFORD RAYFORD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/29/2009, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $24,400.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v STEVEN RAYFORD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/15/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $58,293.24; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER RAYMOND, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/30/2009, 15th Circuit Court-Branch County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Jail: 9 months; Restitution - Amount: $15,006.38.

PEOPLE v CHARISSA ROSEL REDMAN, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 10/26/2010, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $12,233.60.

PEOPLE v JON STACEY REED, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/28/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 100 days; Jail Suspended: 86 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $30,744.22.

PEOPLE v DERRICK D. REID, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 03/24/2009, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $17,404.74.

PEOPLE v PERNELL REID, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/01/2010, 5th District Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 27 days; Jail Suspended: 27 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $22,424.11.

PEOPLE v CHERICE ANNETT REMBERT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/04/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $18,415.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v WALTER REMSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/03/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Desertion/Abandonment/Non-Support; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $14,620.08; Court Costs: $968.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v WALTER REMSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/03/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $14,620.08; Court Costs: $968.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v EFRAIN SOLIS REYNA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/03/2010, 36th Circuit Court-Van Buren County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 1 day; Jail Suspended: 1 day; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $45,512.84; Court Costs: $2,014.34.

PEOPLE v DAVID EDWARD REYNOLDS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/02/2010, 68th District Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $20,028.91.

PEOPLE v MELANIE RICKARD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/20/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $70,845.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v CORY RILEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/22/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $15,693.98; Court Costs: $1,328.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM RITCH, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/23/2009, 33rd Circuit Court-Charlevoix County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $7,649.32.

PEOPLE v ERIC M RITTENHOUSE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/13/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v MIGUEL RIVERA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/25/2009, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 12 months; Restitution - Amount: $8,851.00; Court Costs: $188.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JASON THOMAS ROBACK, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/23/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $19,475.60; Court Costs: $1,688.00.

PEOPLE v MARK LAMONT ROBERSON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/10/2009, 15th District Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $10,000.00.

PEOPLE v WAYNE WILLIAM ROBERT, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 03/26/2010, 53rd District Court-Howell Division, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $16,796.46.

PEOPLE v DEVON ROBINSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/22/2010, 9th Circuit Court-Kalamazoo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v ANGEL RODARTE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/16/2009, 36th Circuit Court-Van Buren County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 14 days; Jail Suspended: 14 days credit; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $23,993.09.

PEOPLE v PIERRE A. ROGERS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/23/2009, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 180 days; Jail Suspended: 86 days credit; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $50,328.98; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v SCOTT ROGERS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/17/2010, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 180 days; Jail Suspended: 100 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $108,972.11.

PEOPLE v BRADLEY DALE ROHRBACK, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/10/2010, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 67 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 67 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $27,142.20.

PEOPLE v THOMAS WENDELL ROLLISON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/29/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $46,940.25; Court Costs: $1,260.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL THOMAS ROMAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/09/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $65,734.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v DAVID ROSE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/04/2010, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 148 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 148 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $69,278.45; Court Costs: $1,332.00.

PEOPLE v GREGORY ROSE, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 11/25/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v DAVID ALLEN ROTH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/10/2010, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v ANDRE ROWELL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/11/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $13,253.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $103.00.

PEOPLE v JOHN JOSEPH ROWLOFF, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/05/2009, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $22,686.57; Court Costs: $480.00.

PEOPLE v MATTHEW RUDY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/26/2009, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 3 days; Jail Suspended: 3 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $14,001.12; Court Costs: $4,124.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v BRUCE WALTER RUFF, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/20/2009, 5th District Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $23,574.56.

PEOPLE v LOVELL LADONE RUFUS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/25/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $72,551.17.

PEOPLE v JOHN RUGANI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/03/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $54,641.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v ENRIQUE HENRY RUIZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/26/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $22,312.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v KEVIN RUNNELLS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/14/2010, 38th Circuit Court-Monroe County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 180 days; Jail Suspended: 24 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $22,248.04; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $897.00.

PEOPLE v ELVIS RAY RUSHLOW, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/04/2010, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 15 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 15 days; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM RUSSELL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/22/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $46,154.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v BRIAN RUTKOWSKI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/12/2009, 38th Circuit Court-Monroe County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Jail: 180 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 3 days; Probation: 48 months; Restitution - Amount: $37,076.84; Other Restitution - Amount: $480.00; Court Costs: $168.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $772.50.

PEOPLE v JAMES RYAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/26/2009, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $35,987.70; Court Costs: $1,750.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v JOHN RYAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/15/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $15,195.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v THOMAS RYAN, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 03/02/2010, 50th Circuit Court-Chippewa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL RYERSE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/23/2009, 11th Circuit Court-Schoolcraft County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Jail: 23 months to 4 years state prison; Jail Suspended: 273 days; Restitution - Amount: $32,243.85.

PEOPLE v DOMENICO SACCO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/04/2010, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $150,128.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v FRANK ROBERT SACKETT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/08/2010, 9th Circuit Court-Kalamazoo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 15 days; Jail Suspended: 15 days; additional 180 days suspended; Probation: 4 years; Restitution - Amount: $24,521.99.

PEOPLE v FABIAN ALONSO SALAS-VASQUEZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/09/2010, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 64 days.

PEOPLE v JACOB AARON SALAZAR, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/09/2010, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v THOMAS SALLEE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/27/2010, 34th Circuit Court-Roscommon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 120 days county jail; Court Costs: $420.00.

PEOPLE v JOHN SALTERS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/25/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days; Jail Suspended: 1 day; Probation: 18 months; Restitution - Amount: $63,964.38; Court Costs: $450.00; Supervision Fee: $740.00.

PEOPLE v RICHARD LARRY SALTSMAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/17/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 18 months; Restitution - Amount: $26,682.44; Court Costs: $878.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DUANE RUSSELL SALYER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/18/2009, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 48 Months; Restitution - Amount: $23,868.66.

PEOPLE v LEROY ARTHUR SANBORN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/18/2009, 8th Circuit Court-Montcalm County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 1 year; Jail Suspended: 39 days; Restitution - Amount: $30,344.70; Other Costs: $1,000.00.

PEOPLE v JESUS SANCHEZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/05/2010, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Jail: 5 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 5 days; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $728.00.

PEOPLE v TY SANDERS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/17/2009, 34th Circuit Court-Roscommon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 9 months; Jail Suspended: 211 days; Other Investigation Costs: $1,179.23.

PEOPLE v GEORGE R. SANDOVAL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/04/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $45,616.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v HENRY HOWARD SANDS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/22/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 30 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - $34,400.00.

PEOPLE v WILBUR SANDS, Verdict - Jury - Convicted, 10/05/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $71,730.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $728.00.

PEOPLE v BRUCE EDWIN SARNIK, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/06/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 365 days; Jail Suspended: 78 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $66,561.33; Court Costs: $428.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v SCOTT SAUNDERS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/16/2010, 9th Circuit Court-Kalamazoo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 15 days coun-

ty jail; Jail Suspended: 15 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $13,486.94.

PEOPLE v RANDY SAYLOR, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/28/2009, 9th Circuit Court-Kalamazoo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Jail: 140 days; Jail Suspended: 140 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $67,242.62.

PEOPLE v DINO SCENNA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/03/2009, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $993.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY MICHAEL SCHALLAU, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 01/19/2010, 2A District Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $12,119.38.

PEOPLE v BRIAN SCOTT SCHILD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/20/2010, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 58 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 58 days; Probation: 18 months; Court Costs: $308.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL SCHIPPERS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/20/2009, 9th Circuit Court-Kalamazoo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 37 Days; Jail Suspended: 37 Days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $24,364.55.

PEOPLE v JEREMY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/25/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $19,321.80; Court Costs: $855.00; CVR Fee: $15.00.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER SCHOONHOVEN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/30/2009, 48th Circuit Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 18 months; Restitution - Amount: $55,760.65.

PEOPLE v JEREMY PHILLIP SCHOTT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/10/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 1 day served, remainder suspended; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $18,341.83.

PEOPLE v MATTHEW JAMES SCIBERRAS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/21/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $19,641.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $428.00.

PEOPLE v DARRIN SCOTT, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 09/14/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v KUAME DEMON SCOTT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/17/2009, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $20,582.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v KUAME DEMON SCOTT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/17/2009, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing to Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $34,251.24; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v RANDY LEE SCOTT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/13/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 9 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 81 days; Restitution - Amount: $60,702.39.

PEOPLE v ROBERT EARL SEARLS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/28/2010, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $22,828.70; Court Costs: $4,842.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT SEARS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/06/2009, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $18,023.32.

PEOPLE v LUIS SEDAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/19/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Desertion/Abandonment/Non-Support; Hab-4, Jail: 17 months - 4 years prison; Jail Suspended: 8 days; Restitution - Amount: $37,657.49.

PEOPLE v SHAD BRIAN SELF, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 07/21/2010, 68th District Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $14,156.61.

PEOPLE v DONALD LEE SHAFFER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/26/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $7,446.15; Court Costs: $828.00.

PEOPLE v KEVIN SHARBNOW, Plea Agreement, 05/12/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support – Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v AL DAVID SHARPE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/26/2010, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 95 days; Jail Suspended: 5 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $82,961.29.

PEOPLE v ROBERT NORMAN SHELDON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 12/03/2009, 15th District Court-Washtenaw County, Desertion/Abandonment/Non-Support; Restitution - Amount: $60,869.49.

PEOPLE v REGINALD RAY SHELTON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/28/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $61,640.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v KURT BRADLEY SHEPARD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/05/2009, 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 34 days; Jail Suspended: 34 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $20,679.47.

PEOPLE v RICHARD JOHN SHINGLEDECKER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/20/2009, 48th Circuit Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 87 days; Jail Suspended: 87 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $34,782.79; Court Costs: $1,238.00.

PEOPLE v SCOTT RANDALL SHINN, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 10/28/2009, 53rd District Court-Howell Division, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $5,000.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL GERARD SHIVERS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/22/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $12,036.89; Court Costs: $1,036.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL LEE SHOOK, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/14/2009, 48th Circuit Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 5 months; Jail Suspended: 133 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $73,606.54; Court Costs: $3,556.00.

PEOPLE v RAYMOND JOSEPH SHORT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/20/2010, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $12,988.51; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v BRYAN LEE SIKORSKI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/08/2010, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Jail: 93 days county jail; Jail Suspended 93 days.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM ALLEN SILVERTHORN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/23/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $100,074.07.

PEOPLE v BRIAN SIMINGTON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/15/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $251,320.90; Court Costs: $1,705.50.

PEOPLE v JAMES BEASIL SIMMONS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 07/10/2009, 28th Circuit Court-Wexford County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $76,159.88.

PEOPLE v KEITH ANTHONY SIMON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/20/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $74,358.26; Court Costs: $1,088.00.

PEOPLE v TONY SIMON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 08/04/2009, 34th Circuit Court-Roscommon County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $10,630.68.

PEOPLE v THOMAS SIMONS, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 06/14/2010, 68th District Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v SHANE MICHAEL SIVINS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/16/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 2 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 2 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $25,103.49; Court Costs: $828.00.

PEOPLE v JOHN SKAGGS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 05/21/2009, 13th Circuit Court-Grand Traverse County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v MARVIN SKIPPER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/12/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $20,081.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v DOUGLAS D. SKUTT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/22/2009, 35th Circuit Court-Shiawassee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Court Costs: $1,928.00.

PEOPLE v JOHN SLADOVNIK, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/03/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $39,547.42; Court Costs: $768.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY SLUSSER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/03/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 days; Jail Suspended: 3 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $38,521.17.

PEOPLE v JANICE SUE SMELSER, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/02/2010, 2A District Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $15,026.62.

PEOPLE v ALAN CLAY SMITH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/27/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 Months; Restitution - Amount: $25,357.46; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Other Costs: $600.00.

PEOPLE v BRIAN SMITH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/03/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $13,134.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $668.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v CRAIG MARTIN SMITH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/29/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $44,738.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v CRAIG MARTIN SMITH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/29/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $38,713.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $428.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES SMITH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/11/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $27,682.00; Court Costs: $153.00.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH SHAWN SMITH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/30/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 18 months; Restitution - Amount: $12,235.50; Court Costs: $878.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v MARVIN DALE SMITH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/02/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $15,850.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $668.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $400.00.

PEOPLE v MORGAN JAMES SMITH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/09/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years.

PEOPLE v PAUL SMITH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/25/2009, 49th Circuit Court-Osceola County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 24 months.

PEOPLE v RONALD WADE SMITH, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 03/19/2009, 50th District Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $8,768.12.

PEOPLE v WINSTON LAMONT SMITH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/14/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $11,229.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES LEE SNIDER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/08/2009, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-4, Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $18,973.47; Court Costs: $4,782.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER SNYDER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/07/2009, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 24 months; Restitution - Amount: $37,361.79.

PEOPLE v PATRICK JOSEPH SOLTIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/09/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 15 days; Jail Suspended: 15 days; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v GARY LYNN SORENSEN, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 08/13/2009, 10th District Court-Calhoun County, Desertion/Abandonment/Non-Support; Restitution - Amount: $8,499.64.

PEOPLE v HAROLD SORRELL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/02/2010, 50th Circuit Court-Chippewa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 270 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 82 days; Probation: 2 years.

PEOPLE v MICHEAL SOUTH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/16/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $11,552.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $103.00.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER SPADE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/15/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $39,264.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH SPARKMAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/20/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $55,014.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,068.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v LOWELL LEE SPENCE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/13/2009, 45th Circuit Court-St. Joseph County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Jail: 3 months.

PEOPLE v JOHN A SPENCER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/14/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-4, Probation: 3 years; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v MARK ARRON SPICER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/29/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $15,203.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v RONALD SPRINGER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/24/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $117,102.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v MARLON DWAYNE SPRINGFIELD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/21/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 42 days; Jail Suspended: 42 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $29,223.42.

PEOPLE v NICKOLAS JOSEPH STACKPOOLE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/10/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 3 days; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $16,194.44.

PEOPLE v DAVID GERALD STAGG, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/20/2009, 15th District Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $29,800.00.

PEOPLE v ANNETTE M STAHL, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 05/29/2009, 72nd District Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $28,203.41.

PEOPLE v MATTHEW STAHL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/10/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 180 days; Court Costs: $834.00.

PEOPLE v DONNELL STALLINGS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/11/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $13,087.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT STAMBAUGH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/06/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $71,788.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,128.00.

PEOPLE v RICHARD JOSEPH STANISLAWSKI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/08/2010, 43rd Circuit Court-Cass County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 150 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 29 days.

PEOPLE v JANICE STANLEY, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 05/21/2010, 55th Circuit Court-Clare County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v CINDI JEANETE STARKEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/09/2010, 5th District Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 85 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 85 days; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v LEROY ROBERT STEAGALL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/10/2010, 28th Circuit Court-Wexford County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $11,763.25; Court Costs: $428.00.

PEOPLE v RANDALL STEIN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/11/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $80,573.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER STELLMAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/10/2010, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $27,620.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v RICHARD WILLIAM STEPHENS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/10/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 12 months; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v ANDREW HAROLD STERSIC, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 02/12/2010, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $12,500.00.

PEOPLE v COURTNEY DEWAYN STEVENSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/02/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $116,216.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT STEVER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/19/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 41 days; Jail Suspended: 41 days; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $600.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT STINGER, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 07/21/2010, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v JON ALAN STOEPKER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/24/2010, 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 45 days; Jail Suspended: 45 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $24,015.27.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY ALLEN STOREMSKI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/10/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $12,788.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL ST. PIERRE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/06/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $135,758.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v DALE STRAIN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/05/2010, 48th Circuit Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 116 days; Jail Suspended: 116 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $30,045.07.

PEOPLE v BRIAN STRAUSS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/26/2010, 1st District Court-Monroe County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $77,464.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $100.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v NEIL STRESS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/22/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 24 months; Restitution - Amount: $8,031.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v WAIKATA STUBBS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/09/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $30,157.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v DERRICK ALAN SUDDUTH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/09/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $5,148.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $240.00; Court Costs: $1,128.00.

PEOPLE v ANDREW JOSEPH SWANCHARA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/29/2010, 65-B District Court-Gratiot County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 48 days credit, remainder on tether; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $19,873.01.

PEOPLE v HERMAN SCHULTZ SWANSON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 05/19/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $18,655.19.

PEOPLE v ROBERT SWARTZ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/23/2009, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days; Jail Suspended: 1 day; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $69,711.85.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM SWARTZENTROVER, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 10/15/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $7,343.90.

PEOPLE v BRIAN LEE SWAYNE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/22/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $55,269.29; Court Costs: $728.00.

PEOPLE v ROLAND TAGA, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 09/30/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $21,817.97.

PEOPLE v ALBERT TAYLOR, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/04/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $63,562.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v ALBERT TAYLOR, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/04/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $13,620.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES TAYLOR, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/21/2010, 41-B District Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $8,203.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $718.00.

PEOPLE v TERRY CHANTAL TAYLOR, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/21/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $29,778.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v MARIO TEAGUE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/28/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $38,826.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v DONALD ROBERT TERHAAR, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/14/2010, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Jail: 75 days; Jail Suspended: 75 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $31,719.72; Court Costs: $458.00.

PEOPLE v JASON THELEN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/11/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 24 months; Restitution - Amount: $3,655.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $240.00; Court Costs: $103.00.

PEOPLE v DANIEL LAMILE THOMAS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/08/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $19,510.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v DANIEL LAMILE THOMAS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/08/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $69,735.00.

PEOPLE v DOUGLAS LEE THOMAS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/23/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Court Costs: $768.00; CVR Fee: $600.00.

PEOPLE v KEITH THOMAS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/28/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $72,134.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL ANTHONY THOMAS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/17/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $23,596.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v RAYMOND THOMAS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/27/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $26,800.24; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v SCOTT ANTHONY THOMAS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/01/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $17,105.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v STEVE THOMAS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/28/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $34,122.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM THOMAS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/13/2009, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $24,514.34.

PEOPLE v RICKY THOMAS THOMERSON, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 02/16/2010, 1st District Court-Monroe County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v DAVID PAUL THOMPSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/22/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 18 months; Restitution - Amount: $6,400.00; Court Costs: $758.00.

PEOPLE v TERESA THORNTON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/11/2010, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 1 day county jail; Jail Suspended: 1 day; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $40,188.14.

PEOPLE v JOHN LLOYD TILEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/19/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $30,852.10; Court Costs: $908.00.

PEOPLE v CHERIE LYNN TOBIAS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 12/10/2010, 56-B District Court-Barry County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $369.50.

PEOPLE v JAMES THEODORE TOMASZEWSKI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/26/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $768.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v LEONARD TONKIN, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/30/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Desertion/Abandonment/Non-Support; Restitution - Amount: $36,575.29.

PEOPLE v FRANCIS XAVIER TORDY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/12/2009, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $73,707.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $48.00; CVR Fee: $53.00.

PEOPLE v LOREN DION TOWNES, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/23/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $56,524.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $48.00; CVR Fee: $53.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES ROY TOWNSEND, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/24/2010, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 days; Jail Suspended: 2 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $24,680.67.

PEOPLE v JACKIE TRAMMELL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/28/2010, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 18 months; Court Costs: $308.00.

PEOPLE v RONALD WAYNE TRIPLETT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/20/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $23,784.00; Court Costs: $1,128.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES RICHARD TROUT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/06/2010, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 4 years; Restitution - Amount: $29,951.71; Court Costs: $905.00.

PEOPLE v BRANT TRUMBO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/13/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $29,861.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY TRUSKOLASKI, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/29/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $16,284.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $728.00.

PEOPLE v FLOYD NOELL TUCKER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/13/2009, 15th Circuit Court-Branch County, Disorderly Person - Non-Support; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v GEORGE TUCKER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/04/2010, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $67,330.91; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES DOUGLAS TUCKER, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 07/21/2009, 53rd District Court-Brighton Division, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $20,695.00.

PEOPLE v ANTONIO TURNAGE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/04/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $36,557.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v FREDERICK TURNER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/03/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $33,217.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v RICKY GENE TURNER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/18/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 18 months; Restitution - Amount: $33,235.80; Court Costs: $758.00.

PEOPLE v THOMAS SENIOR TUSSEY, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 04/30/2009, 5th District Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $1,000.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM HENRY TWADDLE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/15/2010, 85th District Court-Benzie County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Court Costs: $250.00.

PEOPLE v CHARLES EDWARD TYLER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/29/2010, 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 180 days county jail; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $47,678.53.

PEOPLE v DION VANBOEKEL, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 01/29/2009, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $9,729.62.

PEOPLE v JERRY LEE VANBRANDE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/10/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $560.00.

PEOPLE v JUAN GABRIEL VARGAS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 12/16/2009, 57th District Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $11,467.60.

PEOPLE v ERIK VAUGHAN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/04/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days; Jail Suspended: 72 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $38,663.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,378.00.

PEOPLE v SHAWN VAUGHN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/04/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $52,344.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v HOWARD DOUGLAS VEAL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/08/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; State Prison: 23 - 48 months; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v WALLACE VICKERSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/10/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $95,814.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v HOWARD VIEAU, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/14/2010, 53rd Circuit Court-Cheboygan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days; Jail Suspended: 90 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $40,190.71.

PEOPLE v THOMAS BRETT VIGIL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/30/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-4, Jail: 10 days; Jail Suspended: 10 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $48,695.82; Court Costs: $728.00.

PEOPLE v MARIO VILLAREAL, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 11/16/2010, 48th Circuit Court-Allegan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution – Amount: $8,045.33.

PEOPLE v CARL VOLLMERHAUSEN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/10/2010, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 1 year county jail; Jail Suspended: 1 year suspended; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $13,551.08.

PEOPLE v GEORGE VOULGARIS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/06/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $19,769.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $728.00.

PEOPLE v JASON WALBECQ, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/28/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $23,116.42; Court Costs: $1,260.00.

PEOPLE v HOWARD WALKER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/23/2010, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Jail: 51 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 51 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $23,810.83; Court Costs: $929.00.

PEOPLE v RODNEY MICHAEL WALKER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/06/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $89,246.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $1,128.00.

PEOPLE v VINCENT EDWARD WALKER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/25/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $11,165.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v ANDREW WALSH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/14/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $63,832.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $428.00.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER WARD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/09/2009, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $69,972.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES WARD, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 05/29/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Desertion/Abandonment/Non-Support; Restitution - Amount: $65,611.58.

PEOPLE v MARC DAVID WARD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/15/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 3 days; Jail Suspended: 3 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $15,976.54.

PEOPLE v MARK WARD, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 04/28/2010, 41-B District Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v DARIN WARDLAW, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/20/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $21,614.00; Court Costs: $1,128.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL ORRIN WARG, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/23/2009, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 36 months; Court Costs: $1,272.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v SCOTT MICHAEL WARNER, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 12/02/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $1,453.50.

PEOPLE v KEITH DOUGLAS WASHINGTON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/02/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $75,056.81; Court Costs: $1,560.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL WASHINGTON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/13/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $38,120.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v SUMMER DAWN WATROS, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 09/11/2009, 86th District Court-Antrim County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $12,294.28.

PEOPLE v MARK WATSON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 03/18/2009, 72nd District Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $41,189.09.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL DEAN WATSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/27/2010, 5th Circuit Court-Barry County, Desertion/Abandonment/Non-Support; Jail: 11 months county jail; Jail Suspended: 58 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $64,189.67.

PEOPLE v TONY MAURICE WATTS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/20/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $30,162.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL WEILER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/08/2010, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v RICK WELCH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/26/2010, 30th Circuit Court-Ingham County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT WELCH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/09/2009, 36th Circuit Court-Van Buren County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 26 days; Jail Suspended: 26 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $8,000.00.

PEOPLE v JEROME DAVID WELLS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/19/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $44,409.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JACK BERNARD WENGER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/23/2009, 20th Circuit Court-Ottawa County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 24 months; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $240.00; Other Costs: $337.00.

PEOPLE v ALAN WENZEL, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 06/15/2010, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v KEVIN WESTMORELAND, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/12/2009, 23rd Circuit Court-Iosco County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 2 years.

PEOPLE v RODNEY WHALEY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/17/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $20,554.86; Court Costs: $1,260.00.

PEOPLE v BRIAN TED WHALING, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/20/2010, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 270 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 71 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $23,176.94; Court Costs: $798.00.

PEOPLE v REX WHEELER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/25/2009, 8th Circuit Court-Montcalm County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 59 days; Jail Suspended: 59 days; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $31,432.22; Court Costs: $360.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $400.00; Fines: $300.00.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM ROBERT WHEELER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/25/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 7 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 7 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $33,587.35; Court Costs: $697.00.

PEOPLE v CALVIN WHITE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/08/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $19,234.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $68.00.

PEOPLE v DARRELL WHITE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/13/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $85,615.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v DARYL DWAYNE WHITE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/03/2010, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 8 months state prison; Restitution - Amount: $29,772.38; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v DEVIN MARCELL WHITE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/10/2010, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $11,039.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v DYLAN WHITE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/11/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-2, Probation: 18 months.

PEOPLE v JEFFERY DUANE WHITE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/12/2010, 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 117 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 117 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $23,984.69.

PEOPLE v JUAN LAMAR WHITE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/02/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $31,604.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $668.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY WHITE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/24/2009, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 120 days; Jail Suspended: 8 days; Probation: 2 years.

PEOPLE v SETH ADAM WIECZOREK, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/29/2010, 49th Circuit Court-Osceola County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 34 days credit, remainder suspended.

PEOPLE v VERNE DELBERT WILCOX, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/08/2010, 40th Circuit Court-Lapeer County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-4, Jail: 365 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 80 days.

PEOPLE v JERRY LYNN WILER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/02/2009, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 18 months; Restitution - Amount: $16,418.37.

PEOPLE v KENNETH LAMONT WILLIAMS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/06/2010, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 months; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $23,687.64; Court Costs: $1,540.00.

PEOPLE v LORENZO WILLIAMS, Plea Agreement, 04/17/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support – Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v MARIO JAMAL WILLIAMS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/31/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 1 day; Jail Suspended: 1 day; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $20,674.96; Court Costs: $728.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v MONDRAGO WILLIAMS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/10/2010, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $21,636.67; Court Costs: $679.00.

PEOPLE v SANFORD WILLIAMS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/15/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 18 months; Restitution - Amount: $22,248.87; Court Costs: $1,418.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v THOMAS RICHARD WILLIAMS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/26/2010, 5th Circuit Court-Barry County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months; Jail Suspended: 74 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $56,045.21; Court Costs: $641.00.

PEOPLE v TYRONE WILLIAMS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/14/2009, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Jail: 12 months; Jail Suspended: 73 days; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v BRIAN ALLEN WILSON, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 07/21/2010, 68th District Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay.

PEOPLE v HAROLD PAUL WILSON, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/02/2010, 8th Circuit Court-Ionia County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $4,597.58.

PEOPLE v JAMES VINCENT WILSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 01/29/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 66 days county jail; Restitution - Amount: $45,779.26; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v KATHY JO WILSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/20/2009, 43rd Circuit Court-Cass County, Disorderly Person - Non-Support; Jail: 40 days; Jail Suspended: 40 days; Probation: 4 months.

PEOPLE v NADEEN WILSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/18/2009, 36th District Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 48 months; Restitution - Amount: $11,833.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v PATRICK A WILSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/19/2010, 31st Circuit Court-St. Clair County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 1 day; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $34,905.97; Court Costs: $368.00.

PEOPLE v ROBERT WILSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/09/2010, 5th District Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 85 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 85 days; Probation: 5 years.

PEOPLE v TRAVIS WILSON, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/14/2010, 53rd Circuit Court-Cheboygan County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 80 days; Jail Suspended: 80 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $23,187.12.

PEOPLE v ANDREW WINKLEPLECK, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/08/2010, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES DOUGLAS WISNER, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 04/28/2010, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 20 days; Jail Suspended: 20 days; Probation: 2 years; Restitution - Amount: $55,242.74; Court Costs: $778.00.

PEOPLE v NEIL NICHOLAS WOLOSONOWICH, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/28/2009, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $78,753.81.

PEOPLE v FRANK JAMES WOOD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/25/2010, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 21 months - 6 years prison; Jail Suspended: 46 days.

PEOPLE v FRED WOOD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 10/14/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 90 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 43 days; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $45,141.08; Court Costs: $1,500.00.

PEOPLE v JOHNNY MARK WOODARD, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/01/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $24,367.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v ERIC DEQUAN WOODS, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/11/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 36 months; Restitution - Amount: $4,676.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $360.00; Court Costs: $228.00.

PEOPLE v NOLEN ANTHONY WRIGHT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/29/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $43,382.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $198.00.

PEOPLE v DANIEL WRUBEL, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 07/28/2010, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $42,587.91; Court Costs: $1,228.00.

PEOPLE v CALVIN LEE WYANT, Non-Lit - Letter Sent, 12/10/2010, 27th Circuit Court-Newaygo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 270 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 33 days, remainder suspended; Probation: 2 years.

PEOPLE v CARL B WYLIE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/11/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $14,250.94; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v BILLY JOE WYNN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 11/10/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $49,101.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v KEITH YAHNE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/19/2009, 45th Circuit Court-St. Joseph County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Jail: 180 days jail; Jail Suspended: 27 days credited, balance suspended; Probation: 2 years.

PEOPLE v TONY YALDO, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 06/25/2009, 50th District Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $71,755.12.

PEOPLE v CHOU CHEE YANG, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/09/2010, 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $152,003.27; Court Costs: $668.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v WALTER YEARBY, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/17/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $14,347.69; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v ANTWIONE YOUNG, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 08/17/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $12,019.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v FONTAINE YOUNG, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/27/2009, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 60 months; Restitution - Amount: $15,919.95; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Other Costs: $600.00.

PEOPLE v HARMONY YOUNG, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/04/2010, 19th Circuit Court-Benzie County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $30,637.00; Court Costs: $320.00.

PEOPLE v JEREMY AARON YOUNG, Dismissed as Restitution Made, 08/26/2009, 68th District Court-Genesee County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $18,964.89.

PEOPLE v ROBERT YOUNG, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/21/2010, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $27,806.00; Other Restitution - Amount: $600.00; Court Costs: $128.00.

PEOPLE v ROCKY ALLEN YOUNG, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/10/2009, 8th Circuit Court-Montcalm County, Child Support-Failing To Pay; Jail: 6 months; Jail Suspended: 6 months; Court Costs: $68.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v THOMAS MICHAEL YOUNG, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 05/18/2010, 49th Circuit Court-Osceola County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 60 days county jail; Court Costs: $511.00.

PEOPLE v CARL ANTHONY ZADLO, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 09/09/2010, 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $24,450.12; Court Costs: $1,048.50.

PEOPLE v GARY ZAHRT, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/08/2010, 27th Circuit Court-Newaygo County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 365 days county jail; Jail Suspended: 49 days; Probation: 2 years; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v LEROY ZAPATA, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/01/2009, 15th District Court-Washtenaw County, Child Support-Failing To Pay; Probation: 5 years; Restitution - Amount: $10,778.80; Court Costs: $3,582.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v ANDREW ZARSKE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 03/08/2010, 26th Circuit Court-Alpena County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Hab-3, Restitution - Amount: $1,000.00; Court Costs: $760.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v THOMAS ZIELKE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 02/12/2009, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Restitution - Amount: $10,172.42; Court Costs: $60.00; CVR Fee: $60.00.

PEOPLE v STEVEN ZINN, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 06/08/2009, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Jail: 18 months - 6 years; Jail Suspended: 2 days; Restitution - Amount: $31,161.64.

PEOPLE v ROBERT DWAYNE ZUKE, Verdict - Court - Convicted, 12/22/2009, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Child Support - Failing To Pay; Probation: 3 years; Restitution - Amount: $39,249.26; Court Costs: $1,260.00.

Corporate Oversight Division – Prosecutions 2009 - 2010

PEOPLE v ADVANCED MEDIATION SERVICES, 3 Cts Credit Services Act Violations; 75th District Court-Midland County, 08/30/2010, Plea Agreement, Court Costs: $53.00; Supervision Fee: $100.00; Fines: $600.00; Other Costs: $50.00.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH JOHN CARR, 1 Ct False Pretenses - $1,000.00 Or More But Less Than $20,000.00; 1 Ct Charitable Contributions - No license Application; 1 Ct Charitable Contributions - Professional Fundraiser/Solicitors - No License; 30th Circuit Court-Ingham County, 10/06/2010, Verdict - Jury - Convicted, Restitution - Amount: $12,000.00; Court Costs: $500.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $600.00; Other Costs: $164.00.

PEOPLE v JAMES KLEIN, 3 Cts Credit Services Act Violations; 75th District Court-Midland County, 08/30/2010, Plea Agreement, Other Restitution - Amount: $5,700.00; Court Costs: $53.00; Fines: $600.00; Other Costs: $50.00.

PEOPLE v MICHIGAN ECONOMIC REINSTATEMENT PROGRAM, 4 Cts Credit Services Act Violations; 16th District Court-Wayne County, 03/26/2010, Plea Agreement, Probation: 1 year probation concurrent with Mark Aloe; Court Costs: $300.00; Fines: $150.00; Other Costs: $48.00.

PEOPLE v PAYMENT DOCTORS, 4 Cts Credit Services Act Violations; 48th District Court-Oakland County, 02/23/2010, Plea Agreement, CVR Fee: $50.00; Supervision Fee: $180.00; Fines: $647.00; Other Costs: $53.00.

PEOPLE v SAVE MY HOME USA, 4 Cts Credit Services Act Violations; 43rd District Court-Ferndale Division, 05/06/2010, Plea Agreement, Other Restitution - Amount: $1,600.00; Court Costs: $1,000.00; Fines: $1,000.00.

Criminal Division – Prosecutions 2009-2010

PEOPLE v BELAL KHALIL ABDALLAH, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/06/2010. Defendant ordered to pay $100 fines and $100 court costs.

PEOPLE v BILL ABDALLAH, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/01/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months probation with no contact with casino, $150 fines and $100 costs.

PEOPLE v HUSSEIN ABDALLAH, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/01/2010. Defendant received a 1 year delayed sentence with $200 in court costs, and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v SALIH ABDALLAH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v MAJEED ABDULLAH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/17/2009. Sentenced to 2 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $330, CVF $50, state minimum costs $53, supervision fee $240 and restitution in the amount of $9,528.

PEOPLE v SAEED ABDULLAH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/19/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $7,914.

PEOPLE v EDDI ABOONA, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 48 counts False Pretenses greater than $999 and less than $20,000, and 48 counts BC-Return Nonreturnables-100 to 10,000, 46th District Court-Oakland County. Pursuant to a Plea Agreement on 6/10/09, Defendant pled guilty to corporate felony and was ordered to pay $100,000 in restitution.

PEOPLE v ABRAHAM FUEL GROUP, INC., charged with 14 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 6 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 2 counts Food Stamps-Fraud, $250 or Less, 7 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, and 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/06/2009. Pled guilty to 1 count - CEC. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $97,679 to State of Michigan.

PEOPLE v GERROD ABRAM (GTC 75-08), charged with 1 count Credit Card Fraud, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months probation and restitution in the amount of $9,000.

PEOPLE v GERROD ABRAM (MCC 78-08), charged with 1 count Credit Card Fraud, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/26/2010. Defendant

was sentenced to 18 months probation and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $9,000.

PEOPLE v LAURECE DELCONTEE ABRAHAM, charged with 14 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 6 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 2 counts Food Stamps-Fraud, $250 or Less, 7 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, and 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/09/2009. Pled to Misdemeanor Food Stamp Fraud, sentenced to 1 year probation, and ordered to pay $10,000 in restitution to the State of Michigan.

PEOPLE v VICTOR ABRAHAM, charged with 2 counts Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 1 count Food Stamps - Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 1 count Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court- Wayne County. On 11/13/2009, Defendant pled Nolo Contendere to Food Stamps - Fraud Over $1,000. Defendant Sentenced to 5 years Probation.

PEOPLE v SUAD ABUSALAH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Court on 09/23/2010.

PEOPLE v JASON ADAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v LASHAUN ADAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,571.

PEOPLE v MARCELLA REGINA ADAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 4/14/09. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation and ordered to pay $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 state costs, $600 supervision fee, $60 CVF, and restitution in the amount of $64,208.

PEOPLE v STEPHANI M. ADAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation and ordered to pay $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $600 supervision fee, $60 CVF, $60 state costs, and restitution in the amount of $27,309.

PEOPLE v TIMIKA LYNN ADAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $64,720.

PEOPLE v DAVID CECIL ADKINS, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

08/13/2010. Defendant sentenced to pay $150 court costs, $100 fines, and $100 in other costs.

PEOPLE v JEANETTE ADKINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion and restitution in amount of $786.

PEOPLE v MOHAMMAD ADOURE, charged with 2 Counts Tobacco Product Tax Act Violation, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/14/2010. Defendant sentenced to 1 year probation with the following fees: $2,500 restitution, $68 state costs, $60 CVF, $275 court costs, $250 supervision fee.

PEOPLE v ZUBIR AEZAH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v GRETCHEL AGEE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, and ordered to pay $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $600 supervision fee, $60 CVF, $60 state costs, and $17,970 restitution.

PEOPLE v NASSER MOHAMED-HAIDAR AHMAD, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation-Felony, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Plaintiff on 01/09/2009.

PEOPLE v SHOPNA AHMED, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,449.

PEOPLE v MIRVES AHMIC, charged with 1 count Malicious Destruction of Personal Property - Greater than $200 but Less Than $1,000, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/01/2010. Defendant was ordered to pay $750 restitution, $300 fines, and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v TAMMIE AIKEN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $5,381.

PEOPLE v STEPHANE AJAMI, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation.-Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/11/2009. Defendant sentenced to 6 months probation, and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $8,000.

PEOPLE v MOHAMMAD HASSAN AJROUCHE, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation-Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/07/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year non-reporting probation, and ordered to pay $60 state fee, $60 CVF, $600 court costs, and $7,718 in restitution to be paid to the Michigan Department of Treasury.

PEOPLE v AJ'S MARATHON, INC, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 4 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 4 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000 and 4 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 08/24/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Count 1 - CEC. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years Probation, and restitution in the amount of $13,370.

PEOPLE v MALIKAH AKBAR, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $600 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $10,416.

PEOPLE v KAMAL AKRAWE, charged with 1 Count of Misdemeanor Gambling-Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/11/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 12 months probation, 80 hours Community Service, $100 court costs, and $100 in fines.

PEOPLE v KHALED AL-BONIJIM, charged with 5 counts of Criminal Enterprise-Conducting, 8 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 5 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000 and 4 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/18/08. Pled guilty to Financial Transaction Device, and sentenced to 2 years probation, court costs, CVF, and restitution.

PEOPLE v FOIAD AL-DHEFERY, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, no contact with the casinos, and screening/treatment for gambling addiction. Defendant was ordered to pay $125 attorney fees, $400 fines, $200 costs, $120 supervision fee.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM LEONARD ALDRED, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 23rd District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/24/2010. Defendant ordered to pay $500 fines/costs.

PEOPLE v LEE WELLINGTON ALDRICH, Charged with 8 counts Using the Internet to Communicate with Another to Distribute To Commit a Crime-Attempting to Distribute Child Sexually Abusive Material, 1 count Using the Internet to Communicate With Another to Commit a Crime-Attempting to Commit Accosting and Soliciting, and 1 count Using the Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit a crime-Attempting to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Matter to a Minor, 30th Circuit Court-Ingham County. Plea Agreement on 08/14/2008. Defendant pled no contest to 1 count of Using the Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit a Crime-Attempting to Commit Accosting and Soliciting, 8 counts Using the Internet to Communicate with Another to Distribute To Commit a Crime-Attempting to Distribute Child Sexually Abusive Material, and the remaining count was dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to 36 - 120 months prison time, $540 state costs, $500 attorney fees, $500 court costs and $60 Crime Victim Rights Fund. On 04/29/09, Defendant was re-sentenced to 23 months to 20 years incarceration and mandatory sex offender registration.

PEOPLE v JACINTA ALEXANDER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,515.

PEOPLE v KAREN ALEXANDER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/06/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,004.

PEOPLE v LOUISE ALEXANDER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $580.

PEOPLE v SHAKER ALFARAJALL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v JOAN ALFRED, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person-Trespass- Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/09/2010. Defendant ordered to pay $100 fines, $100 court costs, and $100 attorney fees - with 6 months to pay.

PEOPLE v GAMAL ALGAHIM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,051.

PEOPLE v MOHAMED GAMIL-ISMAIL AL-GAZALI, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 20 counts Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 8 counts Food Stamps - Fraud Over $1,000, and 8 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/18/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Financial Transaction Device and sentenced to 1 year probation.

PEOPLE v SAIF ALGHATHIE, charged with 4 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 6 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner and 2 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/13/08. Defendant pled guilty to 1 count Conspiracy, and sentenced to 5 years probation and ordered to pay restitution.

PEOPLE v FADI AL-GHAZALI, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 2 counts Food Stamp Fraud - Over $1,000, 2 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 2 counts Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/22/2010. Defendant pled to lesser count of Food Stamp Fraud, and was sentenced to 2 years probation and $15,000 forfeiture.

PEOPLE v HALIL FUAD AL-HADAI, charged with 8 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 20 counts Conspiracy-Legal

Act in Illegal Manner, and 8 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 1/28/09. Defendant pled guilty to Financial Transaction and sentenced to 1 year probation.

PEOPLE v HAGER ALHALEMI, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,271.

PEOPLE v AHMED MOHAMMED ALHALMI, charged with 8 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 20 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, and 8 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 1/27/09. Defendant led guilty to Food Stamp Fraud - Greater than $250, but Less than $1,000, and sentenced to 5 years probation.

PEOPLE v HAYDAR AL-HAYDARI, charged with 2 counts Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation-Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Pursuant to a Plea Agreement on 11/26/2009, Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation and ordered to pay restitution at the rate of $300 a month ($300 x 12 = $3,600), and an agreed upon payment plan with the Treasury Department beyond the 1 year probation.

PEOPLE v MOHAMMED ALI, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,322.

PEOPLE v MOHAMMED ALI, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,247.

PEOPLE v SAIFUL ALI, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2009. Defendant placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,435.

PEOPLE v ABDUL FATTAH-MOHOMOOD ALKAHIF, charged with 7 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 10 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, and 6 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 9/25/08. Defendant pled guilty to Financial Transaction Device and sentenced to 4 years probation.

PEOPLE v BRIAN ALLEN, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/09/2010. Defendant ordered to pay $100 fines, $100 court costs, $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v COLIN ALLEN, charged with 1 count Financial Transaction Device - Possession, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/22/2010. Defendant sentenced to 1 year probation and ordered to pay restitution to casino in the amount of $3,000.

PEOPLE v EVELYN ALLEN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,155.

PEOPLE v GEORGE ALLEN, charged with 1 count of Child Sexually Abusive Activity, 1 count of Computers Internet Communicating with Another to Commit Crime, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County. Plea Agreement on 10/21/2010. Per plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to 2 counts of soliciting a minor for immoral purposes - no sentence agreement. Defendant sentenced to credit for time served (14 months) and also received 5 years probation, fines and costs, and must register under the Sex Offender Registry Act.

PEOPLE v MATTHEW JOSEPH ALLEN, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/13/2009. Defendant pled guilty as charged and was sentenced to 6 months delayed sentenced, and ordered to pay fines and costs in the amount of $285.

PEOPLE v RAQUEISHA ALLEN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/07/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $825 costs, $600 supervision fee, $250 attorney fee, $68 state minimum cost, $60 CVF, and restitution in the amount of $25,004.

PEOPLE v RONECIA ALLEN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/05/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $600 supervision fee, and $24,548 restitution.

PEOPLE v SHAHARA ALLEN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/31/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $893 court costs, $600 supervision fees, $250 attorney fees, $60 CVF, and $33,655 restitution.

PEOPLE v TAMIKA ALLEN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and $1,039 restitution.

PEOPLE v CHARLOTTE ALLISON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Court on 12/28/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v NANCY ALM, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/11/2010. Defendant's sentencing was delayed for 1 year. The court also set $100 costs and $100 fees.

PEOPLE v TERRI ALMORE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,002.

PEOPLE v FATEH AL-MORISI, charged with Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 30th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/11/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $500 fine, $50 state costs, $45 CVF, $600 court costs, and $2,500 restitution.

PEOPLE v MOHAMMED ABDERAHMAN AL-MUHI, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities-Misdemeanor Violation, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/04/2009. Defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to 40 hours of community service, $200 fines, and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v MUSTAFA MOHAMED-AHMED ALQOHAIF, charged with 7 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 12 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, and 6 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 6/27/08. Defendant pled guilty to Financial Transaction Device and was sentenced to 1 year probation.

PEOPLE v YOUSEF MOHAMED-AHMED ALQOHAIF, charged with 7 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 12 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, and 6 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/04/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Financial Transaction Device and was sentenced to 90 days probation.

PEOPLE v DHEYAB M. ALQUHAIF, charged with 7 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 12 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner and 6 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 9/26/08. Defendant pled guilty to Financial Transaction Device and was sentenced to 4 years probation.

PEOPLE v MOHAMED AL-QURAISHI, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,051.

PEOPLE v ABED-ALLEH MOHAMMAD ALRFIFEH, charged with 4 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 8 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, and 4 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/26/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Food Stamp Fraud, and was sentenced to 3 years probation and restitution in the amount of $10,000 to be paid to the State of Michigan.

PEOPLE v ABRAHAM MOHAMMAD ALRFIFEH, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 8 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, and 4 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 4 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 7/9/09. Defendant pled guilty to Food Stamp Fraud over $1,000 and was sentenced to 5 years probation.

PEOPLE v MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM ALRFIFEH, charged with 4 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 8 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, and 4 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/03/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Food Stamp Fraud, and was sentenced to 5 years probation and restitution in the amount of $10,000 to be paid to the State of Michigan.

PEOPLE v RAMZY JAMIL AL-SAEEGH, charged with 1 count Tobacco Product Tax Act Violation - Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/24/2010. Defendant sentenced to pay $300 fines, $200 costs, and $398 in taxes owed.

PEOPLE v RADHI S. AL-SAEDI, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation- Felony, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 08/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, and ordered to pay $20,000 restitution, $53 state costs, $50 CVF, $240 supervision fee, and $240 Court costs.

PEOPLE v MAZEN J. AL-SAIEGH, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/14/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, no contact with the casinos or criminal justice system, and to submit to screening for gambling addiction by the Department of Community Health - with treatment as indicated after the screening. Defendant was also ordered to pay $100 fines and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v RAMI ALSHALABI, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/03/2010. Defendant pled guilty, in return for a 6-month delayed sentence, and was ordered to pay $200 in court costs.

PEOPLE v DENISE ALSTON, charged 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/20/2009. Defendant pled guilty, was sentenced to 5 years probation, and ordered to pay $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $600 supervision fee, $60 CVF, $60 state costs, and $65,944 restitution.

PEOPLE v ALEXIS ALVARENGA, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v ALI AL-ZAMZAMI, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v IBRAHIM ALI AMMAR, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/10/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with the casinos or criminal justice system, and was ordered to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health - with treatment as indicated after the screening. Defendant was ordered to pay $200 fines, and $68 costs.

PEOPLE v DWIGHT ANDERSON, charged with 1 count of Malicious Destruction of Private Property- Less Than $200, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Agreement made on 10/28/2010. Defendant paid $100 in restitution and the case was dismissed.

PEOPLE v LATONDRA ANNETTE ANDERSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Pursuant to a Plea Agreement on 10/30/2009, Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $600 supervision fee and $15,294 restitution.

PEOPLE v LAURIE ANDERSON, charged 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $720 costs, $495 fees, and restitution in the amount of $6,215.

PEOPLE v LINDA ANDERSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,520.

PEOPLE v RAYMOND ANDERSON, charged with 1 count Larceny in a Building, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/13/2010. Pled to Larceny, less than $200. Defendant was sentenced to 21 days jail and 5 days community service.

PEOPLE v ROBIN EARL ANDERSON, charged with 3 counts Forgery, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 04/14/2009. Defendant pled guilty to count 1, with counts 2, 3, and habitual notice being dismissed. Defendant sentenced 1 to 14 years imprisonment.

PEOPLE v IQRECIA ANDREWS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $570.

PEOPLE v LENEISHA ANDREWS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $862.

PEOPLE v NABEEL IBRAHIM ANSARA, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/07/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, no contact with the casinos or criminal justice system, and ordered to undergo screening for gambling addiction by the MI Department of Community Health - with treatment as indicated after the screening. Defendant ordered to pay $500 fines/costs, and $160 seized from Defendant was turned over to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v CHANEL ANTHONY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Court on 11/05/2010. Case referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v AUDBERTO CESAR ANTONINI, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity and 1 count of Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Commit a Crime-maximum 15 years to life, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/26/2009. Defendant sentenced to 1 to 20 years with credit for 167 days, $60 CVF, $60 state costs, $600 court costs, $803 reimbursement to prosecution for witness travel, and Defendant is required to register as a sex offender.

PEOPLE v GHEITH ANTOO, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities-Misdemeanor Violation, 1 count Alcohol-Purchase/Consume/Possess by Minor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/27/2010. Per plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to count 1 (underage gambling), count 2 (MIP) was dismissed. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 6 months. Ordered to pay $200 fines, $200 court costs.

PEOPLE v NITHAL AOUN, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant received 3-month delayed sentence with $200 in court costs.

PEOPLE v SHANELLE APPLING, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,199.

PEOPLE v RUDOLPH ARMOUR, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $695.

PEOPLE v DEIDRE ARMSTRONG, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/20/2010. Defendant was placed on 3 years diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,554.

PEOPLE v TANISHA ARMSTRONG, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/11/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $50 CVF, $175 court costs, $250 attorney fees, $53 costs, and restitution in the amount of $8,650.69.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY LOREN ARTHUR, charged with 2 counts Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Accost and Solicit a Minor for Immoral Purposes and 1 count Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors, 35th Circuit Court-Shiawassee County. Plea Agreement on 09/19/2009. Defendant sentenced to 6 months jail, 60 months probation, and 75 hours of community service. Defendant is ordered to pay $1,600 court costs, $60 CVF, $600 supervision fee, $120 in other costs.

PEOPLE v DANYAI ASAKA-CARPENTER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v TOI ASBERRY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 6/15/2010.

Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,560.

PEOPLE v SHALONA ASKEW, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Pursuant to a Plea Agreement on 10/22/2009, Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $600 supervision fee, and $12,323 restitution.

PEOPLE v LARRY ASPY, charged 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Communication Activity and 1 count Computers - Internet Communicating with Another to Commit Crime, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Defendant convicted by jury. On 9/28/09, Defendant was sentenced to 30 months to 20 years, ordered to register as sex offender, and ordered to pay $60 CVF, $68 state costs, and $2,072.37 in restitution for witness costs payable to the Department of Attorney General.

PEOPLE v FATHI ASSAEDI, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, eighteen counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 15 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, and 15 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 05/28/2009.

PEOPLE v RITA ASSAF, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $989.

PEOPLE v MOSTAFA FAWZI ASSI, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities-Misdemeanor Violation and 1 count Alcohol-Purchase/Consumption/Possession by a Minor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement reached on 01/27/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Gambling Activities, with the charge of Alcohol Purchase/Consumption/Possession by a Minor being dismissed. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, and he was ordered to have no contact with the casinos and criminal justice system, subject himself to screening for gambling addiction by the MI Department of Community Health, substance (alcohol) abuse evaluation - with treatment as necessary after the screening/evaluation. Defendant ordered to pay $100 fines, $100 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v JIM ATTY, charged with 1 count of Tobacco Product Tax Act Violation, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/03/2010.

PEOPLE v JACQUELINE AVINGER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,898.

PEOPLE v MOUNIR AWAD, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 4 Counts Conspiracy- Legal Act in Illegal Matter, 4 Counts Food Stamps- Fraud Over $1,000, 3 Counts Financial Transaction Device- Forgery, Alter, Counter, and 4 Counts Financial Transaction Device- Furnish Goods Or Services, 68th District Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 04/19/2010. Defendant

pled to misdemeanor Food Stamp Fraud, forfeited $80,000, and sentenced to 2 years probation.

PEOPLE v NAHLA AWALA, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities-Felony Violations and 1 count False Pretenses more than $199 but less than $1,000, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/03/2009. Defendant pled guilty false pretenses and the felony charge was dismissed. Defendant was immediately sentenced to 1 year probation, no contact with casinos, $50 CVF, $35/month supervision fee, $100 fines, $100 costs, and $350 restitution to MCC.

PEOPLE v JULIAN AZZAR, charged with 2 counts Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation-Felony, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 12/17/2009. Defendant pled to Attempt TPTA felony, and was sentenced to 1 year probation and ordered to pay $14,000 restitution, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, $250 court costs.

PEOPLE v ABDULMAJED DAHAAN BADANI, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation-Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/02/2009. Defendant pled to TPTA Misdemeanor. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation with restitution in the amount of $2,213 to be paid over the period of probation.

PEOPLE v TAREK MOSHEN BADERDDINE, charged with 4 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 6 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner and 2 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 7/30/08. Defendant pled guilty to 1 count unlawful use of Financial Transaction Device and was sentenced to 2 years probation.

PEOPLE v KAMEL BADRO, charged with 1 count Malicious Destruction of Personal Property $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/01/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Malicious Destruction of Property-Misdemeanor, and was sentenced to 6 months probation, $875 restitution, and $150 fine.

PEOPLE v TAMEIKA BAILEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,134

PEOPLE v ALLENE BAITY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v HOPE BAKER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/21/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CFV $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $22,180.

PEOPLE v KERVIN BAKER, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

11/30/2010. Defendant received a 6-month delayed sentence with a court imposed fine of $100, $100 court costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v MARGARET BAKER, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 67-2B District Court-Burton Div Genesee County. Defendant pled guilty as charged on 10/15/09 after agreeing to cooperate and testify against bar owner. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Case dismissed by court on 10/07/2010.

PEOPLE v MONIQUE BAKER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $894.

PEOPLE v MAGGIE BALL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v WILLIE BALLARD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,274.

PEOPLE v KHODER BALLOUT, charged with 1 Count Disorderly Person-Loitering, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/30/2010. Defendant received 12-month delayed sentence with $100 in court costs and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v ANETTE BANKS, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, and ordered to pay $100 costs and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v JASMINE BANKS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $940.

PEOPLE v OPAL BANKS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/24/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $33,671.

PEOPLE v JANICE VIOLA BARAKA, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/27/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, and ordered to have no contact with the casinos or criminal justice system. Defendant is ordered to undergo screening for gambling addiction by the MI Department of Community Health - with treatment if necessary after the screening. Defendant ordered to pay $100 fines, $100 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v ROBERT MICHAEL BARACH, charged with 2 counts Uttering & Publishing and 2 counts Air Pollution Control-FLS. Statements and Omissions, 37th District Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Count 2- Misdemeanor, and was sentenced to 2 years probation and a fine of $10,000.

PEOPLE v EDDIE BARASH, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 34 counts False Pretenses greater than $999 and less than $20,000, and 20 counts BC-Return Nonreturnables-100 to 10,000, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Corporate Felony and was ordered to pay $145,000 in restitution.

PEOPLE v TERESSA BARBER, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 68th District Court-Genesee. Case dismissed by court on 11/18/2010.

PEOPLE v JERRY BARNES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/19/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $495 court costs, $60 CFV, $68 state costs, $300 supervision fee and $6,262 restitution.

PEOPLE v KRYSTAL T. BARNES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v TODD CHANNING BARNES, charged with 1 count Financial Transaction Device - Possession and 1 count False Pretenses, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/02/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 6 months in the Wayne County Jail, credit for 48 days served.

PEOPLE v CARMEN BARROW, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $4,169.

PEOPLE v JEFFREY BARRY, charged with 5 Counts False Pretenses- $20,000 or more, 29th Circuit Court-Clinton County. Plea Agreement on 06/10/2010. Defendant pled guilty to 1 count False Pretenses and was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $10,000, $50 special cost, $68 state minimum costs, $60 CVF, $1,200 court costs, and $1,000 fines/Library Fund.

PEOPLE v EDWARD BARTOLOMEI, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations-Felony Violations, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2009. Defendant sentenced to 1 year probation, and order to pay court costs $68, Supervision fee $110, fines $150, restitution to the Michigan State Police in the amount of $168.

PEOPLE v JACQUELINE BARTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v ANITA DENAI BASKIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

12/15/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, and ordered to pay attorney fees $250, court costs $495, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $360 and restitution in the amount of $8,095.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL BASTIANELLI, charged with 1 Count Uttering & Publishing, 1 Count Election Law- Recall Petition- False Statement, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/10/2010., Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation and 15 days of Alternative Work Force Program.

PEOPLE v PAUL BATTISTE, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations- Felony Violations, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 04/27/2010. Defendant was ordered to pay $200 fines, $250 costs, $60 CVF, and $68 state fee.

PEOPLE v ALLI RAFIC BAYDOUN, charged with 1 count Gamble Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/01/2009. Defendant pled as charged and ordered to pay $500 fine, $200 court costs, 3x $100 attorney fees, and the $700 confiscated was donated to the addicted gambler's fund.

PEOPLE v FARID BAZZI, charged with 1 count TPTA-Unauthorized Tax Stamps and 2 counts Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation-Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/11/2009. Defendant pled to Unauthorized Tax Stamps, and the other counts were dismissed. Defendant sentenced to 2 years probation, 1 year jail, and restitution in the amount of $15,000 to be paid to the State of Michigan.

PEOPLE v MOHAMED ALI BAZZI, charged with 1 count Assault/Resisting/Obstructing a Police Officer and 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2009. Defendant pled guilty to count 2, Disassociated Person, and was sentenced to 21 days jail.

PEOPLE v MOHAMED BAZZI, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Plaintiff on 11/10/2010.

PEOPLE v TAREK BAZZI, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities Violations - Bet Capping- Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/23/2010. Defendant pled guilty to False Pretenses- misdemeanor, and was sentenced to 6 months probation.

PEOPLE v DEDRIC BEAM, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities- Misdemeanor Violation, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/24/2010. Defendant sentenced to 1 year Holmes Youthful Trainee Act probation, and ordered to pay $100 in costs and $100 in fees.

PEOPLE v REBECCA BEARD, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/29/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant was ordered to pay $100 costs, $100 attorney fees and $1,450 in winnings to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v ELAINA BEASLEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/09/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $495, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $360 and restitution in the amount of $7,324.

PEOPLE v CRYSTAL BECKER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,438.

PEOPLE v KIJAUN BECKLEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v DEANNA BEDELL-JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v TAMMY BEECHAM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,374.

PEOPLE v ARFUL BEGUM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/23/2010.

PEOPLE v HENRY BELCHER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v ALEX BELL, charged with 1 count Felony Gambling Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/28/2010. Defendant pled to Attempted Cheating and was sentenced to 1 year probation.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY BELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v CHARLES BELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v CONNIE BELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,906.40.

PEOPLE v DEVON BELL, charged with 2 counts Homicide-Murder 1st Degree-Premeditated, 9 counts Assault with Intent to Murder, 2 counts Weapons-Felony

Firearm, and 1 count Open Murder-Statutory Short Form, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Convicted by jury on 11/24/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 25 - 40 years on Second Degree Murder and 2 years on Felony firearm. Defendant ordered to pay state minimum charges $136, court costs $600, and CVF $60.

PEOPLE v SANTINA A. BELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fee $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CFR $60, state fee $60, and restitution in the amount of $21,732.

PEOPLE v SHAUETTA MICHAELLE BELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/16/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $28,728.

PEOPLE v YOLANDA BELL, charged with 1 count Larceny- Less Than $200, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/22/2010. Defendant was given a delayed sentence of 6 months and ordered to pay $100 fine, $100 restitution, $100 court costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE BELTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/29/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $825 fees, attorney fees $250, state costs $60, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $21,223.

PEOPLE v MARYVETTE BELTRAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Plaintiff on 03/26/2009.

PEOPLE v RHONDA BENDER, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing- Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/23/2010., Defendant received 12-month delayed sentence and was ordered to pay $100 in court costs and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v WALEED BENIMEEN, charged with Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation- Felony, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 10/07/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months probation and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $5,000.

PEOPLE v CHARNITA BENNETT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,264.

PEOPLE v MAIA BENNETT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/09/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $10,948.

PEOPLE v RUSSELL LEE BENNETT, charged with 1 count Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors, 2 counts Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Accost and Solicit a Minor for Immoral Purposes, 1 count Computers - Internet Communicating with Another to Commit Crime, 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Communication Activity, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/03/2010. Defendant pled guilty to counts 1 and 5. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months in jail and was required to register under Sex Offender Registry Act for 25 years.

PEOPLE v NATISHA BENSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v ANDREA BENTLEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,978.

PEOPLE v SHATONYA BENTLEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,091.

PEOPLE v ZEF BERISHAJ, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/09/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 6 months probation, have no contact with casinos or criminal justice system, submit to screening for gambling addiction - with treatment for gambling addiction if necessary, pay $100 fines, $100 costs, $100 attorney fees, and perform 8 hours of community service.

PEOPLE v JESUS BERMUDEZ, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v MOHAMAD BERRO, charged with 5 counts of Criminal Enterprise-Conducting, 8 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 5 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000 and 4 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 9/19/08. Defendant pled guilty to Financial Transaction Device and sentencing to 5 years probation.

PEOPLE v SAMUEL BERRO, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/14/2009. Defendant paid $1,500 taxes and was sentenced to 6 months non-reporting probation, $60 state costs, $45 CVF and $1,000 court cost.

PEOPLE v ALISA CAROL BERRY-BROWN, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/02/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant is to pay $100 fines, $100 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v YASHAKI BERRY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,723.

PEOPLE v CRYSTAL BERT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v CRYSTAL BERT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/16/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $60 CVF rights fee, $68 state costs $360 supervision fee, $495 court costs, $7,027 restitution and 150 hrs community service. Defendant may perform an additional 150 hours community service in lieu of costs/fines.

PEOPLE v MARICELA BETANZOS-RUIZ, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $915.

PEOPLE v MOHAMED ALI BEYDOUN, charged with 3 counts False Pretenses-$20,000 or more and 3 counts Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 8/25/09. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, and ordered to pay $2000 restitution, $60 state costs, $60 CVR, $3,000 supervision fee, and $600 court costs.

PEOPLE v BIG AL'S MARATHON, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 3 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 3 counts Money Laundering-2nd Degree, 6 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, and 2 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods Or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/06/2009.

PEOPLE v JASON ROBERT BIGELOW, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Communication Activity and 1 count Using Computers-Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit a Crime, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 04/02/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Count 2 and was sentenced to 1 to 20 years, then ordered to pay $60 CVF, $60 state costs, $300 court costs, and sex offender registration.

PEOPLE v DONNA BIGHAM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,341.

PEOPLE v THEODIS BIRDEN, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation-Felony, 68th District Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 04/03/2009. Defendant pled to TPTA Misdemeanor and fined $403.

PEOPLE v PETER BIUNDO, charged with 2 counts False Pretenses-$20,000 or more and 1 count Criminal Enterprise - Conducting, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb

County. Plea Agreement on 04/22/2009. Defendant pled to misdemeanor False Pretenses and was sentenced to 1 year probation, $500 fine, and restitution in the amount of $5,486.75

PEOPLE v NICOLE BLACK, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,595.

PEOPLE v LISA BLACKLEDGE, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 67th District Court-Central Div Genesee County. Case dismissed by Plaintiff on 10/07/2010.

PEOPLE v RONALD BLAKE, charged with 1 Count of Child Sexually Abusive Activity, 2 Counts of Computers Internet Communicating with Another to Commit Crime, and 1 Count Child Sexually Abusive Material- Possession, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County. Plea Agreement on 02/09/2010. Defendant pled guilty to counts 2 and 4, and was sentenced to 22 months in prison, $68 state costs, $60 CVF, and sex offender registration.

PEOPLE v KIRKLAND BLAKELY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,444.

PEOPLE v VICTORY BLANCH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 Court costs, $60 CVF, $68 State Minimum costs, $600 supervision fee and restitution in the amount of $71,257.31.

PEOPLE v HARRIET BLAZNEK, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant received 12-month delayed sentence with $100 in court costs, and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v TONY BLOCKER, charged with Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2009. Placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,949.

PEOPLE v BOB AND RON'S PLACE, charged with 1 count Conducting Criminal Enterprises, 2 Counts Conspiracy, 1 count Food Stamp Fraud, and 1 count Financial Transaction Device, 36th District Court- Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation.

PEOPLE v OLA BOBO, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,842.

PEOPLE v BRANDI BOGAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010.

Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,756.

PEOPLE v WISAM BOLA, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/04/2010. Defendant's sentencing was delayed for 1 year. Defendant was ordered to pay $100 court costs and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v TODD ALAN BOLAND, charged with 4 counts Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Accost and Solicit a Minor for Immoral Purposes and 2 counts Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 03/5/2009. Defendant pled guilty plea to counts 1 and 2. Defendant sentenced to 5 months jail, 5 years probation, sex offender registration, and sex offender treatment while in jail.

PEOPLE v NIKIA BOLDEN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $495 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 State Minimum costs, $360 supervision fee, and $9,097 restitution.

PEOPLE v HENRY BOMBA, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,759.

PEOPLE v DANIELLE BONNER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v NORMA BONNER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,700.

PEOPLE v TRAHERN BONNER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 4/13/09. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, state costs $60, CVF $60, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $32,186.

PEOPLE v SELENA BOROM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v RICKQUELL BOWENS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $6,027.

PEOPLE v DAVID BOWERS, charged with 3 counts Utter & Publish Counterfeit Bill or Note, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/05/2009. Defendant pled guilty to count 1, and counts 2 and 3 were dismissed at sentencing.

Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, $68 state fee, $60 CVF, $240 supervision fee, $600 court costs, $400 attorney fees, alcohol screening, and to have no contact with casinos.

PEOPLE v JARRAD LAWRENCE BOX, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Communication Activity, 1 count Computers - Internet Communicating with Another to Commit Crime, and 1 count Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 12/17/2009. Defendant sentenced to 18 months to 20 years, $350 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, and ordered to register as sex offender.

PEOPLE v STEVEN BOYD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $994.

PEOPLE v TUNISIA BRANCH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,077.

PEOPLE v OPAL JEAN BRANDT, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations-Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/25/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 months probation, $100 court costs, $75 supervision fee, and must forfeit all confiscated funds.

PEOPLE v ANNETTE BRANTLEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $7,952.

PEOPLE v JEAN BRASWELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,309.

PEOPLE v JACQUETTA BRAXTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE BRAXTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/02/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $6,614.

PEOPLE v HUGH CARL BRAYTON III, charged with 2 counts Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Accost and Solicit a Minor for Immoral Purposes and Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors, 30th Circuit Court-Ingham County. Convicted by jury on 3/20/09. Defendant was found guilty on counts 3 and 4, and was sentenced to 6 months in the county jail, with 30 days to be served immediately and the remainder

of the sentence to be work release. Defendant was ordered to pay $500 state cost and $500 fees.

PEOPLE v BRADLEY BREAULT, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing and 1 count Habitual Offender-2nd Offense Notice, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/09/2009. Defendant pled no contest to Uttering & Publishing. In exchange for the plea, the habitual 2 notice was dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, $60 state costs, $60 CVF, $120 supervision fee, $165 court costs, $450 attorney fees, must obtain GED within 6 months, must undergo alcohol and drug screening.

PEOPLE v JACQUELINE BREEDEN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/19/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,356.

PEOPLE v MIRANDA BRESINSKI, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v DEETTA BRIGHT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/13/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $825 costs, supervision fee $600, attorney fees $250, state minimum costs $68, and CVF $60, restitution in the amount of $13,235.

PEOPLE v LATOYA BRISCOE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $555.

PEOPLE v KIMBERLY BROADEN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/06/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,483

PEOPLE v REGINA BROADNAX, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v LIDEYA BROCKS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $670.

PEOPLE v MARGARET BROOKINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v AARON BROOKS, JR., charged with 2 counts False Pretenses-$20,000 or more and 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 06/25/2009. Defendant sentenced was sentenced to 3 yrs

probation, $3,600 court costs, $3,600 supervision fee, $3,600 fine, $60 CVR, $68 State cost, and may not engage in or seek a license for any activities involving banking and real estate.

PEOPLE v AMANDA BROOKS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/14/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution to be determined by the Michigan Department of Human Services.

PEOPLE v JONATHAN BROOKS, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation- Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $200 court costs, $240 supervision fee, and serve 42 days in Wayne County Jail.

PEOPLE v TALISA BROOKS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/15/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $84,094.

PEOPLE v YOLANDA BROOKS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,988

PEOPLE v VERONICA BROOM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,522.

PEOPLE v ALFREDA BROWN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,671.

PEOPLE v CAROL BROWN-KING, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation and restitution in the amount of $1,426

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER BROWN, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/09/2010

PEOPLE v DANIELLE BROWN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,164.

PEOPLE v DELORES LEE BROWN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 5/12/09.

Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, CVF $60, state costs $60, supervision fee $600, court costs $825, and restitution in the amount of $44,232.

PEOPLE v DEMOND BROWN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v DESMOND BROWN, charged with 2 counts Embezzlement-Agent/Trustee greater than $199 and less than $1000, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with the casinos or criminal justice system, and is not to be employed or seek employment with the MGCB or MGM. Defendant is ordered to pay $380 restitution to MGM, $200 fines, and $68 costs.

PEOPLE v DESMOND BROWN, charged with 1 count Embezzlement-Agent or Trustee greater than $199 but less than $1,000, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court 09/21/2009.

PEOPLE v DURRIYYAH BROWN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $5,513.

PEOPLE v HATTIE BROWN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v KATHRYN BROWN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $2,643 restitution.

PEOPLE v MARNEDA BROWN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne Count. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $51,248.

PEOPLE v SHILIA BROWN, charged with 14 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 8 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 7 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, and 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 1/27/09. Defendant pled to Food Stamp Fraud - reduced charge misdemeanor. Defendant sentenced to 1 year probation, non-reporting.

PEOPLE v TAISHA BROWN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/21/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $45,492.

PEOPLE v TEANTE BROWN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,238.

PEOPLE v TOMIKA BROWN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $993.

PEOPLE v TONI BROWN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $926.

PEOPLE v YAHKISHA BROWN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $495 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 State Minimum costs, $360 supervision fee, and $5,677 restitution.

PEOPLE v MILINDA BRUNER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,585.

PEOPLE v OLIVER BRYAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $6,948 restitution.

PEOPLE v TRINA BRYAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,857.

PEOPLE v ERIC BRYANT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v SHARON BRYANT, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/01/2010. Defendant pled to added count False Pretenses less than $200 but greater than $1,000. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $50 CVF, $53 state costs, $120 supervision fees and to have no contact with casinos.

PEOPLE v TAMARA BUCHANAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $4,833.60.

PEOPLE v BOBBIE JOE BUCKLEY, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/31/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, no contact with casino, $68 State costs, $60 CVF, $1,224 Supervision fee, $600 Court costs, and $400 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v JENNIFER MARIE BUNYAK, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/21/2010. Defendant was sentenced to probation with $200 fines and $200 court costs.

PEOPLE v YARISSA BURGOS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v MILENA BURKETT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v TAMIKO BURKS-COLLINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/02/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $10,669.

PEOPLE v CHARLOTTE DARLENE BURLEY, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/21/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with the casinos or criminal justice system, and was ordered to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health - with treatment as indicated after the screening. Defendant ordered to pay $100 attorney fees, $100 court costs.

PEOPLE v TAMEKA LASHAUN BURNETT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/14/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $495, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $360 and restitution in the amount of $6,362.

PEOPLE v RAMOND QUINCY BURNLEY, charged with 1 count with Gambling-Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/28/2010. Defendant was sentenced to $200 fines and $200 court costs, no contact with criminal justice system or casinos.

PEOPLE v TARRIE BURNS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v ERIC BURSE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,420.

PEOPLE v ALBERTA DELORES BURTON, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/13/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed 1 year, and ordered to pay $100 fines and $100 court costs.

PEOPLE v ALWIN BURTON, charged with 1 count Malicious Destruction of Property, less than $200, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/24/2010. Defendant pled no contest and received a 6-month delayed sentence with $200 in costs and $100 in fees.

PEOPLE v NATALIE BURTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v CAROL BUSH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $25,467.

PEOPLE v TAMEIKA BUSH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v VERNEAL BUSH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,527.

PEOPLE v DEANA BUTLER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/29/2009. Defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to 3 years probation, $730 costs, $495 fees and restitution in the amount of $6,948.

PEOPLE v JACQUELINE BUTLER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v JACQUELINE BUTLER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/20/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,249.

PEOPLE v OKEMO CHARMONE BUTLER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/30/2009. The Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 State Minimum costs, $600 supervision fee and $88,232 restitution.

PEOPLE v SHEMIKA BUTLER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $844.

PEOPLE v RAAD BUTRIS, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant's sentencing was delayed for 1 year. The court also set $100 fine, $100 costs and $100 fees.

PEOPLE v KRISTINA BYNUM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,559.

PEOPLE v PRECIOUS BYRD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,018.

PEOPLE v ROBERT BYRD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,064.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE CADE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/11/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $50 CVF, $175 court costs, $250 attorney fees, $53 costs and restitution in the amount of $12,399.75.

PEOPLE v DEMETRIA CALDWELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/20/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fee $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $11,101.

PEOPLE v KEVIN CALDWELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,496.

PEOPLE v VAKEISHA CALLOWAY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/18/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $495 court costs, $60 CVF rights fee, $68 state costs, $360 supervision fee and $6,450 restitution.

PEOPLE v SYLVIA CALMESE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,207.

PEOPLE v CYNTHIA CAMPBELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,988.

PEOPLE v DEKEISHA RENE CAMPBELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/29/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation with attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $10,074.

PEOPLE v LATOYA CAMPBELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v PATRYCE CANN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/02/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $49,877.

PEOPLE v CHARLOTTE CANNON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/17/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fee $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $35,153.60.

PEOPLE v LATOYA CANNON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,006.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM CANNON, charged with 3 Counts Embezzlement - Agent or Trustee $20,000 or more but less than $50,000, 5 Counts Embezzlement - Agent or Trustee $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 12/02/2010. Defendant pled to 1 count Embezzlement over $1,000 but less than $20,000. Defendant received a sentence of 6 months in Macomb County Jail, 5 years probation and restitution in the amount of $74,061.79.

PEOPLE v SHERRY CAPANDA, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,547.

PEOPLE v RENITA CARMICHAEL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,415.

PEOPLE v CANDICE MAY CARSON, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations-Felony Violations, 26-2nd District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/16/2009. Preliminary exam was 4/16/09. Defendant pled no contest to the 1years

misdemeanor (750.302). Defendant sentenced to 1 year probation, $540 supervision fees, $1,000 fines.

PEOPLE v NYISHA CARTER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $619.

PEOPLE v MELANIE CHAMBERLIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,203.

PEOPLE v KEVIN CHAPMAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,183.

PEOPLE v ALI CHARARA, charged with 1 Count Misdemeanor Gambling-Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/12/2010. Defendant pled guilty to a lesser count of Disorderly Person Loitering, and was given 12 months delayed sentence with $200 court costs and $200 fines.

PEOPLE v KELLY CHARBONEAU, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,223.

PEOPLE v GEORGIA CHATMAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/25/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v JUNG JA CHO, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Defendant pled guilty as charged on 12/18/2009. Defendant assessed court costs $100, fines $100, and restitution in the amount of $100.

PEOPLE v JUNG JEANNETTE CHO, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/07/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed1 year. Defendant ordered to pay $100 fines and $100 court costs.

PEOPLE v SHAKILA RAFEE CHOATES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 4/13/09. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court fees, $60 CVF, $60 state costs, $600 supervision fee and restitution in the amount of $48,820.

PEOPLE v MELISSA CHRISTIE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v BARJAS SELMAN CHWICH, Charged with 2 counts Gambling Activities-Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/04/2009. Defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to 2 yrs probation, $400 attorney fees, $68 state costs, $60 CVF, $240 supervision fee, $600 court costs, $1,500 restitution, and 150 hours of community service in lieu of fines and costs.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY CICERONE, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/13/2010. Defendant pled no contest and received 6-month delayed sentence with $200 in court costs.

PEOPLE v DONNA CIOFFI, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,666.

PEOPLE v KRYSTAL CLARK, charged with 1 count Larceny in a Building, 1 count Larcey-$200 or more, and 1 count Larceny-$200 or more but less than $1,000, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Plaintiff on 1/8/2009.

PEOPLE v MICHELE CLARK, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v WENDY CLARK, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v FARREN CLAY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,523.

PEOPLE v PREDETTA CLEMONS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/25/2010. Case referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v STEVEN CLINE, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/03/2010. Defendant received 6-month delayed sentence with a court imposed fine of $100, $100 court costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v ANITA COATS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,510.

PEOPLE v ANDREW JOSEPH COFFEY, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/18/2009. Defendant ordered to pay $100 court costs, $100 fines, and $100 other costs (not specified).

PEOPLE v SHERRELLE COKER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $6,122.

PEOPLE v RANDY ODELL COLBRY, charged with 1 count Operating While Intoxicated and 1 count Failure to Stop-Property Damage Accident, 66th District Court-Shiawassee County. Defendant pled guilty on 8/13/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, 15 days in jail with credit for 15 days in-patient treatment, ordered to wear a SCRAM tether, ordered to pay $2,319 in total costs (including $270 restitution to AG for prosecutor reimbursement).

PEOPLE v EUGENE HOWARD COLE, SR., charged with 7 Counts Computer-Internet- Communicating with Another To Do Crime, 3 Counts Disseminating Sexually Explicit Matter To Minors, 39th Circuit Court-Lenawee County. Plea Agreement on 03/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 23 months - 120 months Prison for Count 4, 23 months - 120 months Prison on Count 9, and 23 months - 48 months on Count 10. Defendant was also ordered to pay $204 in state costs and $60 CVF, and to register as a sex offender.

PEOPLE v SERENA COLE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $6,206.

PEOPLE v BRIDGET COLEMAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v BRYNNE COLEMAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,760.

PEOPLE v GEORGETTA COLEMAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/25/2010. Case referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v LADONNA SHAREE COLEMAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/16/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $56,155.85.

PEOPLE v SHANDA COLEMAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation with attorney fee $250, CVF $60, state costs $60, Court costs $825, supervision fee $600, restitution in the amount of $33,925.

PEOPLE v CHAD WILLIAM COLEY, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities-Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/18/2010.

Defendant pled to misdemeanor False Pretenses greater than $200 but less than $1,000 and was sentenced to probation.

PEOPLE v JOYCE COLEY, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person-Trespassing- Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/19/2010. Defendant received 12-month delayed sentence, with $100 in court costs and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v JAMES EARL COLLUM, JR., charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing and 1 count No Account Check, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/25/2009. Defendant was sentenced to, 1 year probation and $250 a year costs.

PEOPLE v CHIVON CONNEILES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fee $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, restitution in the amount of $37,605.

PEOPLE v KIMBERLY CONNER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,929.

PEOPLE v CONSUMER OUTER DRIVE, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 8 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 4 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 4 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/06/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Criminal Enterprise - Conducting and was sentenced to 5 years probation.

PEOPLE v DEIRDRA COOKE-ELDER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v LATASHIA CORDER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,951.

PEOPLE v SHELLBY CORNELIOUS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $28,058.

PEOPLE v SABRINA COTTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v DJUNET COURTNEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

12/02/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF rights fee, $68 state costs, $600 supervision fee, and $86,245 in restitution.

PEOPLE v RONETTA COX, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,903.

PEOPLE v TIESHA COX, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fee $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $24,778.40.

PEOPLE v TONYA COX, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/16/2010. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $7,229.

PEOPLE v KRISTI CRAIG, charged with 2 Counts Embezzlement - Agent or Trustee $20,000 or more but less than $50,000, and 3 Counts Forgery, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 01/26/2010. Defendant pled guilty to counts 1 and 3 and was sentenced to 180 days county jail, 5 years probation, and restitution in the amount of $87, $964 attorney fee, $60 CVF, and $136 state costs.

PEOPLE v MONIQUE CRAIG, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,278.

PEOPLE v AKILAH CRAWFORD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/28/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v JAMESINA CRAWFORD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v MEKEBA CRENSHAW, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,946.

PEOPLE v JESSIE CROCHERON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 6/2/09. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, Court costs $825, attorney fee $250, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $31,000.

PEOPLE v TYRINA CROMER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010.

Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $832.

PEOPLE v YVONNE CROMER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,191.

PEOPLE v CHRISTINE CROOK, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,346.

PEOPLE v CHARLENE CROONE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $495 costs, $730 fees, and restitution in the amount of $8,778.

PEOPLE v KARA CROSS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v LATANYA CROSS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $948.

PEOPLE v STEVE CUNIGAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,600.

PEOPLE v BRANT CUNNINGHAM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v JESSICA CUNNINGHAM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,347.

PEOPLE v SHEKITA CURETON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/25/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v THOMAS CURETON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v CRESTA LYNN CURRIE, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 32-A District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/06/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, no drugs/alcohol, no violations, report

1x/week, no involvement with illegal gambling, Defendant to attending counseling until successful completion, $500 fines, $500 costs, and $360 supervision fee.

PEOPLE v DARNAY CURRY, charged with 4 counts Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Accost and Solicit a Minor for Immoral Purposes, 2 counts Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/09/2010. Defendant pled guilty to counts 1 & 6 and was sentenced to 12 months county jail, $60 state costs, $68 Crime Victim fee.

PEOPLE v SYLVIA JOYCE CUSHENBERRY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/16/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $55,682.

PEOPLE v JOHN DELEO CUSTER, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Communication Activity, 2 Counts Computer-Internet-Communication with Another To Do Crime, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County. Plea Agreement on 03/11/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 12 months County Jail, must register as sex offender, and pay CVF $60, and other Costs in the amount of $68.

PEOPLE v RICHARD CZARNOPYS, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 1 count Forgery, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. On 11/18/09, case was dismissed.

PEOPLE v DAVID ADEL DABISH, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/04/2010. Defendant was given 6 months delayed sentence and ordered to pay $200 and costs $200.

PEOPLE v TAHA DAHABRA, charged with 1 count Bet Capping, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/10/2010. Defendant pled guilty to Disorderly Person. He was sentenced to 6 months probation and must forfeit $980 in winnings.

PEOPLE v ALAA JARGIS DAKHOO, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation-Felony, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 06/10/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation-Misdemeanor, and was sentenced to time served, 3 years probation, $45,894 in restitution to be paid to the Michigan Department of Treasury, $68 state minimum costs, $60 CVF, $10 per month supervision fee ($10 x $360), $30 per month court costs ($30 x 36 = $1080). Count 1 was dismissed.

PEOPLE v MARK RONALD DALTON, charged with 1 count using the Internet to Communicate with Another to Produce Child Sexually Abusive Material, 1 count Using the Internet to Communicate with Another to Distribute Child Sexually Abusive Material, 8 counts Using the Internet to Communicate with Another to Accost Children for Immoral Purposes, and Habitual Offense-2nd Offense, 6th Circuit Court - Oakland County. Plea Agreement on 04/06/2009. Defendant pled guilty and the Habitual Offender-2ndOffense count is to be dismissed at sentencing. Defendant was Sentenced to: Count 1; 84 to 240 months (with credit for 481 days)

prison time; Count 2: 48 to 120 months prison time, $60 Crime Victims Rights Fund, $600 state costs, sex offender registration, and must have no computer/minor contact.

PEOPLE v SARKIS KEVORK DANAYAN, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/16/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1year delayed sentence, screening for gambling addiction, and treatment as indicated. Defendant ordered to also pay $100 fine, $200 court costs, $100 Attorney fee, and must have no contact with casinos.

PEOPLE v BRANDY DANGERFIELD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,084.

PEOPLE v MALKIA DANIEL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/02/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 4 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF' Rights Fee, $68 state costs, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $16,391.

PEOPLE v DAN'S QWICK STOP, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 2 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 2 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, and 2 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 10/29/09. Defendant pled guilty to Count 1, placed on 5 years probation, with no new law violation and EBT privileges revoked.

PEOPLE v NICOLE DARDEN, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/10/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $200 court costs, and $360 supervision fee.

PEOPLE v MARCUS DARRINGTON, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/29/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 32 days in Wayne County Jail without any other condition.

PEOPLE v MANIKANDAN DASARATHARAO, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Communication Activity and 1 count Using a Computer-Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit a Crime, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 3/5/2009. Defendant pled guilty count 1 and count 2 was dismissed at sentencing. Defendant was sentenced to 1 to 20 years, $60 state costs, $60 CVRF, $700 court costs and sex offender registration.

PEOPLE v JAMES DAUGHERTY, charged with 1 count Unauthorized Practice of Residential Building, 85th District Court-Benzie County. Plea Agreement on 12/02/2010. Defendant pled guilty to 1 count of Unlicensed Builder Activity, was ordered by the Judge to leave the trade and seek another profession, and sentenced to 2 years probation.

PEOPLE v ARIANNA DAVIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2009.

Defendant sentenced to 2 years probation, $330 costs, $585 fees, and restitution in the amount of $10,766.

PEOPLE v DEONNA DAVIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $2,378 restitution.

PEOPLE v DONNA DAVIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,279.

PEOPLE v FREDRICK E. DAVIS, 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Communication Activity and 1 count sing a Computer-Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit a Crime -Max 15-Life, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 03/05/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1-20 years MDOC (140 days credit), $60 CVF, $60 state cost, and ordered to undergo sex offender treatment.

PEOPLE v GLORIA DAVIS, charged with 1 Count Gambling- Disassociated Person-Trespass- Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/23/2010. Defendant received 12-month delayed sentence with $100 in court costs and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v KELLISHA DAVIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,924.

PEOPLE v KENYATTA DAVIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,175.

PEOPLE v MARK EDWARD DAVIS, charged with 1 count Larceny In a Building, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/29/2010. Defendant pled guilty to False Pretenses- Less than $200 and was sentence to 1 year probation.

PEOPLE v MAXINE DAVIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v MICADELA CHARICE DAVIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 Court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $44,798.56.

PEOPLE v NAKIA NANA DAVIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/31/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court

costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $65,386.

PEOPLE v SANDRA DAVIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,636.

PEOPLE v SHEILA RENEE DAVIS, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/20/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation. $68 state fee, $60 CVF Fee, $120 Supervision fee, $600 Court costs, $400 attorney fee.

PEOPLE v SIMEON DAVIS, charged with 2 counts Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/23/2009. Defendant pled to attempt Uttering & Publishing, and was sentenced to 1 year probation, $600 court costs, $400 Attorney fees, and $120 CVF.

PEOPLE v STACY DAVIS, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/21/2010. Defendant received 3-month delayed sentence with court imposed $100 fine, $100 in court costs, and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v TOASHA DAVIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $4,016.

PEOPLE v VERLEANER DAVIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,046.

PEOPLE v TAMEKA DAWKINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $754.

PEOPLE v BRANDON DAWSON, charged with 1 count Malicious Destruction of Private Property, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/13/2010. Defendant was given 6 month delayed sentence and ordered to pay court costs $200, fines $100, other costs $100, and restitution in the amount of $250.

PEOPLE v MARLIN DAY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v JOHN DEANGELIS, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations-Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 8/14/09. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $58 State costs, $60 CVF, $1,248 supervision fee, $600 Court costs, and no contact with gaming of any sort.

PEOPLE v TAMMY JO DECKER (MGM 132-07), charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement reached on 01/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to 1 year probation, fines, costs, and $1,000 restitution to MGM.

PEOPLE v ANTON DEDAJ, charged with 1 count Malicious Destruction of Private Property, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Plaintiff on 12/10/2010.

PEOPLE v MARJAN DEDVUKAJ, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities-Misdemeanor Violation, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/14/2009. Defendant pled guilty to underage gambling. His sentence was delayed for 6 months, and he was ordered to have no contact with the casinos or criminal justice system. Defendant was ordered to pay $150 fines/costs, and $205 seized from Defendant was forfeited.

PEOPLE v JEROME DEES, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/14/2009. Defendant pled guilty to trespass by a disassociated person. His sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with the criminal justice or casinos, and submit to screening for gambling addiction by the MI Dept of Community Health - with treatment as indicated after the screening. Defendant also ordered to pay $100 fines, $100 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v ROMERO LAMAR DEES, charged with 3 counts Check-Non-Sufficient Funds $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/27/2009. Defendant pled guilty to the reduced charge of NSF check less than $500, a 1 year misdemeanor. Counts 2 & 3 were dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year non-reporting probation, with no contact with casinos. Fines and costs waived due to Defendant's indigent status.

PEOPLE v HOLLY DEHEUS, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing- Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/23/2010. Defendant received 12-month delayed sentence, with $100 in court costs and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v EDMYNE DEHKO, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprise-Conducting, 1 Count Criminal Enterprise-Acquire/Maintain and 1 count Criminal Enterprises Racketeering Proceeds, 43rd District Court-Hazel Park Division. Case dismissed on 03/11/2009.

PEOPLE v DENNIS JAMES DELL'EVA, charged with 1 count Failure to report to Probation Agent as Ordered and 1 count Failure to Notify Agent of Change of Address or Employment Status, 49th Circuit Court-Osceola County. Defendant pled guilty to both counts on 5/01/09. Defendant was sentenced to 17 months to 15 years prison, with credit for 354 days, and ordered to pay $1,000 court costs. All of the Defendant's financial obligations to continue as conditions of parole.

PEOPLE v NIZAR BENNOUREDDINE DEMNI, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/14/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant

ordered to have no contact with the casinos or criminal justice system, submit to screening for gambling addiction by the MI Department of Community Health, and is ordered to pay $100 fines, $100 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE DEMSKE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,146.

PEOPLE v RICHARD DEMSKE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,146.

PEOPLE v FRANCHITA DENHAM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $4,489.

PEOPLE v SCOTT JOSEPH DEROUIN, charged with 2 Counts Computers - Internet - Communicating With Another To Commit Child Sexually Abusive Activity, 1 Count Computers - Internet - Communicating With Another to Commit Disseminating Sexually Explicit Matter to a Minor, and 1 Count Habitual Offender-Third Offense Notice, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 08/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 12 months probation, $3,000 in fines and costs, and was ordered to register under Sex Offenders Registry Act.

PEOPLE v ROBERT JAMALL DEWBERRY, charged with 1 count Underage Gambling and 1 count Obstructing Officer by Disguise, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Plaintiff on 02/12/2009.

PEOPLE v MAHER DIAB, charged with 4 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 6 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, and 3 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 8/6/08. Defendant pled guilty to Financial Transaction Device and sentenced to 2 years probation.

PEOPLE v FELICIA DIGGINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v PATRICIA FAYE DILLIHAY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/12/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $495 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $360 supervision fee and restitution in the amount of $7,261.

PEOPLE v MATTHEW DANIEL DINATALE, charged with 2 counts Production of Child Sexually Abusive Material, 1 count Using a Computer to Produce Child Sexually Abusive Material, 6 counts Possession of Child Sexually Abusive Material, and 1 count Using a Computer to Possess Child Sexually Abusive Material, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 7/22/08. Defendant pled guilty to

counts 4 - 10 and sentenced to 12 months jail, 5 years probation, no computer/internet except for work, no contact with minors unless supervised, $60 CVF, $420 state costs, $600 supervision fee, and $1,500 court costs.

PEOPLE v AMANOOL DISHO, charged with 1 count Malicious Destruction of Personal Property-$200 or more but less than $1000, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/14/2009. Defendant sentence was delayed for 1 year. During that year, he is to have no contact with MCC, no contact with the criminal justice system, attend 3 anger management classes, pay $300 restitution to MCC, $200 fines, $200 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v MARTHA DIXON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,950.

PEOPLE v SARAH DOBINE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $966.

PEOPLE v MYERS DONYEN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Plaintiff on 6/9/09.

PEOPLE v LAURA DOUGHAIM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $4,755.

PEOPLE v LAVONNE DOUGLAS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/06/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, with $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $4,463

PEOPLE v VANESSA DOWDELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,940.

PEOPLE v CAREY EUGENE DOWDY, Charged with 1 Count Felony Embezzlement Agent Or Trustee $1,000 or more But Less Than $20,000 and 1 Count Stolen Property - Receiving And Concealing - $1,000 or more But Less Than $20,000, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/25/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation.

PEOPLE v CHEVON DRUMMOND, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v WILL DUBOISE, charged with 1 count Sex Offenders-Fail to Comply, 14th Circuit Court - Muskegon County, 54-A District Court-Ingham County. Plea Agreement on 8/12/2009 in 54-A District Court. Defendant was sentenced in the

16th Circuit Court. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, incarceration of 10 months with credit for 91 days, $200 court costs, CVF fund $65, and state costs of $68.

PEOPLE v LUCINDA DUBOSE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $962.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER DUDLEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,689.

PEOPLE v NATASHA SISTRUNK DUFFEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/24/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $495, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $360 and restitution in the amount of $5,227.

PEOPLE v SHIRLETTA DUFFEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $8,037.

PEOPLE v EDWARD DUNLAP, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $805.

PEOPLE v ALVIN DUNN, charged with 1 count Malicious Destruction of Property, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/20/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $1,200 restitution and $250 supervision fee.

PEOPLE v TERRESA DUNN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v DEANGELO EADY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v SHEQUANINA EARLY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,440.

PEOPLE v GLORIA EASLEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,101.

PEOPLE v APRIL EASTERLING, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/16/2010., Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $33,249.

PEOPLE v JASON JAY EBELS, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity, 1 count Using Computer/Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit a Crime, and 1 count Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 05/26/2009. Defendant sentenced to 1-20 years prison, ordered to register as a sex offender, and to pay statutory costs and fines.

PEOPLE v REBECCA ECIE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,172.

PEOPLE v ROBERT EDDINS, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/09/2010. Defendant received 1 year delayed sentence with $100 fine, $100 court costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v RENITA PATRICE EDMONDS, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/09/2009. Defendant pled as charged and was sentenced to 3 months delayed sentence, gambling screening and treatment as indicated, ordered to have no contact with casinos, and to pay $150 fine, and $68 court costs

PEOPLE v TODD BARRETT EILAND, charged with 1 count Retail Fraud-First Degree and 1 count Larceny-$1000 or More But Less Than $20000, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/05/2009. Defendant sentenced to 2 years probation, 139 days jail credit, $1,304 restitution, $68 CVF, $60 state costs, $240 supervision, and $400 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v DOUGLAS ELKINS, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/25/2010. Defendant received 1 year delayed sentence, and the court ordered forfeiture of $9,850 in confirmed winnings to go to compulsive gambling prevention fund. Court also ordered $100 costs, $100 fees.

PEOPLE v CHARLES GORDON ELLIOTT, charged with 7 counts Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Accost and Solicit a Minor for Immoral Purposes and 3 counts Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors, 41-B District Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 6/23/09. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, and 6 months jail with credit for 1 day served. He was also ordered to register as sex offender and have no contact with kids or internet access.

PEOPLE v CASSANDRA ELLIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v JOHN JUNIOR ELLIS, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/04/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant was ordered to pay $100 fines, $100 costs, $100 attorney fees, and forfeit $330 winnings to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v TAMEKA ELLIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $636.

PEOPLE v GHASSAN EL-MALLAH, charged with 1 count TPTA-Unauthorized Tax Stamps and 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation-Felony, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County. Plea Agreement on 07/09/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $68 state costs, $68 CVF, $728 Court costs, $960 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $10,000 - $3,000 paid at sentencing.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH ELRUBI, charged with 4 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 6 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner and 3 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 8/20/08. Defendant pled guilty to transaction device and sentenced to 4 years probation and to have no contact with anyone under 17. Defendant forfeits $10,000 to State of Michigan, and must pay a minimum of $2,500 from total amount due per year. Defendant also ordered to pay $500 supervision fee, CVF $60.

PEOPLE v JERRY LEWIS EMDE, charged with 2 Counts False Pretenses- $20,000 or more, 1 Count Common Law Offenses, 4 Counts Schools- Falsifying Records, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 08/10/2010. Pursuant to the agreement, Defendant pled guilty to counts 3 and 4, Common law offense - Misconduct in Office and Schools - Falsifying Records. The remaining counts (counts 1, 2, 5, 6, 7) were dismissed per this agreement. Defendant was also sentenced to 36 months of probation, and ordered to pay $136 state minimum, $60 CVF, $350 in court costs, $360 oversight fee, and $2,000 fine.

PEOPLE v ADNREA J. EMERSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/29/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation with and ordered to pay attorney fees $250, court costs $825, State costs $60, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $19,806.

PEOPLE v ANITA EMILII, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $611.

PEOPLE v DEBORAH EMPSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v ANN GODFREY ENDRES, charged with 1 count Children-Contributing to Delinquency, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/10/2009.

Defendant's sentence was delayed for 6 months, and was ordered to have no contact with MGM, perform 20 hours of community service, and pay $200 fines, $200 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v TRIANNA ESTERS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/29/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation with and ordered to pay attorney fee $250, court costs $825, State costs $60, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $22,445.

PEOPLE v CARLOS EVANS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,048.

PEOPLE v LATONYA EVANS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,062.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE EVANS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/17/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, and ordered to pay attorney fee $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, restitution in the amount of $35,153.60.

PEOPLE v S. KANOCA EVANS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $815.

PEOPLE v SALLY EVANS, charged with charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,878.

PEOPLE v POCAHONTAS FAIRGOOD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $5,798.

PEOPLE v SIDNEY FARRINGTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v PATRICIA FARRIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,455.

PEOPLE v KHODR MAHMOUD FAWAZ, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea

Agreement on 05/05/2009. Defendant pled guilty as charged to 1 count of trespass by a disassociated person. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with the casinos or criminal justice system, submit to screening for gambling addiction - with treatment if necessary, and pay $200 fines, $200 costs.

PEOPLE v ANNA FEARS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,368.

PEOPLE v TABITHA FEAZELL, charged with 1 count Larceny from a Building, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/13/2010., Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant pled to Embezzlement greater than $200 but less than $1,000-misdemeanor, and was sentenced to 1 year probation and ordered to pay $974 restitution.

PEOPLE v CARL HENRY FEILER, charged with 1 count Embezzlement-Agent/Trustee greater than $999 but less than $20,000 and 1 count Habitual Offender-Fourth Offense Notice, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 02/11/2009.

PEOPLE v SARAH-MAY AGPALO FELIZ, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Plaintiff on 02/26/2009.

PEOPLE v SARAH-MAY AGPALO FELIZ, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2009. Defendant was given a 9 month delayed sentence, must continue counseling for gambling addiction until discharged, attend Gamblers Anonymous meetings 3x/week, have no contact with the casinos, pay $100 fines, $100 costs, $35/month supervision fee ($35 x 9 = $315), $100 attorney fees, and $1518.50 in winnings is to be forfeited to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v GEORGETTA FENN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fee $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $15,100

PEOPLE v MARY FENNELLY, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/23/2010. Defendant received 12-month delayed sentence with $200 in court costs, and $200 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v SHARMEL FIELDS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, and was ordered to pay attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, supervision fee $600, state fee $60, and restitution in the amount of $30,444.

PEOPLE v SHEILA FIELDS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,184.

PEOPLE v YOLANDA FIELDS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,219.

PEOPLE v NICHELLE FINLEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/13/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $825 costs, supervision fee $600, attorney fees $250, state minimum costs $68 and CVF fee of $60, and restitution in the amount of $30,400.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY FITZHUGH, charged with 1 Count Child Sexually Abusive Activity, 1 Count Using Computer to Communicate with Another to Commit Crime, 1 Count Habitual Offender 2nd, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County. Plea Agreement on 08/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 12 months to 20 years Jail, $60 CVF, $68 state costs and sex offender registration.

PEOPLE v EBONY FLEMING, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,281.

PEOPLE v TRACEY FLEMING, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/21/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 4 years probation, and ordered to pay $250 attorney fees, $495 court costs, $60 CVF rights fee, $68 state costs, $600 supervision fee and $11,019 restitution.

PEOPLE v TALAYA LASAUNDRA FLEMONS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $78,008.

PEOPLE v REVA FLENNOY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,763.

PEOPLE v LAURIE FLETCHER, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations-Felony Violations, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 04/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 6 months non-reporting probation, $10,000 fine, $60 CVF, and $68 state fee.

PEOPLE v DUSHAWN FLUKER, charged with 1 count of Past Post, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/16/2010.. Defendant pled to False

Pretenses greater than $200 but less than $1,000-misdemeanor, and was sentenced to 1 year probation and a $600 fine.

PEOPLE v LINDA FORD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/21/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion and restitution in the amount of $3,807.

PEOPLE v TALELA CHERISE FORD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/31/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, and ordered to pay attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $35,537.64.

PEOPLE v TONI R. FORD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/25/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 State Minimum costs, $600 supervision fee and restitution in the amount of $35,796.50.

PEOPLE v JAMES MATTHEW FORSTER, JR., charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/03/2009. Defendant given delayed sentence for 1 year, conditioned on no contact with casinos or criminal justice system, submission to MI Dept of Community Health screening for gambling addiction - with treatment as indicated, ordered to pay $200 fines/costs to court, and seized winnings turned over to Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v JASON ROBERT FORTUNA, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/03/2009. Defendant sentenced to time served.

PEOPLE v CHIQUITA FOSTER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v EDWARD DEON FOSTER, charged with 1 count Homicide- Murder 1st Degree- Premeditated, and 1 count Homicide- Felony Murder, 36th Circuit Court-Van Buren County. Convicted by jury on 11/17/2010. Defendant was sentenced to life without parole.

PEOPLE v LATOYA FOSTER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,879.

PEOPLE v SHEREE FOSTER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/19/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $734.

PEOPLE v SHERRY FAYE FOSTER-POLANDO, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea

Agreement on 03/04/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant was ordered to pay $100 fines, $100 costs, $100 attorney fees, and $1,560 winnings to be forfeited to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v KATHERINE ANNE FRANCIS, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 68th District Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2009. Defendant pled guilty as charged and her sentence was delayed for 1 year, conditioned on no contact with illegal gambling and with criminal justice system. Also, Defendant is to pay $500 fines/costs, complete 4 sessions of community service, and pay supervision fees.

PEOPLE v DIANA FRANCO, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v CYNTHIA FRANKLIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $4,495.44.

PEOPLE v OKEEMA FRANKS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/14/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation and the following fees: attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $13,465.63.

PEOPLE v MRDHI A. FRANSI, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Plaintiff on 01/21/2009.

PEOPLE v MRDHI A. FRANSI, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities-Felony Violations, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/19/2009. Defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor false pretenses, less than $200. Defendant was sentenced to 6 months probation, no contact with casinos, $300 costs, $40/month supervision fee ($40 x 6 = $240).

PEOPLE v MICHELLE FRAZIER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v NATASHA LAFAYE FREDRICK, charged with 1 count Financial Transaction Device- Possession, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/16/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, $68 state fee, $60 CVF, $120/years supervision fee, $165/ year court costs, and $425 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v BRIANA FREEMAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v LATASIA FREEMAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

03/26/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $495 costs, $730 fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,860.

PEOPLE v HARRISON DAVID FREID, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities-Misdemeanor Violation, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2009. Defendant pled guilty to underage gambling. His sentence was delayed for 9 months. During that time he is to have no contact casinos or criminal justice system, and is ordered to pay $200 fines, $200 costs.

PEOPLE v DENNIS RAY FRICK JR., charged with 1 Count Child Sexually Abusive Activity and 1 Count of Computers-Internet-Communicating with another to Commit Crime, 13th Circuit Court-Grand Traverse County. Plea Agreement on 08/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 36 months in prison.

PEOPLE v JAMES MICHAEL FRUCIANO, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/21/2010. Defendant was ordered to pay $200 fines and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v KIMBERLY FUDGE, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/03/2010., Defendant's sentenced was delayed for 1 year and ordered to pay $100 court costs and $100 Attorney fees.

PEOPLE v PAMELA FULLER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/21/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $16,720.

PEOPLE v ISIAH JEROME FULTON, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/10/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant is to have no contact with the casinos or criminal justice system, submit to screening for gambling addiction by the MI Dept of Community Health - with treatment as indicated after the screening, and is ordered to pay $200 fines, $200 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v TONIA LYNN FULTS, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 68th District Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 09/29/2009. Defendant pled guilty as charged. Defendant's sentence delayed 1 year, and ordered to have no contact with gaming casinos.

PEOPLE v ROBERT FUQUAY, charged with 1 count Controlled Substance-Possession Of Marijuana, and 1 count Gambling Activities- Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/28/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation and no contact with casinos.

PEOPLE v WILLEDTRA GAINES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, Attorney fee $250, State costs $60, court costs $825, Supervision fee $600, CVF $60, restitution in the amount of $27,006.

PEOPLE v MELISSA GAJEWSKI, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,861.

PEOPLE v KIMBERLY GALLOWAY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,869.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY GAMBLE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,248.

PEOPLE v JENNIFER GARCIA, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v RONALD GARCIA, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v LATOYA GARDNER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/02/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, $600 supervision fee and $17,690 restitution.

PEOPLE v ALISHIA GARLAND, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $813.

PEOPLE v AMER ODISH GARMO, charged with 1 count Tobacco Product Tax Act Violation-Misdemeanor and 1 count TPTA-Unauthorized Tax Stamps, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. Plea Agreement on 08/25/2009. Defendant pled to attempt on the 5 year TPTA felony. The misdemeanor (1 year) and the counterfeit stamp charge were dismissed at sentencing. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $60 CVF, $840 supervision fee, $300 court costs, and $68 state fee.

PEOPLE v ALETTA M. GARNER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/28/2009., Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $825 court costs, $250 attorney fees, $60 CVF, $600 supervision fee, state minimum costs $68 and restitution in the amount of $86,756.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY GARR, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/14/2010. Defendant was sentenced to serve 5-23 months in prison and pay $150 fines, $150 court costs.

PEOPLE v MARIA GARRISON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $4,801.

PEOPLE v CARMEADA LA'NEICE GARY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/31/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $25 court costs, $600 supervision fees, $250 attorney fees, state costs $68, $60 CVF, and ordered to pay $55,520 in restitution.

PEOPLE v DORA GASTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,101.

PEOPLE v WENDY GATEWELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $5,435.

PEOPLE v ANGELA GAYLE, charged with 1 count No Account Check, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/15/2009. Defendant pled guilty to False Pretences greater than $200 but less than $1000, and was sentenced to 1 year probation, $300 fine, and $50 court cost.

PEOPLE v ABDURAHMAN ABDULLA GAZZALI, charged with 8 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, twenty counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, and 8 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 2/18/09. Defendant pled guilty to Food Stamp Fraud $250 or Less and sentenced to 3 years HYTA probation.

PEOPLE v QUINETTA GEMES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fee $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600; state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $38,392.

PEOPLE v ORITHA GWENDOLYN GEORGE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/14/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $12,323.

PEOPLE v VINCENT JOHN GEORGE, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/15/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 30 days in the Wayne County Jail, credit for 30 days served.

PEOPLE v VANESSA GIBBS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010.

Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,652.

PEOPLE v KIM GIBSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,232.

PEOPLE v LASHONDA GILBERT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/21/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $60 CVF, $825 court costs, $250 attorney fees, $68 felony fee, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $100,277.

PEOPLE v GREGORY GILDERSLEEVE, charged with 3 counts of Gambling Operations- Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/10/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 2 year probation with fines and costs.

PEOPLE v ROBERT GILDERSLEEVE, charged with 3 Counts Gambling Operations- Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/10/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation with fines and costs.

PEOPLE v LAVERNE GILLERY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $906.

PEOPLE v SHATIKI GILLETTE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $10,356.

PEOPLE v TAMMIE GILLIESPIE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $810.

PEOPLE v LONITA GILSTRAP, charged with 2 counts Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $13,260.

PEOPLE v CAROLYN GINN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,310.

PEOPLE v JOYLISIA GIPSON, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities-Misdemeanor Violation, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/23/2010. Defendant was ordered to pay $100 fine and $100 in court costs.

PEOPLE v TAITIANA GLAZE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,232.

PEOPLE v BARBARA GLENN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation and attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $22,112.

PEOPLE v CORETTA GLENN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,842.

PEOPLE v SEAN GLENN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $891.

PEOPLE v TERRIE GLOWACKI, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v AMMAR MAHMOOD GOBAH, charged with 7 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 12 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner and 6 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 9/26/08 Defendant pled guilty to Financial Transaction Device less than $200 and sentenced to 3 months probation.

PEOPLE v STEVEN CHARLES GODDARD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v APRIL GOFF, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,748.

PEOPLE v GOLDEN SPOT LIQUOR, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprise - Conducting, 1 count Conspiracy, 1 count Food Stamp Fraud over $1,000, and 1 count Financial Transaction Device, 68th District Court-Genesee County. Case dismissed by court, 3/16/2009.

PEOPLE v BRANDY GOMEZ, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,483.

PEOPLE v FRANK GOMEZ, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v SHAYLA GOMEZ, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v THERESA GOOCH, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 01/13/2010.

PEOPLE v JONATHAN GOODWIN, charged with Felony Gambling Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant pled to misdemeanor False Pretenses less than $200 but greater than $1,000 and was sentenced to 1 year probation.

PEOPLE v PHILLIP GORDON, charged with 1 count Financial Transaction Device - Possession, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/09/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, $600 costs, $68 state fee, and $60 CVF.

PEOPLE v NESAN GORGIS, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing- Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/17/2010. Defendant received a 12-month delayed sentence and ordered to pay $200 in court costs and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v CRYSTAL DENISHA GOSS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, state costs $60, CVF $60, supervision fee $600, and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $37,572.

PEOPLE v PAUL GOULD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v KENNETH RICHARD GOURLAY, charged with 11 counts Criminal Sexual Conduct 3rd Degree (Person 13-15), 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Defendant convicted by jury, and sentenced to 10-15 years in prison.

PEOPLE v EBONI GRANT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/18/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $495 court costs, $60 CVF rights fee, $68 state costs, $360 supervision fee, and $8,855 restitution.

PEOPLE v TAWANA GRANT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $60 CFV, $68 state costs, $360 supervision fee, $495 court costs, $250 attorney fees, $9,482 restitution, and 150 hours community service. Defendant may perform an additional 150 hours community service in lieu of costs/fees.

PEOPLE v GERARD GRATIOT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/25/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v DIRRICK TERRELL GRAVES, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/21/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with the casinos or the criminal justice system, submit to screening for gambling addiction by the department of community health - with treatment as indicated after the screening, and pay $100 attorney fees, $100 court costs. $350 in casino checks seized from Defendant at the time of his arrest were forfeited to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v KEVIN GRAVES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v ROMONIA GRAVES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $860.

PEOPLE v ANDREA GRAY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v MONA GRAY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,127.

PEOPLE v ADNAN GREBOVIC, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/07/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with the casinos or the criminal justice system, submit to screening for gambling addiction by the MI Department of Community Health - with treatment as indicated after the screening, and pay $200 fines, $200 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v CHRISTINA GREEN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v CONRAD CARTER GREEN, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 3 counts Uttering & Publishing, and 1 count Accessory After the Fact to a Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Defendant sentenced on 2/29/2008. Defendant sentenced on count 1 to 45 months-20 years in prison, and ordered to pay $100,000 fine. Defendant sentenced on Counts 2, 3, and 4 to 3 - 14 years in prison, to run concurrent.

PEOPLE v KATRINA GREEN-COLE, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/25/2010. Defendant was

sentenced to 1-5 years in Michigan Department of Corrections for each count to run concurrent, with credit for 113 days served.

PEOPLE v KATRINA GREEN-COLE, charged with 3 Counts of Identity Theft, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/25/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1-5 years prison for each count, to run concurrent, and credit for given for 113 days served.

PEOPLE v KELLY RENEE GREEN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v ROSEZETTA GREEN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/18/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $825 court costs, $60 CVF rights fee, $68 state costs, $600 supervision fee and $24,447 restitution.

PEOPLE v VANITA GREEN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/25/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL ALAN GREENBERG, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity, 1 count Computers-Internet Communicating with Another to Commit a Crime Max. 15 to Life, and 1 count Computers-Internet Communicating with Another to Commit a Crime More than 2 years less than 4 years, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on Defendant pled guilty to Count 2. Counts 1 and 3 were dismissed at sentencing. Defendant sentenced to 1 to 20 years, $60 CVF, $60 state costs, $700 court costs, and sex offender registration.

PEOPLE v JENNIFER GREGORY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v RICKY GRIER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/29/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation with attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $26,703.

PEOPLE v BESSIE GRIFFIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $4,918.

PEOPLE v GREGORY GRIFFIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v BILLIE JUNE GRIGGS, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations-Felony Violations, 27th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2009. Defendant pled guilty to 1 year misdemeanor for Keeping a Gambling

House. The 10 year felony was dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to 6 months probation, and was to have no contact with illegal gambling, pay $200 costs, $297 supervision fees, $50 CVF, and $53 state fee.

PEOPLE v STEPHANIE GRIMES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,064.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH M. GROVE, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/17/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, submit to screening for gambling addiction with the Michigan Department of Community Health - with treatment as indicated after screening, and pay $200 fines, and $50 costs. $2,752 in winnings is to be forfeited to the state of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v DEBRA GUTHRIDGE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $560.

PEOPLE v MARIA HAGAN, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/13/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed 1 year and pay $100 fines and $100 costs.

PEOPLE v CHERYL HAGER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $4,484.

PEOPLE v ALI HASSAN HAIDOUS, charged with 4 counts False Pretenses-$20,000 or More and 4 counts Uttering & Publishing, 19th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/23/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years non-reporting probation, and was ordered to pay $225,000 restitution, $60 CVR, and $68 state fee.

PEOPLE v GWEN HAIRSTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/01/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $495 costs, supervision fee $360, attorney fees $250, state minimum costs $60 and CVF fee of $60, and restitution in the amount of $6,243.

PEOPLE v JEFFREY HAISHA, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/09/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 6 months probation (no delay), screening for gambling addiction and treatment as indicated, and to have no contact with casinos. Defendant ordered to pay $200 court costs and $200 fine.

PEOPLE v EBONY HALL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010.

Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,086.

PEOPLE v ROBERT HALL, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 68th District Court-Genesee County. Case dismissed by Plaintiff on 08/30/2010.

PEOPLE v RAYMOND DAVID HAMAMA, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/05/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 90 days time served.

PEOPLE v NADYH HAMDAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,116.

PEOPLE v TAMIKA HAMILTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $1,529 restitution.

PEOPLE v AJUAN LAMONT HAMMOCK, charged with 9 counts Gamble-Disassociated Person-Trespassing Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 9/10/09. Defendant pled guilty as charged to 4 counts Gamble-Disassociated Person-Trespass Misdemeanor. The other 5 counts were dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to 60 days Wayne County Jail - no probation.

PEOPLE v MARY HAMPTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/20/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $25,701.

PEOPLE v SHERI HAMPTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $1,497 restitution.

PEOPLE v GABRIEL HANNA, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 4 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 4 counts Food Stamps-Fraud over $1,000, and 1 count Cs-Deliver/Mfg (1,2,3 except Marijuana), 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 04/03/2009.

PEOPLE v RITTA HANNA, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 4 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 4 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000 and 1 count C's-Deliver/Mfg (1, 2, 3 Except Marihuana), 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed on 10/13/2009.

PEOPLE v BARBARA HANSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $4,872 restitution.

PEOPLE v AHMED ALI HARAJLI, charged with Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation- Felony, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/10/09.

PEOPLE v TAMIRA SHANON HARDNETT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/16/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $14,759.

PEOPLE v DEBRA HARDRICK, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,244.

PEOPLE v DAKEISHA HARDWICK, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,667.

PEOPLE v BRUCE HARDY II, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations- Felony Violations, Gambling House- Permitting for Gain, Keeping Gambling House, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 11/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation and required to pay $6,000 restitution.

PEOPLE v TAMERIA MICHELLE HARDY, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 68th District Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 09/16/2009. Defendant pled guilty as charged. Defendant sentenced to $150 fines, $75 costs, $50 CVF, and $53 state costs.

PEOPLE v AARANISA HARGRAVE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fee $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, restitution in the amount of $73,495.40.

PEOPLE v HUSSIN HARHARA, charged with 1 count False Pretenses greater than $999 but less than $20,000, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/05/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $68 State costs, $60 CVF, $120 Supervision fee, and $400 Court costs.

PEOPLE v PETER JOSEPH HARRINGTON, charged with 3 counts False Pretenses- $20,000 or more, 1 count of writing NSF checks in 10 days, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. On 01/05/2009, Defendant pled guilty to 1 count False Pretenses $20,000 or more and the remaining charges were dismissed per plea agreement. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2.1 million to GTC. Defendant was also ordered to participate and complete gambling addiction assessment, and pay $1,200 in fines and court costs.

PEOPLE v APRIL HARRIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion and restitution in the amount of $1,594.

PEOPLE v CALISHA HARRIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,547.

PEOPLE v GANEEN HARRIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $760.

PEOPLE v GEMELLE HARRIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v JENNIFER HARRIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,581.

PEOPLE v JOASHIVA HARRIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/24/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $29,252.

PEOPLE v MARIE CAROL HARRIS, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing and 1 count Identity Theft, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2009. Defendant pled to False pretenses and was sentenced to 6 months probation, 10 days community service, and to have no contact with casinos/law enforcement.

PEOPLE v NICOLE HARRIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,254.

PEOPLE v OLIVIA DENISE HARRIS-OSUOHA, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/27/2009. Defendant pled guilty and her sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant was ordered to have no contact with the criminal justice system or casinos, undergo screening for gambling addiction by Department of Community Health - and follow whatever treatment is indicated after the screening, and pay $300 costs.

PEOPLE v ORONDE HARRIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v PRISCILLA HARRIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,981.

PEOPLE v RICHARD DUDLEY HARRIS, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations-Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/16/2009. Defendant pled to an attempt charge and was sentenced to 1 year probation, and ordered to pay $165 court costs, $58 state costs, $50 CVF, and $300 restitution to MGM. Defendant was also ordered to have no contact with casino.

PEOPLE v TERKELIA D. HARRIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, and ordered to pay $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 State Minimum costs, $600 supervision fee and $34,496 restitution.

PEOPLE v VIVIAN HARRIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,694.

PEOPLE v SHERR HARRISON-WHITE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v KATRINA HARVEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,370.

PEOPLE v MONIQUE HARVEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v PATRICIA HARVEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $790.

PEOPLE v TRAVIS HARVILLE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v BILAL ALI HASHEM, charged with 4 counts False Pretenses-$20000 or more and 4 counts Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/23/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $600 supervision fee and restitution in the amount of $24,700.

PEOPLE v JAMIL HASSAN, charged with 1 count Racketeering, 1 count Food Stamp Trafficking, 1 count Conspiracy and Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 36th District Court - Wayne County. Case dismissed by Plaintiff on 03/19/2010.

PEOPLE v TERRI HATALA, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v MOUSA HAWAMDA, charged with 1 count Financial Transaction Device- Possession, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Plaintiff on 06/23/2010.

PEOPLE v KEITH HAWKINS, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conspiracy, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/27/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, no drugs or drug paraphernalia, no weapons, no contact with felons, no alcohol, substance abuse screening, treatment if necessary, urinalysis at least once a month, must maintain employment a minimum of 30 hours/week, no contact with Motor City Casino, no contact with any casinos or any gambling, and attend gamblers anonymous. Defendant ordered to pay $60 CVF, $68 state fee, $360 supervision fee, $600 costs, and $5,000 restitution to Motor City Casino.

PEOPLE v LATOYA HAWKINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,454.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL RAY HAWKINS, charged with 1 Count Financial Transaction Device- Possession, 1 Count of Uttering and Publishing, and 1 Count Identity Theft, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/06/2010.

PEOPLE v ANTRELLA HAWTHORNE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $740.

PEOPLE v VICTORIA HAWTHORNE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,602.

PEOPLE v LASANTA HAYES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/20/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $730 costs, $495 fees, and restitution in the amount of $9,434.92.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE HAYES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $889.

PEOPLE v ROSS MCKINLEY HAYNES, charged with 1 Count of Sex offender failure to register, 54-A District Court-Ingham County. Defendant was found guilty on 7/11/08. Defendant sentence dated 8/11/08. Defendant was sentenced to, CVA of $60, State costs of $60, Costs of $400, 60 days in jail suspended upon payment of $520 in costs and fees, and Defendant must register as a sex offender.

PEOPLE v SAMUEL HAYWOOD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/05/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,717.

PEOPLE v NICOLE HEAGS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,517.

PEOPLE v CARMEN HENDERSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,580.

PEOPLE v PAUL HENDERSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,580.

PEOPLE v TIFFANY HENDERSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,048.

PEOPLE v JALA HENDRIX, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More and 1 count False Pretenses-$20,000 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/31/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $893 court costs, $600 supervision fees, $250 attorney fees, $60 CVF fee and $20,508 restitution.

PEOPLE v KIMBERLY HENKINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,424.

PEOPLE v ELTON HENLEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,808.

PEOPLE v JACK BASIL HERMIZ, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/10/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant was assessed $100 fines and $200 court costs.

PEOPLE v MARIA ANTONIA FRANKS HERNANDEZ, charged with 1 count False Pretenses - $20,000 or more, and 1 count Identity Theft, 61st District Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was ordered to pay $700 costs/fees, $136 State costs, and $60 CVF' rights fee.

PEOPLE v DANIELLE TONIEA-RENEE HERRING, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/15/2009. Defendant pled guilty sentenced to 5 years probation attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $34,082.

PEOPLE v GUNASINGHE PUNCHI HEWAGE, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, and Defendant is ordered to have no contact with the casinos or the criminal justice system, submit to screening for gambling addiction by the MI Department of Community Health - with treatment as indicated after the screening, and pay $100 costs, $50 CVF rights fee, and $35/month supervision fee ($35 x 12 = $420).

PEOPLE v ANTHONY HICKS, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/19/2010. Defendant received 6-month delayed sentence with a court imposed fine of $200, and $200 in court costs

PEOPLE v MYRTLE JOANNA HICKS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $45,393.86.

PEOPLE v TYRONE HICKS, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/13/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant is to have no contact with the casinos or criminal justice system, submit screening for gambling addiction by the MI department of community health - and treatment as indicated after the screening, and pay $200 fines, $200 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v VICTOR HICKS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v LAWRENCE HIGGINBOTHAM, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/16/2009. Defendant ordered to pay $100 fines, $100 court costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v ELLEN HIGGINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,247.

PEOPLE v LACARLA HILL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,137.

PEOPLE v MARLETHA HILL, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, Controlled Substance -Possession of Marijuana/Spices/Salvia, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Plaintiff on 6/7/10.

PEOPLE v NICHOLE HILL, charged with 1 Count Gambling- Disassociated Person-Trespass- Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

09/09/2010. Defendant received 1 year delayed sentence, and court imposed $100 fine, $100 court costs, and $100 attorney fees - 6 months to pay.

PEOPLE v PATRICIA HILL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,405.

PEOPLE v PATRICIA HILL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v TIFFANY HILL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,066.

PEOPLE v SANDRA HILLIKER, charged with 1 count Tobacco Product Tax Act Violation- Misdemeanor, 41-B District Court-Macomb County. Case dismissed by court on 06/02/2010.

PEOPLE v DEBRA HINSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $1,184 restitution.

PEOPLE v ABDULLAH HIZAM, charged with 1 count Racketeering, 1 count Food Stamp Trafficking, 1 count Conspiracy, and 1 count Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/22/2010. Defendant pled to count 4, all other counts dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation and $15,000 forfeiture.

PEOPLE v NABIL HIZAM, charged with 1 count Racketeering, 1 count Food Stamp Trafficking, 1 count Conspiracy, and 1 count Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/22/2010. Defendant pled to lesser count of Food Stamp Fraud and was sentenced to 2 years probation.

PEOPLE v LEO CHICHIEN HO, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/10/2009. Defendant's sentencing was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with the casinos or the criminal justice system, submit to screening for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health - with treatment as indicated after the screening, and pay $200 fines, $68 costs.

PEOPLE v OTISHA LAVERNE HOBSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Plaintiff on 07/13/2009. Matter Referred back to OIG for further investigation.

PEOPLE v JOSHUA HOE, charged with 6 Counts Computers- Internet-Communicating W/Another To Commit Crime, 1 Count Children- Accosting For Immoral Purposes, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County. Plea Agreement on

11/17/2010. Defendant pled guilty to counts 1 and 7, and was sentenced to 5 years probation, 9 months jail in the Washtenaw County jail, and ordered to pay $68 state cost, supervision fee of $2,400, and court costs of $1,664.

PEOPLE v DANIEL HOLBROOK, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 2 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 2 counts Food Stamps-Fraud over $1,000 and 2 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 12/10/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Count 3 and was sentenced to 5 years probation, and forfeiture of $15,000.

PEOPLE v ANDREW MICHAEL HOLDINSKI, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2009. Defendant's sentencing was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with the casinos or the criminal justice system, submit to screening for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health - with treatment as indicated after the screening, and pay $200 fines and $68 costs.

PEOPLE v SABRINA HOLIMON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/14/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation and ordered to pay attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $47,802.

PEOPLE v GWENDALYN HOLLAND, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/24/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $495, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $360 and restitution in the amount of $9,746.

PEOPLE v MADALYN HOLLIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/14/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation and the following fees: attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $61,818.

PEOPLE v INN SOOK HOLLOHAN, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/27/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with the casinos or criminal justice system, submit to screening for gambling addiction by the MI Department of Community Health - with treatment as indicated after the screening, and to pay $300 costs.

PEOPLE v DEVONSHALINE HOLLOWAY, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/07/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $200 costs, $20/month supervision fee, with 200 hours community service in lieu of 45 days alternate work force (Defendant is disabled).

PEOPLE v EBONY HOLMES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010.

Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,550.

PEOPLE v KELLY HOLMES, charged with 2 counts Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $44,135.60.

PEOPLE v OCTAVIA HOLMES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $550.

PEOPLE v RYAN HOLT, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities- Misdemeanor Violation, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 05/06/2010.

PEOPLE v YOLANDA HOLT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, and attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $22,742.

PEOPLE v LEWEEDA HOOD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/13/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $13,832.10.

PEOPLE v NATASHA HOOD, charged with 1 count of Uttering and Publishing, 1 count Identity Theft, and 1 Count Habitual Offender - Second Offense Notice, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation assessed $68 state costs, $60 CVF, $160 court costs/year, $120 supervision costs/year, and $400 attorney fee.

PEOPLE v NORRISHEA HOOD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/25/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL HOOKER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,090.

PEOPLE v KIM HOOPS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $2,372 restitution.

PEOPLE v LASHAUNDA HOPKINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $341.

PEOPLE v LORI HOPSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,564.

PEOPLE v KELLY HORN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $1,186 restitution.

PEOPLE v KENYA HORTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $1,419 restitution

PEOPLE v SABRINA HORTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $901 restitution.

PEOPLE v PATRICIA HOUSER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,934.

PEOPLE v KATHLEEN HOUSTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,791.

PEOPLE v KIRSTEN HOWARD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/10/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $495 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $360 supervision fee and restitution in the amount of $7,010.

PEOPLE v MARY HOWARD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,244.

PEOPLE v LISA DENISE HOWARD-MITCHELL, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/27/2009. Defendant was sentenced today to 18 months probation, $60 CVF, $65 State costs, $180 Supervision fee, $400 Attorney fee, $600 Court costs.

PEOPLE v YOLANDA HUBBARD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,340.

PEOPLE v CHARLIE HENRY HUDGINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/13/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $495 costs, supervision fee $360, attorney fees $250, state minimum costs $68 and CVF fee of $60, restitution in the amount of $6,638.

PEOPLE v FELICIA HUDSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $9,800.

PEOPLE v KEITH HUDSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v CYNTHIA HUGHES, charged with 2 counts Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/29/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $10,867.

PEOPLE v DIANA HUGHES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $835 restitution.

PEOPLE v JASON DUANE HUGHES, charged with 1 count Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Accost and Solicit a Minor for Immoral Purposes and 2 counts Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 7/21/2008. Defendant pled guilty to the 2 counts and sentenced to 5 years probation, no contact with minors, no computer/internet, sex offender treatment, assessed $60 state costs, $60 CVF, $150 supervision fee per/year (total $750), $150 court costs per/year (total $750), and may perform 75 hours community service in lieu of supervision fees and court costs.

PEOPLE v MARVIN HUGHES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $796.

PEOPLE v STACEY HUGHES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,655.

PEOPLE v RAYMOND HUGUELY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $695.

PEOPLE v JOHNNY HULL, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 1/8/09. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, and ordered to have no contact with the casinos, pay $35 restitution, $120 supervision fees, $600 court costs, $400 attorney fees, $50 state fee, and $50 CVF.

PEOPLE v SHERRY HULL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v MIKITA HUMPHREY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $4,275.

PEOPLE v ANNE MARIE HUMPHRIES, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/19/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $600 Court costs, $400 Attorney fees, $120 Supervision fee, $60 State costs, $60 CVF, and 100 hours community service.

PEOPLE v TRINA HUMPHRIES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,213.

PEOPLE v KELLE HUNT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,443.

PEOPLE v LAKEIA HUNT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $637.

PEOPLE v MARIO HUNTER, charged with Gambling- Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/29/2010. Defendant was sentenced to pay a fine of $100, court costs of $100, and attorney fees of $100.

PEOPLE v DAWNESHA HURST, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $5,472.

PEOPLE v HASSAN ALI HUSSEIN, charged with 4 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 6 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner and 2 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/08/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Conspiracy and sentenced to 5 years probation.

PEOPLE v TAMIEKA HUTCHINSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v JAMES HUTSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/21/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,068.

PEOPLE v DEQUINCY HYATT, charged with 2 counts False Pretenses-$20,000 or more and 1 count Criminal Enterprise - Conducting, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 06/25/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, total restitution in the amount of $203,292, CVF $60, and state costs $136. Defendant may not engage in nor seek certification to enter into any type of real estate transaction. Defendant must enter into a wage assignment and is subject to bi-annual asses reviews.

PEOPLE v MAJED ABRAHEM ILAYAN, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 8/11/09. Defendant's sentence delayed 6 months, and was ordered to have no contact with casino, and pay $200 fines and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v IM GAS AND MART, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, twenty counts Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 8 counts Food Stamps - Fraud Over $1,000, and 8 counts Financial Transaction Dev. - Furnish Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 1/17/2009. Defendant pled guilty to count 6 - Criminal Enterprise and sentenced to 5 years probation and forfeiture of $53,220

PEOPLE v ALA GORGIS IMSAIAH, charged 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation-Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2009. Defendant pled to TPTA Felony, and was sentenced to 1 year probation, $600 court costs, and $3,302 restitution to the State of Michigan.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL INMAN, charged with 2 counts Gambling Activites-Felony Violations, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conspiracy, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/21/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation.

PEOPLE v EBONY IRBY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/24/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $600 supervision fee, $68 state costs and restitution in the amount of $11,285

PEOPLE v JAMAL IRBY, charged with 1 count Debit Card Fraud, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant pled to Financial Transaction Device-Fraud-Misdemeanor, and was sentenced to 1 year probation, $68 CVF and $600 court costs.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL ANTHONY IRVING, charged with 1 count Malicious Destruction of Personal Property $1000 or more but less than $20,000, 3rd Circuit

Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/11/2009. Defendant sentenced to 1 year probation, fines and costs of $160, and to have no contact with casinos.

PEOPLE v IT MINI MART, charged with 8 counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 20 counts Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, and 8 counts Financial Transaction Device-Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 1/27/09. Defendant pled guilty to Criminal Enterprises and sentenced to 5 years probation.

PEOPLE v ZORAN IVEZAJ, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/07/2009. Court delayed his sentence for 1 year, and ordered to have no contact with the casinos or the criminal justice system, submit to screening for gambling addiction by the MI Department of Community Health - with treatment as indicated after the screening, and pay $200 fines, $200 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v ALI ABDUL-KARIM JABER, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/06/2010. Defendant was given a delayed sentence of 1 year, and ordered to pay $100 fines and $100 court costs.

PEOPLE v HUSSEIN JABER, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/10/2010. Defendant received a 6-month delayed sentence with a court imposed a fine of $200 and court costs of $200.

PEOPLE v DARRYL JACKS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,202.

PEOPLE v ALIZA JACKSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/14/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $68, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $35,055.

PEOPLE v MARCIA DINETA JACKSON, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/05/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years reporting probation, cannot enter any gambling institution in state of Michigan (to include hotels), assessed $68 state costs, $60 CVF, $120 supervision fee per year, $160 court costs per year, $400 attorney fees, and completion of 100 hours community service in lieu of costs.

PEOPLE v MAXIMILLIAN JULIAN JACKSON, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing and 1 court Habitual Offender-2nd Offense Notice, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County. Plea Agreement on 07/29/2009. Defendant pled on a separate case. Case dismissed by Plaintiff.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE JACKSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/25/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v RENITA JACKSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/24/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $41,016.

PEOPLE v TAHRA JACKSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,102.

PEOPLE v TIEHESHA JACKSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,449.

PEOPLE v MOHAMED JAHAF, charged with 2 counts Gambling Operations-Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/20/2009. Defendant pled to Attempt Cheating, and was sentenced to 6 months probation, $400 court costs, $60/months supervision fee, no contact with casinos, and must surrender all confiscated monies to the casino.

PEOPLE v BRADLEY JAHNKE, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity and 1 count Using Computer/Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit a Crime, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 07/07/2009. Defendant sentenced to 1 to 20 months, $700 court costs, $68 state costs and $60 CVF.

PEOPLE v ASHISH JAIN, charged with 1 Count Child Sexually Abusive Communication Activity and 1 count of Computers Internet Communicating with Another to Commit Crime, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County. Plea Agreement on 02/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 12 months county jail, $68 state costs, $60 CVF, and registration as a sex offender.

PEOPLE v JENNIFER JAKUBOWSKI, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v SAAD JAPPAYA, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/29/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, and he was assessed $200 costs and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v RAID YOOSIF JEBROO, charged with 1 count TPTA-Unauthorized Tax Stamps and 1 count Tobacco Product Tax Act Violation-Misdemeanor, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/06/2009. Defendant pled to misdemeanor TPTA and sentenced to 1 year probation per agreement, and ordered to pay $1,068 tax/restitution to SOM.

PEOPLE v KUWONA JEFFERSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,495.

PEOPLE v NATHANEIL ODEN JEFFERSON, charged with 1 count Financial Transaction Device - Uttering & Publishing, 1 count Financial Transaction Device - Possession, and 1 count Habitual Offender-Third Offense Notice, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/4/09. Defendant pled to Counts 1 and 2 and was sentenced to 18 months probation, $250 costs (unspecified), $20/month supervision fee ($20 x 18 = $360), and to forfeit all confiscated monies to the Addicted Gamblers Fund.

PEOPLE v SHARON JELSONE, charged with Gambling- Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/11/2010. Defendant's sentencing was delayed for 1 year. Defendant was assessed $100 court costs and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v DEBORAH JENKINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,311.67.

PEOPLE v EVELYN JENKINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,569.

PEOPLE v NAKESIA JENKINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/02/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $22,032.

PEOPLE v STEVEN JAY JENKINS, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court, Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation and assessed court costs $165, CVF $60, supervision fee $240, state costs $468, and $400 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v TYSON DEAN JENKINS, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Communication Activity, 1 count Computers-Internet Communicating with Another to Commit Crime, and 1 count Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 03/12/2009. Defendant pled guilty to count 1 and sentenced to 18 months in prison, with credit for 146 days, and assessed $60 CVF, $60 state costs, and sex offender treatment while in prison.

PEOPLE v SAM GERGES JINA, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation-Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2009. Defendant pled to Attempted TPTA, and sentenced to 1 year probation. Defendant ordered to pay $300 court cost, $40/month supervision fee, and $10,000 restitution.

PEOPLE v ANTONIO JOHNSON, charged with 6 counts Forgery, Habitual Offender, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County. Plea Agreement on 1/29/2009. Defendant pled guilty to 3 counts. Remaining 3 counts and habitual charge were dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation with first 6 months in county jail.

PEOPLE v BONNIE JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years on diversion status, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,780.

PEOPLE v CANDICE JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $31,081.

PEOPLE v COURTNEY JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $4,770.27.

PEOPLE v CRAIG JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with the casinos or criminal justice system, submit to screening for gambling addiction by the MI Department of Community Health - with treatment as indicated after the screening, and pay $100 fines and $100 costs.

PEOPLE v DOMONICK JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,033.

PEOPLE v FELISHA JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/16/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $60 CVF, $68 state fee, $360 supervision fee, $495 court costs, $250 attorney fees, $24,187 restitution and 150 hours community service. Defendant may perform and additional 150 hours community service in lieu of costs and fees.

PEOPLE v HELEN JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/29/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant assessed $200 costs and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v HERMAN JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 in attorney fees and $847 restitution.

PEOPLE v JONATHAN ARTHUR JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 35th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/28/2009. Defendant pled no contest as charged. Sentenced to 1 year probation, abstain from illegal gambling, and ordered to pay $180 supervision fee, $300 Fines, and $50 costs.

PEOPLE v KAREN JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $824.

PEOPLE v KIMBERLY JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months non-reporting probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $252.50, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $180, and restitution in the amount of $138,670.

PEOPLE v LATOYA CARLISA JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $14,865.

PEOPLE v MELVINA JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $3,515 restitution.

PEOPLE v NATASHA JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/06/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $4,261.

PEOPLE v NATHAN JOHNS, charged with 1 count Past Poster/Bet Capper, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/22/2010.

PEOPLE v RACHEL JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v SHARMEKIA JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/29/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $60 CVF, $825 court costs, $68 state fee, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $36,514.

PEOPLE v TABATHA JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,347.

PEOPLE v TANEKA JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, restitution in the amount of $12,789.

PEOPLE v TIANA JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $730 costs, $495 fees, and restitution in the amount of $9,132.

PEOPLE v TOI JOHNSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,311.

PEOPLE v ARLETTE JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v BENITA JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 4/13/09. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, state costs $60, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, restitution in the amount of $22,836.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v CRYSTAL JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,620.

PEOPLE v EDNA JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $5,452.

PEOPLE v FREDDIE JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,504.

PEOPLE v HENRY LEE JONES, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/27/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 6 months. Defendant is ordered to pay $100 fines and $100 court costs.

PEOPLE v KATHRYN JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/21/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $16,151.

PEOPLE v KIMBERLEE JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,389.

PEOPLE v LAQUITTA JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $6,376.

PEOPLE v LATOYA MONIQUE JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/01/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $495 costs, $360 supervision fee, $250 attorney fee, $60 state minimum costs, $60 CVF, and restitution in the amount of $4,903.

PEOPLE v LESLIE JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $38,985.

PEOPLE v LORENZO JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v MARLETO JUAN JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/13/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $825 costs, supervision fee $600, attorney fees $250, state minimum costs $68, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $16,431.

PEOPLE v MARSHA JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v MARY DANNIE JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/16/2009. Pled guilty, sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fee $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, restitution in the amount of $38,793.20.

PEOPLE v MAURICE DEDRICK JONES, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne. Plea Agreement on 03/18/2009. Defendant sentenced to 1 year on probation, to have no contact with the casinos or the criminal justice system, submit to screening for gambling addiction - and obtain treatment if necessary.

PEOPLE v ONITA JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/28/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v RAYSHAUN JONES, charged with 1 count Identity Theft, 1 count Financial Transaction Device-Possession, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea

Agreement on 10/20/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Attempt Financial Transaction Device and was sentenced to 2 years probation, no contact with casinos, restitution $223.98, $68 state costs, $60 CVF, $240 supervision fee, $330 court costs, and $450 attorney fee.

PEOPLE v REGINA JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,403.

PEOPLE v SOMALIA JONES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/17/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $730 costs, $495 fees and restitution in the amount of $6,167.25.

PEOPLE v TASHUNA JONES, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/05/2010. Defendant received 12-month delayed sentence, with $100 in court costs and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v VINSON JORDAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,092.

PEOPLE v AMELIA JUAREZ, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/21/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,071.60.

PEOPLE v TOMA JUNCAJ, charged with 1 count Malicious Destruction of Private Property $200 or more but less than $1,000, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Defendant convicted by verdict on 11/10/2010. The Court sentenced defendant to 6 months probation, imposed $100 in court costs, $100 in attorney fees, and ordered defendant to pay $278.86 in restitution.

PEOPLE v LANFJI ADJOUA-ESTELLE KABA, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or More, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/02/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $40,840.

PEOPLE v ADNAN KADA, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 48 counts False Pretenses greater than $999 and less than $20,000, and 48 counts BC-Return Nonreturnables-100 to 10,000, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. Case dismissed per Agreement 10/08/2009.

PEOPLE v KHALID KADA, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 48 counts False Pretenses Greater than $999 and less than $20,000, and 48 counts BC-Return Nonreturnables-100-10,000, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. Plea Agreement on 04/6/2009. Defendant pled guilty to one 5 year felony and was ordered to pay $75,000.00 in restitution with a credit for $37,401.00 as forfeited.

PEOPLE v WALEED KADA, charged with 47 counts of False Pretenses-Greater than $999 and Less than $20,000, 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, and 48 counts BC-Return Nonreturnnables-100-10,000, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. Plea Agreement on 4/6/09. Defendant pled guilty to 1 count BC-Return Nonreturnables, and the rest of the counts were dismissed. Defendant sentenced to 6 months probation, and ordered to pay $150, costs, $53 state minimum costs, $60 CVF, and $90 supervision fee.

PEOPLE v ALI MOHAMAD KADRY, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/14/2009. Defendant pled to a reduced charge and was sentenced to 1 year probation, $1,500 court costs, $50 CVF, and $53 state cost. Defendant remitted a check in the amount of $5,000 restitution.

PEOPLE v REVA KAKISH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v SALWA KAMMO, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/21/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with the casinos or with the criminal justice system, submit to screening for gambling addiction by the Department of the Community Health - with treatment as indicated after the screening, and pay $100 attorney fees and $100 court costs.

PEOPLE v AMIR KANNO, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/25/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation and ordered to pay $300 fines, $200 court costs, $50 CVF, and pay a $35 monthly oversight fee.

PEOPLE v AMIR SALLOMI KANNO, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/16/2009. Defendant pled guilty as charged and was ordered to pay fines $100, Costs $100, and attorney fees $100.

PEOPLE v GARY EUGENE KAPANOWSKI, charged with 3 counts of Using a Computer to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Material to Minors and 2 counts of Using a Computer to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Material to Minors, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 01/13/2009. Defendant pled guilty to 1 count of Using a Computer to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Material to Minors (10 years maximum) and 1 count of Using a Computer to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Material to Minors (4 years maximum), 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 1/13/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, with the first 60 days spent in jail, sex offender registration, no use or possession of a computer, no unsupervised contact with minors, $60 CVF Rights Fee, $600 court costs, $120 state costs and $8,100 supervisory fee.

PEOPLE v WESAM KARCHO, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/05/2010., Defendant received 12-month delayed sentence with $100 fine and $100 in court costs.

PEOPLE v FADI KASHAT, charged with 2 Counts Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant pled to a 6 month delayed sentence. Defendant is responsible for any outstanding taxes owed on the contraband.

PEOPLE v JALAL M. KASSA, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 1 Count Criminal Enterprises- Conducting, 6 Counts Conspiracy- Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 3 Counts Food Stamps- Fraud Over $1,000, 3 Counts Financial Transaction Device- Furnish Goods Or Services. Plea Agreement on 03/18/2010. 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation.

PEOPLE v SARKON B KASTANIN, charged with 1 count Misdemeanor Gambling Activities, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Plaintiff on 04/08/2010.

PEOPLE v KC'S MARKET, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprise - Conducting, Conspiracy, 1 count Food Stamp Fraud over $1,000, and Financial Transaction Device, 68th District Court-Genesee County. Case dismissed on 04/19/2010.

PEOPLE v TRACY KECSKES, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conspiracy, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/12/09. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, no contact with any casinos or any gambling, attend gamblers anonymous, and pay $60 CVF, $68 state fee, $360 supervision fee, $600 costs, and $5,000 restitution to Motor City Casino

PEOPLE v STEPHANIE DENISE KEETON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/13/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $17,681.40.

PEOPLE v CHARLES KEIL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,395.

PEOPLE v MYMOON KEITH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $7,859.25 restitution.

PEOPLE v ADNAN JERGES KEJBOU, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/19/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months reporting probation. Defendant must pay $200 fines and $200 court costs.

PEOPLE v CARMEN KELLEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $934.

PEOPLE v ANGELITA KELLY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,664.

PEOPLE v JACOLE KELLY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $789

PEOPLE v ANTONIO KENNEDY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v LAEL KENNEDY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,176.

PEOPLE v NANCY KENNEDY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $10,944.

PEOPLE v THAISE KENNEDY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $4,053.

PEOPLE v MARISA KESTNER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $3,471.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH KETTNER, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by Plaintiff on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v THILICIA KEYES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, with attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $15,878.60.

PEOPLE v TYNIIA KEYS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/26/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,414.

PEOPLE v AHMED ABD KHALIF, charged with 1 count Disorderly Person-Loitering, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010.

Defendant received 1-month delayed sentence with a court imposed fine of $200 and $200 in court costs.

PEOPLE v EMAD KHALIF, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation-Felony, 56-A District Court-Eaton County. Plea Agreement on 05/12/2009. Defendant pled to TPTA Misdemeanor. Defendant was sentenced to, 6 months probation (restitution to be paid during probation) $200 state costs, $300 court costs, $50 CVF, $40 judicial fund fee.

PEOPLE v JAMAL KHAMANEH, charged with 1 count Felony Gambling Activities, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/14/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation and ordered to pay court costs $100, CVF $60, supervision fee $420, and fines $100.

PEOPLE v WISAM KHAMERKO, charged with 2 counts Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation-Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/13/2009. Defendant pled to TPTA misdemeanor and tendered $4,000 in restitution (paid to State of Michigan), and was sentenced to 12 months probation. Original felony counts were dismissed.

PEOPLE v ANWAR HUSSAIN KHAN, charged with Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/10/2009. Defendant sentenced to 11 months probation, no contact with casinos or criminal justice system, screening and treatment for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health - with treatment for gambling addiction as indicated after the screening, pay $200 fines, $68 costs, and $2,835 winnings forfeited to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v WYNONA KILBURN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,619.

PEOPLE v PAUL SONG KIM, charged with 1 count Gambling- Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/07/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation and ordered to pay $100 fines, $100 court costs, $100 attorney fees. Defendant's $800 in winnings gets forfeited to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v LANA KIMBREL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fee $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $55,084.94.

PEOPLE v TENA KIMBROUGH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 State Minimum costs, $600 supervision fee, and $33,231 restitution.

PEOPLE v CHRISTINA KATHLEEN KING, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/02/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $22,189.70.

PEOPLE v LATOYA MONIQUE KING, charged with 2 counts Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/29/2009. Defendant pled guilty, sentenced to 5 years probation, and ordered to pay attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $63,470.34.

PEOPLE v ROSALYN KING, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $631.

PEOPLE v DARLENE KIRBY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $870.

PEOPLE v TANYA KIRK, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs 495, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $360, and restitution in the amount of $5,620.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY JOHN KIRN, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, gambling addiction screening, no contact with casinos, and 10 days community service in lieu of fines and cost. $5,126 forfeited to State of Michigan.

PEOPLE v DARLENE KITCHEN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $2,948.

PEOPLE v JAMES KIZY, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation-Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/01/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Misdemeanor TPTA and paid $3500 restitution. In addition, the court sentenced Defendant to 1 year non-reporting probation, $1,000 costs, $600 CVF, $60 state fee.

PEOPLE v DEBRA LYNN KNACK, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement reached on 01/13/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, and Defendant ordered to have no contact with the casinos or criminal justice system, undergo screening for gambling addiction by the MI Department of Community Health - with treatment for gambling addiction if needed, and ordered to pay $100 fines, $100 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v ELIZABETH KNIGHT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,128.

PEOPLE v JERRMAINE WINSTON KNOWLES, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person- Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 09/24/2010.

PEOPLE v JERRMAINE WINSTON KNOWLES, charged with 2 Counts Identity Theft, 1 Count Criminal Enterprises- Conducting, 4 Counts Larceny From The Person, 3 Counts Obtain/Possess/Transfer- Intent ID Theft, 1 Count Financial Transaction Device- Steal/Retain Without Consent, 1 Count State Id Card- False Application, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/22/2010. Defendant pled to 5 counts of False Pretenses greater than $200 but less than $1,000, and was sentenced to 1 year in jail and restitution in the amount of $4,200.

PEOPLE v TODD KORTMAN, charged with 3 counts WRP-Substantial Endangerment to Public and 1 count Conspiracy-Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 53rd Circuit Court-Cheboygan County. Case dismissed by court on 3/20/08.

PEOPLE v NICK TOM KOTTALIS, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/17/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with the criminal justice system or casinos, screening for gambling addiction by Michigan Department of Community Health - with treatment as indicated after the screening, and pay $200 fines and $50 costs.

PEOPLE v YVETTE KOUAYARA, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,985.

PEOPLE v LOUAY KOUZA, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 4 Counts Conspiracy- Legal Act/Illegal Matter, 4 Counts Food Stamps-Fraud Over $1,000, 3 Counts Financial Transaction Device- Forgery, Alter, Counter, 4 Counts Financial Transaction Device - Furnish Goods Or Services, 68th District Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 04/19/2010. Pled to misdemeanor Food Stamp Fraud, and ordered to pay $80,000 forfeiture and was sentenced to 2 years probation.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL THOMAS KRAUSS, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Communication Activity, 1 count Computers - Internet Communicating with Another to Commit Crime, and 1 count Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County. Plea Agreement on 12/17/2009. Defendant sentenced to 16 months to 20 years, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, and ordered to register as sex offender.

PEOPLE v DANIELLE KRAUTHOER, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 48 counts False Pretenses greater than $999 and less than $20,000, and

48 counts BC-Return Nonreturnables-100 to 10,000, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. Pursuant to a Plea Agreement on 4/6/09, Defendant pled guilty to a misdemeanor and was ordered to pay $5,000 in restitution.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL KRAUTHOER, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 48 counts False Pretenses greater than $999 and less than $20,000, and 48 counts BC-Return Nonreturnables-100 to 10,000, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. Pursuant to a Plea Agreement on 4/6/09, Defendant pled guilty to a misdemeanor and was ordered to pay $5,000 in restitution.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE KRIEGER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, and ordered to pay $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,241.

PEOPLE v YANKEE KUE, charged with 1 count of Gambling Activities - Felony Violations and 1 count of False Pretenses - Less Than $200, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 1/28/09. Defendant pled guilty to False Pretenses - less than $200. Sentenced to 1 year probation, $165 Court cost, $50 CFV, $45 State costs, and $200 fine.

PEOPLE v L & L INDUSTRIES, INC, charged with Releasing/Discharging Hazardous Materials into State Waters, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County. Plea Agreement on 10/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, $200 fine, $150 court costs and $10,000 restitution.

PEOPLE v ELAYSSANDRIA LACY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $9,097.

PEOPLE v TABATHA LAFEVER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $23,628.36.

PEOPLE v STEVEN GERARD LAJOIE, Charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity, 1 count Using a Computer/Internet-Communicating With Another to Commit Child Sexually Abusive Activity, and 1 count of Using a Computer/Internet to Communicate with Another Disseminating Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. Plea Agreement on 4/14/09. Defendant pled guilty to 1 count Using a Computer to Commit Crime and 1 count of Using the Internet to Commit a Crime. Charge of child abuse/commercial activity was dismissed. Defendant sentenced to prison 2 - 10 years for first offense, and 2 - 4 years on second offense.

PEOPLE v SCOTT ANTHONY LANE, charged with 2 counts Using a Computer to Communicate with another to Commit a Crime-Max greater than 4 and Less than 10 years and 1 count Using a Computer to Communicate with another to Commit a Crime-Max greater than 2 and Less than 4 years, 40th Circuit Court-Lapeer County.

Plea Agreement on 03/16/2009. Defendant pled guilty to counts 1 and 3 - with count 2 being dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to 180 days (6 months) jail with credit for 113 day, $60 state costs, $60 CVF, $250 court costs, $250 fine, and sex offender registration and treatment.

PEOPLE v CAMILLE LATHAM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL LATKA, charged with 1 count Releasing/Discharging of Hazardous Materials into State Waters, 12th District Court-Jackson County. Plea Agreement on 10/12/2010. Defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor count of Liquid Industrial Waste - General Violation.

PEOPLE v THOMAS LATKA, charged with 1 count Releasing/Discharging of Hazardous Materials into State Waters, 12th District Court-Jackson County. Plea Agreement on 10/12/2010. Defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor count of Liquid Industrial Waste - General Violation.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM GEORGE LATREILLE, charged with 1 count Permit Gambling Apparatus on Premises and 1 count of Maintaining Gambling House for Gain, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 01/21/2010. Defendant was ordered to pay $60 CVF, $500 court costs, $68 state fees, and $15,000 restitution.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM GEORGE LATREILLE III, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations-Felony Violations and 2 counts Gambling House-Permitting for Gain, 68th District Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 10/23/2009. Defendant pled guilty to added count of keeping a gambling house, a 1 year misdemeanor. Defendant ordered to pay $53 state fee, $60 CVF, $150 costs, and $300 fines.

PEOPLE v CHARLENE MARIE LAVELLE, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 68th District Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 09/16/2009. Defendant pled guilty as charged. The court sentenced Defendant to $150 fines, $75 costs, $50 CVF, $53 state costs.

PEOPLE v MILDRED LAWS-DAVIS, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/06/2010. Defendant was given a delayed sentence of 1 year and ordered to pay $100 fines, $100 court costs.

PEOPLE v JASON PAUL LAWSON, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity 1 Count Computers - Internet Communicating with Another to Commit Crime and 1 count Disseminating Sexually Explicit Matter to Minor, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 03/31/2009. Defendant sentenced to 18 months in prison.

PEOPLE v THUY LE, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/09/2010. Defendant received 1 year delayed sentence with $100 fines, $100 court costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v ANGELA LEE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/09/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $495, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $360, and restitution in the amount of $6,522.70.

PEOPLE v BRIDGETTE LEE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/23/2010.

PEOPLE v GREGORY LEE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v LINDA LEE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,612.

PEOPLE v PEGGY LEE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $5,404.

PEOPLE v SHAWNA CORA LEE, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/14/2010. Defendant pled guilty sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant was ordered to pay $50 court costs, $100 attorney fees, and $1,509.48 winnings to State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v KELLY LEFEVERE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v GARY MICHEAL LENTZ, charged 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity and 1 count Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Commit Crime, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/13/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 2 to 20 years imprisonment.

PEOPLE v CHARLES JOHN LEONE, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/09/2009. Sentenced to 6 months probation (delayed sentence), screening for gambling addiction, treatment as indicated, no contact with casinos, forfeit all monies confiscated if any, $200 court costs, $200 fine, $200 attorney fee.

PEOPLE v NATIKA LESLIE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $60 CVF, $68 state fee, $360 supervision fee, $495 court costs, $250 attorney fees, $8,749 restitution, and 150 hours community service.

PEOPLE v CONSTANCE MARIE LEWIS, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

05/27/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant was assessed the $100 court costs and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v MARVA LEWIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/25/2010. Case referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v PHEBE LEWIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $4,371.

PEOPLE v ROSETTA LEWIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,033.

PEOPLE v SHERMAINE LEWIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/14/2009. Sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $73,005.

PEOPLE v SONYA LEWIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/06/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $669

PEOPLE v KENYATTA LEWIS-DICKERSON, charged with 1 count Bet Capping/Fugitive, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/01/2010. Defendant pled to False Pretenses $200-$1,000 and was sentenced to 1 year probation, $50 CVF, $53 state costs, $165 court costs, $400 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v TRACY LEWIS-MORROW, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/24/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, court costs $893, CVF $60, supervision fee $600, other costs $250, restitution $54,014.

PEOPLE v CECEILY LIGGON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/25/2010. Case referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v KIMMASYA LIGHTNER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/21/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $10,205.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY LINDSEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v BRITTANY LINDSEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,611.

PEOPLE v CHRISTIAN LINTA, charged with 1 count Malicious Destruction of Personal Property $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/16/2009. Defendant pled to Attempt MDOPP and was sentenced to1 year probation, $1,500 restitution, $250 court costs, $600 attorney fees, $60 CVF, and $60 state costs.

PEOPLE v LINDA LIPSEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and $2,500 restitution.

PEOPLE v DANIEL LITTLE, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea agreement on 01/09/2009 to Attempted Uttering & Publishing and was sentenced to $150 fines, $150 costs, 1 year probation, and no contact with casinos.

PEOPLE v MARIE LITTLE, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/05/2010. Defendant received 12 month delayed sentence with $100 court costs and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v ROMONA LITTLE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/28/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v VANECIA LITTLE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $919.

PEOPLE v DARRYL LITTLEJOHN, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/16/2010. Defendant received 6 month delayed sentence with $100 court costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v SHANTEL MCGAIL LITTLEJOHN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/01/2009. Sentenced to 5 years probation, $825 costs, supervision fee $600, attorney fees $250, state minimum costs $60, and CVF $60.

PEOPLE v JING PING LIU, charged with Gambling Activities- Felony Violations, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 05/24/2010. Matter was dismissed without prejudice.

PEOPLE v CHRYSENTHIA LIVERMAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v PRENKA LJUCOVIC, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/03/2009. Defendant received delayed sentence for 1 year conditioned on no contact with casinos, no contact with criminal justice system, MI Dept of Community Health screening for gambling addiction, treatment as indicated, $200 fines/costs to Court, and any seized winnings forfeit to the Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v DORA L. LLOYD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/01/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $885 costs, supervision fee $600, state minimum costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $11,938.

PEOPLE v BARBARA SUE LOBKOVICH, charged with 1 count Gambling-Disassociated Person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant is to have no contact with the casinos or the criminal justice system, submit to screening for gambling addiction by the MI Department of Community Health - with treatment as indicated after the screening, and pay $100 costs, $50 CVF rights fee, 40 hours of community service in lieu of the $35/month supervision fee ($35 x 12 = $420). Additionally, $1,332.75 in winnings seized from Defendant at the time of her arrest, and in possession of the MSP, were turned over to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v LEON LOCKETT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $735.

PEOPLE v MARCEL LOFTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v TOETISHA LOMBARD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/23/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $23,241.72.

PEOPLE v JASON JEROME LOMBARDO, charged with Child Sexually Abusive Activity - Using Computer Communicating with Another to Commit Crime, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County. Plea Agreement on 02/09/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 12 months Michigan Department of Corrections, $68 state costs, $60 CVF, and sex offender registration.

PEOPLE v JUDY LONG, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $730 costs, $495 fees, and restitution in the amount of $6,144.

PEOPLE v KIMBERLY LONG, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010.

Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,028.

PEOPLE v PATRICK LONGO, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v SCOTT WAYNE LOONEY, charged with 4 counts of Using a Computer to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors, 30th Circuit Court-Ingham County. Plea Agreement on 01/21/2009. Defendant pled guilty to 2 counts of Using a Computer to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors. Defendant was sentenced to 36 months probation, $120 state costs, $60 CVF, $1,080 supervisory fee, $500 court costs, no contact with minors except his son, may not possess sexually stimulating material, and may not use a computer.

PEOPLE v ARMANDO FRANK LOPEZ, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity and 3 counts Using a Computer to Communicate with Another to Commit Crime, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/03/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Using a Computer and the Internet for Communicating with Another to Commit a Crime. Sentenced to 1 to 20 years incarceration and sex offender registration, court costs $600, state costs $60, CVF $60.

PEOPLE v MIRIAM TERESA LOPEZ, charged with Insurance - Fraudulent Acts, Uttering & Publishing, False Pretenses more than $999 but less than $20,000, 40th Circuit Court-Lapeer County. Plea Agreement on 03/01/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 90 days jail and ordered to pay fines totaling $3,129.45.

PEOPLE v JOHNEKA LOVE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/14/2009. Sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $61,414.

PEOPLE v LENNETTE LOVE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,459.

PEOPLE v WAYNE KENNETH LOVE JR, charged with 3 counts Using a Computer and the Internet for Communicating with Another to Commit a Crime, 1st Circuit Court-Hillsdale County. Plea Agreement on 05/03/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation with the first 6 months in Hillsdale County Jail, sex offender registration, $720 supervision fee, $60 CVF, and $68 state costs

PEOPLE v LAKISHA LOWE, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/28/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Attempt Uttering & Publishing and was sentenced to 6 months probation and fines and costs of $500.

PEOPLE v PATRICIA LOWERY, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/23/2010. Defendant received 12 month delayed sentence with $200 in court costs and $200 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v LUCIANA LOYD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010, Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,937.

PEOPLE v LIA DORINA LUCACI, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/30/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered no contact with the criminal justice system, undergo screening for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, follow treatment program as indicated by screening, pay $200 fines, $200 costs, $100 attorney fees, and $3,500 winnings is forfeit to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v TEKEVA LUMPKIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,232.

PEOPLE v AWA LY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/17/2009. Sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, restitution $33,563.06.

PEOPLE v JAVIER MACIAS, charged 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity and 1 count Using a Computer Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit Crime, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 07/31/2009. Sentenced to 1 year in Kent County Jail, probation for 5 years, $300 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state costs $900 supervision fee, and sex offender registration.

PEOPLE v ADEJA KATHY MACKI, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/10/2009. Defendant sentencing was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $200 fines, and $68 costs.

PEOPLE v EVITA T. MACKLIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/13/2009. Sentenced to 5 years probation, $825 costs, supervision fee $600, attorney fees $250, state minimum costs $68, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $14,604.

PEOPLE v LISA MACNEIL, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/03/2010. 12 month delayed sentence with $100 in court costs, $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v VENIKA MACON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,736

PEOPLE v CHARNATTIA MADISON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v ELIAS JOSEPH MAIZI, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/02/2009. Defendant received a 1 year delayed sentence.

PEOPLE v FARRES MAJHED, charged with Racketeering, Food Stamp Trafficking, Conspiracy and Financial Transaction Device - Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/22/2010. Defendant pled to Food Stamp Fraud and was sentenced to 2 years probation and $15,000 forfeiture.

PEOPLE v ALI AHMAD MAKKI, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne Count. Plea Agreement on 01/30/2009 to Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation less than $250 - Misdemeanor. Sentenced to 6 months probation, fine, costs, tax, and penalties.

PEOPLE v MAHMOUND SAMI MAKKY, charged with 4 counts False Pretenses, $20000 or more and 4 counts Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/16/2009. Defendant pled guilty to 1 count of False Pretenses over $1,000. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, restitution, $68 state costs, $60 CVF, supervision fee to be calculated on 5 years, and $600 court costs.

PEOPLE v TABATHA MALLORY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,601.

PEOPLE v BRETT MALOLEY, charged with 4 counts Using a Computer and the Internet for Communicating with Another to Commit a Crime, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 09/30/2010. Defendant pled guilty to 2 counts of Using Computer to Commit a Crime (Accosting a Minor for Immoral Purposes) and received 2 years probation.

PEOPLE v LAHIB MAMOU, charged with Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 30th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/20/2010 to Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Misdemeanor. Sentenced to 3 months probation and $400 court costs.

PEOPLE v JOSEPHINE MANION, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,868.

PEOPLE v MYRNA MANN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,589.

PEOPLE v LAWRENCE FAROUK MANNI, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/01/2009. Defendant received a 1 year delayed sentence, forfeit all monies confiscated to State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund, no contact with casinos, gambling screening and treatment as directed, $100 court costs, $100 attorney fee, and $100 fines.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL MANNONE, charged with Selling/Furnishing Alcohol to Minor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court without prejudice on 11/18/2010.

PEOPLE v NOAS MANSOOR, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2010. Defendant was ordered to pay $200 fines and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v PIERRE MAPP, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,098.

PEOPLE v JENNY BASIL MAQI, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Plaintiff on 05/27/2010. The matter was dismissed without prejudice.

PEOPLE v SARAB MAQI, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/12/2010. Defendant pled guilty to Disorderly Person Loitering and was given 6 months delayed sentence with $200 fines and $200 court costs.

PEOPLE v TAMMY MARCHAND, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,238.

PEOPLE v OLDS MARINGA, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $5,724.

PEOPLE v MARILYN JEAN MARKHAM, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 32-A District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/06/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, no involvement with illegal gambling, 100 hours community service, $1,000 fines, $500 costs, $360 supervision fee.

PEOPLE v DENNIS MARLOWE, charged with Computer Fraud, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/21/2010. Defendant pled to False Pretenses $200-$1,000 and was sentenced to 1 year probation.

PEOPLE v ANDREW MAROGI, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/04/2010. Defendant was sentenced to $200 fines, $200 court costs, no contact with justice system, and no contact with casinos.

PEOPLE v RAESHONDA MARSHALL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/23/2010.

PEOPLE v SASONDRA MARSHALL, charged with Larceny in a Building, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/10/2010. Defendant was sentenced to probation and to pay restitution in the amount of $3,125.

PEOPLE v SELINA MARSHALL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/25/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v ALICIA MARTIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v CLIFFE MARTIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $3,543 restitution.

PEOPLE v JOI MARTIN, charged with Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $17,510.74.

PEOPLE v MONIQUE MARTIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $495, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $360, and restitution in the amount of $9,359.56.

PEOPLE v NAEEMAH MARTIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,215.

PEOPLE v TASHA MARTIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/02/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $495, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $360, and restitution in the amount of $7,835.

PEOPLE v GERALD MARZETTE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/26/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,036.

PEOPLE v TAMAROFF MARZETTE, charged with Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/11/2010. Defendant was sentenced to the 1 year probation, court costs $600, CVF $50, supervision fee $120, other costs $450.

PEOPLE v ANDREA MASHATT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,066.

PEOPLE v DARON MASON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,684.80.

PEOPLE v LEROY MASSENBURG, charged with Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/01/2010. Defendant pled to False Pretenses $200-$1,000. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $53 state fee, $50 CVF, $165 court costs, $400 attorney fees, and no contact with casinos.

PEOPLE v NAKIA MATHIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/13/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $825 costs, supervision fee $600, attorney fees $250, state minimum costs $68, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $49,794.

PEOPLE v VERNISHA MATHIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $23,715.

PEOPLE v LAKEISHA MATKINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,950.

PEOPLE v ANDREA DIANE MATTHEWS, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2009. Defendant received a delayed sentence for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $200 fines, and $68 costs.

PEOPLE v MARICA MATTHEWS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v MARLON MATTHEWS, charged with 8 counts UCC-Filing False/Fraudulent Finance Statement, 56th Circuit Court-Eaton County. Convicted by a verdict of 4 counts on 4/15/2008. Defendant was sentenced to 365 days in jail for each count to run concurrent with 97 days credited, 36 months probation, $660 costs, and fees.

PEOPLE v TOCCARA MATTHEWS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

07/14/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $563, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $360, and restitution in the amount of $8,176.

PEOPLE v ANNETTE MARIE MAY, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 23rd District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/24/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to pay $500 fines and costs.

PEOPLE v CYNTHIA MAYBERRY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,717.

PEOPLE v DENNIS MAYBERRY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $608.

PEOPLE v RAQUEL MAYO, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,004.

PEOPLE v SENEKUA L MAYS, charged with Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/02/2010. Defendant pled guilty to Misdemeanor False Pretenses less than $1,000. Defendant was sentenced to cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of others involved in the matter.

PEOPLE v CANDIC MCBRIDE-SHELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,176.

PEOPLE v TARHONDA MCBRIDE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v ROBIN MCBURROWS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $11,885.

PEOPLE v CATINA MCCAIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $495 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $360 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $5,376.

PEOPLE v ARIANA MCCLAIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/10/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court

costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $30,100.

PEOPLE v CHRISTINA MCCLAIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state $60, supervision fees $600, and restitution in the amount of $23,748.

PEOPLE v JENNIE MCCLENDON, charged with 1 count of Felony Gambling Activities at the Motor City Casino, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/03/2010 to False pretenses less than $200. Defendant was sentenced to 1 yr probation, $45 state costs, $50 CVF, $300 court costs, $300 attorney fees, and Defendant must testify truthfully at all future proceedings.

PEOPLE v JACKSI MCCOMBS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v INDIA MCCORD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v SHARON MCCORMICK, charged with Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,064.

PEOPLE v FRANCES LOUISE MCCOWIAN, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/12/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant is to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, was ordered to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $200 fines, and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v PAMELA MCCOY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $4,612.

PEOPLE v BRENDA MCCRAY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,182.

PEOPLE v CHARICE MCDANIEL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,048.

PEOPLE v NATISHA MCDANIEL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

04/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $65,148.

PEOPLE v INDIA MCDOUGAL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status with $40 in attorney fees and restitution in the amount of $1,333.

PEOPLE v ANTIONETTE MCELROY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $766.

PEOPLE v BARBARA CAROLYN MCGARTH, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/13/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 6 months delayed probation.

PEOPLE v CERVANTE MCGOUGH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,540.

PEOPLE v DEBORA MCGUIRE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/28/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v TAMIKA CHANTY MCINTOSH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, restitution $66,729.

PEOPLE v ROBERT FRANCIS MCISAAC, charged with 1 count Keeping a Gambling House, 35th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/28/2009. Defendant sentenced to 1 year probation, no illegal gambling, $180 oversight fee, $300 fines, and $50 costs.

PEOPLE v PATRICK MCKEEVER, charged with Second Degree Murder and Manslaughter, 37th Circuit Court-Calhoun County. Plea Agreement on 01/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 10-30 years with Michigan Department of Corrections. Defendant was ordered to pay $68 court cost, $60 CVF, $451 attorney fees and an amount to be determined to Crime Victim's Services for funeral expenses.

PEOPLE v ERICKA MCKEITHAN, charged with 1 count MDOPP less than $200, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/27/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 17 days in the Wayne County Jail, credit for 17 days served, 6 months probation, $100 restitution, $100 fine, $50 CVF, and $210 supervision fee.

PEOPLE v ANNA MCKINNEY, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing- Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/09/2010. Defendant received a 6 month delayed sentence with a $100 fine and $100 court costs.

PEOPLE v MINNIE MCKINSTRY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,687.

PEOPLE v ANNIE MCLORN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/25/2010 in the. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v SHANIKA MCMICKEL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,364.

PEOPLE v JERYLEEN MCNEAL, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/12/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, screening for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $100 fines, $100 costs, $100 attorney fees, and $139 winnings are forfeit to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v SHARRANCE S. MEALY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, supervision fee $60, CVF $60, court costs $825, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $34,176.

PEOPLE v MARTHA MEDINA, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v MONIQUE MEDLEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/27/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $38,942.

PEOPLE v ROSE MEEKS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $6,270.

PEOPLE v DARRY MELSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v AKIM MENA, charged with Gambling Activities - Misdemeanor Violation, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/26/2010. Defendant was assessed fines $100, and court costs $100.

PEOPLE v SHERRI MENTING, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $4,176.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY MERHI, charged with Gambling - Minor - Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/16/2010. Defendant received a 1 month delayed sentence requiring payment of $200 in fines and $200 in court costs.

PEOPLE v MYLES MERRIWEATHER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 11/01/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v BELAL MHEISEN, charged with Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/01/2010. Defendant pled guilty to Misdemeanor Tobacco Products Tax Act Violations and his sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to pay $768 in restitution to the State of Michigan, and $200 fines/costs.

PEOPLE v GJON MHILLI, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant received a 1 year delayed sentence and ordered to pay $100 in fines and $100 in court costs.

PEOPLE v SALWAN MOAYED MICHAEL, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/10/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 6 months, $100 fines, $200 costs, and $93.10 forfeit to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v VONETTIA MIDGETT, charged with Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,056.

PEOPLE v FISNIK MIFTIU, charged with Gambling Operations - Felony Violation, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/03/2010. Defendant pled to Maintaining a Gambling Room - Misdemeanor, and was sentenced to 2 years probation, forfeiture of all monies and machines, $10,000 in restitution, and a $400 supervision fee.

PEOPLE v DENISE MILES, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/13/2009. Defendant sentenced to 1 year probation, $250 court costs, $30/month supervision fee ($30 x 12 = $360), and no contact with casinos.

PEOPLE v RENATA MILES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,573.

PEOPLE v FEJZO MILKIC, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v CHERISSA MILLER, charged with 1 count Food Stamps - Fraud Over $1,000 00, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/13/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation.

PEOPLE v DEBORA MILLER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $67,237.52.

PEOPLE v REGINALD MILLER, charged with 1 count Conspiracy to Commit False Pretenses $20,000 or more and 2 Counts of False Pretenses $20,000 or more, 56th Circuit Court-Eaton County. Plea Agreement on 04/17/2009. Defendant pled to 1 count of False Pretenses over $1,000. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, 30 days jail with credit for 9 days, 100 hours community service, restitution in the amount of $56,000 joint and several with co-defendants, $68 court costs, $60 CVF, and $1,200 supervision fee.

PEOPLE v RONDALE MILLER, charged with 2 counts Felony Financial Transaction Device - Uttering and Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/19/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, court costs $250, and fines of $250.

PEOPLE v TERRY ANN MILLER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/27/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $11,115.

PEOPLE v WADDELL MILLER, charged with Retail Fraud - Third Degree, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/24/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 30 days jail.

PEOPLE v DARNELL MILLS, charged with Failure to Register (Sex Offender), 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/25/2009. Defendant sentenced to probation.

PEOPLE v KEISHA PATRICE MINOR, charged with 14 counts Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 6 counts Food Stamps - Fraud Over $1,000, 2 counts Food Stamps - Fraud $250 or less, 7 counts Financial Transaction Device - Furnishing Goods or Services and 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/09/2009. Defendant pled to Food Stamps - Fraud $250 or less. Defendant sentenced to probation for 1 year.

PEOPLE v MARSHARIEA MINTER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/02/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $495, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $360, and restitution in the amount of $9,278.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE MINZEY, charged with 2 counts of Larceny, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/12/2010. Defendant received a 1 year delayed sentence, was ordered to pay court costs of $100, and fines of $50.

PEOPLE v NAMIR MIO, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/03/2010. Defendant received 6 month delayed sentence with a $100 fine, $100 court costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v EMAN MIRFIQ, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v FRANK JOSEPH MISORSKI, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations - Felony Violations, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Plaintiff on 04/16/2009.

PEOPLE v SANDRA KATHLEEN MISORSKI, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations -Felony Violations, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 05/15/2009.

PEOPLE v ZAKARIA MISSED, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,297.

PEOPLE v DARREN MITCHELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $595.

PEOPLE v DELMIRE MITCHELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/20/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $27,138.

PEOPLE v EDITH LYNN MITCHELL, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/02/2009. Defendant ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, ordered to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $125 fine, and all winnings confiscated donated to Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v JENNIFER MITCHELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $917.

PEOPLE v STEPHANIE MITCHELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

10/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,744.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL JOHN MODENA, charged with 4 counts UCC-Filing False/Fraudulent Finance Statement, 56th Circuit Court-Eaton County. Plea Agreement on 03/24/2009. Defendant sentenced to pay fines $500, costs $500, supervision fee $600, state costs $120, CVF $60, and restitution. Defendant must serve 100 days in the Eaton County Jail with credit for 100 days served and 100 hours of community service.

PEOPLE v IBRAHIM SALEH-ALI MOHAMED, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 20 counts Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 8 counts Food Stamps - Fraud Over $1,000, and 8 counts Financial Transaction Device - Furnish Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/27/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Food Stamp Fraud over $250 but less than $1,000. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation.

PEOPLE v NOORALDAIN SALEH MOHAMED, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 20 counts Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 8 counts Food Stamps - Fraud Over $1,000, and 8 counts Financial Transaction Device - Furnish Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/27/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Food Stamp Fraud over $250 but less than $1,000. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation.

PEOPLE v MUHAMMAD MOHEISEN, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 4/19/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $200 state costs, $360 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $1,500.

PEOPLE v ROSA MONCION, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status with $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,050.

PEOPLE v MIKEEL MONGER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,530.

PEOPLE v DOROTHY MONIER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/24/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $495, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $360, and restitution in the amount of $3,837.

PEOPLE v CHRSHONDA MONROE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/26/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,808.

PEOPLE v SHAWN MONTGOMERY, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conspiracy, 3rd Circuit Court-

Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/27/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, no contact with any casinos or any gambling, attend gamblers anonymous, $60 CVF, $68 state fee, $360 supervision fee, $600 costs, and $5,000 restitution.

PEOPLE v KIMBERLY LYNN MOODY, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 27th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Plaintiff without prejudice on 09/21/2009.

PEOPLE v ANGEL MOORE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,128

PEOPLE v ANNIE MOORE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,311.

PEOPLE v FELICIA MOORE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $819.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE MOORE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v OMAR MOORE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v OMARI MOORE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v SANDRA MOORE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/26/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,675.

PEOPLE v SHAVON MOORE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/27/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $16,771.

PEOPLE v TAMIKA MOORE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,867.

PEOPLE v TAWANA MOORE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v TINA MOORE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,080.

PEOPLE v TONYA MOORE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $6,873.

PEOPLE v VICTORIA MOORE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $13,746.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM MORAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v IVORY MORGAN, charged with 1 count False Pretenses - More than $999 but less than $20,000, 1 count Insurance - Fraudulent Acts, and 1 count Insurance Fraud - Conspiracies, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. Acquittal verdict on 05/14/2009.

PEOPLE v PATRICIA DASILVA MORIKAWA-PAVLINAC, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Peron -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/25/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 6 months delayed sentence, no contact with casinos, and monies confiscated are forfeit.

PEOPLE v SHERYL MORRIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,107.40.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH GEORGE MORROW, charged with 1 Child Sexually Abusive Activity, 1 count Using a Computer Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit Crime, 1 count Disseminating Sexually Explicit Matter to a Minor, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 07/14/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months to 20 years, sex offender registration, and $858 in fines and costs.

PEOPLE v TRACEY MORROW, charged with Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,557.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM MORTON, charged with 2 counts Homicide - Murder 1st Degree -Premeditated, 9 counts Assault with Intent to Commit Murder, 2 counts Weapons - Felony Firearm, and 1 count Open Murder, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Defendant found guilty on all counts and sentenced to mandatory life without parole, $390 state minimum costs, $600 court costs, and $60 CVF.

PEOPLE v YOLANDA MOSBY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $658.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM MOSLEY, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2010. Defendant received a delayed 1 year sentence, ordered to pay $200 fines, $200 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY MATHEW MUCCIANTE, charged with 2 counts Embezzlement -Agent/Trustee more than $20,000 but less than $50,000, 4 counts Embezzlement - Agent/Trustee more than $999 but less than $20,000, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 11/23/2009. Defendant pled to Embezzlement over $20,000 and Embezzlement over $1,000. Defendant was sentenced to 17 months to 15 years. Defendant ordered to pay $48,000 restitution, $60 CVF, and $136 state costs.

PEOPLE v ROKIBA HAMZA MUHAMMAD, charged with 2 counts Uttering & Publishing Counterfeit Bill or Note, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 02/17/2010 without prejudice.

PEOPLE v SHERRI MULLINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/25/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v CAROL MUNSON-RHONE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,300.

PEOPLE v SAM MUHSSEN MUQBEL, charged with 2 counts Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/30/2010. Defendant received a 1 year delayed sentence with $100 in court costs and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v GREGORY MURRAY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v RIYADH MUSA, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Plaintiff on 11/15/2010.

PEOPLE v RIYADH MUSA, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/15/2010. Defendant received a 12 month delayed sentence with $200 in court costs and $200 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v LAWANDA ANN MYLES, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea

Agreement on 11/16/2009. Defendant was sentenced to a1 year delayed sentence, screening for gambling addiction and treatment as indicated, $100 fine, $200 court costs, $200 attorney fee, and must have no contact with casinos.

PEOPLE v N AND J PETROLEUM, charged with 2 counts of Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, Food Stamps - Fraud Over $1,000, 1 count Financial Transaction Device - Furnish Goods or Services, and 1 count Criminal Enterprises – Conducting, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement with dismissal on 03/19/2010.

PEOPLE v NABIL & SONS, charged with Racketeering, Food Stamp Trafficking, Conspiracy and Financial Transaction Device - Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement with dismissal on 03/19/2010.

PEOPLE v STEPHENIE NABINGER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,262.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL NAGY, charged with Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, Criminal Enterprises - Conspiracy, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/27/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, no contact with any casinos or gambling, attend gamblers anonymous, $60 CVF, $68 state fee, $360 supervision fee, $600 costs, and $5,000 restitution to Motor City Casino.

PEOPLE v ANGELICA NANCE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,911.

PEOPLE v KRYSTAL NANDIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,818.

PEOPLE v DANIEL JOHN NANNEY, charged with Gambling House - Permitting for Gain, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation with no jail time, $750 fines and $50 court costs.

PEOPLE v ANDRASHA LEMEKA NASH, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/05/2009. Defendant sentenced to 18 months probation and released to parole hold in Ohio.

PEOPLE v CARVIN NASH, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/12/2009. Defendant his sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, screening for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $100 fines, $100 costs, $100 attorney fees, and the $1,674 in winnings are forfeited to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v TENITA NASH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/29/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $15,536.80.

PEOPLE v RADWAN NASSER, charged with Tobacco Products Tax Act Violations, 4th Circuit Court-Jackson County. Plea Agreement on 11/18/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 30 months probation and restitution in the amount of $19,388.

PEOPLE v LATRICE NEAL, charged with 1, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/26/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $6,694.40.

PEOPLE v SHEILA NEAL, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $200 fines, $100 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v ADA NEGRON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $895.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL ANGELO NELSON, charged with 1 count Past Posting, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/15/2010. Defendant pled to False Pretenses less than $200 and was sentenced to 6 months probation, $30 restitution, $53 state costs, $50 CVF, $165 court costs, $400 attorney fee, and a $500 fine.

PEOPLE v LORENE NEVIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,168.

PEOPLE v NEW ERA CANNING, charged with 1 count Water Resources Violation, 27th Circuit Court-Newaygo County. Plea Agreement on 01/19/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $60 CVF, $4,872 fines, and $68 state costs.

PEOPLE v PHOUNG THI NGO, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person –Trespassing, 36th District Court -Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/25/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, no contact with the casino or the criminal justice system, screening for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, and complete any treatment as indicated after the screening. The court waived fines and costs.

PEOPLE v BE THI NGUYEN, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court -Wayne County. Dismissed by Plaintiff on 05/20/2010.

PEOPLE v NGOC LANTHI NGUYEN, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea

Agreement on 06/24/2009. Defendant was sentenced to, 2 years probation, 80 hours community service, $250 fines, $250 costs, $35 monthly supervision fee ($35 x 24 = $840), and gambling screening.

PEOPLE v MADONNA JOY NICHOLS, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 67th District Court-Central Division-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 09/29/2009. Defendant received a 1 year delayed sentence, must testify truthfully at all related matters, no contact with gaming, $53 State cost, and $50 CVF

PEOPLE v RENEE LEE NICKELS, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/29/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Trespass by a Disassociated Person. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $200 fines, and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v RENEE LEE NICKELS, charged with 2 counts Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/29/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Trespass by a Disassociated Person. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $200 fines, and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v CLARICE NICKERSON, charged with Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $26,843.

PEOPLE v SCOTT JONATHON NIECKO, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation, 10th District Court-Calhoun County. Plea Agreement on 05/14/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $1,000 restitution, fines and costs of $250.

PEOPLE v DENNIS NIX, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,479.

PEOPLE v TENNILLE NIX, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/14/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $495, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $360, and restitution in the amount of $4,805.

PEOPLE v SUZANNE MARIE NORTHUP, charged with 1 count Gambling House - Permitting for Gain, 42-2nd District Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 06/16/2009. Defendant's plea was taken under advisement for 1 year. Defendant is to have no contact with illegal gambling, pay $250 fines/costs, and cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of same or similar incidents.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM ALBERT NORWOOD, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/18/2010. Defendant's sentencing was delayed for 1 year. Defendant was ordered to pay $100 fines, $100 costs, $120 oversight fee, and $28 to be forfeited to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v ARNOLD JOSEPH NOWICKI, charged with Explosives - Send with Intent to Frighten, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/20/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, anger management, $68 state costs, $600 Court costs, $60 CVF.

PEOPLE v LATIFAH NUMAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $5,251.50

PEOPLE v EDWARD O'CONNOR, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v NAJEEB ODEFA, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,774.

PEOPLE v MARIAN B. OLANIYAN, charged with 3 counts Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/13/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, costs $825, supervision fee $600, attorney fees $250, state minimum costs $68, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $33,621.

PEOPLE v VIRGINIA OLESZKOWICZ, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/16/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $33,210.

PEOPLE v SHERRY OLIVER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,546.

PEOPLE v ROBERT O'QUINN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $887.

PEOPLE v JOHN FRANCIS ORMANIAN, charged with 1 count Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult $20,000 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Plaintiff on 05/19/2009.

PEOPLE v VIRGINIA ANN ORMANIAN, charged with 1 count Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult $20,000 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/19/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, minimum of $10,000 restitution, no care for anyone 62 year old or older, no gambling or contact with casinos, $60 CVF, $60 state fee, $600 costs, $400 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE ORNDORFF, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

EOPLE v ADIL GEORGE ORO, charged with 2 counts Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation -Felony, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2009. Defendant pled to a Misdemeanor TPTA violation. Defendant agreed to waive any claim to the seized vehicle, the tobacco products seized, $3,433 in cash, and pay $1500 in restitution.

PEOPLE v LADONNA OSBORNE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/19/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $9,399.60.

PEOPLE v LACRECHA OSTERMAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/28/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v FADEL OUZA, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,534.

PEOPLE v BETH LOUISE OWENS, charged with 1 count Gambling House - Permitting for Gain, 42-2nd District Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year non-reporting probation with no contact with the criminal justice system or illegal gambling, pay $300 fines, and $300 costs.

PEOPLE v ELAINE OWENS, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 1 count Identity Theft and 1 count Habitual Offender - Fourth Offense Notice, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/30/2009. Defendant pled to 1 count Uttering & Publishing and 1 count ID Theft. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, no contact with the casinos, outpatient substance abuse treatment, $60 CVF, $60 state fee, $360 supervision fee, $600 costs, and $400 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v KRISTINA OWENS, charged with 2 counts Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/29/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $37,653.

PEOPLE v VANESSA OWENS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v TAMIKA MARIE PAGE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $10,832.

PEOPLE v DANA PALMER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/27/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, $60 CVF, and restitution in the amount of $43,210.

PEOPLE v ERNESTINE PALMER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,539.

PEOPLE v TIFFENEY YVETTE PALMER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/14/2009. Defendants sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, $60 CVF, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $41,779.

PEOPLE v ANTONIO PARKER, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing and 1 count Habitual Offender - Third Offense Notice, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/20/2009. Defendant pled to U&P and was sentenced to 24 months probation with fines/costs of $600, and no contact with casinos.

PEOPLE v KENYA PARKER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/26/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,401.

PEOPLE v ROZETTA PARKER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and $3,453 restitution.

PEOPLE v RICHARD ALLEN PASHNIK, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/14/2010. Defendant received a 1 year delayed sentence, ordered to pay $50 costs, $100 attorney fees, and $3,350.20 winnings to State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE PASSINO, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $6,986.

PEOPLE v SHASHIKANT PATEL, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation, 22nd Circuit Court-Washtenaw County. Plea Agreement on 05/20/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $48 state costs, $416 court costs, $45 CVF, and $6,162 in restitution.

PEOPLE v PATRICH, INC., charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing and 1 count Forgery, 54-A District Court-Ingham County. Plea Agreement on 1/06/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation and ordered to pay costs, fine and restitution totaling $5,400.

PEOPLE v EBONI PATTERSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,278.

PEOPLE v KRISTAL PATTERSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/27/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $730 costs, $495 fees, and restitution in the amount of $6,075.

PEOPLE v RONNIE DENNIS PAULSEN, charged with 4 counts Using the Computer to Solicit a Minor for Sex, and 3 counts of Using the Computer to Disseminate Sexually Explicit Matter to a Minor, 8th Circuit Court-Montcalm County. Guilty verdict by jury on 06/25/2009, convicted of all counts. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months to 10 years, sex offender registration, and $1,986 in fines and costs.

PEOPLE v PETER PAULUS IV, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing and 2 counts Identity Theft, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/04/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1½ to 10 years in the Michigan Department of Corrections.

PEOPLE v KEISHA PAYMOND, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, state costs $68, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $13,561.83.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM PAYNE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v SANDRA PEARSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,774.

PEOPLE v SHAKYA PEARSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,247.

PEOPLE v NAKIA PENNIX, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/12/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $24,855.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH MICHAEL PERAINO, charged with 6 counts of Computers/Internet - Children Accosting for Immoral Purposes and 2 counts of Computers/Internet - Disseminating Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors, 31st Circuit Court -St. Clair County. Plea Agreement on 05/24/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 8 months in county jail.

PEOPLE v ANDREW PERKINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY GEROME PERKINS, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing and 1 count Habitual Offender - Third Offense Notice, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/27/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months probation.

PEOPLE v JELANI PERKINS, charged with Financial Transaction Device - Steal/Retain without Consent, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/14/2009. Defendant sentenced to 2 years probation, counseling, and $1,500 fines/costs.

PEOPLE v DENNIS ANTOINE PERRY, charged with 1 count Felony Financial Transaction Device - Possession, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/05/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $60 state costs, $60 CVF, $120 supervision fee, $160 court costs, and $400 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v JENNIFER PERRY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,690.

PEOPLE v LATEENA PERRY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and $2,640 restitution.

PEOPLE v VENUS PERRY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,228.

PEOPLE v VERONICA ELAINE PERRY, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/16/2009. Defendant order to pay fines $100, costs $100, and attorney fees $100.

PEOPLE v KENNETH PETERSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v SIMIKIA DARNETT PETERSON, charged with 3 counts Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/23/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, no contact with casinos, $900 restitution, $60 state fee, $60 CVF, $240 supervision fee, $300 court costs, and $400 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v DENISE SHERRIE PETTIES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

08/28/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $825 court costs, $250 attorney fees, $60 CVF, $600 supervision fee, state minimum costs $68 and restitution in the amount of $44,984.

PEOPLE v SHALA PETTWAY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $4,941.

PEOPLE v JOHN KURT PFEIFFER, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $200 fines, $200 costs, $100 attorney fees, and $1,750 in winnings forfeit to the state of Michigan compulsive gambling prevention fund.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY CARL PHILLIPS, charged with 1 count Sex Offender failure to register, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County. Convicted on 01/07/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 30 months probation, 6 months jail, sex offender registry, $300 in court costs, $60 in CVF, and $60 in state costs.

PEOPLE v MALINDA FAYE PHILLIPS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/29/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state fee $60, and restitution in the amount of $58,796.

PEOPLE v NATHANIEL PHILLIPS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v REGINALD PHILLIPS, charged with 3 counts Uttering & Publishing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Plaintiff on 04/28/2010.

PEOPLE v CHARMAINE PHILSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and $3,344 restitution.

PEOPLE v BONNIE PICKENS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v PATRICE PICKENS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,926.

PEOPLE v STEPHANIE PIERRIE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v LESLEY PINKINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,137.

PEOPLE v DEBRA PITTS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/20/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $24,398.

PEOPLE v PLYMOUTH GAS AND MART, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 20 counts Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 8 counts Food Stamps - Fraud Over $1,000, and 8 counts Financial Transaction Device - Furnish Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/27/2009. 1/27/09 Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation.

PEOPLE v JAWANA POLLOCK, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,485.

PEOPLE v KENNETH MICHAEL POMEROY, charged with 4 counts Computer - Net - Communicating to Commit Crime, 36th Circuit Court-Van Buren County. Plea Agreement on 02/09/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, $2,400 supervision fee, and sex offender registration.

PEOPLE v KEISHA POOL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,178.

PEOPLE v ERBIE PORTER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v TONI PORTER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,304.

PEOPLE v SHELDON POWELL, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity and 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Material - Possession, 38th Circuit Court-Monroe County. Plea Agreement on 06/04/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year jail, 5 years probation, sex offender registration, and must pay restitution of $15,478.54 to HUD.

PEOPLE v WENDY POWELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,824.

PEOPLE v LATOYA POWELS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/27/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 6 months probation, $60 CVF, supervision fee, $68 court costs and restitution in the amount of $22,078.

PEOPLE v GLORIA POWERS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/14/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $11,413.

PEOPLE v MICAELA PRECAJ, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v LINDA MARGARET PRESTON, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/10/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, pay $100 fines, and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v SENOLA PRICE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/09/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, court costs $825, CVF $60, attorney fees $250, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $85,488.

PEOPLE v STEVEN PRICE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v TORE PRICE, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/16/2010. Defendant received 6-month delayed sentence with $100 in court costs and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v FELICIA PRIMM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v DIANDRA PRINGLE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/09/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $12,592.

PEOPLE v MARC ALEXANDER PULK, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespass, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed 1 year. Defendant was ordered to pay $200 fines, $200 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v ASHLEY PULLIAM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $6,628.

PEOPLE v SHEILA M. PULLIAM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/31/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $40,876.

PEOPLE v SHAWANNA PURDY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/13/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $46,831.20.

PEOPLE v MOTHANA QARAA, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespass - Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/09/2010. Defendant received 1 year delayed sentence, $100 fine, $100 court costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v MAHDY MAHAMMAD QASEM, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/18/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 30 days in jail.

PEOPLE v MWAFAG QUEISI, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act - Unauthorized Tax Stamps, 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act - Selling Product without Tax Stamp and 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 5th District Court-Berrien County. Plea Agreement on 03/25/2009. Defendant received a delayed sentence.

PEOPLE v QUICK FILL, charged with Racketeering, Food Stamp Trafficking, Conspiracy and Financial Transaction Device - Furnishing Goods or Services, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation and $60,000 forfeiture.

PEOPLE v PATRICK QUINN, charged with Larceny in a Building - Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant pled guilty to a Larceny Misdemeanor and was sentenced to 1 year probation with fines and costs.

PEOPLE v ERIC QUINNEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v NUZHAT QURESHI, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing - Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/10/2010. Defendant received a 6 month delayed sentence with a court imposed fine of $100 and $100 court costs.

PEOPLE v CHANEL RACHARD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v JEREMY RADEMACHER, charged with 3 counts of Computers - Internet- Communicating with Another to Commit Crime - Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-

Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, CVF $60, and supervision fee $365.

PEOPLE v SINGH RAGHBIR, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 2 counts Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 3 counts Food Stamps - Fraud Over $1,000, and 2 counts Financial Transaction Device - Furnishing Goods or Services, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 03/16/2009. Case dismissed.

PEOPLE v AYAT RAHAL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,257.

PEOPLE v SHAMIMUR RAHMAN, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/10/2009. Defendant's sentencing was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $200 fines, and $68 costs.

PEOPLE v YOUSEF RAIA, charged with 1 count Larceny, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/30/2010. Defendant received a 6 month delayed sentence with $100 in court costs and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v ASHTON RAINES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/28/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v SARAH RAINES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/28/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v SHUKRIA YOSIF RAIS, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/22/2009. Defendant pled to False Pretenses less than $200. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year non-reporting probation, $50 CVF, $45 state fee, $600 court costs, and no contact with casinos.

PEOPLE v RICHARD CARL RAITHEL, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations - Felony Violations, 26-2nd District Court-Wayne County. Case was dismissed by Plaintiff, 11/11/2009.

PEOPLE v DANIELLE RAMSEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,745.

PEOPLE v LAURA RAMSEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v CHISA RANDALL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $60 CVF, $825 court costs, $600 supervision fee, $250 attorney fees, $68 felony fee and restitution in the amount of $53,433.26.

PEOPLE v LATRINA RANDLE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/27/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $730 costs, $495 fees, and restitution in the amount of $10,069.

PEOPLE v TIFFANY RATLIFF, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 2 years probation with attorney fee $250, Court costs $345, CVF $60, supervision fee $240 restitution in the amount of $7,093.32.

PEOPLE v RICK PATON RAY, charged with 2 counts Water Resources Protection Violations, 78th District Court-Oceana County. Case dismissed on 11/23/2009.

PEOPLE v TODD JOSEPH RAY, charged 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity, 1 count Using a Computer Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit Crime, 1 count Habitual Offender - Third Offense Notice, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 09/15/2009. Defendant sentenced to 18 months to 20 years, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, and $702 in restitution.

PEOPLE v FAYE RAYE, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/05/2010. Defendant received a 12 month delayed sentence with $100 in court costs and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v LAKISSIUA REAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/19/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,800.

PEOPLE v JANNETTE REDD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $7,553 restitution.

PEOPLE v PAMELA REDDING, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,378.

PEOPLE v SAUNDRA REDEEMER-ROSS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/25/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v DAPHNE DELORES REED, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea

Agreement on 11/16/2009. Defendant was sentenced to a 1 year delayed sentence, screening for gambling addiction with treatment as necessary, $100 fines, $200 court costs, $100 attorney fees, and must have no contact with casinos.

PEOPLE v JAMES A. REED, charged with 1 count Water Resources Protection Violations and 1 count Hazardous Substance - Knowing Release of Hazardous Substance - False Statement, 4th District Court-Cass County. Plea Agreement on 06/26/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, and $6,335 in restitution.

PEOPLE v JENITA REED, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,982.

PEOPLE v STACY REED, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,711.

PEOPLE v NATASHA REESE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/02/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,922.

PEOPLE v ILENA ANGELINA REEVES, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to pay $200 fines, $200 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v CHRISTINA RENFROE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v DAGOBERTO TAVEREZ REYES, charged with 2 counts Identity Theft, 8 counts False Pretenses - $20,000 or more, and 4 counts False Pretenses more than $999 but less than $20,000, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed on 05/18/09 without prejudice.

PEOPLE v ELIZABETH REYES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,290

PEOPLE v CYNTHIA REYNOLDS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed on 07/09/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v CHRISTINA RICHARDS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/29/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $730 costs, $495 fees and restitution in the amount of $7,986.

PEOPLE v MONTESE RICHARDS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed on 05/29/2009. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v CHARLES RICHARDSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v FANNIE RICHARDSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,686.

PEOPLE v PATRICIA RICHARDSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v TANISHA RIDOUT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,763.

PEOPLE v CASANDRA RILEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,884.

PEOPLE v FELICIA RILEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/13/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $495 costs, supervision fee $360, attorney fees $250, state minimum costs $68, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $9,536.

PEOPLE v ASHLEY RENAE RISPER, charged with 14 counts Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 6 counts Food Stamps - Fraud Over $1,000, 2 counts Food Stamps - Fraud $250 or less, 7 counts Financial Transaction Device - Furnishing Goods or Services and 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/30/2009. Defendant pled to Misdemeanor Food Stamp Fraud $250 or less and sentenced to 1 year probation.

PEOPLE v LAKISHA RITTER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/19/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,078.

PEOPLE v NORBERT JOSEPH RIVARD, charged with Gambling Operations - Felony Violations, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 12/09/2010. Defendant received a $10,000 fine.

PEOPLE v ALICIA RIVAS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and $4,886 restitution.

PEOPLE v MOUHAMAD RIZK, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation -Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/31/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, restitution $3,650, court costs $200, state costs $50, CVF $60 supervision fee $120.

PEOPLE v THOMAS PATRICK ROACH, charged with 2 counts Oil & Gas - False Statement, 54-A District Court-Ingham County. Dismissed by Court on 01/06/2009.

PEOPLE v JANETTE ROBBINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,912.

PEOPLE v BERRY ROBERSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,076.

PEOPLE v FELICIA ROBERSON, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/21/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, $60 CVF, $68 state fee, $240 supervision fee, $330 court costs, and $400 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v SALLIE ROBERTSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,622.

PEOPLE v TERIA ROBERTSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/28/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 4 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $60 CVF, $495 court costs, $68 state fee, $360 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $6,833.

PEOPLE v ANITA ROBINSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,302.

PEOPLE v CATRINA ROBINSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/29/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution $29,196.

PEOPLE v CICQUITA ROBINSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $5,561.

PEOPLE v DELOIS ROBINSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $842.

PEOPLE v EARL ROBINSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v HARVEY ROBINSON, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing and 1 count Election Law - Recall Petition - False Statement, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Convicted by jury verdict on 10/19/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation and 90 days jail on the Uttering & Publishing count.

PEOPLE v INDIA ROBINSON charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,326.

PEOPLE v MAKEYA ROBINSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs 495, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $360, and restitution in the amount of $4,393.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL ROBINSON, charged with 1 count Larceny in a Building, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/23/2009., The Defendant pled guilty to False Pretenses less than $200 and was sentenced to 6 months probation (delayed sentence), $100 fine, $60 supervision fee, $50 CVF, and $50 state costs.

PEOPLE v NINA ROBINSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,069.

PEOPLE v TERENCE ROBINSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v THEODORE ROBINSON, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/04/2009. Defendant sentenced to no contact with casinos, court costs $120, and fines $150.

PEOPLE v VALQUIRE ROBINSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/05/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $56,786.

PEOPLE v ATIRAS ROBY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v RHANDA ROCKSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $605.

PEOPLE v LATOYA RODGERS-BOONE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/20/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution $37,834.

PEOPLE v LATOYA RODGERS-BOONE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/14/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $12,666.

PEOPLE v MONIQUE RODGERS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/28/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $825 court costs, $250 attorney fees, $60 CVF, $600 supervision fee, state minimum costs $68, and restitution in the amount of $55,767.02.

PEOPLE v ANTHIA RODREGUEZ-PEREZ, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 1 count Identity Theft, Habitual Offender- 2nd Offense Notice, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Case dismissed by court on 06/07/2010.

PEOPLE v ALLEN ROGERS, charged with Pinched and Capped Bets, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne Count. Plea Agreement on 07/27/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation with fines and costs.

PEOPLE v CARL CHESTER ROGERS, charged with False Pretenses - $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/25/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 6 months probation and restitution.

PEOPLE v GERALD DOUGLAS ROGERS, charged with Embezzlement more than $50,000 but less than $100,000, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, 100 hours community service and restitution in the amount of $50,000

PEOPLE v THEORIA ROGERS, charged with 2 counts Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 05/11/2010.

PEOPLE v BRANDIE MARIE ROOKS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/16/2009. Defendant sentenced 3 years probation, $730 costs, $495 fees, and restitution in the amount of $8,155.

PEOPLE v KAREN ROSS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $640.

PEOPLE v SONYA LYNN ROSS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/20/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution $63,941.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH ROUMAYAH, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities - Misdemeanor Violation, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/11/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation with a delayed sentence, no contact with Detroit casinos, and fines and costs of $500.

PEOPLE v NAJAH ROUNAYAH, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/30/2010. Defendant received a 6-month delayed sentence with a fine of $100 and $100 court costs.

PEOPLE v BIPLAB ROY, charged with 2 counts Uttering & Publishing and 2 counts Air Pollution Control - False Statements and Omissions, 37th District Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Misdemeanor - Air Pollution Control Violation and was sentenced to 2 years probation and a $10,000 fine.

PEOPLE v DIPANKAR ROY, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity and 5 counts Using Computer to Communicating with Another to Commit Crime, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County. Plea Agreement on 02/09/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 16 months county jail, $68 state costs, $60 CVF, and sex offender registration.

PEOPLE v JACQUES ROYAL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/20/2010. Matter referred back to DHS/OIG for recoupment.

PEOPLE v CLARENCE ROZNOWSKI, charged with 3 counts Violation of Water Resources Protection Act and 1 count Conspiracy to Violate Water Resources Protection Act, 53rd Circuit Court-Cheboygan County. Court Granted Defendant's Motion to Quash on 3/20/08.

PEOPLE v ROBERT RUDELICH, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/18/2010. Defendant received 12-month delayed sentence with $100 in court costs, and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v PAUL CHARLES RUDISEL, charged with1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity, 1 count Using a Computer Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit Crime, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 02/24/2009. Defendant pled guilty to count 1 and was sentenced to 1 to 20 years, $60 CVF, $60 state costs, $700 court costs, and $500 fines.

PEOPLE v REGINA RUFFIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,730.

PEOPLE v ASTRIT RUMI, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/14/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, $250 fines/costs, and $500 seized from Defendant at the time of arrest is forfeit to the state of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v LATREEVA RUSH, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/18/2010. Defendant received 12 month delayed sentence with $100 in court costs, and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v LYNNETTE RUSH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v NAKIA RUSSELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $4,081.25.

PEOPLE v DENNIS HENRY RUTOWSKI, charged with Permit Gambling Apparatus on Premises, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/20/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to pay $500 fines, and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v NICOLE J. RYANS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/23/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $60, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $63,691.

PEOPLE v KHALIL MAHMOUD SAAD, charged with Gambling - Disassociated person-Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/28/2010. Defendant was ordered to pay $200 fines and $200 court costs.

PEOPLE v KIMBERLY SABRA, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,007.

PEOPLE v ISAM KAMEL SADIK, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/04/2009. Defendant pled guilty to 1 count of Trespass by a Disassociated Person. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $200 fines, and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v LAKEISHA SADLER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation with attorney fees $250, CVF $60, state costs $60, supervision fee $600, court costs $825, and restitution $23,028.

PEOPLE v MUSAID SAEED, charged with 2 counts Homicide - Felony Murder, 1 count Arson- Insured Property, 1 count Arson - Real Property, 15th Circuit Court-Branch County. Convicted by jury verdict on 05/03/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 to 10 years incarceration in the Michigan Department of Corrections.

PEOPLE v LAMBROS SAITES, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations - Felony Violations, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 12/07/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months probation, $540 supervision fees, and $30,000 restitution.

PEOPLE v NAZIH SALEH, charged with 2 counts Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 38th Circuit Court-Monroe County. Plea Agreement on 07/21/2009. Defendant pled to Attempt TPTA Felony and was sentenced to 2 years probation, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, $25 per month supervision fee ($25 x 24 = $600), $250 fine, $100 court costs, and $10,000 restitution.

PEOPLE v NAOMI SALOMON, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/13/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed 1 year, ordered to pay $100 fines, $100 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v KATRINA SALTER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/23/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $60, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $42,488.

PEOPLE v CLARICE SAMMONS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,727.

PEOPLE v MARIA SANCHEZ-GARCIA, P charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v JAMES SANDERFER, charged with Food Stamps- Fraud Over $1,000, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, $400 supervision fee, and $5000 forfeiture to the State of Michigan payable during probation.

PEOPLE v ANGELENA SANDERS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $540.

PEOPLE v LAKIA SANDERS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $19,280.

PEOPLE v VICTORIA SANDERS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $5,698.

PEOPLE v REBA SANDIEFOR, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,671.

PEOPLE v MARLIN SANDIHA, charged with Gambling Activities - Misdemeanor Violation, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/15/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 9 months, ordered to complete 40 hours of community service, pay $200 fines, and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v PATRICIA SANFORD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v RICARDO SANTIAGO, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v PAUL SARKHANIAN, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/09/2010. Defendant received 6 month delayed sentence with $200 fine and $200 in court costs.

PEOPLE v ABIR MANOEL SAROKI, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 4 counts Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 4 counts Food Stamps - Fraud over $1000, and 4 counts Financial Transaction Device - Furnish Goods or Services, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 10/21/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation and forfeiture of $10,000.

PEOPLE v ARMIN SAROKI, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 4 counts Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 4 counts Food Stamps - Fraud over $1000, and 4 counts Financial Transaction Device - Furnish Goods or Services, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 10/21/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation and forfeiture of $10,000.

PEOPLE v LAYLA SAROKI, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 4 counts Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 4 counts Food Stamps - Fraud over $1000, and 4 counts Financial Transaction Device - Furnish Goods or Services, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 10/21/2009. Defendant was sentenced to probation for 5 years and must forfeit $15,000.

PEOPLE v PAULA SATKOWIAK, charged with Keeping Gambling House, 68th District Court-Genesee County. Dismissed by Plaintiff on 06/29/2010.

PEOPLE v ESSAM SATTAM, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 48 counts False Pretenses greater than $999 and less than $20,000, and

48 counts of BC - Return Nonreturnables - 100 to 10,000, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Corporate Felony and was ordered to pay $100,000 in restitution.

PEOPLE v MARLOWE SATTAM, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 48 counts False Pretenses greater than $999 and less than $20,000, and 48 counts BC-Return Nonreturnables-100 to 10,000, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. Plea Agreement on 6/24/09. Defendant pled guilty to corporate felony and ordered to pay $100,000 in restitution.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH GEORGE SAWAYA, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/05/2009. Defendant pled to Misdemeanor False Pretense $200 or more, less than $1,000. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $300 restitution, $160 costs, $15/month supervision fees ($15 x 12 = $180).

PEOPLE v LAKENYA SAWYER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,048.

PEOPLE v RODNEY SCALES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v TANYA SCHEUERMAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/06/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,450.

PEOPLE v DONALD DAVID SCHMIDT, charged with 5 counts Using Computers - Internet -Communicating with Another to Commit Crime, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 10/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $1,200 supervision fee, $136 state costs, serve 1 year in jail with first 50 days immediately with remaining 90 days on tether in lieu of jail, remaining 265 days served at end of probation, and sex offender treatment.

PEOPLE v RODNEY LYNN SCHOOLCRAFT, charged with 2 counts Oil & Gas - False Statement, 54-A District Court-Ingham County. Dismissed by Court on 01/06/2009.

PEOPLE v KEVIN SCHUH, charged with 1 count Common Law Offenses, 1 count Forgery, 1 count Uttering & Publishing and 1 count Insurance Fraud - Conspiracies, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Convicted by jury verdict on 05/27/2009. Sentenced to 9 months jail and 5 years probation.

PEOPLE v CRYSTAL MARIE SCHULTZ, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 32-A District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/06/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, no involvement with illegal gambling, 100 hours community service, $750 fines, $500 costs, and $360 supervision fee.

PEOPLE v GINNY SCHULZ, charged with 3 counts of Campaign Finance - Failure to File Campaign Statements, 54-A District Court-Ingham County. Plea Agreement

on 02/10/2010. Defendant was ordered to file all missing reports and pay $200 to the campaign finance group.

PEOPLE v ANDREW SCHUTZE, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity, 1 count Using a Computer Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit Crime, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Convicted on all counts by verdict on 06/02/2009. Defendant Sentenced to 3 to 20 years and sex offender registration.

PEOPLE v CHRISTINE SCOTT, charged with Controlled Substance - Possession of Marihuana, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/04/2010. Defendant was sentenced to a 6 month delayed sentence, $100 in court costs, and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v CYNTHIA SCOTT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,632.

PEOPLE v DEBORAH SCOTT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v NATASHA SCOTT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution in the amount of $10,618.

PEOPLE v SHERITA SCOTT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,177.

PEOPLE v JESSICA SEGARRA, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $921.

PEOPLE v LACHELL SELLERS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $5,768.

PEOPLE v MATTHEW SELLING, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,277.

PEOPLE v ENGJELL SEMSEDINI, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities - Misdemeanor Violation, 1 count Alcohol - Purchase/Consume/Possess by Minor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/11/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 12 months probation, court costs $100, and fines $100.

PEOPLE v DANNY SHABA, charged with Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 06/28/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, restitution in the amount of $7,631, 20 hours community service, $53 state cost, $50 CVF, $30 court costs, and $500 fine.

PEOPLE v DAEVON SHADE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v RAJA SHAHIN, charged with 1 count of Cheating at Mini Baccarat, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/02/2010. Defendant pled to False Pretenses less than $200 and was sentenced to 1 year probation, $200 fine, $50 state costs, $60 CVF, $165 court costs, and $400 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v ARJAN SHAHOLLI, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/04/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation and delayed sentence, no contact with casinos, $200 court costs, and $200 fines.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL FORREST SHALER, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity, 2 counts Using a Computer Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit Crime, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2009. Defendant sentenced to 2 to 20 years, CVR $60, and other costs $136.

PEOPLE v NASON SAAD SHAMASHA, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/27/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year delayed sentenced, $300 fine, $60 court costs, ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening.

PEOPLE v NABIL SHAMEL, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 01/12/2009.

PEOPLE v JALAL SHAMMAMI, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/18/2010. Defendant received a 12-month delayed sentence, $100 in court costs, and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v JALAL SHAMMAMI, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/18/2010. Defendant was given 12 month delayed sentence, $100 court costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v JALAL SHAMMAMI, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Plaintiff on 10/18/2010.

PEOPLE v ALAA SHAMON, charged with 1 count Tobacco Product Tax Act Violation -Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

06/29/2009., Defendant pled as charged to TPTA Misdemeanor. Sentenced to $1,100 fine plus court costs.

PEOPLE v PATRICK LEO SHARKEY, charged with 1 count Common Law Offenses and 1 count Assault or Assault and Battery, 54th Circuit Court-Tuscola County. Plea Agreement on 06/03/2009. Defendant pled to misdemeanor charge of Assault and Battery.

PEOPLE v KAREN SHARPE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,406.

PEOPLE v SOPHIA SHARPLEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and $2,142 restitution.

PEOPLE v NAZAR JAMIL SHARRAK, charged with 2 counts Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/09/2009. Restitution in the amount of $10,000.

PEOPLE v THAMER SHARRAK, 2 counts Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 06/18/2009.

PEOPLE v TOMEKA SHAW, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/28/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v NORA SHERIDAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/12/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $495 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $360 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $7,858.40.

PEOPLE v GAIL SHORTER, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing - Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/18/2010. Defendant received 3 month delayed sentence, fine of $100, and $100 in court costs.

PEOPLE v ALI R. SHOUMAN, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act - Unauthorized Tax Stamps, 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 08/26/2010. Defendant received 11 months delayed sentence, pay $68 state costs, $60 CVF, $1,100 supervision fee, $110 court costs.

PEOPLE v CHRISTINE SHURA-KUHN, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/04/2010. Defendant received 6 month delayed sentence, fine of $100, and $100 in court costs.

PEOPLE v MATTHEW MICHAEL SIBALI, charged with 1 count Using a Computer Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit Crime, 30th Circuit Court-Ingham County. Plea Agreement on 03/18/2009. Defendant sentenced to 15 to 20 months, $60 CVF, $60 state costs, and sex offender treatment in prison.

PEOPLE v SANDREA SIMMONS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,267.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY SIMMONS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v ANGELA SIMPSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $691.

PEOPLE v TAWANA SIMPSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/19/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $982.

PEOPLE v THAMIN SINAWE, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/04/2010. Defendant received 6 month delayed sentence, fine of $200, and $200 in court costs.

PEOPLE v BRIAN SINGER, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant received a 6 month delayed sentence, a $100 fine, and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v BALJIT SINGH, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County. Plea Agreement on 08/02/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $2,414 restitution, $200 court costs, $200 fine, $53 state costs, and $50 CVF.

PEOPLE v JASBIR SINGH, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 2 counts Conspiracy -Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 3 counts Food Stamps - Fraud Over $1,000 and 2 counts Financial Transaction Device - Furnishing Goods or Services, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 08/25/2009. Pled guilty to Food Stamp Fraud and sentenced to 3 years probation and $10,000 restitution.

PEOPLE v KALDIP SINGH, charged with 2 counts Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County. Plea Agreement on 08/02/2010. Defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor and was sentenced to 1 year probation, $4,365 restitution, $200 court costs, $200 fine, $53 state costs, and $50 CVF.

PEOPLE v SATPAL SINGH, charged with Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County. Plea Agreement on 08/02/2010.

Defendant pled guilty to Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Misdemeanor and was sentenced to 1 year probation, $10,000 restitution, $200 court costs, $200 fine, $53 state costs, and $50 CVF.

PEOPLE v JAMIE SINGLETON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v NAKESIA SINGLETON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/20/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $28,624.

PEOPLE v TRACI SINGLETON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $3,891 restitution.

PEOPLE v TARAH SISON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v FERAS DAWED SITTO, charged with Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/20/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $250 costs, $40/month supervision fees ($40 x 12 = $480), and $3,000 restitution.

PEOPLE v DEREK SHANE SLATE, charged with 4 counts Using the Computer/Internet Communicating with Another to Commit Crime and 1 count Using the Computer/Internet Disseminating Sexually Explicit Material to Minor, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. Plea Agreement on 10/06/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 8 months in jail, 5 years probation, $136 state costs, $1,200 supervision fee, $1,500 court costs, and must register as a sex offender.

PEOPLE v LASHEMA SLEDGE, charged with Past Posting/Bet Capping, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/23/2010. Defendant pled to False Pretenses less than $200 and was sentenced 1 year probation.

PEOPLE v KIMBERLY SLOAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $5,959.

PEOPLE v CHRISTINE SLUSCHEWSKI, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/03/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, $100 court costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v ERICA SMALL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,491.

PEOPLE v RANDY SMIDDY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to DHS/OIG for recoupment.

PEOPLE v ALICIA SMITH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/10/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $825 fees, $600 court costs, $250 attorney fees, $60 state costs, $60 CVF, and restitution in the amount of $15,575.95.

PEOPLE v ARIKA SMITH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/19/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,824.

PEOPLE v BARBARA SMITH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $798.

PEOPLE v BRANDON CHARLES SMITH, charged with Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, Criminal Enterprises - Conspiracy, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/27/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, no contact with any casinos or gambling, attend gamblers anonymous, pay $60 CVF, $68 state fee, $360 supervision fee, $600 costs, and $5,000 restitution.

PEOPLE v CHALOEA SMITH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,198.

PEOPLE v EARL SMITH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $810.

PEOPLE v HELENE SMITH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/28/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $60 CVF, $825 court costs, $68 state costs, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $43,845.

PEOPLE v JESSICA LAWSON SMITH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fee $250, court costs $825, restitution $21,747, state costs $60, supervision fee $600, and CVF $60.

PEOPLE v KURT SMITH, charged with 4 counts Embezzlement - Agent/Trustee, 19th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/13/2010.

PEOPLE v MONICA SMITH-YOUNG, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $10,853.

PEOPLE v NIKITA SMITH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,360.

PEOPLE v QIANA SMITH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $970 costs, $825 fees, and restitution in the amount of $71,977.80.

PEOPLE v ROBERT SMITH, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Communication Activity, 1 count Computer - Internet - Communication Activity, 1 count Using a Computer and the Internet for Communicating with Another to Commit a Crime, 44th Circuit Court-Livingston County. Plea Agreement on 08/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 12 months to 20 years, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, and sex offender registration.

PEOPLE v SHANITTA SMITH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,544.

PEOPLE v SHEILA SMITH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,168.

PEOPLE v SHERRAY ANTOINETTE SMITH, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/24/2009. Defendant pled to False Pretenses more than $200 but less than $1,000. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation $45 state costs, $50 CVF, and 100 hours community service.

PEOPLE v VANESSA SMITH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010

PEOPLE v VICTORIA SMITH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 Court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $22,978.50.

PEOPLE v RONALD WILLIE SNOW, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/29/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Trespass by a Disassociated Person. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $200 fines, $200 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v GINO SOAVE, charged with Forgery, Uttering & Publishing, Taxes - Failure to File/False Return, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 02/11/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months reporting probation, 100 hours of community service, $5,601 restitution, $450 court costs, supervision fee $450, and $50 CVF.

PEOPLE v HIKMAT SOKA, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises-Conducting, 48 counts False Pretenses greater than $999 and less than $20,000, and 48 counts BC-Return Nonreturnables-100 to 10,000, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2009. The Defendant pled guilty to one 5 year felony and was ordered to pay $75,000 in restitution.

PEOPLE v DANIEL SOLOMON, charged with 1 count Larceny in a Building and 1 count Habitual Offender - Fourth Offense Notice, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/01/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months probation.

PEOPLE v SABRINA SPAIN, charged with Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/18/2009 to Attempted Uttering & Publishing. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, no contact with casinos, $68 state costs, $60 CVF, $180 supervision fee, $600 court costs, and $400 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v DAVID SPANKE, charged with 1 count Gambling Violations - Underage Gambling - Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/26/2010. Defendant was given a 6 month delayed sentence, ordered to pay court costs $100, fines $100, and other costs $100.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL SCOTT SPEARS, charged with 3 counts Using a Computer Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit Crime, 9th Circuit Court-Kalamazoo County. Plea Agreement on 01/05/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Internet - Communicating to commit Accosting & Soliciting a Minor for Immoral purposes. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation with first 6 months in county jail.

PEOPLE v MARION SPILLMAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,439.

PEOPLE v DOMINIQUE SPINA, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months probation, no contact with casinos, $10/month supervision fee ($10 x 18 = $180), $60 state costs, $60 CVF.

PEOPLE v ALLISON SPIVEY, charged with 1 count Identity Theft, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation.

PEOPLE v GIGI SPIVEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $4,545.

PEOPLE v JENNIFER STACEY, charged with Keeping Gambling House, 68th District Court-Genesee County. Dismissed by Plaintiff on 06/08/2010 without prejudice.

PEOPLE v TOMEKA STALLWORTH, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,019.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE STAMPS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,013.

PEOPLE v ALICIA STARK, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/16/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, $825 court costs, $360 supervision fee, restitution in the amount of $49,780.98, and 150 hours community service.

PEOPLE v SUSIE STEEMER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v DION STEPHENS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $924.

PEOPLE v MONIQUE STEPHENS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution $17,413.

PEOPLE v ERIN STERNER, charged with 5 counts Uttering & Publishing Counterfeit Bill or Note, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/18/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $68 state costs, $60 CVF, $240 supervision fee, $600 court costs, $400 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v DIANE STEVENSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,409.

PEOPLE v MASON STEVENSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,085.

PEOPLE v TANEKA NICOLE STEVENSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

03/13/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution $12,240.

PEOPLE v CHAWNTAE NICOLE STEWART, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, state costs $60, supervision fees $600, CVF $60, restitution $30,732.

PEOPLE v CHEYENNE STEWART, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Plaintiff on 11/10/2010.

PEOPLE v SHERI STEWART, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution of $20,881.62.

PEOPLE v SHAWN ST. JOHN, charged with 1 count of Uttering and Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/27/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1½ years probation with costs and fines.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM ST. MARTIN, charged with 1 count Water Resources Protection Violations, 41st Circuit Court-Menominee County. Plea Agreement on 03/20/2009. Defendant sentenced to 30 days jail, relinquish license, and $1,000 fine.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL STODDART, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing - Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/19/2010. Defendant received 6 month delayed sentence, a fine of $200, and $200 in court costs.

PEOPLE v MICHELE STRAUSSER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/19/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,928.

PEOPLE v VALERIE STRAYHORNE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and $1,409 restitution.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL STREET, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v SONIA STREET, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/27/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution $38,781.

PEOPLE v LAKIESHA STRICKLAND, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/09/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $49,810 restitution, $825 court costs, $250 attorney fees, $600 supervision fee, $60 CVF, and $68 state costs.

PEOPLE v VENUS LAVETTE STRICKLAND, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/13/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 6 months delayed with fines and costs of $285.

PEOPLE v SONYA STUBBS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/20/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $730 costs, $495 fees, and restitution in the amount of $5,887.

PEOPLE v DANE MICHAEL SUJKOWSKI, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities -Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Underage Gambling and sentencing was delayed for 6 months. Defendant ordered to have no contact with the Detroit casinos or the criminal justice system, and pay $200 fines plus $68 court costs.

PEOPLE v KEVIN SULLIVAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v EBONY SUMBRY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v SUNNY'S PARTY STORE, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 2 counts Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 3 counts Food Stamps - Fraud over $1,000 and 2 counts Financial Transaction Device - Furnishing Goods or Services, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 08/25/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation and $80,000 restitution.

PEOPLE v CHARMEL SURNEY, charged with Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, Criminal Enterprises - Conspiracy, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/27/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, no contact with any casinos or gambling, attend gamblers anonymous, $60 CVF, $68 state fee, $360 supervision fee, $600 costs, $5,000 restitution to Motor City Casino.

PEOPLE v TAWANDA SUTTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,739.

PEOPLE v STEPHEN SUWIA, charged with Retail Fraud - Third Degree, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v CRYSTAL SWANIGAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $950.

PEOPLE v SONCHA SWANIGAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/19/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $4,950.

PEOPLE v NATHAN ALLEN SWANSON, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity, 1 count Using a Computer Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit Crime, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 09/24/2009. Defendant pled guilty to count 2 in and was sentenced to 18 months in the MDOC, and ordered to pay $600 in fines and costs.

PEOPLE v TERRI SWEARENGEN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/27/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $23,225.

PEOPLE v LARRY L. SYPOLT, charged with 5 counts Using a Computer Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit Crime, 1 count Disseminating Sexually Explicit Matter to a Minor. 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/09/2010. Defendant sentenced to 12 months jail, 3 years probation, registration as a sex offender, sex offender treatment, pay $68 state costs, $60 CVF, $1,200 supervision fee, and $600 court costs.

PEOPLE v MAGDALEN SZCZEPANKIAK, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v KHANH TA, charged with 2 counts Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/05/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, pay $200 fines, $200 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v ALI NAZIH TAHA, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/28/2009. Defendant sentenced to 1 year probation and paid $2,247 as restitution.

PEOPLE v MOHAMMED TAHA, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant's sentencing was delayed for 1 year, $100 fine, $100 costs, and $100 fees.

PEOPLE v MOHAMAD TALAB, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and $2,249 restitution.

PEOPLE v DARRYL TALLEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v ABDULLAH TALOOL, charged with Malicious Destruction of Personal Property- $200 or more but less than $1,000, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/21/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 6 months, ordered to pay $750 restitution, and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v MORGANA TARRANCE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/29/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $60

CVF, $825 court costs, $68 state costs, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $35,152.

PEOPLE v LAKISHA TARTT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/02/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, $600 supervision fee, and $110,814 restitution.

PEOPLE v ANDREA TATE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $905.

PEOPLE v DARYL JAMES TATE, charged with 3 counts Assault or Assault And Battery and 1 count Malicious Destruction of Building - $200 or more but less than $1000, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/06/2009. Defendant sentenced to 18 months probation, $100 fines, $100 costs, $50 CVF, $550 restitution.

PEOPLE v MONIKA TATE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $13,097.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY LEWIS TAYLOR, charged with 1 count Identity Theft, 1 count Financial Transaction Device - Possession of Fraudulent Device, and 1 count Financial Transaction Device - Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Identity Theft and Financial Transaction Device - Possession. Defendant sentenced to 2 year probation, $272 state costs, $60 CVF, $120 supervision fee, and $165 court costs per year ($165 x 2 = $330).

PEOPLE v BARBARA TAYLOR, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,291.

PEOPLE v BRITNEE TAYLOR, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation and attorney fees $250, court costs $495, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $360, and restitution in the amount of $5,516.

PEOPLE v DELISHA TAYLOR, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v DIMEKA TAYLOR, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v DONNA TAYLOR-STOKES, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/27/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution $21,978.

PEOPLE v HERNIE WINSTON TAYLOR, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/14/2009. Defendant sentenced with conditions of probation, fines $100, costs $100, and attorney fees $100.

PEOPLE v JERMAINE TAYLOR, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/21/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,489.

PEOPLE v KATRINA TAYLOR, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $5,016.

PEOPLE v LINDA BEATRICE IVORY-TAYLOR, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year reporting probation, court costs $100, fines $100, and other costs $100.

PEOPLE v MARGARET MARQUETTA TAYLOR AKA MARGARET MARQUETTA WILSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $26,793.57.

PEOPLE v MARIE D. TAYLOR, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/23/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $24,700.

PEOPLE v SANGREA TAYLOR, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $7,550.

PEOPLE v SIMONE TAYLOR, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v TINA TAYLOR, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,053.

PEOPLE v TONY TAYLOR, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v WADE TAYLOR, charged with Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, Criminal Enterprises - Conspiracy, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/21/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, no contact with any casinos or gambling, attend gamblers anonymous, $60 CVF, $68 state fee, $120 supervision fee, $600 costs, $5,000 restitution to Motor City Casino, and $450 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v CRYSTAL TEAGUE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $495 court costs, $60 CVF, $48 state costs, $360 supervision fee, and $10,053.80 restitution.

PEOPLE v JONATHAN POLANCO TEJADA, charged with 2 counts False Pretenses greater than $999 but less than $20,000, and 4 counts Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/26/2009. Defendant pled to Attempted Cheating and received 1 year probation, $500 restitution, fines, and costs.

PEOPLE v PATRICIA TELGENHOF, charged with 1 count Keeping Gambling House, 68th District Court-Genesee County. Dismissed by Plaintiff on 12/06/2010 without prejudice.

PEOPLE v GERARDO TELLEZ, charged with 1 count Identity Theft, Berrien County. Plea Agreement on 09/09/2010. Defendant sentenced to 90 days jail, $68 state fee, and $60 CVF.

PEOPLE v TEQUEALA TELLIS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,760.

PEOPLE v MARIA TELLO, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v JAWANA TEMPLE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,723.

PEOPLE v SAID THABET, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespass- Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/09/2010. Defendant received 1 year delayed sentence, $100 fine, $100 court costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v BANGONE THENGKHAM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/16/2010. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $60 CVF, $68 state costs,

$495 court costs, $360 supervision fee, $8,257.72 restitution, and 150 hours community service.

PEOPLE v THIO INC. (D/B/A JEFFERSON LIQUOR PALACE), charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 4 counts Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 4 counts Food Stamps - Fraud over $1,000, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court 10/13/2009.

PEOPLE v AKILAH THOMAS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/14/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $600 supervision fee, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, and restitution in the amount of $78,177.

PEOPLE v DIANNE THOMAS, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $100 costs, $50 CVF, $35/month supervision fee ($35 x 12 = $420) or 40 hours of community service in lieu of the supervision fee.

PEOPLE v JEANNITHA THOMAS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $8,667.

PEOPLE v JOHN EDWARD THOMAS, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/16/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 months jail and $750 fines/costs.

PEOPLE v LAKEISHA THOMAS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,901.

PEOPLE v MARY THOMAS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,693.

PEOPLE v RITA L. THOMAS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/16/2010. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $51,770.

PEOPLE v ROBERT LEE THOMAS, charged with 1 count Financial Transaction Device -Steal/Retain without Consent, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Sentencing was 11/20/09. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, $600 costs, $68 state fee, $60 CVF, $400 attorney fees, and $240 supervision fees.

PEOPLE v SHERYL THOMAS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,795.

PEOPLE v TERRY JEAN THOMAS-CARTER, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement reached on 01/14/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $100 fines, $100 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v WENDALIN THOMAS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v CRYSTAL DENISE THOMPSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2009.
Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, state fee $60, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $28,218.

PEOPLE v CURTIS THOMPSON, charged with 2 counts of Uttering and Publishing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/27/2010

PEOPLE v FREDA LASHAE THOMPSON, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/04/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to pay $100 fines, and $100 costs.

PEOPLE v HELESHIA THOMPSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/28/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v SEAESTHER THOMPSON-HAYES charged with 2 counts False Pretenses $20,000 or more and 1 count Criminal Enterprise - Conducting, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 06/25/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, total restitution in the amount of $203,292, CVF $60, and state costs $136. Defendant may not engage in nor seek certification to enter into any type of real estate transaction.

PEOPLE v STEPHANIE THOMPSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/27/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $42,747.

PEOPLE v DAVID THORNBERRY, charged with 8 counts Children - Accosting for Immoral Purposes, 2 counts of Disseminating Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. Plea Agreement on 08/03/2010, Defendant was sen-

tenced to 5 years probation, $1,500 court costs, $60 CVF, $1,500 supervision fee, and $136 other costs.

PEOPLE v DEKEA ELAINE THORNTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2009. Sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, state costs $60, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $51,215.

PEOPLE v LUCRECIA THORNTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v SHAQUANDA THURMAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,238.

PEOPLE v LE THUY-THI LE, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/03/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $500 in court costs, $30 in restitution, and no contact with casinos.

PEOPLE v MARK THWENI, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/01/2010. His sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to pay $100 fines, and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v DIA KIRIAKOS THWENY, charged with 1 count Criminal Enterprises - Conducting, 4 counts Conspiracy - Legal Act in Illegal Manner, 4 counts Food Stamps - Fraud over $1,000, and 1 count Habitual Offender-2nd Offense, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 04/03/2009.

PEOPLE v LOLITA TIGGNER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,459.

PEOPLE v TERESA TILLIE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/23/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $495 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $360 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $6,269.

PEOPLE v NIETTIE TIPPINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $28,012.

PEOPLE v DAVID TODD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v VASYL TODYRYNCHUK, charged with Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/22/2010. Defendant pled guilty as charged and was sentenced to 90 days in the Wayne County Jail.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE TOLER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $86,912.

PEOPLE v VINCENT TOLOMEI, charged with Malicious Destruction of Personal Property - less than $200 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/13/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed until Defendant paid $196 restitution, $100 attorney fees, and $100 court costs.

PEOPLE v TOM KARIM TOMA, charged with 5 counts Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/31/2009. Defendant sentenced to 80 days jail, 1 year probation, $68 CVF, and $60 state costs.

PEOPLE v KAREN TOMCHEFF, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,107.

PEOPLE v KIYANA TOMLIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,790.

PEOPLE v TAMMY LYNN TORTONESI, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations - Felony Violations, 27th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/09/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, pay $750 fines/costs, probation oversight fees, 5 days alternate work force, and cooperation with the AG's office in further prosecution.

PEOPLE v DARNIA TOWNSEND, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/29/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $60 CVF, $825 court costs, $68 state fess, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $46,637.

PEOPLE v ANN BRANDY TRAN, charged with Felony Gambling Violations - Past Posting, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/21/2010. Defendant was sentenced to probation and a $150 fine.

PEOPLE v SHANIA MY-LINH TRAN, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treat-

ment as indicated after the screening, pay $200 attorney fees, $200 costs, and $500 winnings forfeit to State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v MONTRESA D. TRAPP, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $46,116.

PEOPLE v SANDRA TRAYLOR, charged with 1 count Larceny - Less than $200, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2009. Defendant's sentencing was delayed for 1 year, no contact with the casinos or the criminal justice system, not to be employed or seek employment with MGCB or MGM, $100 restitution, $200 fines, and $68 costs.

PEOPLE v DARREL TRIMMIER, charged with Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/28/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation.

PEOPLE v PHILLIP TRIMBLE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/28/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,653.

PEOPLE v ERICA RENE TROTTER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/17/2009. Pled Guilty, sentenced to 3 years probation, $730 costs, $495 fees, and restitution in the amount of $7,490.90.

PEOPLE v TARA TRUITT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $11,059.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER TRUMPET, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities - Felony Violations and 1 count Habitual Offender - 2nd Offense Notice, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/10/2009.

PEOPLE v CARRIE TUCKER, charged with Food Stamps - Fraud Over $1,000, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, $400 supervision fee, $5,000 forfeiture to the State of Michigan payable during probation.

PEOPLE v JAMES TUCKER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v SHIRLEY TUCKER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $6,105.

PEOPLE v JOHNS BRIAN TUFTS, charged with 1 count Malicious Destruction of Personal Property, $200 or more but less than $1,000, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/01/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 6 months probation, $100 fines, $100 costs, $1,100 restitution to casino.

PEOPLE v ANGELA TUGGLE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,448.

PEOPLE v ELIZABETH TUMPKIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,305.

PEOPLE v EDITH TURNBOWEL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $790.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY TURNER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,458.

PEOPLE v KIMBERLY TURRENTINE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/01/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $495 costs, supervision fee $360, attorney fees $250, state minimum costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $8,755.

PEOPLE v DEBONEE TUTSTONE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $32,836.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH TWIGGS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $810.

PEOPLE v JACQUELINE TYSON-BUTLER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,546.

PEOPLE v JOSHUA ROSS UDMAN, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/27/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to pay $200 fines, $200 court costs, $3,110 winnings to be forfeit to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v JASON LEE ULLERY, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity, 1 count Using a Computer Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit Crime, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation with first year in county jail.

PEOPLE v REMISE ULLIUS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v ARIEN UNDERWOOD, charged with 2 counts Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/12/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Attempted Cheating. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, no contact with casinos, $250 court costs, $40 per month supervision fees ($40 x 12 = $480).

PEOPLE v JOHN DAVID UNDERWOOD, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 01/27/2009.

PEOPLE v KENYATTA VALENTINE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/09/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $26,243.

PEOPLE v REBECCA VANCE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v SANTANYA VANDAM, charged with 3 counts Embezzlement - Agent/Trustee more than $999 but less than $20,000, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/31/2009. Defendant pled guilty to 1 misdemeanor and was sentenced to 1 year probation, restitution $15,258.90, CVF $60 supervision fee $120, no contact with casinos, and must testify truthfully at any related hearings.

PEOPLE v TAREKA RENEE VANOVER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $825 fees, $600 court costs, $250 attorney fees, $60 state fee, $60 CVF, and restitution in the amount of $71,195.09.

PEOPLE v GARY EVANS VARISTO, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/17/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $200 fines, and $50 costs.

PEOPLE v NANCY VASSALLO, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/04/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to pay $100 court costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v DEIDRA VASSAR, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/23/2010.

Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $112,419.

PEOPLE v KIMBERLY ANN VAUGHN, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/25/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, must pay $200 fines, and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v ORNETHA VAUGHN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/27/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $71,315.45.

PEOPLE v JOHN VECCHIO, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations - Felony Violations, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 05/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to pay $10,000 to the State of Michigan, and $2,000 to County of Macomb.

PEOPLE v AIMEE VELEZ, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,757.

PEOPLE v ROBIN VERDIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v DAVID VEZZOSI, charged with Probation Violation, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. Dismissed by Court on 09/29/2009.

PEOPLE v PETER NOEL VILLEMURE, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 92nd District Court-Luce County. Dismissed by Court on 11/05/2009.

PEOPLE v PETER NOEL VILLEMURE, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 92nd District Court-Luce County. Plea Agreement on 12/17/2009. Defendant pled to Misdemeanor TPTA and was sentenced to 1 year probation, $2,500 restitution $500 costs/fines, and $180 attorney fee.

PEOPLE v JULIANNA VULAJ, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/10/2009. Defendant's sentencing was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $200 fines, $68 costs, and forfeit $1,651 in winnings to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v CARRAINNA WADE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,971.

PEOPLE v TANYETTA WADE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1529

PEOPLE v KATRINA WADLEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Plaintiff on 06/30/2009.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE WADLEY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/20/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $20,064.80.

PEOPLE v JERIEL WADSWORTH, charged with Larceny in a Building, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/11/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 6 months Wayne County mental health treatment and $215 restitution.

PEOPLE v BRUCE WAYNE WAGGONER, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations - Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/18/2009. Defendant pled to Attempt Gambling Operations. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, alcohol and gambling screening, $68 state fee, $68 CVF, $175 supervision fee, and $200 court costs.

PEOPLE v THOMAS JOSEPH WALIGORA, charged with Homicide - Murder First Degree - Premeditated, Felony Murder, Home Invasion, Weapons - Dangerous Weapon - Carrying with Unlawful Intent, 53rd Circuit Court-Cheboygan County. Plea Agreement on 06/16/2009. Defendant pled to Second Degree Murder with sentence agreement of 22-40 years, restitution, and funeral expenses of $5,153.50.

PEOPLE v AIED WALITY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v GERALD WALKER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,742.

PEOPLE v GWANA WALKER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/18/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,701.

PEOPLE v LOVELL J. WALKER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 2 years probation, $585 costs, $330 fees, and restitution in the amount of $10,051.

PEOPLE v SHARON WALKER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v SHAWANDA WALKER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, restitution $13,543.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM WALKER, charged with 1 count Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/04/2009. Defendant pled to False Pretenses less than $200, Misdemeanor. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $53 state costs, $50 CVF, $360 supervision fee, $600 court costs, and $300 restitution.

PEOPLE v DIONNE WALLACE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/10/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $34,148.

PEOPLE v DORIAN WALLACE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 11/05/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v PATTY BETH WALLACE, charged with 4 counts of Forgery, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Dismissed by Court on 06/04/2009.

PEOPLE v RICHARD WALLACE/COALITION FOR A FAIR MICHIGAN, charged with Campaign Finance - Failure to File Campaign Statements, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/03/2010. Defendant was sentenced to $2,000 in fines.

PEOPLE v STACEYLYNNE WALLACE, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court - Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/22/2010. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to pay $100 fines, $100 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE WALLS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/07/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $35,192.

PEOPLE v TENA WALLS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/29/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $23,575.20.

PEOPLE v DEBRA ANNE WALSH, charged with 2 counts of Felony Uttering & Publishing and 1 count of Identity Theft. Plea Agreement on 10/28/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months probation and assessed the following fees: $600 in court costs, $400 in attorney fees, $180 supervision fee, $60 CVF, $68 felony fee.

PEOPLE v DARAN STEVEN WALSTON, charged with Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/21/2010. Defendant was sen-

tenced to 1 year probation, $600 court costs, $400 attorney fees, $68 state costs, and $60 CVF.

PEOPLE v ANDREW DOUGLAS WALTHERS, charged with 5 counts Using a Computer Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit Crime, 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County. Plea Agreement on 08/31/2009. Defendant sentence to 14 months MDOC, sex offender registration, and $256 fines.

PEOPLE v TIMOTHY WALTON, charged with Insurance Fraud - Conspiracies, False Report of a Felony, 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County. Dismissed by Court on 03/03/2010. Judge dismissed count 2 on a directed verdict. Jury found Defendant not guilty on count 1.

PEOPLE v LESLIE ALTON WARDELL, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/10/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Trespass by a Disassociated Person. Defendant was sentenced to 6 months probation, screening for gambling addiction and treatment as indicated, pay $100 fines, and $200 costs, 14 days community service in lieu of fines and costs.

PEOPLE v LESLIE ALTON WARDELL, charged with 1 count Larceny in a Building and 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/24/2009. Defendant sentenced to 1 year probation for Larceny in Building, no contact with any casino, 40 hours of community service, $68 costs, $60 CVA, $120 supervision fee, $600 court costs.

PEOPLE v GREGORY WARFIELD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and $2,410 restitution.

PEOPLE v TIFFANY WARFIELD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,688.

PEOPLE v CRYSTAL WARLICK, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/09/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $21,751.93.

PEOPLE v CARRIANNE WARREN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/25/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v ANGELA WASHINGTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $1,052 restitution.

PEOPLE v DARRIUS WASHINGTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,908.

PEOPLE v DAVID WASHINGTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $710.

PEOPLE v DIONNE WASHINGTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/06/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,739.

PEOPLE v KEVIN WASHINGTON, charged with 1 count of Homicide - Solicitation of Murder, 8th Circuit Court-Ionia County. Convicted by verdict on 07/13/2009. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison.

PEOPLE v LATOSHA MARIE WASHINGTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $730 costs, $495 fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,600.

PEOPLE v TASHA M. WASHINGTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/29/2009. Defendant was sentenced to attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, restitution $19,806, and 5 years probation.

PEOPLE v THERESA WASHINGTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $5,566.

PEOPLE v ROBERT LEE WATERS, JR., charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/29/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Trespass by a Disassociated Person. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $200 fines, $200 costs, and forfeit $189 winnings to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v DUSHON WATKINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more and 1 count False Pretenses $20,000 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne Count. Plea Agreement on 07/31/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $893 court costs, $600 supervision fees, $250 attorney fees, $60 CVF, and $24,149 restitution.

PEOPLE v ERIKA WATKINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010.

Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,625.

PEOPLE v JOSEPH WATKINS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more and 1 count False Pretenses $20,000 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne Count. Plea Agreement on 07/31/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, $825 court costs, $68 state, $600 supervision fees, $250 attorney fees, $60 CVF, and $24,149 restitution.

PEOPLE v CARL WATSON, charged with 1 count of Larceny in a Building, 1 count of Receiving and Concealing Stolen Property, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/16/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months probation and plus fines and costs.

PEOPLE v NINA WATSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/05/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $66,364.

PEOPLE v SIBRINNIA WATSON, charged with Credit Card Fraud, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/07/2010. Defendant pled to Identity Theft and was sentenced to 12 months probation, $200 restitution, $120 supervision fee, $68 state costs, $60 CVF, $600 court costs, and $400 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM LAWRENCE WATSON, charged with Gambling Operations - Felony Violations, 26-1st District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/06/2010. Defendant pled to Maintaining a gaming room, misdemeanor. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, and $10,000 restitution.

PEOPLE v DENISE WATTERS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,072.

PEOPLE v NINA WEATHERFORD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/05/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $92,034.

PEOPLE v MONICA WEAVER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/30/2009. Defendant sentenced to 3 years probation, $730 costs, $495 fees, and restitution in the amount of $6,912.

PEOPLE v PAMELA WEAVER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,209.

PEOPLE v KIMBERLY WEBSTER, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,358.

PEOPLE v MARK WEISS, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/24/2010. Defendant received 12 month delayed sentence with $200 in court costs and $200 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v RONALD WELLINGTON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 08/26/2010.

PEOPLE v BRADLEY LYNN WELLS, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Activity, 1 count Using a Computer Internet to Communicate with Another to Commit Crime, 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 01/28/2009. Defendant pled guilty to count 2 and was sentenced to 1 to 20 years.

PEOPLE v CHARLES ARNOLD WELLS, charged with Gambling Operations - Felony Violations, Gambling House - Permitting for Gain, 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 05/24/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months probation, $1,000 fine, $60 CVF, $68 state fee, and $180 supervision fee.

PEOPLE v GARY RICHARD WELLS, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2010. Defendant his sentence was delayed 1 year. Defendant was ordered to pay $200 fines, $200 costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v JASON WENDLING, charged with Gambling Activities - Felony Violations, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/14/2010. Defendant pled guilty to the False Pretenses Misdemeanor and was sentence to a $150 fine.

PEOPLE v DENA WERY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,140.

PEOPLE v ROBERT ARTHUR WERY, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations - Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/01/2009. Defendant sentenced to forfeit all monies held, 2 years probation, and future testimony against vendor.

PEOPLE v ERIC CARL WESCHE, charged with 1 count Child Sexually Abusive Comm. Activity and 1 count Using a Computer/Internet to Commit a Crime (Max 15 years to Life), 17th Circuit Court-Kent County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2009. Defendant sentenced to 60 months probation with first year in jail, 6 months tether, 300 hours community service, sex offender registration, no contact with minors and no use of internet/computer, $68 state costs, and $60 CVF.

PEOPLE v DOROTHY WEST, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $8,800.

PEOPLE v MELISSA WEST, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/25/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action

PEOPLE v RICHARD WEST, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/06/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v KATRINA MICHELLE WHITE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/16/2009. Defendant sentenced to5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $15,463.

PEOPLE v LOUISE LANNETTE WHITE, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Trespass by a Disassociated Person. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after screening, pay $200 costs, and $200 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v TRACI WHITE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $3,974.

PEOPLE v CHRISTOPHER WHITFIELD, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Plaintiff on 03/27/2009.

PEOPLE v BRIAN THOMAS WHITMAN, charged with Criminal Sexual Conduct 1st Degree (Person under 13), 10th Circuit Court-Saginaw County. Plea Agreement on 02/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 180 months to 15 years prison, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, and sex offender registry.

PEOPLE v DAN WICKER, III, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/04/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Trespass by a Disassociated Person. His sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $200 fines, $200 costs, and $200 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v JENNA LEE WILCOX, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/02/2010.

Defendant was given 6 months delayed sentence and ordered to pay $200 fines and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v RACHEL WILETTS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,133.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY WILLIAMS, charged with Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/09/2010. Defendant pled to Attempt Uttering & Publishing and was sentenced to 90 days Wayne County Jail.

PEOPLE v APRIL WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,069.

PEOPLE v BARNARD WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,004.

PEOPLE v CHERRIE WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $5,958.

PEOPLE v CYNTHIA WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,937.

PEOPLE v DAVID WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,024.

PEOPLE v DEANNE WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, $495 court costs, $320 supervision fee, $6,993 restitution, and 150 hours community service. Defendant may perform an additional 150 hours community service in lieu of costs and fees.

PEOPLE v DESHAWN WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/20/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $19,578.

PEOPLE v DIANA WILLIAMS, charged with Felony Gambling Violations. Plea Agreement on 06/08/2010. 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Defendant pled guilty to False Pretenses less than $200 and was sentenced to 1 year probation.

PEOPLE v ERICA WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $975.

PEOPLE v JANEVA WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation and attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $24,854.

PEOPLE v JOHNNIE EUGENE WILLIAMS, charged with 2 counts Election Law - Absentee Ballot - Improper Possess/Return, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/29/2009 to 1 count of Election Law Fraud - Absentee Ballot Improper Possession. Sentenced to time served.

PEOPLE v KIMBERLY WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation and attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $78,055.

PEOPLE v LANETT WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,259.

PEOPLE v LANISHA WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/02/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, $600 supervision fee and $14,854 restitution.

PEOPLE v LARRAINE WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v LASHANDA WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, state costs $60, CVF $60, and restitution in the amount of $23,820.

PEOPLE v LASHAWN WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,040.

PEOPLE v LATISHA WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v LATOYA WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v MAUREEN WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,092.

PEOPLE v MEGAN WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/12/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $4,311.

PEOPLE v MELKIA WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $95,107.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $715.

PEOPLE v RANDALL EUGENE WILLIAMS, charged with Felony Uttering and Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/21/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, CVF $60, supervision fee $120, and state costs $68.

PEOPLE v RICHARD WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Identity Theft, charged with 1 count Larceny - $1,000 or more but less than $20,000. Plea Agreement on 08/23/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation and was ordered to pay $7,952.57 restitution.

PEOPLE v RICHARD DION-MONTE WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Identity Theft and 1 count Larceny $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/24/2009.

PEOPLE v ROVITA WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,641.

PEOPLE v SCOT WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to DHS/OIG for recoupment.

PEOPLE v SHAMEKA YOLANDA WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250

attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $600 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $30,622.

PEOPLE v SHEVELLE WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $3,908 restitution.

PEOPLE v TEISHA WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 12/28/2010. Matter referred back to MDHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v TERRICA WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $6,429.

PEOPLE v VENCELLA WILLIAMS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600 and restitution $12,030.

PEOPLE v VERNON WILLIAMS, charged with 3 counts Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, no casinos, and forfeiture of all property/monies seized.

PEOPLE v DAVID WILLINGHAM, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $4,354 restitution.

PEOPLE v DEBORAH WILLS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,934.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY WILSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees and $4,961 restitution.

PEOPLE v ELECTA WILSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/07/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $978.

PEOPLE v JANETTE DENISE WILSON, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing and 1 count Habitual Offender - Third Offense Notice, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/11/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, $500 restitution to MCC, $60 state fee, $60 CVF, $240 supervision fee, $400 attorney fees, and $600 court costs.

PEOPLE v JENAE WILSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,313.

PEOPLE v KEVIN WILSON, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing and 1 count Habitual Offender - 2nd Offense Notice, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Attempt U&P. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation, $68 state costs, $60 CVF, $240 supervision fee, $600 court costs, and $400 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v LAWRENCE WILSON, JR., charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing and 1 count Habitual Offender - 2nd Offense Notice, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/17/2009. Defendant pled to Attempt U&P and was sentenced to 12 months probation, $750 fines and costs, and no contact with casinos.

PEOPLE v MINNIE JEAN WILSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $825 fees, $600 court costs, $250 attorney fees, $60 state costs, $60 CVF, and restitution in the amount of $12,958.

PEOPLE v SHARLYN WILSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,541.

PEOPLE v STEPHANIE WILSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/17/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,468.

PEOPLE v TAYA WILSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,980.

PEOPLE v WARREN WILSON, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to DHS/OIG for recoupment.

PEOPLE v ANTHONY DEWAYNE WINBURN, charged with 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/23/2009. Defendant pled to Attempted U&P and was sentenced to 1 year probation, $165 court costs, $400 attorney fees, $120 CVF, and no contact with casinos.

PEOPLE v CHARLOTTE WISEMAN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v WENDY WITHROW, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on

06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $6,574.

PEOPLE v DAYMEN WITTUM, charged with Keeping Gambling House, 68th District Court-Genesee County. Plea Agreement on 10/15/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to pay $53 state fee, $50 CVF, and must cooperate and testify if needed. Dismissed by Court on 10/07/2009.

PEOPLE v SUN I. WOELDERS, charged with 4 counts Check-Non-Sufficient Funds $500 or more, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/13/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $28,000 restitution, $200 costs, and $20 per month supervision.

PEOPLE v SUN I. WOELDERS, A/K/A SUNI MAY, charged with 3 Non-sufficient Funds Checks in 10 days and Non-sufficient Funds Check over $500, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Plaintiff, 04/30/2009.

PEOPLE v TAMMY WOLFE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/19/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,358.

PEOPLE v WILLIAM DAVID WOLSKE, charged with 1 count Gambling Operations - Felony Violations, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/01/2009. Defendant was sentenced to forfeit all monies held, probation for 2 years, and testimony in further prosecution.

PEOPLE v GABRIEL ROBERTO WOODARD, charged with 3 counts Carjacking, 3 counts Armed Robbery, 1 count Weapons Felony Firearm, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/30/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Armed Robbery and was sentenced to 27 months MDOC, and 3 years probation.

PEOPLE v ABBIE WOODS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/19/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $927.

PEOPLE v TERESA WOODS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/25/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,675.

PEOPLE v TIFFANY WOODS, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/14/2009. Defendant sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution to be determined by the Michigan Department of Human Services.

PEOPLE v DAVID T. WOODWARD, charged with 3 counts Campaign Finance - Fail to File Campaign Statements, 54-A District Court-Ingham County. Plea Agreement on 03/17/2010. Defendant was required to file all missing reports and pay a fine.

PEOPLE v TANISHA M. WOODWARD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/16/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, supervision fee $600, CVF $60, state costs $60, and restitution in the amount of $61,020.27.

PEOPLE v TAKEISA WORD, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Failure to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $495 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state minimum costs, $360 supervision fee, and restitution in the amount of $4,973.

PEOPLE v CHASITY WRIGHT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/05/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $4,182.

PEOPLE v EVELYN WRIGHT, charged with Food Stamps - Fraud Over $1,000, 3rd Circuit Court- Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation.

PEOPLE v HOWARD WRIGHT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v JENNIFER WRIGHT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/21/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $495, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $360, and restitution in the amount of $6,004

PEOPLE v KIAJAWANA WRIGHT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 09/09/2010.

PEOPLE v LAJUANA WRIGHT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 07/30/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $8,373.

PEOPLE v MARQUELLA WRIGHT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/24/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, attorney fees $250, court costs $825, CVF $60, state minimum costs $68, supervision fee $600, and restitution in the amount of $29,802.

PEOPLE v ROBIN WRIGHT, charged with Larceny in a Building, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/11/2010.

PEOPLE v RONALD WRIGHT, charged with Food Stamps - Fraud Over $1,000, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation.

PEOPLE v AMONDA WYATT, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 10/21/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 4 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $495 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, $360 supervision fee, and $8,765 restitution.

PEOPLE v AMJED YACOUB, charged with Tobacco Product Tax Act Violation - Felony, 41-A District Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 06/02/2010. Defendant pled guilty to 1 count Tobacco Product Tax Act Violation - Misdemeanor and was sentenced to 1 year probation and $2,500 restitution.

PEOPLE v KATHLEEN YATES, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespass - Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 09/09/2010. Defendant received 1 year delayed sentence, $100 fine, $100 court costs, and $100 attorney fees.

PEOPLE v MICHELLE YEAGER, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing - Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/19/2010. Defendant received a 6 month delayed sentence with $100 in court costs and $100 in attorney fees.

PEOPLE v SHAWNTEIA YEARGIN, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/29/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,435.

PEOPLE v MIKE SABRI YELDA, charged with 1 count Disturbing the Peace and 1 count Disorderly Person - Drunk, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/07/2009. Defendant pled to count Drunk & Disorderly. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 6 months, ordered to have no contact with casino, undergo substance abuse evaluation and treatment if needed, pay $200 fines, and $200 costs.

PEOPLE v MYUNG YI, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing - Misdemeanor, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 08/23/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 12 months probation, court costs $200, supervision fee $420, and fines $300.

PEOPLE v SU MYONG YI, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 02/19/2009. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year. Defendant ordered to have no contact with casinos or the criminal justice system, to be screened for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $500 fines/costs, and $6,300 winnings forfeit to the State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v JUM SOON YO, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/07/2009. Defendant pled to Trespass by a Disassociated Person. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to have no contact with the casinos or the criminal justice system, complete screening for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $200

fines, $200 costs, and $202.50 forfeit to State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v BASIM YOUKHANA, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation -Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 04/29/2009. Defendant pled to TPTA - Misdemeanor and received 1 year probation, $1,746 tax plus penalty, $600 court costs, and $100 fine.

PEOPLE v JENNIFER YOUNCE, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 12/22/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 3 years diversion status, $40 attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,825.

PEOPLE v CHANTE YOUNG, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/09/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,430.

PEOPLE v CHARREKA YOUNG, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/19/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $1,614.

PEOPLE v DAVIDA YOUNG, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 10/21/2010. Matter referred back to the DHS/OIG for recoupment action.

PEOPLE v MADALYN CAROL YOUNG, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/14/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Trespass by a Disassociated Person. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to have no contact with the casinos or the criminal justice system, complete screening for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, and pay $250 fines/costs.

PEOPLE v RODERICK YOUNG, charged with 2 counts Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Court on 05/19/2010.

PEOPLE v SHRONDA MONIQUE YOUNG, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by Plaintiff on 03/26/2009. Matter referred back to OIG/DHS for administrative action.

PEOPLE v VERA YOUNG, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/15/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,197.

PEOPLE v EDWARD JAN YOUSIF, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 01/26/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, ordered to pay $100 fines, and $100 court costs.

PEOPLE v WIDAD YOUSIF, charged with 1 count Gambling - Disassociated Person -Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/14/2009. Defendant pled guilty to Trespass by a Disassociated Person. Defendant's sentence was delayed for 1 year, ordered to have no contact with the casinos or the criminal justice system, complete screening for gambling addiction by the Michigan Department of Community Health, complete treatment as indicated after the screening, pay $250 fines plus costs, and $1,788.50 winnings forfeit to State of Michigan Compulsive Gambling Prevention Fund.

PEOPLE v VERRERI YOWELL, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 11/08/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation, $250 attorney fees, $825 court costs, $60 CVF, $68 state costs, $600 supervision fee, and $23,576 restitution.

PEOPLE v EDDIE ZABEN, charged with Tobacco Products Tax Act - Unauthorized Tax Stamps, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Case was dismissed by Court on 11/02/2009.

PEOPLE v EDDIE ZABEN, charged with1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act - Unauthorized Tax Stamps and 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Dismissed by court on 10/30/2009. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $50 CVF, $53 state fee, $600 costs, and $100 per month supervision fee ($100 x 12 = $1200).

PEOPLE v LATASHA ZACHARY, charged with 1 count Welfare Fraud (Fail to Inform) $500 or more, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/21/2010. Defendant was placed on diversion status, ordered to pay $40 in attorney fees, and restitution in the amount of $2,654.68.

PEOPLE v BASSAM ZAEL, charged with Tobacco Products Tax Violation Act - Felony, 16th Circuit Court - Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 03/24/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $9,000 restitution, $68 state fee, $60 CVF, $120 supervision fee, and $120 court costs.

PEOPLE v ALI ZAHER, charged with False Pretenses more than $999 but less than $20,000, Financial Transaction Device - Uttering & Publishing, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 03/15/2010. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $121 state costs, $60 CVF, $120 supervision fee, $600 court costs, and restitution as determined by probation.

PEOPLE v SAIED FAIEK ZEINEH, charged with 2 counts Perjury - Court Proceeding and 1 count Uttering & Publishing, 30th Circuit Court-Ingham County. Plea Agreement on 06/11/2009. Defendant pled on 04/14/2009 to 1 count of perjury and 1 count of uttering and publishing. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months probation, restitution in the amount of $2,741.06, $68 state court costs, $60 CVF, court cost $500, and 12 months jail credit 1 day with the balance suspended until end of probation.

PEOPLE v GIUSEPPE ZERILLI, charged with Gambling - Disassociated Person - Trespassing, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 05/07/2010. Defendant was sentenced to a delayed sentence of 1 year, court costs $100, and $100.

PEOPLE v HAITHAM ZORA, charged with 2 counts Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation-Felony and 1 count Taxes - Failure to File/False Return, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 11/19/2009. Defendant pled to Tobacco Products Tax Act - 5 year Felony. Defendant was sentenced to 1 year probation, $600 court costs, $600 supervision fee, $10,000 restitution, $60 CVF, and $68 state costs.

PEOPLE v NASHAWN ZORA, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation -Unauthorized Tax Stamps and 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation - Felony, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Plea Agreement on 11/23/2009. Defendant pled to Tobacco Product Tax Act - Felony on and was sentenced to, 1 year probation $600 court costs, $600 supervision fee, $10,000 restitution, $60 CVF, $68 state costs.

PEOPLE v ZIYAD NATID ZORA, charged with 1 count Tobacco Products Tax Act Violation -Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Plea Agreement on 06/02/2009. Defendant sentenced to probation and payment of $2,000 in restitution.

Health Care Fraud Division – Prosecutions 2009-2010

PEOPLE v TRACEY ASHLEY, Count 1 - Nursing Homes - Abuse of a Patient. 36th District Court, Wayne County. Jury - Acquittal, 12/15/2009.

PEOPLE v MARCIA BAKER, Count 1 - Medicaid Fraud False Claim. 35th Circuit Court, Shiawassee County. Pled Guilty, Probation: 60 months; Other Restitution - Amount: $430.98; Court Costs: $600.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Other Costs: $538.00, 12/04/2009.

PEOPLE v DENISE BANKS, Count 1 - Financial Transaction Device - Stealing/Retaining Without Consent, Embezzlement - From a Vulnerable Adult - $200.00 Or More But Less Than $1,000.00. 17th Circuit Court-Kent County, Case dismissed per Plea Agreement with Defendant Mary Banks. Dismissed by Plaintiff/Petitioner, 02/23/2009.

PEOPLE v MARY BANKS, Count 1 - Financial Transaction Device - Stealing/Retaining Without Consent, Embezzlement - From a Vulnerable Adult - $200.00 Or More But Less Than $1,000.00; Plea Agreement, 17th Circuit Court, Kent County. Pled Guilty, Probation: 24 months; Other Restitution - Amount: $4874.50; Court Costs: $700.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Other Costs: $120.00, 02/12/2009.

PEOPLE v STEPHEN BIAS, Count 1 - Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult , more than $1,000 but less than $20,000, Count 2 - Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult $20,000 or more, 16th Circuit Court-Macomb County. Pled Guilty, Probation: 3 Yrs; Other Restitution - Amount: $27,953.00; Court Costs: $900.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $900.00; Other Costs: $68.00, 09/01/2010.

PEOPLE v DANIELLE BORIEO, Count 1 - Identity Theft, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal per Plea Agreement by Jeff Borieo, 04/20/2009.

PEOPLE v JEFF BORIEO, Count 1 - Identity Theft; 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Pled Guilty, 2 years probation, $240 supervision fee, $60 CVR, $1,000 costs, $60 state minimum costs; $1500 court costs, probation may be transferred to Orlando, Florida at discretion of Florida authorities; prohibited from having a checking account, credit card or financial transaction device in his or any other name; no legal contact with victim Helena Borieo, 04/20/2009.

PEOPLE v LAURA CIPPONERI, Count 1 - Identity Theft; 6th Circuit Court-Oakland County, Pled Guilty, Probation: 12 months; Other Restitution - Amount: $5,196.00; Court Costs: $600.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $1,620.00; Other Costs: $60.00, 01/06/2009.

PEOPLE v RICK COCHRAN, Count 1 - Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, Count 2 - 1 Felony Count Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult $1,000 or more but less than $20,000 and Count 3 - 1 Misdemeanor Count Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult - $200 or more but less than $1,000, 57th District Court, Allegan County, Nolle entered as to Count 1: Pled Guilty as to Count 2 and Count 3, Other Restitution - Amount: $22,800.00; Court Costs: $1,500.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $600.00; Other Costs: $136.00, 05/25/2010.

PEOPLE v SANDRA COLLIER, Count 1 Nursing Homes - Abuse of a Patient, 36th District Court-Wayne County. Pled nolo contendere; under advisement 90 days. Failed to appear after 90 days - Bench Warrant issued by the Court 07/20/87; as of 10/16/2000, bench warrant is no longer in LEIN. A Motion/Order of Nolle Pros was filed by AG on September 15, 2009, as the defendant is unable to be located. Judge Paula Humphries signed the order on October 15, 2009. Plea Agreement, 09/15/2009.

PEOPLE v LISA CONEY, Count 1 - Medicaid Fraud - False Claim – Felony and Count 2 - Misdemeanor Count Controlled Substances Drugs - Obtaining by False Name, 15th Circuit Court-Branch County. Pled Guilty, 24 months probation, 9 months jail with all but 3 days suspended, $200 fines, $52 restitution, $60 CVR, $400 costs, $121 State Minimum costs, $250 repay attorney fees, 04/01/2010.

PEOPLE v KEVIN CROTHERS, Count 1 - Embezzlement - From A Vulnerable Adult - $1,000.00 Or More But Less Than $20,000.00 and Count 2 - Embezzlement - From A Vulnerable Adult - $20,000.00 Or More; Plea Agreement, County 3 - Embezzlement - Person in Relationship of Trust with Vulnerable Adult $1,000 but less than $20,000 - Felony, 30th Circuit Court-Ingham County. Pled Guilty, 11 days jail with 11 days credit; 60 months probation, $60 CVR, $240 Supervision Fee, $68 State Costs, $500 Court Costs, $500 Attorney Fees, Restitution of $206,250, payable as follows: $37,908.96 to Meadowbrook Care Facility, $38,051.58 to the IRS and $130,289.46 to the guardian, Sally Watrous, 03/31/2010.

PEOPLE v MICHAEL FARMER, Count 1 - Attempt Embezzlement - Agent or Trustee $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, Count 2 - Attempt-Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult $1,000 or more but less than $20,000. 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County, Sentenced on Count 2: Attempt-Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult $1,000 or more but less than $20,000. Pursuant to plea agreement, Wagner was sentenced to 1 day jail with credit for 1 day; 18 months probation, $540 supervision fee, $5,158 restitution payable to the guardian, court costs $450, state minimum costs $68, attorney fees $450, and $60 crime victims rights fee, 12/15/2010.

PEOPLE v KEVIN GANTON, Count 1 - Public Health Code - General Violations, 12th District Court-Jackson County, Pled Guilty to 1 Misdemeanor Count Public Health Code - General Violations; $193 fine, $500 costs, $53 state costs, $54 miscellaneous (total $800). Court Costs: $500.00; CVR Fee: $50.00; Fines: $193.00; Other Costs: $57.00, 02/19/2010.

PEOPLE v JEFFREY GEROU, Count 1 - Felony Count Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult - $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, Count 2 - Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult - $200 or more, but less than $1,000. 57th Circuit Court-Emmet County, Probation: 2 years, Plea Agreement to Count 2 $200 or more but less than $1,000. Per plea agreement the People will dismiss the charged felony, Count 1. Sentenced to $60 CVR, $53 state costs, $350 court costs, $5,875 restitution, $528 attorney fees, 200 hours community service, no firearm, 2 years probation, 05/04/09.

PEOPLE v LUWILLIS GIBSON, JR., Counts 1-2 - Felony Attempted Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult - $1,000 or more but less than $20,000. 14th Circuit Court-Muskegon County, Pled Guilty, Probation: 18 months; Other Restitution - Amount: $2,403.88; Court Costs: $300.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $1,440.00;

Other Costs: $68.00. Count 2 Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult - $1,000 or more but less than $20,000 Nolle Prossed, 12/14/2009.

PEOPLE v SHENILE GRADY, Counts 1-2 - Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult - $1,000 or more but less than $20,000. 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Pled Guilty to Count 2 Attempt Embezzlement - Person in Relationship with Vulnerable Adult – nole prossed. Sentenced to 60 months probation, $600 supervision fees, $4,530 restitution (payable to Heritage Manor Nursing Home), $60 CVR, $400 attorney fees, $68 fines, 08/05/2010.

PEOPLE v REBECCA GRAWIEN, Count 1 - Embezzlement - From A Vulnerable Adult - $200.00 Or More But Less Than $1,000.00 and Count 2 - Embezzlement - From A Vulnerable Adult - $1,000.00 Or More But Less Than $20,000.00. 32nd Circuit Court-Gogebic County, One year delayed sentence on Count 2, Attempt Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult, $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, and ordered to pay $420 in costs and fees and to pay $2,293.50 in restitution to the Gogebic County Clerk for the use of the Gogebic County Medical Care Facility. The People did not acquiesce to the delayed sentence. The People dismissed Count 1. Judge Gotham requested a motion to dismiss Count 2 as Grawien had fully paid restitution and successfully complied with the terms of her delayed sentence. The People filed a nolle prosequi for Count 2 so as to comport the pleadings with the sentence of the court. Judge Gotham granted the nolle prosequi, 10/01/09.

PEOPLE v VERONICA HAYNES, Count 1 Nursing Homes - Abuse of a Patient, Count 2 Capturing/Distributing Image of Unclothed Person and Count 3 Obscenity, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Plea entered to 1 Count Capturing/distributing Image of Unclothed Person (Video Voyeurism) and 1 Count Nursing Homes - Abuse of a Patient. Sentenced to 6 months probation, Supervision Fees $120, Standard MSD fees (CC, Atty, Sm, CVF) $403. NOTE: order is incorrect in that it states the conviction was for Capturing/distributing Image of Unclothed Person (video Voyeurism). Recd CORRECTED ORDER changing the conviction to Obscenity. Sentenced to 6 months probation, Supervision Fees $120, CVR $60, Court costs $300, $68 State minimum costs, 04/17/2009.

PEOPLE v DAVID HOPPE, Count 1 - Embezzlement - Agent Or Trustee $1,000.00 Or More But Less Than $20,000.00, Count 2 - Embezzlement - Agent Or Trustee $20,000.00 Or More But Less Than $50,000.00, Count 3 - Embezzlement - From A Vulnerable Adult - $1,000.00 Or More But Less Than $20,000.00, 46th Circuit Court-Kalkaska County, Pled Guilty as to Count 3: 1 Felony Count Attempt Embezzlement - Agent or Trustee $1,000 or more but less than $20,000. Defendant was sentenced on his plea to an added count 3, Attempt-Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, 5 years probation, assessed a crime victims rights fee of $60, $68 in state costs, $300 in local court costs, and $350 for attorney fees. $13,795 in restitution to the clerk who will transfer the restitution to the account of the victim at Kalkaska Medical Care Facility Long Term Care Unit. Nolle filed dismissing Count 1: Embezzlement Agent or Trustee $20,000 or more, Motion/Order of Nolle Prosequi signed dismissing Count 2 Embezzlement - Agent or Trustee, $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, 06/21/2010.

PEOPLE v TAMARA HOPPE, Count 1 - Embezzlement - From A Vulnerable Adult - $200.00 Or More But Less Than $1,000.00, Count 2 - Larceny - $1,000.00 Or More

But Less Than $20,000.00 and Count 3 - Larceny By Conversion - $200.00 Or More But Less Than $1,000.00, 87th District Court-Kalkaska County, Plea Agreement as to Count 1: Misdemeanor - Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult - $200 or more but less than $1,000; and Count 3: Misdemeanor - Larceny by Conversion - $200 or more but less than $1,000. Sentenced as to Count 1 - $60 CVR; $3,165.00 restitution to Leo Hoppe, c/o Patricia Sulivan, (minus payment made by Defendant towards restitution of $800); $53 state fees; $100 court costs; $15; $50 fines; $350 attorney costs; $80 assessment fee, as to Count 3 - $53 state fees; $200 court costs; $100 fines; $15. 365 days jail if fines, costs and restitution are not paid in full by 6/1/11. Count 2 - Larceny, $1,000 or more but less than $20,000 dismissed (nolle signed 5/24/10).

PEOPLE v JEN HUNG, Counts 1-3 - Larceny by Conversion - $1,000 or More But Less Than $20,000, Counts 4-5 - Health Care Fraud – False Claim and Counts 6-62 - Health Care Fraud – False Claim , 52nd Circuit Court-Huron County, Pled Guilty to 2 Counts Attempted Health Care Fraud - False Claim 19/10 Nolle entered dismissing 56 Counts Health Care False Claims (MCL 752.1003(1) and 2 Counts Larceny by Conversion, Sentenced to 18 months probation, $200 Fines-Library Fund, $60 CVR, $200 Court Costs, $136 State Minimum Costs, $32,319 Restitution ($27,700 Medicaid, $4,584 BCBS, $35 DNA testing to Huron County Sheriff's Dept), 04/19/2010.

PEOPLE v YUH HUNG, Counts 1-56 - Health Care Fraud - False Claim and Counts 57 through 59 - Larceny by Conversion - $1,000.00 Or More But Less Than $20,000.00, 52nd Circuit Court-Huron County, Motion/Order of Nolle filed dismissing without prejudice 1-56 Counts Health Care False Claims and 57-59 Counts Larceny by Conversion, Dismissed by Plaintiff/Petitioner, 04/19/2010.

PEOPLE v YUH LIN HUNG, MD PC, Counts 1-2 - Larceny By Conversion - $1,000.00 Or More But Less Than $20,000.00, Counts 3-59 - Health Care Fraud – False Claim, 52nd Circuit Court-Huron County, Pled Guilty to 2 Counts Attempted Health Care Fraud, Plaintiff filed Nolle dismissing 1-2 Larceny by Conversion and Counts 4-59 of Health Care False Claims, 04/19/2010.

PEOPLE v STEVE ILYAYEV, 1-41 Counts of Medicaid Fraud – False Claim; Count 42 - False Pretenses - $1,000 or More But Less Than $20,000, Counts 43-50 - Medical Records – Intentionally Placing False Information On Chart – Health Care Provider, Counts 51 - 59 of Health Care Fraud – False Claim, 30th Circuit Court-Ingham County, Pled Guilty to Count 2 Medicaid fraud false claim. Sentenced to 1 day jail, $60 Crime Victims Fund, $60 state cost, $550 court costs, $15,000 court fine, $70,000 restitution to BCBS and $20,000 to the State of Michigan (fines and restitution joint and several with Premier Consulting, 03/18/2009.

PEOPLE v NICOLE INGERSOLL, Count 1 - Nursing Homes - Abuse of a Patient, 61st District Court-Kent County Plea Agreement, Attempt Nursing Home Abuse MCL. Sentenced to 1 day jail (1 day served), $100 fine, $250 city costs, $45 state fees, $50 CVR, $140 attorney fees (total fines and fees $585), 02/06/09.

PEOPLE v ELEANOR JACKSON, Count 1 - Controlled Substances - Possession (Cocaine, Heroin or another Narcotic) Less Than 25 Grams, Count 2 - Larceny in a Building. 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Pled Guilty 1 Count Controlled Substance-Possess Narcotic/Cocaine Less than 25 Grams, Jail: 10 days; Probation: 24

months; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $240.00; Other Costs: $468.00, 07/27/2009.

PEOPLE v ERICKA JACKSON, Count 1 - Nursing Homes - Abuse of a Patient, 41-A District Court-Macomb County, 11/20/06 Recd Defendant's Application for Leave to Appeal 41st District Court's order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 16th Circuit Court No. 06-4971-AR. 6/8/07 Macomb County Circuit Court affirmed the 41-A District Court's decision and remands case back to District Court for further proceedings. 2/1/08 Defendant filed Application for Leave to Appeal in Michigan Court of Appeals, appealing Order by Macomb County Circuit Court, affirming Order of 41-A District Court denying Motion to Dismiss. 8/14/08 Court of Appeals issued its Opinion reversing Circuit Court decision and remanding case back to the District court for entry of an Order of Dismissal. (COA ruled a dead body is not a patient of a nursing home under the Public Health Code). Dismissed by District Court due to COA opinion, 12/16/2009.

PEOPLE v DARRYL JAMES, Count 1 - Health Profession - Unauthorized Practice – Felony, 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County. Pled Guilty, $300.00 in attorney fees, $572.00 in court costs, $60 crime victim's fee and $68 state minimum costs (total $1,000.00). The court also ordered that the defendant may be released from jail upon payment of the $1,000.00 due, 05/05/2009.

PEOPLE v KATHLEEN JOHNSON, Count 1 – Homicide – Manslaughter – Involuntary, Count 2 – Vulnerable Adult Abuse – 2nd Degree, Count 3 – Medical Records – Intentionally Placing False Information on Chart – Health Care Provider, Count 4 – Accessory after the Face to a Felony, Count 5 – Tampering with Evidence – Criminal Case – Punishable by more than 10 years, Count 6 – Tampering with Evidence, 77th District Court-Mecosta County. Dismissed by Court/Tribunal w/o prejudice, 02/25/2009.

PEOPLE v LJUBOMIR JOJICH, Counts 1-2 - Health Profession - Unauthorized Practice – Felony, 2 Counts Uttering and Publishing, Plea entered to Count 1 - Health Profession - Unauthorized Practice. Sentenced to 1 year probation, $300 costs, $60 CVR, $68 state costs, $480 supervision fee to the DOC, 06/08/09.

PEOPLE v JANET JONES, Count 1 - Misdemeanor False Pretenses greater than $200. 60th District Court-Muskegon County, Probation: 6 months; Supervision Fee: $150.00, $150 probation fee, $1,139.12 MA restitution, 08/05/2010.

PEOPLE v DOROTHY KANDOW, Counts 1-4 - Controlled Substance Obtained by Fraud, Felony. 3rd Circuit Court-Wayne County, Probation: 3 years; Court Costs: $495.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Other Costs: $468.00, 01/27/2010.

PEOPLE v ROBERT KOCH, Count 1 - Accessory after the Fact to a Felony, Count 2 - Nursing Homes – Failure to Report Abuse of a Patient, 77th District Court-Mecosta County, Dismissed by Plaintiff/Petitioner. Count 1 dismissed w/o prejudice, and retaining jurisdiction on Counts 2 & 3 (misdemeanors). Motion/Order of Nolle entered by AG dismissing remainder of case w/o prejudice, 04/03/2009.

PEOPLE v VICTORIA KONESKY, Count 1 - Vulnerable Adult Abuse - 4th Degree. 27th District Court-Wayne County, Order of Nolle Pros, Case dismissed due to ruling of MI Supreme Court in Edenstrom, 05/27/2009.

PEOPLE v SUSAN KUBSCH, Count 1 - Embezzlement - From A Vulnerable Adult - $200.00 Or More But Less Than $1,000.00, Count 2 - Embezzlement - From A Vulnerable Adult - $1,000.00 Or More But Less Than $20,000.00. 2nd Circuit Court-Berrien County, Complaint filed in 5th District Court to 1 Felony Count Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult - $1,000 or more but less than $20,000. 12/21/09 Amended Info filed adding 1 Misdemeanor Count Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult - $1,000 or more but less than $1,000. Pled Guilty to 1 Misdemeanor Count, Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult - $200 or more but less than $1,000. 1/25/10 Sentenced to 24 months probation, $400 fine, $1,000 costs, $5,595.82 restitution, $60 CVRA, $300 attorney fee $68 state costs and $20 other (total $7,443.82). 1/25/10 AG filed Nolle dismissing 1 Felony Count Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult - $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, 09/24/09.

PEOPLE v BEVERLY LEMON, Count 1 - Embezzlement - From A Vulnerable Adult - $200.00 Or More But Less Than $1,000.00, Count 2 - Embezzlement - From A Vulnerable Adult - $1,000.00 Or More But Less Than $20,000.00. 46th Circuit Court-Kalkaska County, Pled Guilty to 1 Count Embezzlement - Pers. in Rel. with Vulnerable Adult. Nolle Pros filed dismissing 1 Count Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, $300 court costs, $53 State minimum costs and $60 CVR), 12/17/2009.

PEOPLE v DANIEL LOHMEIER, Count 1-2 – Medicaid Fraud – False Claim, Counts 4-88 – Medicaid Fraud – False Claim. 30th Circuit Court Ingham County, Pled Guilty to 2 (high court misdemeanor) Counts Attempted Medicaid Fraud, Jail: 1 day; Probation: 18 months; 200 hours community service; Court Costs: $1,500.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Supervision Fee: $900.00; Other Costs: $136.00, 05/26/2010.

PEOPLE v MARJORIE MEHNEY, Count 1 - Embezzlement - From A Vulnerable Adult - $200.00 Or More But Less Than $1,000.00, Count 2 - Embezzlement From a Vulnerable Adult - $1,000.00 Or More But Less Than $20,000.00. 57th Circuit Court-Emmet County, Amended Info filed in 57th Circuit Court adding Misdemeanor Ct #2 Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult $200 or more but less than $1,000. 1/14/09 Remanded back to District Court for plea and sentencing. Plea entered to Ct #2. Pled Guilty to Count 2 Embezzlement from a Vulnerable Adult, 10 days community service, $45 state minimum, $60 CVR, $500 costs, $395 fines. Order of Nolle Pros for Count 1 - Embezzlement from Vulnerable Adult, 01/14/2009.

PEOPLE v KATHRYN MIZZI, Count 1 - Embezzlement - From a Vulnerable Adult - $1,000.00 or More But Less Than $20,000.00. 11th Circuit Court-Mackinac County, .Remanded With Decision, Opinion and Order following preliminary examination (dismissing case). Claim of Appeal filed in 11th Circuit Court appealing 92nd District Court's Denial of Motion for Reconsideration dated February 25, 2009. Order remanding case back to District Court for further review and action consistent with ruling of factual misrepresentations were erroneously stated at the lower court's hearing, thereby affecting the lower's ruling and decision, 05/22/2009.

PEOPLE v TRACEY MOORE, Count 1 – Homicide – Manslaughter – Involuntary, Count 2 Vulnerable Adult Abuse – 2nd Degree, Count 3 – Accessory after the Fact to a Felony, 77th District Court-Mecosta County, Dismissed by Court/Tribunal, 02/25/2009.

PEOPLE v SHARON MUMAH, Count 1 – Vulnerable Adult Abuse – 2nd Degree, Count 2 – Accessory after the Fact to a Felony, Count 3 – Nursing Homes – Failure to Report Abuse of a Patient, 77th District Court-Mecosta County, Dismissed by Plaintiff/Petitioner, 04/03/2009.

PEOPLE v KENNETH NEBOR, JR., Count 1 - Embezzlement - From a Vulnerable Adult - $200.00 Or More But Less Than $1,000.00, Count 2 - Embezzlement - From a Vulnerable Adult - $1,000.00 Or More But Less Than $20,000.00. 46th Circuit Court-Crawford County, Pled Guilty to Count 1 Embezzlement – From a Vulnerable Adult - $200.00 or More But Less Than $1,000.00, Other Restitution - Amount: $5396.73; Court Costs: $325.00; Supervision Fee: $50.00; Fines: $300.00; Other Costs: $53.00, Nolle entered by Plaintiff Dismissing Without Prejudice Count 2 - Embezzlement From a Vulnerable adult - $1,000 or More But Less Than $20,000.00, 04/19/2010.

PEOPLE v RUDY OCHS, Count 1 – Accessory After the Fact to a Felony, County 2 – Public Officer – Willful Neglect of Duty, 77th District Court-Mecosta County, Dismissed by Plaintiff/Petitioner, 04/03/2009.

PEOPLE v KYLA PARKER, Count 1 - Embezzlement - From a Vulnerable Adult - $1,000.00 Or More But Less Than $20,000.00. 7th Circuit Court-Genesee County, Court Costs: $1,000.00; CVR Fee: $60.00; Other Costs: $60.00, 02/24/2009.

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PEOPLE v LESLIE ROBINSON, 1 Count Embezzlement - Vulnerable Adult - $200 or More But Less than $1,000. 46th District Court-Oakland County, Pled Guilty, Probation, 24 months; Other Restitution - Amount: $9,371.00; CVR Fee: $50.00; Supervision Fee: $960.00; Fines: $350.00, 11/05/2010.

PEOPLE v RACHEL ROEBUCK, Count 1 - Medical Records - Recklessly Placing False Information on Chart - Health Care Provider. 36th District Court-Wayne County, Pled Guilty, Probation: 12 months; Court Costs: $200.00; CVR Fee: $50.00; Supervision Fee: $180.00; Fines: $200.00, 04/21/2010.

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PEOPLE v GARY SINGER, Counts 1-4 - False Pretenses over $20,000. 13th Circuit Court-Grand Traverse County, Jail, 12 months; Pled guilty to one count of False Pretenses over $20,000 carrying a maximum penalty of 10 years. Probation, 5 years, the defendant served 28 months in prison before his sentence was overturned by the Court of Appeals and remanded to the circuit court to sentence him to probation and 1 year in jail, credit for time served, supervision fee $600 and $559,419.09 in outstanding restitution to be paid jointly and severally with Margaret Zimmerman. The defendant was required to surrender his insurance license, 06/30/2009.

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A city charter that provides for the appointment of the city assessor, mayor, and three city council members to the board of review conflicts with the Incompatible Public Offices Act, 1978 PA 566, MCL 15.181 *et seq*, and renders these positions incompatible because the office of board of review member ultimately supervises the work of the office of city assessor and because the charter makes the office of board of review member subordinate to, or under the supervision of, the offices of mayor or city council member. If, however, a city has a population of less than 25,000 and the city's governing board authorizes the appointment of these public officers to the board of review, such officers may serve as board of review members regardless of the incompatibility. MCL 15.183(4)(c) 184

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Const 1963, art 5, § 2—Executive Reorganization Orders—Whether the Governor may compel or authorize the director of a state agency to institute an admission fee for the Michigan Historical Museum and exhibits pursuant to her reorganization authority under Const 1963, art 5, § 2—The Governor may neither compel nor authorize the head of a principal department of state government or other state agency to institute an admission fee for a museum facility and its exhibits pursuant to gubernatorial reorganization authority under Const 1963, art 5, § 2 where the power to institute such a fee has not previously been conferred upon the transferred or receiving department or agency by the Legislature. Thus, as amended by Executive Order 2009-43, Executive Order 2009-36 does not empower the Director of the Department of Natural Resources to institute an admission fee at the Michigan Historical Museum and its exhibits 90

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"reasonable electricity generation need" of a proposed coal-fired electricity plant and then further requiring the DEQ to consider alternative methods of meeting that need, attempt to impose requirements not found in Part 55 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.5501 *et seq*, or the other provisions of law cited in the directive. Executive Directive 2009-2(B) and (C) attempt to amend substantive law contrary to the separation of powers doctrine of Const 1963, art 3, § 2, and are unenforceable 1

Although Executive Directive 2009-2 may constitute a formal expression of the Governor's environmental and energy policy preferences, it cannot and does not alter the existing regulatory requirements and procedures applicable to new coal-fired electricity generating plants under Part 55 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.5501 *et seq*.....1

Legislature—Separation of Powers—Line Item Veto—Force and effect of gubernatorial statements made in line item veto transmittal letters—Upon returning to the Legislature an appropriation bill in which certain line items have been vetoed, the Governor may include in her transmittal letter an expression of her views regarding the unconstitutionality of various boilerplate provisions contained within that bill. The views so expressed however, do not satisfy the requirements for enacting a law, do not amend substantive law, and do not render the identified boilerplate provisions unconstitutional or void 12

GREAT LAKES BOTTOMLANDS:

See NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT

H.

HOME RULE CITY ACT:

See CITIES

I.

INCOMPATIBILITY:

Incompatible Public Offices Act—Board of Review—Assessor—Mayor—City Council—General Property Tax Act—Home Rule City Act—Appointment of city board of review members—Under the General Property Tax Act, 1893 PA 206, MCL 211.28(4), a city may provide for the size, composition, and manner of appointment of the city's board of review by charter, and a city's charter provision will govern such appointments unless the charter contravenes other provisions of law. MCL 117.36.....184

A city charter that provides for the appointment of the city assessor, mayor, and three city council members to the board of review conflicts with the Incompatible Public Offices Act, 1978 PA 566, MCL 15.181 *et seq*, and renders these positions incompatible because the office of board of review member ultimately supervises the work of the office of city assessor and because the charter makes the office of board of review member subordinate to, or under the super-

vision of, the offices of mayor or city council member. If, however, a city has a population of less than 25,000 and the city's governing board authorizes the appointment of these public officers to the board of review, such officers may serve as board of review members regardless of the incompatibility. MCL 15.183(4)(c) 184

Incompatible Public Offices Act—Public Offices and Officers—Whether person serving as township supervisor and city police officer holds incompatible offices—A person holding positions as an elected township supervisor and a city police officer does not violate the Incompatible Public Offices Act, MCL 15.181 *et seq*, unless: 1) the township and the city have or are negotiating a contract for police services; or 2) other particularized facts are present that demonstrate the individual cannot faithfully perform the duties of a city police officer and township supervisor in a manner that protects, advances, or promotes the interests of both offices simultaneously 17

Incompatible Public Offices Act—Public Offices and Officers—Incompatibility of offices of general law township trustee and fire chief of a jointly administered fire department—A trustee of a township with a population less than 25,000 that is a party to an intergovernmental agreement creating a joint fire department may not simultaneously serve as the fire chief of the joint fire department.....48

INSURANCE CODE:

Corporations—Corporate insurance agency's use of the word "insurance" in company name—Section 213(1) of the Business Corporation Act, 1972 PA 284, MCL 450.1213(1), does not require a corporate insurance agency that includes the word "insurance" in its name to also include the word "agency," and a corporate agency is free to use the word "insurance" in its name so long as the name, taken as a whole, does not imply that the agency is an insurance or surety company 113

L.

LEGISLATURE:

Legislature—Governor—Separation of Powers—Line Item Veto—Force and effect of gubernatorial statements made in line item veto transmittal letters—Upon returning to the Legislature an appropriation bill in which certain line items have been vetoed, the Governor may include in her transmittal letter an expression of her views regarding the unconstitutionality of various boilerplate provisions contained within that bill. The views so expressed however, do not satisfy the requirements for enacting a law, do not amend substantive law, and do not render the identified boilerplate provisions unconstitutional or void 12

M.

MENTAL HEALTH CODE:

County Jails—Inmates—Responsibility for costs associated with mental health treatment provided to inmates at county jails—The costs incurred providing

mental health services to an inmate incarcerated in a county jail are ultimately the responsibility of the county under MCL 801.4. The community mental health program serving the county in which that jail is located must nevertheless seek to obtain payment from available insurance or other sources before resorting to the county for payment in accordance with MCL 801.4(2). The costs incurred in providing mental health services to an inmate in a county jail rests with the county, regardless of the type of treatment or mental health service being delivered.....44

MICHIGAN CAMPAIGN FINANCE ACT:

Public Officers and Employees—Candidate Committees—Whether campaign funds may be used to pay an elected officeholder's legal fees incurred to defend against criminal charges—Under sections 9(1) and 21a of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, MCL 169.209(1) and 169.221a, the candidate committee of an elected official is permitted to make an expenditure for an incidental expense to pay for legal fees incurred by the officeholder to defend against criminal charges, but only if the expense is an ordinary and necessary business expense of the elected official as described under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 USC 162, and is paid or incurred in carrying out the business of an elective office. To qualify as such an ordinary and necessary business expense, the source of the charge or the character of the conduct from which the charge stems must arise in the course of carrying out the business of being a public official. Expenses incurred to defend against charges that originate from personal activity unrelated to performing the functions of the public official's office will not so qualify.....95

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY:

Const 1963, art 5, § 8—Executive Directives—Governor—Separation of Powers—Governor's authority to direct the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality to impose certain requirements in the processing of applications for air emissions permits for coal-fired power plants—Executive Directive 2009-2(A) and (D), requiring the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to determine whether there are more environmentally protective "feasible and prudent alternatives" to constructing a new coal-fired electricity generating plant when evaluating an air emissions permit application under Part 55 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.5501 *et seq*, and further requiring the DEQ to deny a permit if such alternatives exist, impose requirements that are not found in Part 55 of the NREPA or the other provisions of law cited in the directive. Therefore, Executive Directive 2009-2(A) and (D) attempt to amend substantive law contrary to the separation of powers doctrine of Const 1963, art 3, § 2, and are unenforceable.....1

Executive Directive 2009-2(B) and (C), requiring the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to make an initial "determination" regarding the "reasonable electricity generation need" of a proposed coal-fired electricity plant and then further requiring the DEQ to consider alternative methods of meeting that need, attempt to impose requirements not found in Part 55 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.5501 *et*

seq, or the other provisions of law cited in the directive. Executive Directive 2009-2(B) and (C) attempt to amend substantive law contrary to the separation of powers doctrine of Const 1963, art 3, § 2, and are unenforceable 1

Although Executive Directive 2009-2 may constitute a formal expression of the Governor's environmental and energy policy preferences, it cannot and does not alter the existing regulatory requirements and procedures applicable to new coal-fired electricity generating plants under Part 55 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.5501 *et seq*.....1

MICHIGAN PENAL CODE:

Firearms Act—Short-Barreled Shotgun—Possession of a firearm that shoots shotgun shells, has not been modified from a shotgun, and has a barrel length of less than 18 inches, and an overall length of less than 26 inches—A person in Michigan may lawfully possess a weapon that fires shotgun shells; has not been constructed from a modified shotgun; has an overall length of less than 26 inches and a barrel length of less than 18 inches; and is not designed or intended to be fired from the shoulder, if the person complies with the purchase and registration requirements for owning a pistol set forth in the Firearms Act, 1929 PA 372, MCL 28.421 *et seq* 169

MICHIGAN PLANNING ENABLING ACT:

See PUBLIC OFFICES, OFFICERS, AND EMPLOYEES

MICHIGAN VEHICLE CODE:

Implied Consent Law—Prosecuting Attorneys—Whether a prosecutor may gain access to blood alcohol test results before initiating a prosecution against a suspected drunk driver—Under subsection (6)(e) of section 625a of the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.625a(6)(e), an actual criminal prosecution need not be pending before a prosecutor may obtain the results of blood alcohol tests taken by a medical facility in the course of providing medical treatment to a driver involved in a motor vehicle accident.....83

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See SUMMER RESORT OWNERS CORPORATION ACT

MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE INCINERATOR:

See CLEAN, RENEWABLE, AND EFFICIENT ENERGY ACT

N.

NATURAL RESOURCES COMMISSION:

See FIREARMS

NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT:

Great Lakes Bottomlands—Issues relating to the intentional sinking of a vessel to expand recreational diving opportunities on Great Lakes bottomlands—Assuming the appropriate state and federal authorization has been obtained, if the owner of a vessel intentionally sinks it in the Great Lakes, physically deserts the vessel, and publishes a notice stating that the owner intends to completely relinquish title, possession, and control of the vessel, without vesting ownership in any other person, the vessel could be considered abandoned under both Michigan common law and Part 761 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, MCL 324.76101(a). But such actions would not necessarily relieve the person who sunk the vessel from legal responsibilities or liabilities that could arise from the act of sinking 29

A vessel intentionally sunk in the Great Lakes does not automatically become property of the State of Michigan when it comes to rest on state bottomlands. The State does, however, reserve to itself a possessory right or title superior to that of a finder to abandoned property of historical or recreational value found on state-owned bottomlands of the Great Lakes. Moreover, pursuant to federal law, the State has title to certain abandoned shipwrecks, including those embedded in Great Lakes bottomlands, as well as other historically significant shipwrecks on Great Lakes bottomlands. In addition, Part 761 provides for the Departments of Environmental Quality and History, Arts, and Libraries to regulate any recovery, alteration, or destruction of abandoned, sunken watercraft, or associated property on Great Lakes bottomlands 29

See CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

O.

OATH OF OFFICE:

See PUBLIC OFFICES, OFFICERS, AND EMPLOYEES

OPEN MEETINGS ACT:

Public Records—Freedom of Information Act— Public access to the minutes of a public body's open meetings—After receiving a request, a public body must make open meeting minutes available for inspection within the time periods specified in the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 *et seq*. The public body may, under rules established and recorded by the public body, request advance notice of and require supervision of any inspection of the public body's record copy of open meeting minutes to protect the record from "loss, unauthorized alteration, mutilation, or destruction." MCL 15.233(3). Generally, neither advance notice nor supervision should be required for the inspection of copies of open meeting minutes 122

Voting—Legality of proxy voting under the Open Meetings Act—A provision in the bylaws of a city's downtown development authority that allows board members to vote by proxy violates the Michigan Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 *et seq*, because proxy voting fails to make the important deliberative aspects of the

absent board member's decision-making process open to the public when rendering a decision that effectuates public policy 22

Quorum—Permissible activity under the Open Meetings Act where a city council's committee of the whole meets to hear testimony—A city council "committee of the whole" may listen to testimony from the public and city administrative staff when it properly notices a meeting under the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 *et seq,* but lacks a quorum when it actually convenes 76

A city council "committee of the whole" may ask questions or make comments when it properly notices a meeting under the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 *et seq,* but lacks a quorum when it actually convenes. The city council's committee of the whole may not, however, render any decision in the absence of a quorum 76

P.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS:

Michigan Vehicle Code—Implied Consent Law—Prosecuting Attorneys—Whether a prosecutor may gain access to blood alcohol test results before initiating a prosecution against a suspected drunk driver—Under subsection (6)(e) of section 625a of the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.625a(6)(e), an actual criminal prosecution need not be pending before a prosecutor may obtain the results of blood alcohol tests taken by a medical facility in the course of providing medical treatment to a driver involved in a motor vehicle accident.....83

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT:

Public School Employers—School Districts—School district contracts for noninstructional support services—Under section 15(3)(f) of the Public Employment Relations Act, MCL 423.215(3)(f), as amended by 2009 PA 201, if, and only if, the public school employer decides that the bargaining unit that represents employees providing noninstructional support services will be given an opportunity to bid on a third-party contract for those services on an equal basis as other bidders, the subjects of (1) the decision of whether to contract with a third party for one or more noninstructional support services, (2) the procedures for obtaining the contract for noninstructional support services, (3) the identity of the third party, and (4) the impact of the contract on individual employees or the bargaining unit, are prohibited subjects of collective bargaining. Section 15(3)(f) does not, however, prohibit collective bargaining over the ability of the bargaining unit to have an opportunity to bid on a contract for those services on an equal basis as other bidders, should the public school employer decide to contract with a third party for one or more noninstructional support services.....151

PUBLIC HEALTH CODE:

Certificate of Need—Department of Community Health—Certificate of need for heart transplant services—Currently there are only two approved heart, heart/lung or lung transplantation services existing in Michigan, and thus there is one available certificate of need for these services under section 4(1) of the

Certificate of Need Review Standards for Heart/Lung and Liver Transplantation Services 117

PUBLIC OFFICES, OFFICERS, AND EMPLOYEES:

Appointment—Oath of Office—Michigan Planning Enabling Act—A person appointed to a local planning commission may not assume the duties of office before the appointment is approved by the municipality's governing body—Under section 15(1) of the Michigan Planning Enabling Act, 2008 PA 33, MCL 125.3815(1), while a person appointed to a planning commission may take his or her oath of office before the appointment is approved by the legislative body of the municipality, he or she may not assume the duties of that office until after the appointment is approved by a majority vote of the members of the municipality's legislative body elected and serving 79

Charter Townships—Charter Township Act—Local Officials Compensation Commission—Circumstances under which a charter township official's salary may be reduced—In accordance with the mandates set forth in section 6a of the Charter Township Act, MCL 42.6a, an elected official of a charter township may not consent to a reduction in his or her salary during the official's term of office unless the consent is in writing and there is a corresponding reduction in the officer's responsibilities and requirements 86

If an elected township official's salary has been improperly reduced, the township should pay the unpaid portion minus the applicable payroll deductions. The official may then voluntarily return to the township all or a portion of any compensation received.....86

Michigan Campaign Finance Act—Candidate Committees—Whether campaign funds may be used to pay an elected officeholder's legal fees incurred to defend against criminal charges—Under sections 9(1) and 21a of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, MCL 169.209(1) and 169.221a, the candidate committee of an elected official is permitted to make an expenditure for an incidental expense to pay for legal fees incurred by the officeholder to defend against criminal charges, but only if the expense is an ordinary and necessary business expense of the elected official as described under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 USC 162, and is paid or incurred in carrying out the business of an elective office. To qualify as such an ordinary and necessary business expense, the source of the charge or the character of the conduct from which the charge stems must arise in the course of carrying out the business of being a public official. Expenses incurred to defend against charges that originate from personal activity unrelated to performing the functions of the public official's office will not so qualify 95

See INCOMPATIBILITY

S.

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS:

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act—Obligations of school or school district pertaining to photographs and video of students—Photographs or video

recordings of students participating in school activities will qualify as education records for purposes of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 USC 1232g, and that Act's prohibition on the release of such records, if they contain information directly related to a student, and are maintained by the school or district 125

A school or district may designate photographs and video recordings of students engaged in school activities as a category of "directory information" that may be disclosed without written consent under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 USC 1232g, as long as the school or district provides the required notice to parents that such media will be considered directory information, and further provides parents with a reasonable opportunity to opt out or deny consent to the release of such information 125

A school or district has no legal responsibility under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 USC 1232g, with respect to photographs or video recordings of students participating in school activities taken by a person not acting on behalf of the school or district, unless the photographs and video recordings are "maintained" by the school or district under 20 USC 1232g(a)(4)(A)(ii)....125

First Class School Districts—Public School Academies—Revised School Code—State School Aid Act—Whether a community college may authorize a charter school within the boundaries of the Detroit Public Schools if it no longer meets the threshold pupil membership count required to qualify as a "first class school district"—If a community college with geographic boundaries located within the boundaries of the Detroit Public Schools, or a federal tribally controlled community college, submits a contract to the Michigan Department of Education in which the college's governing board has authorized a public school academy to operate within the boundaries of the Detroit Public Schools, the Department must assign the academy a "district code," enabling it to receive state school aid. While section 502(2)(c) of the Revised School Code, MCL 380.502(2)(c), precludes a community college's governing board from authorizing public school academies in a first class school district, community colleges with geographic boundaries located within a general powers school district's boundaries and federal tribally controlled community colleges may authorize public school academies and compete for students in a general powers school district. Because the Detroit Public Schools' pupil membership on the most recent pupil membership count day did not reach the threshold required of a first class school district under section 402 of the Revised School Code, MCL 380.402, the Detroit Public Schools does not qualify as a first class school district under the Code and is, therefore, a general powers school district 66

Postsecondary Enrollment Options Act—Revised School Code—Responsibility for conducting criminal history background checks of employees of higher education institutions who provide instruction to K-12 students—The provisions of the Revised School Code, 1976 PA 451, MCL 380.1 *et seq*, do not impose any obligations on a higher education institution to require criminal history checks or fingerprints of its employees who provide instruction to K-12 students....165

The board of a school district or intermediate school district, or the governing body of a public school academy or nonpublic school is obligated to obtain a

criminal history check of employees of a higher education institution who provide instruction to any K-12 students if such instruction is provided: 1) pursuant to a contract with the school board or governing body of the K-12 institution; 2) regularly and continuously – on more than an intermittent or sporadic basis; and 3) "at school," meaning "in a classroom [or] elsewhere on school property," as provided in MCL 380.1230a(15) 165

Public Employment Relations Act—Public School Employers—School district contracts for noninstructional support services—Under section 15(3)(f) of the Public Employment Relations Act, MCL 423.215(3)(f), as amended by 2009 PA 201, if, and only if, the public school employer decides that the bargaining unit that represents employees providing noninstructional support services will be given an opportunity to bid on a third-party contract for those services on an equal basis as other bidders, the subjects of (1) the decision of whether to contract with a third party for one or more noninstructional support services, (2) the procedures for obtaining the contract for noninstructional support services, (3) the identity of the third party, and (4) the impact of the contract on individual employees or the bargaining unit, are prohibited subjects of collective bargaining. Section 15(3)(f) does not, however, prohibit collective bargaining over the ability of the bargaining unit to have an opportunity to bid on a contract for those services on an equal basis as other bidders, should the public school employer decide to contract with a third party for one or more noninstructional support services.....151

Revised School Code—Const 1963, art 11, § 6—School Districts—Merit systems for public school employees—Section 1250 of the Revised School Code, MCL 380.1250, does not conflict with Const 1963, art 11, § 6. Article 11, § 6 does not prohibit the Legislature from enacting or amending legislation requiring that a school district, public school academy, or intermediate school district establish a performance-based compensation method for teachers under contract or tenure. In carrying out this statutory mandate, a school district, public school academy, or intermediate school district does not violate art 11, § 6 190

Student Safety Zones—Application of the Sex Offenders Registration Act's Student Safety Zone Exception to Prisoners—Criminal Law—Law Enforcement—Sexual Offenders—For purposes of the exception in section 35(3)(c) of the Sex Offenders Registration Act, MCL 28.735(3)(c), a person who was confined in prison on January 1, 2006, is regarded as "residing within" the prison on that date.....25

SECRETARY OF STATE:

Public Records—Elections—Access to ballots voted at an election under the Freedom of Information Act—Voted ballots, which are not traceable to the individual voter, are public records subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 *et seq*. The Secretary of State, in her role as the Chief Elections Officer, or the Director of Elections through the authority vested in that office, may exercise supervisory authority over local elections officials responding to a Freedom of Information Act request for voted ballots by issuing directions for the review of the ballots in order to protect their physical integrity and the security of the voted ballots.....134

A person must be allowed to inspect or examine voted ballots, which are not traceable to the individual voter, and to receive copies of the ballots upon request subject to reasonable restrictions prescribed by the Secretary of State. The public body may charge a fee for the copying of the voted ballots as provided for in section 4 of the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.234 134

A person requesting access to voted ballots, which are not traceable to the individual voter, under the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 *et seq*, is entitled to a response from a public body granting or denying the request within 5 to 10 business days. MCL 15.235(2). However, the public body in possession of the voted ballots may not provide access to the ballots for inspection or copying purposes until 30 days after certification of the election by the relevant board of canvassers. 1979 AC, R 168.790 134

SEX OFFENDERS REGISTRATION ACT:

Application of the Sex Offenders Registration Act's Student Safety Zone Exception to Prisoners—Criminal Law—Law Enforcement—Sexual Offenders—Student Safety Zones—For purposes of the exception in section 35(3)(c) of the Sex Offenders Registration Act, MCL 28.735(3)(c), a person who was confined in prison on January 1, 2006, is regarded as "residing within" the prison on that date.....25

SUMMER RESORT OWNERS CORPORATION ACT:

Municipal Corporations—Voting—Voting rights of members of a summer resort owners corporation created under 1929 PA 137—A summer resort owners corporation created under 1929 PA 137, MCL 455.201 *et seq*, affords each owner of a freehold interest in property subject to the corporation's jurisdiction membership in the corporation and the right to vote in all its elections. Freeholders include all those holding a fee title or a life estate in real property. Because a member's right to vote is conditioned on ownership of a freehold interest in lands, a summer resort owners corporation may not through adoption of a bylaw deny or limit that right of suffrage based upon the nonpayment of assessments or dues. A bylaw disenfranchising members for nonpayment of assessments is unenforceable.....35

Each freeholder holding lands within the corporate jurisdiction of a summer resort owners corporation created under 1929 PA 137 is entitled to one vote in elections held under that act. An association bylaw allowing other than one vote per member freeholder is unenforceable. 1929 PA 137, MCL 455.201 *et seq*, does not authorize summer resort owner corporations formed under that act to withdraw the status of membership and deny the right to vote based on a member's failure to pay dues or levied assessments or comply with other bylaw requirements.....35

T.

TAXATION:

Tax Increment Financing District—Downtown Development Authority Act—Taxing jurisdiction's ability to "opt out" of a tax increment financing district—A

taxing jurisdiction, the property of which is subject to the tax capture of a municipality's Downtown Development Authority Tax Increment Financing District, may "opt out" of the tax capture under MCL 125.1653(3) if the district's boundaries are altered or amended, but only with respect to property being added to the district 131

TOWNSHIPS:

Charter Townships—Charter Township Act—Local Officials Compensation Commission—Public Officers and Employees—Circumstances under which a charter township official's salary may be reduced—In accordance with the mandates set forth in section 6a of the Charter Township Act, MCL 42.6a, an elected official of a charter township may not consent to a reduction in his or her salary during the official's term of office unless the consent is in writing and there is a corresponding reduction in the officer's responsibilities and requirements 86

If an elected township official's salary has been improperly reduced, the township should pay the unpaid portion minus the applicable payroll deductions. The official may then voluntarily return to the township all or a portion of any compensation received.....86