Simple Tabletop Exercise, Physical Attack/Security Breach – Notification by Perpetrator Scenario  
Scenario #6  
Facilitator’s Guide

Scenario Summary

Background:  It is fall during an election year and Governor Bryant, a Zenith City native, is a presidential candidate. Excitement is running high in the city in anticipation that a former resident may become the next President of the United States. Based on the high profile of the presidential election and the level of “chatter” being intercepted by the intelligence community, the National Threat Advisory Level was recently raised to orange, indicating a high risk for potential terrorist attacks. Polling places in most major cities around the country are instituting extra security precautions in light of the orange alert.

The Event:  On Election Day, November 2, a “Speedy-ship” delivery truck arrives at the Zenith City water treatment plant. Recognizing the driver as Jeff, who started 3 months ago, the security guard allows the truck to pass. The truck suddenly races down the plant’s driveway, veers off and crashes into the side of the building where chlorine gas canisters are stored. The truck does not go through the exterior wall into the building, but it does significantly damage the wall’s integrity. A small fire begins in the delivery truck’s engine compartment. The security guard calls 911 for an ambulance and a fire truck, and notifies the plant manager of the incident. Emergency Medical Services (EMS), fire, and police personnel arrive on-scene. The EMS personnel administer immediate life support to Jeff, place him in the ambulance, and depart for Zenith City hospital. Shortly thereafter, a large explosion rocks the water treatment plant.

The Results:  Fire and police personnel still on-scene are injured in the blast. A plume of yellow-green gas begins to emit from the water treatment plant and travels downwind. The water treatment plant is immediately evacuated.

To the Facilitator:  The goal of this exercise is to evaluate the participants’ emergency response preparedness and their ability to manage a crisis situation that involves the water supply and public health sectors. Participants will be required to address a physical attack on a water supply scenario resulting in a chemical release. In this exercise, the participants will have to deal with managing mass injuries, losing the ability to treat water, coordinating an evacuation, managing media relations, and disseminating information to the public.

Intended Participants:  This exercise may be run for water supply, public health, state drinking water primacy agencies, federal agencies such as EPA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), local law enforcement, and fire/emergency medical services (EMS) personnel.
You may wish to consider inviting:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Utilities:</th>
<th>Water/Wastewater Utility Managers, Emergency Response Team Members, Utility Operators, IT/SCADA Operators, Engineers, Sampling Staff, Administrative Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospital:</td>
<td>Emergency Room staff, Physicians, Nurses and Nurse Practitioners, Hospital Administrators, Medical Laboratory staff, Public Information Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health:</td>
<td>Health Officers, Epidemiologists, Technical Specialists, Public Information Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Dept., HazMat and EMS:</td>
<td>Fire Fighters, HazMat Team members, EMS workers, 911 Call Center workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police:</td>
<td>Police Officers, Counter-Terrorism Specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laboratory:</td>
<td>Analysts / Technicians, Laboratory Administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Officials:</td>
<td>Mayor and Elected Officials, City Council Members, Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) Members, Local Emergency Management Agency staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Officials:</td>
<td>State Environmental Agency Staff, State Health Department Staff, State Drinking Water Primacy Agency, State Emergency Management Agency, Governor's Office Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Officials:</td>
<td>EPA staff, FBI staff, FEMA staff, CDC staff, DHS staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In particular, water utility personnel, local, county and state health officials, members of the law enforcement community, and first responders (Fire Dept., HAZMAT, and EMS) should be invited as they would play a prominent role in a crisis management scenario of this type.

**Running the Exercise**

**Step 1:** Decide on a facility, training date, training duration, and who to invite. Invite participants well in advance of your training date to ensure that you can achieve your attendance goal. Allow adequate time for planning and be sure to prepare all materials (digital and hard copy) ahead of time.

**Step 2:** Depending on who is participating in this exercise, it may be a good idea to have the participants introduce themselves (name, utility, and job title) so that everyone will understand where any particular individual is “coming from” during the ensuing discussions.

**Step 3:** Explain to the participants that they are participating in a simple table top exercise. There is no time pressure and they are there as a group to discuss their roles and responses to an emergency incident. There are no right or wrong answers, but the group should be able to discuss problem or “gray” areas that may arise during the exercise. Let them know the exercise should stimulate discussion that may lead to changes in the way the participants conduct their daily and emergency operations. Also
inform the participants that, although the incident is set in fictional Zenith City, it is okay
to talk about the incident from their own experiences or in the context of their own
protocols and procedures. It will make the exercise more beneficial for the participants if
they exchange emergency response practices, protocols, and procedures that they
currently use.

**Step 4**: Be sure to give the background PowerPoint® presentation to introduce the
participants to Zenith City and to set the stage for the incident. The exercise goals will
also be presented as a part of this presentation.

**Step 5**: Begin the exercise by delivering the first inject. Then, let the discussion evolve
naturally on its own after giving the participants the first inject. If necessary, to get the
discussion started, simply “nudge” the participants with a non-leading question such as:
What would you do in this situation? You could direct this question to the group at large,
or, in a group where no one is willing to break the ice, to a particular individual,
preferably one that you know serves in a leadership role during the course of their daily
activities. You can also refer to the discussion points in the Facilitator’s Guide to help
jump-start discussion.

**Step 6**: Be sure to take notes during the discussions. These notes will form the basis of
your after-action review. Note problem or gray areas that need more research prior to
resolution and who will perform this research or any action items decided upon by the
participants. The notes you take will ensure that a summary of the take-home points,
action items or messages will not be forgotten or overlooked. You may wish to write
these points, action items and messages on a flip chart at the end of the exercise.

**Step 7**: Perform an after-action review. You may wish to give the participants a 10 to 15
minute break at the end of the exercise to give yourself time to compose your notes prior
to conducting the review. Be sure to review the exercise objectives again to determine if
the objectives were met by the exercise. Allow the participants to give their feedback on
the exercise and the conclusions or decisions that they arrived at during the exercise. The
entire tabletop exercise, including the after-action review, can typically be conducted in a
two to four hour session. This time range is flexible and is dependant on the amount of
discussion generated during the exercise. The pace of the exercise is controlled entirely
by the facilitator, who manages the discussions and presents the injects.
Discussion Points

Remember, this scenario begins on Election Day, November 2. A Zenith City native is a presidential candidate, and excitement is running high in the city that a former resident may become the next President of the United States. Based on the high profile of the presidential election and the level of “chatter” being intercepted by the intelligence community, the National Threat Advisory Level was recently raised to orange, indicating a high risk of terrorist attacks. Polling places in most major cities around the country are instituting extra security precautions in light of the orange alert. Exercise participants are provided a map of Zenith City, a water supply distribution map, a wastewater distribution map, and other pertinent materials. If this exercise is to be customized, all these materials may be substituted with a utility’s own maps and other materials.

Inject #1 (13:40 hrs., November 2, Material Code(s) SSc6-1): Radio call from the gate guard at the water treatment plant informing the water treatment plant manager that a delivery truck has just crashed into the wall of the chemical storage building.

Points that could be covered in the discussion of Inject #1 include:

- How strict is the security at the entrance to the WTP?
- Would stricter policies have made a difference in this situation?
- How strong or secure is the room that stores the plant’s dangerous chemicals?
- Are there employees on site trained in emergency response or first aid?
- Who should be notified at this point?

Inject #2 (13:47 hrs., November 2, Material Code(s) SSc6-2): Radio call from the gate guard at the WTP informing the WTP manager that the truck exploded, and something is leaking.

Points that could be covered in the discussion of Inject #2 include:

- Who instigates the WTP evacuation?
- Has the staff received safety training for a crisis such as this to include escape routes, personal protective equipment (PPE) on site, and drills?
- How would the path and spread of the chlorine gas be estimated?
- The Emergency Response Plan (ERP) and the Incident Command System (ICS) should be activated. How do the new National Response Plan (NRP) and National Incident Management System (NIMS) affect the ERP and ICS?
- Should police from neighboring towns be called in for support?
- The leak must be stopped; who should be contacted?
- Who plans for public notifications and for dealing with the media?
- What other agencies should be contacted? The water utility should immediately notify the National Response Center (1-800-424-8802) of the chemical release, as mandated by CERCLA. The Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) should also be notified, as required by SARA Title III. The LEPC is responsible for ensuring that communities are ready to respond to chemical emergencies.
Inject #3 (15:00 hrs., November 2, Material Code(s) SSce6-3): Phone call from the health department to the water utility asking what decisions are being made as to how the water is being treated, and whether it can still be distributed.

Points that could be covered in the discussion of Inject #3 include:

- Should a “Boil Water”, “Do not drink” or “Do not use” report be issued?
- What is the plan for alternate water?
- Has the amount of water available in storage been assessed?
- Who makes these decisions, the Water Utility Emergency Response Manager (WUERM) or the health department?

Inject #4 (15:30 hrs., November 2, Material Code(s) SSce6-4a and SSce6-4b): E-mail from HazMat to police, health department, and water utility containing a map with the chlorine plume location and concentration levels.

Points that could be covered in the discussion of Inject #4 include:

- How will the area affected by the plume be evacuated? Who is in charge of the evacuation?
- What Mutual Aid Agreements should be enacted? Have shelter locations been pre-designated?
- Road closures to keep people out of harm’s way should be discussed and what ramifications those closures may have.

Inject #5 (16:00 hrs., November 2, Material Code(s) SSce6-5): Phone call from hospital to the health department about the chlorine gas injury cases flooding the hospital.

Points that could be covered in the discussion of Inject #5 include:

- Are there enough beds in the hospitals of Zenith City to support this type of incident? What happens in the event that there are not enough? Do the participants’ hospitals have enough beds for an incident such as this?
- Should a warning notification be sent to the media for broadcast that describes the signs and symptoms that you’ve been exposed to dangerous levels of chlorine gas?
- What type of Mutual Aid Agreements need to be in place prior to an incident such as this from a public health and water supply perspective?
Inject #6 (17:00 hrs., November 2, Material Code(s) SSc6-6): Call from the media asking for information about the WTP explosion.

Points that could be covered in the discussion of Inject #6 include:

- What information do we have?
- Who should be our liaison with the media in a crisis such as this?
- What advice do we have for the public?
- Is the WTP out of commission, and should a water shortage alert be issued?
- Where can we get the amount of chlorine we need that was lost in the leak, and where will we store it?
- What plans are in place to provide an alternate source of water for the long term?

Inject #7 (18:00 hrs., November 2, Material Code(s) SSc6-7): Media report with false, exaggerated information about the explosion.

Points that could be covered in the discussion of Inject #7 include:

- How do we react to this?
- What information are we preparing to be sure that correct reports are given to the media?

Inject #8 (14:05 hrs., November 3, Material Code(s) SSc6-8a and SSc6-8b): A speedy-ship package is forwarded to the police with a threat letter, proving that the driver of the truck that hit the WTP was part of an anti-government group.

Points that could be covered in the discussion of Inject #8 include:

- The package should not be opened without taking the proper precautionary measures. What are these measures?
- The FBI should be informed that there was an intentional attack on a public water supply, and the threat letter should be forwarded to the FBI.
- How do participants select whom they do business with?
- What screening do utilities do of their mail and package delivery services?
- What are the security protocols of the firms who provide the participants with critical services such as chemical delivery?
- Should the public be notified?
- How does this discovery affect the utility’s recovery process?
Inject #9 (17:00 hrs., November 3, Material Code(s) SSc6-9): *Media report including an interview with a resident concerned about what the utility is doing to recover from this situation.*

Points that could be covered in the discussion of Inject #9 include:

- Was this situation handled correctly?
- Are the participants prepared if something like this happens to their system?
- What recovery steps need to be taken at this time to restore the WTP to the level it needs to be at?
- How will consumer confidence be restored?
- Will water conservation requirements reduce the potential problem of a water shortage?
- How long will people be without water? What are the plans for alternate water sources?