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Innovation Collaborative

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Partnership Turnaround: Year One Report

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PARTNERSHIP TURNAROUND: YEAR ONE REPORT

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Table of Contents

KEY TERMS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background i
Key Takeaways ii
Implications ii
Conclusion iii

SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION 1

Purpose of Report 1
Michigan's Partnership Model of School and District Turnaround 2
Michigan's Partnership Districts: A Snapshot of Economic and Social Inequity 6
Summary 15

SECTION TWO: DATA AND METHODS 19

Description of Data and Methods 21
State Administration Records on Students and Teachers 22
Surveys of Teachers and Principals in Partnership Districts ... 25
Interviews with State-Level Stakeholders and Partnership District Leaders 28
Case Studies : Interviews with District Leaders, Central Office Staff, Principals, and Teachers 28
Partnership Agreements 29
Summary 33

SECTION THREE: HOW WAS THE PARTNERSHIP MODEL INTENDED TO WORK? 37

The Partnership District Model Theory of Change 37
The Partnership Model Intervention 39
Local and State Context 47

SECTION FOUR: IMPLEMENTATION IN PARTNERSHIP DISTRICTS 51

Partnership Agreements as Plans for Improvement 55
Governmental Partners: The Role of MDE Liaisons and Intermediate School Districts 70
The Role of Non-Governmental Community and Stakeholder Partners 76
Summary 88

SECTION FIVE: CHANGES TO EDUCATION IN PARTNERSHIP SCHOOLS 91

Educators' Perspectives on School Quality and Partnership Implementation 91
Partnership Impacts on Teacher Staffing and Retention 102
Partnership Impacts on Student Outcomes 108
Summary of First-Year Partnership Impacts Statewide and DPSCD 111

SECTION SIX: HUMAN CAPITAL CHALLENGES IN PARTNERSHIP DISTRICTS 119

Staff Development 119
Turnover and Recruitment 120
Perceived Contributors to Human Capital Challenges 123
The Leadership Aspect of Human Capital 126
Summary 128

SECTION SEVEN: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES 131

Case Study: Blues 133
Case Study: Penguins 140
Case Study: Whalers 146
Cross-Case Analysis 155

SECTION EIGHT: CAVEATS 161

Data-Related Caveats 161
Scope-Related Caveats 163

SECTION NINE: KEY TAKEAWAYS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 167

Key Takeaways 167
Implications 168
Conclusion 170

REFERENCES 171

APPENDICES 172-208

FEATURED SECTIONS

Special Feature A: Different Rounds, Different Partnerships 56
Special Feature B: Local School Boards: Help or Hindrance to Partnership Implementation? 60
Special Feature C: Funding and District Capacity 73
Special Feature D: Structural Challenges: Poverty and Trauma in Partnership Communities 79
Special Feature E: Implementation Differences Between Charter and Traditional Schools 83
Special Feature F: A Closer Look at the Detroit Results: An Interview with Dr. Vitti 112

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Description of Partnership Districts and Schools with Priority Schools and State as Comparisons, 2017-2018 5

Table 1.2 Community and Descriptive Characteristics by Partnership District Status, 2013-2017 7

Table 1.3 Financial Descriptive Statistics by District Type, 2017-2018 9

Table 1.4 Description of Students in Partnership Districts and Schools with Priority Schools and State as Comparisons, 2017-2018 9

Table 1.5.1 Description of Educators in Partnership Districts and Schools, 2017-2018 11

Table 1.5.2. Description of Educators in Non-Partnership Priority Schools, 2017-2018 12

Table 1.5.3. Description of Educators Statewide, 2017-2018 13

Table 2.1 Data Sources 20

Table 2.2 Research Questions with Corresponding Data Sources 22

Table 2.3 Number of Educators Recruited for Each Survey 26

Table 2.4 Response Rates for Each Survey by Partnership Status 26

Table 2.5 Response Rates for Each Survey by Round of Identification 26

Table 2.6 Descriptive Statistics of Partnership Agreement Domains and Overall Partnership Agreement Scores 32

Table 3.1 The Partners Involved in the Partnership Model 42

Table 5.1 Partnership Effects on Teacher Outcomes, Round 1 103

Table 5.2 Partnership Effects on Student Outcomes 109

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Partnership Turnaround Timeline....4

Figure 1.2 Teacher District Exit Rates by School Type 14

Figure 3.1 EPIC Unified Theory of Change 38

Figure 4.1 District-Level Responses to Partnership Reform.... 54

Figure 4.2 Partnership Agreement Quality, Overall, and by Domain 59

Figure 4.3 Educators' Understanding of Their District's Partnership Agreement....63

Figure 4.4 Awareness of Partnership Agreements vs. School Improvement Plans 64

Figure 4.5 Educators' Perceptions of Their School Goals.... 66

Figure 4.6 Perceived Alignment Between Partnership Agreement and School Improvement Plan 69

Figure 4.7.1 Principals Reported Receipt of Support from Various Partners 82

Figure 4.7.2 Teachers Reported Receipt of Support from Various Partners 83

Figure 5.1 Educator's Grades for Their School Activities, by Partnership Status and Position Type....93

Figure 5.2.1 Teachers' Reported of Their School's Change in Focus Over Time by Role and Partnership Status 95

Figure 5.2.2 Principals' Reported of Their School's Change in Focus Over Time by Role and Partnership Status 96

Figure 5.3 Educators' Reported Changes in School Features by Role and Partnership Status.... 98

Figure 5.4.1 Teachers' Perceptions of Where Assistance is Needed by Role and Partnership Status.... 100

Figure 5.4.2 Principals' Perceptions of Where Assistance is Needed by Role and Partnership Status....101

Figure 5.5 Principals' Reports of Hiring Difficulty....104

Figure 5.6 To What Extent Do the Following Factors Affect Your Ability to Recruit and Hire Teachers in Your Schools? 105

Figure 5.7.1 Partnership School Principal Plans for Next School Year....106

Figure 5.7.2 Non-Partnership School Principal Plans for Next School Year 106

LIST OF FIGURES *(continued)*

Figure 5.8.1 Partnership School Teacher Plans for Next School Year 107

Figure 5.8.2 Non-Partnership School Teacher Plans for Next School Year 107

Figure 5.9 Effect Size Interpretation 110

Figure 7.1 Understanding of Partnership Identification, Partnership Educators Only 134

Figure 7.2 Partnership Educators' Perceptions of Hindrances in Partnership Turnaround.....135

Figure 7.3 Partnership Educators' Ratings of Support from Their Board, ISD, and from MDE.....141

Figure 7.4 Cross-Case Themes.....156

LIST OF FIGURES – FEATURED SECTIONS

Figure A1 Partnership Agreement Quality by Round, Overall, and by Domain.....56

Figure A2 Understanding of Partnership Agreement by Round of Identification.....57

Figure A3 Educators' Ratings of Partner Support by Round 58

Figure E1 Educator Participation in Partnership Agreement Development in Charter and TPS Districts 84

Figure E2 Educator Understanding of Partnership Agreement in Charter and TPS Districts..... 84

Figure E3 Alignment Between Partnership Agreement and School Plan in Charter and TPS Partnership Schools.....85

Figure E4 Perceptions of Likely Outcomes Among Educators in Charter and TPS Partnership Schools 85

PARTNERSHIP TURNAROUND:
YEAR ONE REPORT

KEY TERMS

21H Funding: 21H is a grant appropriated by the Michigan Legislature and administered by the Office of Partnership Districts at the Michigan Department of Education. Partnership districts are eligible to apply for 21H funding to support the implementation of their Partnership Agreement.

Blueprint: Blueprint is a program MI Excel offers to aid districts in their work to build or revamp their systems to support high-quality instruction.

CEPI (Center for Educational Performance and Information): The Center for Educational Performance and Information collects and manages Michigan's educational administrative data such as records on the state's teachers, students, and facilities.

ESSA (Every Student Succeeds Act): Passed in 2015, the federal Every Student Succeeds Act is the most recent reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which outlines the federal government's education policies.

District Improvement Plan: In Michigan, all school districts are required to develop an improvement plan that outlines goals and strategies for improving student outcomes.

ISD/RESA (Intermediate School District/Regional Educational Service Agency): In Michigan, ISDs/RESAs are educational entities that operate between the Michigan Department of Education and local education agencies, often serving the local education agencies within a given county. Local education agencies can receive a range of services through their ISD.

LEA (Local Education Agencies): A local education agency is an entity that operates a public school. Local education agencies can be a traditional public school district or a charter school/network.

MDE: The Michigan Department of Education is Michigan's state education agency.

MI Excel: MI Excel is a system of support available to low-performing schools and districts in Michigan.

M-STEP (Michigan Student Test of Educational Progress): A suite of assessments administered to Michigan's students since Spring 2015. M-STEP is the assessment that the Michigan Department of Education uses for school and district accountability.

OPD (Office of Partnership Districts): The Office of Partnership Districts is a unit within the Michigan Department of Education that identifies, supports, and evaluates Partnership districts.

PARTNERSHIP TURNAROUND: YEAR ONE REPORT
KEY TERMS *(continued)*

Partnership Agreement: After being identified as a Partnership district, a local education agency works to develop a Partnership Agreement that guides its turnaround reform. This document identifies the district's strengths and weaknesses, sets 18- and 36-month improvement goals, outlines strategies to help the district achieve those goals, lays out consequences for failing to achieve improvement goals, and describes how a range of external partners will support the district to achieve these goals.

Partnership Agreement Liaison: Partnership Agreement Liaisons are employed by the Office of Partnership Districts but work with Partnership districts themselves to support the implementation of their Partnership Agreement.

Partnership District: Local education agencies that operate a Partnership school automatically become a Partnership district and must develop a Partnership Agreement to improve student outcomes in the identified school(s).

Partnership Model: The Partnership Model is Michigan's plan for accountability, support, and improvement under the Every Student Succeeds Act. Under the Partnership Model, districts that operate the state's lowest-performing schools develop and implement a plan to turn them around over a three-year period.

Partnership School: A low-performing school that has been identified for Partnership.

Priority Schools: This designation applied to the lowest five percent of schools statewide in terms of performance through the 2016-2017 school year.

PSA (Public School Academies): In Michigan, public school academies are publicly funded schools that operate independent of a traditional school district, often referred to as charter schools.

Non-Partnership School: Non-Partnership schools are schools within Partnership districts that have not been identified as Partnership schools themselves.

SAT (Scholastic Aptitude Test): The Scholastic Aptitude Test is an assessment of college readiness. In Michigan, all 11th graders take the SAT as part of the Michigan Merit Examination.

School Improvement Plan: In Michigan, all schools must develop a school improvement plan and update it annually to guide their continuous reform efforts.

SRO (School Reform Office): The School Reform Office was an office tasked with oversight of school accountability in Michigan from 2010 through 2019. The Office was housed with the Michigan Department of Education other than a period from 2015 through 2017 when it was relocated to the Department of Technology, Management, and Budget.

TPS (Traditional Public School Districts): Traditional Public School Districts are special-purpose districts with geographic boundaries and a publicly elected governing board that receive public funds to operate schools.

Partnership Turnaround Report:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

Michigan's Partnership Model of school reform was launched in the Spring of 2017 to support the state's lowest-performing schools and school districts. This Partnership Model focused on building capacity to improve student outcomes by fostering a coalition of partners from the Michigan Department of Education (MDE), intermediate school districts, and local communities. The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the reform's implementation across the state, as well as an analysis of first year (2017-18) student academic outcomes. The evaluation lags one year from implementation because of the need to collect and analyze data retroactively. However, releasing the evaluation in yearly installments represents a vast improvement over prior efforts to evaluate turnaround, which often wait three to five years to find the effects of reform. This report is the first of three interim reports that the Education Policy Innovation Collaborative (EPIC) will release as the evaluation continues through the 2021-2022 academic year, followed by a final and summative report scheduled tentatively for September 2022. These reports are different and separate from the Review of Goal Attainment process the Office of Partnership Districts conducts with Partnership districts. EPIC is the strategic research partner to MDE, and although the analysis documented here was requested by MDE, our evaluation and its results are independent of MDE and the conclusions and recommendations are EPIC's own.

This report relied on multiple methods of data collection and analyses. We used 10 sources of data in their evaluation of the Partnership Model:

1) student administrative records;
2) educator administrative records;
3) surveys of teachers working in Partnership schools and districts;

4) surveys of principals working in Partnership schools and districts;
5) interviews with Partnership district leaders;
6) interviews with state-level stakeholders;
7) case studies of three Partnership districts;
8) an analysis of the Partnership Agreements signed by each district;
9) data from the American Community Survey; and
10) Bulletin 1014 district-level finance data.

This approach allowed us to ask not only whether the Partnership Model improved relevant outcomes, but also how the reform was implemented, and for whom, when, and where. The key takeaways and the implications of those results follow.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Districts and schools have implemented the Partnership Model, but not always as intended.

By design, each district implemented its own local version of the Partnership Model that was supposed to be guided by its local Partnership Agreement. Districts varied widely in the extent to which they embraced the reform, with some districts using the Partnership Model to address the reform's goals, and others making changes in response more selectively.

Partnership identification may have initially negatively impacted student and teacher outcomes, but after implementation these outcomes improved substantially.

Statewide, the initial identification of Round 1 Partnership status in the spring of 2017 appears to have reduced math and ELA M-STEP test scores in that year. However, after the implementation of Partnership in the 2017-2018 year, both math and ELA improved substantially, exceeding the identification decline. This positive impact is especially strong in the Detroit Public Schools Community District (DPSCD), where high school drop-out rates were lower as well. In addition, teachers in all Partnership schools were less likely to exit the profession after Partnership implementation.

The mixed picture of Partnership Model implementation is to be expected so early in the reform.

Districts and schools have three years to improve under their initial Partnership Agreements. This report focuses only on implementation and outcomes immediately following Partnership designation. Long-term improvement strategies should be assessed through long-term outcomes.

IMPLICATIONS

District superintendents and leaders at the ISD and state levels can use the accountability elements of the Partnership Model strategically to implement change.

Although Partnership is an improvement model on which the state will assess districts for results, the reform also appears to have improved school and district perceptions of MDE support efforts as well as the relationships with the Intermediate School Districts (ISD). Both local and external parties may leverage these relationships to build capacity in the future.

The local focus of each Partnership reform is an important component to Partnership success, but it can also create challenges.

Despite the improved relationships with MDE and the ISDs, districts' other partners vary in usefulness and quality. The state – whether MDE, the governor's office, or the legislature – can recognize local contexts and support improvement efforts by continuing to build state capacity and processes/tools to help support districts as they address locally defined needs. Some processes can be standardized given some shared challenges districts face.

Human capital is the most acute shared challenge facing Partnership schools and districts.

Human capital challenges – in particular teacher recruitment and retention – are perceived by district leaders to be the greatest impediment to improvement. This is a complicated policy problem to address, especially where districts require both a stable work force and one that is highly effective and high-capacity. The human capital problem – including both skill/capacity but also recruitment and retention – extends to principals and district leaders. Leadership turnover in these Partnership districts will affect the continuity of implementation efforts.

Multiple improvement policies that overlap with Partnership Model efforts may affect implementation in the future.

Michigan has a number of high-profile improvement policies that have and will disproportionately affect many schools and districts now in Partnership. MDE can recognize the need to help districts navigate multiple layers of policy and help guide the extent to which districts should selectively engage in strategies to make outcomes productive. As other policies are layered on top of the Partnership Model, state policymakers may need to give districts time to continue long-term plans for productive change.

Fundamental challenges remain for Partnership districts beyond the reach of one particular reform – including challenges related to resources.

Partnership schools and districts are among the poorest in the state, with residents facing long-term and persistent historical challenges related to income, race, and socio-economic status. Although the Partnership Model is intended to make fundamental changes to districts' education systems and spur improvement, reforms are still occurring largely on the margin. Most districts do not report the ability nor many wholesale strategies to upend the status quo, even if improvement goals represent substantial moves forward.

CONCLUSION

This report documents schools' and districts' efforts to create Partnership Agreements and strategies for improvement under the Partnership Model. On balance, we find modest but potentially positive results of some of those efforts, most notably gains in test scores (especially ELA, and especially in Detroit) and in teacher retention. In addition, one benefit seems to be improved relationships between the districts and MDE, as well as collaboration between districts and the ISDs. However, these represent short-term accomplishments that could fade with time, particularly if Partnership

efforts are either not sustained or are hampered by new policies that replace or even conflict with districts' Partnership Model implementation plans. State policymakers should recognize that even a fully implemented Partnership Model is unlikely to be a panacea or a cure-all for fundamental issues facing Michigan's struggling schools. Partnership schools did not fall behind overnight, nor did the conditions of poverty and – in some cases – collective trauma Partnership district leaders reported develop out of a single failed policy or program. These problems are old, and their persistence implies that the solutions to address them must be new.

Partnership Turnaround Report: SECTION ONE

INTRODUCTION

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Section One: INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE OF REPORT

In the fall of 2017, the Michigan Department of Education requested that the Education Policy Innovation Collaborative (EPIC) at Michigan State University provide a multi-year evaluation of the implementation and efficacy of the Partnership Model of school and district turnaround. EPIC undertook this study beginning in the spring of 2018 and will continue to track Partnership implementation and outcomes over four school years. This evaluation includes analyses of student academic outcomes, surveys of teachers and principals in Partnership districts (in both Partnership and non-Partnership schools), interviews of Partnership district superintendents and key state-level stakeholders, and case studies of three Partnership districts.

The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of Partnership Model implementation across the state, as well as an analysis of first year (2017-18) student academic outcomes – including but not limited to M-STEP results – and teacher outcomes associated with retention and turnover. This report is the first of three intermediate reports that EPIC will release as the evaluation continues through the 2021-2022 academic year, followed by a final and summative report scheduled tentatively for September 2022.

MICHIGAN'S PARTNERSHIP MODEL OF SCHOOL AND DISTRICT TURNAROUND

Drawing on media reports, policy and legislative documents, and interviews with state-level officials, this section outlines the background and development of the Partnership Model.

The Partnership Model was launched in the spring of 2017 by then-State Superintendent Brian Whiston. He envisioned a program of support for Michigan's lowest-performing schools and districts based on his experience with school turnaround while the Superintendent of Dearborn Public Schools. This reform would target Michigan school districts with the aim of building capacity to improve student outcomes by fostering a coalition of partners from the Michigan Department of Education (MDE), other local and state agencies, and local communities. Superintendent Whiston drew on this vision as MDE developed its strategy under the federal Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), which required that states develop a plan for accountability, support, and improvement for schools. As the Department's ESSA plan development was underway, however, political events in Michigan accelerated the rollout of the Partnership Model.

In January of 2017, Michigan's School Reform Officer announced a plan that placed 38 of the state's lowest-performing schools at risk of closure. These schools had been identified as Priority schools, meaning that they were ranked in the bottom five percent of schools statewide, for three consecutive years, making them eligible for closure under Michigan law. While these schools were formally designated "at risk" for closure, the perception of many was that closure was likely for many, if not all, of these schools. The School Reform Officer (SRO), a position the Michigan Legislature created in 2010 as part of a package of accountability reforms, was vested with the legal authority to close schools for low performance. In 2015, then-Governor Rick Snyder had moved the SRO from MDE to the Department of Technology, Management, and Budget.

The announcement that 38 schools were slated for closure created significant controversy in districts and communities across the state. Opponents of the closure plan rallied to protest the SRO's decision. Two districts initially filed a lawsuit claiming closure was not permitted by law and were later joined by two others. In light of the political and legal challenges to following through on the SRO's closure plan, Governor Snyder turned to Superintendent Whiston for an alternative, giving him 60 days to have a plan in place for these struggling schools.

In response, Superintendent Whiston's proposal was to implement the Partnership Model on an earlier timeline than originally intended, reorganize resources within MDE to support this work, and for the SRO and supporting staff to be returned to MDE. The Governor agreed to that proposal and issued Executive Order 2017-5 to formalize it. In March of that year, Superintendent Whiston reached out to the leaders of the 10 districts[1] that operated the 38 identified schools to discuss implementing the Partnership Model. The first step involved districts working with MDE to develop a Partnership Agreement for identified schools. Adopting the Partnership Model also allowed these schools to avoid next-level accountability consequences from the SRO. Out of these 10 districts, one[2] opted to close while the others worked to adopt the Partnership Model.

Over the following 60 days, Whiston and others at MDE worked with these nine districts, their Intermediate School Districts (ISD), and community stakeholders to develop a Partnership Agreement that analyzed districts' strengths and weaknesses, identified improvement goals to be met over 18- and 36-month time-spans, outlined strategies and reforms to meet those goals, and prescribed consequences for failure to improve. To support the development and implementation of districts' Partnership Agreements, MDE provided them with a Partnership Agreement Liaison (PAL). The role of PALs was to serve as a concierge of sorts to the leaders of Partnership districts by providing technical assistance and mentoring, and by connecting districts with external resources.

Two additional rounds of Partnership schools and districts have taken place since the spring of 2017. The second round was identified in the fall of 2017 and the third in the spring of 2018. There were some notable differences in how districts identified in these later rounds entered into Partnership. In both rounds, MDE managed identification districts had 90 days to craft their Partnership Agreement, but slightly different metrics were used to identify Round 2 and 3 Partnership schools/districts and neither round involved the threat of closure.[3]

All three rounds of Partnership identification employed a three-year improvement cycle, beginning with the school year following Partnership identification, that included interim goals to be met in 18 months and final goals to be met in 36 months. To monitor progress towards these goals, MDE developed evaluation procedures, known as the Review of Goal Attainment, for each timeframe to determine whether districts were on-track to meet and have met their goals, as well as the consequences and/or supports that resulted from being rated off-track. Figure 1.1 outlines the timeline of the Partnership Model reform.

Across all three rounds, there have been 123 Partnership schools identified in 36 districts. A list of the schools and districts identified in each round of Partnership is found in Appendix One.

Since its inception, the Partnership Model has evolved in response to changes in leadership, resources, and legislation. In keeping with the agreement between Superintendent Whiston and Governor Snyder, in the months after Partnership Agreements for Round 1 Partnership districts were approved, the School Reform Office and its personnel were relocated back to MDE. This move centralized both the support and accountability elements of the Partnership Model within the Department to bring greater coherence to the policy. Later, in the fall of 2018, MDE created the Office of Partnership districts to coordinate technical, programmatic, and financial supports to Partnership districts. Because this office also contained the SRO, it additionally performed monitoring and accountability functions.[4]

Two acts by the Michigan Legislature have also impacted MDE's Partnership work. In the summer of 2018, the legislature inserted language into the educational appropriations bill that required Partnership Agreements to meet certain criteria around their goals and next-level accountability. These included having goals that: put students on track toward proficiency and referenced proficiency or grade-level performance; were numerically measurable; and were specific to 18- and 36-month timeframes. Regarding next-level accountability, Partnership districts had to specify accountability

Figure 1.1. Partnership Turnaround Timeline



consequences that may have included closure or reconstitution of the identified Partnership school. Due to this new requirement, several Partnership districts had to amend their Partnership Agreements to bring them into compliance. The second legislative change that impacted MDE's Partnership work came with Public Act 601 of 2018, which repealed the legislation that created the SRO as of July 1, 2019, effectively closing the School Reform Office altogether. Practically speaking, this law proscribed the actions that MDE and the Office of Partnership Districts could take to intervene in low-performing districts across Michigan, including Partnership districts, with a balance between high-stakes accountability and lower-stakes improvement-oriented approaches that still exist as of the writing of this report.

Table 1.1 describes the set of Partnership districts and schools. It shows that slightly more than half of the 36 identified Partnership districts are Public School Academies (PSAs), most of which were identified in Round 3, but that the majority of the 123 Partnership schools that have been identified are operated by traditional public school (TPS) districts (also called local education agencies, or LEAs).

TABLE 1.1. Description of Partnership Districts and Schools with Priority Schools and State as Comparisons, 2017-2018

Partnership					
	Partnership Districts[1]	**Round 1 Partnership Schools**	**Round 2 Partnership Schools**	**Round 3 Partnership Schools**	**Never Partnership Schools in Partnership Districts**
N	36	35	40	43	226
N (%) of Traditional Public Schools	16 (44%)	34 (97%)	34 (85%)	29 (67%)	222 (98%)
N (%) of Public School Academies (Charters)	20 (56%)	1 (3%)	6 (15%)	14 (33%)	4 (2%)
Priority					
	Priority Schools (Never Partnership)		**Priority Schools (Never in Partnership Districts)**		**Priority Schools in Partnership Districts (Never Partnership Schools)**
N	83		53		30
N (%) of Traditional Public Schools	62 (70%)		33 (62%)		29 (97%)
N (%) of Public School Academies (Charters)	21 (30%)		20 (38%)		1 (3%)
Statewide					
	Non-Partnership Districts		**Non-Partnership Districts, Non-Priority Schools**		**Statewide**
N	3,096		3,043		3,440
N (%) of Traditional Public Schools	2,755 (89%)		2,722 (89%)		3,074 (89%)
N (%) of Public School Academies (Charters)	341 (11%)		321 (11%)		366 (11%)

[1] *Values in this column are at the district level. Values in other columns are at the school level.*

Source: Data from the Michigan Department of Education and the Center for Educational Performance and Information

The next section discusses differences between Partnership schools and districts compared to other schools in Michigan, highlighting some of the contextual challenges faced by Partnership schools and districts.

MICHIGAN'S PARTNERSHIP DISTRICTS: A SNAPSHOT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INEQUITY

Michigan's Partnership districts face a unique set of demographic, economic, and social challenges as they work to improve educational outcomes. The context in which these schools operate is an important part of any evaluation of the Partnership Model for at least two major reasons. First, researchers and other experts in education have long pointed to the role that race, income, local neighborhood conditions, access to human capital, and students' family background plays in determining the limits of educational opportunity. Second, as the sections describe in greater following detail, the Partnership reform itself was created in part to draw on local community resources and engagement. The differences between the local conditions in which Partnership districts are operating, the students served by schools in those districts, and the local context under which other Michigan school districts are operating statewide are all critical to understanding the intent, implementation, and outcomes of the reform. To describe these conditions, researchers drew on a combination of data sources that measure economic, demographic, and social differences between Partnership and other Michigan school districts.

THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT OF THE PARTNERSHIP MODEL

By almost any measure – whether on the basis of race, income, educational level, or household structure – Partnership districts are historically more disadvantaged than other districts in Michigan. As one Partnership superintendent (Black Hawks[5]) said in an interview:

> *I think for us, it's all of the collateral consequences of poverty. You know, we deal with transiency. We deal with students who come to school less prepared than their more affluent peers. Just, you know, again, as a direct result of them being impoverished. The community in itself does not have the economic viability that it once had. Our funding has been impacted by the loss of a tax base. Yeah, as it relates to issues, anything that poverty creates, we deal with it.*

Table 1.2 reports a number of different statistics that highlight this pattern for the population of people living within the boundaries of each Michigan LEA. Most Michigan school districts have very few residents of color – nearly 9 of 10 residents who live in the average Michigan district are white. Partnership districts, however, are majority-minority populations, with more than half of residents either African American or Hispanic. Residents in Partnership districts are also considerably poorer than those in the rest of Michigan, with median income, income-per-capita, and home values far lower in Partnership districts. Families in Partnership districts also differ in important ways from

those in non-Partnership districts. Fewer than half of children in Partnership districts live in homes with two parents present, and in Partnership districts, adults are nearly twice as likely to have dropped out of high school, and far less likely to complete college or graduate school. Partnership families are more than three times as likely to be receiving nutrition assistance through the federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Relative to non-Partnership districts, Partnership districts tend to have higher enrollment and are also more likely to be located in urban settings.

TABLE 1.2. Community and Descriptive Characteristics by Partnership District Status, 2013-2017

Community Characteristics	Partnership Districts	Non-Partnership Districts	Differences
RACE			
White	40.4%	86.1%	-45.7%***
African American	50.7%	6.7%	44.0%***
American Indian or Native Alaskan	0.4%	0.5%	-0.1%+
Asian	1.8%	3.1%	-1.4%**
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Other Race	2.7%	0.9%	1.9%***
Two Plus Races	3.9%	2.6%	1.3%
Hispanic of Any Race	8.9%	4.1%	4.8%***
HOUSEHOLD TYPE			
Children Living in Two-Parent Households	47.4%	77.4%	-30.0%***
Children Living in One-Parent Households	52.6%	22.6%	30.0%***
Children Living with Male Head of Household	11.3%	6.7%	4.7%***
Children Living with Female Head of Household	41.3%	15.9%	25.4%***
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT (ADULTS 25+)			
Less than High School Degree	16.7%	8.5%	8.2%***
High School Diploma	25.1%	25.1%	0.0%
GED/Alternative High School Completion	5.7%	3.7%	2.1%***
Some College (less than Bachelor's degree)	33.5%	32.6%	0.8%
Bachelor's Degree	11.8%	18.1%	-6.3%***
Greater than Bachelor's Degree	7.2%	11.9%	-4.8%***
INCOME AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION			
Median Household Income	$33,433.97	$60,471.90	-$27,037.93***
Median Household Income (Families)	$40,692.97	$74,402.23	-$33,709.26***
Median Household Income (Non-Families)	$24,227.67	$34,806.59	-$10,578.92***
Per Capita Income	$19,017.95	$30,861.82	-$11,843.87***
Labor Force Participation (Ages 16+)	58.2%	61.9%	-3.7%***

TABLE 1.2. *(continued)* Community and Descriptive Characteristics by Partnership District Status, 2013-2017

Community Characteristics	Partnership Districts	Non-Partnership Districts	Differences
POVERTY RATE - BELOW POVERTY LINE			
All Residents	32.0%	12.5%	19.5%***
Individuals in Family Households	30.2%	10.3%	19.9%***
Individuals in Married Family Households	16.0%	5.8%	10.2%***
Individuals in One-Parent Family Households	53.8%	25.5%	28.3%***
Individuals in Households – Male Head of Household	33.2%	17.9%	15.3%***
Individuals in Households – Female Head of Household	45.5%	26.9%	18.6%***
Individuals in Non-Family Households	37.3%	21.7%	15.6%***
Households with Children	26.3%	8.7%	17.6%***
HEALTH INSURANCE AND OTHER BENEFITS			
Children without health insurance	3.7%	2.3%	1.3%***
All Residents without health insurance	10.7%	11.5%	-0.9%***
Households Receiving Public Assistance	5.0%	2.3%	2.6%***
Households Receiving Food Stamps/SNAP	32.5%	11.5%	21.0%***
HOME VALUES/OWNERSHIP			
Median Home Value	$65,062.12	$149,148.70	-$84086.58***
Median Monthly Rent	$777.95	$819.40	-$41.45***
Homes Occupied by Owner	58.2%	76.4%	-18.2%***
TOTAL POPULATION	**1,612,526**	**8,313,042**	
Districts with at Least One Urban School (2017-18)	69.4%	19.8%	49.6%***
Average District Enrollment (2017-18)	4,123	1,608	2,515***

*p<.10 +, p<.05 *, p<.01 **, p<.001 ****

Note: American Community Survey data is weighted by community population.

Sources: Community characteristics come from American Community Survey Data, 2013-17. District characteristics come from data from the Michigan Department of Education and the Center for Educational Performance and Information.

PARTNERSHIP SCHOOLS, TEACHERS, AND STUDENTS

The differences in community resident populations are reflected in the differences in Partnership and non-Partnership education systems. Table 1.3 notes the differences in the financial conditions in these districts. Partnership districts have, on average, nearly $1,000 less in local revenue per pupil to draw on, although state and district sources make up the difference. Average expenditures per pupil on instruction and on teacher salaries are lower in Partnership districts, as are average teacher salaries overall.[6] Perhaps more to the point, compared to other districts within the same ISD, Partnership teacher salaries rank in the bottom third – lower than 70% of other districts in the same ISD – while non-Partnership districts approach the median salary level of other districts in the same ISD. Measured by students per teacher, Partnership teachers have higher workloads: the average student-teacher ratio in Partnership districts is 28 students per teacher, compared to 23 students per teacher elsewhere.

TABLE 1.3. Financial Descriptive Statistics by District Type, 2017-2018

	Partnership Districts	Non-Partnership Districts	Differences
N	36	795	
Local Revenue Per Pupil	$1,823	$2,729	-$906
State Revenue Per Pupil	$8,820	$7,621	$1,199***
Federal Revenue Per Pupil	$1,345	$650	$695***
Total Revenue Per Pupil	$12,197	$11,057	$1,140
Total Instructional Expenditures Per Pupil	$5,420	$6,248	-$828*
Total Instructional Salaries Per Pupil	$5,848	$6,276	-$428
Average Salary Per Teacher	$54,526	$56,141	-$1,615
Average Salary Percentile Ranking in ISD	30.8%	46.1%	-15.7%**
Student: Teacher Ratio	28:1	23:1	5:1**

*p<.10 +, p<.05 *, p<.01 **, p<.001 ****

Notes: All reported values of $0 are excluded from the reporting in this table. Many charter schools report expenditures of $0 on measures such as teacher salaries.

Source: 2017-2018 Bulletin 1014 Data from the Michigan Department of Education.

TABLE 1.4. Description of Students in Partnership Districts and Schools with Priority Schools and State as Comparisons, 2017-2018

	Partnership				
	Partnership Districts	Round 1 Partnership Schools[1]	Round 2 Partnership Schools[1]	Round 3 Partnership Schools[1]	Never Partnership Schools in Partnership Districts[1]
N	147,679	18,044	20,194	16,054	93,387
Standardized Math 3-8 M-STEP	-0.76	-1.12	-1.07	-1.03	-0.57
Standardized ELA 3-8 M-STEP	-0.69	-1.03	-0.97	-0.96	-0.51
Standardized Math SAT	-0.65	-1.04	-1.01	-1.00	-0.46
Standardized ELA SAT	-0.58	-1.04	-0.96	-0.93	-0.38
Daily Attendance Rate	85.4%	77.5%	80.5%	82.9%	88.3%
Chronically Absent	48.7%	73.3%	69.0%	55.7%	38.5%
% Left School Mid-Year[3]	11.4%	15.2%	13.3%	15.9%	9.6%
% Enrolled in School Mid-Year[3]	9.8%	13.7%	12.6%	13.1%	8.0%
White	16.6%	3.0%	5.0%	11.4%	22.6%
Black	61.9%	89.0%	83.4%	79.2%	49.0%
Hispanic	15.1%	5.4%	8.4%	5.5%	20.2%
Other Non-White	6.3%	2.6%	3.2%	3.9%	8.2%
Economically Disadvantaged	82.7%	89.8%	89.8%	91.8%	78.3%
English Learners	12.2%	3.3%	8.7%	4.2%	16.0%
Special Education	15.9%	19.4%	17.1%	17.2%	14.8%

TABLE 1.4. *(continued)* Description of Students in Partnership Districts and Schools with Priority Schools and State as Comparisons, 2017-2018

Priority			
	Priority Schools (Never Partnership)	**Priority Schools (Never in Partnership Districts)[2]**	**Priority Schools in Partnership Districts (Never Partnership Schools)[2]**
N	37,568	24,028	13,540
Standardized Math 3-8 M-STEP	-0.77	-0.70	-0.89
Standardized ELA 3-8 M-STEP	-0.69	-0.62	-0.81
Standardized Math SAT	-0.78	-0.76	-0.81
Standardized ELA SAT	-0.74	-0.72	-0.77
Daily Attendance Rate	84.8%	85.2%	84.1%
Chronically Absent	44.1%	39.0%	53.2%
% Left School Mid-Year[3]	15.8%	18.1%	11.7%
% Enrolled in School Mid-Year[3]	9.6%	9.7%	9.5%
White	22.7%	28.9%	12.1%
Black	56.1%	57.4%	53.8%
Hispanic	16.0%	8.6%	29.2%
Other Non-White	5.1%	5.2%	4.8%
Economically Disadvantaged	84.8%	83.7%	86.8%
English Learners	13.8%	7.5%	24.8%
Special Education	14.3%	13.6%	15.5%
Statewide			
	Non-Partnership Districts	**Non-Partnership Districts, Non-Priority Schools**	**Statewide**
N	1,368,136	1,344,108	1,515,815
Standardized Math 3-8 M-STEP	0.08	0.09	0.00
Standardized ELA 3-8 M-STEP	0.07	0.08	0.00
Standardized Math SAT	0.05	0.06	0.00
Standardized ELA SAT	0.04	0.05	0.00
Daily Attendance Rate	93.1%	93.3%	92.4%
Chronically Absent	16.5%	16.1%	19.6%
% Left School Mid-Year[3]	6.1%	5.9%	6.6%
% Enrolled in School Mid-Year[3]	4.1%	4.0%	4.7%
White	71.2%	72.0%	65.9%
Black	13.3%	12.5%	18.0%
Hispanic	7.2%	7.2%	7.9%
Other Non-White	8.3%	8.4%	8.1%
Economically Disadvantaged	49.9%	49.2%	53.1%
English Learners	6.7%	6.6%	7.2%
Special Education	13.3%	13.3%	13.5%

[1] This is a subgroup of students within Partnership districts.

[2] This is a subgroup of students in Priority schools that never became Partnership schools.

[3] Leaving mid-year is defined as no longer being enrolled at the Fall Count Day school at the end of the year. Enrolling in school mid-year is defined as being enrolled in a different school on Fall Count Day than at the end of the year.

Source: Data from the Michigan Department of Education and the Center for Educational Performance and Information

Student demographics in Partnership districts largely reflect the resident populations described above. As Table 1.4 shows, student populations are majority Black or Hispanic. Reflecting the income differences among resident populations, the vast majority of students in Partnership districts are classified as Economically Disadvantaged under the state's designation, while just under half of students in non-Partnership districts meet that designation. There are higher rates of English Language Learners and students with disabilities in Partnership districts as well. Finally, students in Partnership districts score far lower on standardized achievement tests and have lower attendance rates than their peers in non-Partnership districts. Math and ELA M-STEP scores are at least seven-tenths of a standard deviation below the state averages. Less than 20% of students in Partnership districts are considered proficient based on these assessments, compared to more than 40% in other districts.

TABLE 1.5.1. Description of Educators in Partnership Districts and Schools, 2017-2018

	Partnership				
	Partnership Districts	**Round 1 Partnership Schools**	**Round 2 Partnership Schools**	**Round 3 Partnership Schools**	**Never Partnership Schools in Partnership Districts**
TEACHERS					
N	8,539	1,072	1,063	816	5,588
% White	62.8%	40.6%	38.0%	57.8%	72.5%
Black	29.1%	52.2%	54.4%	35.2%	19.0%
Hispanic	2.9%	1.4%	2.1%	1.4%	3.5%
Other Non-White	5.2%	5.8%	5.6%	5.6%	5.0%
Mean Years of Experience	13.35	12.08	13.89	12.92	13.55
First-year	8.1%	10.1%	8.8%	7.1%	7.6%
Second-year	5.5%	4.3%	5.6%	7.8%	5.4%
With Master's Degree +	60.2%	59.5%	64.8%	51.5%	60.7%
Rated Ineffective or Minimally Effective	4.7%	7.3%	5.8%	7.6%	3.6%
Exiting the District*	8.5%	8.7%	9.4%	10.8%	8.0%
PRINCIPALS					
N	458	48	61	40	309
% White	35.6%	12.5%	11.5%	20.0%	46.0%
Black	56.8%	85.4%	82.0%	77.5%	44.7%
Hispanic	4.6%	0.0%	4.9%	0.0%	5.8%
Other Non-White	3.1%	2.1%	1.6%	2.5%	3.6%
Mean Years of Experience	16.19	14.28	17.72	16.11	16.20
First-year	2.4%	2.1%	3.3%	0.0%	2.6%
Second-year	1.1%	2.1%	0.0%	0.0%	1.3%
With Master's Degree +	84.9%	89.6%	91.8%	80.0%	83.5%
Exiting the District*	6.6%	4.2%	6.6%	10.0%	6.5%

*Notes: Teachers are defined as those individuals whose greatest full-time equivalent assignment is as a teacher. Principals are defined as those whose greatest full-time equivalent is in an assignment code is "principal" or "assistant principal" per state reporting. *Exiting the District is defined as either transferring to a new district or no longer appearing in the data.*

Notes on interpretation: Columns C, D, E, F are subgroups of Column B.

Source: Data from the Michigan Department of Education and the Center for Educational Performance and Information.

Math and ELA SAT scores are nearly as low; between 0.58 and 0.65 standard deviations below the state average. This equates to students in Partnership districts scoring about 75 points lower on the math SAT and 60 points lower on the ELA SAT than students in other districts. Attendance rates are also far lower in Partnership schools, but these differences understate the severe attendance problem. Students in Partnership schools, in particular, are more likely than not to be "chronically absent" – i.e. missing more than 10% of possible school days per year. This means the typical Partnership student is losing even more instructional time simply through daily absenteeism. Finally, students in Partnership districts are also more mobile than other students across the state.

TABLE 1.5.2. Description of Educators in Non-Partnership Priority Schools, 2017-2018

	Priority		
	Priority Schools (Never Partnership)	**Priority Schools (Never in Partnership Districts)**	**Priority Schools in Partnership Districts (Never Partnership Schools)**
TEACHERS			
N	1,885	1,166	719
White	73.1%	78.6%	64.1%
Black	19.3%	16.2%	24.2%
Hispanic	3.5%	1.9%	6.0%
Other Non-White	4.2%	3.3%	5.7%
Mean Years of Experience	10.79	9.17	13.43
First-year	10.2%	10.0%	10.6%
Second-year	7.8%	8.7%	6.3%
With Master's Degree +	49.7%	44.3%	58.5%
Rated Ineffective or Minimally Effective	5.1%	5.1%	5.1%
Exiting the District*	10.6%	10.0%	11.5%
PRINCIPALS			
N	80	37	43
White	46.3%	67.6%	27.9%
Black	40.0%	27.0%	51.2%
Hispanic	10.0%	2.7%	16.3%
Other Non-White	3.8%	2.7%	4.7%
Mean Years of Experience	15.00	14.23	15.65
First-year	2.5%	2.7%	2.3%
Second-year	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
With Master's Degree +	77.5%	81.1%	74.4%
Exiting the District*	8.78%	10.8%	7.0%

*Notes: Teachers are defined as those individuals whose greatest full-time equivalent assignment is as a teacher. Principals are defined as those whose greatest full-time equivalent is in an assignment code is "principal" or "assistant principal" per state reporting. *Exiting the District is defined as either transferring to a new district or no longer appearing in the data.*

Notes on interpretation: Columns C & D are subgroups of Column B.

Source: Data from the Michigan Department of Education and the Center for Educational Performance and Information.

TABLE 1.5.3. Description of Educators Statewide, 2017-2018			
Statewide			
	Non-Partnership Districts	**Non-Partnership Districts, Non-Priority Schools**	**Statewide**
TEACHERS			
N	76,743	75,577	85,282
White	94.2%	94.4%	91.0%
Black	2.7%	2.5%	5.4%
Hispanic	1.1%	1.1%	1.3%
Other Non-White	2.0%	2.0%	2.3%
Mean Years of Experience	13.00	13.05	13.03
First-year	5.5%	5.4%	5.8%
Second-year	4.7%	4.7%	4.8%
With Master's Degree +	59.7%	59.9%	59.7%
Rated Ineffective or Minimally Effective	1.5%	1.4%	1.8%
Exiting the District*	5.7%	5.6%	5.9%
PRINCIPALS			
N	3,388	3,351	3,846
White	89.6%	89.9%	83.2%
Black	8.1%	7.9%	13.9%
Hispanic	1.0%	1.0%	1.5%
Other Non-White	1.3%	1.3%	1.5%
Mean Years of Experience	14.59	14.59	14.78
First-year	1.4%	1.3%	1.5%
Second-year	0.9%	0.9%	0.9%
With Master's Degree +	82.8%	82.6%	83.1%
Exiting the District*	4.4%	4.3%	4.6%

*Notes: Teachers are defined as those individuals whose greatest full-time equivalent assignment is as a teacher. Principals are defined as those whose greatest full-time equivalent is in an assignment code is "principal" or "assistant principal" per state reporting. *Exiting the District is defined as either transferring to a new district or no longer appearing in the data.*

Source: Data from the Michigan Department of Education and the Center for Educational Performance and Information.

Within-year mobility, or attending more than one school in the same school year, is far more common in Partnership districts, and especially Partnership schools, than in non-Partnership districts. This lack of continuity in a school setting likely contributes to additional loss of educational opportunity for students attending Partnership schools.

Teachers working in Partnership districts and schools are also different from their non-Partnership colleagues across the state. As Table 1.5 indicates, Partnership districts employ substantially more teachers of color than non-Partnership districts: depending on the Round, between 35% and 54%

of teachers in Partnership schools are African American, relative to fewer than three percent in non-Partnership districts. Experience and education levels are generally comparable, but teachers in Partnership districts are more likely to be first-year teachers, especially in Partnership schools themselves. Teachers exit from Partnership districts at far higher rates – roughly 15% per year in some cohorts – than those in non-Partnership districts. They are also far more likely to be given ratings below "effective" (either "minimally effective" or "ineffective") on the state-mandated, locally determined teacher evaluation system. Although we do not consider effectiveness ratings for them, principals in Partnership districts and schools otherwise exhibit similar differences from non-Partnership districts. As Figure 1.2 shows, these differences have been apparent across the state for some time, though there is some indication that exits have declined more recently.[7]

Figure 1.2. Teacher District Exit Rates by School Type



To this point, all but one of the Partnership superintendents interviewed cited teacher shortage and turnover as a major problem they were facing. As one Partnership district superintendent explained:

> *I laugh because there was an article that came up this morning that said, "There's not a teacher shortage in Michigan." I'm not exactly sure who they're talking to. There's definitely a shortage of people who have the capacity to be successful in high-need environments. It's not like we've got a list of potential candidates for any of these openings. Yeah, it's a challenge to fill those positions. We have a fair number of subs in the building. We do our best to hire solid ones.*

We consider these teacher staffing issues further throughout this report.

SUMMARY

Michigan's Partnership model is being implemented in local contexts characterized by high levels of historical disadvantage as measured by common demographic, economic, and social indicators. Residents in these communities are disproportionately people of color and income levels are among the lowest in the state. Education and home ownership levels are also lower in Partnership communities, and access to health insurance is more limited. Teacher pay is lower in Partnership districts, and student-teacher ratios are higher. Students in Partnership districts and, especially in Partnership schools, experience low achievement and attendance levels that reflect the historical and ongoing challenges facing their communities. Math and ELA test scores are far lower than elsewhere in the state, and chronic absenteeism rates are severe. The teachers in these schools leave at higher rates, and they are replaced disproportionately by new, inexperienced teachers. It is under these circumstances and these conditions that the Partnership reforms began, and this report now turns to considering what happened immediately as a result.

SECTION ONE – NOTES

[1] Districts included traditional public school (TPS) districts as well as public school academies (PSAs) – also referred to as charter schools.

[2] Michigan Technical Academy, a charter organization that operated one school, elected to cease operations at the end of the 2016-2017 school year.

[3] Partnership identification for Round 2 was based on whether a school was identified in the bottom five percent of schools on the 2016-2017 statewide rankings and either 1) had a decrease in the percentage of students proficient in both ELA and math or 2) had less than 10% of students proficient in ELA and/or math. Round 3 Partnership schools were identified in accordance with Michigan's ESSA plan, under which Comprehensive Supports and Improvement schools, those in the bottom fiver percent of schools in 2017-2018, entered Partnership unless they were classified as an alternative school or were high schools identified solely based on graduation rate.

[4] More information on the work of the Office of Partnership Districts can be found in the Office's Comprehensive Guide for Partnership Districts, published Spring 2019.

[5] Black Hawks is a district pseudonym. For more information about the interviews contributing to this report, see Section Two.

[6] Average teacher salaries are computed using Michigan's Bulletin 1014 data, which only includes the salaries of certified teachers.

[7] One limitation of the data described in Section Two is incomplete information on how substitute teachers and other non-regular instructional personnel are utilized. To the extent that Partnership districts rely disproportionately on these types of instructors, as interviews and case studies presented in this report imply, the report is unable at present to provide exact estimates. We plan in future years to continue to explore such differences with more complete data.

Partnership Turnaround Report: SECTION TWO

DATA & METHODS

EPIC
Education Policy Innovation Collaborative
RESEARCH WITH CONSEQUENCE

Section Two:
DATA AND METHODS

To evaluate both the implementation and efficacy of the Partnership Model, this report relies on multiple methods of data collection and analyses. In this kind of mixed-methods triangulation design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007), different types of qualitative and quantitative data are brought to bear on the topic of inquiry to draw on their comparative strengths and overcome their relative limitations. As a result, researchers can ask questions of **whether** the intervention improved relevant outcomes, and also **how** the intervention was implemented, and **for whom, when, and where.**

A triangulation design is well-suited to an evaluation of an intervention as complex and broad-scale as the Partnership Model because it allows researchers to assess results through multiple sources of data and methodological strategies. By integrating analyses of disparate sources of qualitative and quantitative data, we are able to paint a rich picture of how this reform has been implemented across Michigan's 36 Partnership Districts and 123 Partnership Schools, and the efficacy of the reform along multiple intended outcomes.

As shown in Table 2.1, the report uses ten sources of data in the evaluation of the Partnership Model:

1) student administrative records;
2) educator administrative records;
3) surveys of teachers working in Partnership schools and districts;
4) surveys of principals working in Partnership schools and districts;
5) interviews with state-level stakeholders;
6) interviews with Partnership district leaders;
7) case studies of three Partnership districts;
8) Partnership Agreements;
9) data from the American Community Survey; and
10) Bulletin 1014 district-level financial data. This section outlines each source of data and the analytic methodologies used to help understand the implementation and effects of the Partnership Model.

As this is the first interim report of a four-year study of the reform, the analyses focuses on interviews and case studies that were collected in the 2017-18 and 2018-19 school years (the first two years of the reform), educators' responses to surveys administered in the fall of the 2018-19 school year, at times asking retroactively about changes during the reform's first year, and Partnership Agreements

written in 2017 and 2018. In addition, student administrative data records enable us to track student progress and educator outcomes through the 2017-18 school year (Round 1's first implementation year and Round 2 and 3's identification year).

DESCRIPTION OF DATA AND METHODS

This report asks three main research questions about the early implementation of the Partnership Model, using various sources of data described in Table 2.1 to answer each question. Table 2.2, identifies each of the three research questions and the accompanying data sources used to answer them. The remainder of this section outlines each data source and the methods used to analyze each.

TABLE 2.1. Data Sources

Data	Outcomes of Interest	Source	Year(s)	Sample Size (N)	Subgroups
Student administrative records	Math and ELA MEAP/M-STEP scores (gr. 3-8) Math and ELA ACT/SAT scores Grade retention Attendance and chronic absenteeism Mobility High school graduation and dropout rates	Michigan Department of Education (MDE) and the Center for Educational Performance and Information (CEPI)	2013-14 through 2017-18	7,685,261 student-year observations	**Round 1:** Partnership schools and 2016 Priority schools **Round 2:** Partnership Schools and 2016 Priority schools (not part of Round 1) Other sub-analyses include/exclude Priority schools that become Partnership schools in later rounds and other Partnership districts
Educator administrative records	Mobility and exit from profession Low effectiveness ratings	MDE and CEPI	2013-14 through Fall 2018	520,691 teacher-year observations 23,456 principal/assistant principal-year observations	**Round 1:** Partnership Schools and 2016 Priority schools **Round 2:** Partnership Schools and 2016 Priority schools (not part of Round 1) Other sub-analyses include/exclude Priority schools that become Partnership schools in later rounds and other Partnership districts
Teacher surveys	Perceptions and experiences related to working conditions and school improvement	EPIC-developed survey	Fall 2018	2,718 participants (38% RR)	Partnership schools and non-Partnership schools in Partnership districts Rounds 1, 2, and 3 Partnership schools Traditional public schools and charter schools
Principal surveys	Perceptions and experiences related to working conditions and school improvement	EPIC-developed survey	Fall 2018	81 participants (29% RR)	Partnership schools and non-Partnership schools in Partnership districts Rounds 1, 2, and 3 Partnership schools Traditional public schools and charter schools
State-level stakeholder Interviews	Perceptions about design and implementation of Partnership	Interviews conducted by EPIC researchers	2018-2019	16 interviews*	10 MDE leaders 3 state legislators 2 State Board of Education members 2 other state government staff members

TABLE 2.1. *(continued)* Data Sources

Data	Outcomes of Interest	Source	Year(s)	Sample Size (N)	Subgroups
District leadership interviews	Perceptions about design and implementation of Partnership	Interviews conducted by EPIC researchers	2018-2019	21 interviews: 62% overall response rate 75% TPS response rate 50% PSA response rate **- 89% Round 1** **- 43% Round 2** **- 56% Round 3**	12 district superintendents 9 charter school superintendents or principals
Case studies	Perceptions about design and implementation of Partnership	Interviews conducted by EPIC researchers	2018-2019	Three sites: **60 total interviews** Blues (PSA) - 25 interviews, - 25 interviewees Penguins (TPS) - 20 interviews, - 20 interviewees Whalers (TPS) - 12 interviews - 15 interviewees	Across all three case study sites: 14 teachers: - 6 Blues, - 8 Penguins 7 school leaders: - 4 Blues, - 3 Penguins 16 district leaders: - 5 Blues, - 5 Penguins - 6 Whalers, 12 education partners: - 5 Blues, - 3 Penguins - 4 Whalers, 11 community partners: - 5 Blues, - 1 Penguins - 5 Whalers,
Partnership Agreements	Description of pre-intervention district context Goals Professional learning strategies Partners Next-level accountability measures Writing quality	Partnership districts and MDE EPIC developed coding rubric and coding	2017-2018	37 documents (35 districts wrote Partnership Agreements. One district submitted three separate Agreements for each of its three Partnership schools)	10 Round 1 documents 8 Round 2 documents 19 Round 3 documents
American Community Survey	Community characteristics Household characteristics	American Community Survey	2013-2017	5,404 (a representative sample of the communities served by Michigan's school districts)	Partnership districts in Michigan Non-Partnership districts in Michigan
Bulletin 1014	District revenues District expenditures Student-teacher ratio	MDE	2017-2018	831 district observations	Partnership districts in Michigan Non-Partnership districts in Michigan

**Some interviews were conducted with multiple interviewees*

TABLE 2.2. Research Questions with Corresponding Data Sources		
Research Question	**Report Section**	**Source**
How was the reform intended to work?	3	• Interviews with state-level stakeholders • Partnership Agreements
How are schools, districts and educators responding to and implementing the Partnership Model and what factors affect those responses?	4, 6 & 7	• Surveys of teachers working in Partnership schools and districts • Surveys of principals working in Partnership schools and districts • Case studies of three Partnership districts • Interviews with state-level stakeholders • Interviews with Partnership district leaders • Partnership Agreements
How has Partnership changed education in Partnership schools?	5 & 7	• Student administrative records • Educator administrative records • Surveys of teachers working in Partnership schools and districts • Surveys of principals working in Partnership schools and districts • Case studies of three Partnership districts • Interviews with Partnership district leaders

STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS ON STUDENTS AND TEACHERS

Data Sources.

To identify the impact of the Partnership Model on a number of student and teacher outcomes, researchers used administrative data records on Michigan K-12 students and public school teachers provided by the Michigan Department of Education (MDE) and the Center for Educational Performance and Information (CEPI) for the school years 2013-14 through 2018-19. We define public school teachers as those individuals whose primary position is as a teacher.[1] Both student and teacher datasets include general demographic information, such as race, gender, and school placement. Student data also include state standardized test scores and information related to special education status, English Language Learner status, socioeconomic status, attendance, grade retention, and high school graduation/dropout status when applicable. Teacher data include credential information, educational attainment, years of experience, and assignment descriptions.

The report focuses specifically on teachers and students observed in either Round 1 Partnership or 2016 Priority schools, where individuals in Round 1 Partnership schools were the group which were evaluated for impacts, and those in 2016 Priority schools were the comparison group of non-Partnership Priority schools. We chose this comparison group because Round 1 Partnership schools were drawn from Priority schools, and so Priority schools that were not selected for Partnership represent the closest comparison based on academic outcomes. Collectively, these data included approximately 450,000 student-year observations (195,000 unique students) and 27,000 teacher-year observations (9,700 unique teachers) depending on the analyses used. For purposes of

interpretation, these panels of data can be considered the full population of students and teachers in Partnership and comparison schools. This section provides more detail on the comparison group and its purpose.

Student data.

We identified the effects of Partnership on several student outcomes. Of primary interest was student performance on state standardized tests in mathematics and English language arts. We considered math and ELA achievement in grades 3 through 8 on the Michigan Student Test of Educational Progress (M-STEP) as well as grade 11 math and ELA achievement on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT).[2] Both tests are administered annually for accountability purposes. In the case of M-STEP performance, which is analyzed at the individual student level, we considered both achievement and growth outcomes, referred to in our discussion of results as levels and gains models.[3] Since students take the SAT only once in grade 11 for accountability purposes, we did not consider growth for this particular test. We standardized these testing outcomes by subject, grade, and year.

In addition to academic performance, we also estimated the effects of Partnership on grade retention, mobility, four-year high school graduation rates, and high school dropout rates. Grade retention was inferred when a student appeared in the same grade level for two consecutive years. We generated mobility indicators to reflect changes in placement from year to year that could not be attributed to attending the terminal grade offered in a school or graduating from high school. High school graduation and dropout rates were calculated using indicators provided in our data. We were unable to estimate the effect of Partnership on daily attendance or absenteeism because our approach requires multiple years of comparable data on each outcome over time, and the state changed its absenteeism/attendance data definitions in the year Partnership began.[4] In all analyses using student data, we included grade level, socio-economic status, English Language Learner status, and status as a student with a disability to adjust our estimates of the Partnership effect by each of these categories. We also controled for school composition, including race, economic disadvantage, English Language Learner status, special education status, and student enrollment.

Teacher data.

Our primary outcomes of interest for teachers[5] were recruitment and retention. Specifically, we considered whether a teacher transfers within district, transfers out of district, or is no longer observed as a Michigan public school teacher. We also considered whether a teacher is new to a particular school or district, where "new" is defined as not observed in that particular school or district the prior year. To determine whether the Partnership reform has differential effects on these teacher mobility indicators based on experience or education level, we examined mobility outcomes for the following subsets of teachers: first-year teachers, 1 to 5 years of experience, 6 to 10 years of experience, 11 to 15 years of experience, 16 or more years of experience, less than master's degree, and master's degree or higher. In addition to mobility, we also considered teachers' evaluation scores. Specifically, we generated an indicator for whether a teacher received a low effectiveness rating, defined as being rated either "ineffective" or "minimally effective" (as opposed to "effective" or "highly effective"). We also adjusted all teacher-level models for school composition (student race, economic disadvantage, English learner status, special education status, and enrollment) and teacher gender, race, experience, and educational attainment.

Research design.

To calculate the effect of Michigan's Partnership reform on a variety of student and teacher outcomes, we used a statistical technique known as event study modeling. Intuitively, this approach allows for the comparison over time of a treatment group – in this case, students, teachers, and schools under Partnership – with a comparison group that ideally shares many of the same characteristics. The use of comparison groups whose outcomes are observed before and after treatment – regardless, in this case, of whether groups did or did not actually undergo Partnership – allowed us to attribute post-Partnership differences to the Partnership reform itself. In early 2017, Round 1 Partnership schools were identified as a subset of particularly low-performing 2016 Priority schools (schools identified with academic achievement levels in the bottom five percent of the state). As such, 2016 Priority schools are an appropriate comparison group to identify the effects of the Partnership reform. This comparison group continued with "business-as-usual" while Round 1 Partnership schools underwent their first year of intervention in 2017-18. Because 2016 Priority schools that were not selected for the Partnership reform are otherwise quite similar to Round 1 Partnership schools in terms of academic achievement – and because the event study models consider Partnership and comparison schools over time – we can isolate and causally attribute any changes in student or teacher outcomes in Partnership schools to the Partnership reform.

As a first step, we created a series of lead and lag Partnership "treatment" indicators in the data beginning in 2013-14 through 2017-18, where 2017-18 is the first year of Partnership reform implementation, and 2013-14 through 2015-16 are pre-treatment years. In our student-level models, we defined treatment and comparison groups based on placement in the 2016-17 school year, the year that the Partnership reform was announced. Students who were attending a Round 1 Partnership school in 2016-17 are designated as "treated," while students who were attending an untreated 2016 Priority school are designated as "comparison." Student placement can vary across the years included in our study. For example, a student might attend a non-Partnership non-Priority school in 2015-16, transfer to a Priority school in 2016-17, and then transfer to a Round 1 Partnership school in 2017-18. Rather than allowing students to have time-variant treatment status, we assigned treatment based on student placement in 2016-17 and take an approach similar to an "intent-to-treat" analysis in a randomized control trial. Some student outcomes were estimated at the school-level. SAT scores, four-year high school graduation, and high school dropout status are one-time occurrences and therefore we cannot observe individual students over time. Instead, for these outcomes we aggregated to the school-level and observed cohorts. In these models, the treatment status of individual students is time-variant and based on the school that was attended the year in which the outcomes of interest occurred. Similarly, we assigned time-variant treatment status to teachers in our models. A teacher's treatment status can vary over time, based on whether they are working in a Round 1 Partnership school, a 2016 Priority school, or neither.

In our main models, 2015-16 is the omitted reference year because it is the last pre-Partnership year, with the first round of schools identified in the spring of the 2016-17 academic year. This means that Partnership effects should generally be interpreted relative to 2015-16 levels of each outcome. We also estimated models with 2016-17 as the omitted reference year to gauge the difference between Partnership implementation in 2017-18 and the identification year of 2016-17 for Round 1. The pre-treatment interactions were included to account for any trends in outcomes prior to

the announcement of Partnership reform. To conclude that any statistically significant effects we found post-implementation can be causally attributed to the reform, we expected to find small and statistically insignificant coefficients for pre-treatment indicators. Using these approaches, we estimated models of the following form for the student-level outcomes (academic achievement and growth, daily attendance rate, chronic absenteeism, grade retention, mobility):

$$Outcome_{ist}=\alpha_0 + \sum_{r=-3}^{1} I_{2016+r} * Partnership_{ist} + X_{ist}\,\theta + \lambda_t + \psi_i + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (1)$$

where, I_{2016+r} represents a series of year indicators beginning in 2013-14, including the year of Partnership reform announcement, 2016-17, and spanning through the first year of implementation, 2017-18, where 2016-17 is the omitted year. These year indicators are interacted with a binary indicator of treatment status, $Partnership_{ist}$, which indicates whether a student, denoted i, was in a Round 1 Partnership school (=1) or a 2016 Priority school (=0) in 2016-17 (both denoted s) at a timepoint t. These $I_{2016+r} * Partnership_{ist}$ interactions represented the difference in outcomes attributable to the Partnership reform, although for this first-year report only one year of Partnership effects (after the 2017-2018 school year) were available for most outcomes. The following subsection describes assignment to treatment in more detail. X_{ist} is a vector of time-variant characteristics, including student grade-level, socioeconomic status, English Language Learner status, whether the student receives special education services, and peer demographics. Peer demographics are measures of student body race, socioeconomic status, English Language Learner status, special education status, and enrollment. λ_t and ψ_i represent year and student fixed effects, respectively. ε_{ist} is the error term. We clustered robust standard errors by school.

Models for school-level student outcomes (SAT, graduation rate, dropout rate) and teacher outcomes (mobility and receipt of a low effectiveness rating for all teachers and by subgroup) largely mirrored the model noted above. However, for these models we used school fixed effects in lieu of student fixed effects. These models also varied in that treatment indicators are assigned in a time variant manner. There were no individual student covariates in school-level models, only student body demographics. In teacher models, a slightly different set of covariates was used. Here, we controlled for race, gender, years of experience, and educational attainment. Finally, we also conducted sub-analyses where we limited our sample in various ways. For example, we excluded teachers and students in our comparison group who were observed in schools that later become Round 2 or 3 Partnership schools. We also considered models where we focused on, or excluded, Detroit Public Schools Community District (DPSCD) – a particularly large district that accounts for a substantial proportion of those treated with the Partnership reform in the first round of treatment. With teacher mobility outcomes, we estimated a set of models with all charter school teachers excluded due to their unique mobility behaviors. More details on these sub-analyses appear in appendices to this report.

SURVEYS OF TEACHERS AND PRINCIPALS IN PARTNERSHIP DISTRICTS

We surveyed all teachers and principals in Partnership districts in the fall of the 2018-2019 school year – whether in Partnership schools or in non-Partnership schools. This included both traditional public schools (TPSs) and public school academies (PSAs), often referred to as charter schools. The

survey was administered online with mail follow-ups from October 26, 2018 through January 18, 2019.[6] To preserve respondent anonymity, the report shows response rates and survey responses only through these categories, and does not report district or school-specific results.

The overall response rate for the combined set of surveys was 38%. The breakdown is shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.

TABLE 2.3. Number of Educators Recruited for Each Survey

	Overall		TPS		PSA	
	PRINCIPAL	TEACHER	PRINCIPAL	TEACHER	PRINCIPAL	TEACHER
Partnership school	99	2641	87	2381	12	260
Non-Partnership school	184	4462	177	4411	7	51
TOTAL	**283**	**7103**	**264**	**6792**	**19**	**311**

TABLE 2.4. Response Rates for Each Survey by Partnership Status

	Overall		TPS		PSA	
	PRINCIPAL	TEACHER	PRINCIPAL	TEACHER	PRINCIPAL	TEACHER
Partnership school	28.3%	42.3%	21.8%	41.7%	75%	47.3%
Non-Partnership school	28.8%	35.9%	27.7%	35.9%	57.1%	33.3%
TOTAL	**28.6%**	**38.3%**	**25.8%**	**38%**	**68.4%**	**45%**

We surveyed principals and teachers in all three rounds of Partnership school designation (Round 1, Round 2, and Round 3). We asked Round 1 respondents about their first year of full reform implementation, and asked Round 2 and Round 3 respondents about their identification year implementation. Response rates varied across cohorts as shown in Table 2.5.

TABLE 2.5. Response Rates for Each Survey by Round of Identification

	Principal	Teacher	TOTAL
Never Partnership	28.8%	35.9%	35.6%
Round 1	16.7%	42.6%	41.7%
Round 2	18.9%	40.4%	39.6%
Round 3	50%	44.5%	44.7%

Source: Author calculations of EPIC survey administered to educators in Partnership districts.

Given these response rates and in order to make our survey analyses more generalizable to the population of Michigan Partnership district educators, we adjusted for non-response by weighting responses by educator type (teacher and principal), school governance model (PSA and TPS), and round (1, 2, and 3). For teachers, we also weighted by experience.

Surveys focused on the following areas of the Partnership Model and associated school and district contexts:

- understanding and awareness of the Partnership Model;
- understanding and perceptions of the school and districts' improvement goals;
- perceptions of support from various organizations;
- perceptions of school and district effectiveness and implementation;
- perceptions of challenges facing school/district, with a particular focus on staffing;
- school and district culture and climate.

Survey instruments can be found in the online appendix at https://epicedpolicy.org/partnership-turnaround-year-one-report/

For this first-year report, we performed simple descriptive analyses comparing differential average responses between five groups:

1) teachers in Partnership schools relative to non-Partnership schools;
2) principals in Partnership schools relative to non-Partnership schools;
3) partnership school educators in schools identified in each Round 1, 2, and 3; and
4) partnership school teachers and principals in PSAs relative to TPSs;
5) novice Partnership schools and non-Partnership schools educators (in first 5 years) relative to more experienced Partnership schools and non-Partnership schools educators.

The majority of our report focuses on comparisons 1 and 2, examining how teachers and principals in Partnership and non-Partnership schools differed in their understandings of the reform implementation and early outcomes. Notably, the Priority school comparison group used in the statistical analyses on administrative data differs from the comparison group the survey analyses used later in this section. Our event study analyses compared students and teachers in Partnership schools to students and teachers in Priority schools. However, when we drew comparisons between educators in Partnership and non-Partnership schools in our survey analyses, we are referring to non-Partnership schools in Partnership districts. This is because the goal of our survey analyses was to better understand how the Partnership Model was being implemented both by the Partnership schools and by the larger districts (Partnership districts) in which they are situated. As such, our surveys gather data only from educators in Partnership districts – both in schools identified as Partnership schools and those that were not identified as Partnership schools. Given resource constraints and project scope, we did not survey educators in the Priority schools (unless a Priority school was also a non-Partnership school inside a Partnership district) that are the comparison group in our statistical analyses.

Where appropriate, we also brought in differences across rounds of intervention, traditional public schools relative to public school academies, and by experience level. We also examined survey responses for educators in our case study districts. In these instances, we can only compare responses from Partnership school educators (teachers and principals combined) relative to non-Partnership school educators in each district given the smaller numbers of respondents and to protect anonymity. Finally, in the Year 2 report, we will estimate underlying survey constructs that provide measures of Partnership implementation for use with the state administrative data. This hybrid of survey-based implementation measures and administrative data sources will allow us, in later years, to consider how differences in Partnership implementation help moderate or explain differences in Partnership impacts on student and teacher outcomes.

INTERVIEWS WITH STATE-LEVEL STAKEHOLDERS AND PARTNERSHIP DISTRICT LEADERS

We interviewed 21 leaders spearheading Partnership efforts, which included district superintendents, charter school leaders, and leaders of educational service providers employed by the board to support charter schools. We also interviewed 13 state-level stakeholders (e.g. legislators, Michigan Department of Education leaders, key staff members at other state agencies involved in the Partnership Model). Each of these interviews lasted approximately 60 minutes and were transcribed verbatim. To protect participant anonymity, we assigned pseudonyms to each district, labeling each district at random with the name of a professional hockey team.[7] We also anonymized participants and/or labeled their role as a broad category (e.g. "state legislator").

These interviews were constructed to help understand perceptions and implementation of the Partnership Agreement, including its design, the intent of the reform, and perceived successes and challenges associated with planning and implementation. Given that the Theory of Change was created by state-level actors and Agreements were designed and implemented at the district level, we analyzed these interviews to understand the reform from that perspective. Below is a description of how we analyzed and organized all interview data, both from our state stakeholder interviews and our case studies. To categorize districts within categories of our theoretical framework *(crafting coherence, described in Section Four)*, we coded chunks of text within each superintendent interview as examples of "bridging," "buffering" or "symbolic adoption" then classified the district accordingly. For instance, if superintendents gave two examples of using the reform as a "bridge" to external resources, but gave an example of how they cut and pasted verbiage from their prior strategic plan (symbolic adoption) into the Partnership Agreement, we classified that district within both of those circles in the Venn diagram (see Figure 4.1 in Section Four).

CASE STUDIES: INTERVIEWS WITH DISTRICT LEADERS, CENTRAL OFFICE STAFF, PRINCIPALS, AND TEACHERS

To understand and more deeply compare how the Partnership Model is playing out at the school and district level, we employed a multiple case study design of three districts which included a visit to one Partnership school and interviews with leaders and teachers. The case study design allowed us to examine and compare how stakeholders at the school and/or district level perceive and respond to the Partnership reform and how and why this varied across these districts. Within each case study we interviewed teachers, principals, district staff, school board members, community and technical partners, and relevant community actors who were involved in the school's turnaround efforts. In total, our research team interviewed 60 participants, shown in greater detail in Table 2.1. Each interview lasted approximately 60 minutes and was conducted using a semi-structured protocol that consisted of questions about the development, implementation, and perceptions and beliefs about the turnaround work taking place in the school and district.

Multiple case studies are useful in education leadership and policy research to help understand the differences in how, where, and why different cases implement policy (Bush-Mecenas & Marsh, 2018). This is particularly important in the context of the Partnership Model as districts craft individualized

goals and plans as part of their Partnership Agreements, and as such they may choose varied directions to tackle turnaround. Cases were intentionally selected to help understand the variation in the experience of the Partnership reform, including what might be working or not working and why. Two cases were purposively selected because of perceived success by MDE partners in different contexts with different approaches to the implementation of their Partnership Agreements. This is in contrast with the third case that focused on a district struggling to implement the reform due to significant staff turnover and community conflict.

Initially, we coded these data in Dedoose software using a deductive coding procedure focusing on descriptive codes aligned with our research questions and key concepts, including "compliance/ doing what we were already doing," "evidence of a new course of action," and "conditions impacting perceived coherence." This process helped to condense the data in alignment with the present study. After this first round of coding, we integrated relevant quotes and observations into a matrix in Excel that allowed us to compare and create categories of important findings within and across case study sites including a variety of stakeholder perspectives. Categories of columns within our matrix included evidence of bridging, evidence of buffering, perceived benefits, perceived challenges, and conditions that impacted coherence, and rows included interviews grouped by case site and interviewee role. Using matrices allows for trends to emerge and facilitates comparison within and across roles (Bush-Mecenas & Marsh, 2018). Categorizing the data in this manner allowed us to look for (and in some cases quantify) patterns within and across districts, schools, and participant roles while allowing us to explain the variation in responses, challenges, benefits, and other factors affecting implementation, and come up with initial explanations for that variation.

Finally, we counted mentions within coded excerpts of specific themes that emerged throughout the interviews, as implied by the Theory of Change for Partnership reform presented in Section Three. For example, we counted each superintendent that mentioned staffing challenges during their interview, which would include references to issues with both teacher recruitment and retention. Sub-themes that were counted included the number of superintendents who mentioned the need for teachers with urban teaching experience or training, superintendents who mentioned low teacher pay as a particular concern with staffing challenges, and superintendents who have either implemented or plan to implement increases to teacher pay to address some staffing challenges. Other themes that we counted included: positive impressions of work with MDE, positive impressions of work with RESA/ ISD, drawing on supports from MDE outside of the Office of Partnership Districts (e.g. MI Excel), using partners to provide wraparound services for students, engaging with community partners prior to, or outside of, the Partnership Agreement, using grant funding to support Partnership work and specifically 21H funding, district politics (including school board dynamics or relationships with leadership) positively or negatively impacting the implementation of reform, and using previously created strategic plans as models for the Partnership Agreement.

PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS

Upon being identified as a Partnership district, district leaders were required to create a Partnership Agreement (PA). This document outlined school and district strengths and weaknesses, included goals for the district's Partnership schools to achieve over 18- and 36-month periods, outlined

professional learning strategies to meet those goals, identified a set of partners that commit to supporting the district's work to turn around the identified school(s), and articulated consequences for the district if goals were not met. A Partnership district's set of partners was required to include the relevant governing board, intermediate school district, MDE, and community partners, such as local businesses, local or state government agencies, or community organizations that agreed to support the district's turnaround effort by providing expertise, resources, or by collaborating with the district on mutual goals. Partnership Agreements took effect once signed by the district's required partners and approved by MDE, at which point the Partnership district began to implement the improvement strategies outlined in its Agreement. Round 1 Partnership districts were required to submit their Partnership Agreements within 60 days of identification, while Round 2 and 3 Partnership districts were given 90 days. With the exception of one district that created a separate agreement for each of its three Partnership schools and one charter Partnership district that entered Partnership but closed before a Partnership Agreement was finalized, each district submitted one Partnership Agreement, resulting in a total of 37 agreements. In order to add flexibility to the reform, Partnership districts have the opportunity to amend their Agreements in consultation with MDE, and a number have done so since their initial Agreement was approved, primarily in the fall of 2018 to comply with new legislation affecting Partnership districts.

Using an iterative process, a team of EPIC researchers developed a rubric to assess the quality of the Partnership Agreements. This instrument was informed, in part, by prior work done by Strunk, Marsh, Bush-Mecenas & Duque (2016) and was developed to specifically align with the content of the Agreements and the specific goals of the Partnership Model. As the instrument was developed, researchers sought feedback from team members and MDE, which was used to make final adjustments to the rubric. The final rubric used to score Partnership Agreements included six different domains:

1) pre-intervention district context;
2) outcomes;
3) next-level accountability measures;
4) professional learning strategies;
5) partnerships; and
6) writing quality.

Each domain was comprised of one to five items. Table 2.6 shows descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum) for each of the six domains and describes the items that we scored to generate each domain. For instance, under the Goals domain, we assessed both the academic and non-academic goals established in the Partnership Agreements. We looked for alignment with district pre-intervention context, the extent to which they were objectively measurable, and how well 18-month benchmarks positioned districts to achieve 36-month goals.

Similarly, under the domain of professional learning strategies, we assessed the strategies the Agreements set to achieve the academic and non-academic student outcome goals. To systematically organize the variety of strategies discussed in plans, we first catalogued all mentioned practices and grouped them according to common themes. We used an iterative process to group similar practices

together and found that strategies fall into four categories: 1) whole-child approaches; 2) school culture and climate; 3) improving academic outcomes; and 4) tiered support and interventions. Examples of **whole-child approaches** included training in Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) and training to enhance social and emotional learning. Strategies related to **school culture and climate** included classroom management training and Positive Behavior Interventions and Support (PBIS) training. Strategies focused on improving academic outcomes included the use of instructional coaches, support networks for new teachers, and common planning time for teachers. **Tiered support and interventions** included training in multi-tiered supports for both teachers and administrators as well as Tier II and III interventions in literacy. In addition to rating each plan on the presence and quality of strategies in each of these four categories, we also scored the **alignment between the district's identified strategies and their pre-intervention context.** For example, if a plan described the need to improve staff morale, we would expect to see a corresponding school culture and climate strategy to address this need.

Another key area of the Partnership Agreement was the description of the types of partners each district planned to work with to achieve goals and what the roles were of these partners. Within this particular domain, we rated plans on how well they described the role of required partners and assessed the description of the role that partners were to play in achieving district goals.

We also assessed Partnership Agreements across three less-emphasized domains: description of **pre-intervention district context, next-level accountability measures,** and **document quality.** Description of pre-intervention district context focused on the extent to which districts described their current academic outcomes, non-academic outcomes, strengths, and weaknesses. Districts might, for example, provide several years of student attendance trends as framing for a goal later in the plan related to improving student attendance. Alternately, districts might note challenges they face related to non-school issues such as student poverty, or current strengths, such as community support or staff morale.

Each item in the rubric was rated on a scale of zero to four, indicating that content related to the item was not present (0), emerging (1), approaching adequate (2), adequate (3), or exemplary (4). Inter-rater reliability was established across a team of three individuals who evaluated four of the same Partnership Agreements. Because the process of rating Partnership Agreements involved multiple raters using an ordinal rating system, Krippendorff's alpha was used to assess the team's inter-rater reliability. Doing so, we obtained a coefficient of 0.87, which exceeds the recommended threshold of 0.80 (Krippendorff, 2004a; 2004b), indicating a high degree of reliability across raters. See Appendix 2 to view the complete instrument used to rate Agreements.

After scoring each rubric item on a scale of zero to four, we weighted scores in each of the six domains to account for their relative significance and contribution to the overall purpose and mission of the Partnership reform. The weights for these six domains were as follows: pre-intervention district context – 20%, outcomes – 20%, next level accountability measures – 5%, professional learning strategies – 25%, partnerships – 25%, and writing quality - 5%. We scaled final overall Partnership Agreement scores on a four-point scale for ease of interpretation. Section Four of this report discusses the findings in more detail.

TABLE 2.6. Descriptive Statistics of Partnership Agreement Domains and Overall Partnership Agreement Scores					
Domain (Weight)	**Description**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Minimum**	**Maximum**
Pre-Intervention District Context (20%)	Analysis of current academic and non-academic outcomes Analysis of district strengths and weaknesses	2.05	0.82	0.00	4.00
Goals (20%)	Alignment between 36-month academic (non-academic) goals and pre-intervention district context Objectively measurable academic (non-academic) 36-month goals Alignment between 18-month academic (non-academic) benchmarks and 36-month goals Objectively measurable academic (non-academic) 18-month benchmarks Extent to which 18-month benchmarks position district to achieve 36-month goals	3.13	0.68	1.20	4.00
Strategies (25%)	Alignment between strategies and pre-intervention district context School culture and climate Professional support for improving academic outcomes Tiered support and interventions Whole-child approaches	2.01	0.69	0.80	3.40
Partners (25%)	Overall description of required partners District school board District superintendent Michigan Department of Education/School Reform Office Intermediate School District Community Partners	2.31	0.55	1.17	3.83
Next-Level Accountability Measures	Quality and rigor of next-level accountability measures	3.32	0.75	2.00	4.00
Document Quality (5%)	Spelling/grammar Clarity/lack of redundancy Document organization	3.41	0.57	1.67	4.00
OVERALL SCORE		**2.45**	**0.42**	**1.30**	**3.43**

Note: 37 Partnership Agreements from 35 districts were analyzed.

SUMMARY

In all, this report relied on a mixed-methods triangulation design to evaluate the implementation and efficacy of the Partnership Model, including a variety of methods of data collection and analysis. Through the integration and analysis of these qualitative and quantitative data sources and methods, we are able to consider the extent to which the Partnership Model improved outcomes, as well as how the reform was implemented and how implementation and outcomes varied across settings. In the remainder of the report, we bring these multiple data sources to bear to paint a rich picture of how this reform has been experienced and how it has affected Partnership schools and Partnership districts across the state.

SECTION TWO – NOTES

[1] For the portion of the report using the state's administrative data records, this classification may exclude school personnel who do teach on a limited basis but whose primary appointment is in another capacity (e.g. librarians or social workers).

[2] The 2013-2014 outcomes are the Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP) exam and the ACT. The state switched to the M-STEP and SAT in later years. We account for this change by standardizing M-STEP and SAT scores by subject, grade, and year, so all outcomes are on a common scale.

[3] We calculate student growth as the difference in achievement in two consecutive years.

[4] See Section Eight for more information about the policy change around attendance.

[5] Districts report all employees to the CEPI along with an assignment code that identifies the type of work they perform for the district. To identify teachers from this larger set of employees, we rely on a set of assignment codes considered by MDE's Office of Educator Excellence to indicate that an individual is a teacher.

[6] This survey was the first in a series of four surveys that will occur during the same window each year in 2019-20, 2020-21, and 2021-22.

[7] The single exception to this anonymity provision is our discussion in Section Five of an interview conducted in July 2019 with Detroit Public School Community District (DPSCD) Superintendent Dr. Nikolai Vitti on Partnership results specific to DPSCD. We received permission to refer to Dr. Vitti by name for the purposes of that discussion only. The rest of our interviews and surveys of DPSCD personnel are anonymized.

Partnership Turnaround Report:
SECTION THREE

HOW WAS THE PARTNERSHIP MODEL INTENDED TO WORK?

EPIC
Education Policy
Innovation Collaborative
RESEARCH WITH CONSEQUENCE

Section Three:
HOW WAS THE PARTNERSHIP MODEL INTENDED TO WORK?

THE PARTNERSHIP DISTRICT MODEL THEORY OF CHANGE

This section, first addresses the basic but fundamental question: How was the Partnership Model intended to work? To answer this question, the section describes the Theory of Change (ToC) upon which the intervention is based, bringing to bear data collected from interviews with state-level stakeholders critical to the design and implementation of the reform. This involves a discussion on how the ToC evolved over time, and continues to evolve, as MDE has received feedback from the field and the intervention has adapted to shifting state and local contexts.

The Theory of Change is grounded in Superintendent Whiston's and his team's belief that individual schools' low performance reflected more than just difficulties at the school site but also larger systemic issues within low-performing schools' districts. The ToC is based on the idea that whole communities needed to buy into dramatically improving academic outcomes, and that districts and schools could bring together state, district, and local community partners (hence the name) to improve the capacity of the local districts to assist low-performing school sites to improve. Together with MDE and other state-level stakeholders critical to the development and implementation of the reform, EPIC developed a ToC to reflect the intended logic model underlying the reform, shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1. EPIC Unified Theory of Change



THE PARTNERSHIP MODEL INTERVENTION

The description of this ToC starts from the inside white box in Figure 3.1 and discusses the intervention itself (in the top of this box) and moves down to describe the intended near-, intermediate- and long-term outcomes associated with the intervention.

First, as is shown in the left-most box in the ToC, MDE needed to **identify the lowest-performing schools for the Partnership intervention.** The state identified the first round of Partnership schools and districts in March 2017. In this first round, Partnership schools were those that fell into the bottom five percent of academic performance for three straight years and were therefore originally at risk for immediate closure. The districts that housed Partnership schools were then labeled "Partnership districts," and made responsible for turning around their low-performing schools. In November 2017 and March 2018, MDE added subsequent rounds of schools based on broader definitions of persistent low performance for a total of 123 schools in 36 districts. In Round 2, schools were identified for Partnership if they were in the bottom five percent of schools in terms of academic performance the previous year and either 1) their percent proficient decreased in both English Language Arts (ELA) and math between 2016 and 2017 or 2) less than 10% of students were proficient in ELA and/or math. Also, beginning in Round 2, Partnership districts were able to identify optional Partnership schools, low-performing schools not identified by MDE but that the district wished to receive additional supports.[1] In the latest round of Partnership identification, schools were identified using the classification system adopted in Michigan's plan under the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA). In this plan, low-performing schools are classified as Comprehensive Support and Improvement (CSI) Schools if they had a high school graduation rate of less than 67% or if they fall in the bottom five percent of schools based on a newly developed academic index score. In Round 3, CSI schools became Partnership schools unless they were identified as CSI based only on their graduation rate or if they were designated as alternative schools. Notably, and different than many states' turnaround programs, failing charter schools can also be (and are) identified as Partnership schools and held to the same requirements.

Although there have been 123 Partnership schools and 36 Partnership districts identified across the three rounds of the model, as of June 2019 there were 112 Partnership schools in 33 Partnership districts. This is because two Partnership districts voluntarily closed and one exited Partnership status to enter into another arrangement with MDE. Additionally, several Partnership schools have been closed or consolidated by their district. Appendix 1 lists the original and current schools and districts identified as part of the Partnership reform, by round of identification.

DISTRICTS AS THE UNIT OF CHANGE

As is shown in the top left box entitled **Partnership Agreement Development and Implementation,** the Partnership approach is based on Partnership Agreements with local districts that oversee the state's lowest performing schools. Importantly for the reform, the Partnership Model is based in the belief that individual school turnaround can only be accomplished by increasing districts' capacities to support them. As such, district leaders are brought into and made accountable for school

turnaround, centering district leaders as critical agents of change for school improvement. Local districts are then tasked with designing and owning their own school turnaround and improvement plans rooted in a comprehensive data-driven analysis of their own problems and needs.

Several state-level policymakers with whom we spoke highlighted the importance of centering the school turnaround model within a systemic district-wide approach. One MDE employee who was active in the creation and implementation of the Partnership Model said:

> *We realized that programming at the school level was ineffective. We had to program at the district level. The district is where the unit of change, the unit of systematic reform, comes from. That to think that we should – so like SIG [School Improvement] grants or ESEA [Elementary and Secondary Education Act] flex priority schools, we did programming directly with every school. We realized even before [Superintendent Whiston] came that isn't an effective way. The district as the unit of change is…*

Superintendent Whiston further explained that improving district systems would help them support schools that might struggle in the future:

> *The thing about the Partnership, it isn't just about – we don't want them to go in and do something special for building A because it's called a Partnership. It's what's going on [in] the whole district and what can we do to help the whole district be successful. It doesn't do us any good to focus on building A today and then next year building B is identified. So let's do this as a thoughtful whole reform not just - and I have always said, a high school doesn't fail unless the elementary and middle schools are failing. They don't show up at the high school with great success and then all of a sudden stop succeeding. I mean, it means we've got problems in either elementary or middle.*

Similarly, another state-level policymaker said:

> *The reason why the focus is at the district level is with the hopes of not having to go back, but if the district as an organization better understands how to create and build a supportive structure designed to improve student performance, then as other buildings start to show signs of trouble, they'll be more prepared to deal with it and maybe not get there.*

GOAL-SETTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MEETING GOALS

In generating the Partnership Agreement, Partnership districts were asked to draft rigorous but attainable 18- and 36-month goals for both academic and non-academic outcomes for Partnership schools within the districts and for the districts themselves. The Agreements were intended to highlight the areas in which Partnership districts expected to improve and the degree to which they were to be held accountable for doing so, and to clarify the main strategies for achieving these goals. As one key MDE policymaker said:

> *There was always a tension between how much goes in the Partnership Agreement and how much should be in your school or district Improvement Plan, or in the future we'd call it a Continuous Improvement Plan. If what you put in the Agreement is, "We're going to raise math scores," and part of the actions to raise math scores are professional learning and blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. What we told them is, "Put the things in the Agreement that you want to be held accountable on, that are going to be part of the formal Agreement, but you should have a more expansive plan sitting someplace else behind the Agreement. The Agreement shouldn't be the entirety of your plan."*

The district then works with school staff and partners, discussed further below, to develop specific strategies to help them achieve these goals. Importantly for the reform, the goals and the strategies outlined to help the districts and schools achieve those goals are intended to be driven by local needs and by the local contexts in which the schools and districts operate, and to clarify the supports they need from local, state, and regional partners.[2]

BUILDING CAPACITY THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS

A central strategy of the Partnership Model was, in its original conception, to foster a coalition of district- and school-specific partners who would commit to building struggling schools' and districts' capacities in support of their turnaround efforts. MDE specified that the Partnership Agreements include an outline of a set of required partners, including the local governing board, the district's Intermediate School District, MDE, and a set of local community partners. Table 3.1 provides additional detail about the kinds of organizations with which Partnership Districts are collaborating and their specific capacity-building roles.

Building capacity through community partners.

A key aspect of the original reform was for the local districts to identify supportive **community partners** such as local businesses, community organizations, foundations, higher education institutions, and teachers' unions. These groups were intended to support the districts as they developed and then implemented locally driven turnaround strategies, aligning their support for students and schools with the districts' strategies and goals. The inclusion of community partners early in the reform process was intended to serve two goals. First, the state felt it was important to allow the community to express their priorities for their schools. As one key state-level implementer of the Partnership Model said, *"I think the community should have a voice in what their priorities are and how they [funds] should be spent."* Second, the community partners were supposed to provide advice and expertise to the districts, especially in areas in which the districts had identified areas of need, and to provide additional resources in terms of time, funding, and in-kind supports (e.g., tutoring, human resources capacity, etc.). By allowing community partners a voice early on, and then asking them to align their resources and expertise with the key strategies and goals highlighted in the Partnership Agreement, the Partnership Model was intended to make the role of community partners in school and district improvement more efficient and effective. As one member of Governor Snyder's education team said:

TABLE 3.1. The Partners Involved in the Partnership Model		
Partner	**Description of Supports to Partnership Districts**	**Required to Sign Partnership Agreement**
Local Governing Board (both TPS and charter)	▪ Approve programming and financial supports in consultation with the superintendent to achieve the district's Partnership goals ▪ Evaluate the district's progress toward its Partnership goals	**Yes**
Superintendent or School Leader	▪ Has primary responsibility for implementing the Partnership Agreement ▪ Coordinate supports from partners ▪ Communicate progress amongst stakeholders ▪ Support school leaders in achieving Partnership Agreement goals	**Yes**
Intermediate School Districts/ Regional Educational Service Agency	▪ Provide additional supports (e.g. training and professional development) to Partnership districts and schools in consultation with school and district leadership ▪ Administer Regional Assistance Grants to Partnership districts	**Yes**
Michigan Department of Education	▪ Provide a Partnership Agreement Liaison to Partnership districts to support progress toward their Partnership Agreement goals ▪ Eliminate barriers to Partnership districts' turnaround and improvement ▪ Support development of Partnership Agreements ▪ Administer 21H grant to support Partnership districts ▪ Administer Regional Assistance Grant funding to ISDs for their support to Partnership districts ▪ Evaluate Partnership districts' progress toward their Partnership Agreement goals - Release from Partnership after 36-month goals are met - Enact next-level accountability if progress is not made	**Yes**
Authorizer (charter only)	▪ The role of authorizers varies across charter Partnership districts, but they typically provide training for district and/or school staff	**Yes**
Community Partners	▪ Provide targeted services to staff and/or students in Partnership districts and schools in areas of common goals, including: - Behavioral/mental health services - Student mentors - After-school programming - Community outreach	**No**
Additional Educational/ Technical Partners	▪ Support Partnership districts in systems development as part of their turnaround strategy (e.g. MI Excel Blueprint) ▪ Provide additional training in identified areas of need ▪ Provide additional technical assistance in areas such as curriculum selection and implementation, data use, etc.	**No**

> *I think what's really important in a Partnership Agreement is that they all get focused into one thing on student achievement. You no longer have just one source over here, another source over here, and they're all plugged in ad hoc. They get much more focus and concentrated and everyone knows what they're doing and why they're doing it.*

However, as the reform evolved, the central role envisioned for community partners in this reform as a source of local capacity for districts' turnaround faded. Although at the advent of the Partnership Model, Superintendent Whiston had a clear vision of how Partnership districts could partner with local entities in areas of overlapping goals and interests, systematically building that vision into the Model has proven difficult.[3] When asked about the role of community partners in the Partnership Model, one MDE official responded, "*That's interesting that you say that, because that is probably the most underdeveloped aspect of our entire model.*" She/he returned to the subject later in the interview, saying, "*The community, that partner, the true partnership piece, those peripheral partners, we have not developed that.*" To the same question in a separate interview, another MDE official replied:

> *It should be part of the model, especially in a whole child context. In our work to roll out more whole child supports, not just for Partnership Districts but department-wide and state-wide, focus is on – a lot of the whole child supports don't get provided within the schools, or they get provided in coordination with the Juvenile Justice Department and the Mental Health Department, these things. This should be stronger.*

At the same time, leadership within MDE remains committed to more deeply integrating community partners into this reform and leaders have shared the work they are doing to accomplish that. On this topic, an MDE official outlined her/his vision for supporting Partnership districts' work with local partners as:

> *I wanted the Department to do two things, one, just have a better toolkit, like how to partner with community members, and here's a set of actions you could take, or letters to send, or whatever, something, make it easier for them. Then, two, I was hoping we would do more to go out to facilitate the relationships or find the people and then bring them back packaged up to the district instead of them having to hunt them down.*

She/he outlined what she/he referred to as a "portfolio system" to align partners tightly with districts' goals and to align their resources, saying:

> *It was like going to be a TA [technical assistance] with individual partners. I don't care if it's [youth organization]. I don't care if it's mom and pop shop down in whatever. It was going to align. It's like, here are our goals. What is it that you offer, and where does it fit? Having that candid conversation of, if it doesn't fit, then what else could we possibly have you do? Can you realign your goals? Or maybe we can send you to another school that actually could benefit from this, in that sense.*

Greater detail on how Partnership districts are working with community partners during reform implementation and the support they have received to do so is provided later in this report.

Building capacity through technical partners.

At the same time, the Model also enhanced structures for Partnership districts to work closely with the **Michigan Department of Education (MDE)** and their regional **Intermediate School Districts (ISDs).** In particular, MDE worked to provide each Partnership district with carefully targeted assistance based on the local needs districts identified and set out in the Partnership Agreements. This intent was clearly conveyed to us by a respondent from MDE, who said:

> *MDE's been talking a lot about differentiating our supports. Like growing our capacity by being able to say there are some districts that need us to be hand-in-hand. There are some districts that want a little more support, and we can do that. There are some districts that you post it online, and they got it, they're flying, and they don't need us. Almost a MTSS [multi-tiered support system] for districts. Doing this with the funding is a great way to say here's differentiated supports. We can come to you and say we've got this great big book of everything, and we can help you organize your funds.*

To help facilitate this context-specific tiered system of supports for the Partnership Districts, MDE provides each district with a **Partnership Agreement Liaison,** who is an MDE employee tasked with acting, to some extent, as a concierge between the Department and the individual districts. The liaison's role included supporting Partnership districts as they created their Partnership Agreement, communicating information about relevant policies to Partnership districts, and providing support to Partnership districts as they work to implement their turnaround plans. As a part of this role, MDE's Office of Partnership Districts (OPD) and the individual liaisons facilitate referrals and connections to other state offices and departments to help the districts access necessary support. One MDE employee said that critical to the success of the Partnership Model *"was a liaison going to the district to say 'I'm just listening to you. What do you need from me?' Well, [district] doesn't always know what they don't know. Especially if they're in crisis."* This illustrates the potentially important role of the liaison in bringing outside knowledge to bear in situations where superintendent or district capacity might be strained.

Finally, MDE allocates a small amount of funding to Partnership districts to assist them with their turnaround efforts. Notably, funding for the intervention is intentionally thin given the original belief by Superintendent Whiston and Governor Snyder that the majority of resources should be locally based, either by district funding reallocations or fiscal support and in-kind services from community partners. However, a relatively small state appropriation is available to Partnership districts for their reform efforts through the state's 21H grants on a competitive basis. The 21H funds amount to $7 million per year, on average, and districts may apply for 21H funding to purchase new materials, create positions to support Partnership work, and to provide professional development. Round 1 Partnership districts also had access to state Teacher and Leader Support Grants (remaining funds left over from other initiatives that MDE directed toward support of Partnership districts). Partnership districts

receive additional support from MDE through Regional Assistance Grants. These RAGs originate from a federal funding stream specifically designated to serve the lowest-performing schools.[4] To align these federal funds with the Partnership Model, MDE has adopted a collaborative approach in which these monies are directed to ISDs to increase their capacity to support struggling districts. ISDs that work with Partnership districts receive additional funding through RAGs so that they can work more closely with those districts.

The ISD's role as a partner in the reform consisted of the use of these RAGs and other resources to provide support to the Partnership district and school educators. With RAG funding, ISDs were able to have staff dedicated to supporting the work of their constituent Partnership districts and to offer a greater menu of professional development, training, and coaching services to Partnership districts, some of which districts would have otherwise had to pay for.

PARTNERSHIP MODEL OUTCOMES

All of these efforts described above are intended to drive near-, intermediate-, and longer-term outcomes. In the center of the ToC is a highlight of the intended **near-term outcomes.** The process of performing the comprehensive needs assessment, setting realistic but rigorous goals for improvement over a three-year period, clearly delineating strategies through which the districts were to achieve these goals, and working with partners to attain the necessary supports was intended to **drive improvements in district systems and enable districts to have greater capacity** to support core functions such as human resources management, curriculum, instructional systems, operations and data use. In other words, the key near-term district-level outcome was improved functionality at the district level in the areas in which they had struggled previous to the reform.

The ToC holds that, as districts develop and implement Partnership Agreements and turnaround strategies for both the individual Partnership schools and the districts overall, and as a result begin to improve their systems and core functionality, they will be better able to support **schools in their efforts to improve functioning of the instructional core.** Not only would the intervention and enhanced district capacities drive improvements in instruction, but districts also would be able to assist schools as they generated new improvement goals aligned with the Partnership Agreement district goals, turnaround strategies, and interventions. Moreover, the intent is for districts and schools to increase their capacities to use data and metrics to evaluate their progress to date and to inform shifts in strategy to optimize improvements. In essence, the Partnership Model assumes that the district-level planning and capacity building, specific assessment of the needs of their lowest-performing schools, and targeted improvement efforts towards the individual schools and the larger district systems will translate to improvements in Partnership school functioning.

These improvements in Partnership district and school functioning should then lead to at least three predicted **intermediate outcomes:** 1) increased educator retention; 2) consistent, high-quality instruction; and 3) more efficient use of resources. We identified these intermediate outcomes because the state-level stakeholders who developed the reform and with whom we spoke made clear that these were some of the critical outcomes that they believed had to occur in Partnership schools

and districts to facilitate the eventual intended **long-term student outcomes:** improved academic outcomes (in the form of higher achievement on both formative assessments and summative Michigan standardized achievement tests [M-STEP and SAT], and reduced student dropout rates) and also, importantly, improved whole-child outcomes, such as attendance and behavioral measures. It is clear that MDE expected these long-term outcomes, given that they required Partnership districts to establish goals for both academic and non-academic outcomes within their Partnership Agreements, as well as strategies to meet both sets of goals.

CONSEQUENCES FOR FAILURE TO IMPROVE

The last box within the ToC highlights the **consequences for failure** to meet the goals identified in the Partnership Agreements. Under the original conception of the Partnership Model, should Partnership districts fail to show progress towards their goals or, at the end of 36 months, fail to meet their goals, accountability measures were to be taken ranging from takeover of failing districts to school closure (personal communication with State Superintendent Brian Whiston, April 2018). This high-stakes accountability framing of turnaround reforms was particularly important to the Governor's office (at the time, Governor Rick Snyder), who had previously been pushing for the first set of schools identified for Partnership reform to close due to persistent failure. Once it became clear to the Governor's office that school closure was politically challenging, as discussed in Section One of this report, the compromise position became closure as the high-stakes accountability threat for failure to improve along the measures outlined in the Partnership Agreement. To this point, one member of the Governor's education team said:

> *We needed to get everyone to recognize that the performance of these schools was unacceptable. That was the first thing that we asked the superintendent to do. The second thing that we asked him to do was get the schools to agree to some benchmark performance standards. Essentially the schools could say, for example, "Yes. I am able to increase my proficiency by 15 percent by this date." We wanted that because if they didn't reach it, it gives us way more credibility if we have to do something to that school. We can tell them, "You agreed to this, you said you could do it, and yet you still didn't do it."*

While the Partnership Model emerged out of a statewide conversation around school closure, MDE's implementation of the Model has been less focused on punitive measures in favor of providing support and improvement. As the reform has evolved from one that was intended to give schools a last chance before being closed to one that is focused on supporting schools and districts to turn around struggling schools, the stated consequences for failure to improve have become less central to the intervention. This focus on a supportive culture shift rather than a punitive accountability mechanism is showcased by this quote from one of the main state-level implementers of the reform, who said:

> *It's unique because we're trying to figure out, on the one hand, yes, you have the power to do things if they don't make achievement, but we want to not scare people into compliance, but really support people to better performance … In some ways, it's maybe*

> *a beautiful blend if we can, uh, shift the culture internally that it's not about identifying places that have a problem and saying, "Oh, look. You have a problem. You're not doing this right, and you need to fix that." It's saying, "Okay. Why isn't this working, and how can we support you, or how can we think about this different? Let's set some goals. Don't make them too low. Let's stretch yourself. Let's not talk about what happens in three years if you don't reach those goals. Let's just work on this." It's a mind shift for the schools as well as the department.*

Another MDE official explained that accountability and support needed to go hand-in-hand, but that the focus should be more on the partnership with the state:

> *The state needs to work as a partner, not just as a compliance arm or as an accountability threat, while at the same time retaining that accountability threat. It's like the threat is there, it's just a little bit more in the back. It's not right in the front seat. It's like in the trunk, but we didn't leave it behind. And that people are more clear about what the threat is when we start with the Agreement, so they understand the so-what.*

As such, we purposefully located the consequences in a box that is disconnected from the larger flow of the overall Theory of Change to underscore the continued presence of, but general lack of focus in the overall discussion of the Partnership Model on consequences. Under the most recent conception of the reform, the listed consequences for failure to improve are potential reconstitution (which, counter to the national definition of reconstitution, in Michigan does not necessarily mean removing substantial numbers of staff), re-start (i.e., closure and opening again with a charter or other provider), takeover by the ISD, or the required appointment of a CEO by the state. While policymakers within MDE have not conceived of the Partnership Model as an accountability-oriented policy, potential consequences remain an important means of inducing change in low-performing schools and districts under the Partnership Model. For instance, in the summer of 2018, the Office of Partnership Districts drew on the authority of the SRO to place a Partnership district that was not making progress on its Partnership Agreement into a Consent Agreement with OPD that installed a CEO in the district and transitioned the elected school board from its governing function into an advisory role. This demonstrated a willingness on the part of the Department and OPD to take more aggressive actions where districts were not improving under the Partnership Model.

LOCAL AND STATE CONTEXT

All school and district reforms are necessarily nested within their broader contexts, which the figure shows by locating the ToC within larger **local** (blue) **and state** (green) **contexts.** This is particularly relevant for turnaround reforms, and especially for the Partnership Model which was originally intended to rely on both local and state partners to enable reform. In particular, the engagement of local community partners in the Partnership Model is intentional and stems from the understanding that problems within schools often reflect difficulties experienced by communities, such as those we highlighted in the introduction to this report. The Partnership Model's focus on locally defined needs, improvement strategies and partnerships explicitly brings together traditional education resources

with those from outside the school system to work to improve the student achievement in the state's lowest-performing schools, which by default often exist within the state's lowest-income and most disadvantaged communities. Moreover, the Michigan state context of heavy local control, an active state legislature, and relatively low levels of funding for K-12 education compared to other states (see Arsen, Delpier & Nagel, 2019) is relevant to the use of the Partnership Turnaround Model for school improvement.

SECTION THREE – NOTES

[1] To become an optional Partnership school, a school must be included in the district's Partnership Agreement and be given individual improvement goals and consequences if those goals are not met. In some cases, schools were initially announced as Partnership schools but not included in their district's Partnership Agreement and therefore were never officially considered Partnership schools.

[2] More detail about the Partnership Agreements is provided in Section Two of this report.

[3] A series of changes in leadership at MDE may have contributed to the drift in approach to centering local partners in districts' Partnership reform efforts. Importantly, Superintendent Whiston became ill in late 2017 and passed away in April of 2018. Other leadership changes within MDE also impacted the reform vision; four different individuals assumed the responsibilities of the SRO between June 2017 and July 2019, when the position ceased to exist; and the Office of Partnership Districts was created over the implementation time period and faced changes within its leadership and staff.

[4] This funding is intended for Comprehensive Support and Improvement (CSI) schools, which are identified under Michigan's ESSA plan. Though Round 1 and 2 Partnership schools and districts were identified before the CSI designation was adopted, they receive the same supports as Partnership schools and districts identified using the CSI designation.

4

Partnership Turnaround Report:
SECTION FOUR

IMPLEMENTATION IN PARTNERSHIP DISTRICTS

EPIC
Education Policy
Innovation Collaborative
RESEARCH WITH CONSEQUENCE

Section Four: IMPLEMENTATION IN PARTNERSHIP DISTRICTS

This section examines how districts and schools are responding to and implementing the Partnership reform. We divide this section into four sub-sections. First, we explain the theory of **crafting coherence,** which we believe provides a useful lens through which to view the implementation of large-scale reforms like the Partnership Model. Then, in the three sub-sections that follow, we bring to bear data from EPIC surveys, superintendent interviews, and case studies to shed light on the implementation of the reform itself, focusing especially on the far-left boxes in the Theory of Change to understand if the intervention is being implemented as conceived. This section focuses on the role of the Partnership Agreements, the role of governmental partners (the Michigan Department of Education and local Intermediate School Districts/Regional Educational Service Agencies), and the role of community stakeholders in Partnership implementation.

CRAFTING COHERENCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR CONSIDERING PARTNERSHIP IMPLEMENTATION

In an ideal world, educational policies create conditions for productive change. Yet even when a policy is promising, policy **implementation** is often complicated and uneven. Additionally, multiple policies layered over time can result in policy incoherence, wherein various demands are in tension or compete for time and attention (Fuhrman, 1999; Stosich, 2018).

To help frame our analysis, this report draws on crafting coherence theory (Honig & Hatch, 2004) to understand the policy implementation process, particularly how and why districts and schools responded to Partnership reform. **Crafting coherence** is defined as a process by which schools,

school districts, and other partners work together to "continually negotiate the fit between external demands and schools' own goals and strategies" (Honig & Hatch, 2004, p. 16). While scholars argue that eliminating policy incoherence is important to achieving desirable outcomes (Fuhrman, 1999; Stosich, 2018), **crafting coherence** frames multiple policies or external demands as a process that can be negotiated to achieve organizational goals. Thus, the convergence of multiple demands may or may not contribute to poor outcomes since policies can bring organizations new opportunities and new resources for school improvement. In short, savvy organizations and leaders can decide how to engage or disengage with the demands of any reform in ways that advance their goals and best fit their local context.

SAVVY ORGANIZATIONS AND LEADERS CAN DECIDE HOW TO ENGAGE OR DISENGAGE WITH THE DEMANDS OF ANY REFORM IN WAYS THAT ADVANCE THEIR GOALS AND BEST FIT THEIR LOCAL CONTEXT.

Crafting coherence is a particularly relevant framework to bring to the analysis of the Partnership reform because it explicitly centers the role of the school district central office in working with schools to develop high quality goals and strategies and navigate policy implementation. The theory fits well with the Partnership Model because of the district's centrality in the theory of coherence, in the Theory of Change (ToC) that underlies the Partnership reform, and in the actual work of supporting school-level turnaround. According to our ToC, superintendents must coordinate with central office staff, external partners, and school-based staff to craft measurable goals and three-year improvement plans to meet goals. **Crafting coherence** also revolves around three broad activities aligned with the Partnership reform: 1) setting school-wide goals and strategies, 2) schools using goals and strategies to "bridge" or "buffer" external demands, and 3) the central office supporting any new forms of school decision-making.

An understudied and central concern with the process of crafting coherence is whether and why schools and districts engage in productive change (or any change) as a result of the educational policy implementation process, whether or how they leverage external demands to their benefit, and the conditions that promote or deter attempts by central offices and schools to craft coherence. Ultimately, **crafting coherence** is a process of managing multiple demands but ideally should involve building or deepening district and school capacity.

This section integrates our Partnership district leader interviews (n=21) with other data sources to focus on how districts, charter organizations, principals, and teachers responded to Partnership reform – in particular, how, why and to what end Partnership district leaders worked to craft coherence by engaging in "bridging," "buffering," or symbolically adopting external demands.[1] In this case, we defined "external" as demands imposed by actors or policies outside of the organization. Three categories classified the general approaches the Partnership district superintendents and charter leaders were taking to crafting coherence.

	BRIDGING	SYMBOLIC ADOPTION External Demands (Hybrid Bridging/Buffering)	BUFFERING
DEFINITION	Actors selectively engage with policy demands to strategically inform or enhance organizational goals.	Leaders might bridge and buffer by linking new demands to pre-existing efforts. This is a form of compliance called symbolically adopting external demands. Bridging to pre-existing goals or strategies is not necessarily undesirable so long as pre-existing structures are well-positioned to drive school improvement. This may be the case for districts that put new improvement systems, plans, and strategies in place prior to a new reform intervention.	Leaders strategically decide to disengage from external demands.
EXAMPLES	A reform might provide leaders with activities or language for meeting previously elusive goals and strategies, access to new resources, leverage for negotiating with new stakeholders, or strategies for amending goals and strategies to drive improvement.	Leaders can align the organization's existing mission, goals, and practices to external demands while keeping the organization's day-to-day work largely unchanged.	1) Leaders ignore negative feedback or limit the interactions between the environment and the organization; 2) Leaders create structures to manage or strategically limit the involvement of stakeholders. Both limit the amount of time engaging in new demands.
EXAMPLES	The majority of Partnership districts attempted in some way to faithfully implement elements of the reform, using it as an opportunity to "bridge" to new resources and make desired changes.	The majority of Partnership districts described symbolically adopting external demands which would allow them to comply with crafting and implementing the Partnership Agreement but require minimal changes from pre-existing strategies and goals. Thus, these districts symbolically adopted the Partnership reform by linking reform activities to pre-existing initiatives – thus making minimal changes.	Several Partnership district leaders strategically limited the involvement of district staff, principals and teachers from multiple external demands to avoid confusion and to avoid taking precious time and attention away from other important goals.

As seen in Figure 4.1, 15 of 21 Partnership leaders **symbolically adopted** demands of the reform, complying with writing and implementing the Partnership Agreement but in ways that required minimal changes from pre-existing school improvement strategies or goals. However, 14 of the 21 engaged in various attempts to **bridge,** using the reform and/or associated resources to make strategic changes to meet their own goals or specific Partnership goals. The five districts exclusively in the green circle described symbolically adopting demands but engaged in little to no bridging or buffering. Four districts (Canadiens, Flyers, Ducks, Penguins) explicitly discussed attempting to **buffer** various district- or school-level staff from dedicating time or involvement in the reform. Two of these districts, in the middle of the diagram, (Candiens and Penguins) engaged in all three categories – symbolic adoption, bridging, and buffering – strategically responding to different demands in a way that aligned with their overarching goals or vision. Unsurprisingly, everyone in the sample engaged to some degree with the demands of the reform by drafting a Partnership Agreement.

Figure 4.1. District-Level Responses to Partnership Reform



Therefore, no districts or schools fell exclusively into the "buffering" category. Approximately half of the districts are positioned in more than one category, as superintendents described multiple responses depending on the circumstance. For example, a superintendent might describe using her/

his prior strategic plan as the basis of their Partnership Agreement (symbolic adoption) but also working with a Michigan Department of Education (MDE) liaison to gather technical supports to meet their goals (bridging). Just under a third (six of 21) of Partnership districts exclusively bridged, using the reform and the process of writing the Agreement as an opportunity for new change, resources, improvement strategies, and the like. The sections that follow explain what this looks like and why districts responded in these ways.

PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS AS PLANS FOR IMPROVEMENT

As discussed in Section three, a key element of the reform is the development of a Partnership Agreement, or a reform plan, to guide the Partnership districts, Partnership schools, and their partners as they worked to improve academic and non-academic outcomes. It is not rare for turnarounds and other school reform interventions to rely on some kind of school improvement planning process (e.g., Meyers & Hitt, 2018; Strunk, Marsh, Bush-Mecenas, & Duque, 2016; Sun, Penner & Loeb, 2017), and these have been shown to be associated with improved implementation when they are of relatively high quality and offer discrete plans to which educators can adhere (e.g., Strunk, Marsh, Bush-Mecenas, & Duque, 2016).

For the Partnership Agreements to truly guide district and school improvement efforts, the plans must be, at minimum, of high quality and the goals and strategies must be clear to the educators tasked with implementing them. However, after analyzing these documents, it is unclear if these minimal standards were met in the Partnership reform.

PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS WERE OF MODERATE QUALITY

The process of the Partnership Agreement analysis is described in Section Two. Analysis suggests that, at least initially, the Agreements were vague and of middling quality, though they did increase in quality slightly from Round 1 to Rounds 2 and 3. Plans were often fairly formulaic and used boilerplate language in many subsections.

Partnership Agreements set academic and non-academic student outcome goals for districts to achieve over 18- and 36-month periods, and districts had autonomy to specify how ambitious their goals were. As required, every Agreement contained academic goals, specifically expectations for students to improve performance on standardized state tests or other districtwide assessments. Academic goals focused on either growth (e.g., students will attain 1.2 years of growth on a given assessment) or proficiency (e.g., 40% of students will be proficient on a given assessment). Notably, several plans did not contain any non-academic goals for students, reflecting the fact that Partnership districts were encouraged but not required to include goals for non-academic outcomes. When they were included, non-academic goals typically focused on improving student attendance and behavior. For example, plans might specify goals of obtaining student attendance rates of 95% or decreasing office discipline referrals by 50%.

Different Rounds, Different Partnerships

One factor that may have influenced the results presented in this report is the round of identification. Appendix 1 breaks down the districts and schools identified over the course of three rounds of Partnership Model implementation. Although the student and teacher outcome results presented in Section five of this report do not incorporate differences by rounds (only results for Round 1 can be traced at this stage of the evaluation), we did observe several small differences in implementation across schools and districts identified in different rounds of the Partnership reform.

First, as shown in Figure A1, the overall quality of Partnership Agreements increased slightly between districts initially identified in Rounds 1 and Rounds 2 and 3. This was largely driven by improvements in the quality of the goals and strategies outlined in the Agreements, as well as descriptions of the pre-intervention context. A similar pattern of increased turnaround plan quality has been seen in previous reforms (e.g., Strunk et al., 2016), and may suggest that districts learn from others' and their own past experience in developing actionable plans.

Figure A1. Partnership Agreement Quality by Round, Overall, and by Domain



Notes: Author's analyses of Partnership Agreements. Weight of each category shown in parentheses.

Although Round 1 Agreements were the lowest quality, educators' self-reported understanding of why their school was identified for Partnership and of the various components of their Partnership Agreements was highest in Round 1 Partnership schools and lowest in Round 2 Partnership schools, as shown in Figure A2. Though it is difficult to determine why this is the case, it may be due to the unique political circumstances involving potential closure for Round 1 Partnership schools. However, this pattern is not reflected in many other survey measures. In addition, Round 3 schools

Different Rounds, Different Partnerships *(continued)*

are more likely to be charter schools. As discussed on pages five through six of this report, the conflation between school governance model and round of identification may drive some of these patterns. For instance, Partnership charter school educators were more involved in developing their Agreements, which may be reflected in Round 3 educators' greater understanding of aspects of their Agreements shown, in Figure A2.

Figure A2. Understanding of Partnership Agreement by Round of Identification



Notes: Educators were asked, "How well do you understand the following aspects of your school's Partnership Agreement?"
Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnerships districts.

Different Rounds, Different Partnerships *(continued)*

How educators rated the assistance their school received is of potential concern since it decreased from Round 1 to Round 3 schools, especially the ratings for support from MDE and their ISD, as shown in Figure A3. Earlier research on organizational capacity to turn around multiple schools and districts suggests that, given the intensity of this work, it is difficult to provide the necessary turnaround supports to a large number of struggling schools and districts. The pattern reflected in Figure A3 may point to a similar challenge with bringing the Partnership Model to scale as more schools were added to the reform. However, it may also be that these differences are the product of Round 1 schools receiving increased supports over a longer period of time.

Figure A3. Educators' Ratings of Partner Support by Round



Notes: Educators were asked, "How would you rate the quality of assistance or support from ____?" Only those who responded that they received assistance or support from the entity/organization responded to this item.

Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

We also found decreases in subsequent rounds in terms of educators' grade/evaluations of their school, perceptions of positive change over the previous year, and their reported job satisfaction (see Appendix 3). Here, too, it is difficult to determine whether these patterns are driven by differences in the needs of and/or conditions in different rounds of Partnership schools or due to improvements in Round 1 Partnership schools, the only Partnership schools that had experienced a full year of Partnership at the time the survey was administered. We will be able to learn more with additional years of data.

Figure 4.2 provides average scores for each domain rated in the rubric. It shows that, on average, the goals domain received a 3.13 out of a maximum of four points, which represents "adequate" on a scale of non-existent (0), emerging (1), approaching adequate (2), adequate (3), and exemplary (4). There was wide variation in the quality of the goals outlined in districts' Partnership Agreements; scores in this domain ranged from 1.2 (emerging) to 4.0 (exemplary).

However, the strategies outlined in the Agreements that were intended to guide districts and schools as they worked to achieve their Agreement goals were less well-developed than the Partnership goals themselves. On average, plans received 2.01 points in this domain ("approaching adequate"), with scores ranging from 0.8 to 3.4. On average, districts were more adept at outlining quality strategies related to improving academic outcomes (with an average score of 2.62) and weakest in clarifying specific whole-child approaches (0.81 points) to meet their goals. The difference in quality between goals and strategies suggests that Partnership districts' reform plans may set reasonable goals, but that they have greater difficulty outlining the specific strategies to drive improvement. However, these strategies were better aligned with districts' descriptions of their pre-intervention contexts; on average, plans received an alignment score of 2.81 – nearing "adequate." This suggests that although districts often selected strategies that were not particularly well-aligned with their specific academic and non-academic goals, they at least reflected to some extent their unique district contexts.

Figure 4.2. Partnership Agreement Quality, Overall, and by Domain



Note: Percentages noted in parentheses following each domain indicate the weight at which the domain counted toward the overall score.

Source: Author evaluation of Partnership Agreements

The next-level accountability measures specified in the Agreements were intended to specify the consequences for failing to achieve 18-month benchmarks and 36-month goals. The average plan received 3.32 points. For the most part, plans borrowed boilerplate language, and suggested consequences such as reconstitution or closure if goals were not achieved.

Another key area of the Partnership Agreement was the description of the types of partners each district planned to work with and the specific roles of these partners. On average, plans received 2.31 points and ranged from 1.17 to 3.83. Within the domain of Partners, the strongest partner description was the Michigan Department of Education (3.00 points on average) and the weakest was the school board (1.73 points). We also took note of the particular types of community partners with which districts selected to work. Districts named anywhere from zero to 17 community partners. These partners were most commonly providers of educational services and social supports (for example, institutions of higher education and after-school tutoring services). Other common types of community partners included local or state governmental organizations, philanthropic organizations, local businesses, churches, and mental health/counseling services. Descriptions of community partners ranged from simply listing the names of these partners to more detailed explanations of how these partners would work with districts to achieve goals.

Local School Boards: Help or Hindrance to Partnership Implementation?

The relationships between district leaders and their locally elected school boards can greatly impact the success of large-scale school and district reforms. In particular, having support and assistance from the board can facilitate difficult conversations about the causes that led to poor outcomes and can help bolster efforts to address them.

We saw this in particular in our interviews with Partnership superintendents. Ten of the 21 superintendents interviewed cited district politics as impacting their turnaround work. A few superintendents noted how conflict with their school board was a challenge to implementing Partnership reforms. For example, the Red Wings superintendent found her/his board wanted only positive reports on the district, and did not appreciate them bringing up the challenges the district faced:

> *The superintendents before me, everything was rubber stamped. I was the one coming and holding myself and the board accountable. When you tell people that this has been a failure for so long, you're not the most popular person in the world, in the district. I think it's something that was needed, because at the end of the day, our kids are suffering.*

A district administrator from Whalers was more direct, citing the school board as the greatest barrier to the district's implementation of its Partnership Agreement:

Local School Boards: Help or Hindrance to Partnership Implementation? *(continued)*

> *I think the one thing that we haven't brought up that is a big barrier in this district is the Board of Education. They have their agenda which is not in agreement. They're a board that, not unlike many school boards in underserved districts, they want to – they're not sure about their role – they're not good at staying in their lane, even though the state superintendent at the very beginning of this stood up in front of all of them and was very specific that they needed to stay in their lane. Let the superintendent be in her/his lane. That has not occurred. They try to micromanage and we have our instructional goals. We have backgrounds in education and instruction, and we know what best practice is. They come in with demands and initiatives that don't have anything to do with what best practice in education is. They have a lot of power [...]. They are a real barrier to the implementation.*

On the other hand, the superintendent of Capitals articulated the importance of a supportive board in being able to implement district-level changes:

> *This was a board that sees opportunities. [...] The key component for the board is do they have the capacity to listen, be patient, and take direction in a way that isn't where they have personal agendas that get in the way? This board didn't have folks with personal agendas that would stop the growth process.*

A few superintendents connected the importance of a supportive board to the implementation of the Partnership reform. For example, the superintendent of Flames expressed that board involvement in the Partnership Agreement was important to their district's planning process:

> *One of the representatives from the school board came to a couple of the Partnership Agreement meetings just to be informed of what was going on and the process that we were taking. At the signing, a board representative was present to sign the Agreement along with the state and [ISD] and the other stakeholders. Yeah, they've been aware of the process along the way. They've been right along with us.*

Local School Boards: Help or Hindrance to Partnership Implementation? *(continued)*

The superintendent of Oilers also noted that the Partnership Agreement process may have facilitated greater transparency between stakeholders:

> *I think our board has been in more open communications with our authorizers about our students, the types of things we're seeing from them [...]. I think in the long run the board supports not only us, but I think it's opened facilitation and communication with our authorizer a little bit more. They've always been, I think, some good advocates as much as they can at the legislative level.*

Finally, even a supportive board can at times serve to stymie progress. For instance, the superintendent of Sharks indicated that personal relationships between the board and district or school employees have at times interfered with the board's ability to serve in an accountability role, saying "*There's just some friendships between the school leadership and the board that I think are not very healthy. That's always been the case for the board to actually hold the school accountable to the things that it sets out to do.*" In this superintendent's experience, these relationships led the board to be less proactive in encouraging reform.

Overall, our data makes clear that school boards are crucially important in the successful implementation of turnaround reforms, including – and perhaps especially – in the Partnership Model.

EDUCATORS IN PARTNERSHIP DISTRICTS EXPRESSED RELATIVELY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS

The moderate quality of the Partnership Agreements, and particularly of the strategies outlined to achieve their goals, may help explain why few educators within Partnership districts expressed deep understanding of the Partnership Agreement itself or of its contents. Figure 4.3 shows educators' responses to survey questions asking them how well they understood individual aspects of their Partnership Agreements, with 1 indicating not at all and 5 indicating extremely well. Figure 4.3 shows that educators in Partnership districts had relatively little understanding of why their districts were identified as a Partnership district. Moreover, they reported less understanding of the academic and non-academic 18-month benchmarks and 36-month goals specified in their Agreements, or the

Figure 4.3. Educators' Understanding of Their District's Partnership Agreement



Note: Educators were asked, "How well do you understand the following aspects of your district's Partnership Agreement?"

Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

strategies outlined to help them reach these goals. They also didn't understand the consequences their districts would face (outlined in the Agreements) if they failed to achieve their goals, or of the roles the partners brought in to help build their system-wide capacity. In all of these areas, Partnership teachers, non-Partnership teachers, and Partnership principals rated, on average, their level of understanding as less than "moderate," with non-Partnership teachers always rating their awareness as less than "slightly." The one exception to this pattern is that principals in Partnership schools reported a relatively solid understanding – between a 3.5 and 4 on a scale of 1 to 5 – in almost every area. These patterns in overall awareness of the Partnership Agreement mirror actors' understanding (or lack thereof) of most elements of the Partnership Agreement itself.

As might be expected given that Partnership schools were the ones identified as low-performing and non-Partnership schools were only identified as a result of residing in the same district, non-Partnership school educators reported substantially lower levels of understanding than Partnership school educators. In addition, the fact that principals always reported greater understanding than teachers in each school type may suggest evidence of principals working to buffer their teachers from elements of the reform, and in particular the language of the Partnership intervention.

Indeed, the survey results, presented in Figure 4.4, show that principals in Partnership schools were the only group with broad awareness of their Partnership Agreement. Teachers were far more aware of other kinds of improvement plans but expressed little recognition of the Partnership Agreement or Partnership reform in particular. Figure 4.4 shows that 85% of principals in Partnership schools reported being aware of the reform overall, relative to only 55% of principals in non-Partnership schools (but in Partnership districts). Fifty-one percent of Partnership school teachers were aware of the reform relative to only 22% of Non-Partnership school teachers. By contrast, 94% of Partnership school principals and 91% of non-Partnership school principals knew about their more general district improvement plans, and 81% and 74% of teachers (respectively) were aware of more general school improvement plans.

Figure 4.4. Awareness of Partnership Agreements vs. School Improvement Plans



Note: Educators were asked, "Are you aware of your (school's/district's) [plan]?"

Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

These levels of (un)awareness and (lack of) understanding may have occurred for one of several reasons. First, the Agreements themselves were underdeveloped in several key areas. This may have been due in part to the relatively short time frame available for Partnership Agreement development (60 days for Round 1, 90 days for Rounds 2 and 3). In addition, the Partnership Model itself has an additional layer of complexity in that only some of the schools within each district are identified as Partnership schools, so, while the Partnership Agreement applies to the district as a whole, not all schools, and potentially only Partnership schools, are held to the goals and strategies outlined in the Agreement. This may have led to mixed awareness and understanding of the reform. Moreover, educators were often relatively uninvolved in developing the Partnership Agreements in many districts. In particular, only approximately half of Partnership School principals were involved in developing the Partnership Agreement, and only four percent of teachers in Partnership schools reported being involved. Even fewer educators in non-Partnership schools were involved in developing the Agreements (11% of principals and 0.01% of teachers; results not shown).

SURVEY DATA SUGGESTS THAT THIS "BUY-IN" WAS FAR MORE EVIDENT FOR PRINCIPALS THAN FOR TEACHERS.

EDUCATOR SUPPORT OF AND BUY-IN TO PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT GOALS IS CRITICAL BUT VARIED BY ROLE

Partnership school principals – who were the most aware of and best understood the reform – also reported the greatest optimism about the quality of their district's improvement goals. For instance, as shown in Figure 4.5, principals in Partnership schools "agreed" that their goals are feasible to accomplish in a three-year time frame, that they are focused on the most important issues facing their schools, that they will help meet the needs of their students, that they focus on clear and concrete steps they can take to improve student outcomes, and that their instructional efforts are aligned with their goals. This level of buy-in for the improvement goals is believed to be critical for the success of the reform. One state policymaker said:

> *You've got to get buy-in. The only way any of these reforms work is if you've got significant – you're never going to have a hundred percent, obviously, but if you've got significant buy-in that people at the classroom level and who are managing the building are totally committed and on the same page to what needs to happen – that's the bare bones basic, and that's something that we just do a really bad job of in Michigan, in my opinion.*

However, survey data suggests that this "buy-in" was far more evident for principals than for teachers. For instance, teachers in Partnership schools reported less optimism that their improvement goals and strategies would help them achieve their objectives than did both their own principals or teachers in non-Partnership schools. The school-level interviews may offer one possible explanation for this pattern; it appears that educators in Partnership schools and districts felt overwhelmed by

multiple new demands associated with Partnership implementation and changes in curriculum and instruction. Teachers in Blues reported feeling this way, and the Blues Math Coach also explained that she/he was feeling stretched by the work of Partnership implementation:

Figure 4.5. Educators' Perceptions of Their School Goals



Note: Educators were asked, "Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement about [the goals in your improvement plan]?" As the survey was administered online, respondents were routed to a question about their Partnership Agreement if they indicated awareness of the Agreement or to a version that asked about their school's overall improvement goals if they indicated a lack of awareness of their Partnership Agreement.

Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

> *Well, a personal challenge for me is just a whole lot of initiatives and just one of me. I don't mean that in the sense that there's just one of me; we have a whole team working together. But as a math coach, I feel like my time to actually coach teachers around mathematics is very limited and a lot of times just spent on other district-wide systems building things.*

In particular, she/he felt conflicted between doing the work of coaching and focusing on other concurrent initiatives. This was echoed by a Blues teacher who alluded to "20 different things" that they were being asked to do. These interviews suggest that perceived implementation demands at the school level may affect the relative pessimism of teachers in our survey data.

Although Partnership school principals were relatively positive about their ability to meet their improvement goals, Figure 4.5 also indicates their concern that they did not have sufficient resources to meet these goals. In particular, this report returns to this theme of inadequate staffing several times. Interview respondents consistently pointed out the challenges they faced in achieving their goals due to the lack of a specific kind of resource: staff and the financial resources to attract and keep staff needed to implement and sustain their reforms. One teacher from Penguins said:

20 OUT OF 21 SUPERINTENDENTS AND CHARTER LEADERS INTERVIEWED CITED STAFFING AS ONE OF THE GREATEST PROBLEMS FACING THEIR DISTRICTS.

> *Trying to get some new teachers in and I think that every school is struggling and filling in vacant spots within the [Penguins] District. Trying to fill those, but I think that's a struggle that most districts in Michigan are finding that there's that teacher shortage that happens that's hit pretty hard. I feel like this year I've noticed it a little bit more, but I feel like I've seen it in more schools, more districts that it's not just a [Penguins] District issue or anything like that. Those are I would say the biggest problems I think we're facing right now.*

This theme was echoed by teachers and district staff in both of our other case study sites. Indeed, in our superintendent and charter leader interviews, 20 of 21 system leaders cited staffing as one of the greatest problems facing their districts.

SOME SUPERINTENDENTS USED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS TO IMPLEMENT PREVIOUS IMPROVEMENT GOALS WHILE OTHERS USED THEM TO BRIDGE TO NEW REFORM EFFORTS

Although all superintendents with whom we spoke were aware of the reform, it became clear through interviews that even at the leadership level, familiarity with the reform was dependent in part on the in-district experience and tenure of the superintendents. This lack of familiarity with and comprehension of the Agreement caused some superintendents to symbolically adopt the reform

rather than use it to bridge to new initiatives. A few newer superintendents, for example, indicated less familiarity with the Partnership Agreement because it was written by the prior superintendent. For example, the superintendent of Devils was not as familiar with the reform for this reason: *"I was not here when they did the Partnership Agreement. I'm living off the document that was given to me when I got here. I was not involved in the creation of it. […] If I had been, I may have a better grasp of the whole idea."* Some also felt that writing an Agreement would be difficult for a new superintendent balancing the many demands of the job, such as one superintendent who noted it would be "overwhelming" for a new superintendent. This situation represented one way in which superintendents responded to the reform: symbolically adopting the prior plan but potentially not implementing it because they were either not familiar or wanted to craft one they felt made more sense based on their own vision and understanding of the district's needs.

A more common example of symbolic adoption involved more experienced superintendents or leaders intentionally "cutting and pasting" their district's prior strategic planning efforts into the Partnership Agreement because they felt the prior plans were consistent with meeting the goals of the reform. For example, Avalanche's superintendent indicated that the Partnership Agreement was not necessarily new work but a combination of three previous strategic planning efforts:

> *That was really a culmination of – or a combination of what the ISD had already put in place, what we were already developing in terms of our own capacity, and then what we've realized we needed additional capacity and based on the MI Excel blueprint. I would say as far as the writing of that, it really came from those three places.*

Similarly, the superintendent of Blues shared that the Partnership Agreement was taken from a previously crafted five-year strategic plan:

> *What we did in Blues was when I first came we were wrapping up the creation of a five-year strategic plan […]. Then it coincided with the creation of Partnership schools. Because of that, our Partnership Agreement, the first one was the first three years of the five-year strategic plan.*

The Ducks superintendent summarized this particular approach to crafting the Partnership Agreement saying, *"When they identified us as a Partnership district, and I was required basically to develop a Partnership Agreement, I simply cut and paste the strategic plan into the Partnership Agreement."*

These data suggest that, for some districts, the Agreement itself may not represent a new approach to turnaround work, but a continuation of initiatives and plans already in progress. This might explain the high level of reported alignment between district and school improvement plans and Partnership Agreements; as is shown in Figure 4.6, principals report high levels of alignment of goals and strategies between the two sets of plans, although teachers report slightly lower levels of alignment. On average, educators in Partnership schools believe that alignment is higher than do educators in non-Partnership schools.

Although some districts symbolically adopted external demands by crafting Partnership Agreements largely from existing documents, many also used the reform as an opportunity to "bridge" to new resources and facilitate improvement in their districts (see Figure 4.1). For example, the superintendent of Avalanche, despite using prior plans to craft the Partnership Agreement, noted that Partnership *"really has given us more of a language for work we needed to get done here."* Other superintendents echoed the power of Partnership to negotiate with stakeholders (a form of bridging), specifically, teachers and principals. Blues' superintendent said: *"How do we help the teachers feel this urgency? That's where I think the power of the Partnership can come in if you capitalize on it, like, look, [we've only got so much time]."* As explained later in Section Five, the Detroit Public Schools Community District's superintendent[2] viewed the ability to use partnership as a motivator as one of the key strategies that drove the academic gains of Partnership schools in DPSCD.

Figure 4.6. Perceived Alignment Between Partnership Agreement and School Improvement Plan



Note: Educators were asked to rate their level of agreement with the following statements: "My school improvement plan and Partnership Agreement identify similar..."

Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

One way a few districts worked to use Partnership Agreement development as a bridging mechanism was to incorporate teachers into the planning process, although doing so was relatively rare. For instance, the superintendent of Red Wings described involving teachers in coming up with "all the planning and ideas" for the Partnership Agreement. She/he noted a significant boost in teacher motivation: *"Now after [teachers] being able to collaborate with a Partnership Agreement, it changed their attitudes towards each other."* This superintendent's experience illustrates the possible benefits of using the reform as a bridge to motivate and invest teachers in meeting the goals of the Partnership Agreement. Others intended to involve teachers but found it difficult. For instance, the charter leader at Hurricanes invited teachers to apply to a leadership team but they were unable to find meeting

times to craft the Agreement. In lieu of a collaborative meeting, the leader, a literacy coach, and the MDE liaison crafted the Agreement and solicited feedback from the volunteer leadership team. Time constraints such as these along with having only 60 to 90 days to write the Agreement likely contributed to less teacher involvement. Given the earlier finding that Partnership school teachers are the least optimistic that their schools can achieve their goals and that their goals are meeting the needs of their students (Figure 4.5), and the importance of buy-in to the success of the reform, it may be critically important for Partnership district leaders to use the Agreement development and additional planning processes to involve teachers and other educators in the change process.

GOVERNMENTAL PARTNERS: THE ROLE OF MDE LIAISONS AND INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL DISTRICTS

Partners at all levels – the state, Intermediate School Districts (ISDs), and local community groups – were considered central to the Partnership Model of district and school turnaround. This next part of section first discusses how governmental partners were perceived by Partnership district educators and we then move to the ways in which local community partners aided or hindered reform implementation. Partnership is a complicated process, and, for various reasons and in various contexts, some partners are better at aligning with districts' needs than are others.

DISTRICT LEADERS REPORT IMPROVED SUPPORT FROM MDE, ALTHOUGH LIAISON SUPPORT IS MIXED

The Michigan Department of Education (MDE) played a key role in Partnership reform implementation, and local leaders largely considered this role beneficial. Indeed, 18 out of the 21 Partnership district leaders interviewed positively mentioned MDE's support and assistance. These results are consistent with the larger Theory of Change in which MDE liaisons work directly with districts, particularly superintendents, to improve the district's capacity to support school-level turnaround.

Many leaders focused on the shift in MDE's orientation from compliance-focused to a more "service-minded" organization, and superintendents especially called out assistance from MDE staff (including the liaisons) as well as the 21H and other funding streams allocated to assist improvement efforts. The Avalanche superintendent explained MDE's shift in focus:

> *I think [Superintendent Whiston] has come in when he became state superintendent and really had more of a service-minded orientation. Really wanted to have MDE become – seen more as helpful and providing resources and providing expertise and help and other kinds of things. I really appreciate that, and I think [the new MDE leadership] has continued that way of thinking, as opposed to just simply being the hammer when you don't meet your Title [1 Audit].*

This idea that MDE was becoming more of a support structure, not just in intention but in practice, was reinforced by numerous superintendents. As the leader of Blues explained:

> *MDE has been phenomenal. Everyone, from my field service representative – they have a new title now, but it's the person that helps with the Title I, Title II consolidated application. She's like, 'I have been instructed to do what I can to help you.' I think they always would, but they just – I feel like they go out of their way to help us.*

In the original conception of the Partnership Model, MDE intended for the Partnership Agreement Liaisons to play an important support role that would facilitate many of the services for Partnership districts and schools as they worked to improve. Reports of their success was markedly mixed, potentially contributing to the modest quality ratings accorded to MDE support in the surveys. In some cases, the liaison was reported to be a mechanism that allowed for a true sense of support, either through providing new knowledge of resources or technical expertise related to achieving partnership goals. Several leaders explained that working with a liaison brought needed technical expertise in key areas. As the Superintendent of Blue Jackets said, *"Through our liaison, we've gotten some support in being able to explore a broad array of curriculums."* Similarly, the leader at Oilers explained in response to a question about whether the Partnership reform changed the way the organization did things:

> *I think as a school we were looking at a high level of data for the school in where we're scoring or how much of our students are meeting proficiency in certain areas and things. Now we're able to – our first liaison really helped us dig into, again, what M-STEP is because that's what our index score is based on – not saying that we're teaching to a test, but we are teaching to standards that need to be met in order for a student to be successful to graduate. We're able to look at those standards and then see with our own curriculum map, "Are we spending a lot of time on things that are measured on that assessment or not?"*

In this case, liaisons acted as a new technical resource to help leaders accomplish the goals of the partnership. Other leaders noted that their MDE liaison not only brought technical expertise but acted as a "bridge" – connecting resources available at the state or elsewhere with their goals. The leader of Hurricanes explained: *"The state, of course, has access to a lot more resources and understanding and all of those things. To have someone who is a go-between between those resources and the school, then bringing that has been extremely helpful."*

However, key personnel involved in statewide implementation of the Partnership Model recognized the difficulty with the liaison role. For instance, one respondent told us:

> *In the first model that [MDE] came up with, we relied a lot on this idea of liaisons as empowered professionals to make the judgements with the districts that they need to make. I think that model is so person-dependent and getting the right people in the right chairs, and then figuring out if they're a right match for the districts is hard [...] There was just a huge variation in liaison quality.*

This sentiment was echoed in both our case studies and interviews with the leaders of Partnership districts. These data suggest that differences in how actors from MDE, especially liaisons, have interacted with districts shapes their Partnership work. For instance, while some Partnership districts

have worked with the same liaison since they entered Partnership, others have worked with several, and the leaders of some Partnership districts reported lower levels of support. For instance, the leader of Sharks recalled she/he felt supported by her/his liaison only when they asked for assistance. She/he noted:

> *My sense of my work with [liaison], though, she/he was always there whenever I needed to call for something. If I had a question or if I had to understand what the next visit was supposed to look like or help to create the agenda up for that next meeting, [liaison] was very helpful with that. My feeling on it was like it wasn't proactive. It was more a reactive thing.*

In some districts, liaisons were actively unhelpful. At times, district administrators were not able to develop a productive relationship with the district, which led the district to request a new liaison. One district official from Whalers recalled:

> *Our current liaison is more: "You will do this. This is what needs to be done. Do it now." We were just in a meeting a couple of weeks ago around this Partnership. They told us all these things that we identified the problems, she/he identified how we're going to fix them. It's more that top-down hammer approach, which is, as I understand it, very much against [the superintendent's] idea of this partnership. It really is about your community saving your schools, and MDE trying to be very hands-off and provide guidance and support. She/he is just the opposite… She/he's gone rogue.*

Other districts experienced less severe, but nevertheless meaningful, issues due to gaps in liaison assignments. Some service gaps came during the process of entering Partnership while others were due to the liaison being reassigned to new districts due to personnel changes within MDE. For example, the leader of Sabres recalled that they did not have a liaison to work with for several months after entering Partnership. When asked whether that posed a challenge to their Partnership work, she/he replied, *"it caused some issues with receiving the 21H dollars."*

Together, these examples illustrate how variation in interactions with liaisons shaped how Partnership districts have developed and implemented their respective Partnership Agreement, a topic explored more deeply in the analyses of our case study Partnership districts.

Even with the liaison intended as the central conduit between MDE and Partnership districts, several district leaders detailed how they felt the need to buffer themselves and others from the demands of Partnership, specifically the time demands that would take them away from focusing on current important initiatives and the confusion that would result from having too many people involved in planning, designing, or implementing the reform. That is, regardless of the quality of the assistance coming from MDE (and other partners), there was a need to buffer the improvement process and their staffs from having the proverbial "too many cooks in the kitchen" problem. For example, the leader of Flyers explained:

> *We are engaging with MDE and [our ISD] at the minimum level expected so that we can be compliant with what we need to do, but without having to run into the constant bureaucratic mix of multiple viewpoints from multiple people. We have intentionally decided to not engage more deeply beyond what is minimally required.*

The leader of Sharks reinforced this sentiment that there may be a need to buffer from the views of multiple people: *"I think one of the biggest issues has been there's so many people who are trying to get in the mix and say, 'Let me get support. Let me get support.' It's not streamlined, and there's not clarity around it."* The process of dealing with multiple people, all with good intentions, became confusing and put further demands on this leader's time. As explained through our case study analysis in Section Seven, it may be productive for districts to engage in buffering behavior when Partnership interferes with the implementation of other improvement efforts or when district and school capacity to manage multiple demands is low.

Overall, there is evidence that, while Partnership district leaders felt that MDE and, in some cases, the liaisons were increasingly helpful and service-oriented, and they appreciated the flexibility and assistance obtaining 21H funding, they still expressed concerns about multiple and competing demands from several actors and insufficient resources to address all of their turnaround needs.

PARTNERSHIP DISTRICT LEADERS REPORTED POSITIVE SUPPORTS FROM THEIR ISDS

Partnership district educators generally reported positive perceptions of support from their local ISDs (or Regional Educational Service Agencies, RESAs). The vast majority of principals reported receiving assistance from their ISDs with relatively high ratings of the quality of that assistance. Superintendents echoed this understanding, with 13 of 21 superintendents reporting positive

Funding and District Capacity

In addition to MDE personnel assisting improvement efforts, superintendents also noted that associated grant funding has been used for a wide variety of initiatives, including funding human resources needs such as instructional coaching, attendance or truancy interventions, wraparound services, and partnership coordinators. For example, the superintendent of Hurricanes noted how critical additional funds were to their turnaround work:

> *I am currently, as part of the 21H funds, which I'm sure you know are the Partnership funds that the schools apply for, for support for being a Partnership from the state. I was awarded funds based on our plan. In that, I created three positions that were a direct correlation to the issues that we identified in our plan. I created a position for a reading interventionist, a math interventionist and an attendance liaison.*

Funding and District Capacity *(continued)*

Here, the superintendent noted how the funds gave her/him the flexibility to take actions that **directly aligned** with meeting the goals in her/his Agreement. Similarly, other Partnership districts sought 21H funds, Regional Assistance Grant (RAG) funds from their ISDs, and additional grant sources, such as Title II finance opportunities, to help cover the costs of personnel and programs they felt were important to Partnership work. They used these funds to pay for critical turnaround initiatives, including professional development for teachers, tutoring programs, school culture and climate initiatives, and in some cases teacher incentives.

Importantly, the Partnership Model structure not only gave districts access to additional funds, but to the resources to help access them. For instance, the superintendent of Avalanche noted that MDE has helped them apply for additional financial resources, such as 21H funds, to aid with their work:

> *I would say as a result of the actual Partnership Agreement, we have taken advantage of a grant that was made available to us. My people here in the district have become better connected to some people at MDE… I don't know if that connection has helped us get additional resources or if it's just simply that connection has helped us become aware of additional resources that MDE has to offer.*

Not all superintendents, however, found this support to be sufficient. For example, the Islanders superintendent indicated that the funds were insufficient to finance long-term changes:

> *It's not enough. It's a drop in the bucket.[…] It's not enough. It's not enough. That's all. It's just there's not enough to do substantial change. $100,000 is nothing when you talking about doing programming. That's a year's programming. You talking about substantial growth for kids who have five to six years of deficit. It doesn't work that way.*

The size of the Partnership district may have contributed to the efficacy of new and available funds targeted for reform. In some cases, the leaders of smaller Partnership districts lamented that, explicitly due to their size, they had less access to funding to support their turnaround efforts. For example, the Senators superintendent said, *"when you're a small district and you just don't have the funding, I mean, there's no place for the money to come from. I did a lot of it myself, but I felt like the kids deserved it, so I didn't know what else to do."* The superintendent of Avalanche, a smaller district located in close proximity to a larger district, described a similar sentiment, saying:

> *It's sexy to give [neighboring large district] money. We've got a local attorney that is happy to donate [many] backpacks and supplies to [neighboring district] and when we reached out to him and said, 'Look. We don't need tens*

Funding and District Capacity *(continued)*

> *of thousands. Can you help us?' He said, 'No. We only do this for [neighboring district].' We almost, in a way – that adds another layer of complexity.*

On the other hand, it appeared that in some ways smaller districts benefited more from the 21H grants associated with the Partnership Model than did larger districts, primarily because the total dollars went farther when spread across fewer students and buildings. For instance, the superintendent of Flyers – a relatively small Partnership charter district – found the 21H funds be useful in their work:

> *I would say our primary resources are those that we've acquired through our 21H grant dollars that we've received in both Round 1 and Round 2. We've received grant dollars from MDE to support things like our directors of academics, their coaching work, to support the real-time coaching we're doing with, to support having expert-level content coaches come in to support our teachers, some of the work that our school social workers do. We've been able to execute some of the strategies because of funding that we've received through 21H.*

By contrast, the superintendent of Bruins – a larger Partnership district – noted that the funding was insufficient. When asked about the "bucket" of money provided by the state to support Partnership districts, he/she responded:

> *Do you see that box over there? The Kleenex box, yeah. Is that a bucket or a small box?... Spread out over [a large number of kids]? We've received a couple hundred thousand dollars of that. We appreciate that. There's some value to it. I'm not going to denigrate it. I'm simply going to say it's insufficient.*

These examples suggest that large and small districts have distinct advantages and disadvantages in the implementation of the Partnership Model, especially related to fiscal resources, that may merit consideration by district leaders and policymakers as they consider financing improvement efforts.

Overall, Partnership district leaders were grateful for the funding streams available from MDE, the ISDs, and other sources, and appreciated Partnership supports that helped them to access additional dollars. However, there was broad agreement that the available dollars were insufficient to fully enable them to implement their reform strategies. Smaller districts – which were often also charter schools and organizations (see page 83-87) – were better able to take advantage of the relatively sparse funding streams, as the same amount of money goes farther when spread over fewer buildings and people. However, smaller districts faced other disadvantages related to both funding and supports from community partners. As the state continues to implement the Partnership Model, it will be important to assess how associated funds are spent and how size and funding interact to enable districts to bridge to new and innovative interventions.

impressions of their work with their ISD in interviews. For instance, the superintendent of Blue Jackets said: *"There's been some support provided, again, through our ISD with – we have some instructional support coaches for two of our schools."* Flames' superintendent also indicated that the supports from their ISD provided positive, impactful supports, noting:

> *The pro part of that is they've been very supportive in providing professional development, even funding and some supplies and everything to our teachers and teaching staff and even to the administrators at the school to assist them throughout the process. They've had PDs [professional developments] on learning and for the principal and vice principals. It's really getting to those core issues that were lacking before. It's really helping them.*

In addition to professional development and instructional supports, some districts note that the ISD can provide data and intervention supports. The superintendent of Sabres explained some of the supports they receive, *"For the ISD, our primary individual is [name]. She/he is one of two members on our ISD's team that specifically work with Partnership schools. She/he's with us three days a week at the school and provides substantial support as far as the MTSS [multi-tiered support system] models and taking a look at data."*

Taken together, the generally positive results from state and ISD partners provided an important basis for implementation success. Considering the responses of superintendents and other leaders, this may be because the support provided was technical in nature and aligned with the improvement and implementation of instructional or behavioral systems. Next, this section reports on the roles of non-governmental community or stakeholder partners, which were substantially more varied than those of the MDE and ISD efforts.

THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL COMMUNITY AND STAKEHOLDER PARTNERS

PARTNERSHIP SCHOOLS AND DISTRICTS RECEIVED SOME SUPPORT FROM COMMUNITY PARTNERS, ALTHOUGH MUCH OF THIS EXISTED BEFORE THE INTERVENTION

Services provided by partners included providing supplies, tutoring services, after-school programs, monitoring and supporting truant students, mentoring, field experiences, and mental health services. For example, the Red Wings superintendent engaged with community organizations to provide mentoring, *"What we are working to do with [service organization] is have them assigned to a mentor. That mentor would come in every two weeks and work through different things with them and just talk to them and just work with them like that."*

Some districts found these community partners to be helpful in promoting programming and working with students in their schools, and particularly in their Partnership schools. For example, the superintendent of Penguins noted that, at one Partnership school, community organizations

helped provide substantial volunteer assistance. He said, "*I can tell you that the community at [area school] – that principal has got about 200 volunteers that work with them on a regular basis.*" The Blues superintendent also highlighted some of the benefits for their district, especially given the extensive educator turnover:

> *One example was the [youth organization]. They just recently got a 21st Century grant to help continue to fund that. Then another example was [media organization]. In their portion of their partnership, they committed to help tell the story, to support our students. We have a broadcast class. They send people over here. Their team, with all the technical expertise, works with the new teachers – with my teacher to help make sure that they can teach the students the broadcasting skills and knowledge that they need. That's extremely helpful because of the turnover that we have. It provides that more systematic support.*

On the other hand, the extent to which districts changed or improved their partnerships as a result of the Partnership Model is unclear. Just over half of the superintendents indicated that at least some partnerships existed before their Partnership Agreements or that they have not actively pursued new partnerships. This raises questions about whether districts see the partners as a key aspect of the Partnership Model and suggests that many superintendents may be only symbolically adopting this aspect of the reform. As the superintendent of Bruins put it, *"I didn't need a Partnership Agreement to tell me to partner. I had 200-plus partners before. I have 200-plus partners afterwards."* This refrain was consistent for many system leaders who had been in their role for more than two years and had established improvement plans and community relationships.

In some instances, Partnership Model-driven partnerships with community organizations came at a cost to districts' progress. We will return to this finding in our analysis of one case study (Whalers), where developing partnerships took the district's time away from other instructional improvement efforts.

COMMUNITY PARTNERS VARIED IN CAPACITY AND FOCUS TO SUPPORT PARTNERSHIP REFORM

Another challenge superintendents highlighted in attempting to "bridge" the work of partners with specific Partnership goals was misalignment between what partners were capable of doing and districts' own goals and priorities. The Blue Jackets superintendent explained:

> *I think one of the other challenges is that the work is sometimes different. The work that some of these agencies are doing is sometimes different from the work that we're doing as a K-12 system and trying to find ways that work aligns, so to speak, and ways that they can support what we're doing may be challenging at times.*

Similarly, the superintendent of Avalanche found that the services partners were willing to provide were not necessarily aligned with the district's needs:

> *There have been times – [organization] has been a partner with us for years but sometimes the way they get funding allocated is for certain things and if it doesn't align to our mission and the work we're doing to improve the education of our students, I'm not really interested in doing that just for the sake of having a partner.*

Several superintendents expressed that they were unclear how partners were intended to be used under the Partnership Model. The superintendent of Devils district shared, *"I am not entirely sure the purpose of the community partners"* and regarding the use of community partners the superintendent of Capitals district said, *"I don't get that part of it. I need to learn that. Somebody needs to help me understand. Beyond the Department of Ed, who are we partnering with?"* These comments indicate that some districts are likely not incorporating or minimally incorporating outside community partners to engage in their turnaround work and could benefit from greater support around creating effective community partnerships.

By contrast, support from educational partners (e.g., ISDs; MDE liaisons; Blueprint/MI Excel) was seen as much more helpful in terms of providing needed technical expertise. For example, several superintendents explained that Blueprint, a program offered by MDE to aid districts in building or revamping their organizational systems, helped them to develop systems to track and better use instructional and human resource data. In some cases, these systems were also discussed at the school level, as the ELA coach in Blues explained about the process of using Blueprint:

> *Yeah, so we do our [Blueprint] data meetings – they come in, and they help us with that whole system. We pull all of our information. We put it on MI Data. We get everything uploaded. This is behavior and academics again. Then they take us through the protocol. We answer a bunch of questions. We get stuff organized. Then when we come to our grade-level meetings or up here, content area meetings – they have all of the information in one spot. Now they can make goals for themselves to keep us on track to hit those Partnership Agreement goals. So, "Here we are now. Here's where we need to be."*

Similarly, several superintendents and charter leaders described being supported to be more data savvy, whether by partners such as MI Excel or Partnership liaisons from MDE.

SOME DISTRICTS USED PARTNERSHIPS TO ADDRESS ECONOMIC AND STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES BUT LACK OF FUNDING PRESENTED A CHALLENGE IN ACCESS AND CONTINUITY

Some superintendents have attempted to engage community partners to address structural challenges presented by poverty and trauma. In interviews with the leaders of Partnership districts, six indicated that they were seeking partners to try to provide wraparound services for students. In

Structural Challenges: Poverty and Trauma in Partnership Communities

The introduction to this report detailed the extent to which students attending Michigan's Partnership districts face concentrated disadvantage. They are more likely to be students of color and come from single-parent homes. On average, their household resources in terms of income and educational achievement are also much lower than the rest of Michigan. In interviews with Partnership district superintendents, it was evident that they are keenly aware of the issues their students face. When asked about the main challenges facing their districts, 67% identified exactly these structural concerns as the main issues facing their district – poverty, trauma, and community health – and linked them to challenges students face in learning and to difficulties district and school staff confront in serving the intellectual, physical, social, and emotional needs of their students. The superintendent of Blues district explained:

> *Our kids have a ton of trauma and toxic stress. This is what our kids – it's a bigger issue than school. Right? They struggle to sleep because they worry about their safety. When our kids leave at the end of the day, they say to each other, "Be safe." That's their goodbye is, "Be safe."*

Superintendents throughout our sample reported similar concerns, illustrating widespread recognition that students attending Partnership districts face a range of challenges in addition to, and intertwined with, their academic struggles.

Many superintendents connected structural issues to challenges they have faced in trying to turn around their districts, explaining that school and district improvement work was simply more difficult in their districts because teachers and leaders needed to address substantial student needs associated with poverty and trauma. The superintendent of Bruins indicated that some of their students need time to come in, decompress, and settle into their school day after traumatic nights at home, and that this requires the school to provide that time, space, and support. Similarly, the Red Wings superintendent found truancy to be a particularly salient issue for students who are dealing with poverty and trauma:

> *Our biggest issue – and it's probably an issue everywhere – is truancy. We have so many students who miss so many days of school. Really, for us, it's – our focus has really been on our younger students. The largest area of them missing is our kindergartners. They miss more school than any other class combined. I mean any other class I should say, not combined. We have a lotta young parents. We have a lot of poverty. We have a lot of homelessness. A lot of it has to do with that.*

Structural Challenges: Poverty and Trauma in Partnership Communities *(continued)*

Many of the leaders of Partnership districts noted that Michigan's system of education finance accentuates the dire consequences of poverty, claiming that Michigan does not provide adequate resources for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. On this subject, the superintendent of Bruins elaborated:

> *No schools are more profoundly underfunded than those that educate the most profoundly underexposed, those with the highest percentages of court children and English Language Learners and special-needs children and the like. You're talking not exclusively but predominantly urban school districts. [...] What the state does is it underfunds, on the one hand, children who are underfunded from jump when they begin their lives. It courses into schools, which are underfunded, and then the state consequences school districts for failures, which are far broader than those of individual schools or individual-school communities.*

While superintendents widely acknowledged the impact of poverty on student learning, some leaders rejected a fatalistic view that students' futures are determined by their environment. Moreover, superintendents acknowledge that the Partnership Model is in and of itself an attempt to situate school and district turnaround inside these challenging local contexts. For instance, the superintendent of Canadiens said:

> *The majority of conversation was more about what kids could not do because of the challenges of poverty. Those challenges are real, and they can't be ignored, but children still have a right to learn, and can still learn with the right kind of systems and processes and support...the difference [with Partnership reform is] a push, I think, from the new district administration to say, "We hear you. Yes, these are real challenges. We're not ignoring them, but we still have a responsibility to ensure children are learning at higher levels."*

Clearly, poverty and its contributors and correlates made it particularly difficult for educators in Partnership schools and districts to accomplish the hard work of turning around and improving student learning. Nonetheless, Partnership superintendents described a range of ways in which they worked to address structural challenges within their district. Two common approaches described were recruiting community partners to support students in specific areas and shoring up their financial situation by strategically using their existing funding streams and seeking out supplemental resources. In the coming years, we will continue to assess how structural challenges inherent in Partnership district communities impact the work of Partnership district leaders and educators and the outcomes of their students.

several districts, leadership brought community partners into their schools for the purpose of helping students to accommodate difficult out-of-school contexts. For example, Blues partnered with a local healthcare provider to have some of their employees work out of the district's Partnership schools, thus making their healthcare services more accessible to students.

Some districts also tried to work with community partners to connect Partnership district families with services for counseling, job searching, or similar support services. For example, the superintendent of Senators shared that, along with hosting a career fair, her/his district was working to provide supports to parents to help them access additional resources:

> *I believe one of the biggest things that I've changed is access to the resources in the school for the parents, letting them know that these things are available for them here, doing workshops for them, the increase in the technology for the student use and the platforms which they are able to use that have been implemented.*

Not only would such services help parents to access resources that might alleviate some of the poverty-related disadvantages families of Partnership students face, but they might also help involve parents in their students' schools and educations. Indeed, the superintendent of Senators viewed parental involvement as key to the district's turnaround work, and so felt that efforts to include parents in schools by bringing in partners to help parents in these ways was some of the most important work they were doing in relation to the Partnership reform.

Insufficient resources to fund partners' work often made bringing them in to work with families and students challenging. In some cases, partners had external grant funding available to support their work in partnership with schools and districts. In Blues, for instance, the local chapter of a youth organization secured a grant to provide after-school services to students. Occasionally, community partners helped districts raise funds to aid them in providing necessary student supports. For example, in Red Wings, the superintendent reported that a local civic organization conducted some fundraising on her/his behalf. However, several superintendents noted that it was challenging to sustain these enhanced partner-provided services. For instance, Blues' healthcare partner expressed uncertainty about its ability to continue staffing positions in the district's schools. In other cases, Partnership schools and districts were able to draw on teams of (free) volunteers from community partners to support certain initiatives such as tutoring or mentoring.

In short, while the superintendents of some Partnership districts were able to somewhat mitigate the impact of structural issues on their work to improve student outcomes, many nevertheless expressed that they struggled to provide the assistance and related resources necessary to support the specific needs of their students.

PRINCIPALS AND TEACHERS WERE NOT WELL AWARE OF COMMUNITY AND STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS

Surveys suggest a substantial lack of awareness about the receipt of support from various organizations – community, regional or state. In particular, high proportions (approximately one-third) of survey respondents chose not to respond to questions about the receipt of and quality of supports received from partners, and approximately 31% to 42% of the overall set of respondents reported that they "did not know" to questions about assistance from various groups. This reflects

a potential disconnect in that some partners (e.g. MDE or ISDs) may be working at the district rather than the school level and thus teachers and principals may have been less aware of partner involvement.

With that in mind, Figures 4.7.1 and 4.7.2 show principals' and teachers' reported receipt of support from various partners (response options were yes, no, and I don't know). Notably, the difference between Partnership and non-Partnership school principals' responses shows that Partnership schools did receive greater levels of support. The majority of Partnership school principals reported receiving support from community partners (93%), the superintendent or central office (87%), the RESA/ISD (84%), and from MDE (57%). Lower proportions reported receiving assistance from their school boards (38%) and teachers' unions (50%). As might be expected, Partnership school teachers were less likely to report receipt of supports from these organizations, likely because often teachers were simply unaware (a far greater proportion of teachers report that they didn't know if they received supports from various groups), which may itself be a response to strategic buffering from district and school leaders.

Figure 4.7.1. Principals Reported Receipt of Support from Various Partners



Note: Educators in charter districts were asked about assistance from their education service provider in lieu of their superintendent/ central office for this item.

Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

The quality of supports received from groups was reportedly not particularly different between Partnership and non-Partnership school principals. Partnership schools' principals described the assistance from MDE as of moderate quality, on average, with the RESA/ISD, superintendent/central office and school board slightly higher (between moderate and high quality, not shown).

Figure 4.7.2. Teachers Reported Receipt of Support from Various Partners



Note: Educators in charter districts were asked about assistance from their education service provider in lieu of their superintendent/central office for this item.

Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

Implementation Differences Between Charter and Traditional Schools

CHARTER SCHOOLS MORE LIKELY TO USE PARTNERSHIP MODEL TO BRIDGE TO NEW OPPORTUNITIES

A close look at Figure 4.1 shows that the majority of Partnership charter schools (seven of the nine Partnership charters) used the Partnership reform as an opportunity to bridge to new resources or strategies, and four charters fell exclusively into the "bridge" category.

It's unclear precisely why Partnership charters were more likely than Partnership traditional public school (TPS) districts to use the Partnership reform to facilitate changes and interventions that they believed would improve student outcomes. However, perhaps as a result of this embrace of the Partnership Model or potentially contributing to it, we found that educators in Partnership charter schools were more involved in developing their Partnership Agreements than were their TPS peers. Figure E1 shows that educators in Partnership charters were over four times as likely as TPS educators to report that they were involved in creating their Partnership Agreement

Implementation Differences Between Charter and Traditional Schools *(continued)*

(17.7% compared to 4.2%). This greater involvement was reflected in educators' understanding of the reform; compared to educators in Partnership schools operated by traditional public schools (TPS), educators in Partnership charters reported greater understanding of all elements of their Partnership Agreements. PSA educators also reported greater alignment between their Partnership Agreements and overall school improvement goals and plans (see Figures E2 and E3).

Figure E1. Educator Participation in Partnership Agreement Development in Charter and TPS Districts



Note: Educators were asked, "Were you involved in developing your school's Partnership Agreement?"

Figure E2. Educator Understanding of Partnership Agreement in Charter and TPS Districts



Note: Educators were asked, "How well do you understand the following aspects of your school's Partnership Agreement?"

Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

Implementation Differences Between Charter and Traditional Schools *(continued)*

Figure E3. Alignment Between Partnership Agreement and School Plan in Charter and TPS Partnership Schools



Note: Educators were asked to rate their level of agreement with the statement "My school improvement plan and Partnership Agreement identify similar..."
Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

Educators in Partnership charters also report greater confidence that their Partnership Agreement goals will lead to improved student outcomes, both in the current year (2018-19) and in the next three years (see top panel of Figure E4). This may again link back to the greater prevalence of bridging that occurred in Partnership charters relative to Partnership TPSs, or it may stem from the fact that the reform seemingly brought about a more noticeable increase in support and resources for charter schools than for TPS partnership educators.

Figure E4. Perceptions of Likely Outcomes Among Educators in Charter and TPS Partnership Schools



Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

Implementation Differences Between Charter and Traditional Schools *(continued)*

INCREASES IN FUNDING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ARE HELPFUL TO CHARTERS

One factor that may have helped Partnership charter schools use the reform to bridge to new programs and strategies is their relatively small size. In particular, the size of charters may have enabled their 21H funds to go farther, providing proportionally greater resources that could be used to implement Partnership-associated changes relative to TPS Partnership districts. Whereas superintendents of large districts said the funds were of limited use because of the large number of students they served, many charter leaders said these funds were very helpful. For example, the superintendent of Hurricanes (a Partnership charter school) used the 21H funds to hire personnel to help execute the plans set out in their Agreement:

> *I am currently, as part of the 21H funds, which I'm sure you know are the Partnership funds that the schools apply for, for support for being a Partnership from the state. I was awarded funds based on our plan. In that, I created three positions that were a direct correlation to the issues that we identified in our plan. I created a position for a reading interventionist, a math interventionist and an attendance liaison.*

Another difference between charter and TPS Partnership districts' experiences of the reform was in their access to partners. Prior to entering Partnership, these charters operated relatively independently of MDE and their ISDs, which is consistent with the vision of charters having greater autonomy than TPS districts. However, through the Partnership Model, charters, like all Partnership districts, receive a Partnership Liaison for support and to connect the district to state-level resources. In interviews, most of the leaders of charter Partnership districts welcomed assistance from their liaisons. Through the Partnership Model, charters also developed a greater relationship with their ISDs, which was often described as particularly helpful. Charter leaders reported that in the past, they would have been required to pay for services and support from their ISD. Under Partnership, the additional Regional Assistance Grant funding to ISDs to support their work with Partnership districts opened up new supports for charters. As the superintendent of Flames, one charter Partnership district, explained:

> *We've been able to see support from, especially [the] ISD that we haven't received before. I wish [we'd had] some of the support that we've been able to tap into through this process. If we had those kinds of supports before, I think we wouldn't have been in the bottom five [percent] in the first place. The pro part of that is [the ISD] has been very supportive in providing*

Implementation Differences Between Charter and Traditional Schools *(continued)*

> *professional development, even funding and some supplies and everything to our teachers and teaching staff and even to the administrators at the school to assist them throughout the process. They've had PDs [professional development sessions] on learning and for the principal and vice principals. It's really getting to those core issues that were lacking before. It's really helping them.*

ISD supports are viewed as having a meaningful, positive impact in charter Partnership schools and districts. However, charter Partnership schools appeared to experience greater challenges integrating community partners into their reform efforts; educators in Partnership charter schools were just over half as likely to report receiving assistance from community partners as were their TPS peers (30% vs. 54%). Further, these educators rated the assistance they did receive from community partners as slightly lower in quality. This suggests that charter schools have greater difficulty in tapping community resources in the manner envisioned by the Partnership Model's Theory of Change.

CHARTER EDUCATORS ARE MORE COGNIZANT OF THE POTENTIAL FOR HIGH-STAKES ACCOUNTABILITY

Notably, charter educators also believed that there were greater consequences for failure than did their colleagues in TPS Partnership schools. Figure E4 shows that charter educators believed that failure to achieve their Partnership Agreement goals will lead to consequences for their schools, and in particular, to a low accountability rating for their school, staff dismissal, and school closure. Although we can only speculate as to why this is, it may result from the increased understanding of the reform itself (as discussed above) or from the simple fact that charter educators may believe it is more likely any failure – whether as part of Partnership or not – will lead to consequences.

In all, the Partnership Model seems to have played out somewhat differently in charter relative to TPS Partnership schools and districts. However, it is difficult to disentangle any differences between charter and traditional public schools from differences that might occur between rounds of identification (see the discussion of variation across rounds of Partnership identification on pages 56-58 of this report), as over two-thirds of Partnership charter schools were identified in Round 3, and nearly one-third of Round 3-identified schools are charter schools (compared to only three percent in Round 1 and 13% in Round 2). Given the interesting trends noted here, and the conflation between governance model and round identification, it will be important to continue to track heterogeneous implementation across both rounds and school governance models.

SUMMARY

Altogether, we found that the Partnership Model of school and district turnaround is playing out only somewhat as intended. While Partnership Agreements were intended to guide and shape the work of Partnership schools and districts, these planning documents are of only middling quality and educators are often only moderately aware of them, of the improvement goals and strategies intended to direct their work, and of the processes put into place to help them improve their schools and districts. Similarly, partners are being accessed and utilized to varying degrees across the Partnership districts and schools – some to greater success (e.g., MDE, ISDs) than others, and with more or less of a marked difference relative to pre-reform operations. This kind of variation across districts is not particularly surprising given the importance of local context in turnaround reforms. Moreover, given that we predominantly focused on the first year of reform implementation, it may be too soon to tell how the reform is being implemented overall. In the section that follows, this report examines the early outcomes associated with the Partnership Model.

SECTION FOUR – NOTES

[1] Section Seven, turns to our three case study sites to give a deeper sense of how these organizations are responding to Partnership reform.

[2] We received permission to identify this district in order to help explain the results of our impact analyses, discussed more in Section Five.

5

Partnership Turnaround Report:
SECTION FIVE

CHANGES TO EDUCATION IN PARTNERSHIP SCHOOLS

EPIC
Education Policy
Innovation Collaborative
RESEARCH WITH CONSEQUENCE

Section Five:
CHANGES TO EDUCATION IN PARTNERSHIP SCHOOLS

At its core, the Partnership Model is intended to improve educational opportunity for students in Michigan's lowest-performing schools. There is no single, best way to measure school quality, but the Theory of Change (ToC) behind Partnership implies that, as districts and schools develop their operational and instructional capacity, including by improving human capital management practices, they will see measurable improvements not only in students' test scores, but also other indicators of both teacher quality and student success. This section continues to trace the ToC from top to bottom, first assessing the near- and intermediate-term outcomes associated with the reform, and finally moving to the long-term outcomes that can be measured this early in the evaluation time period. This section first focuses on educator perspectives of the Partnership Model, and then considers teacher staffing changes and, ultimately, student outcomes.

EDUCATORS' PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL QUALITY AND PARTNERSHIP IMPLEMENTATION

Inherent in our method of study is the belief that educator perspectives are central to understanding reform implementation and outcomes. How teachers perceive the effectiveness of their own school surroundings is an important indicator of how well schools are functioning. Teachers are also, to a very

real extent, the **"first responders"** in educational improvement. How educators perceive reform to occur – how affected their work is in the first place – is a measure of the reform implementation itself. Partnership principals and superintendents are also well-positioned to provide school and district-wide assessments of outcomes and performance. Through the teacher and principal surveys and the superintendent interviews described in the Data and Methods section, we collected a number of key indicators of how Partnership educators gauge not only what Partnership has affected, but how well Partnership schools and districts were working in the first place.

ARE DISTRICTS AND SCHOOLS IMPROVING THEIR CAPACITY AND CORE FUNCTIONS?

As is shown in the ToC, the Partnership Model is intended to improve district systems and core functions as well as to improve the operations of the school instructional core. One clear indication of how well a reform is working is to simply ask these educators how they believe their schools and districts are faring before and after the reform. Given that this is the first year during which educator perspectives have been systematically captured, we view these results as revealing how educators perceive their schools and districts to be faring after the first year of reform implementation (Round 1) or the identification year (Rounds 2 and 3). We cannot ascertain growth or improvements over time. Rather, these results provide a baseline from which we will assess future-year outcomes.

HOW TEACHERS PERCEIVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR SCHOOL SURROUNDINGS IS AN IMPORTANT INDICATOR OF HOW WELL SCHOOLS ARE FUNCTIONING.

Educators give their schools middling grades, with non-Partnership school educators rating their schools and districts slightly higher than educators in Partnership schools.

As shown in Figure 5.1, principals in both Partnership and non-Partnership schools give their schools overall, and on most subareas, between a B and a C grade, with principals in non-Partnership schools grading their schools slightly higher, on average, than their colleagues in Partnership schools. Principals on the whole believe that their schools do best in terms of collaboration within their schools, management of financial resources, and staff and teacher retention. Teachers rate their schools highest on a slightly different set of elements: teacher attendance, access to technology, and student enrollment. Overall, principals and teachers alike give their schools the lowest grades on the availability and reliance on substitute teachers, academic achievement, their ability to support all student subgroups, and literacy practice and instruction (principals).

These ratings are also reflected in overall job satisfaction indicators. Both principals and teachers reported modest satisfaction with their jobs, with non-Partnership teachers (3.4 out of 5) rating their jobs slightly higher than Partnership teachers (3.3 out of 5), and non-Partnership principals (3.7) rating their jobs slightly higher than Partnership principals (3.5 out of 5, not shown).

Figure 5.1. Educator's Grades for Their School Activities, by Partnership Status and Position Type



Note: Educators were asked to rate how well their school was implementing activities in selected areas.
Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

Partnership schools and districts give higher ratings on professional development for teachers than do teachers in non-Partnership schools.

There are differences in how Partnership and non-Partnership school educators view their schools and districts. In particular, Partnership school teachers rate their principals as more effective in their facilitation and encouragement of professional development activities for teachers, and in their principals' communication of improvement strategies (not shown). Moreover, Partnership school teachers and principals rate their schools relatively high on the provision of professional development and supports for teachers, whereas this does not fall into the highest grades for non-Partnership school teachers and principals (not shown).

The focus of schools in Partnership districts may be shifting to improve instructional and behavioral systems and operations, but changes are not (yet) widespread.

Although these "grades" give a clear sense of how educators perceive the core functioning of their schools and districts overall and in specific areas, we would like a better sense of whether educators perceive that their schools and districts are improving. To assess this in the first year of the evaluation, we asked principals and teachers to compare their schools' focus in the 2018-19 school year to the schools' focus in the previous year (2017-18).[1]

EPIC survey results suggest that, in general, principals and teachers in Partnership districts do not perceive substantial shifts in focus over the past year. Notably, Figures 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 show that all four groups of educators report that one of the greatest relative shifts in focus is in instruction driven by student achievement data. Reinforcing the point made above, Partnership principals and teachers also report relative increases in focus on teacher professional development programs. There is some mismatch between where principals and teachers believe there to be increasing levels of focus: Partnership principals report providing increased attention to behavioral interventions such as PBIS (positive behavior interventions and supports), restorative justice and suspension reductions, attendance interventions, and school culture and climate; whereas Partnership teachers report increased attention to curriculum and instruction, assessments, and teacher evaluations. Similarly, non-Partnership principals perceived different areas of increased focus from non-Partnership teachers.

For the most part, there are few significant differences between the areas of focus, educators reported in Partnership schools and those in non-Partnership schools. However, Partnership school principals do report a greater increase in focus on family and community engagement strategies, attendance interventions, and teacher dismissal.

Principals in both Partnership and non-Partnership schools consistently report greater shifts in attention and focus than do teachers in these schools. This may have occurred because the changes in district systems that were intended to help schools accomplish the goals established in their Partnership Agreement was potentially less visible to teachers than to principals, sometimes intentionally so. Principals were simply closer to implementing the systems associated with the Partnership work. For instance, when discussing the revision of district human resources systems intended to help recruit and retain teachers through MI Excel the superintendent of Blues explained:

Figure 5.2.1. Teachers' Reported of Their School's Change in Focus Over Time by Role and Partnership Status



Notes: Educators were asked, "Comparing this year to the 2017-2018 school year, to what extent has your school's focus changed in the following areas?" Only educators who indicated earlier in the survey that they had worked in their current school the previous year were asked to respond to this question.

Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

Figure 5.2.2. Principals' Reported of Their School's Change in Focus Over Time by Role and Partnership Status

Notes: Educators were asked, "Comparing this year to the 2017-2018 school year, to what extent has your school's focus changed in the following areas?" Only educators who indicated earlier in the survey that they had worked in their current school the previous year were asked to respond to this question.

Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

I'm not sure how many [teachers] will know the detail of it because they're trying to survive in their world. I think that's my job and it's to keep track of the big picture, where we are going, what has to happen next, how do we know if we're getting there and then just trying to phase out okay, this is our next step.

In this sense, the perception of greater shifts in attention and focus may be larger at the level of school or district administration because principals and superintendents are working on these systems and being deliberate about what to communicate to teachers and what to involve them in (or not). This finding echoes what was reported in Section Four; while a little over half of Partnership superintendents were using the reform as an opportunity to "bridge" and advance change in alignment with Partnership goals, some were confused (e.g. how to create effective partnerships), overwhelmed when it came to implementation, or dismissive of the potential for Partnership to facilitate the changes needed in their districts. These superintendents responded by creating only symbolic change or even "buffering" others from the demands of the reform so they could focus on their own goals and agendas.

PARTNERSHIP SUPERINTENDENTS WERE USING THEIR PARTNERSHIP STATUS TO MOTIVATE EDUCATORS, COMMUNICATING A SENSE OF URGENCY AROUND ACADEMIC EXPECTATIONS.

Some perceive that schools are changing for the better in the past year, especially in Partnership schools, though principals are more optimistic than teachers.

We asked principals and teachers about specific changes in their schools since the past school year (2017-18). On average, there were no areas in which principals in either Partnership or non-Partnership schools reported functions changing for the worse in the past year, and overall, and in several specific areas, principals report incremental changes for the better. Moreover, as is shown in Figure 5.3, in several areas, principals in Partnership schools perceive greater improvements than do principals in non-Partnership schools. For teachers, there is a continued pattern that they are more negative than their principals about possible improvements in both Partnership and non-Partnership schools. For the most part, they report virtually no changes since the past year, and in some cases report changes for the worse (mostly in Partnership schools). However, in a few areas Partnership teachers report positive, statistically significant changes relative to non-Partnership teachers. In particular, Partnership teachers highlighted increasing quality of professional development, facilities, academic expectations for students, and a focus on student learning.

Why might teachers and principals in Partnership schools experience improvements in school and district functioning in these areas? One potential explanation is because Partnership superintendents were using their Partnership status to motivate educators, communicating a sense of urgency around academic expectations and student learning to principals and teachers as a result of being identified as a Partnership school. Several superintendents noted that the Partnership label helped them do this. For example, Dr. Vitti, Superintendent of Detroit Public Schools Community District, said:

Having come in knowing that these were the lowest performing schools, I've been able to, more over the last couple of years, use the Partnership Agreement as a lever to get a

Figure 5.3. Educators' Reported Changes in School Features by Role and Partnership Status



Notes: Educators were asked, "To what extent have the following features of your school changed since last school year (2017-2018)?" Only teachers who indicated earlier in the survey that they had worked in their current school the previous year were asked to respond to this question.

Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

greater sense of urgency among the principal and teachers to say, "We have to do things differently here. Why? Because we're a Partnership school."

While this helped superintendents accomplish their goals, the increased urgency was also difficult for teachers in some districts. For instance, as we explain in the case study analysis in Section Seven, teachers were overwhelmed especially in light of issues with staffing that made managing these changes even more difficult.

Partnership educators report that they need more assistance to improve their schools and districts.

Educators can speak to areas not only where reform has and hasn't worked, but where continued change is necessary. Partnership is multi-staged and multi-year, and no sustained improvements can be made overnight. Teachers and principals in particular can help identify where the specific points of growth remain.

To begin to assess where educators believe their schools and districts need continued improvement, we asked teachers and principals about areas in which they believe their districts (principals) and schools (teachers) would benefit from increased assistance. Figure 5.4.1 presents responses from teachers and principals from Partnership and non-Partnership schools.

The first important takeaway from Figure 5.4.1 is that teachers in Partnership schools consistently report that their schools would benefit from increased assistance in every area relative to teachers in non-Partnership schools. In particular, they state that their schools would benefit significantly or immensely (rated four or higher out of five on the Likert scale, which is used to measure survey respondents' attitudes) from assistance in the following categories: pay incentives for teachers, school culture and climate, opportunities for teachers to meet and work together, socio-emotional outcomes for students, academic improvement for students on the cusp of state test levels and for special populations, behavioral interventions, family and community engagement, and attendance interventions. By contrast, teachers in non-Partnership schools reported far fewer areas of great need of assistance: pay incentives for teachers, opportunities for teachers to meet and work together, school culture and climate, and socio-emotional outcomes for students. This comparison between teachers in Partnership and non-Partnership schools sheds light on the differential working conditions and perceptions of a dire situation in these schools, even as they are in the same Partnership districts.

Partnership principals, as well, listed far more areas of great need than did non-Partnership principals, and in many of the same areas as their teachers. Indeed, there are only few instances in which principals and teachers in Partnership schools report statistically significant differences in their assessments. As is clear from Figure 5.4.2, Partnership principals report that they would, on average, significantly or immensely benefit from increased assistance in the following areas: academic improvements for special populations and for students on the cusp of state test levels, attendance interventions, instruction driven by student data, behavioral interventions, school culture and climate, socio-emotional outcomes, pay incentives for teachers, family and community engagement strategies, and opportunities for teachers to meet and work together.

Figure 5.4.1. Teachers' Perceptions of Where Assistance is Needed by Role and Partnership Status



Notes: Educators were asked, "To what extent do you believe that your school would benefit from increased assistance in the following areas?"

Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

Figure 5.4.2. Pincipals' Perceptions of Where Assistance is Needed by Role and Partnership Status



Notes: Educators were asked, "To what extent do you believe that your school would benefit from increased assistance in the following areas?"

Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

Interestingly, while non-Partnership school principals reported that they most need assistance with pay incentives for teachers and administrators (ranked first and second in Figure 5.4.2), these are only ninth and fifteenth for Partnership principals. However, superintendents said that teacher salaries were a crucial factor impacting districts' ability to recruit and retain educators so that they could meet Partnership goals. Section Six examines this issue in greater depth.

PARTNERSHIP IMPACTS ON TEACHER STAFFING AND RETENTION

Other outcomes relating to Partnership school improvement can be those that parents, policymakers, and other stakeholders may point to in assessing educational success. For example, the Parent Dashboard for School Transparency, a data tool that displays a range of statistics for all of Michigan's schools and has been cited as important to parents and other stakeholders, contains a number of staff-related outcomes that together point to schools' ability to attract and retain educators. Through a combination of both our teacher and principal surveys, as well as the administrative records from the state's Registry of Educational Personnel (REP), we are able to consider the extent to which Partnership has affected these school staffing measures. Our analysis indicates several major patterns associated with Partnership identification and implementation, and except where explicitly noted as a survey result, our analysis was based on the event study methods described in Section Two. For this report, the timeline Figure 1.1 in Section One defined the identification year as 2016-17 for Round 1, and define the implementation year as 2017-18. We defined teacher transfers, exits, and evaluation ratings as occurring after each year, and the share of new teachers starting during that year. Due to data availability, results from the MDE and CEPI administrative data are for Round 1 only, with Rounds 2 and 3 results from those data to be included in future reports.

PARTNERSHIP DECREASED TEACHER EXITS

We considered three types of teacher mobility: exit from the state's data system (our best proxy for exit from public school teaching), transfer between schools in the same district, and transfer out of the district to other teaching jobs. Rows A and D of Table 5.1 indicate that, in general, entering Partnership in Round 1 decreased the probability that teachers exited the profession after either identification or after the first implementation year relative to teachers in Priority schools. This is particularly true for early career teachers (those with one to five years of experience).

This section provides statewide results and, separately, results for Detroit Public Schools Community District (DPSCD) due to the disproportionate number of Partnership schools located within DPSCD. DPSCD patterns are similar to the statewide patterns: teachers, especially early career teachers, are less likely to exit teaching or transfer to another district after entering Partnership thus far.

PARTNERSHIP IMPLEMENTATION GENERALLY INCREASED THE PROBABILITY THAT A TEACHER WAS NEW

Rows H and I in Table 5.1 indicate that most estimates of the effect of Partnership implementation on the probability that a teacher in a particular school was new are positive relative to Priority schools.

This is our best estimate of effects of Partnership implementation on district hiring, and shows that district hiring may have increased even though teachers were exiting at lower rates.

PARTNERSHIP DID NOT CHANGE THE FREQUENCY OF LOW TEACHER EVALUATION SCORES

Teacher retention is also related to teachers' job performance. Michigan law requires all districts to evaluate teacher performance and to provide summary results of that rating using one of four categories: ineffective, minimally effective, effective, or highly effective. Employment decisions including retention and dismissal must take these ratings into account. It is possible that due to pressure to improve student outcomes tied to the Partnership Agreements, districts increased the use of these ratings to identify particularly ineffective teachers. Although Table 1.5 in Section One indicated that in general Partnership schools have somewhat higher rates of "below effective" (i.e. ineffective or minimally effective), Row G in Table 5.1 shows Partnership did not result in a change in the likelihood that teachers received low evaluation scores. This is important because teachers rated below effective are more likely to leave their schools.[2]

TABLE 5.1. Partnership Effects on Teacher Outcomes, Round 1

	Round 1 Partnership Schools Compared to Priority Schools			DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools Compared to DPSCD Priority Schools		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Identification (2016-2017)	Implementation (2017-2018)	Implementation v. Identification	Identification (2016-2017)	Implementation (2017-2018)	Implementation v. Identification
A. Probability of leaving teaching (all teachers)	-0.04** (0.01)	-0.04** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.03+ (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
B. Probability of out-of-district transfer (all teachers)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
C. Probability of within-district transfer (all teachers)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02+ (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
D. Probability of leaving teaching (1st-5th yr. teachers)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.10* (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
E. Probability of out-of-district transfer (1st-5th yr. teachers)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
F. Probability of within-district transfer (1st-5th yr. teachers)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
G. Probability of low effectiveness rating (all teachers)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
H. Probability of being new to the school (all teachers)	0.02 (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.10* (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)
I. Probability of being new to the district (all teachers)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)

*p<.10 +, p<.05 *, p<.01 **, p<.001 ****

Note: Cells show estimated changes in the probability of each type of outcome, with standard errors in parentheses. Full models include the covariates described in Section Four. Models contain year indicators, year x treatment indicators, teacher characteristics (race, gender, years of experience, education level), school-level student demographics, and school fixed effects with robust standard errors clustered by school. See Appendix 4 for full model results and additional robustness checks and sample restrictions.

Source: Author calculations using data retrieved from the Michigan Department of Education and the Center for Educational Performance and Information.

SURVEY RESULTS SUGGEST THAT WHILE STAFFING REMAINS A CONCERN IN PARTNERSHIP DISTRICTS, EDUCATORS REPORT IMPROVEMENTS IN RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION IN PARTNERSHIP SCHOOLS AND DISTRICTS

As shown in Figure 5.5, Partnership principals did not report substantial difficulties recruiting and hiring teachers to their districts in the 2018-19 school year, and believed that recruiting and hiring teachers has gotten easier since 2017-18 – consistent with the results in Rows A, B, and C of Table 5.1. In 2017-18, principals in both Partnership and non-Partnership schools reported "moderate difficulty" with recruitment and hiring in their district (4.2/5 and 4.1/5), whereas in 2018-19, they reported only "some difficulty" (3.4/5 and 3.2/5, respectively). Similarly, principals in both Partnership and non-Partnership schools report that their schools had fewer challenges recruiting and hiring teachers in 2018-19 relative to 2017-18, although in this instance we saw that Partnership principals reported greater difficulty in both years than did non-Partnership principals.

Figure 5.5. Principals' Reports of Hiring Difficulty



Note: Principals were asked, "To what extent did your school and district experience difficulties in recruiting and hiring teachers this year (last year)?"

Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPALS STILL NOTE SEVERAL CHALLENGES TO THEIR ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY RECRUIT AND HIRE TEACHERS

Although Partnership and non-Partnership principals relay that teacher recruitment and retention was getting easier over time, they still reported that many factors negatively impact their ability to recruit and hire teachers to their schools, and these challenges may still be greater than in non-Partnership schools even in the same districts. Figure 5.6 shows that both sets of principals describe hiring competition from nearby districts, teacher salaries, and the socio-economic status of the surrounding community as negatively impacting their ability to recruit and hire teachers. Partnership school principals believed that many factors more negatively affect their staffing prospects than do

non-Partnership principals, including student attendance, the school/district's Partnership status, and students' academic performance. Indeed, the only factor that principals – in both Partnership and non-Partnership schools – believed at least somewhat positively impacted their recruitment and hiring of new teachers was their ability to offer professional development and support. This last point was particularly notable since, as discussed in Section Four, principals and teachers in Partnership districts reported an increased focus on professional development activities since the inception of the reform.

Figure 5.6. To What Extent Do the Following Factors Affect Your Ability to Recruit and Hire Teachers in Your School?



Note: Principals were asked, "To what extent do the following factors affect your ability to recruit and hire teachers in your school?" No non-Partnership principals are in charter schools in our sample of survey respondents.

Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPALS REPORT INTENDING TO STAY IN THEIR SAME POSITIONS IN 2019-20

It is also important to assess teachers' and principals' intentions to remain in or exit their schools and districts in the 2019-20 school year. Because, at the time of this report we did not have teacher placement data for the 2019-20 school year, we asked Partnership teachers and principals (both in Partnership schools and in non-Partnership schools) about their intent to remain in their school or district in the following school year. Because these questions were asked in fall/winter 2018, we cannot yet assess the extent to which teachers' reported intentions match their actions in the following school year. However, survey results suggested two main patterns of note with regards to teachers' and principals' intentions for 2019-20: as shown in Figure 5.7.1 and 5.7.2, over 80% of Partnership district principals report that they intend to stay in their same positions in the next year (2019-20). Only three percent of non-Partnership school principals and no Partnership school principals reported that they intend to move to a different district, with five percent and two percent of non-Partnership and Partnership school principals, respectively, stating that they intend to leave education altogether for reasons other than retirement.



Figure 5.7.1. Partnership School Principal Plans for Next School Year

Same position, same school	86%
Different position, same school	6%
Different school	3%
Different district	0%
Leave education	2%
Retire	3%

Figure 5.7.2. Non-Partnership School Principal Plans for Next School Year

Same position, same school	84%
Different position, same school	0%
Different school	3%
Different district	3%
Leave education	5%
Retire	5%



Note: Educators were asked, "Which of the following best describes your plans for next school year?"
Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

FEWER TEACHERS IN PARTNERSHIP DISTRICTS REPORT INTENDING TO STAY IN SAME POSITIONS IN 2019-20, AND THIS IS PARTICULARLY THE CASE FOR TEACHERS IN PARTNERSHIP SCHOOLS

Figures 5.8.1 and 5.8.2 show that, relative to principals, a far lower number of Partnership teachers intend to remain in their positions next year. This is especially the case for Partnership school teachers. Only 60% of Partnership school teachers reported that they intend to stay in the same school in the following year, with another 7% saying that they intend to stay in the same school but in a different position. In comparison, 69% of non-Partnership school teachers reported that they intended to stay in their same position, with five percent reporting that they intended to stay in the same school but in a different position. Partnership school teachers are more likely to report that they will leave their schools but stay in the same district than are non-Partnership school teachers (12% relative to five percent, respectively), whereas non-Partnership school teachers are more likely to report intending to leave the district for another district (11% relative to eight percent). There are no statistically significant differences in reported intentions to remain or exit their districts across rounds of Partnership identification.



Figure 5.8.1. Partnership School Teacher Plans for Next School Year

Same position, same school	60%
Different position, same school	7%
Different school	12%
Different district	8%
Leave education	7%
Retire	6%

Figure 5.8.2. Non-Partnership School Teacher Plans for Next School Year

Same position, same school	69%
Different position, same school	5%
Different school	5%
Different district	11%
Leave education	5%
Retire	5%



Note: Educators were asked, "Which of the following best describes your plans for next school year?"
Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

PARTNERSHIP IMPACTS ON STUDENT OUTCOMES

Finally, this section turns to Partnership impacts on student outcomes. Ultimately, Partnership schools were identified based on years of sustained student achievement far below the rest of the state. Each Partnership Agreement included district and school commitments to improved achievement, and in Michigan, the M-STEP remains the primary accountability exam used to assess individual student, school, and district progress. But there are a number of ways to measure student achievement – the Parent Dashboard includes graduation, test scores, and retention among them. Because of this, we considered Partnership impacts on M-STEP and other measures of student success.

Our analysis is based on the event study methods described in Section Two.

PARTNERSHIP HAD LITTLE OVERALL EFFECT ON M-STEP, BUT STUDENTS DID GAIN IN THE IMPLEMENTATION YEAR, ESPECIALLY IN DPSCD

The coefficient in Row A, Columns 1 to 6 in Table 5.2 provides estimates of Round 1 Partnership impact on growth in math M-STEP standard deviations.[3] It provides statewide results (Columns 1 to 3) and, separately, results for Detroit Public Schools Community District (DPSCD) (Columns 4 to 6) due to the disproportionate number of Partnership schools located within DPSCD. The numbers in Table 5.2 are regression coefficients calculated by estimating the model outlined in Equation 1 in Section Two, with full results provided in Appendix 5. It provides comparisons between the identification year (2016-17) and the implementation year (2017-18) for Round 1 relative to the last pre-Partnership year (2015-16) as well as comparisons between the implementation and identification years. Table 5.2 indicates that neither identification nor implementation effects exceeded pre-Partnership gains statewide, although there were positive gains (0.09 standard deviations) between the identification and implementation years – largely because there was a (statistically insignificant) drop in math scores due to identification that students more than made up for once Partnership was actually implemented. Moreover, in DPSCD, while students also dropped in math M-STEP in the identification year, the implementation gain of 0.14 standard deviations relative to the last pre-Partnership year was substantial.

With analyses like these, researchers often worry that other factors are occurring at the same time as a particular reform, and that the results we observed are driven by those factors instead of the reform we are considering. In this case, for example, 2017-2018 also coincides with the arrival of Dr. Nikolai Vitti as the Superintendent, so a comparison of DPSCD schools to other schools in the state could be affected by other changes the new superintendent made. However, focusing on the within-DPSCD results allows us to hold constant district-wide reforms, and instead estimate differences due specifically to Partnership.

The estimates in Row B in Table 5.2 show a similar story in ELA as in math. There was a large drop in test scores in the identification year relative to 2015-16, followed by a substantial rebound in the implementation year. In the full sample, students grew 0.10 standard deviations between the

identification and implementation years, and in DPSCD that growth was even larger (0.16). A recent (2014) study of the effect of school closures in Michigan between 2006 and 2009 found negative effects of roughly -0.06 and -0.07 of closure on the math achievement scores of students who had to be moved to a new school because their schools closed. Those negative impacts were present in both the year of and year after closure. Thus, based on the benchmark of earlier, negative impacts of closure in Michigan, the results seen after year 1 in Partnership – especially in Detroit – appear substantial and positive relative to a potential alternative. That study did not, however, find negative impacts in later years or in ELA.[4]

PARTNERSHIP HAD NO EFFECT ON SAT SCORES, ON-TIME HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION OR DROP-OUT RATES OVERALL BUT DID DECREASE DROP-OUT RATES IN DPSCD

Other student outcomes apart from M-STEP results are in Rows C through G in Table 5.2. It focuses here on the SAT, on-time graduation, and high school dropout. In general, Partnership had no impact on school-level SAT scores, graduation rates, or drop-out rates statewide. However, Partnership identification and implementation did appear to decrease drop-out rates in schools within DPSCD.

TABLE 5.2. Partnership Effects on Student Outcomes

	Round 1 Partnership Schools Compared to Priority Schools			DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools Compared to DPSCD Priority Schools		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Identification (2016-2017)	Implementation (2017-2018)	Implementation v. Identification	Identification (2016-2017)	Implementation (2017-2018)	Implementation v. Identification
A. Math 3-8 Achievement (Gains)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.09+ (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.14+ (0.08)	0.20* (0.08)
B. ELA 3-8 Achievement (Gains)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	-0.10+ (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.16** (0.06)
C. Math SAT Scores	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.08)	0.07 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.07)
D. ELA SAT Scores	0.04 (0.05)	0.10+ (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.03 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)
E. On-Time High School Graduation	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.06 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
F. High School Dropout Rates	0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.09* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)
G. Grade Retention	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
H. Within-District Transfer	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.02)
I. Out-of-District Transfer	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)

*p<.10 +, p<.05 *, p<.01 **, p<.001 ****

Note: Full models include the covariates described in Section Four. Models contain year indicators, year x treatment indicators, time variant student characteristics (economic disadvantage status, disability status, English learner status, grade level), school-level student demographics, and student fixed effects with robust standard errors clustered by school. See Appendix 3 for full model results and additional robustness checks and sample restrictions.

Source: Author calculations using data retrieved from the Michigan Department of Education and the Center for Educational Performance and Information.

In future years, we will be able to estimate Partnership effects on the probability that students enrolled in a two- or four-year college. Researchers often also consider student absenteeism/attendance as an important academic outcome beyond testing, and these measures are a prominent part of Michigan's Parent Dashboard for School Transparency. However, for this current report we cannot provide estimates of Partnership impacts on absenteeism/attendance because of changes in how these outcomes are measured by the state beginning in 2017-18, which corresponds to the first Partnership year.[5]

Figure 5.9. Effect Size Interpretation



To interpret how "large" an effect size is, we drew on Kraft's (2018) schema of suggested effect size interpretations. In this framework, effect sizes with an absolute value between 0 and .05 are considered "small" while effect sizes with absolute values of .05 up to .2 and .2 or greater are considered "medium" and "large," respectively.

This graphic displays the magnitude and statistical significance in both ELA and math one year after implementation for five different interventions that could be considered as alternatives to the Partnership Model. For instance, a study of school closure in Michigan found a medium, negative effect on student achievement in ELA, though the estimated effect was not statistically significant.

This graphic can be used to interpret the estimated effect sizes displayed in Table 5.2.

PARTNERSHIP HAD NO EFFECT ON RETENTION OR WITHIN-DISTRICT TRANSFER STATEWIDE; IN DETROIT, PARTNERSHIP INCREASED THE RATE OF STUDENTS EXITING THE DISTRICT

Rows H and I of Table 5.2 reports estimates of the Partnership impact on the probability that students were retained or transfered between schools or districts. Overall, there were no effects on within-district transfer, or on grade retention, whether considering students in our full sample or in Detroit specifically. There was no overall effect on the probability students transferred out of Partnership districts. However, relative to students in Priority schools (the main comparison group for Equation 1), Partnership appears to have increased the probability that Detroit students left the district by about 0.04 in the identification year and 0.07 in the implementation year. The positive effect on M-STEP of Round 1 for Detroit does not appear to be driven by disproportionate exit of lower scoring students from Detroit Partnership schools.[6]

SUMMARY OF FIRST-YEAR PARTNERSHIP IMPACTS STATEWIDE AND DPSCD

This section has described early changes that appear to have occurred in Partnership districts. In general, there are signs that the reform has modestly improved education in these districts, although challenges remain. Survey data indicated that some perceived that schools are changing for the better over the prior year, especially in Partnership schools, though principals are more optimistic than teachers. The focus of schools in Partnership districts may be shifting to improve instructional and behavioral systems and operations, but changes are not (yet) widespread. Partnership schools and districts appeared to be focusing on professional development for teachers, although it is not clear whether Partnership itself increased those efforts.

The administrative data from CEPI indicated that Partnership decreased teacher exits, especially for early career teachers. Partnership identification generally increased the rate of new teachers in districts, which may indicate new initial success in hiring. Finally, Partnership identification may have led to a drop in M-STEP math and ELA scores initially, followed by substantial and positive recovery of test scores in the implementation year, relative to Priority schools. Partnership had no effect on student retention or within-district transfer, but in Detroit, Partnership increased the rate of students exiting the district. Because those transfers were disproportionately among the district's higher scoring students, the positive M-STEP results are more likely due to meaningful improvements by the students who stayed, rather than an exodus of lower-scoring students. Finally, the Partnership Model reduced drop-out rates in DPSCD in both the identification and implementation years of Round 1.

A Closer Look at the Detroit Results: An Interview with Dr. Vitti

Due to the large number of Partnership schools in the Detroit Public School Community District (DPSCD), we calculated Partnership impacts on teachers and students both statewide and, separately, for DPSCD. That analysis indicated that, at least in the first year following reform, the Partnership's positive impacts after the first year of implementation were strongest and most consistent in DPSCD. To gain insight into what specific efforts Partnership entailed in DPSCD, and in part to provide additional confirmation that the results described above were specific to DPSCD's Partnership efforts, we interviewed the district's superintendent, Dr. Nikolai Vitti, who assumed his leadership of the district in the same year as the first round of Partnership implementation.[7] In particular, we requested his perspective on any changes occurring in 2017-2018 that might have contributed to the positive impacts of Partnership on DPSCD Partnership schools relative to other low-performing (priority) schools within DPSCD, and on the extent to which the Partnership Model was helpful in achieving these results. A single interview is incomplete in capturing the potential variety of perspectives and experiences involved in these efforts (including both the strengths and costs of strategies used). In this instance, however, we determined it necessary to further evaluate apparent first-year improvements in student performance and teacher retention in DPSCD Partnership schools. In that interview, Dr. Vitti identified a number of strategies that may help to explain the DPSCD results:

A FOCUS ON THE INSTRUCTIONAL CORE AND HUMAN CAPITAL

When considering these positive results, Dr. Vitti first emphasized the importance of focusing the district's efforts on the instructional core and human capital:

> *I see a lot of conversation and strategy outside of the core, the core being instruction, and if you don't focus on improving instruction, and then you don't deal with human capital, you're not going to get anywhere... You might actually [argue] that wraparound services are important, but that alone of itself isn't going to raise student achievement. It's going to get kids to come to school more often. It's going to get kids out of trouble. All good, but it's not going to move student achievement [by itself].*

STRATEGIC AND TARGETED GOALS

Alongside having districts craft a targeted plan to meet academic goals, the Theory of Change behind the Partnership Model emphasizes the role of community and technical partners in helping to build district and school capacity. When we asked whether elements of this theory were helpful to him in achieving positive academic results in Partnership schools, Dr. Vitti relayed that having strategic goals for Partnership allowed him to be intentional and targeted in helping Partnership schools meet those goals. He said:

> *Our three focus areas with the Partnership schools, one is expanding wraparound services, improving human capital, and improving overall community engagement. Now when we move forward and we're going to start a new initiative, or we're looking at where we would start an opportunity to increase resources, we focus on the Partnership schools as that place where we would implement that initiative or those new resources in these original Partnership schools.*

A Closer Look at the Detroit Results: An Interview with Dr. Vitti *(continued)*

In addition, while Dr. Vitti noted the importance of partners to DPSCD, he did not credit them with driving improvements to date. For instance, he said: *"As far as the partners are concerned, not yet. I think we're going to start to see that more with wraparound services."* While Dr. Vitti noted that partners like City Year were helping with problems of truancy in Partnership schools and wraparound services were clearly important to him, they were not the most critical drivers of achievement gains.

One possible reason that Dr. Vitti reported not needing to rely on partners to drive improvements in the district may have been because he felt he already had the knowledge, expertise, and capacity to do the work of school turnaround as a result of his prior experience in Jacksonville, Florida. This suggests that the identification and goal setting component of the larger Theory of Change can be an effective tool for those leaders who have the necessary capacity and are able to build broader coalitions in the communities they serve. Interviews with other Partnership district superintendents showed that some clearly appreciated or desired partner support, and Dr. Vitti suggested that the state as a "partner" could build or enhance these systems:

> *I think more support needs to be provided to superintendents on: How do you manage Partnership schools? How do you create systems to hold principals accountable, but also develop them at the same time? We really don't do that in Michigan at all, and then what does that look like for superintendents? What does that look like for people in charge of curriculum and instruction? What does that look like for principals, and what does that look like for teachers?*

"THE IDENTIFICATION AND GOAL SETTING COMPONENT OF THE LARGER THEORY OF CHANGE CAN BE AN EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR THOSE LEADERS WHO HAVE THE NECESSARY CAPACITY AND ARE ABLE TO BUILD BROADER COALITIONS IN THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE."

NEW ACCOUNTABILITY DESIGNATIONS AS A LEVER FOR CHANGE

In addition, although not an explicit aspect of the Theory of Change, Dr. Vitti stressed that being a Partnership district or school and the accountability that came with this designation could be useful for driving change. He said, *"I would just say a leader knows how to use extra accountability as a lever for change and creating a sense of urgency."* He explained:

> *Having come in knowing that these were the lowest performing schools, I've been able to, more over the last couple of years, use the Partnership Agreement as a lever to get a greater sense of urgency among the principal and teachers to say, "We have to do things differently here. Why? Because we're a Partnership school."*

A Closer Look at the Detroit Results: An Interview with Dr. Vitti *(continued)*

SYSTEMS AND STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING STUDENT AND TEACHER OUTCOMES

In addition to the aspects of the Partnership Model that were or were not useful to Dr. Vitti in helping him turn around struggling schools, he also highlighted several system and strategies that he believed were most responsible for helping schools achieve positive results. Specifically, he attributes the gains in student and teacher outcomes in the district to the following:

- hiring new principals for many Partnership schools;
- raising expectations for adults and students;
- increased monitoring of Partnership schools;
- support and accountability around reteaching standards, differentiated instruction, and looking at data;
- building the capacity of school leaders to understand and target the instructional core; and
- recruiting and developing human capital.

Dr. Vitti indicated that when he first started the job in 2017, he had the opportunity to make leadership changes in Partnership schools:

> *We did make some principal changes in some of the Partnership schools... Some of those changes were related to vacancies, and some were concerns that had been raised by the outgoing administration into this one. As a lever of change, I always think that the principal is key to school improvement as an instructional leader.*

When asked whether teachers were reassigned (as occurs in many other states' turnaround efforts), he answered that this was not the case for Partnership schools. Rather, attrition and mobility in Partnership schools at that time occurred "naturally" or voluntarily.

Another important change was raising expectations for adults and students alike. He explained:

> *I think, in year one, we started to immediately challenge the level of expectations around what we thought principals should do, what we thought teachers should be doing, and more importantly, what kids are capable of. I do think that there were signs of a maturation process of understanding that there was going to be a new set of expectations, not only with these schools, but with the administration coming in.*

At the district level, raising expectations specifically involved increased monitoring and support to build the capacity of teachers and leaders alike to understand and teach standards and align instruction with assessments.

Principals in Partnership schools were grouped as a cohort and supported by a "principal leader." Vitti explained that the Deputy Superintendent of Schools was also responsible for leading much of the daily work with principal leaders and Partnership school principals. Beginning in 2017-18, an important part of the district's support revolved

A Closer Look at the Detroit Results: An Interview with Dr. Vitti *(continued)*

around data meetings. When asked to describe these data meetings, Vitti explained: *"We meet by principal group with the principals. I lead that conversation, and we have indicators that are very clear that we look at throughout the course of the year. '17-'18 was the first year we started to implement this practice, which was look at last year's M-STEP results."*

Whereas the district-level data team meetings were held for all principals, Dr. Vitti noted that Partnership schools had much more intensive monitoring than non-Partnership schools and this took place in the form of instructional reviews:

> *Then, also in '17-'18, were instructional reviews that took place at the schools where the principal leader, deputy superintendent walked with the principal to identify in literacy, in math, instructional strategies that were working and not working, and then a clear plan of action was developed to implement.*

He added, *"We monitor it. We hold you accountable to it. I don't think the principals [in Round 1 Partnership schools] ever had that level of specificity about what they should be doing."*

The specific instructional strategies that he believed were most important involved *"reteaching standards that students weren't grasping. Moving into small group instruction to work with students in smaller groups, utilizing academic interventionists to work with students in small groups. That was all new."* He emphasized the importance of this strategy several times, alongside making sure what was being taught aligned with M-STEP:

> *We provided more materials on reteaching the main factors that would be a part of the M-STEP. We provided extra materials to all teachers just to reteach a lot of the standards that we knew would be emphasized in the M-STEP schools... I do think we started to see more differentiated instruction in '17-'18. What I mean by that is just reteaching things and working with students in smaller groups. I said it, but I just want to emphasize that. I think that was one of the reasons why we saw improvement in '17-'18.*

In sum, he felt this targeted focus was most important to achieving the gains Partnership schools in DPSCD saw in 2017-2018.

ADDRESSING THE HUMAN CAPITAL CHALLENGE IN DPSCD

Dr. Vitti felt that principal leadership was most important in retaining teachers, which may help explain the teacher retention increases. Asked more broadly about his perspective on the issue of recruiting and retaining teachers in Partnership districts, he noted that it was also critical to pay teachers more. He described one strategy to do so:

> *There were a lot of contracts at the school level, at the district level that I didn't see results connected to, and I didn't see it connected to a broader vision of the district in the way of work. That's where the low-hanging fruit was, to cut contracts and just create a line-item budget aligned to the strategic plan, and one of our main focus areas was to increase compensation for our teachers.*

A Closer Look at the Detroit Results: An Interview with Dr. Vitti *(continued)*

As detailed above in this section, and consistent with other Partnership leaders and superintendents across the state, Dr. Vitti emphasized the importance of recruiting and retaining teachers and the role of compensation in doing so. He also recognized that the capacity for superintendents to do so might vary depending upon other contextual factors. For instance, he acknowledged that the pool of available teachers from which to recruit might be wider and deeper in a relatively denser city like Detroit as compared to a rural area or smaller city.

Overall, the positive first-year results for DPSCD Round 1 Partnership schools suggest that DPSCD may be implementing promising strategies to help improve both educator and student outcomes. As Dr. Vitti and his staff continue to push forward with the strategies and systems described here, it will be imperative to assess continued success and challenges as they arise.

SECTION FIVE – NOTES

[1] This question was not asked of teachers who reported being in their first year at their given school.

[2] Drake, S., Cowen, J. M. & Auletto, A. (2019). Race and gender differences in teacher evaluation ratings and teacher employment outcomes. Education Policy Innovation Collaborative. Available at https://epicedpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/race_and_gender_policy_brief4WEB.pdf for the full report on teacher evaluation ratings in Michigan.

[3] A standard deviation is a common way to calculate changes in a test score relative to its average.

[4] Brummet, Q. (2014). The effect of school closings on student achievement. Journal of Public Economics, 119, 108-124 for more detail on earlier closures in Michigan and their impacts.

[5] See Section Eight on caveats for additional information.

[6] In general, students exiting Round 1 schools are either similarly scoring on M-STEP or are even slightly higher scoring. In addition, we estimated versions of the out-of-district transfer models for DPSCD Round 1 separately by M-STEP quartile, and these estimates indicate lower scoring children were generally less likely to exit the district, even after controlling for other factors. Results provided in Appendix 6.

[7] We received permission to identify DPSCD and Dr. Vitti for the purpose of the impact analyses. In our larger study, consistent with all other districts, we assigned districts and individuals pseudonyms to protect anonymity.

Partnership Turnaround Report:
SECTION SIX

HUMAN CAPITAL CHALLENGES IN PARTNERSHIP DISTRICTS

EPIC
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RESEARCH WITH CONSEQUENCE

Section Six:
HUMAN CAPITAL CHALLENGES IN PARTNERSHIP DISTRICTS

Perhaps the most commonly identified determinant of Partnership success – or lack thereof – is human capital: the knowledge, skill, and capacity of staff, especially teachers, that can be brought to bear to educate and support students. Educators at all levels of the system recognized the difficulty inherent in turning around schools and districts when faced with human capital challenges. Indeed, of the 21 Partnership district superintendents we interviewed, 20 raised problems with human capital among the most significant barriers to turning around their districts. School-based educators also noted the major human capital issues in their schools; compared to non-Partnership schools in Partnership districts, educators in Partnership schools gave their school lower marks for teacher retention. Educators in Partnership schools also indicated that their school would receive a "significant benefit" from increased assistance in teacher recruitment and hiring.

STAFF DEVELOPMENT

Central to the Partnership Agreements that orient Partnership districts' turnaround efforts is the set of strategies that Partnership districts plan to undertake to improve student outcomes. Often, these strategies focused on efforts to **increase the effectiveness of each district's teachers** through trainings, professional development, and initiatives designed to provide opportunities for teachers to share knowledge of their craft. As discussed in Sections Four and Five, some of these strategies appear to have borne fruit as educators in Partnership schools, compared to their peers in non-Partnership schools within Partnership districts, reported a heightened focus on improvement in their school generally and specifically in the areas of curriculum and instruction, assessment, and

professional development. The responses from educators in Partnership schools also indicated more positive changes in the quality of professional development offered and in teachers' focus on student learning. These findings, which are consistent with the Partnership Model's Theory of Change, are encouraging. However, even with this increased attention to staff development and support, we found that districts' ability to simply recruit and retain teachers is more central to their ability to sustain reform.

TURNOVER AND RECRUITMENT

In interviews with Partnership superintendents, **turnover** and **recruitment** were regularly cited as primary issues. Although the results of our event study models from Section Five suggest that Partnership may have decreased teacher turnover, at least in Round 1 Partnership schools, year-over-year turnover of teachers in Partnership schools remains high. As mentioned in Section One, teachers in Partnership schools exited their district at roughly 1.5 times the rate found among schools in non-Partnership districts. In addition, when asked in our surveys about their professional plans for the following year, 32% of teachers in Partnership schools indicated that they intended to leave their current school, suggesting that turnover is indeed a significant factor facing schools and districts as they work to coherently implement their Partnership Agreement.

Superintendents reported that the main consequences of turnover extended past the immediate loss of human capital and into the future, as the continuous need to search for, hire, and train teachers is a drain on their already stretched resources and significantly hampers their reform efforts. Discussing the loss experienced when teachers leave the district, the superintendent of Islanders noted:

> *There's a serious teacher shortage in Michigan. Teachers will go who you put a lot of equity in, and then go to other places, because they can make more money and do different things like that. Finding high-quality instructors is a challenge at all times, as well. Because in the summer, you may lose five, six teachers that you worked with and built that capacity throughout the year, but they go somewhere else. Those are some ongoing challenges that we face on a regular basis.*

That this superintendent drew on the concepts of accrued equity and capacity underscores the role of teachers as a resource in reform, hinting that high turnover impacts Partnership district leaders' long-term plans. Recalling the loss of several dozen teachers over a two-month period, the superintendent of Avalanche spoke more directly about how turnover has complicated their reform, saying *"That kind of turnover – every time that happens – that puts us in a situation where we're trying to rebuild things that had previously been functioning and working and now we're trying to rebuild it."*

Aside from losing teachers with important skills and knowledge, superintendents identified significant financial costs arising from turnover. This was evident in an interview with the superintendent of Blues district, who stated, *"Every year, we put this $100,000 into training our staff, and then the next year half of them leave. Then we spend another $100,000 and we train people, and then half of them leave."*

Superintendents' accounts of teacher turnover and its impact described a cycle in which teachers leave, taking with them the investment the district had made in them and requiring the district to divert future resources toward training new teachers who may also then leave, starting the process over again. In one interview, the superintendent of Flames district lamented their situation as:

> *That's always a struggle. That's why I mentioned to the leadership team, professional development this summer, but I really want not to have that next year because you want to make sure we're educating the teachers that are going to be here and not have them take that information somewhere else. It's always a challenge in Flames. Spend all this money and time on professional development and then have to start from scratch with a new teacher who has not had that information because the other teacher left. It's a constant struggle. It's just something that we've had to deal with throughout the year.*

SUPERINTENDENTS' ACCOUNTS OF TEACHER TURNOVER AND ITS IMPACT DESCRIBED A CYCLE IN WHICH TEACHERS LEAVE, TAKING WITH THEM THE INVESTMENT THE DISTRICT HAD MADE IN THEM AND REQUIRING THE DISTRICT TO DIVERT FUTURE RESOURCES TOWARD TRAINING NEW TEACHERS WHO MAY ALSO LEAVE, STARTING THE PROCESS OVER AGAIN.

As highlighted above, across interviews, superintendents described turnover as diminishing the human resources they rely on to boost student achievement. But this concern about teacher retention is not limited to leaders of Partnership districts; it is shared by the principals of Partnership schools. In our survey, Partnership school principals gave their district low marks for staff retention and also identified a high rate of teacher turnover as the second-greatest hindrance to their school achieving its improvement goals.

If Partnership districts and schools could replace the teachers who leave with equally or more qualified and effective teachers, turnover would be a less significant long-term problem. However, leaders in Partnership schools and districts report major challenges in **recruiting and hiring new teachers,** especially teachers with the skills or experience they see as important for success in their context. Discussing the pool of teachers from which they could hire, the superintendent of Capitals said:

> *It's a pool problem. I used to – I spent time with other states [in a prior role], and talking about teacher pools. I would raise my hand, and I'd say it's wonderful that there's 17 states in the United States that can talk really effectively about teacher pools. I said Michigan might have a puddle.*

She/he further noted that hiring challenges persisted well into the school year and became an even greater struggle, saying, "*The closer we are to November here, I'm thinking it's [the pool of teacher candidates is] more like wet cement.*" Most superintendents expressed similar concerns across

interviews, all but one of whom mentioned that they either had trouble attracting teachers or had teaching positions that remained vacant at the time of the interview.

While Partnership district leaders reported pronounced difficulty in hiring teachers generally, they described acute challenges in finding teachers with what they viewed as the requisite skills for success in their district. Often, superintendents mentioned a **need for teachers who can be successful in an urban setting,** such as the superintendent of Canadiens who reported, *"The other [issue] that's deeper is vacancies, is trying to recruit teachers that have worked in an urban setting, that are willing to stay, that have a track record of success."* Citing a lack of experienced job candidates, leaders alluded to relying mainly on newly certified teachers and that this brought additional challenges. As an instructional coach in Blues described, *"I think it [the district] is a really tough environment to come into with no tricks in your bag. You've never been a teacher before. You're a first-year teacher."* The superintendent of Penguins connected a lack of skills and experience with the high turnover the district had experienced, stating:

> *The main issues facing our district are – I think one of the primary issues is regarding teacher, the absence of quality teacher candidates. People who are prepared, A; B, willing to work in an urban environment. Not everyone is cut out to do that. We've had people apply to be working in Penguins and within two weeks, three weeks they take off. […] The absence of good teacher candidates is one of our problems, one of our challenges.*

ONE-THIRD OF SUPERINTENDENTS INTERVIEWED DESCRIBED RESORTING TO SUBSTITUTES TO SERVE AS FULL-TIME TEACHERS.

This theme was evident in multiple superintendent interviews, with eight of 21 bemoaning applicants for their teaching positions lacked a background in environments like theirs, experienced a steep learning curve in their schools, and struggled to adjust to their context.

Due to challenges in hiring teachers, leaders and educators in many Partnership districts reported that they rely on substitutes to fill their vacant teaching positions. When asked to grade their school in a number of areas, both teachers and principals in Partnership districts gave the second-lowest marks to their reliance on substitute teachers, with teachers and principals in Partnership schools giving a lower evaluation of this than their peers in non-Partnership schools. Principals were also asked to rate their district in several areas and here, too, reliance on substitute teachers received the second-lowest ratings. Substitutes were often described by Partnership superintendents as being poorly equipped to teach their students, though some superintendents reported being able to recruit motivated, high-quality substitutes. Describing the challenges stemming from staffing schools with substitute teachers, the leader of Capitals mentioned:

> *Even with the change to 60 credit hours [of required college coursework], we have substitutes that are coming in. We have to be real careful, because they might yell at kids in a certain way. They might behave in a way that leads to me getting phone calls, and*

> *the principal having the – they're not trained. They might have 60 credit hours of college credit. Doesn't mean they can come in and manage a classroom full of fourth graders that are like, "Fresh meat. Yes, let's have – we got a new person coming in."*

In all, one-third of the superintendents interviewed described resorting to substitutes to serve as full-time teachers.

The converging issues of retention and recruitment created a situation in which Partnership districts are severely challenged by an inadequate supply of human capital needed to implement and sustain their turnaround strategies. This is perhaps best summarized in the following response from the superintendent of Flyers when asked about the main issues facing her/his district:

> *The main issues are, one, around teacher and leadership turnover. We've been unable to have one program model implemented more than one year due to a turnover in either leadership and/or teachers. High quality certified teachers is another very large obstacle that we continue to face. In a building with 19 total teachers, four of them are certified teachers, so we have a serious shortage in the availability of certified teachers. [...] There's the consistency issue, which prevents the model from being able to really take hold, and then there's the lack of talent.*

PERCEIVED CONTRIBUTORS TO HUMAN CAPITAL CHALLENGES

The extent of the human capital challenges is clear from interviews with district leaders, teacher and principal responses to surveys and in our case studies (more of which can be found in Section Seven). Respondents offered several explanations for the direness of the situation.

Low compensation in Partnership districts.

Many superintendents felt limited in their ability to reduce teacher turnover and to improve teacher recruitment. Often, they cited **low pay** in the district and noted that there were few teachers in the local community they could bring into the district. As noted earlier in this report, teacher salaries in Partnership districts ranked in the bottom third of districts within their ISD. Ten superintendents, approximately half of those interviewed, linked their district's lower salaries to their issues with retention and recruitment. As the superintendent of Flames explained:

> *The teacher gets offered $235 - $10,000 to work across the street because of the money factor. Now, we do have some that say, "You know what? I love this school. The money doesn't matter. I'll stay. I want to help these kids." The majority, it's all about the dollars. Then they will leave and go across the street.*

The superintendent of Capitals described a similar situation:

> *Right down to the [neighboring district], as an example, raised their starting wage to $40,000, and we had been on a pay freeze for five, six years. Some teachers were $2,000 less than the starting wage of the school district next door.*

Superintendents often expressed a desire to increase teachers' salaries but faced financial constraints around doing so. Speaking to their situation, the superintendent of Capitals elaborated that financial struggles in the past strained their current fiscal situation:

> *Imagine being in deficit for several years. We haven't taken care of our buildings. We haven't taken care of our facilities. We've got to do that, as well, and take care of our teaching staff that has – they're hard workers. They're dedicated to children. We now realize that there is significant competition. Other districts are more than happy to say, "We'll pay you 42 [thousand dollars] and we'll give you five years of service." I can't do that, because we've been on a pay freeze.*

Though accounts such as these were common in superintendent interviews, they were not universal among Partnership districts. One superintendent, the leader of Black Hawks, noted that the district had not experienced a significant shortage of human capital and attributed this to its strong tax base and salary schedule that offered higher salaries than the surrounding districts.

Some superintendents identified a high rate of student mobility as a factor that impacted their ability to offer teachers higher salaries. For instance, when asked about the human capital challenges the district faced, the superintendent of Ducks said:

> *Number one is the teacher retention and recruitment because it is a complex, complicated issue in that it's tightly aligned to funding. When you're a declining enrollment district, which many of the Partnership districts are, that means you're also losing funding and you have to cut teachers, which also means that you're not always able to compete or provide a competitive compensation package. How do we recruit and retain teachers in districts that are educating concentrated groups of vulnerable students for lesser pay?*

As these examples illustrate, the leaders of Partnership districts attributed a significant portion of their human capital challenges to their inability to offer teachers salaries that are competitive with nearby districts.

Teachers' location preferences.

Partnership district superintendents also identified **teachers' preferences to teach closer to where they live** as a factor driving their teacher shortage problems, although this was mentioned less frequently than salaries. In particular, the issue highlighted was that few teachers live in the Partnership districts themselves. On this subject, the superintendent of Devils said, *"Many of our teachers live in [nearby cities]. If a job opens closer to them in the current environment where there's a teacher shortage, they look at it and have a really good shot at getting hired."* This was also a theme in Blues, where one long-serving teacher recalled her/his observations about how mobility in the district has changed over time:

> *Now, I've heard there's shortages, too, but it just seems like they have a real hard time keeping staff now or finding qualified teachers for maybe a specific kind of math, a math teacher or a science teacher. I guess the biggest one is probably just the turnover. It*

> *seems like before, teachers that taught in Blues, not all of them, but a lot, it was their career. They were here from when they started. I'd say probably 60 to 70 percent of the teachers started here and finished here. Then, there were always some that moved around, but now, it seems like just about – there's only a couple I can think of that have been here the last five years and then, everybody else just kind of cycles through in a year or two.*

When asked why she/he thought that teachers left the district now, in addition to low pay, she/he remarked, *"I think some that they've hired from [nearby city], they find jobs closer to home, so they're just not driving."* This aligned with reports from other teachers in the district. In an interview with another, first-year teacher in Blues, she/he expressed an inclination to leave the district at the end of the year to find a position closer to home, saying, *"I live in [nearby city], so I'd probably look for something close by."* However, this was not universal among teachers in Blues. A third teacher, a veteran in the district, mentioned that she/he too lived in [nearby city] but when asked about her/his plans for next school year, replied firmly, *"I'm gonna be here."* Though she/he followed up that response by stating *"I could do with more money [laughter]."*

PARTNERSHIP DISTRICT AND SCHOOL RESPONSES TO HUMAN CAPITAL CHALLENGES

Though superintendents often indicated that they felt constrained in their ability to address their human capital challenges, some described strategies they had employed to improve the human capital in their district. Two such strategies include **increasing salaries** for instructional staff and **adjusting reforms** to accommodate districts' human capital challenges.

Increasing salaries for instructional staff.

Six Partnership superintendents mentioned that they had been able to use financial levers to attract new teachers to the district. One, the superintendent of Hurricanes, described a strategic approach to the district's finances to offer bonuses for new teachers that drew in new educators, saying:

> *Creativity is the key to anything I think. One of the things that we did this year, we went into our grant funds, specifically Title 2A, which is your professional development grant. We allocated funds to offer signing bonuses for staff who come on. We were able to give a $1,000 signing bonus to any highly qualified staff member that agreed to come on, which we did get. We were able to hire three very capable teachers as a result of that.*

Another, the superintendent of Blue Jackets, mentioned a district-level effort to make teaching in their district more financially attractive, recalling:

> *One hurdle we've just jumped – quite frankly, we talked about attracting and retaining talent, and that's offering competitive teaching salaries. We were able to do that this past year and raising the starting salary and even offering a signing bonus. Prior to that, our teaching salary hadn't moved in, maybe, 20 years, the starting teaching salary. If you're not able to attract and retain high-quality instructors to put in front of students, that certainly will have an impact on student achievement.*

Overall, Partnership district superintendents associated lower teacher compensation with greater human capital challenges. Those that have attenuated those challenges attributed this success to their efforts that made teaching in their district more lucrative.

SOME PARTNERSHIP DISTRICTS MANAGED SHORTAGES OF HIGH-QUALITY AND CONSISTENT TEACHERS BY ADOPTING INSTRUCTIONAL STRATEGIES THAT WOULD BE LESS IMPACTED BY STAFFING DISRUPTIONS.

"Turnover-proofing" instruction.

Some Partnership districts worked to manage shortages of high-quality and consistent teachers by adopting instructional strategies that would be less impacted by staffing disruptions. At least one district took this approach by adopting a scripted curriculum, a system in which daily objectives, lesson plans, and activities were all pre-determined in a way that could be easily implemented. Describing the rationale for this, a district official in Blues district explained:

> *One of the things that we did, honestly, take into account was teacher turnover. That is one of the reasons why we chose the language arts program that we did because anyone literally could come in, and it is a scripted program. It's aligned to common core, and it's exactly what we needed, that if we had a long-term sub come in, say, 'They left off on lesson three. You need to start with lesson four.' That you can go in and start with lesson four on there. That was one of the things. I know that we should have teachers put their own spin on things, but we personally, the district needs something that is more scripted, so somebody can just come in and move on, and if they did lesson three, then they can do lesson four. Then if someone else comes in, then they can do lesson five.*

As the district official acknowledged, if tacitly, using a scripted curriculum may not be preferred pedagogically, but seemed a necessary response to mitigate the impacts of teacher turnover because of the level of standardization and transferability.

THE LEADERSHIP ASPECT OF HUMAN CAPITAL

Although most leaders' responses to our surveys and interviews focused on human capital as primarily a matter of recruiting and retaining teachers, human capital at the school and district leadership level was itself a different challenge for Partnership districts. While turnover of leadership can be a problem, some districts noted that strategic turnover at higher levels may be necessary to bring about needed changes. District leaders told us that high-quality leadership is critical for successful turnaround work. For example, the Canadiens superintendent characterized the principal as key to turnaround success and noted that her/his district needed to address the issue of too few high-quality school leaders in the district's lowest-performing schools:

> *I think a lot of our Partnership principals are not instructional leaders, defined as individuals that know how to recruit, retain teachers, know how to give constant feedback to teachers, can problem-solve with teachers, and create a culture of instructional focus*

where the principal is truly the instructional leader. Can go in as a generalist in specific content areas, provide feedback on how to improve instruction, can lead professional development, can analyze data, and really have credibility with teachers to improve practice.

In line with this description, some superintendents felt it was necessary to remove ineffective leaders from Partnership schools. For instance, the Avalanche superintendent said:

[A few] years ago, when I first came here, what I will tell you is how I would characterize – we were not really even running a school in that particular building. We had a serious leadership problem. We had a principal who had taken on her/his staff and had demeaned her/his staff in staff meetings. Basically, I had to direct her/him not to have staff meetings [laughter] anymore because he/she would use it as an opportunity to beat up on the staff. The staff, themselves, had started to unite against her/him. It created quite a few, obviously, problems there but it was – it resulted, really, in adult behavior that was not really treating students and was not really focused on the work of educating students. It was more about, "What do we do, as adults, to survive in – ourselves in this environment where we're being attacked by our principal?" Other pieces where they just were not feeling real valued in their work. A couple months into my tenure as superintendent, I relieved her/him of her/his duties and we brought in an interim who steadied things there but still, student behavior was out of control. There was, again, a lack of academic focus. If I were to characterize it now, and I probably would've done the same three years ago, is it's really an environment where both adults and kids were simply trying to survive every day.

SUPERINTENDENTS SEE HUMAN CAPITAL AS CENTRAL TO THEIR REFORM EFFORTS.

Conversely, the Penguins superintendent discussed strategically selecting new leadership for one Partnership school, and the new principal was cited as the positive force behind changes in school climate and culture:

That school has been a pain in the whatever of anybody who's been sitting in this chair, because it just has been a mess. I mean a total mess. No buy in or whatever. […] We turn it over to this new principal – not new but [Principal name], and we say, 'Go for it.' We get a magnet […] and it's like the sun has risen on that place. It's a new environment, it's a new place, different staff, kids are happy, not a peep out them, community is happy.

Just as superintendents expressed the need to recruit and retain teachers who are trained to work with students facing the structural challenges – like poverty and trauma – in Partnership schools and districts, they also made clear the critical importance of hiring and retaining leaders with the necessary skills and experience to turn around these schools. Across all levels of the district – from district leadership to the classroom – superintendents see human capital as central to their reform efforts.

SUMMARY

Access to human capital – effective and motivated teachers, strong and supportive leadership – is a central element not only of the Partnership Model's Theory of Change, but of school improvement strategies writ large. In the Partnership districts, human capital in general, and teacher recruitment and retention especially, may be the most significant determinant of the extent to which Partnership reform succeeds or falters in individual districts. Partnership schools and districts attempted different strategies to improve human capital but remained constrained by both geographic access to large and sustained labor markets, and by financial resources that declined further in a cycle of teacher hiring and exit. In future years, if Partnership districts diverge in the successes and failures of their reforms, a key explanation is likely to be the difference between either meeting or falling short on the human capital challenge.

Partnership Turnaround Report:
SECTION SEVEN

COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES

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Section Seven: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES

This section takes a closer look at our three case study districts to more deeply understand how and why implementation of the Partnership reform varied, and to what effect. Multiple case studies are important for understanding sets of conditions that may impact the success or failure of educational policies (Bush-Mecenas & Marsh, 2018). For example, if educator turnover is a barrier to Partnership implementation, studying a setting that illustrates why this is the case and comparing it with a setting that had similar barriers but was able to overcome them can help inform understanding of why turnover was more or less intractable in one setting relative to the other. For this reason, we intentionally chose qualitative case studies that varied in terms of 1) perceived success by MDE officials and the Partnership superintendents and 2) implementation of Partnership reform. We also refer to our theoretical framework from Section Four (crafting coherence; see pages 51-55) to understand how the case study districts and schools were implementing and responding to the Partnership reform, including whether the reform changed their approach to school improvement, and why.

In particular, this section focuses on research question two, which asked: ***How are schools, districts, and educators responding to and implementing the Partnership Model and what factors affect those responses?*** We answered this question from the perspective of each district, examining in particular

the conditions that most impacted the coherence and implementation of the reform. In this section, we provide a quick summary of each case district's implementation of the Partnership reform as well as our overall cross-case findings. We then delve into the details of each case site.[1]

Three main cross-case themes explained some of the variation in implementation, the common challenges each district confronted, and how they dealt with such challenges. First, **turnover and lack of supply of teachers and substitutes** arose as a prominent concern across all three cases, with superintendents saying they needed to fill half their teaching positions year-to-year or that they needed to staff up to one-third of their schools with substitute teachers. Second, and relatedly, this **turnover created a host of implementation challenges** for capacity stretched districts like Whalers and Blues. For example, respondents from these districts cited difficulty providing coverage for teachers to engage in professional learning, trouble maintaining a positive school climate, and needing to spend significant resources on training teachers only to then reinvest that time and energy over and over again when those teachers left. Third, district leaders' motivation to drive change and ability to navigate the political dimensions of their role was both varied and critical to the perceived coherence of Partnership reform implementation. In particular, **district leaders' ability to build coalitions across different stakeholders with power to affect reform implementation** (e.g. school boards, teachers) helped explain the perceived success or failure of improvement efforts across the cases.

BLUES

Clearly implementing the reform in alignment with the Theory of Change and felt positive about their efforts at the district level, but less so at the school level.

Blues is an example of an attempt to use Partnership reform as a tool to bridge and create new resources and change throughout the district.

PENGUINS

Stable district leadership widely perceived as strong, with established and coherent plans and partnerships.

They were largely symbolically adopting the Partnership Model but also used the reform to strategically accomplish Partnership goals (bridging) that would otherwise be a "political nightmare" in the words of the superintendent.

WHALERS

Trying to implement Partnership reform in alignment with the Theory of Change (bridging).

However, the new changes created conflict and additional demands, illustrating both the need and the difficulty of building coalitions and trust between multiple partners and with the school board in particular.

CASE STUDY: BLUES

IMPLEMENTING IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS ALIGNED WITH THE THEORY OF CHANGE

Of the three districts, Blues demonstrated the clearest efforts to strategically implement the reform according to the Theory of Change. District and school-level interviews uncovered examples of new initiatives and strategies at the district- and school-level that were grounded in the implementation of Partnership reform. These included:

- **Creating new roles** at the district and school levels that were aligned with implementation of the Partnership reform. For example, Blues hired a new central office employee to oversee and coordinate Partnership efforts (e.g. communication with community partners) and hired an ELA and a math coach to help meet the academic goals set out in the Partnership Agreement.

- **Establishing new community and MDE partnerships** in which the district and superintendent worked to solicit input from partners, coordinated regular meeting times to strategize and assess progress, and engaged and motivated multiple partners in the work and goals of the Agreement.

- **Adopting a new curriculum.** District staff and the superintendent believed that the absence of coherent and aligned instruction had contributed to the district's academic challenges. To overcome this lack of coherence, they chose and implemented a new curriculum in the 2018-2019 school year. They intentionally selected a curriculum that had a more scripted approach to accommodate the district's high degree of teacher turnover and their difficulty finding teachers and substitutes to staff classrooms.

- **Creating new systems and structures.** In order to facilitate improvements, Blues administrators implemented a set of new systems and structures, including professional development that aligned with their instructional changes, coaching, working with MI Excel to implement new district-level systems and procedures (e.g. revising HR procedures, building data analytic capacity), and implementing the Blueprint in coordination with MI Excel consultants, the MDE liaison, and district/school level staff.

- **Implementing strategic efforts to recruit and retain teachers,** including attempts to partner with local universities, MDE, and national Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) to increase the teacher pipeline.

USING PARTNERSHIP AS A CALL TO ACTION

In addition to these coordinated efforts to implement the reform, the superintendent used the Partnership Agreement as a vehicle for communicating urgency for new initiatives and desired changes. She/he explained:

> *For me it gives it a little bit more teeth behind it sometimes. Sometimes when we're like, 'Okay, should we do this, should we not?' We sat down and looked at the data. It stunk. It mirrors our M-STEP data or our SAT data that says less than ten percent of our kids are proficient as readers. We said, "Okay, so what are we going to do about this?"*

Here, the superintendent explained a committee's debate about when to implement a plan to address reading. They discussed whether to wait another month so that teachers would not be overburdened. Ultimately, Partnership was a way for the superintendent to advocate for more urgency, *"How do we help the teachers feel this urgency? That's where I think the power of the Partnership can come in if you capitalize on it, like, look, [we've only got so much time]."*

Educator surveys suggested that the superintendent's message was clear; educators in Blues reported a strong understanding of why they were identified as a Partnership school relative to the other case sites and to Partnership educators in the full survey sample, as shown in Figure 7.1 (4.13 out of 5 compared to an average of 2.79 out of 5 for Partnership educators in our full sample).

Figure 7.1. Understanding of Partnership Identification, Partnership Educators Only



Note: Educators were asked, "How well do you understand why your school was identified as a Partnership school?"
Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

CONDITIONS IMPACTING COHERENCE

In Blues, several factors helped to enable the implementation of the reform. In the next section, we detail how hiring a new superintendent just after the district had been identified for Partnership and having a board aligned with the superintendent's vision for reform impacted coherence.

Implementation can be facilitated by a new superintendent willing to enact changes to leadership personnel and systems.

In Blues, respondents reported that the new superintendent, hired just after the district was identified for Partnership, was instrumental in implementing changes in the district. For example, one district administrator said, *"I will tell you that this district would not be where it is without [superintendent]. She/he's the force behind this turnaround,"* emphasizing the central role the superintendent played in guiding the Partnership reform in the district. This is in keeping with the Theory of Change that the Partnership reform should be driven from the district level.

Moreover, the superintendent then made changes in district leadership and systems, which were also perceived as helpful and positively impacting Partnership work. For instance, an ISD employee said:

> *This year was the most bare-bones and skeleton crew, but it's because [superintendent] found every single issue that there was and dealt with it. She/he's not going to have people in positions where they aren't certified, and everyone's going to get paid a fair wage. No one's going to make more. You're not going to have more vacation days than the person next to you.*

This reflects that, to facilitate turnaround efforts, the new superintendent was trying to change the personnel, systems, and practices that may have been problematic in the past.

Board support for the superintendent, even in the face of a challenging political context, is crucial for reform implementation.

The kinds of changes the new superintendent implemented were not always well-received by the broader community. In particular, the superintendent experienced community backlash in response to some of the changes she/he was implementing. This kind of pushback presented additional challenges and conflicts that the superintendent and district educators had to address, taking time from the work of improving the district's systems and outcomes. Indeed, the superintendent expressed being less prepared for the challenging political dimension of the role than she/he would have liked. Educators within the district also perceived this political climate to be a challenge to reform. In surveys, educators in Blues' Partnership school(s) often rated politics as "a great hindrance" to achieving the district's Partnership goals, citing this as a greater obstacle than did educators in the overall sample or in either of the other case study sites, as shown in Figure 7.2.

Figure 7.2. Partnership Educators' Perceptions of Hindrances in Partnership Turnaround



Note: Educators were asked, "To what extent is the following a hindrance to achieving your Partnership Agreement goals?"
Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

A district employee tried to articulate the contrast between her/his own positive impressions of the superintendent's work and some members of the community's negative perceptions of the district leader. She/he explained: *"I'm not only seeing the passion, but I can feel the passion. I can experience that passion because I'm here every day and I know the time and effort and commitment she/he's putting in... but there has not been a lot of accountability prior to [superintendent] coming in."*

The superintendent reinforced the notion that not everyone in the community was supportive of her/his efforts, and that it was difficult for some of her/his supporters to be vocal in their support given the political context. She/he told us:

> *There is a group of parents, and a group of community members that show up for our parent events, show up for our football games. When we did a playground build this week, they were here. They'll hug me and whisper in my ear, "Keep going. Keep fighting." They are not going to go public because of the power structure in this community.*

Thus, while some community members actively worked to undermine the leadership and new changes to the district, other community members found the superintendent to be a positive asset. Moreover, and importantly, the school board also supported the superintendent and her/his vision for change. Several district respondents highlighted the board's support for the new district leadership, and the superintendent confirmed her/his positive relationship with the board. She/he said, *"With my board, it's good. Yeah, it's very good. I mean, they don't hesitate to give me constructive feedback. They'll let me know I think you can do this better, but they are also very supportive, and they understand this is a long haul."*

This alignment with the school board made the superintendent's changes – even when some of the community members disagreed – feasible, and meant that, despite the political challenges stemming from some vocal community dissent, the superintendent was able to leverage her/his position of power to implement the changes she/he believed were necessary.

The MDE Partnership Agreement Liaison served as a helpful as-needed resource.

In addition to a supportive school board, Blues benefited from a positive relationship with their MDE-appointed liaison. Similar to many of the Partnership district leaders interviewed for this study (discussed in Section Four), the Blues superintendent said that, even though they had several different liaisons over the course of the Partnership Model implementation, they had found them open and willing to be helpful. For instance, when asked about how the liaison was helping the district, she/he said:

> *For example, we struggle with getting teachers. Sometimes we have out-of-state candidates who come in and then trying to get reciprocal certification, getting sub permits, getting a sub permit extended... so if we call, my liaison might give me the name of somebody, or I just made some relationships with people. I can call. [...] I say Blues and they're like, "How can I help you?"*

The superintendent also relayed how the liaison had assisted the district in more hands-on ways. For instance:

> *[Liaison] worked very closely with us and set up for different sessions and we pushed out a strategic plan that was a five-year plan. It was perfect timing because that was October/November to January and then the letter from the SRO [School Reform Officer] came out saying the districts were going to close. We had our strategic plan ready to go and we were able to take a subset of that strategic plan to be our Partnership Agreement.*

The ability to work in partnership with an MDE liaison enabled Blues district leaders to more easily implement turnaround strategies. The liaisons facilitated important connections for the district and served as a strategic thought partner in reform efforts.

Teacher turnover negatively impacted reform implementation.

According to district leadership, many new initiatives were underway to accomplish the difficult work of turnaround. Some of the new changes included adopting a new curriculum, new reading programs, professional development that aligned with instructional changes, coaching, and working with MI Excel to implement new district-level systems and procedures (e.g. revising HR procedures, building data analytic capacity). District staff often recognized and praised the superintendent for these strong efforts to turn around Partnership schools. Despite excitement from district-level staff and support from the board and some community members, however, implementing the necessary school-level reforms remained challenging.

TEACHER TURNOVER IS A COMPOUND PROBLEM; NOT ONLY DID TURNOVER CAUSE INSTABILITY AND TUMULT IN THE DISTRICT ON ITS OWN, BUT THE "TRICKLE-DOWN EFFECTS" OF EDUCATOR INSTABILITY INHIBITED TURNAROUND EFFORTS IN BLUES AS IT BECAME MORE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT NECESSARY REFORMS.

In particular, teacher turnover proved to be one of the greatest challenges to reform implementation. First, educator instability on its own made simply operating a functional school system in Blues difficult, echoing results presented earlier in this report. This problem seemed particularly acute in Blues; our survey data showed that educators in Blues' Partnership schools gave the district's ability to retain teachers an "F" grade, whereas respondents overall gave their districts a grade of "C." Similarly, educators in Blues' Partnership schools rated the "high rate of teacher turnover" in their district as the greatest hindrance to achieving their Partnership goals, as shown in Figure 7.2. By contrast, the full sample of Partnership school educators rated teacher turnover as a "moderate hindrance." Indeed, in all of interviews throughout the district, educators noted that teacher recruitment and retention was one of the most critical issues facing their schools and the district as a whole.

Blues also highlighted the important point that, in many Partnership districts, and probably in many low-performing districts across the country, teacher turnover is a compound problem; not only did turnover cause instability and tumult in the district on its own, but the "trickle-down effects"

of educator instability inhibited turnaround efforts in Blues as it became even more difficult to implement necessary reforms alongside a new and impermanent educator labor force. Educators throughout Blues made this point in various ways. For instance, one district employee explained that, as the district worked to implement the host of new reforms, staff had to familiarize and train new (and existing) employees on the newly adopted systems and processes. She/he said:

> *We have to intensely focus on those new people coming in, making sure that they know all of the pacing guides, the curriculum, resources when they need additional help, who to go to. There's a lot of things that aren't in place here, so we've been spending a lot of time trying to create systems.*

This proved overwhelming to district personnel, as they worked to simultaneously implement the many different programs and systems in the midst of substantial teacher turnover. Educators across the district elaborated further about why turnover continually took the wind out of their sails. For example, one teacher explained that the constant churn made it difficult to *"build working relationships with colleagues."* Another educator explained how it was a persistent issue to get teachers the professional development they needed:

> *We started to spin our wheels again this year even though we have these systems now. It was just like every third day we had new staff... To train them and to spend the time with them was taking up a majority of our time. We never got our feet off of the ground. We have decided that once a month on Fridays is our new staff onboarding. Our principals have been so wonderful. They [cover] the rooms for that day if they have to. Hopefully we don't have to because we have [that time] scheduled. Hopefully we can find someone to help cover classes, but I know this week for sure a couple principals will have to go in and support our Friday PD to pull the teachers out to give them that.*

Another teacher noted, *"We have lost too many teachers. Last year, we were combining classes. That's what started it. No planning periods, burnout. It's already hard enough in this district if everything ran smoothly."*

Even decisions about areas as fundamental as curriculum and instructional programs needed to accommodate staff turnover. One district employee explained that one of the reading programs was specifically selected to deal with the problems of constant churn:

> *One of the things that we did, honestly, take into account was teacher turnover. That is one of the reasons why we chose the language arts program that we did because anyone literally could come in, and it is a scripted program. It's aligned to common core, and it's exactly what we needed, that if we had a long-term sub come in, say, "They left off on lesson three. You need to start with lesson four." That you can go in and start with lesson four on there. That was one of the things. I know that we should have teachers put their own spin on things, but we personally, the district needs something that is more scripted,*

> *so somebody can just come in and move on, and if they did lesson three, then they can do lesson four. Then if someone else comes in, then they can do lesson five.*

The curricular decision was made in part to help with the issue of turnover, and indeed, turnover only added to the demands and stress of the job in the sense that it took substantial time and resources away from other initiatives. Perhaps as a reflection of these demands and the nature of programming, Blues teachers rated curriculum much lower overall than Partnership school respondents across the state. Teacher survey data showed educators in the Blues' Partnership school(s) rating the quality of the curriculum a 1.83 on a scale of 1 to 5 compared to 3.36 for respondents in all Partnership schools in our sample.

The superintendent reiterated how difficult it is to manage a district and improve instruction amidst substantial turnover. She/he said:

> *The problem that we experience is we have had a 50, five-zero, percent turnover of our teaching staff over the last several years... Every year we put this $100,000 into training our staff, and then the next year half of them leave. Then we spend another $100,000 and we train people, and then half of them leave.*

Turnover also made it harder for the staff hired to improve instruction to do their jobs. To that end, the math and reading coaches in Blues explained that their time spent coaching was more limited than they would like because they were needed to staff classrooms when teachers were absent or left their jobs.

SUMMARY

There were multiple attempts to use the Partnership reform as a bridge to enhance school improvement efforts, stemming in large part from the presence of a strong new superintendent. Yet these attempts were often stymied or complicated in implementation, with educators at all levels handling the demands of managing multiple systems and initiatives at once while simultaneously contending with the adverse effects of teacher churn.

Blues leadership was working to improve educator stability in the district, for instance by focusing intently on the new curriculum as well as teacher professional development and training. Educators in Blues Partnership schools understood but had mixed or negative feelings about these efforts. They gave relatively low ratings for the curriculum and they also rated the focus on professional development as a 2.7 out of 5 overall. Unfortunately, personnel at the district and school level still felt like their early efforts were insufficient to help them address their substantial staffing problems. Teachers rated teacher recruitment and hiring efforts as a 1.7 out of 5 overall, reflecting the pessimism teachers expressed in interviews around issues with staffing. It will be important to see how some of the efforts that were just underway at the time of our study have or have not generated meaningful improvements for districts and schools in Year 2.

CASE STUDY: PENGUINS

This section now turns to the Penguins district, which took a far different approach to reform implementation. Penguins had an established superintendent with comprehensive plans who chose to largely buffer the district and teachers from external demands that might derail their school improvement efforts. In contrast with Blues, Penguins' district and school improvement efforts were not driven by Partnership reform. Rather, everyone interviewed at the district level described symbolically adopting many of the external demands of the reform (e.g. listing pre-existing partners/partnerships in the Agreement, using their district improvement plan and associated interventions as the basis of their Agreement, etc). However, the district did use the sense of urgency presented by Partnership as a way to institute changes that district leadership already thought were good ideas. Like Blues, the Penguins case illustrates how bridging or buffering can be either productive or unproductive depending on contextual factors. What follows first outlines the importance of a strong leader and a well-aligned school board and discusses how the superintendent used the reform as an opportunity to reconstitute a Partnership school to meet the goals of their Agreement.

STRONG SUPERINTENDENT LEADERSHIP AND ALIGNMENT WITH THE BOARD LED TO A SENSE OF COHERENCE

District and school staff perceived leadership as strong at both the district level and at the Partnership school studied. At the district level, the Penguins superintendent had experience both in and outside of the district and in a large variety of school settings and had an established record of leadership at Penguins. In addition, the superintendent had a robust relationship with the district's school board, which, as seen in Blues and discussed in Section Four, is crucially important to Partnership implementation.

The experience and leadership of the superintendent and her/his management team, as well as the strong relationship with the board, was important to the majority of educators and other district personnel and stakeholders interviewed. This is reflected in Partnership educators' ratings of the support they received from their board, as shown in Figure 7.3. Partnership educators in Penguins rated the support from their board higher than did Partnership educators in Whalers, Blues, or Partnership educators overall. In another example of board support, a school board member cited the superintendent as one of the district's strengths, saying, *"I actually think Penguins's got a very strong superintendent who's built a good team, and has built a lot of internal administrative systems, and works well with the school board. A lot of those institutional pieces are there."* This alignment – the "institutional pieces" – were crucial enablers of coherence. She/he elaborated:

> *You don't have institutional fragmentation and conflict. The superintendent and the board tend to work fairly collaboratively with each other. That's one element. From my perception, the administrative team is pretty experienced – seems very competent. The quality of presentations and information they give the school board during meetings is good. The audits have been all clean. They've been steadily building up their financial*

reserves. They've managed to keep instructional spending up even while the district has lost students. That loss of students has declined pretty dramatically, and the last two years, it's been a trivial decline.

Figure 7.3. Partnership Educators' Ratings of Support from Their Board, ISD, and from MDE



Notes: Educators were asked, "How would you rate the quality of the assistance or support your school received from [entity]?" Only educators who had already indicated that their school had received assistance or support were asked to respond to this question.

Source: EPIC survey of educators in Partnership districts.

Similar to the case of Blues, and in contrast with Whalers (as explained later), the Penguins school board trusted the district leadership's competence to make improvements. This enabled the superintendent and her/his leadership team to make difficult decisions and implement reforms needed to improve academic and non-academic outcomes. The superintendent emphasized the importance of a positive working relationship between the administration and the board, especially in the context of the Partnership Model:

> *We'll see what happens to the Partnership Model, and how well the department can support a superintendent and the central office in doing things that [school boards in other districts] may not appreciate. We'll see when the rubber meets the road. In Penguins, we're in good shape. The board's very supportive, they believe that I know what I'm doing, I believe I know what I'm doing, I have a great team who knows what they're doing. I think the test of the Partnership Model will come when there is this conflict juxtaposition between the board, the superintendent… To get rid of the building principal that happens to be the brother-in-law of one of the board members. I mean those are tough decisions to make. I don't know that a Partnership Agreement is going to change that in the long run.*

Like other superintendents in our study, the Penguins' superintendent here emphasized the importance of having a supportive board as one of the necessary conditions for coherent implementation of the Partnership reform, particularly if (as described in the case of Whalers) the central office and MDE try to make changes that the board does not like.

HAVING A STRONG AND EXPERIENCED LEADER ALONGSIDE COHERENT PRE-EXISTING INITIATIVES LED TO SYMBOLIC ADOPTION AND BUFFERING OF THE PARTNERSHIP REFORM

Because of strong and stable leadership from the superintendent, the district mainly, *"[does] what it was going to do anyway,"* according to a Penguins board member. This idea was repeated by numerous district employees and the superintendent. For example, everyone said that the district already had robust community partnerships. Therefore, little to no change occurred in those relationships as a result of the Partnership reform.

District leaders and the principal also buffered employees from the demands of the Partnership reform. For example, there was little (if any) effort put into communicating the goals and intentions of the reform to teachers. As one district leader put it, *"No [I don't think they are aware]. They might know they're on some sort of state list... I think from a teacher's perspective a lot of their attitude is this, too, shall pass."* To that end, survey results show that Penguins educators in Partnership school(s) had a lower degree of understanding about why their school was identified for Partnership than did Partnership educators in Whalers, Blues, or all Partnership educators (see Figure 7.1). Unsurprisingly, none of the teachers interviewed reported being aware of what the Partnership Agreement was, though they knew what a Priority school was. As one teacher said when she/he confused Partnership with Priority status, *"I don't know. I guess in my mind it's all lumped together."*

THE SCHOOL BOARD TRUSTED DISTRICT LEADERSHIP'S COMPETENCE TO MAKE IMPROVEMENTS. THIS ENABLED THE SUPERINTENDENT AND HER/HIS LEADERSHIP TEAM TO MAKE DIFFICULT DECISIONS AND IMPLEMENT REFORMS NEEDED TO IMPROVE ACADEMIC AND NON-ACADEMIC OUTCOMES.

Similarly, the principal of our case school within Penguins explained that the conversation around goals was not necessarily a conversation about Partnership. Rather, it was a conversation about the school improvement plan (which was in turn aligned to the district improvement plan and Partnership generally). In other words, the district and the principal used language with which teachers were already familiar. This made sense from a leadership perspective given all the other changes transpiring in our case school (described in greater detail below).

In these ways, we saw evidence that the district was mainly symbolically adopting the external demands of the reform and at times intentionally buffering employees from spending too much time or mental effort on other demands of the reform.

THE MDE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT LIAISON PROVIDED SUPPORTS WHERE NEEDED

Similar to Blues' experience with Partnership Agreement Liaisons, Penguins leadership's relationship with their liaisons (again, as in Blues, the appointed liaison changed over the course of Partnership Model implementation) was positive and relatively hands-off. The Penguins superintendent noted that she/he had met with the liaisons only infrequently, but that they had been helpful. She/he said, *"Yeah. We met with the liaison once. They've said to us, 'Tell us what you want.'"* Later in the conversation, she/he added:

> *They've been helpful in a couple instances on cutting through some of the red tape, like with our [federal grant application]. That kind of got raised to the top of the queue, so that we could release funds and get things moving.*

The Partnership coordinator in Penguins was particularly positive about the liaison, reporting that *"[The liaison is] not punitive at all. It's [been] really helpful."* In particular, she/he noted how helpful the liaison had been in making connections to MDE about access to 21H funds and ensuring that there were no mistakes made with the state assessment process.

Again, as in Blues, Penguins leadership was able to use the liaison as a bridge, helping the district access state and federal funds to support their efforts. However, interactions were relatively limited because the district did not feel the need for more assistance. When we asked the district's liaison about assisting Penguins, she/he said they had very little interaction, particularly compared to some other districts in the liaison's portfolio that needed more support.

Despite examples of buffering and symbolic adoption, there were exceptions where the reform was used as a political tool to bridge and make necessary, but previously difficult, changes to improve Partnership schools, for instance by reconstituting a Partnership school.

USING THE REFORM AS A BRIDGING STRATEGY TO RECONSTITUTE A PARTNERSHIP SCHOOL

The superintendent used the Partnership reform as a bridging strategy to accomplish the goal of changing our case Partnership school's "toxic" culture. She/he felt this could be accomplished by reconstituting and changing the composition of the school, including students (e.g. changing the grade configuration at the school), teachers, and the school leader. Teaching positions were posted across the district, and current teachers were required to reapply for their positions in the reconstituted school. A new principal was hired to lead the school. The superintendent explained:

> *Sometimes there are schools that just need to be shut down and restarted. We have done that with a few of our schools. We've taken full advantage of the option to do a turnaround as opposed to transformation. By saying we're hiring staff from the beginning now, the principal's going to be hired. We just started all over again and set the expectations for what you want.*

She/he noted that pursuing this strategy was often a "political nightmare," but, like other superintendents in our larger study, felt Partnership offered a language, urgency, and an opportunity to navigate those politics and implement a difficult change.

The importance of good school-level leaders: Bringing in a strong principal to lead the Partnership school turnaround efforts.

As in DPSCD (see pages 112-116), leadership change was a crucial element of the turnaround effort. It appeared that, in Penguins, the superintendent selected the right person for the job. Nearly everyone interviewed viewed the principal of the reconstituted Partnership school as a strong leader capable of tackling the turnaround work, and many credited her/him with early changes in school systems and culture and climate. One district administrator noted that the school leader, who was specifically selected for this role, was an important driver of change:

> *We also have seen a change in our administration. We picked an administrator from a school that has historically had [a particular kind of student population] and then we moved her/him over to [case site], and she/he's a strong administrator. As a result of the population change and the change of administration and the [new programming] that's been I think a significant reason why we've seen changes in the culture and climate of that school.*

Some teachers cited the principal's leadership as a reason that they chose to teach at this particular school. For example, one teacher who followed the principal explained her/his motivation to move:

> *Mainly it was the students, but also our principal. She/he's a good principal. She/he really does care about the teachers here. She/he cares about the students. She/he's fair. She/he treats everyone equally. There's a big culture sensitivity issue going on right now that we're trying to work out, our huge at-risk population. She/he's being pulled in so many different directions, but she/he's someone you can really depend on. I really followed her/him along with [other teacher].*

PARTNERSHIP OFFERED A LANGUAGE, URGENCY, AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO NAVIGATE THOSE POLITICS AND IMPLEMENT A DIFFICULT CHANGE.

Another teacher moved to this school after hearing about the new principal:

> *Before I made the decision to leave my charter school I was fishing around to see, "What do you like about this school? Should I [apply to] this opening here?" Everyone kept saying, "[principal name]. You want to get [principal name], she/he's great. She/he listens to the teachers. She/he's what a principal should be." In the charter school we had directors who – I had children that didn't even know who the principal was or the director was and they went there for six years. I like the idea of that presence. I met her/him and instantly I knew that, "Okay, I'm going to be taken seriously here and they're going to appreciate me." Her/his first goal is to help the children and teachers are a really close second. I've liked that. It's very word of mouth within the teacher community here.*

Thus, the strategy of bringing in a well-regarded new leader helped the district address a difficult challenge observed in the other two case sites: attracting motivated and well-matched educators to work in Partnership schools.

Using reconstitution to bring in well-matched teachers.

One of the benefits – and difficulties – of reconstituting a school is that the new principal and administrators can select teachers who want to be in that school, working with the team to implement turnaround strategies. Hiring an inspirational principal on its own aided this case site in finding teachers who wanted to be there. The teachers and district leaders interviewed expressed appreciation for the principal's leadership, and for their perceived changes in culture and climate brought about by changes in the staff and students.

One teacher explained that these changes in culture were made possible by the district's choice to shape teacher composition:

> *I think the teachers who are here are the teachers who want to be here. A couple teachers have quit because they didn't like what was going on, and I think the teachers who stay really – we really do try and back each other up.*

TEACHER RECRUITMENT CHALLENGES HINDER IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: WHERE ARE THE URBAN EDUCATORS?

Consistent with themes discussed earlier in this report, the main condition impacting school improvement efforts in Penguins was finding and keeping teachers able and willing to teach in this urban district. The idea that urban education is different and requires a different mindset and skill compared to the general student population was emphasized by the superintendent and others:

> *I think one of the primary issues [facing our district] is regarding teachers – the absence of quality teacher candidates. People who are prepared, A; and B, willing to work in an urban environment. Not everyone is cut out to do that. We've had people apply to be working in Penguins and within two weeks, three weeks they take off. In spite of the fact that we have [many resources] which provide mentor teachers and a lot of support.*

The superintendent emphasized how difficult it was to attract teachers to work in an urban setting, even one that arguably had more established and coherent supports than other districts that were resetting their systems (as were our other two case districts, Blues and Whalers).

Despite teachers expressing excitement about working with the principal of the Penguins Partnership school, the principal still said it was challenging to fill positions. When asked about teacher staffing, she/he said, *"It's really hard, and it has been a challenge in our school. We still have [several] open positions in our school. We haven't been able to fill the positions. We have highly qualified subs in those positions."*

Responses from teachers and the assistant principal helped illustrate why it was so difficult to fill these positions. Although many who were familiar with the previously "toxic" school culture of the newly reconstituted school said it was getting much better, they still cited several factors as detrimental to recruitment and retention efforts. For instance, educators reported that student discipline was a critical issue facing the school. The assistant principal explained, *"student discipline, although I don't think it's awful, it's very – it's time-consuming for us. The kids need to be in the classroom to get the instruction. I would say that [is one of] the biggest issues [right now]."* This aligns with educators' survey responses about the demands made of their non-instructional time. In Penguins, as in Blues and Whalers, educators reported spending more time on student discipline issues than on their own professional development, communicating with parents, reviewing student achievement data, and supervising students outside of instruction. Consistent with themes earlier in the report, poverty and trauma were seen as causing many of the problems their students brought to school, which in turn made teaching in the school much more difficult and (alongside lower teacher compensation levels compared to wealthier adjacent communities) made the job far less desirable for the majority of the existing teacher labor market.

THIS CASE STUDY ILLUSTRATES HOW BUFFERING FROM A REFORM MIGHT BE PRODUCTIVE WHEN STRATEGIC EFFORTS ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY, BUT ALSO HOW SAVVY LEADERS MIGHT USE LANGUAGE FROM EXTERNAL DEMANDS TO ACCOMPLISH OTHERWISE DIFFICULT SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT GOALS.

SUMMARY

Penguins represented a unique case in that there was stable leadership and a relative sense of coherence across the district and the school despite the challenges of turnover and teacher supply that all districts were confronting. In particular, this site illustrates how buffering from a reform might be productive when strategic efforts are already underway, but also how savvy leaders might use language from external demands to accomplish otherwise difficult school improvement goals.

CASE STUDY: WHALERS

Finally, this section turns to our third case study district, Whalers, which was unable to meet their goals or coherently implement the Partnership reform. Under the leadership of a new superintendent, the district had put in place a new curriculum and various instructional initiatives before the Partnership Agreement. The district aligned its Agreement with these efforts but also attempted to set ambitious goals. However, the time and energy spent crafting partnerships and implementing the Agreement took time away from other initiatives that district personnel perceived as far more meaningful for necessary academic improvement. This case highlights how compliance with the reform could undermine rather than bolster school improvement efforts in conditions of community distrust and limited district capacity.

PARTNERSHIP EXACERBATES ISSUES OF TRUST AND CREATES CONFLICT

As part of the Partnership Model's Theory of Change, districts were expected to engage with community and agency partners to bring about changes that would ultimately result in improvements in student performance. As such, it is assumed that it is important for the superintendent or other district personnel to form relationships with outside community partners. In addition, it is understood that the school board and district leadership needed to work together to bring about these partnerships and implement Partnership strategies. However, Whalers interviewees cited conflict between district leadership, the board, and the community as significant barriers to district improvement overall. There was a theme of distrust at Whalers which caused various problems when it came to implementing the Partnership reform, and this distrust was brought to the surface in Whalers' efforts to engage community partners and the board.

A history of failed relationships with community partners made it difficult to build positive future relationships.

Whalers had a long record of reform efforts, and community groups such as philanthropic organizations, local businesses, and nonprofits had a complex history of working with the district over time. Nonetheless, the district continued to struggle. Given this history, it was difficult for some community partners to buy in to the Partnership Agreement. Some organizations felt that efforts might be wasted because the district was ill-positioned to succeed. For example, one district employee noted:

> *Like I said, some of them, they've been around in this community forever. [Health partner] has been here forever, [University partner] has been here, [Business partner] has been here. They've seen our shortcomings. They've seen our dysfunction. [Business partner] has offered and has given – they've given financial support. It hasn't improved. Now, I feel like they're saying, "Okay, you do have this Partnership Agreement, but you've got to show us something. You've got to evidence some consistency in your staffing, consistency in your leadership, in which – it's true. You have to show us that you're moving on the right track with your student instruction, their learning, and then we'll put in. I'm with the proof is in the pudding. I'll believe it when I see it." That kind of deal.*

The distrust between community partners and the district was not a one-way street; the district, school board, and larger district community also held historically-based views of the degree to which they should trust various potential community partners. Based on the long-term relationships between various organizations and the district and community, some potential partners were labeled "insiders" (and therefore trusted) whereas others were "outsiders" (and therefore not trusted). In explaining these dynamics, a district employee noted, *"It's a very close community that for a lot of probably justifiable reasons has some distrust of outsiders."* She/he continued to articulate how this trust or distrust might affect who might be a viable or productive partner, *"I think the [group 1] play[s] that role [of insider]. I think [group 2] is probably on the fence. Some people in the community really like them. Some people don't. I think that's the same with [group 3]."*

One partner, said that community distrust impacted their work, "*the [Partnership] school [that we work with] has a history with parents that's not the best so we've got to re-establish trust with parents in regards to what we're trying to do in collaboration with the school to help the students.*" In contrast with Blues, mistrust of potential community partners and their intentions made implementation of the partnering aspect much more contentious for the district and superintendent.

Support from the locally elected school board, the most important "insider" partner.

Nearly everyone interviewed also acknowledged the lack of trust between certain district employees, who were themselves viewed as "outsiders," and the board as the elected embodiment of the community ("insiders"). One district employee felt that while the superintendent was working to implement Partnership reform by building strong relationships with external partners, she/he should have been investing more time building up the relationship with the board and the community itself in an effort to address some of the distrust:

> *I think [superintendent] built her/his relationships with [state agency] and some of the partners, and maybe didn't have a strong relationship with the board. I'm not sure that's good for the district. The Partnership is intended to be reflective of the community, but I think it only reflects a portion of the community, whereas the board is elected by the community. Whether we're happy or not that they're our board, they are our board, and they're elected by the folks who pay for this district. I think if you're going to prioritize external relationships, probably the board relationship has to be stronger than the actual partnership.*

The board also generally mistrusted other technical partners. One partner who provided technical assistance felt there was some pushback from the board regarding their involvement:

> *When I took the job I felt like I was coming in to – I don't know - for lack of better words, trying to come in and help save the district. After I got here, I didn't get that feeling from the community and the board. The board was different at that time. The board president at that time in several board meetings referred to – and I took it very personally at first, and I had to learn not to – but the board president at that time would say, "Those people from [highway] and [highway]," referring to those of us that do not live in the community and drive in, and never had a lot of positive things to say. To me, my intuition is, okay. Well, I'm going to prove that wrong. I'm going to show you that I'm here and I'm a benefit to your district. I don't know. There's still that mindset. I do think a lot of it is historical.*

Several people interviewed used this same word, "historical," to describe the climate of distrust of "outsiders." In light of community/board distrust of outsider involvement, district representatives and partners suggested that attempts by the leadership to seek outside partnerships potentially increased conflict between the board and the superintendent.

As another example, an ISD representative indicated that the board relationship was a challenge for the district leadership because they and other interviewees felt that the board frequently became improperly involved in decision-making:

> *I think... board member, but certain school board members not knowing their role as a board member. They get involved with employee evaluation decisions and hiring decisions. They don't properly delegate that to the superintendent. Also, is it interference because they're muddying the waters, they aren't letting HR and the process work? They're jumping in or requesting that an employee be terminated or non-renewed based on hearsay or some personal interaction they've had with the person versus following the process.*

DISTRUST BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE, AND THE BOARD IN PARTICULAR, POTENTIAL COMMUNITY PARTNERS, AND THE DISTRICT CREATED A COMPLEX SET OF RELATIONAL DYNAMICS FOR A DISTRICT IMPLEMENTING THE PARTNERSHIP REFORM TO NAVIGATE.

Several interviewees referred to this cross-over of responsibilities as a failure of the board to *"stay in [its] lane."* In other words, some felt that the board often failed to do its job and not interfere with the responsibilities of others. A partner with whom we spoke thought that the board may have been reacting to a perceived loss of power. She/he said:

> *I think the resentment is that they, over time, the board's authority has been chipped away because [the state is] saying that if we don't do this, things are going to be bad, or your district will be dissolved. They don't have any options. I think a lot of it is just resentment of not having any other options.*

However, an MDE employee with whom the Whalers worked strongly believed that the conflict was due to a lack of effective communication between the superintendent and the board. She/he said:

> *Communication. The board felt like they weren't getting information, and when they got it they didn't trust that it was accurate. In many instances, they were right, because they would ask me, and I would give them, well according to MDE here's this, or here's the law, or here's the link. They were right. It wasn't correct. It just created a big problem.*

This introduced a more complicated dynamic in the sense that the board might have reason for the responses many criticized. In particular, given that the board is elected as a representative of the community, an ISD employee explained that their over-reach might be an attempt to gain power and voice that they felt was constantly missing.

Together, this distrust between the community as a whole (and the board in particular), potential community partners, and the district created a complex set of relational dynamics for a district implementing the Partnership reform to navigate. Unlike in Penguins and Blues, where boards were generally supportive, this caused significant trouble for the district as leadership tried to enact changes they felt were necessary to improve academic performance in Partnership schools.

THE MDE PARTNERSHIP LIAISON WAS PERCEIVED AS LESS HELPFUL THAN MDE LIAISONS IN OTHER CASE SITES

Although most districts mentioned an improved relationship with MDE – and strong support from the MDE liaisons – as a result of Partnership, the Partnership Liaison appointed to help Whalers in implementing the reform was perceived as less helpful in her/his support role than liaisons in other districts. This contrasted sharply with experiences in Blues and Penguins, where liaisons provided assistance and facilitated connections for district leaders as needed.

It was not that the liaison could not or would not try to help – to the contrary, one district administrator reported that the liaison worked to support the district. She/he said:

> *[Liaison] was already here supporting us in various ways. That support, because once that information did come down, she/he continued to support us there. She/he offered a voice from MDE to help guide us in creating the goals, some of the narrative pieces as well. Once we created it, we kind of ran things by her/him, and she/he offered input, and we needed to go in a different direction. She/he offered that and suggested that. That was the support personally that was there.*

However, another district staff person felt that, despite having strong knowledge relevant to improving outcomes in the district, the liaison engaged with community politics in a way that did not fully support to the district's reform efforts. She/he stated:

> *The meetings that [we] were at yesterday, it was confirmed that our liaison is [...] painting a different picture than what exists. It's which picture do you believe? Ours, which is not great, we're zero performance, we're climbing right? We've always been very transparent about our challenges. Or her/his where, you know, you're just not working, not doing anything.*

Finally, district administrators also spoke about the liaison *"staying in her/his lane,"* as some felt that they were given directives about what they needed to do rather than being supported to implement the plan they had already collaboratively established. As one district employee said, *"[Her/his approach] is 'You will do this. This is what needs to be done. Do it now'... It's more that top-down hammer approach."* This furthered the sense of distrust between the district and MDE.

Clearly, in the case of Whalers, where relationships between the adults in the system were already creating a difficult working environment and making it even harder for district and school personnel to implement the reform, having a liaison who was perceived to take a side in the conflict between the board and district staff caused even deeper divisions. This relationship may have contributed to the confusion and lack of consensus described below.

ATTEMPTS TO ENACT PARTNERSHIP LED TO CONFLICT, LACK OF CONSENSUS OVER GOALS, AND PERCEPTIONS OF WASTED TIME

Based on interviews with district staff and state leaders, it appears that the district attempted to implement the Partnership Model with fidelity. They created ambitious new academic and non-

academic goals, and the superintendent attempted to create new community partnerships despite the climate of distrust. However, many described difficulty arriving at shared goals given the distrust and disagreement about what was best for the community. This made it challenging to enact the Partnership reform, which asks the district to craft an Agreement with shared goals and strategies to achieve those goals. One district employee explained, "*There was some disagreement on what the board was wanting us to do, what [superintendent] wanted us to do, what the Partnership Agreement was trying to do.*" These disagreements ended up taking substantial time and energy from the superintendent and her/his staff, thus leaving less space for improvement efforts.

Moreover, these efforts to use the external demands of Partnership to improve schools were seen as highly unproductive because trying to implement the community partner aspect of the Partnership model distracted the superintendent and her/his staff from the instructional and systems-building work of district and school reform. District staff members explained that the superintendent had already developed instructional and curricular systems to drive school improvement, but the compliance and partner-building demands of the reform were drawing her/him away from that instructional work. One explained:

> *Now we're supposed to get help from all these other people. [The state] wasn't really clear on how we were going to do that. I think for the situation the district was in, it added another level of complexity in the midst of a situation where we already don't have enough. It's not just money resources. It's people resources, too, and ability, and the skill and the will of the folks who are here every day trying to make a difference. It became one more thing to do instead of, wait, this is supposed to help us.*

Another district administrator said of the time the superintendent was spending developing partnerships, "*It was complicated. It was more trouble than it was worth.*" Moreover, it took away from the instructional efforts they felt were at the core of the necessary work. She/he explained:

> *Has it impacted us? It's impacted us negatively. It stops the work. It doesn't promote the work, unfortunately. As soon as this Partnership hit, we stopped. Halted completely. [Our other work] was dead in the water, because we spent so much time, weeks at a time, all day in this room knocking out the Partnership. That was us. Then when our part was written and we started moving forward, [the superintendent] has been out of the picture working on bringing in partners, meeting partners.*

This sentiment underscores how, in some cases, making decisions to buffer or only symbolically adopt demands of the reform might be more productive than trying to adopt new reform initiatives wholesale. At least in this case, making good faith attempts to comply with the demands and trying to bridge to new resources suggested by the policy ended up taking precious time and attention away from other improvement efforts. One district administrator was explicit that she/he believed that the Partnership Model itself got in the way of the intent of the reform – to improve systems in order to improve student outcomes. When we asked what advice she/he would give to a district entering Partnership, she/he responded:

> *My first advice would be to take the work that you're already doing and look at it. Use your data, look at it, and go from there. Don't try to do something different. Try to be a little more forceful with MDE and your partners. Maybe limit the number of partners, then get some very specific commitments from them before you embark on this… When you get down to it, the partners don't really do much. Be careful – I don't know. Bring your board along as much as you can, help them to stay in their lane.*

In essence, this district administrator recommended symbolically adopting the Partnership Model, somewhat like Penguins had done, while also using elements of the reform to bridge to new interventions.

In sum, the relational dynamics of the district and community made it difficult to enact change and come to consensus. In addition, although well-intentioned, the demands of the reform proved to be too much in a district like Whalers, that suffered from a toxic and difficult culture, was already engaged in substantial change, and that had limited resources and capacity to begin with. This section turns to this last point – human capital resources – in what is an unfortunate, yet familiar, story.

WHALERS' LOW DISTRICT CAPACITY WAS EXACERBATED BY A LACK OF HUMAN CAPITAL

As in Penguins and Blues, personnel recruitment, retention, and turnover surfaced as major impediments to reform implementation and efficacy. However, the unique context of Whalers exacerbated these issues even further, painting an even more dire picture of the potential for turnaround in the face of human capital challenges.

Leadership instability was a major impediment to reform.

Whalers experienced consistent leadership turnover. An ISD employee noted that not only was teacher and principal turnover difficult to overcome, but superintendent turnover was also a major problem:

> *I'll just start by saying a lack of a consistent leader. We've worked with [several] different superintendents in a [short time] period. There's a lack of consistent leadership. There's board member interference in decision making. A lot of systems issues, even though, I think, we've brought in a lot of stability when it comes to systems… I think, in my mind, it all boils down to leadership and board involvement.*

A district employee also described the leadership turnover since she/he joined the district, "*When I started this position in [year within the past five years], they were transitioning. One superintendent was leaving, and another – they had a transition period where they had a couple of different interims. There was lots of chaos before that.*"

Given this level of leadership instability, implementing reforms of any sort is inherently difficult – especially one, like the Partnership Model, that relies on the central office as the critical driver of

change and requires the creation and maintenance of trusting relationships with community partners. One community partner summed up the challenges of working with a district with leadership turnover and conflict:

> *You have to have someone who's able to use what we or another group are offering and manage that in some kind of consistent way. The inconsistency in the structures and systems is, I think, a really huge challenge. I think while we and other partners will continue to want to do what we can and do what we can, we can't be the solution. We can only be a piece of the jigsaw, maybe linking some other pieces together, but the management of the partnership and the skills has got to come from inside.*

Together, this case (and particularly compared with Penguins) suggests that longevity in the position may be a critical factor in helping superintendents and districts productively build community partnerships. In situations of high conflict or where superintendents are newer, more support and time might be needed to help build productive community partnerships.

MAKING GOOD FAITH ATTEMPTS TO COMPLY WITH THE DEMANDS AND TRYING TO BRIDGE TO NEW RESOURCES SUGGESTED BY THE POLICY ENDED UP TAKING PRECIOUS TIME AND ATTENTION AWAY FROM OTHER IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS.

The difficulty of implementing instructional reforms with an unstable teacher work force.

Whalers experienced similar challenges as Blues in terms of staffing schools and district positions. District employees involved with instructional efforts at the school level described severe difficulties with staffing and retaining teachers. Several said that a sizable portion of educators were long-term substitutes. The human capital context in Whalers was so dire that interviewees were despondent about their abilities to affect instructional change. For instance, in response to whether Partnership would help, one said: *"I mean, you can develop these goals, these lofty goals, and say that our students are capable of achieving them, but they need teachers to teach them."*

Another district employee tasked with coaching teachers and helping to improve instruction in the district noted how her/his already time-crunched duties are made worse by having to work with substitutes:

> *I don't have time in my day to do data talks with teachers... Now I have to figure out how I'm going to take two hours out of my day next week to meet with different grade levels to have a conversation around data, especially subs. Then it will be four hours, because I've got to explain the purpose of data and then how I might use it and demonstrate it.*

This idea that the sheer proportion of substitute teachers in the district made any improvement effort feel like a lost cause was reiterated over and over. Another employee said:

> *[Turnover is] a huge component, because every few weeks potentially we can have a different person in that classroom. It gets really defeating to train somebody, and spend time with them, and really get them going, and then they have a couple of bad days in the classroom and they're like, I can't do this anymore. I'm out of here. Then it goes – you go back to the drawing board. There's a constant training need for onboarding.*

Additionally, turnover created numerous instructional system implementation problems. Two examples we heard were related to professional development and the curriculum. The employee charged with supporting teachers explained:

> *Thinking about PDs [professional developments] are very basic. Now, like, I meet weekly with 30 subs, and teach around very basic pieces. Last week, we talked around, how do you build a relationship with your kids? Granted, we don't learn that in college, but after a couple – you get used to it, you figure that out. These folks don't have that. Next week we start looking at instructional focus. What is the purpose of a learning target? I call it "Teaching 101," that's really what my sub PDs are. I could be a college professor, because I could just teach Teaching 101 [every week].*

YOU CAN DEVELOP THESE GOALS, THESE LOFTY GOALS, AND SAY THAT OUR STUDENTS ARE CAPABLE OF ACHIEVING THEM, BUT THEY NEED TEACHERS TO TEACH THEM.

The idea that teacher development had to focus at a very basic level was made even more complicated by the curriculum they were attempting to put in place so that teachers could help raise standards and expectations for students. The same person said:

> *Great curriculum, high ranked by ed reports. Very rigorous for students. The problem is, it's rigorous for staff. When I have a third of my staff who, A, they have no content, no understanding of teaching, and they were supposed to come in and pick up a sub and teach it, and then I have low students. Beginning of this year, [hundreds of] kids, who didn't know letter sounds or letter IDs. How do you implement something that's so rigorous, right?*

The high rate of turnover in Whalers diminished teacher capacity and skill, making it nearly impossible for the district to implement a rigorous curriculum.

Inability to attract educators to the district because of low pay and poor working conditions.

The human capital problem was further exacerbated because there were so few resources available to incentivize teachers to come to or stay in the district, especially in light of the difficult working conditions and low pay that teachers would face there. As one MDE representative said about Whalers:

> *They have really high turnover just in teachers, and they can't get enough teachers. They have a ton of subs. When [so much of your teaching staff] has been outsourced to subs, it's a struggle to have any sort of real result. It turns into teachers for lack of better words*

just babysitting because they're not qualified to teach or certified to teach whatever they're in front of the kids for. The [problem is also made worse because] pay is horrible.

District staff also reported that teachers in Whalers were making significantly less than they could in surrounding districts and explained that this made it very difficult to compete with surrounding districts when teaching positions opened up in more desirable locales.

SUMMARY

The story of Whalers showcases the difficulty of school and district turnaround within a charged political environment with deep and historical rifts between groups of stakeholders. Whalers shows how, in such a context, a district's problems can cascade, reinforcing and exacerbating other problems. In particular, this case highlights how working to adopt a turnaround reform wholesale may not always prove the most effective turnaround strategy. The superintendent may have benefited from strategically determining where to bridge, where to buffer, and where to take advantage of any existing processes that could be adapted to the Partnership reform.

CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS

The experiences of district- and school-level educators in our case studies illustrate not only how, but why turnaround is so difficult, particularly in Michigan's most distressed communities. We found several themes across our case districts that helped explain the variation in implementation and the common challenges each district confronted. Figure 7.4 summarized examples from our findings as they relate to each theme.

Returning to our theoretical framing, these cases provide examples of how bridging, buffering, and symbolic adoption of the external demands of a policy can be productive or unproductive. In Penguins' case, because participants noted there was a strong and experienced superintendent, the district's primary response was to strategically buffer and symbolically adopt demands by using existing community partnerships and goals in their Partnership Agreement and aligning them with pre-existing initiatives. However, this superintendent was also able to use the reform as a bridge to accomplish what she/he perceived as a necessary reconstitution of a Partnership school. By contrast, Blues and Whalers had newer superintendents who both tried to comply with the demands of the Partnership reform and implemented it in alignment with the general Theory of Change. While district staff in Blues appreciated the superintendent's urgent efforts, the reviews were more mixed on the ground as teachers grappled with multiple different implementation demands alongside high staff turnover. Blues illustrates the complexity of reform implementation – specifically the challenges of creating necessary change while considering teacher motivation and morale. Finally, Whalers represents a district attempting to make changes in compliance with the reform. In this case, attempts at bridging to new resources may have been unproductive, as reform implementation ended up surfacing conflict and distrust while also taking time away from other improvement efforts that district staff felt were more important, thus, highlighting how partners could contribute to rather than assist with existing issues in districts.

Figure 7.4. Cross-Case Themes

	BLUES	PENGUINS	WHALERS
PROBLEMS WITH TEACHER SUPPLY AND TURNOVER	Up to 50% of educators reportedly left each year.	Cited a low supply of educators willing and able to work in urban settings.	A sizable portion of the district's teaching staff were reported to be substitute teachers.
DISTRICT LEADERSHIP'S ABILITY TO BRIDGE AND BUFFER STRATEGICALLY AND TO BUILD COALITIONS	Superintendent perceived as a strong (new) leader by district staff and some community members. Attempts at change are driven by Partnership reform but are not yet well-received by teachers. Aligned school board. MDE liaison was perceived as helpful and contributed support as needed and when asked.	Superintendent has a history in the district and perceived as a strong leader. Changes are perceived as productive at numerous levels, but many changes are not driven by Partnership. Buffering and symbolic adoption were preferred. Aligned school board, district staff, and teachers. Although there was little perceived need for support, MDE liaison was considered to be helpful and contributed support as needed.	New superintendent perceived as a strong leader by district staff but was unable to gain board support. Lack of consensus over Partnership goals. Time spent on Partnership compliance took away from school improvement efforts that some felt were more productive. Distrusting community and school board. Inability to build trust and partnership amplifies existing issues of trust and creates conflict. The MDE liaison was less helpful supporting implementation than MDE liaisons in other case sites.
TURNOVER AND SHORTAGE IMPACT PARTNERSHIP MODEL IMPLEMENTATION	Teachers perceived that curriculum and turnover were problematic. Teachers and district staff noted the cost of training and retraining new staff. Adopted more scripted curriculum.	Used Partnership school reconstitution and new leadership as a strategy to attract well-matched educators. Despite this, reported difficulty staffing some positions in newly reconstituted school.	Basic and ongoing training for substitutes. Inability to teach more rigorous curriculum because of low teacher capacity. Constant need to spend time onboarding rather than focusing on advanced professional learning.

In addition, we saw that in at least two of the cases, MDE liaisons were perceived as helpful and superintendents turned to them for assistance when needed. However, in Whalers' case, the liaison was not helpful to the district in several instances, potentially exacerbating long-standing conditions of distrust and illustrating the difficult balance between a liaison as a source of both support and accountability. Taken together, these cases provide important considerations for future implementation of the reform. In particular, an assessment of district and leader capacity and specific local context might help state-level policy makers and partners provide Partnership districts and schools with the appropriate level of support.

SECTION SEVEN - NOTES

[1] We opted not to provide a richer description of each district context (e.g. size, students served, number of Partnership schools, etc.) to protect the anonymity of districts and the participants within them.

Partnership Turnaround Report: SECTION EIGHT

CAVEATS

EPIC
Education Policy
Innovation Collaborative
RESEARCH WITH CONSEQUENCE

Section Eight: CAVEATS

Although the results of this report are robust across different analytical approaches and sources of data, there are nevertheless caveats to our findings that merit discussion. This section organizes these caveats into the areas of policy changes, those related to the nature of the data evaluated in this report, and the scope of this evaluation, and briefly reviews them and their implications for how this report is interpreted.

DATA-RELATED CAVEATS

POLICY CHANGES LIMIT THE ABILITY TO MEASURE PARTNERSHIP EFFECTS ON STUDENT ATTENDANCE

Changes in attendance policy limited our ability to estimate the impact of the Partnership Model on student attendance as measured by their daily attendance rate and the rate of chronic absenteeism. Starting with the 2017-2018 school year, the Michigan Department of Education adopted a new definition of a student absence that all schools across the state were required to use. Up through the 2016-2017 school year, a student was considered absent only if she/he missed an entire school day. Starting with the 2017-2018 school year, students are considered absent if they miss more than 50% of a school day. This change also impacted the measure of chronic absenteeism because daily attendance is used to identify students as chronically absent.

For an example of how this policy changed impacted our ability to attribute changes in student attendance to the Partnership Model, consider the following scenario: In both the 2016-2017 and the 2017-2018 school years, a student missed two full days of school and was also not present for 75% of the school day on six other days. In 2016-2017, the student would have been counted absent for

two days. In 2017-2018, the student would have been counted as absent for eight days even though she/he missed the same amount of school. Thus, changes in attendance rates between these years do not necessarily reflect changes in the amount of time that students were present in school.

Because this change in how attendance is measured coincided with the implementation of the Partnership Model in 2017-18, which Round 1 districts began implementing the same year, it is not possible to determine whether observed changes in student attendance were due to the effect(s) of the Partnership Model on students or were an artifact of the new way that attendance is measured.

DISTRICTS' RELIANCE ON SUBSTITUTE TEACHERS PREVENTS US FROM FULLY MEASURING THE HUMAN CAPITAL CHALLENGE

A common theme in interviews with the leaders of Partnership districts, teacher and administrator surveys, and our case study data was that Partnership schools and districts experience significant difficulty hiring and retaining qualified teachers and sometimes rely on substitute teachers to fill instructional positions. At present, we are unable to fully examine the extent to which districts use long-term substitutes to fill teaching positions across different contexts. With a daily substitute teacher permit, one can work in a single teaching assignment for up to 90 calendar days but the data does not indicate whether a person with this permit worked only intermittently throughout the school year, for a full 90 days before moving to a new assignment, or anything in between. In addition, the prevalence of long-term substitute permits in a given district may not reflect the extent to which individual educators were filling vacancies on a substitute rather than permanent basis. In future years of this report, we plan to more extensively examine the use of long-term substitutes, as well as other issues related to filling teacher vacancies.

THERE MAY BE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN "WHO IS TEACHING" AND "WHO IS A TEACHER" IN PARTNERSHIP DISTRICTS

Although defining a teacher in the Registry of Education Personnel (REP) is relatively straightforward, this report used the definition maintained by the Office of Educator Excellence at the Michigan Department of Education, in practice different sources of data used different definitions of a teacher. For instance, some data sources identified teachers based on an identifier of the type of work they do in their respective school(s), meaning that substitute and regularly credentialed teachers are all considered teachers. In others, only those with a valid Michigan Educator Certificate were counted as teachers. Finally, some data weight teaching positions based on their full-time equivalent (FTE) status. For instance, a person working as a long-term substitute teacher for one out of five instructional periods may differentially be counted as one teacher, not a teacher, and .2 teachers across different data sources. In schools and districts across Michigan that primarily employ full-time, certified teachers in instructional positions, these differences are likely to be small. However, due to the issues raised in our interview data, these distinctions may be more meaningful when examining Partnership schools and districts.

ALTHOUGH THE SURVEYS ARE IMPORTANT TO REPRESENT EDUCATORS' VOICES, RESPONSE RATES ARE BELOW 50%

As noted earlier in this report, we attempted to survey all teachers and principals in Partnership districts to learn about the implementation of the Partnership Model and about conditions at their schools and districts. We received responses from nearly 3,000 educators, or 38% of the population of teachers and principals in those districts. If certain types of teachers or principals were more or less likely to respond to the survey, this could skew our findings. To account for this, we weighted our survey responses to make results more representative of population of interest. However, there may be other unobservable characteristics that were correlated with how an educator would have responded to the survey and whether educators elected to respond for which we were not able to account. If so, this could be a source of bias that impacted the generalizability of our survey findings.

NOT ALL SUPERINTENDENTS WERE WILLING TO BE INTERVIEWED FOR THIS REPORT

To describe how districts approached the Partnership Model, this report draws heavily on interviews with the leaders of Partnership districts. After repeatedly contacting the leaders of all Partnership districts, our team was able to schedule interviews with 21 of the 33 districts that were implementing the Partnership Model during the 2018-2019 school year, a response rate of over 60%. While this captures a broad swath of Partnership districts, the leaders of the other approximately 40% of Partnership districts may have had unique experiences and perceptions relevant to our evaluation of this reform that could not be included in this report.

SCOPE-RELATED CAVEATS

While this report draws on a wide range of data sources to examine the early implementation and impact of the Partnership reform, resource constraints prevented the research team from including input from parents and students about their experiences and perceptions related to the Partnership Model. We also were unable to survey educators in Priority schools not in Partnership districts. As a result, this report should be interpreted as an examination of how Partnership has affected educators, their work, and student outcomes after one year of implementation. Reports in future years may indicate different outcomes over time, or across Rounds 1, 2, or 3.

Partnership Turnaround Report:
SECTION NINE

KEY TAKEAWAYS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

EPIC
Education Policy
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Section Nine:
KEY TAKEAWAYS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This report is the first in a multi-year evaluation of the implementation and efficacy of the Partnership Model of school and district turnaround conducted at the request of the Michigan Department of Education (MDE). This evaluation included analyses of student academic outcomes, surveys of teachers and principals in Partnership districts (in both Partnership and non-Partnership schools), interviews of Partnership district superintendents and key state-level stakeholders, and case studies of three Partnership districts. The objective of this first report was to establish an overview of Partnership Model implementation across the state, as well as an analysis of first-year (2017-18) student academic outcomes – including but not limited to M-STEP results – and teacher outcomes associated with retention and turnover. This final section outlines key takeaways and considers the implications of these results for future policy making.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

DISTRICTS AND SCHOOLS HAVE IMPLEMENTED THE PARTNERSHIP MODEL, BUT NOT ALWAYS AS INTENDED

- The Partnership Model is based on a Theory of Change involving collaboration across multiple groups: teachers, principals, district leaders, state liaisons, intermediate school districts (ISDs), and community stakeholders. Principals and, in particular, teachers in many schools and districts were unaware of Partnership implementation, and thus unable to attribute changes in the district directly to this reform.

- By design, each district implemented its own local version of the Partnership Model that was supposed to be guided by its local Partnership Agreement. In general, few Partnership Agreements were of high quality, which may shape the efficacy of districts' reforms.

- However, teachers and principals express some optimism for improvement over time, regardless of whether the Partnership Model is driving those improvements.

- Participating in the Partnership reform appears to have improved school and district perceptions of MDE support efforts, as well as relationships with the ISDs.
- The Partnership Model may provide an opportunity for some school district leaders to implement changes ranging from curricular and professional development reform to staffing and personnel changes, strategically using the reform as the motivation for major overhaul.
- Districts varied widely in the extent to which they embraced the reform, with some districts using the Partnership Model to address the reform's goals, and others making changes more selectively.

EARLY PARTNERSHIP EFFECTS ON STUDENT AND TEACHER OUTCOMES ARE MIXED

- Relative to the last pre-Partnership year, Partnership identification did not improve test scores and may even have had a negative impact, especially in DPSCD. However, Partnership implementation had a large and positive effect – also concentrated in DPSCD - that was larger than any negative impact of identification.
- Partnership appears to have reduced high school drop-out rates in both the identification and implementation years in DPSCD.
- The Partnership Model increased teacher retention after implementation and increased the rate of new teachers in Partnership schools across the state.
- However, administrators still cite teacher recruitment and retention – and other human capital challenges – as major issues facing their districts.

THE MIXED PICTURE OF PARTNERSHIP MODEL IMPLEMENTATION IS TO BE EXPECTED SO EARLY IN THE REFORM

- Districts and schools have three years to improve under their initial Partnership Agreements. Educational change rarely happens instantly.

IMPLICATIONS

Districts recognize the accountability elements that are part of the Partnership Model, and superintendents and leaders at the IDS and state-levels can use these strategically to implement change.

THE LOCAL FOCUS OF EACH PARTNERSHIP REFORM IS AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF PARTNERSHIP SUCCESS, BUT IT CAN ALSO CREATE CHALLENGES

- Despite the improved relationships with MDE and the ISD, districts' other partners vary in usefulness and quality. Some districts used community partners to address underlying issues

related to local historic and economic challenges, others were unclear or ambivalent about the community role. In addition, local school boards varied in how much they embraced or frustrated improvement efforts.

- The state – whether MDE, the governor's office, or the legislature – can recognize local contexts and support improvement efforts by continuing to build state capacity and processes/tools to help support districts as they address locally defined needs. Some of these processes can be standardized given shared challenges districts face.

OF ALL SHARED CHALLENGES, HUMAN CAPITAL IS THE MOST ACUTE

- Human capital challenges, in particular teacher recruitment and retention, are perceived by district leaders to be the greatest impediment to improvement. But while an important element of Partnership's Theory of Change, addressing human capital challenges is essentially unaddressed by the reform itself. Partnership may have improved teacher retention in the first year, but there is no underlying mechanism to resolve fundamental issues related to human capital.

- This is a complicated policy problem to address, especially where districts require both a stable work force and one that is also highly effective and high-capacity. Districts cannot invest in skill and capacity until the problems of recruitment and retention are addressed.

- The human capital problem – including both skill/capacity but also recruitment and retention – extends to principals and district leaders. As leadership turns over in these Partnership districts, implementation efforts will be affected.

MULTIPLE IMPROVEMENT POLICIES THAT OVERLAP WITH PARTNERSHIP MODEL EFFORTS MAY AFFECT IMPLEMENTATION IN THE FUTURE

- Michigan has a number of high-profile improvement policies that have and will disproportionately affect many schools and districts now in Partnership. These include the new Read by Grade Three Law implementation, which is scheduled to take full effect in the 2019-2020 school year, and the new A-F report card system. State policy makers can recognize the need to help districts navigate multiple layers of policy and help guide the extent to which districts should selectively engage in strategies to make outcomes more productive.

- Any reform takes time, and the fact that the Partnership reform is not hindering improvement and may actually be improving some teacher and student outcomes even after just one year is important. As other policies are layered on top of the Partnership Model, state policy makers in particular may need to give districts time to continue a long-term plan for productive change.

THERE REMAIN FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGES FOR PARTNERSHIP DISTRICTS BEYOND THE REACH OF ONE PARTICULAR REFORM, INCLUDING CHALLENGES RELATED TO RESOURCES

- Every other issue, from human capital to academic opportunity gaps, is tied to local conditions. The state can recognize that efforts to improve, and the measures by which Partnership schools and districts are gauged for success, occur in this context.

- Districts recognize that the funding associated with the Partnership Model is useful, and for the most part are attempting to leverage those resources well. But few believe it is sufficient to fully implement the reform, much less solve underlying challenges.

- Although the Partnership Model is intended to make fundamental changes to districts' education systems and spur improvement, reforms are still occurring largely on the margin. Most districts do not report the ability nor many wholesale strategies to upend the status quo, even if improvement goals represent substantial moves forward.

STATE POLICYMAKERS SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT EVEN A FULLY IMPLEMENTED PARTNERSHIP MODEL IS UNLIKELY TO BE A PANACEA OR A CURE-ALL FOR FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES FACING MICHIGAN'S STRUGGLING SCHOOLS. PARTNERSHIP SCHOOLS DID NOT FALL BEHIND OVERNIGHT, NOR DID THE CONDITIONS OF POVERTY AND, IN SOME CASES, COLLECTIVE TRAUMA DEVELOP OUT OF A SINGLE FAILED POLICY OR PROGRAM.

CONCLUSION

This report has documented schools' and districts' efforts to create Partnership Agreements and strategies for improvement under the Partnership Model, their efforts to implement those plans, and the outcomes associated with that work. On balance, we observed modest but potentially positive results of some efforts, most notably gains in test scores (particularly M-STEP ELA, and especially in DPSCD) and in teacher retention. In addition, one benefit seemed to be improved relationships between the districts and MDE, as well as collaboration between districts and the ISDs. However, these represent short-term accomplishments that could fade with time, particularly if Partnership efforts are either not sustained or are hampered by new policies that replace or even conflict with districts' Partnership Model implementation plans.

State policymakers should recognize that even a fully implemented Partnership Model is unlikely to be a panacea or a cure-all for fundamental issues facing Michigan's struggling schools. Partnership schools did not fall behind overnight, nor did the conditions of poverty and – in some cases – collective trauma develop out of a single failed policy or program. These problems are old, and their persistence implies that the solutions to address them must be new.

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APPENDIX 1 - TABLE OF PARTNERSHIP DISTRICTS AND SCHOOLS BY ROUND AND CURRENT STATUS

District	School	Exited Partnership?
ROUND 1		
Benton Harbor Area Schools		
	Dream Alternative Academy School of Choice	Exited summer 2018 via a Cooperative Agreement with MDE
	International Academy at Hull	Exited summer 2018 via a Cooperative Agreement with MDE
	STEAM Academy at MLK	Exited summer 2018 via a Cooperative Agreement with MDE
Kalamazoo		
	Washington Writers' Academy	
	Woodward School for Technology and Research	
Eastpointe		
	Eastpointe Middle School	
Muskegon Heights Public Schools Academy System		
	Muskegon Heights Academy	
Pontiac		
	Pontiac High School	
	Whitman Elementary School	
Saginaw		
	Jesse Loomis School	
	Saginaw High School	
Bridgeport-Spaulding Community School District		
	Martin G. Atkins Elementary School	
Detroit Public Schools Community District		
	Ann Arbor Trail Magnet School	
	Bow Elementary-Middle School	
	Burns Elementary-Middle School	
	Clark, J.E. Preparatory Academy	
	Denby High School	
	Detroit Collegiate Preparatory High School	
	Detroit Institute of Technology at Cody	Closed by district
	Durfee Elementary-Middle School	
	Fisher Magnet Upper Academy	
	Ford High School	
	Gompers Elementary-Middle School	
	Henderson Academy	
	Law Elementary School	

District	School	Exited Partnership?
ROUND 1		
Detroit Public Schools Community District (continued)	Marquette Elementary-Middle School	
	Mary McLeod Bethune Elementary-Middle School	
	Mason Elementary School	
	Mumford High School	
	Osborn Academy of Mathematics	
	Osborn College Preparatory Academy	Closed by district
	Osborn Evergreen Academy of Design and Alternative Energy	Closed by district
	Pershing High School	
	Sampson Academy	
	Southeastern High School	
	Thirkell Elementary School	
ROUND 2		
Mildred C. Wells Preparatory Academy		
	Mildred C. Wells Preparatory Academy	
Battle Creek Public Schools		
	Ann J. Kellogg School	
	Northwestern Middle School	
Lansing		
	Attwood Elementary	
	Gardner International Academy	
	J.W. Sexton High School	
	North School	
	Woodcreek Achievement Center	
Muskegon Heights Public Schools Academy System		
	Dr. Martin Luther King Academy	
Pontiac		
	Owens Elementary School	
	Pontiac Middle School	
Saginaw		
	Jesse Rouse School	
Detroit Public Schools Community District		
	Blackwell Institute	
	Brewer Elementary-Middle School	
	Carstens Elementary-Middle School	
	Cody Academy of Public Leadership	
	Detroit International Academy for Young	
	Dixon Elementary School	

District	School	Exited Partnership?
ROUND 2		
Detroit Public Schools Community District (continued)	Dossin Elementary-Middle School	
	Earhart Elementary-Middle School	
	East English Village Preparatory Academy	
	Edward "Duke" Ellington @ Beckham	
	Emerson Elementary-Middle School	
	Greenfield Union Elementary-Middle School	
	King High School	
	King, John R. Academic and Performing Arts	
	Mackenzie Elementary-Middle School	
	Mann Elementary School	
	Marshall, Thurgood Elementary School	
	Neinas Dual Language Learning Academy	
	Noble Elementary-Middle School	
	Palmer Park Preparatory Academy	
	Pulaski Elementary-Middle School	
	Schulze Elementary-Middle School	
	Wayne Elementary School	
Wayne-Westland Community School District		
	Hoover Elementary School	
Henry Ford Academy		
	Henry Ford Academy: School for Creative Design	
American International Academy		
	American International Academy - Elementary	
David Ellis Academy		
	David Ellis Academy	
ROUND 3		
Insight School of Michigan		
	Insight School of Michigan	
Flint Community Schools		
	Accelerated Learning Academy	
	Doyle Ryder Elementary	
	Durant-Tuuri-Mott Elementary	
	Eisenhower school	
	Freeman school	
	Holmes STEM Academy	
	Neithercut Elementary	
	Northwestern High School (Flint)	

District	School	Exited Partnership?
ROUND 3		
Flint Community Schools (continued)	Pierce School	
	Potter School	
	Scott School	
	Southwestern Classical Academy	
Genessee STEM Academy		
	Genessee STEM Academy	
El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz Academy		
	El Hajj Malik El-Shabazz Academy	
Grand Rapids Public Schools		
	Alger Middle School	
William C. Abney Academy		
	William C. Abney Academy Elementary	
Baldwin Public Schools		
	Baldwin Junior High School	
Macomb Montessori Academy		
	Macomb Montessori Academy	
Sarah J. Webber Media Arts Academy		
	Sarah J. Webber Media Arts Academy	
Great Lakes Academy		
	Great Lakes Academy	
Saginaw Preparatory Academy		
	Saginaw Preparatory Academy	
Detroit Public Schools Community District		
	A. Philip Randolph Technical High School	Closed by district
	Brenda Scott Academy for Theatre Arts	
	Brown, Ronald Academy	
	Carleton Elementary School	
	Douglass Academy for Young Men	
	Eastside Detroit Lions Academy	
	Fisher Magnet Lower Academy	
	Gardner Elementary School	
	Garvey Academy	
	Mark Twain Elementary-Middle School	
	Medicine and Community Health Academy at	
	Nichols Elementary-Middle School	
	Robeson Academy, Malcolm X Academy	
Ecorse Public Schools		
	Ecorse Community High School	

District	School	Exited Partnership?
ROUND 3		
Detroit Public Safety Academy		
	Detroit Public Safety Academy	
Detroit Delta Preparatory Academy for Social Justice		
	Detroit Delta Preparatory Academy for Social Justice	Closed by board
Detroit Leadership Academy		
	Detroit Leadership Academy Middle/High	
GEE Edmonson Academy		
	GEE Edmonson Academy	
Joy Preparatory Academy		
	Joy Preparatory Academy	
Frederick Douglass International Academy		
	Frederick Douglass International Academy	Closed by board

Sources: MDE Office of Partnership Districts Press Releases, CEPI Educational Entity Master.

APPENDIX 2 - PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT EVALUATION RUBRIC

Domain	Exemplary	Adequate	Approaching Adequate	Emerging
PRE-INTERVENTION DISTRICT CONTEXT				
Analysis of Current Academic Outcomes				
How thorough is the district's analysis of current academic outcomes?	The plan provided a rich description of the district's current academic performance data. This description included specific data (such as test scores) for individual grade levels and includes data trends over time. Multiple measures are described.	The plan provided an adequate description of the district's current academic performance data but is lacking some detail. For example, the plan may only describe one measure of academic performance, fail to describe performance by individual grade level/ subject area, or trends over time may be missing.	The plan provided some description of the district's current academic performance data but is lacking some detail. Two of the following three conditions are met: the plan may only describe one measure of academic performance, the plan fails to describe performance by individual grade level/ subject area, or trends over time may be missing.	The plan provided very little description of the district's current academic performance data. The plan describes only one measure of academic performance, the plan fails to describe performance by individual grade level/ subject area, and trends over time are missing.
How thorough is the district's analysis of current non-academic outcomes?	The plan provided a rich description of the district's current non-academic performance data. This description includes specific data (such as test attendance rates) for individual grade levels and includes data trends over time. Multiple measures are described.	The plan provided an adequate description of the district's current non-academic performance data but is lacking some detail. For example, the plan may only describe one measure of non-academic performance, fail to describe performance by individual grade level or trends over time may be missing.	The plan provided some description of the district's current non-academic performance data but is lacking some detail. Two of the following three conditions are met: the plan may only describe one measure of non-academic performance, the plan fails to describe performance by individual grade level/ subject area, or trends over time may be missing.	The plan provided very little description of the district's current non-academic performance data. The plan described only one measure of non-academic performance, the plan failed to describe performance by individual grade level/subject area, and trends over time are missing.
Strengths and Weaknesses				
How thoroughly does the district identify and describe their academic strengths and weaknesses?	The plan provided a detailed description of the district's academic strengths and weaknesses, supported by data/ evidence. (For example, instead of simply stating that there has been recent academic growth, specific growth rates are given.) Strengths and weaknesses are relevant to the partnership goals of improving student academic outcomes.	The plan provided an adequate description of the district's academic strengths and weaknesses. However, specific data/ evidence are not present. (For example, the plan might state that there has been recent academic growth without stating any specific rates.) Strengths and weaknesses are relevant to partnership goals of improving student academic outcomes.	The plan provided some detail in its description of the district's academic strengths and weaknesses, but does not offer specific data/evidence. Strengths and weaknesses are weakly related to partnership goals of improving student academic outcomes.	Although the plan described strengths and weaknesses of the district, they do not relate to academic outcomes. The plan identified two or fewer specific strengths and weaknesses and includes very little detail.
How thoroughly does the district identify and describe their non-academic strengths and weaknesses?	The plan provided a detailed description of the district's non-academic strengths and weaknesses, supported by data/ evidence. (For example, instead of simply describing community collaboration as "strong," specific examples are given.) Strengths and weaknesses are relevant to the partnership goals of improving student non-academic outcomes.	The plan provided an adequate description of the district's non-academic strengths and weaknesses. However, specific data/ evidence are not present. (For example, the plan might describe community collaboration as "strong" without giving any specific examples.) Strengths and weaknesses are relevant to partnership goals of improving student non-academic outcomes.	The plan provided some detail in its description of the district's non-academic strengths and weaknesses, but does not offer specific data/evidence. Strengths and weaknesses are weakly related to partnership goals of improving student non-academic outcomes.	Although the plan described strengths and weaknesses of the district, they do not relate to non-academic outcomes. The plan identified two or fewer specific strengths and weaknesses and includes very little detail.

Domain	Exemplary	Adequate	Approaching Adequate	Emerging
OUTCOMES				
Academic Outcomes				
36-MONTH ACADEMIC GOALS				
36-month goals: How closely do the 36-month academic goals align with the district's pre-intervention context?	36-month academic goals are well aligned with the district's pre-intervention context. For example, if a district identified math achievement as an area of concern, it was incorporated into the district's 36-month goals.	36-month academic goals are, for the most part, aligned with the district's pre-intervention context. For example, if a district identified math achievement as an area of concern, it was incorporated into the district's 36-month goals. However, the plan may not have direct alignment between the district's pre-intervention context and 36-month academic goals in all cases.	36-month academic goals are only aligned with the district's pre-intervention context in some cases. For example, if math and reading were both identified as areas of concern in the district's pre-intervention context, the 36-month academic goals may not address both.	36-month academic goals, while present, do not relate to the district's pre-intervention context, as described in the district's plan.
36-month goals: Are the 36-month academic goals objectively measurable?	All 36-month academic goals have objectively measurable outcomes (e.g., increasing the percentage of students scoring at or above grade level in NWEA reading assessments by 6 percentage points).	More than half of the 36-month academic goals have objectively measurable outcomes (e.g., increasing the percentage of students scoring at or above grade level in NWEA reading assessments by 6 percentage points). However, this is not the case for every academic goal.	More than half of the 36-month academic goals are not objectively measurable. For example, a goal might be to "improve reading proficiency" or "increase SAT math scores."	36-month academic goals do not have objectively measurable outcomes. For example, a goal might be to "improve reading proficiency" or "increase SAT math scores."
18-MONTH ACADEMIC BENCHMARKS				
18-month benchmarks: How closely do the 18-month academic benchmarks align with the district's 36-month academic goals?	All 18-month academic benchmarks mirror the district's 36-month academic goals. Every 36-month goal has an 18-month benchmark describing where the district should be in terms of reaching the 36-month academic goal. For example, if a district has a 36-month goal of improving SAT scores, there is a corresponding 18-month benchmark.	18-month academic benchmarks, for the most part, mirror the district's 36-month academic goals. Most 36-month academic goals have an 18-month academic benchmark describing where the district should be in terms of reaching the 36-month academic goal. For example, if a district has a 36-month goal of improving SAT scores, there is a corresponding 18-month benchmark.	18-month academic benchmarks are only aligned with 36-month academic goals in some cases. For example, if math and reading improvement were both identified as 36-month academic goals, the 18-month academic benchmarks may fail to address both.	18-month academic benchmarks, while present, do not relate to the plan's 36-month academic goals.
18-month benchmarks: Are the 18-month academic benchmarks objectively measurable?	All 18-month academic benchmarks have objectively measurable outcomes (e.g., increasing the percentage of students scoring at or above grade level in NWEA reading assessments by 6 percentage points).	More than half of the 18-month academic benchmarks have objectively measurable outcomes (e.g., increasing the percentage of students scoring at or above grade level in NWEA reading assessments by 6 percentage points). However, this is not the case for every academic benchmark.	More than half of the 18-month academic benchmarks are not objectively measurable. For example, a benchmark might be to "improve reading proficiency" or "increase SAT math scores."	18-month academic benchmarks do not have objectively measurable outcomes. For example, a benchmark might be to "improve reading proficiency" or "increase SAT math scores."

Domain	Exemplary	Adequate	Approaching Adequate	Emerging
18-month benchmarks: How reasonable are the 18-month benchmarks in positioning the district to reach its 36-month academic goals?	18-month academic benchmarks, if achieved, position the district to reach its 36-month academic goals. For example, if a 36-month academic goal is to increase the number of students proficient in math by 8 percentage points, a reasonable 18-month academic benchmark would be to increase the number by 3 to 5 percentage points.	In most cases, 18-month academic benchmarks are reasonably ambitious to achieve 36-month academic goals. Some 18-month benchmarks, however, are either too rigorous (and likely unattainable) or lenient (and likely unable to position the district to reach 36-month academic goals).	In some cases, 18-month academic benchmarks are reasonably ambitious to achieve 36-month academic goals. Many 18-month benchmarks, however, are either too rigorous (and likely unattainable) or lenient (and likely unable to position the district to reach 36-month academic goals).	18-month academic benchmarks are either too ambitious and likely unattainable given the 36-month academic goals (for example, expecting a 5 percentage point increase in math proficiency rates when the 36-month academic goal is 6 percentage points) or not ambitious enough to achieve the 36-month academic goals (for example, expecting only a 1 percentage point increase in math proficiency rates when the 36-month academic goal is 6 percentage points).
Non-Academic Outcomes				
36-MONTH NON ACADEMIC OUTCOMES				
36-month goals: How closely do the 36-month non-academic goals align with the district's pre-intervention context?	36-month non-academic goals are well aligned with the district's pre-intervention context. For example, if a district identified discipline referrals as an area of concern, it was incorporated into the district's 36-month goals.	36-month non-academic goals are, for the most part, aligned with the district's pre-intervention context. For example, if a district identified discipline referrals as an area of concern, it was incorporated into the district's 36-month goals. However, the plan may not have direct alignment between the district's pre-intervention context and 36-month non-academic goals in all cases.	36-month non-academic goals are only aligned with the district's pre-intervention context in some cases. For example, if attendance and discipline referrals were both identified as areas of concern in the district's pre-intervention context, the 36-month non-academic goals may only address attendance.	36-month non-academic goals, while present, do not relate to the district's pre-intervention context, as described in the district's plan.
36-month goals: Are the 36-month non-academic goals objectively measurable?	All 36-month non-academic goals have objectively measurable outcomes (e.g., decrease discipline referrals by 40%).	More than half of the 36-month non-academic goals have objectively measurable outcomes (e.g., decrease discipline referrals by 40%). However, this is not the case for every non-academic goal.	More than half of the 36-month non-academic goals are not objectively measurable. For example, a goal might be to "improve attendance" or "decrease discipline referrals."	36-month non-academic goals do not have objectively measurable outcomes. For example, a goal might be to "improve attendance" or "decrease discipline referrals."
18-MONTH NON-ACADEMIC BENCHMARKS				
18-month benchmarks: How closely do the 18-month academic benchmarks align with the district's 36-month academic goals?	All 18-month non-academic benchmarks mirror the district's 36-month non-academic goals. Every 36-month goal has an 18-month benchmark describing where the district should be in terms of reaching the 36-month non-academic goal. For example, if a district has a 36-month goal of improving student discipline outcomes, there is a corresponding 18-month benchmark.	18-month non-academic benchmarks, for the most part, mirror the district's 36-month non-academic goals. Most 36-month non-academic goals have an 18-month non-academic benchmark describing where the district should be in terms of reaching the 36-month non-academic goal. For example, if a district has a 36-month goal of improving student discipline outcomes, there is a corresponding 18-month benchmark.	18-month non-academic benchmarks are only aligned with 36-month non-academic goals in some cases. For example, if attendance and discipline referrals were both identified as areas of concern in the district's pre-intervention context, the 36-month non-academic goals may only address attendance.	18-month non-academic benchmarks, while present, do not relate to the plan's 36-month non-academic goals.

Domain	Exemplary	Adequate	Approaching Adequate	Emerging
18-month benchmarks: Are the 18-month non-academic benchmarks objectively measurable?	All 18-month non-academic benchmarks have objectively measurable outcomes (e.g., decreasing discipline referrals by 40%).	More than half of the 18-month non-academic benchmarks have objectively measurable outcomes (e.g., decreasing discipline referrals by 40%). However, this is not the case for every non-academic benchmark.	More than half of the 18-month non-academic benchmarks are not objectively measurable. For example, a goal might be to "improve attendance" or "decrease discipline referrals."	18-month non-academic benchmarks do not have objectively measurable outcomes. For example, a goal might be to "improve attendance" or "decrease discipline referrals."
18-month benchmarks: How reasonable are the 18-month benchmarks in positioning the district to reach its 36-month non-academic goals?	18-month non-academic benchmarks, if achieved, position the district to reach its 36-month non-academic goals. For example, if a 36-month non-academic goal is to decrease discipline referrals by 40%, a reasonable 18-month non-academic benchmark would be 15-25%.	In most cases, 18-month non-academic benchmarks are reasonably ambitious to achieve 36-month non-academic goals. Some 18-month benchmarks, however, are either too rigorous (and likely unattainable) or lenient (and likely unable to position the district to reach 36-month non-academic goals).	In some cases, 18-month non-academic benchmarks are reasonably ambitious to achieve 36-month non-academic goals. Many 18-month benchmarks, however, are either too rigorous (and likely unattainable) or lenient (and likely unable to position the district to reach 36-month non-academic goals).	18-month non-academic benchmarks are either too ambitious and likely unattainable given the 36-month non-academic goals (for example, expecting a 35% decrease in discipline referrals when the 36-month non-academic goal is 40%) or not ambitious enough to achieve the 36-month non-academic goals (for example, expecting only a 5% decrease in discipline referrals when the 36-month non-academic goal is 40%).
NEXT LEVEL ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES				
This domain evaluates the quality of the plan's next level accountability standards.	The plan proposed an extensive and ambitious set of actions to be taken in the event that the 18-month benchmarks and 36-month goals are not met. A wide variety of actions are proposed that will comprehensively address the district's inability to meet benchmarks and goals. These actions may include: further work with partners, changes to personnel/leadership, and closure/reform model selection.	The plan proposed a set of actions to be taken in the event that the 18-month benchmarks and 36-month goals are not met. A variety of actions are proposed that will address the district's inability to meet benchmarks and goals. These actions may include: further work with partners, changes to personnel/leadership, and closure/reform model selection but do not include all of these strategies.	The plan proposed some actions to be taken in the event that the 18-month benchmarks and 36-month goals are not met. The proposed actions somewhat address the district's inability to meet benchmarks and goals but lack some detail.	The plan proposed a very limited set of actions to be taken in the event that the 18-month benchmarks and 36-month goals are not met. The proposed actions fail to address the district's inability to meet benchmarks and goals and lack detail.
PROFESSIONAL LEARNING STRATEGIES				
For each domain under "Professional Learning Action Plan," we will first indicate whether the strategy is present or not. For strategies that are present, we will then evaluate them on the four-point rubric scale.				
How well do the Professional learning strategies align with their pre-intervention context?	All of the professional learning strategies included in the plan are relevant to the pre-interview context and comprehensively address the needs of the students and staff.	Most of the professional learning strategies included in the plan are relevant to the pre-interview context and comprehensively address the needs of the students and staff. However, there are a few strategies that do not appear connected or relevant.	Some of the professional learning strategies included in the plan are relevant to the pre-interview context and comprehensively address the needs of the students and staff. However, there are several strategies that do not appear connected or relevant.	Few of the professional learning strategies included in the plan are relevant to the pre-interview context and comprehensively address the needs of the students and staff. However, most of the strategies do not appear connected or relevant.

Domain	Exemplary	Adequate	Approaching Adequate	Emerging
Improve school culture and climate	The plan included specific details about professional development implementation that will aid in improving school culture and climate (i.e. behavior, classroom management, restorative practices) with specific attention given to strategies and programs for teacher learning and measurable outcomes. The expressed purpose coheres with the established 36 month goals.	The plan included specific details about professional development implementation that will aid in improving school culture and climate (i.e. behavior, classroom management, restorative practices) but either without specific attention given to strategies and programs or lacks a plan for teacher learning and outcomes are measurable. The expressed purpose coheres with the established 36 month goals.	The plan included details about professional development implementation that will aid in improving school culture and climate (i.e. behavior, classroom management, restorative practices) but lacks both attention to strategies and programs and lacks a plan for teacher learning and outcomes are measurable. The expressed purpose loosely coheres with the established 36 month goals.	The plan included details about professional development implementation that will aid in improving school culture and climate (i.e. behavior, classroom management, restorative practices) but lacks attention to strategies and programs, a plan for teacher learning and outcomes are measurable. The expressed purpose is not coherent with the established 36 month goals.
Professional support for improving academic outcomes (including PLCs)	The plan provided a detailed description of the professional development opportunities that teachers and support staff will engage in to improve classroom instructional strategies. It specifically pinpoints which academic content areas are the areas of focus consistent with the established benchmarks and goals.	The plan provided a description of the professional development opportunities that teachers and support staff will engage in to improve classroom instructional strategies. It pinpoints which academic content areas are the areas of focus consistent with the established benchmarks and goals, yet the plan lacks some details and specificity.	The plan provided a description of the professional development opportunities that teachers and support staff will engage in to improve classroom instructional strategies, but does not pinpoint which academic content areas are the areas of focus consistent with the established benchmarks and goals.	The plan included professional development opportunities that will support teacher improvement of classroom instructional strategies, but does not pinpoint which academic content areas are the areas of focus consistent with the established benchmarks and goals as well as with MDE partnership district goals, lacks specificity for execution, and neglected the role of support staff.
Tiered Support and Interventions (MTSS)	The plan articulated that professional development for teachers and support staff will be provided involving multi-tiered systems of support. It is specific about both the content areas and the tier or tiers that are the center of focus. It also includes the student data sources (i.e. NWEA) to be analyzed and a focus on using the data to inform instructional decisions.	The plan articulated that professional development for teachers and support staff will be provided involving multi-tiered systems of support. It is specific about both the content areas and the tier or tiers that are the center of focus yet it lacked information regarding the student data sources (i.e. NWEA) to be analyzed and a focus on using the data to inform instructional decisions. OR The plan articulates that professional development for teachers and support staff will be provided involving multi-tiered systems of support. It is specific about either the content areas or the tier or tiers that are the center of focus, but not both. It included information regarding the student data sources (i.e. NWEA) to be analyzed and a focus on using the data to inform instructional decisions.	The plan articulated that professional development for teachers and support staff will be provided involving multi-tiered systems of support. It included either the content areas or the tier or tiers that are the center of focus, but not both. It also lacked information regarding the student data sources (i.e. NWEA) to be analyzed and a focus on using the data to inform instructional decisions.	The plan articulated that professional development for teachers and support staff will be provided involving multi-tiered systems of support. It did not include the content areas or the tier or tiers that are the center of focus. It also lacked information regarding the student data sources (i.e. NWEA) to be analyzed and a focus on using the data to inform instructional decisions.

Domain	Exemplary	Adequate	Approaching Adequate	Emerging
Whole-child approaches	The plan provided a detailed description of professional development and other teacher and support staff learning opportunities available that focus on other aspects of child wellness such as dealing with childhood trauma or social emotional learning. These professional development opportunities are consistent with the established benchmarks and goals.	The plan provided a detailed description of professional development or other teacher and support staff learning opportunities available that focus on other aspects of child wellness such as dealing with childhood trauma or social emotional learning. However, these professional development opportunities are inconsistent with the established benchmarks and goals.	The plan provided a description of professional development or other teacher and support staff learning opportunities available that focus on other aspects of child wellness such as dealing with childhood trauma or social emotional learning, but it is lacking detail and these professional development opportunities are inconsistent with the established benchmarks and goals.	The plan called for professional development or other teacher and support staff learning opportunities available that focus on other aspects of child wellness such as dealing with childhood trauma or social emotional learning, but does not describe what these opportunities will be, how they will be executed, and are inconsistent with the established benchmarks and goals.
EVALUATION OF PARTNERSHIPS				
Overall evaluation of use of four required partnerships (School Board, Superintendent, ISD/RESA, SRO/MDE	There is a detailed plan for utilizing the four required partners focused on improving students' academic achievement. The role of each partner is evident and clear with the overall goal of providing the district with the resources necessary to allow each student with access to a quality education.	There is a detailed plan for utilizing the four required partners that is focused on improving student achievement, but there are elements included that do not directly impact student achievement. The role each partner is clear, but there is no listing of the resources to be provided.	There is a plan for utilizing the three of the four required partners that is focused on improving student achievement, but many of the elements included that do not directly impact student achievement. The role each partner is unclear or not stated and the list of resources to be provided is unclear or not stated in some cases.	The plan for utilizing two or fewer of the required partners, is not necessarily focused on student achievement and the role each partner and the resources to be provided is unclear or not stated.
District School Board	The plan included specific details about the role that the school board will play, the resources and information to be provided by the school board. It is clear how this role and resources will help the district to improve student achievement.	The plan included details about the role that the school board will play and the resources and information to be provided by the school board, but it is less clear how this role or resources will help the district to improve student achievement.	The plan included details about either the role of the school board or the resources and information to be provided, but not both. It is less clear how this role or resources will help the district to improve student achievement.	The plan only vaguely addressed the role the school board will play or the resources to be provided, but it is loosely connected to student achievement.
District Superintendent	The plan included specific details about the role that the superintendent will play, the resources and information to be provided by the superintendent. It is clear how this role and resources will help the district to improve student achievement.	The plan included details about the role that the superintendent will play and the resources and information to be provided by the superintendent, but it is less clear how this role or resources will help the district to improve student achievement.	The plan included details about either the role of the superintendent or the resources and information to be provided, but not both. It is less clear how this role or resources will help the district to improve student achievement.	The plan only vaguely addressed the role the superintendent will play or the resources to be provided, but it is loosely connected to student achievement.
Intermediate School District (ISD) or Regional Educational Service Agency (RESA)	The plan included specific details about the role that the ISD or RESA will play, the resources and information to be provided by the ISD or RESA. It is clear how this role and resources will help the district to improve student achievement.	The plan included details about the role that the ISD or RESA will play and the resources and information to be provided by the ISD or RESA, but it is less clear how this role or resources will help the district to improve student achievement.	The plan included details about either the role of the ISD or RESA or the resources and information to be provided, but not both. It is less clear how this role or resources will help the district to improve student achievement.	The plan only vaguely addressed the role the ISD or RESA will play or the resources to be provided, but it is loosely connected to student achievement.

Domain	Exemplary	Adequate	Approaching Adequate	Emerging
Michigan Department of Education (MDE) and School Reform Office (SRO)	The plan included specific details about the role that MDE and the SRO will play, the resources and information to be provided by MDE and the SRO. It is clear how this role and resources will help the district to improve student achievement.	The plan included details about the role that MDE and the SRO will play and the resources and information to be provided by MDE and the SRO, but it is less clear how this role or resources will help the district to improve student achievement.	The plan included details about either the role of MDE and the SRO or the resources and information to be provided, but not both. It is less clear how this role or resources will help the district to improve student achievement.	The plan only vaguely addressed the role MDE and the SRO will play or the resources to be provided, but it is loosely connected to student achievement.
Overall evaluation of use of optional partnerships	There was a detailed plan for utilizing several optional partners focused on improving students' academic achievement. The role of each partner is evident and clear with the overall goal of providing the district with the resources necessary to allow each student with access to a quality education.	There was a detailed plan for utilizing at least two optional partners that is focused on improving student achievement, but there are elements included that do not directly impact student achievement. The role each partner is clear and there is a list of the resources to be provided.	There was a plan for utilizing at least one optional partner that is focused on improving student achievement, but many of the elements included that do not directly impact student achievement. The role each partner is unclear or not stated and the list of resources to be provided is unclear or not stated in some cases.	The plan did not utilize any optional partners.
CHECKLIST FOR OTHER PLAN COMPONENTS				
For each domain under "Checklist for Other Plan Components," indicate whether or not the component was present in the plan.				
Budget				
Future meeting dates				
Checklist of actions				
MI Excel/Blueprint				
WRITING QUALITY				
Spelling and Grammar	The plan was free of spelling and grammatical errors.	The plan contained several spelling and/ or grammatical errors but these errors do not distract/prevent the reader from easily understanding the plan.	The plan contained some spelling and/ or grammatical errors that minimally distract/ prevent the reader from understanding the plan.	The plan contained numerous spelling and grammatical errors that significantly distract/ prevent the reader from easily understanding the plan.
Clarity/Lack of Redundancy	The plan was written very clearly and can be understood by an outside audience. The plan did not unnecessarily repeat information or use terminology that has not been defined.	The plan was generally written clearly and can, for the most part, be understood by an outside audience. There was minimal repetition of information and/or minimal use of terminology that has not been defined but this did not prevent the reader from clearly understanding the plan.	The plan was written somewhat clearly and there are may be areas of the plan that cannot be understood by an outside audience. The plan repeated some information and/or uses some terminology that has not been defined. The reader may experience some difficulty in understanding the plan.	The plan was not written clearly in a way that it can be understood by an outside audience. The plan may frequently repeated information in multiple sections and/or use terminology that has not been defined. These features of the writing make it difficult for the reader to understand the plan.
Document Organization	The plan was organized in a clear and logical manner that allowed the reader to easily identify and locate information under section headings.	The plan was generally organized in a clear and logical manner that allowed the reader to, for the most part, identify and locate information under section headings.	The plan was organized in a somewhat unclear manner. It may be difficult for the reader to identify and locate information under section headings.	The plan was not organized in a clear and logical manner. It was difficult for the reader to identify and locate information under section headings.

APPENDIX 3 - SELECTED EDUCATOR SURVEY RESPONSES BY IDENTIFICATION ROUND

Grades			
	ROUND 1	ROUND 2	ROUND 3
Overall	3.11	3.10	2.80
Family/community engagement	3.28	3.28	3.02
Collaboration within the school	3.47	3.36	3.21
Professional development/support for teachers	3.71	3.63	3.31
Access to technology	3.74	3.45	3.66
Management of financial resources	3.49	3.39	3.05
Curriculum	3.50	3.38	3.23
Academic achievement	2.93	2.98	2.72
Literacy practice and instruction	3.44	3.41	3.19
Student enrollment	3.54	3.57	3.37
Teacher attendance	3.62	3.63	3.60
Teacher retention	3.09	3.15	2.80
Ability to support all student subgroups (e.g. English learners, special education students, low-SES students)	3.12	2.99	2.87
Staff retention	3.00	3.17	2.79
Availability of substitute teachers	2.01	1.92	1.88
Reliance on substitute teachers	2.21	2.09	2.08

Notes: We are interested in how well you believe your school has been implementing activities in the following areas. Please give your school a grade, from A (high) to F (low) in each of the following areas. To represent letter grades, 1=F 2=D 3=C 4=B 5=A

Positive Change Since the Prior School Year			
	ROUND 1	ROUND 2	ROUND 3
School culture and climate	3.09	3.01	2.79
School facilities and physical environment	3.21	3.06	3.10
The quality of professional development offered in this school	3.31	3.33	3.19
Academic expectations for students	3.51	3.60	3.35
Teachers' focus on student learning	3.66	3.75	3.44
Teachers' willingness to collaborate and work together	3.42	3.68	3.36
Morale of school staff	2.80	2.74	2.46
Quality of our teaching staff	3.25	3.32	3.08
Staff participation in decision-making	3.12	2.99	2.76
Socio-emotional supports for students (e.g. personal guidance, counseling, enrichment activities)	3.30	3.27	3.09
Parental engagement and support	2.96	3.00	2.92
Community and external partnerships	3.16	3.24	3.08
Ability to try out new practices	3.36	3.41	3.19

Notes: To what extent have the following features of your school changed since last school year (2017-2018)? 1-Significantly for the worse 2-Slightly for the worse 3-No change 4-Slightly for the better 5-Significantly for the better. This question was only asked to educators who reported having been in their school in the 2017-2018 school year

Job Satisfaction			
	ROUND 1	ROUND 2	ROUND 3
I like the way things are run at this school	3.09	3.03	2.80
I am satisfied with my job	3.39	3.39	3.04
If I could go back to college and start over again, I would still become an educator.	3.03	3.21	3.18

Note: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 1-Strongly disagree 2-Disagree 3-Neither agree nor disagree 4-Agree 5-Strongly agree

APPENDIX 4 - FULL RESULTS FOR TABLE 5.1

Sample	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Outcome	Probability of Exiting Teaching				Probability of Transferring Out-of-District			
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**
Teacher Experience Group	**all**	**all**	**1st-5th**	**1st-5th**	**all**	**all**	**1st-5th**	**1st-5th**
Priority School 2013-14	0.00398 (0.00830)	0.000163 (0.00775)	-0.0146 (0.0127)	-0.0193+ (0.0113)	0.00303 (0.00389)	-0.00144 (0.00458)	0.00180 (0.0101)	-0.000423 (0.0104)
Priority School 2014-15	-0.000216 (0.00682)	-0.00361 (0.00659)	-0.0165 (0.0114)	-0.0205+ (0.0113)	-0.00225 (0.00323)	-0.00696 (0.00457)	-0.00719 (0.00734)	-0.00887 (0.00893)
Priority School 2015-16		-0.00118 (0.00640)		0.00908 (0.0104)		-0.000486 (0.00521)		0.0110 (0.00992)
Priority School 2016-17	0.0105 (0.00670)		0.0269* (0.0115)		0.0149* (0.00681)		0.0203 (0.0142)	
Priority School 2017-18	-0.0110 (0.00669)	-0.0149* (0.00660)	0.00493 (0.0131)	-0.00122 (0.0124)	0.00922+ (0.00500)	0.00332 (0.00439)	0.0123 (0.00997)	0.00818 (0.00863)
Priority School 2018-19								
Partnership School 2013-14	0.0137 (0.0138)	0.0334* (0.0160)	0.0670* (0.0277)	0.110*** (0.0328)	-0.000965 (0.00666)	0.00328 (0.00685)	-0.000120 (0.0203)	0.0126 (0.0196)
Partnership School 2014-15	0.00666 (0.0156)	0.0265 (0.0181)	0.0685* (0.0294)	0.112*** (0.0336)	0.0117 (0.00760)	0.0162* (0.00734)	0.0271 (0.0180)	0.0401* (0.0164)
Partnership School 2015-16		0.0249 (0.0170)		0.0642* (0.0255)		0.00820 (0.00787)		0.0165 (0.0210)
Partnership School 2016-17	-0.0429** (0.0137)		-0.0764** (0.0257)		-0.00654 (0.00811)		-0.0250 (0.0174)	
Partnership School 2017-18	-0.0353** (0.0117)	-0.0149 (0.0117)	-0.0281 (0.0253)	0.0182 (0.0244)	-0.00587 (0.00781)	-0.00129 (0.00816)	-0.0149 (0.0173)	-0.000857 (0.0183)
Partnership School 2018-19								
School-level: % Non-White Students	-0.0635 (0.202)	-0.0288 (0.202)	-0.405 (0.290)	-0.329 (0.294)	0.114 (0.145)	0.145 (0.139)	0.124 (0.333)	0.173 (0.322)
School-level: % African-American Students	-0.112 (0.0930)	-0.112 (0.0920)	-0.0712 (0.159)	-0.0848 (0.153)	0.0493 (0.0607)	0.0787 (0.0594)	0.107 (0.149)	0.119 (0.148)
School-level: % Hispanic Students	-0.346** (0.132)	-0.375** (0.127)	-0.310 (0.233)	-0.344 (0.227)	0.111 (0.0880)	0.140 (0.0853)	0.257 (0.188)	0.266 (0.188)
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	0.0147 (0.0430)	0.0319 (0.0453)	-0.00973 (0.0656)	0.0367 (0.0694)	-0.0429 (0.0311)	-0.0327 (0.0331)	-0.0501 (0.0662)	-0.0132 (0.0663)
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	0.106 (0.0853)	0.111 (0.0861)	0.0955 (0.142)	0.112 (0.143)	-0.0179 (0.0396)	-0.00530 (0.0385)	-0.0745 (0.0715)	-0.0633 (0.0681)
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	-0.0518 (0.0950)	-0.0452 (0.0964)	0.107 (0.178)	0.112 (0.178)	0.0129 (0.0544)	0.0274 (0.0551)	0.123 (0.148)	0.127 (0.149)
Log of Student Enrollment	-0.0116 (0.0125)	-0.00643 (0.0119)	-0.0207 (0.0201)	-0.00950 (0.0191)	-0.0181 (0.0114)	-0.0208+ (0.0113)	-0.0433* (0.0220)	-0.0414+ (0.0214)
Teacher: Male	0.00205 (0.00500)	0.00199 (0.00500)	0.0151+ (0.00857)	0.0151+ (0.00861)	0.00934** (0.00325)	0.00937** (0.00326)	0.0135+ (0.00759)	0.0132+ (0.00760)
Teacher: African-American	-0.0361*** (0.00545)	-0.0364*** (0.00545)	-0.0313** (0.0107)	-0.0322** (0.0107)	-0.00339 (0.00260)	-0.00321 (0.00261)	-0.00863 (0.00597)	-0.00882 (0.00594)
Teacher: Hispanic	-0.00737 (0.0121)	-0.00740 (0.0121)	0.00847 (0.0237)	0.00813 (0.0238)	-0.000790 (0.00578)	-0.000748 (0.00579)	-0.00836 (0.0120)	-0.00898 (0.0121)
Teacher: Non-White	0.0932*** (0.0126)	0.0933*** (0.0125)	0.0879*** (0.0215)	0.0896*** (0.0216)	0.000690 (0.00452)	0.000509 (0.00452)	-0.00289 (0.0131)	-0.00226 (0.0130)
Teacher: Years of Experience	0.00145*** (0.000383)	0.00146*** (0.000381)			-0.000813*** (0.000146)	-0.000794*** (0.000148)		
Teacher: Master's Degree or Higher	-0.00853+ (0.00444)	-0.00844+ (0.00442)	-0.00387 (0.00764)	-0.00358 (0.00756)	-0.000221 (0.00242)	-0.000310 (0.00240)	-0.00176 (0.00606)	-0.00203 (0.00606)
Lagged School-level % Non-White Students								
Lagged School-level % African-American Students								
Lagged School-level % Hispanic Students								
Lagged School-level % Economically Disadvantaged Students								
Lagged School-level % English Language Learner Students								
Lagged School-level % Students Receiving Special Education Services								
Lagged Log of Student Enrollment								
Constant	0.276* (0.122)	0.228+ (0.121)	0.329+ (0.198)	0.223 (0.193)	0.126 (0.0888)	0.110 (0.0925)	0.236 (0.184)	0.180 (0.188)
Observations	**30,225**	**30,225**	**10,809**	**10,809**	**22,396**	**22,396**	**7,485**	**7,485**
R-squared	**0.036**	**0.036**	**0.056**	**0.056**	**0.121**	**0.120**	**0.123**	**0.123**
Adjusted R-squared	**0.0193**	**0.0191**	**0.0236**	**0.0238**	**0.105**	**0.104**	**0.0875**	**0.0874**

Sample	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Outcome	Probability of Transferring Within District				Probability of Being Rated Minimally Effective or Ineffective		Probability of Being New to Their School			
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	15-16	16-17	15-16	16-17	15-16	16-17	15-16	16-17	15-16	16-17
Teacher Experience Group	all	all	1st-5th	1st-5th	all	all	1st-5th	1st-5th		
Priority School 2013-14	-0.00639 (0.00397)	-0.00646 (0.00406)	-0.00330 (0.00494)	-0.00166 (0.00529)	-0.00700 (0.0107)	0.00181 (0.00969)	0.0355* (0.0178)	0.0268 (0.0167)	-0.00581 (0.0167)	-0.00587 (0.0135)
Priority School 2014-15	-0.0113*** (0.00339)	-0.0116*** (0.00338)	-0.0113* (0.00484)	-0.00957* (0.00472)	0.000665 (0.00813)	0.0116 (0.00769)	-0.00397 (0.0183)	-0.0126 (0.0156)	0.00794 (0.0175)	0.00792 (0.0146)
Priority School 2015-16		-0.00308 (0.00400)		0.00360 (0.00630)		0.0177* (0.00767)		-0.0144 (0.0140)		-0.00433 (0.0101)
Priority School 2016-17	-0.00252 (0.00426)		-0.00142 (0.00622)		-0.0160+ (0.00917)		0.00239 (0.0140)		-0.00341 (0.00984)	
Priority School 2017-18	0.000667 (0.00513)	0.000712 (0.00476)	-0.00127 (0.00710)	0.000358 (0.00649)	-0.0165+ (0.00971)	-0.00509 (0.00794)	0.00611 (0.0137)	-0.00254 (0.0127)	0.0244* (0.0114)	0.0244* (0.0111)
Priority School 2018-19							0.0191 (0.0161)	0.0103 (0.0165)	0.0316* (0.0134)	0.0315** (0.0113)
Partnership School 2013-14	0.00138 (0.00796)	-0.000524 (0.00809)	-0.00649 (0.0160)	-0.0115 (0.0164)	-0.0381* (0.0185)	-0.0169 (0.0124)	0.0195 (0.0352)	0.0230 (0.0402)	-0.00441 (0.0214)	0.0184 (0.0190)
Partnership School 2014-15	0.00907 (0.00910)	0.00711 (0.00964)	0.00609 (0.0131)	0.000740 (0.0127)	-0.0155 (0.0183)	0.00503 (0.0241)	0.104** (0.0336)	0.107** (0.0379)	0.0739* (0.0329)	0.0963*** (0.0290)
Partnership School 2015-16		0.00173 (0.00989)		-0.00662 (0.0139)		0.0502* (0.0252)		0.0293 (0.0307)		0.0420* (0.0208)
Partnership School 2016-17	0.00847 (0.00944)		0.0106 (0.0184)		-0.0155 (0.0198)		0.0241 (0.0317)		-0.00737 (0.0196)	
Partnership School 2017-18	0.0188+ (0.0102)	0.0167 (0.0104)	0.00792 (0.0121)	0.00206 (0.0128)	-0.0210 (0.0205)	-0.000278 (0.0148)	0.0905** (0.0298)	0.0935** (0.0326)	0.0260 (0.0225)	0.0483** (0.0187)
Partnership School 2018-19							-0.0486+ (0.0273)	-0.0456 (0.0315)	-0.0506* (0.0250)	-0.0286 (0.0249)
School-level: % Non-White Students	0.330* (0.167)	0.328+ (0.168)	0.279 (0.334)	0.265 (0.335)	-0.0909 (0.222)	-0.134 (0.216)				
School-level: % African-American Students	-0.0437 (0.0666)	-0.0417 (0.0667)	0.0858 (0.100)	0.0864 (0.0985)	0.0658 (0.106)	-0.0194 (0.111)				
School-level: % Hispanic Students	-0.165 (0.108)	-0.156 (0.108)	-0.133 (0.158)	-0.129 (0.159)	-0.132 (0.182)	-0.224 (0.177)				
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	0.0163 (0.0246)	0.00858 (0.0247)	-0.0101 (0.0308)	-0.00846 (0.0311)	0.0613 (0.0563)	0.102+ (0.0620)				
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	-0.0203 (0.0555)	-0.0200 (0.0554)	0.0515 (0.0742)	0.0476 (0.0722)	0.0834 (0.103)	0.0405 (0.0981)				
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	-0.0417 (0.0782)	-0.0415 (0.0779)	-0.0196 (0.0953)	-0.0211 (0.0945)	0.00580 (0.134)	-0.0291 (0.135)				
Log of Student Enrollment	-0.0122 (0.00891)	-0.0129 (0.00863)	-0.0146 (0.0109)	-0.0163 (0.0104)	-0.0157 (0.0157)	-0.00146 (0.0140)				
Teacher: Male	0.00526+ (0.00305)	0.00528+ (0.00304)	0.00143 (0.00465)	0.00133 (0.00464)	0.0510*** (0.00573)	0.0508*** (0.00573)	0.0260*** (0.00667)	0.0260*** (0.00666)	0.0235*** (0.00536)	0.0234*** (0.00536)
Teacher: African-American	0.00403 (0.00294)	0.00406 (0.00294)	0.00453 (0.00467)	0.00466 (0.00466)	0.0149** (0.00551)	0.0144** (0.00546)	0.0129 (0.00824)	0.0129 (0.00826)	-0.000852 (0.00651)	-0.000960 (0.00650)
Teacher: Hispanic	-0.00752 (0.00803)	-0.00745 (0.00802)	-0.00929 (0.00843)	-0.00920 (0.00842)	0.0200 (0.0148)	0.0201 (0.0148)	-0.0371+ (0.0205)	-0.0370+ (0.0204)	-0.00785 (0.0153)	-0.00774 (0.0153)
Teacher: Non-White	-0.00641 (0.00492)	-0.00642 (0.00494)	-0.00618 (0.00794)	-0.00613 (0.00797)	0.00470 (0.00748)	0.00594 (0.00745)	0.0482*** (0.0138)	0.0482*** (0.0138)	0.0489*** (0.0105)	0.0488*** (0.0105)
Teacher: Years of Experience	-0.000144 (0.000175)	-0.000143 (0.000174)			-0.000623* (0.000261)	-0.000648* (0.000258)	-0.0128*** (0.000478)	-0.0128*** (0.000478)	-0.0137*** (0.000393)	-0.0137*** (0.000394)
Teacher: Master's Degree or Higher	0.00305 (0.00240)	0.00307 (0.00239)	0.00642 (0.00408)	0.00635 (0.00407)	-0.0127** (0.00412)	-0.0124** (0.00405)	-0.0229** (0.00853)	-0.0229** (0.00852)	-0.0238*** (0.00664)	-0.0237*** (0.00663)
Lagged School-level % Non-White Students							0.219 (0.357)	0.197 (0.357)	-0.167 (0.284)	-0.180 (0.285)
Lagged School-level % African-American Students							-0.321+ (0.186)	-0.323+ (0.187)	-0.116 (0.145)	-0.118 (0.145)
Lagged School-level % Hispanic Students							-0.277 (0.342)	-0.281 (0.341)	-0.322 (0.208)	-0.325 (0.209)
Lagged School-level % Economically Disadvantaged Students							-0.0621 (0.0850)	-0.0569 (0.0854)	-0.119 (0.0832)	-0.115 (0.0837)
Lagged School-level % English Language Learner Students							-0.0382 (0.131)	-0.0415 (0.129)	0.0376 (0.113)	0.0349 (0.112)
Lagged School-level % Students Receiving Special Education Services							-0.682** (0.211)	-0.678** (0.211)	0.0720 (0.162)	0.0757 (0.162)
Lagged Log of Student Enrollment							-0.182*** (0.0267)	-0.183*** (0.0269)	-0.108** (0.0357)	-0.109** (0.0357)
Constant	0.131 (0.0874)	0.141+ (0.0849)	0.0612 (0.104)	0.0703 (0.0990)	0.0877 (0.140)	0.0295 (0.137)	1.961*** (0.230)	1.977*** (0.232)	1.220*** (0.330)	1.220*** (0.333)
Observations	22,461	22,461	7,310	7,310	28,896	28,896	29,254	29,254	29,254	29,254
R-squared	0.090	0.090	0.103	0.103	0.086	0.087	0.142	0.142	0.216	0.216
Adjusted R-squared	0.0738	0.0738	0.0670	0.0670	0.0692	0.0706	0.127	0.127	0.202	0.202

Sample	DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and DPSCD 16-17 Priority Schools	DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and DPSCD 16-17 Priority Schools	DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and DPSCD 16-17 Priority Schools	DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and DPSCD 16-17 Priority Schools	DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and DPSCD 16-17 Priority Schools	DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and DPSCD 16-17 Priority Schools	DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and DPSCD 16-17 Priority Schools	DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and DPSCD 16-17 Priority Schools
	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)
Outcome	Probability of Exiting Teaching				Probability of Transferring Out-of-District			
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**
Teacher Experience Group	**all**	**all**	**1st-5th**	**1st-5th**	**all**	**all**	**1st-5th**	**1st-5th**
Priority School 2013-14	0.0159 (0.0146)	0.0148 (0.0141)	0.0127 (0.0306)	-0.0103 (0.0338)	-0.00363 (0.00447)	-0.00420 (0.00413)	-0.0122 (0.0182)	-0.00865 (0.0123)
Priority School 2014-15	0.00602 (0.00925)	0.00779 (0.00985)	-0.00676 (0.0207)	-0.0252 (0.0247)	-0.00181 (0.00371)	-0.00214 (0.00361)	-0.0157 (0.0149)	-0.0107 (0.0132)
Priority School 2015-16		0.00660 (0.0113)		0.00625 (0.0247)		0.00104 (0.00799)		0.0127 (0.0364)
Priority School 2016-17	-0.000436 (0.0139)		0.0642* (0.0304)		0.00222 (0.00491)		-0.00256 (0.0220)	
Priority School 2017-18	-0.0163 (0.0114)	-0.0146 (0.0110)	0.0752* (0.0349)	0.0582 (0.0378)	0.00189 (0.00447)	0.00100 (0.00422)	-0.00466 (0.0134)	-0.000685 (0.0130)
Priority School 2018-19								
Partnership School 2013-14	0.00714 (0.0208)	0.0317 (0.0250)	0.0701 (0.0432)	0.172*** (0.0465)	-0.00470 (0.00678)	-0.00438 (0.00714)	0.0123 (0.0261)	0.0129 (0.0230)
Partnership School 2014-15	0.000590 (0.0188)	0.0245 (0.0244)	0.0581 (0.0419)	0.157** (0.0464)	0.0101 (0.00792)	0.0103 (0.00762)	0.0376+ (0.0211)	0.0370+ (0.0186)
Partnership School 2015-16		0.0254 (0.0241)		0.122** (0.0365)		0.00200 (0.00974)		-0.00392 (0.0390)
Partnership School 2016-17	-0.0511** (0.0186)		-0.180*** (0.0349)		0.00214 (0.00807)		0.000959 (0.0229)	
Partnership School 2017-18	-0.0290+ (0.0174)	-0.00342 (0.0163)	-0.0976* (0.0470)	0.00992 (0.0468)	-0.00950 (0.00657)	-0.00935 (0.00681)	-0.00307 (0.0177)	-0.00358 (0.0199)
Partnership School 2018-19								
School-level: % Non-White Students	-0.681 (0.599)	-0.647 (0.616)	-1.798 (1.931)	-1.515 (1.896)	0.601 (0.427)	0.603 (0.422)	-0.280 (0.997)	-0.299 (1.001)
School-level: % African-American Students	-0.333 (0.645)	-0.400 (0.650)	-0.491 (2.086)	-0.603 (1.999)	0.320 (0.359)	0.332 (0.358)	-0.545 (0.986)	-0.561 (0.992)
School-level: % Hispanic Students	-0.151 (0.674)	-0.359 (0.692)	-0.425 (1.882)	-0.504 (1.735)	0.0580 (0.343)	0.0861 (0.341)	-0.680 (1.111)	-0.688 (1.094)
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	-0.0548 (0.0658)	-0.0174 (0.0728)	-0.266 (0.173)	-0.171 (0.177)	0.00776 (0.0264)	0.0156 (0.0373)	0.00574 (0.0844)	0.0335 (0.127)
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	0.0742 (0.143)	0.0942 (0.147)	0.200 (0.283)	0.144 (0.274)	-0.113* (0.0528)	-0.115** (0.0431)	-0.304+ (0.176)	-0.265 (0.160)
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	-0.207 (0.142)	-0.239 (0.154)	-0.0336 (0.369)	-0.142 (0.394)	0.0746 (0.0487)	0.0732 (0.0507)	0.0702 (0.180)	0.0621 (0.180)
Log of Student Enrollment	-0.0220 (0.0220)	0.00360 (0.0205)	-0.0482 (0.0362)	0.0302 (0.0341)	-0.00413 (0.00854)	-0.00515 (0.00885)	-0.0210 (0.0250)	-0.0169 (0.0220)
Teacher: Male	0.000679 (0.00894)	0.000470 (0.00897)	0.0147 (0.0184)	0.0152 (0.0192)	0.00398 (0.00340)	0.00396 (0.00339)	0.0154 (0.00974)	0.0151 (0.00962)
Teacher: African-American	-0.0486*** (0.00796)	-0.0491*** (0.00796)	-0.0520** (0.0154)	-0.0548*** (0.0156)	9.69e-05 (0.00262)	0.000105 (0.00262)	0.000801 (0.00798)	0.000784 (0.00783)
Teacher: Hispanic	0.000545 (0.0239)	0.000674 (0.0239)	0.0422 (0.0484)	0.0442 (0.0488)	0.00177 (0.00652)	0.00187 (0.00650)	0.000545 (0.0173)	0.00101 (0.0176)
Teacher: Non-White	0.0877*** (0.0188)	0.0882*** (0.0188)	0.0434 (0.0378)	0.0462 (0.0387)	0.00717 (0.00585)	0.00711 (0.00587)	0.0191 (0.0181)	0.0189 (0.0180)
Teacher: Years of Experience	0.000423 (0.000684)	0.000389 (0.000678)			-0.000985*** (0.000205)	-0.000978*** (0.000203)		
Teacher: Master's Degree or Higher	-0.0174* (0.00826)	-0.0167* (0.00823)	-0.0362* (0.0150)	-0.0325* (0.0145)	0.00217 (0.00239)	0.00217 (0.00235)	-0.00239 (0.00782)	-0.00241 (0.00797)
Lagged School-level % Non-White Students								
Lagged School-level % African-American Students								
Lagged School-level % Hispanic Students								
Lagged School-level % Economically Disadvantaged Students								
Lagged School-level % English Language Learner Students								
Lagged School-level % Students Receiving Special Education Services								
Lagged Log of Student Enrollment								
Constant	0.678 (0.676)	0.551 (0.680)	1.190 (2.063)	0.700 (1.978)	-0.260 (0.363)	-0.273 (0.358)	0.710 (0.969)	0.670 (0.972)
Observations	**11,618**	**11,618**	**2,922**	**2,922**	**8,672**	**8,672**	**2,011**	**2,011**
R-squared	**0.037**	**0.036**	**0.074**	**0.074**	**0.145**	**0.145**	**0.190**	**0.191**
Adjusted R-squared	**0.0234**	**0.0228**	**0.0334**	**0.0334**	**0.133**	**0.133**	**0.149**	**0.150**

Sample	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools	All Round 1 Partnership Schools and All 16-17 Priority Schools
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Outcome	Probability of Transferring Within District				Probability of Being Rated Minimally Effective or Ineffective		Probability of Being New to Their School			
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**
Teacher Experience Group	**all**	**all**	**1st-5th**	**1st-5th**	**all**	**all**	**1st-5th**	**1st-5th**		
Priority School 2013-14	-0.00639 (0.00397)	-0.00646 (0.00406)	-0.00330 (0.00494)	-0.00166 (0.00529)	-0.00700 (0.0107)	0.00181 (0.00969)	0.0355* (0.0178)	0.0268 (0.0167)	-0.00581 (0.0167)	-0.00587 (0.0135)
Priority School 2014-15	-0.0113*** (0.00339)	-0.0116*** (0.00338)	-0.0113* (0.00484)	-0.00957* (0.00472)	0.000665 (0.00813)	0.0116 (0.00769)	-0.00397 (0.0183)	-0.0126 (0.0156)	0.00794 (0.0175)	0.00792 (0.0146)
Priority School 2015-16		-0.00308 (0.00400)		0.00360 (0.00630)		0.0177* (0.00767)		-0.0144 (0.0140)		-0.00433 (0.0101)
Priority School 2016-17	-0.00252 (0.00426)		-0.00142 (0.00622)		-0.0160+ (0.00917)		0.00239 (0.0140)		-0.00341 (0.00984)	
Priority School 2017-18	0.000667 (0.00513)	0.000712 (0.00476)	-0.00127 (0.00710)	0.000358 (0.00649)	-0.0165+ (0.00971)	-0.00509 (0.00794)	0.00611 (0.0137)	-0.00254 (0.0127)	0.0244* (0.0114)	0.0244* (0.0111)
Priority School 2018-19							0.0191 (0.0161)	0.0103 (0.0165)	0.0316* (0.0134)	0.0315** (0.0113)
Partnership School 2013-14	0.00138 (0.00796)	-0.000524 (0.00809)	-0.00649 (0.0160)	-0.0115 (0.0164)	-0.0381* (0.0185)	-0.0169 (0.0124)	0.0195 (0.0352)	0.0230 (0.0402)	-0.00441 (0.0214)	0.0184 (0.0190)
Partnership School 2014-15	0.00907 (0.00910)	0.00711 (0.00964)	0.00609 (0.0131)	0.000740 (0.0127)	-0.0155 (0.0183)	0.00503 (0.0241)	0.104** (0.0336)	0.107** (0.0379)	0.0739* (0.0329)	0.0963*** (0.0290)
Partnership School 2015-16		0.00173 (0.00989)		-0.00662 (0.0139)		0.0502* (0.0252)		0.0293 (0.0307)		0.0420* (0.0208)
Partnership School 2016-17	0.00847 (0.00944)		0.0106 (0.0184)		-0.0155 (0.0198)		0.0241 (0.0317)		-0.00737 (0.0196)	
Partnership School 2017-18	0.0188+ (0.0102)	0.0167 (0.0104)	0.00792 (0.0121)	0.00206 (0.0128)	-0.0210 (0.0205)	-0.000278 (0.0148)	0.0905** (0.0298)	0.0935** (0.0326)	0.0260 (0.0225)	0.0483** (0.0187)
Partnership School 2018-19							-0.0486+ (0.0273)	-0.0456 (0.0315)	-0.0506* (0.0250)	-0.0286 (0.0249)
School-level: % Non-White Students	0.330* (0.167)	0.328+ (0.168)	0.279 (0.334)	0.265 (0.335)	-0.0909 (0.222)	-0.134 (0.216)				
School-level: % African-American Students	-0.0437 (0.0666)	-0.0417 (0.0667)	0.0858 (0.100)	0.0864 (0.0985)	0.0658 (0.106)	-0.0194 (0.111)				
School-level: % Hispanic Students	-0.165 (0.108)	-0.156 (0.108)	-0.133 (0.158)	-0.129 (0.159)	-0.132 (0.182)	-0.224 (0.177)				
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	0.0163 (0.0246)	0.00858 (0.0247)	-0.0101 (0.0308)	-0.00846 (0.0311)	0.0613 (0.0563)	0.102+ (0.0620)				
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	-0.0203 (0.0555)	-0.0200 (0.0554)	0.0515 (0.0742)	0.0476 (0.0722)	0.0834 (0.103)	0.0405 (0.0981)				
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	-0.0417 (0.0782)	-0.0415 (0.0779)	-0.0196 (0.0953)	-0.0211 (0.0945)	0.00580 (0.134)	-0.0291 (0.135)				
Log of Student Enrollment	-0.0122 (0.00891)	-0.0129 (0.00863)	-0.0146 (0.0109)	-0.0163 (0.0104)	-0.0157 (0.0157)	-0.00146 (0.0140)				
Teacher: Male	0.00526+ (0.00305)	0.00528+ (0.00304)	0.00143 (0.00465)	0.00133 (0.00464)	0.0510*** (0.00573)	0.0508*** (0.00573)	0.0260*** (0.00667)	0.0260*** (0.00666)	0.0235*** (0.00536)	0.0234*** (0.00536)
Teacher: African-American	0.00403 (0.00294)	0.00406 (0.00294)	0.00453 (0.00467)	0.00466 (0.00466)	0.0149** (0.00551)	0.0144** (0.00546)	0.0129 (0.00824)	0.0129 (0.00826)	-0.000852 (0.00651)	-0.000960 (0.00650)
Teacher: Hispanic	-0.00752 (0.00803)	-0.00745 (0.00802)	-0.00929 (0.00843)	-0.00920 (0.00842)	0.0200 (0.0148)	0.0201 (0.0148)	-0.0371+ (0.0205)	-0.0370+ (0.0204)	-0.00785 (0.0153)	-0.00774 (0.0153)
Teacher: Non-White	-0.00641 (0.00492)	-0.00642 (0.00494)	-0.00618 (0.00794)	-0.00613 (0.00797)	0.00470 (0.00748)	0.00594 (0.00745)	0.0482*** (0.0138)	0.0482*** (0.0138)	0.0489*** (0.0105)	0.0488*** (0.0105)
Teacher: Years of Experience	-0.000144 (0.000175)	-0.000143 (0.000174)			-0.000623* (0.000261)	-0.000648* (0.000258)	-0.0128*** (0.000478)	-0.0128*** (0.000478)	-0.0137*** (0.000393)	-0.0137*** (0.000394)
Teacher: Master's Degree or Higher	0.00305 (0.00240)	0.00307 (0.00239)	0.00642 (0.00408)	0.00635 (0.00407)	-0.0127** (0.00412)	-0.0124** (0.00405)	-0.0229** (0.00853)	-0.0229** (0.00852)	-0.0238*** (0.00664)	-0.0237*** (0.00663)
Lagged School-level % Non-White Students							0.219 (0.357)	0.197 (0.357)	-0.167 (0.284)	-0.180 (0.285)
Lagged School-level % African-American Students							-0.321+ (0.186)	-0.323+ (0.187)	-0.116 (0.145)	-0.118 (0.145)
Lagged School-level % Hispanic Students							-0.277 (0.342)	-0.281 (0.341)	-0.322 (0.208)	-0.325 (0.209)
Lagged School-level % Economically Disadvantaged Students							-0.0621 (0.0850)	-0.0569 (0.0854)	-0.119 (0.0832)	-0.115 (0.0837)
Lagged School-level % English Language Learner Students							-0.0382 (0.131)	-0.0415 (0.129)	0.0376 (0.113)	0.0349 (0.112)
Lagged School-level % Students Receiving Special Education Services							-0.682** (0.211)	-0.678** (0.211)	0.0720 (0.162)	0.0757 (0.162)
Lagged Log of Student Enrollment							-0.182*** (0.0267)	-0.183*** (0.0269)	-0.108** (0.0357)	-0.109** (0.0357)
Constant	0.131 (0.0874)	0.141+ (0.0849)	0.0612 (0.104)	0.0703 (0.0990)	0.0877 (0.140)	0.0295 (0.137)	1.961*** (0.230)	1.977*** (0.232)	1.220*** (0.330)	1.220*** (0.333)
Observations	**22,461**	**22,461**	**7,310**	**7,310**	**28,896**	**28,896**	**29,254**	**29,254**	**29,254**	**29,254**
R-squared	**0.090**	**0.090**	**0.103**	**0.103**	**0.086**	**0.087**	**0.142**	**0.142**	**0.216**	**0.216**
Adjusted R-squared	**0.0738**	**0.0738**	**0.0670**	**0.0670**	**0.0692**	**0.0706**	**0.127**	**0.127**	**0.202**	**0.202**

APPENDIX 5 - FULL RESULTS FOR TABLE 5.2

STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT OUTCOMES MATH M-STEP

Student-Level Acheivement Outcomes										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Sample	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that didn't become Partnership Schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that didn't become Partnership Schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools
Outcome	Math M-STEP Levels		Math M-STEP Growth/Gains							
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
Priority School 2013-2014	-0.487*** (0.0485)	-0.238*** (0.0331)	-0.607*** (0.0751)	-0.341*** (0.0521)	-0.757*** (0.110)	-0.434*** (0.0754)	-0.572*** (0.0808)	-0.317*** (0.0555)	-0.596*** (0.156)	-0.356** (0.109)
Priority School 2014-2015	-0.435*** (0.0339)	-0.185*** (0.0185)	-0.573*** (0.0534)	-0.307*** (0.0325)	-0.643*** (0.0793)	-0.320*** (0.0464)	-0.550*** (0.0573)	-0.295*** (0.0341)	-0.700*** (0.113)	-0.460*** (0.0644)
Priority School 2015-2016	-0.249*** (0.0202)		-0.266*** (0.0313)		-0.323*** (0.0458)		-0.255*** (0.0330)		-0.240*** (0.0623)	
Priority School 2016-2017		0.249*** (0.0202)		0.266*** (0.0313)		0.323*** (0.0458)		0.255*** (0.0330)		0.240*** (0.0623)
Priority School 2017-2018	0.251*** (0.0194)	0.500*** (0.0330)	0.165*** (0.0348)	0.431*** (0.0558)	0.179*** (0.0497)	0.502*** (0.0809)	0.151*** (0.0362)	0.406*** (0.0593)	0.103+ (0.0575)	0.343** (0.104)
Partnership School 2013-2014	0.0483 (0.0384)	0.0139 (0.0298)	0.0134 (0.0452)	-0.0220 (0.0450)	0.0439 (0.0528)	0.00736 (0.0501)	0.0357 (0.0615)	-0.00843 (0.0690)	0.143* (0.0675)	0.0817 (0.0677)
Partnership School 2014-2015	0.0156 (0.0348)	-0.0189 (0.0211)	-0.0220 (0.0414)	-0.0574 (0.0376)	-0.0341 (0.0520)	-0.0706 (0.0470)	-0.102+ (0.0601)	-0.146* (0.0597)	0.100 (0.0671)	0.0395 (0.0602)
Partnership School 2015-2016	0.0345 (0.0280)		0.0354 (0.0361)		0.0365 (0.0443)		0.0441 (0.0436)		0.0609 (0.0521)	
Partnership School 2016-2017		-0.0345 (0.0280)		-0.0354 (0.0361)		-0.0365 (0.0443)		-0.0441 (0.0436)		-0.0609 (0.0521)
Partnership School 2017-2018	0.0182 (0.0337)	-0.0163 (0.0293)	0.0930+ (0.0543)	0.0576 (0.0539)	0.137* (0.0641)	0.101 (0.0625)	0.176* (0.0693)	0.132+ (0.0735)	0.197* (0.0771)	0.136+ (0.0782)
Economically Disadvantaged	0.00281 (0.00805)	0.00281 (0.00805)	-0.00683 (0.0140)	-0.00683 (0.0140)	-0.0141 (0.0177)	-0.0141 (0.0177)	-0.00202 (0.0132)	-0.00202 (0.0132)	0.0229 (0.0239)	0.0229 (0.0239)
English Language Learner	-0.0346 (0.0336)	-0.0346 (0.0336)	0.0107 (0.0462)	0.0107 (0.0462)	-0.00972 (0.0597)	-0.00972 (0.0597)	0.00491 (0.0481)	0.00491 (0.0481)	0.0822 (0.100)	0.0822 (0.100)
Receives Special Education Services	0.0548*** (0.0137)	0.0548*** (0.0137)	0.0876*** (0.0238)	0.0876*** (0.0238)	0.0700* (0.0304)	0.0700* (0.0304)	0.0985*** (0.0253)	0.0985*** (0.0253)	0.0755 (0.0570)	0.0755 (0.0570)
School-level: % Non-White Students	0.183 (0.170)	0.183 (0.170)	0.221 (0.200)	0.221 (0.200)	0.180 (0.203)	0.180 (0.203)	0.358+ (0.214)	0.358+ (0.214)	1.323** (0.490)	1.323** (0.490)
School-level: % African-American Students	-0.140*** (0.0420)	-0.140*** (0.0420)	-0.183** (0.0607)	-0.183** (0.0607)	-0.161* (0.0711)	-0.161* (0.0711)	-0.181** (0.0639)	-0.181** (0.0639)	-0.305 (0.487)	-0.305 (0.487)
School-level: % Hispanic Students	-0.0710 (0.0963)	-0.0710 (0.0963)	-0.157 (0.112)	-0.157 (0.112)	-0.134 (0.139)	-0.134 (0.139)	-0.114 (0.121)	-0.114 (0.121)	0.101 (0.449)	0.101 (0.449)
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	0.164* (0.0788)	0.164* (0.0788)	0.0954 (0.105)	0.0954 (0.105)	0.0637 (0.122)	0.0637 (0.122)	0.0708 (0.113)	0.0708 (0.113)	0.202 (0.323)	0.202 (0.323)
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	0.000222 (0.114)	0.000222 (0.114)	0.0184 (0.110)	0.0184 (0.110)	0.0234 (0.141)	0.0234 (0.141)	-0.0343 (0.116)	-0.0343 (0.116)	-0.629 (0.632)	-0.629 (0.632)
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	-0.538*** (0.101)	-0.538*** (0.101)	-0.487*** (0.126)	-0.487*** (0.126)	-0.409** (0.156)	-0.409** (0.156)	-0.501*** (0.133)	-0.501*** (0.133)	-0.452+ (0.265)	-0.452+ (0.265)
Log of Student Enrollment	-0.0777*** (0.0137)	-0.0777*** (0.0137)	-0.110*** (0.0153)	-0.110*** (0.0153)	-0.111*** (0.0176)	-0.111*** (0.0176)	-0.104*** (0.0154)	-0.104*** (0.0154)	-0.0311 (0.0434)	-0.0311 (0.0434)
4th Grade	-0.332*** (0.0211)	-0.332*** (0.0211)	-0.781*** (0.0649)	-0.781*** (0.0649)	-0.986*** (0.0799)	-0.986*** (0.0799)	-0.740*** (0.0684)	-0.740*** (0.0684)	-0.717*** (0.112)	-0.717*** (0.112)
5th Grade	-0.513*** (0.0340)	-0.513*** (0.0340)	-0.828*** (0.0832)	-0.828*** (0.0832)	-1.107*** (0.106)	-1.107*** (0.106)	-0.776*** (0.0883)	-0.776*** (0.0883)	-0.778*** (0.157)	-0.778*** (0.157)
6th Grade	-0.746*** (0.0488)	-0.746*** (0.0488)	-1.050*** (0.101)	-1.050*** (0.101)	-1.361*** (0.127)	-1.361*** (0.127)	-0.972*** (0.107)	-0.972*** (0.107)	-0.899*** (0.191)	-0.899*** (0.191)
7th Grade	-0.924*** (0.0628)	-0.924*** (0.0628)	-1.188*** (0.121)	-1.188*** (0.121)	-1.546*** (0.158)	-1.546*** (0.158)	-1.108*** (0.128)	-1.108*** (0.128)	-1.033*** (0.232)	-1.033*** (0.232)
8th Grade	-1.112*** (0.0795)	-1.112*** (0.0795)	-1.373*** (0.146)	-1.373*** (0.146)	-1.767*** (0.193)	-1.767*** (0.193)	-1.286*** (0.156)	-1.286*** (0.156)	-1.152*** (0.282)	-1.152*** (0.282)
Constant	0.358** (0.129)	0.115 (0.125)	2.048*** (0.184)	1.789*** (0.167)	2.419*** (0.227)	2.105*** (0.202)	1.939*** (0.194)	1.689*** (0.175)	1.482* (0.610)	1.262* (0.585)
Observations	**151,581**	**151,581**	**113,636**	**113,636**	**79,005**	**79,005**	**102,883**	**102,883**	**35,860**	**35,860**
R-squared	**0.752**	**0.752**	**0.159**	**0.159**	**0.176**	**0.176**	**0.161**	**0.161**	**0.196**	**0.196**
Adjusted R-squared	**0.646**	**0.646**	**-0.232**	**-0.232**	**-0.244**	**-0.244**	**-0.228**	**-0.228**	**-0.212**	**-0.212**

APPENDIX 5 - FULL RESULTS FOR TABLE 5.2

STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT OUTCOMES ELA M-STEP

Student-Level Acheivement Outcomes										
	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
Sample	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that didn't become Partnership Schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that didn't become Partnership Schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools
Outcome	ELA M-STEP Levels		ELAM-STEP Growth/Gains							
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
Priority School 2013-2014	-0.536*** (0.0460)	-0.284*** (0.0325)	-0.734*** (0.0719)	-0.471*** (0.0490)	-0.866*** (0.118)	-0.536*** (0.0793)	-0.740*** (0.0785)	-0.475*** (0.0529)	-0.633*** (0.124)	-0.451*** (0.0883)
Priority School 2014-2015	-0.465*** (0.0312)	-0.213*** (0.0172)	-0.631*** (0.0520)	-0.368*** (0.0332)	-0.698*** (0.0844)	-0.367*** (0.0480)	-0.635*** (0.0553)	-0.371*** (0.0339)	-0.702*** (0.0876)	-0.521*** (0.0638)
Priority School 2015-2016	-0.252*** (0.0199)		-0.262*** (0.0328)		-0.331*** (0.0505)		-0.264*** (0.0347)		-0.182*** (0.0474)	
Priority School 2016-2017		0.252*** (0.0199)		0.262*** (0.0328)		0.331*** (0.0505)		0.264*** (0.0347)		0.182*** (0.0474)
Priority School 2017-2018	0.261*** (0.0168)	0.513*** (0.0295)	0.225*** (0.0322)	0.487*** (0.0507)	0.257*** (0.0495)	0.588*** (0.0802)	0.227*** (0.0335)	0.491*** (0.0548)	0.129* (0.0511)	0.311*** (0.0737)
Partnership School 2013-2014	0.0835* (0.0412)	0.0384 (0.0306)	0.0129 (0.0410)	-0.0375 (0.0371)	0.0316 (0.0471)	-0.0288 (0.0457)	0.0187 (0.0548)	-0.0732 (0.0479)	0.137+ (0.0707)	0.0410 (0.0622)
Partnership School 2014-2015	0.0305 (0.0340)	-0.0146 (0.0229)	-0.0285 (0.0362)	-0.0789+ (0.0433)	-0.0458 (0.0424)	-0.106+ (0.0549)	-0.120** (0.0413)	-0.211*** (0.0526)	0.105+ (0.0553)	0.00909 (0.0588)
Partnership School 2015-2016	0.0451 (0.0277)		0.0504 (0.0437)		0.0604 (0.0540)		0.0919+ (0.0516)		0.0957+ (0.0548)	
Partnership School 2016-2017		-0.0451 (0.0277)		-0.0504 (0.0437)		-0.0604 (0.0540)		-0.0919+ (0.0516)		-0.0957+ (0.0548)
Partnership School 2017-2018	0.0492* (0.0230)	0.00409 (0.0244)	0.0953* (0.0402)	0.0449 (0.0359)	0.116* (0.0470)	0.0553 (0.0447)	0.147** (0.0481)	0.0547 (0.0430)	0.159** (0.0596)	0.0632 (0.0485)
Economically Disadvantaged	0.00895 (0.00891)	0.00895 (0.00891)	-0.0189 (0.0137)	-0.0189 (0.0137)	-0.0146 (0.0168)	-0.0146 (0.0168)	-0.0128 (0.0148)	-0.0128 (0.0148)	-0.0399 (0.0307)	-0.0399 (0.0307)
English Language Learner	0.00647 (0.0417)	0.00647 (0.0417)	0.116** (0.0436)	0.116** (0.0436)	0.0986 (0.0619)	0.0986 (0.0619)	0.109* (0.0464)	0.109* (0.0464)	0.187* (0.0753)	0.187* (0.0753)
Receives Special Education Services	0.0307* (0.0137)	0.0307* (0.0137)	0.0685** (0.0238)	0.0685** (0.0238)	0.0771** (0.0304)	0.0771** (0.0304)	0.0779** (0.0253)	0.0779** (0.0253)	0.0208 (0.0570)	0.0208 (0.0570)
School-level: % Non-White Students	0.282+ (0.160)	0.282+ (0.160)	0.561** (0.191)	0.561** (0.191)	0.583* (0.227)	0.583* (0.227)	0.596** (0.196)	0.596** (0.196)	1.294* (0.574)	1.294* (0.574)
School-level: % African-American Students	-0.0969* (0.0412)	-0.0969* (0.0412)	-0.0992 (0.0661)	-0.0992 (0.0661)	-0.0747 (0.0827)	-0.0747 (0.0827)	-0.101 (0.0705)	-0.101 (0.0705)	0.990+ (0.525)	0.990+ (0.525)
School-level: % Hispanic Students	-0.0414 (0.0923)	-0.0414 (0.0923)	-0.145 (0.111)	-0.145 (0.111)	-0.156 (0.135)	-0.156 (0.135)	-0.122 (0.112)	-0.122 (0.112)	0.0524 (0.492)	0.0524 (0.492)
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	0.164* (0.0754)	0.164* (0.0754)	0.127 (0.111)	0.127 (0.111)	0.105 (0.133)	0.105 (0.133)	0.117 (0.121)	0.117 (0.121)	0.479* (0.238)	0.479* (0.238)
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	-0.00507 (0.0983)	-0.00507 (0.0983)	0.0928 (0.110)	0.0928 (0.110)	0.157 (0.145)	0.157 (0.145)	0.0711 (0.111)	0.0711 (0.111)	1.206** (0.425)	1.206** (0.425)
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	-0.433*** (0.0988)	-0.433*** (0.0988)	-0.476*** (0.126)	-0.476*** (0.126)	-0.509*** (0.144)	-0.509*** (0.144)	-0.431** (0.138)	-0.431** (0.138)	0.127 (0.295)	0.127 (0.295)
Log of Student Enrollment	-0.0716*** (0.0116)	-0.0716*** (0.0116)	-0.107*** (0.0150)	-0.107*** (0.0150)	-0.101*** (0.0178)	-0.101*** (0.0178)	-0.104*** (0.0149)	-0.104*** (0.0149)	-0.0737+ (0.0388)	-0.0737+ (0.0388)
4th Grade	-0.284*** (0.0176)	-0.284*** (0.0176)	-0.654*** (0.0598)	-0.654*** (0.0598)	-0.707*** (0.0780)	-0.707*** (0.0780)	-0.677*** (0.0635)	-0.677*** (0.0635)	-0.575*** (0.0882)	-0.575*** (0.0882)
5th Grade	-0.503*** (0.0288)	-0.503*** (0.0288)	-0.815*** (0.0702)	-0.815*** (0.0702)	-0.952*** (0.103)	-0.952*** (0.103)	-0.842*** (0.0750)	-0.842*** (0.0750)	-0.663*** (0.0990)	-0.663*** (0.0990)
6th Grade	-0.680*** (0.0440)	-0.680*** (0.0440)	-0.993*** (0.0884)	-0.993*** (0.0884)	-1.163*** (0.138)	-1.163*** (0.138)	-1.012*** (0.0949)	-1.012*** (0.0949)	-0.737*** (0.124)	-0.737*** (0.124)
7th Grade	-0.912*** (0.0602)	-0.912*** (0.0602)	-1.271*** (0.109)	-1.271*** (0.109)	-1.476*** (0.170)	-1.476*** (0.170)	-1.304*** (0.118)	-1.304*** (0.118)	-0.964*** (0.153)	-0.964*** (0.153)
8th Grade	-1.076*** (0.0738)	-1.076*** (0.0738)	-1.429*** (0.125)	-1.429*** (0.125)	-1.672*** (0.203)	-1.672*** (0.203)	-1.459*** (0.137)	-1.459*** (0.137)	-1.050*** (0.173)	-1.050*** (0.173)
Constant	0.303** (0.0979)	0.0602 (0.0962)	1.938*** (0.146)	1.686*** (0.138)	2.118*** (0.191)	1.802*** (0.172)	1.939*** (0.153)	1.685*** (0.143)	0.0368 (0.595)	-0.113 (0.603)
Observations	**151,808**	**151,808**	**114,452**	**114,452**	**79,424**	**79,424**	**103,660**	**103,660**	**36,369**	**36,369**
R-squared	**0.768**	**0.768**	**0.167**	**0.167**	**0.185**	**0.185**	**0.170**	**0.170**	**0.213**	**0.213**
Adjusted R-squared	**0.669**	**0.669**	**-0.219**	**-0.219**	**-0.229**	**-0.229**	**-0.214**	**-0.214**	**-0.187**	**-0.187**

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10*

APPENDIX 5 - FULL RESULTS FOR TABLE 5.2

STUDENT MOBILITY OUTCOMES PROBABILITY OF WITHIN-DISTRICT TRANSFER

Student-Level Mobility Outcomes								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Sample	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools
Outcome	Probability of Within-District Transfer							
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
Priority School 2013-2014	0.00989	0.000228	0.0122	-0.0277	0.0185	0.00510	-0.0287	-0.0164
	(0.0266)	(0.0188)	(0.0294)	(0.0241)	(0.0272)	(0.0190)	(0.0395)	(0.0313)
Priority School 2014-2015	0.00703	-0.00263	0.0235	-0.0164	0.0129	-0.000418	-0.0205	-0.00822
	(0.0185)	(0.0107)	(0.0202)	(0.0144)	(0.0190)	(0.0107)	(0.0283)	(0.0186)
Priority School 2015-2016	0.00966		0.0399**		0.0134		-0.0123	
	(0.0120)		(0.0141)		(0.0123)		(0.0208)	
Priority School 2016-2017		-0.00966		-0.0399**		-0.0134		0.0123
		(0.0120)		(0.0141)		(0.0123)		(0.0208)
Priority School 2017-2018	-0.00193	-0.0116	-0.0118	-0.0517*	-0.00600	-0.0194	-0.00804	0.00427
	(0.0106)	(0.0193)	(0.0111)	(0.0216)	(0.0107)	(0.0199)	(0.0162)	(0.0329)
Partnership School 2013-2014	-0.00112	0.000627	0.000606	0.0631**	0.0183	0.0310	0.00286	0.0131
	(0.0122)	(0.0192)	(0.0137)	(0.0201)	(0.0188)	(0.0224)	(0.0212)	(0.0315)
Partnership School 2014-2015	-0.00952	-0.00777	-0.0229+	0.0396**	-0.00398	0.00866	-0.0142	-0.00393
	(0.0123)	(0.0157)	(0.0136)	(0.0144)	(0.0180)	(0.0178)	(0.0201)	(0.0238)
Partnership School 2015-2016	-0.00174		-0.0625**		-0.0126		-0.0102	
	(0.0215)		(0.0199)		(0.0283)		(0.0356)	
Partnership School 2016-2017		0.00174		0.0625**		0.0126		0.0102
		(0.0215)		(0.0199)		(0.0283)		(0.0356)
Partnership School 2017-2018	-0.0153	-0.0136	0.00762	0.0701**	-0.0322*	-0.0195	-0.00505	0.00518
	(0.0130)	(0.0273)	(0.0114)	(0.0241)	(0.0161)	(0.0383)	(0.0197)	(0.0483)
Economically Disadvantaged	-0.000895	-0.000895	0.00512	0.00512	-0.000667	-0.000667	-0.00770	-0.00770
	(0.00367)	(0.00367)	(0.00410)	(0.00410)	(0.00395)	(0.00395)	(0.00815)	(0.00815)
English Language Learner	-0.0105	-0.0105	0.00325	0.00325	-0.0133	-0.0133	-0.0191	-0.0191
	(0.0126)	(0.0126)	(0.00841)	(0.00841)	(0.0140)	(0.0140)	(0.0122)	(0.0122)
Receives Special Education Services	-0.00109	-0.00109	0.00236	0.00236	0.000118	0.000118	0.00598	0.00598
	(0.00525)	(0.00525)	(0.00599)	(0.00599)	(0.00557)	(0.00557)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)
School-level: % Non-White Students	0.300**	0.300**	0.326*	0.326*	0.363**	0.363**	0.0167	0.0167
	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.251)	(0.251)
School-level: % African-American Students	0.0693**	0.0693**	0.0490	0.0490	0.0492+	0.0492+	-0.402	-0.402
	(0.0257)	(0.0257)	(0.0312)	(0.0312)	(0.0279)	(0.0279)	(0.273)	(0.273)
School-level: % Hispanic Students	-0.0977	-0.0977	-0.00805	-0.00805	-0.125	-0.125	-0.481*	-0.481*
	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.0790)	(0.0790)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.213)	(0.213)
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	-0.172***	-0.172***	-0.179***	-0.179***	-0.151***	-0.151***	-0.172	-0.172
	(0.0418)	(0.0418)	(0.0529)	(0.0529)	(0.0428)	(0.0428)	(0.119)	(0.119)
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	0.196+	0.196+	0.0800	0.0800	0.175	0.175	0.00526	0.00526
	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.0807)	(0.0807)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.265)	(0.265)

Student-Level Mobility Outcomes								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Sample	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools
Outcome	Probability of Within-District Transfer							
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	0.0522	0.0522	0.0111	0.0111	0.0367	0.0367	-0.300*	-0.300*
	(0.0725)	(0.0725)	(0.0823)	(0.0823)	(0.0796)	(0.0796)	(0.143)	(0.143)
Log of School's Student Enrollment	0.0152	0.0152	0.0165	0.0165	0.0175+	0.0175+	-0.0360*	-0.0360*
	(0.00987)	(0.00987)	(0.0134)	(0.0134)	(0.0105)	(0.0105)	(0.0147)	(0.0147)
In Their School's Terminal Grade	0.910***	0.910***	0.917***	0.917***	0.902***	0.902***	0.786***	0.786***
	(0.00797)	(0.00797)	(0.00900)	(0.00900)	(0.00817)	(0.00817)	(0.0317)	(0.0317)
Left Michigan Data								
1st Grade	-0.0142	-0.0142	0.0126	0.0126	-0.0112	-0.0112	-0.0428**	-0.0428**
	(0.00996)	(0.00996)	(0.0106)	(0.0106)	(0.0102)	(0.0102)	(0.0151)	(0.0151)
2nd Grade	-0.0172	-0.0172	0.0175	0.0175	-0.00913	-0.00913	-0.0588*	-0.0588*
	(0.0188)	(0.0188)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0193)	(0.0193)	(0.0282)	(0.0282)
3rd Grade	-0.0184	-0.0184	0.0252	0.0252	-0.00735	-0.00735	-0.0805+	-0.0805+
	(0.0283)	(0.0283)	(0.0307)	(0.0307)	(0.0292)	(0.0292)	(0.0420)	(0.0420)
4th Grade	-0.0248	-0.0248	0.0228	0.0228	-0.00922	-0.00922	-0.0960+	-0.0960+
	(0.0369)	(0.0369)	(0.0402)	(0.0402)	(0.0380)	(0.0380)	(0.0539)	(0.0539)
5th Grade	-0.0103	-0.0103	0.0445	0.0445	0.00938	0.00938	-0.103	-0.103
	(0.0473)	(0.0473)	(0.0504)	(0.0504)	(0.0489)	(0.0489)	(0.0675)	(0.0675)
6th Grade	-0.0403	-0.0403	0.0228	0.0228	-0.0148	-0.0148	-0.138+	-0.138+
	(0.0549)	(0.0549)	(0.0597)	(0.0597)	(0.0566)	(0.0566)	(0.0791)	(0.0791)
7th Grade	-0.0507	-0.0507	0.0205	0.0205	-0.0217	-0.0217	-0.148	-0.148
	(0.0631)	(0.0631)	(0.0688)	(0.0688)	(0.0649)	(0.0649)	(0.0894)	(0.0894)
8th Grade	-0.0670	-0.0670	0.0303	0.0303	-0.0341	-0.0341	-0.115	-0.115
	(0.0735)	(0.0735)	(0.0808)	(0.0808)	(0.0758)	(0.0758)	(0.106)	(0.106)
9th Grade	-0.0734	-0.0734	0.0151	0.0151	-0.0447	-0.0447	-0.216+	-0.216+
	(0.0813)	(0.0813)	(0.0895)	(0.0895)	(0.0836)	(0.0836)	(0.109)	(0.109)
10th Grade	-0.0689	-0.0689	0.0418	0.0418	-0.0341	-0.0341	-0.248*	-0.248*
	(0.0873)	(0.0873)	(0.0947)	(0.0947)	(0.0897)	(0.0897)	(0.121)	(0.121)
11th Grade	-0.0855	-0.0855	0.0367	0.0367	-0.0491	-0.0491	-0.280*	-0.280*
	(0.0947)	(0.0947)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.0972)	(0.0972)	(0.133)	(0.133)
12th Grade	-0.946***	-0.946***	-0.833***	-0.833***	-0.903***	-0.903***	-0.945***	-0.945***
	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.148)	(0.148)
Constant	0.108	0.117	0.0358	0.0584	0.0761	0.0877	1.152***	1.136***
	(0.0788)	(0.0733)	(0.0923)	(0.0868)	(0.0820)	(0.0759)	(0.333)	(0.329)
Observations	**282,246**	**282,246**	**193,166**	**193,166**	**256,000**	**256,000**	**104,620**	**104,620**
R-squared	**0.686**	**0.686**	**0.739**	**0.739**	**0.673**	**0.673**	**0.570**	**0.570**
Adjusted R-squared	**0.566**	**0.566**	**0.625**	**0.625**	**0.548**	**0.548**	**0.405**	**0.405**

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10*

APPENDIX 5 - FULL RESULTS FOR TABLE 5.2

STUDENT MOBILITY OUTCOMES PROBABILITY OF OUT-OF-DISTRICT TRANSFER

Student-Level Mobility Outcomes								
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Sample	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools
Outcome	Probability of Out-of-District Transfer							
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
Priority School 2013-2014	0.0164	0.0338*	-0.0108	-0.0246	0.0136	0.0328*	-0.286***	-0.156***
	(0.0243)	(0.0155)	(0.0295)	(0.0217)	(0.0254)	(0.0160)	(0.0328)	(0.0244)
Priority School 2014-2015	0.00425	0.0217*	0.000974	-0.0129	0.00228	0.0214*	-0.187***	-0.0572***
	(0.0178)	(0.00873)	(0.0223)	(0.0136)	(0.0185)	(0.00889)	(0.0239)	(0.0150)
Priority School 2015-2016	-0.0175		0.0138		-0.0192		-0.130***	
	(0.0166)		(0.0254)		(0.0170)		(0.0177)	
Priority School 2016-2017		0.0175		-0.0138		0.0192		0.130***
		(0.0166)		(0.0254)		(0.0170)		(0.0177)
Priority School 2017-2018	-0.0854***	-0.0679*	-0.0806**	-0.0945+	-0.0809***	-0.0617+	0.0450+	0.175***
	(0.0214)	(0.0345)	(0.0292)	(0.0486)	(0.0213)	(0.0349)	(0.0256)	(0.0380)
Partnership School 2013-2014	0.00749	0.0153	0.0348	0.0764**	-0.0347+	0.0598***	0.0745***	0.111***
	(0.0163)	(0.0227)	(0.0213)	(0.0286)	(0.0183)	(0.0155)	(0.0196)	(0.0181)
Partnership School 2014-2015	0.00319	0.0110	0.00963	0.0512*	-0.0514***	0.0431***	0.0196	0.0564***
	(0.0158)	(0.0173)	(0.0208)	(0.0207)	(0.0154)	(0.0102)	(0.0149)	(0.0108)
Partnership School 2015-2016	-0.00780		-0.0415		-0.0946***		-0.0368*	
	(0.0231)		(0.0298)		(0.0157)		(0.0158)	
Partnership School 2016-2017		0.00780		0.0415		0.0946***		0.0368*
		(0.0231)		(0.0298)		(0.0157)		(0.0158)
Partnership School 2017-2018	0.00594	0.0137	0.0157	0.0572	0.120***	0.215***	0.0298	0.0666**
	(0.0226)	(0.0360)	(0.0308)	(0.0478)	(0.0245)	(0.0287)	(0.0215)	(0.0235)
Economically Disadvantaged	0.00669	0.00669	0.0142+	0.0142+	0.00498	0.00498	-0.0116*	-0.0116*
	(0.00566)	(0.00566)	(0.00751)	(0.00751)	(0.00593)	(0.00593)	(0.00554)	(0.00554)
English Language Learner	-0.0534***	-0.0534***	-0.0604***	-0.0604***	-0.0453***	-0.0453***	0.00364	0.00364
	(0.0109)	(0.0109)	(0.0125)	(0.0125)	(0.0117)	(0.0117)	(0.0112)	(0.0112)
Receives Special Education Services	0.0128+	0.0128+	0.0197*	0.0197*	0.0128+	0.0128+	-0.00536	-0.00536
	(0.00713)	(0.00713)	(0.00862)	(0.00862)	(0.00755)	(0.00755)	(0.0104)	(0.0104)
School-level: % Non-White Students	-0.140	-0.140	-0.112	-0.112	-0.104	-0.104	-0.0756	-0.0756
	(0.0989)	(0.0989)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.162)	(0.162)
School-level: % African-American Students	-0.198***	-0.198***	-0.162***	-0.162***	-0.168***	-0.168***	0.155	0.155
	(0.0276)	(0.0276)	(0.0326)	(0.0326)	(0.0296)	(0.0296)	(0.139)	(0.139)
School-level: % Hispanic Students	-0.266***	-0.266***	-0.258**	-0.258**	-0.252**	-0.252**	-0.285*	-0.285*
	(0.0727)	(0.0727)	(0.0948)	(0.0948)	(0.0801)	(0.0801)	(0.132)	(0.132)
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	-0.00301	-0.00301	-0.0482	-0.0482	-0.0337	-0.0337	0.138	0.138
	(0.0417)	(0.0417)	(0.0555)	(0.0555)	(0.0435)	(0.0435)	(0.0918)	(0.0918)
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	0.0155	0.0155	0.0553	0.0553	0.0156	0.0156	0.395*	0.395*
	(0.0653)	(0.0653)	(0.0780)	(0.0780)	(0.0690)	(0.0690)	(0.158)	(0.158)

Student-Level Mobility Outcomes								
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Sample	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools
Outcome	Probability of Out-of-District Transfer							
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	-0.0515	-0.0515	0.000531	0.000531	0.0546	0.0546	-0.101	-0.101
	(0.0816)	(0.0816)	(0.0927)	(0.0927)	(0.0877)	(0.0877)	(0.0673)	(0.0673)
Log of School's Student Enrollment	-0.0216***	-0.0216***	-0.0211**	-0.0211**	-0.0166*	-0.0166*	-0.00182	-0.00182
	(0.00656)	(0.00656)	(0.00759)	(0.00759)	(0.00644)	(0.00644)	(0.0114)	(0.0114)
In Their School's Terminal Grade	0.669***	0.669***	0.672***	0.672***	0.678***	0.678***	0.671***	0.671***
	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0258)	(0.0258)	(0.0221)	(0.0221)	(0.0456)	(0.0456)
Left Michigan Data	0.707***	0.707***	0.703***	0.703***	0.711***	0.711***	0.779***	0.779***
	(0.0210)	(0.0210)	(0.0295)	(0.0295)	(0.0225)	(0.0225)	(0.0188)	(0.0188)
1st Grade	-0.00510	-0.00510	0.000306	0.000306	-0.00315	-0.00315	-0.0180	-0.0180
	(0.0125)	(0.0125)	(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0131)	(0.0131)	(0.0155)	(0.0155)
2nd Grade	-0.000472	-0.000472	0.00720	0.00720	-0.00157	-0.00157	-0.0761**	-0.0761**
	(0.0223)	(0.0223)	(0.0268)	(0.0268)	(0.0231)	(0.0231)	(0.0288)	(0.0288)
3rd Grade	0.00697	0.00697	0.0111	0.0111	0.00419	0.00419	-0.141***	-0.141***
	(0.0318)	(0.0318)	(0.0382)	(0.0382)	(0.0330)	(0.0330)	(0.0414)	(0.0414)
4th Grade	0.000396	0.000396	-0.000660	-0.000660	-0.00410	-0.00410	-0.209***	-0.209***
	(0.0414)	(0.0414)	(0.0497)	(0.0497)	(0.0430)	(0.0430)	(0.0533)	(0.0533)
5th Grade	0.00936	0.00936	0.00493	0.00493	-0.000597	-0.000597	-0.265***	-0.265***
	(0.0507)	(0.0507)	(0.0607)	(0.0607)	(0.0524)	(0.0524)	(0.0647)	(0.0647)
6th Grade	0.0278	0.0278	0.0208	0.0208	0.0168	0.0168	-0.316***	-0.316***
	(0.0601)	(0.0601)	(0.0717)	(0.0717)	(0.0622)	(0.0622)	(0.0776)	(0.0776)
7th Grade	0.0260	0.0260	0.0187	0.0187	0.0145	0.0145	-0.377***	-0.377***
	(0.0686)	(0.0686)	(0.0815)	(0.0815)	(0.0710)	(0.0710)	(0.0902)	(0.0902)
8th Grade	0.0679	0.0679	0.0658	0.0658	0.0462	0.0462	-0.417***	-0.417***
	(0.0794)	(0.0794)	(0.0962)	(0.0962)	(0.0816)	(0.0816)	(0.104)	(0.104)
9th Grade	0.0446	0.0446	0.0180	0.0180	0.0203	0.0203	-0.542***	-0.542***
	(0.0878)	(0.0878)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.0904)	(0.0904)	(0.110)	(0.110)
10th Grade	0.0734	0.0734	0.0488	0.0488	0.0547	0.0547	-0.564***	-0.564***
	(0.0974)	(0.0974)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.122)	(0.122)
11th Grade	0.0678	0.0678	0.0412	0.0412	0.0458	0.0458	-0.621***	-0.621***
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.134)	(0.134)
12th Grade	0.0198	0.0198	-0.0662	-0.0662	-0.0228	-0.0228	-0.612***	-0.612***
	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.147)	(0.147)
Constant	0.486***	0.467***	0.489***	0.492***	0.441***	0.411***	0.262	0.120
	(0.0619)	(0.0549)	(0.0688)	(0.0616)	(0.0635)	(0.0557)	(0.236)	(0.232)
Observations	**299,734**	**299,734**	**215,022**	**215,022**	**268,935**	**268,935**	**91,755**	**91,755**
R-squared	**0.544**	**0.544**	**0.555**	**0.555**	**0.552**	**0.552**	**0.642**	**0.642**
Adjusted R-squared	**0.370**	**0.370**	**0.370**	**0.370**	**0.378**	**0.378**	**0.472**	**0.472**

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10*

APPENDIX 5 - FULL RESULTS FOR TABLE 5.2

STUDENT MOBILITY OUTCOMES PROBABILITY OF BEING NEW TO ONE'S SCHOOL

Student-Level Mobility Outcomes								
	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
Sample	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools
Outcome	Probability of Being New to One's School							
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
Priority School 2013-2014	0.218***	0.181***	0.257***	0.209***	0.240***	0.195***	0.242**	0.180**
	(0.0636)	(0.0415)	(0.0769)	(0.0499)	(0.0644)	(0.0420)	(0.0823)	(0.0532)
Priority School 2014-2015	0.116**	0.0784***	0.140**	0.0914***	0.132**	0.0861***	0.138*	0.0760**
	(0.0426)	(0.0212)	(0.0517)	(0.0258)	(0.0431)	(0.0214)	(0.0562)	(0.0259)
Priority School 2015-2016	0.0373		0.0484		0.0455+		0.0620+	
	(0.0244)		(0.0306)		(0.0246)		(0.0329)	
Priority School 2016-2017		-0.0373		-0.0484		-0.0455+		-0.0620+
		(0.0244)		(0.0306)		(0.0246)		(0.0329)
Priority School 2017-2018	-0.0392	-0.0765	-0.0266	-0.0750	-0.0455	-0.0911+	-0.0846**	-0.147*
	(0.0343)	(0.0545)	(0.0467)	(0.0705)	(0.0346)	(0.0550)	(0.0312)	(0.0615)
Partnership School 2013-2014	-0.00302	0.0125	0.0495	0.0224	0.0842***	0.0271	-0.0322	-0.0309
	(0.0266)	(0.0266)	(0.0305)	(0.0231)	(0.0237)	(0.0171)	(0.0259)	(0.0191)
Partnership School 2014-2015	0.0252	0.0407+	0.0724*	0.0453+	0.0863***	0.0291+	0.00165	0.00289
	(0.0280)	(0.0219)	(0.0349)	(0.0236)	(0.0235)	(0.0155)	(0.0249)	(0.0129)
Partnership School 2015-2016	-0.0155		0.0271		0.0572**		-0.00124	
	(0.0270)		(0.0260)		(0.0188)		(0.0227)	
Partnership School 2016-2017		0.0155		-0.0271		-0.0572**		0.00124
		(0.0270)		(0.0260)		(0.0188)		(0.0227)
Partnership School 2017-2018	-0.0296	-0.0141	-0.106*	-0.133*	-0.0873+	-0.145**	-0.0134	-0.0122
	(0.0459)	(0.0551)	(0.0506)	(0.0578)	(0.0487)	(0.0560)	(0.0485)	(0.0607)
Economically Disadvantaged	0.0372***	0.0372***	0.0333***	0.0333***	0.0355***	0.0355***	0.0535***	0.0535***
	(0.00628)	(0.00628)	(0.00741)	(0.00741)	(0.00652)	(0.00652)	(0.00890)	(0.00890)
English Language Learner	0.0904***	0.0904***	0.142***	0.142***	0.0851***	0.0851***	0.0390	0.0390
	(0.0241)	(0.0241)	(0.0271)	(0.0271)	(0.0231)	(0.0231)	(0.0374)	(0.0374)
Receives Special Education Services	-0.0112	-0.0112	-0.00866	-0.00866	-0.00777	-0.00777	0.0112	0.0112
	(0.00776)	(0.00776)	(0.00997)	(0.00997)	(0.00838)	(0.00838)	(0.0123)	(0.0123)
School-level: % Non-White Students	-0.0933	-0.0933	-0.174	-0.174	-0.0712	-0.0712	0.252	0.252
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.175)	(0.175)
School-level: % African-American Students	-0.142***	-0.142***	-0.171***	-0.171***	-0.123**	-0.123**	0.429*	0.429*
	(0.0429)	(0.0429)	(0.0447)	(0.0447)	(0.0466)	(0.0466)	(0.193)	(0.193)
School-level: % Hispanic Students	0.0932	0.0932	-0.101	-0.101	0.106	0.106	0.608***	0.608***
	(0.0914)	(0.0914)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.0983)	(0.0983)	(0.166)	(0.166)
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	-0.155*	-0.155*	-0.0734	-0.0734	-0.153+	-0.153+	-0.262*	-0.262*
	(0.0764)	(0.0764)	(0.0745)	(0.0745)	(0.0827)	(0.0827)	(0.104)	(0.104)
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	-0.342***	-0.342***	-0.200*	-0.200*	-0.316***	-0.316***	-0.0452	-0.0452
	(0.0724)	(0.0724)	(0.0819)	(0.0819)	(0.0743)	(0.0743)	(0.192)	(0.192)

Student-Level Mobility Outcomes								
	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
Sample	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools
Outcome	Probability of Being New to One's School							
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	0.0313	0.0313	0.0521	0.0521	0.0683	0.0683	0.463***	0.463***
	(0.0924)	(0.0924)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.0948)	(0.0948)	(0.120)	(0.120)
Log of School's Student Enrollment	0.00194	0.00194	0.00321	0.00321	-0.00325	-0.00325	0.0396	0.0396
	(0.0173)	(0.0173)	(0.0206)	(0.0206)	(0.0191)	(0.0191)	(0.0263)	(0.0263)
In Their School's Terminal Grade								
Left Michigan Data								
1st Grade	0.356***	0.356***	0.355***	0.355***	0.349***	0.349***	0.339***	0.339***
	(0.0278)	(0.0278)	(0.0353)	(0.0353)	(0.0275)	(0.0275)	(0.0310)	(0.0310)
2nd Grade	0.424***	0.424***	0.440***	0.440***	0.431***	0.431***	0.368***	0.368***
	(0.0515)	(0.0515)	(0.0643)	(0.0643)	(0.0518)	(0.0518)	(0.0565)	(0.0565)
3rd Grade	0.497***	0.497***	0.530***	0.530***	0.510***	0.510***	0.412***	0.412***
	(0.0724)	(0.0724)	(0.0890)	(0.0890)	(0.0737)	(0.0737)	(0.0837)	(0.0837)
4th Grade	0.556***	0.556***	0.609***	0.609***	0.580***	0.580***	0.444***	0.444***
	(0.0945)	(0.0945)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.0963)	(0.0963)	(0.110)	(0.110)
5th Grade	0.636***	0.636***	0.722***	0.722***	0.670***	0.670***	0.514***	0.514***
	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.142)	(0.142)
6th Grade	0.871***	0.871***	0.997***	0.997***	0.894***	0.894***	0.598***	0.598***
	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.163)	(0.163)
7th Grade	0.876***	0.876***	0.967***	0.967***	0.912***	0.912***	0.577**	0.577**
	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.198)	(0.198)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.188)	(0.188)
8th Grade	0.801***	0.801***	0.932***	0.932***	0.856***	0.856***	0.573**	0.573**
	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.224)	(0.224)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.210)	(0.210)
9th Grade	1.386***	1.386***	1.558***	1.558***	1.467***	1.467***	1.303***	1.303***
	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.243)	(0.243)	(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.230)	(0.230)
10th Grade	0.984***	0.984***	1.183***	1.183***	1.038***	1.038***	0.647*	0.647*
	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.284)	(0.284)	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.256)	(0.256)
11th Grade	1.004***	1.004***	1.209***	1.209***	1.091***	1.091***	0.642*	0.642*
	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.307)	(0.307)	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.281)	(0.281)
12th Grade	1.035***	1.035***	1.262***	1.262***	1.126***	1.126***	0.645*	0.645*
	(0.271)	(0.271)	(0.328)	(0.328)	(0.275)	(0.275)	(0.309)	(0.309)
Constant	-0.219	-0.185	-0.384	-0.328	-0.264	-0.211	-0.902***	-0.841***
	(0.203)	(0.186)	(0.235)	(0.214)	(0.216)	(0.199)	(0.242)	(0.225)
Observations	**371,400**	**371,400**	**266,785**	**266,785**	**334,091**	**334,091**	**124,360**	**124,360**
R-squared	**0.363**	**0.363**	**0.396**	**0.396**	**0.372**	**0.372**	**0.488**	**0.488**
Adjusted R-squared	**0.171**	**0.171**	**0.184**	**0.184**	**0.178**	**0.178**	**0.302**	**0.302**

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10*

APPENDIX 5 - FULL RESULTS FOR TABLE 5.2

STUDENT MOBILITY OUTCOMES PROBABILITY OF BEING NEW TO DISTRICT

Student-Level Mobility Outcomes								
	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)
Sample	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools
Outcome	Probability of Being New to District							
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
Priority School 2013-2014	0.0427	0.0304	0.0764	0.0538	0.0651	0.0452	0.104***	0.0542***
	(0.0562)	(0.0362)	(0.0713)	(0.0455)	(0.0574)	(0.0369)	(0.0183)	(0.0120)
Priority School 2014-2015	0.0169	0.00462	0.0377	0.0151	0.0322	0.0123	0.0769***	0.0272***
	(0.0366)	(0.0169)	(0.0464)	(0.0211)	(0.0374)	(0.0172)	(0.0121)	(0.00568)
Priority School 2015-2016	0.0123		0.0226		0.0200		0.0497***	
	(0.0206)		(0.0266)		(0.0210)		(0.00959)	
Priority School 2016-2017		-0.0123		-0.0226		-0.0200		-0.0497***
		(0.0206)		(0.0266)		(0.0210)		(0.00959)
Priority School 2017-2018	0.0227	0.0104	0.0328	0.0101	0.0174	-0.00256	-0.0778***	-0.128***
	(0.0309)	(0.0499)	(0.0429)	(0.0671)	(0.0314)	(0.0509)	(0.00798)	(0.0140)
Partnership School 2013-2014	0.0140	0.00520	0.0215	0.0143	0.0870***	0.0301**	-0.0105	-0.0137
	(0.0134)	(0.00901)	(0.0174)	(0.0120)	(0.0142)	(0.0116)	(0.0116)	(0.0102)
Partnership School 2014-2015	0.0128	0.00402	0.0145	0.00727	0.0838***	0.0269***	-0.00124	-0.00445
	(0.0120)	(0.00693)	(0.0149)	(0.00899)	(0.0104)	(0.00802)	(0.00917)	(0.00679)
Partnership School 2015-2016	0.00876		0.00720		0.0569***		0.00322	
	(0.0109)		(0.0127)		(0.00865)		(0.00999)	
Partnership School 2016-2017		-0.00876		-0.00720		-0.0569***		-0.00322
		(0.0109)		(0.0127)		(0.00865)		(0.00999)
Partnership School 2017-2018	-0.0356	-0.0444+	-0.0548+	-0.0620+	-0.171***	-0.228***	-0.0505***	-0.0537***
	(0.0247)	(0.0266)	(0.0329)	(0.0374)	(0.0190)	(0.0213)	(0.0140)	(0.0155)
Economically Disadvantaged	0.0244***	0.0244***	0.0288***	0.0288***	0.0242***	0.0242***	0.0406***	0.0406***
	(0.00546)	(0.00546)	(0.00726)	(0.00726)	(0.00594)	(0.00594)	(0.00677)	(0.00677)
English Language Learner	0.0676***	0.0676***	0.0889***	0.0889***	0.0645***	0.0645***	-0.0354**	-0.0354**
	(0.0157)	(0.0157)	(0.0234)	(0.0234)	(0.0169)	(0.0169)	(0.0123)	(0.0123)
Receives Special Education Services	-0.0145*	-0.0145*	-0.0131	-0.0131	-0.0111+	-0.0111+	0.0105	0.0105
	(0.00629)	(0.00629)	(0.00827)	(0.00827)	(0.00669)	(0.00669)	(0.00846)	(0.00846)
School-level: % Non-White Students	0.0873	0.0873	0.0203	0.0203	0.118	0.118	0.0334	0.0334
	(0.0885)	(0.0885)	(0.0931)	(0.0931)	(0.0940)	(0.0940)	(0.111)	(0.111)
School-level: % African-American Students	-0.339***	-0.339***	-0.368***	-0.368***	-0.305***	-0.305***	-0.0713	-0.0713
	(0.0416)	(0.0416)	(0.0419)	(0.0419)	(0.0432)	(0.0432)	(0.0949)	(0.0949)
School-level: % Hispanic Students	-0.129+	-0.129+	-0.193*	-0.193*	-0.108	-0.108	0.124	0.124
	(0.0770)	(0.0770)	(0.0974)	(0.0974)	(0.0833)	(0.0833)	(0.107)	(0.107)
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	0.131	0.131	0.161+	0.161+	0.129	0.129	-0.0660+	-0.0660+
	(0.0828)	(0.0828)	(0.0875)	(0.0875)	(0.0879)	(0.0879)	(0.0351)	(0.0351)
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	-0.311***	-0.311***	-0.284***	-0.284***	-0.300***	-0.300***	-0.218*	-0.218*
	(0.0613)	(0.0613)	(0.0726)	(0.0726)	(0.0632)	(0.0632)	(0.0895)	(0.0895)

Student-Level Mobility Outcomes								
	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)
Sample	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools
Outcome	Probability of Being New to District							
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	-0.269***	-0.269***	-0.257**	-0.257**	-0.209**	-0.209**	0.0185	0.0185
	(0.0748)	(0.0748)	(0.0835)	(0.0835)	(0.0752)	(0.0752)	(0.0361)	(0.0361)
Log of School's Student Enrollment	-0.0103	-0.0103	-0.000383	-0.000383	-0.00610	-0.00610	0.00901	0.00901
	(0.0193)	(0.0193)	(0.0234)	(0.0234)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.00726)	(0.00726)
In Their School's Terminal Grade								
Left Michigan Data								
1st Grade	0.181***	0.181***	0.195***	0.195***	0.186***	0.186***	0.108***	0.108***
	(0.0232)	(0.0232)	(0.0297)	(0.0297)	(0.0241)	(0.0241)	(0.00650)	(0.00650)
2nd Grade	0.195***	0.195***	0.218***	0.218***	0.208***	0.208***	0.115***	0.115***
	(0.0433)	(0.0433)	(0.0551)	(0.0551)	(0.0448)	(0.0448)	(0.0115)	(0.0115)
3rd Grade	0.211***	0.211***	0.248**	0.248**	0.230***	0.230***	0.129***	0.129***
	(0.0624)	(0.0624)	(0.0795)	(0.0795)	(0.0645)	(0.0645)	(0.0173)	(0.0173)
4th Grade	0.229**	0.229**	0.275**	0.275**	0.256**	0.256**	0.137***	0.137***
	(0.0826)	(0.0826)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.0853)	(0.0853)	(0.0229)	(0.0229)
5th Grade	0.236*	0.236*	0.293*	0.293*	0.272*	0.272*	0.144***	0.144***
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.0292)	(0.0292)
6th Grade	0.267*	0.267*	0.341*	0.341*	0.309*	0.309*	0.157***	0.157***
	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.0342)	(0.0342)
7th Grade	0.294*	0.294*	0.378*	0.378*	0.342*	0.342*	0.169***	0.169***
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.0395)	(0.0395)
8th Grade	0.295+	0.295+	0.381+	0.381+	0.355*	0.355*	0.179***	0.179***
	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.0454)	(0.0454)
9th Grade	0.449*	0.449*	0.559*	0.559*	0.507**	0.507**	0.254***	0.254***
	(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.227)	(0.227)	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.0558)	(0.0558)
10th Grade	0.340+	0.340+	0.479+	0.479+	0.407*	0.407*	0.121*	0.121*
	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.0570)	(0.0570)
11th Grade	0.341	0.341	0.490+	0.490+	0.418+	0.418+	0.118+	0.118+
	(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.277)	(0.277)	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.0614)	(0.0614)
12th Grade	0.317	0.317	0.472	0.472	0.402	0.402	0.111+	0.111+
	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.299)	(0.299)	(0.244)	(0.244)	(0.0656)	(0.0656)
Constant	0.159	0.173	0.0131	0.0376	0.0436	0.0707	-0.0403	0.0105
	(0.227)	(0.211)	(0.273)	(0.253)	(0.239)	(0.223)	(0.110)	(0.109)
Observations	**371,400**	**371,400**	**266,785**	**266,785**	**334,091**	**334,091**	**124,360**	**124,360**
R-squared	**0.350**	**0.350**	**0.376**	**0.376**	**0.351**	**0.351**	**0.388**	**0.388**
Adjusted R-squared	**0.154**	**0.154**	**0.158**	**0.158**	**0.151**	**0.151**	**0.165**	**0.165**

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10*

APPENDIX 5 - FULL RESULTS FOR TABLE 5.2

STUDENT MOBILITY OUTCOMES PROBABILITY OF BEING RETAINED IN GRADE

Student-Level Mobility Outcomes								
	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)
Sample	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools
Outcome	Probability of Being Retained in Grade							
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
Priority School 2013-2014	-0.952***	-0.653***	-0.899***	-0.619***	-0.943***	-0.647***	-1.214***	-0.824***
	(0.100)	(0.0651)	(0.116)	(0.0751)	(0.106)	(0.0689)	(0.0924)	(0.0613)
Priority School 2014-2015	-0.604***	-0.305***	-0.566***	-0.286***	-0.598***	-0.302***	-0.784***	-0.394***
	(0.0684)	(0.0333)	(0.0793)	(0.0384)	(0.0721)	(0.0352)	(0.0639)	(0.0328)
Priority School 2015-2016	-0.299***		-0.280***		-0.296***		-0.390***	
	(0.0352)		(0.0411)		(0.0371)		(0.0313)	
Priority School 2016-2017		0.299***		0.280***		0.296***		0.390***
		(0.0352)		(0.0411)		(0.0371)		(0.0313)
Priority School 2017-2018	0.313***	0.612***	0.296***	0.577***	0.310***	0.606***	0.393***	0.783***
	(0.0361)	(0.0710)	(0.0431)	(0.0836)	(0.0381)	(0.0749)	(0.0331)	(0.0640)
Partnership School 2013-2014	-0.000493	0.00196	-0.00354	0.000918	-0.00343	0.00232	0.00582	0.00529
	(0.00377)	(0.00358)	(0.00478)	(0.00422)	(0.00461)	(0.00451)	(0.00562)	(0.00444)
Partnership School 2014-2015	-0.00541	-0.00295	-0.0107+	-0.00625+	-0.00826+	-0.00251	0.00256	0.00202
	(0.00450)	(0.00270)	(0.00617)	(0.00333)	(0.00492)	(0.00344)	(0.00507)	(0.00367)
Partnership School 2015-2016	-0.00245		-0.00446		-0.00576		0.000538	
	(0.00460)		(0.00602)		(0.00527)		(0.00518)	
Partnership School 2016-2017		0.00245		0.00446		0.00576		-0.000538
		(0.00460)		(0.00602)		(0.00527)		(0.00518)
Partnership School 2017-2018	-0.00222	0.000231	-0.00300	0.00146	-0.00714	-0.00138	-0.00272	-0.00326
	(0.00531)	(0.00527)	(0.00740)	(0.00724)	(0.00606)	(0.00571)	(0.00569)	(0.00582)
Economically Disadvantaged	0.000140	0.000140	-0.00160	-0.00160	-0.000491	-0.000491	0.000572	0.000572
	(0.00283)	(0.00283)	(0.00382)	(0.00382)	(0.00311)	(0.00311)	(0.00252)	(0.00252)
English Language Learner	-0.00149	-0.00149	-0.000563	-0.000563	-0.00304	-0.00304	-0.00692	-0.00692
	(0.00469)	(0.00469)	(0.00616)	(0.00616)	(0.00508)	(0.00508)	(0.00433)	(0.00433)
Receives Special Education Services	0.0116***	0.0116***	0.0114**	0.0114**	0.0119***	0.0119***	0.0199**	0.0199**
	(0.00318)	(0.00318)	(0.00364)	(0.00364)	(0.00338)	(0.00338)	(0.00686)	(0.00686)
School-level: % Non-White Students	0.0114	0.0114	0.0116	0.0116	0.0193	0.0193	-0.00643	-0.00643
	(0.0233)	(0.0233)	(0.0261)	(0.0261)	(0.0260)	(0.0260)	(0.0302)	(0.0302)
School-level: % African-American Students	-0.0336***	-0.0336***	-0.0434***	-0.0434***	-0.0315***	-0.0315***	0.000844	0.000844
	(0.00742)	(0.00742)	(0.00931)	(0.00931)	(0.00823)	(0.00823)	(0.0494)	(0.0494)
School-level: % Hispanic Students	-0.0262+	-0.0262+	-0.0235	-0.0235	-0.0249	-0.0249	-0.0272	-0.0272
	(0.0136)	(0.0136)	(0.0160)	(0.0160)	(0.0155)	(0.0155)	(0.0286)	(0.0286)
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	0.0445***	0.0445***	0.0581***	0.0581***	0.0438**	0.0438**	0.0332	0.0332
	(0.0134)	(0.0134)	(0.0169)	(0.0169)	(0.0147)	(0.0147)	(0.0208)	(0.0208)
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	-0.00131	-0.00131	-0.0241	-0.0241	0.00222	0.00222	0.0686	0.0686
	(0.0171)	(0.0171)	(0.0194)	(0.0194)	(0.0185)	(0.0185)	(0.0569)	(0.0569)

Student-Level Mobility Outcomes								
	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)
Sample	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools
Outcome	Probability of Being Retained in Grade							
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	0.0496**	0.0496**	0.0419+	0.0419+	0.0596**	0.0596**	-0.00871	-0.00871
	(0.0169)	(0.0169)	(0.0238)	(0.0238)	(0.0187)	(0.0187)	(0.0239)	(0.0239)
Log of School's Student Enrollment	-0.00317	-0.00317	-0.00338	-0.00338	-0.00276	-0.00276	-0.00635*	-0.00635*
	(0.00458)	(0.00458)	(0.00566)	(0.00566)	(0.00482)	(0.00482)	(0.00307)	(0.00307)
In Their School's Terminal Grade								
Left Michigan Data								
1st Grade	-0.322***	-0.322***	-0.315***	-0.315***	-0.317***	-0.317***	-0.380***	-0.380***
	(0.0357)	(0.0357)	(0.0417)	(0.0417)	(0.0378)	(0.0378)	(0.0324)	(0.0324)
2nd Grade	-0.656***	-0.656***	-0.628***	-0.628***	-0.647***	-0.647***	-0.810***	-0.810***
	(0.0709)	(0.0709)	(0.0824)	(0.0824)	(0.0749)	(0.0749)	(0.0657)	(0.0657)
3rd Grade	-0.979***	-0.979***	-0.932***	-0.932***	-0.968***	-0.968***	-1.231***	-1.231***
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.0979)	(0.0979)
4th Grade	-1.295***	-1.295***	-1.231***	-1.231***	-1.281***	-1.281***	-1.637***	-1.637***
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.129)	(0.129)
5th Grade	-1.607***	-1.607***	-1.526***	-1.526***	-1.590***	-1.590***	-2.033***	-2.033***
	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.161)	(0.161)
6th Grade	-1.919***	-1.919***	-1.821***	-1.821***	-1.899***	-1.899***	-2.424***	-2.424***
	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.241)	(0.241)	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.193)	(0.193)
7th Grade	-2.229***	-2.229***	-2.115***	-2.115***	-2.207***	-2.207***	-2.821***	-2.821***
	(0.242)	(0.242)	(0.280)	(0.280)	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.227)	(0.227)
8th Grade	-2.537***	-2.537***	-2.408***	-2.408***	-2.512***	-2.512***	-3.205***	-3.205***
	(0.275)	(0.275)	(0.320)	(0.320)	(0.291)	(0.291)	(0.262)	(0.262)
9th Grade	-2.822***	-2.822***	-2.666***	-2.666***	-2.792***	-2.792***	-3.582***	-3.582***
	(0.312)	(0.312)	(0.363)	(0.363)	(0.331)	(0.331)	(0.303)	(0.303)
10th Grade	-3.141***	-3.141***	-2.971***	-2.971***	-3.107***	-3.107***	-3.982***	-3.982***
	(0.347)	(0.347)	(0.404)	(0.404)	(0.368)	(0.368)	(0.330)	(0.330)
11th Grade	-3.466***	-3.466***	-3.274***	-3.274***	-3.430***	-3.430***	-4.394***	-4.394***
	(0.385)	(0.385)	(0.449)	(0.449)	(0.408)	(0.408)	(0.363)	(0.363)
12th Grade	-3.709***	-3.709***	-3.491***	-3.491***	-3.670***	-3.670***	-4.748***	-4.748***
	(0.422)	(0.422)	(0.491)	(0.491)	(0.447)	(0.447)	(0.396)	(0.396)
Constant	2.069***	1.770***	1.973***	1.692***	2.046***	1.749***	2.685***	2.295***
	(0.210)	(0.175)	(0.244)	(0.204)	(0.223)	(0.186)	(0.225)	(0.194)
Observations	**371,400**	**371,400**	**266,785**	**266,785**	**334,091**	**334,091**	**124,360**	**124,360**
R-squared	**0.489**	**0.489**	**0.508**	**0.508**	**0.494**	**0.494**	**0.520**	**0.520**
Adjusted R-squared	**0.336**	**0.336**	**0.335**	**0.335**	**0.337**	**0.337**	**0.346**	**0.346**

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10*

APPENDIX 5 - FULL RESULTS FOR TABLE 5.2

SCHOOL-LEVEL OUTCOMES SAT MATH

School-Level Outcomes								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Sample	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools
Outcome	SAT Math							
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
Priority School 2013-2014	0.171***	0.190***	0.134***	0.184**	0.167***	0.189***	0.162**	0.195***
	(0.0282)	(0.0365)	(0.0377)	(0.0528)	(0.0280)	(0.0372)	(0.0534)	(0.0309)
Priority School 2014-2015	0.130***	0.148***	0.0883*	0.138**	0.124***	0.146***	0.139*	0.172***
	(0.0309)	(0.0328)	(0.0430)	(0.0484)	(0.0312)	(0.0330)	(0.0516)	(0.0261)
Priority School 2015-2016	-0.0188		-0.0494		-0.0217		-0.0331	
	(0.0285)		(0.0395)		(0.0289)		(0.0408)	
Priority School 2016-2017		0.0188		0.0494		0.0217		0.0331
		(0.0285)		(0.0395)		(0.0289)		(0.0408)
Priority School 2017-2018	0.0109	0.0296	-0.0196	0.0298	0.0209	0.0426	0.0983+	0.131**
	(0.0454)	(0.0582)	(0.0703)	(0.0921)	(0.0465)	(0.0605)	(0.0528)	(0.0339)
Partnership School 2013-2014	0.00606	0.0595	0.0358	0.0594	-0.00560	0.0483	-0.0600	0.00585
	(0.0412)	(0.0464)	(0.0397)	(0.0566)	(0.0515)	(0.0487)	(0.0780)	(0.0475)
Partnership School 2014-2015	0.0545	0.108*	0.0991+	0.123*	0.0457	0.0996*	-0.0171	0.0488
	(0.0456)	(0.0441)	(0.0511)	(0.0561)	(0.0462)	(0.0430)	(0.0702)	(0.0427)
Partnership School 2015-2016	-0.0534		-0.0237		-0.0539		-0.0658	
	(0.0424)		(0.0499)		(0.0462)		(0.0542)	
Partnership School 2016-2017		0.0534		0.0237		0.0539		0.0658
		(0.0424)		(0.0499)		(0.0462)		(0.0542)
Partnership School 2017-2018	-0.00144	0.0520	0.0184	0.0421	0.0776	0.131+	-0.00576	0.0601
	(0.0761)	(0.0782)	(0.0914)	(0.105)	(0.0681)	(0.0675)	(0.0652)	(0.0474)
School-level: % Non-White Students	0.330	0.330	1.535	1.535	0.238	0.238	-0.193	-0.193
	(0.914)	(0.914)	(1.098)	(1.098)	(0.914)	(0.914)	(3.702)	(3.702)
School-level: % African-American Students	0.330	0.330	0.327	0.327	0.433	0.433	-1.314	-1.314
	(0.428)	(0.428)	(0.517)	(0.517)	(0.497)	(0.497)	(3.707)	(3.707)
School-level: % Hispanic Students	0.339	0.339	0.390	0.390	-0.211	-0.211	-6.526	-6.526
	(0.628)	(0.628)	(0.859)	(0.859)	(0.809)	(0.809)	(4.826)	(4.826)
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	0.0198	0.0198	0.0404	0.0404	-0.0871	-0.0871	-0.262	-0.262
	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.212)	(0.212)	(0.200)	(0.200)	(0.337)	(0.337)
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	0.263	0.263	0.253	0.253	0.469	0.469	-1.106	-1.106
	(0.413)	(0.413)	(0.473)	(0.473)	(0.473)	(0.473)	(0.826)	(0.826)
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	-0.638	-0.638	-0.126	-0.126	-0.924*	-0.924*	-0.854	-0.854
	(0.486)	(0.486)	(0.520)	(0.520)	(0.458)	(0.458)	(0.521)	(0.521)
Log of School's Student Enrollment	-0.0787	-0.0787	-0.0801	-0.0801	-0.0877	-0.0877	0.101	0.101
	(0.0744)	(0.0744)	(0.0846)	(0.0846)	(0.0760)	(0.0760)	(0.0886)	(0.0886)
Constant	-0.708	-0.741	-0.794	-0.852	-0.553	-0.585	0.284	0.216
	(0.589)	(0.585)	(0.662)	(0.656)	(0.622)	(0.617)	(3.904)	(3.899)
Observations	**265**	**265**	**194**	**194**	**245**	**245**	**93**	**93**
R-squared	**0.813**	**0.813**	**0.826**	**0.826**	**0.821**	**0.821**	**0.813**	**0.813**
Adjusted R-squared	**0.746**	**0.746**	**0.759**	**0.759**	**0.756**	**0.756**	**0.708**	**0.708**

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10*

APPENDIX 5 - FULL RESULTS FOR TABLE 5.2

SCHOOL-LEVEL OUTCOMES SAT EVIDENCE-BASED READING AND WRITING

School-Level Outcomes								
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Sample	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools
Outcome	SAT Evidence-Based Reading and Writing							
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
Priority School 2013-2014	0.0205 (0.0273)	0.0627 (0.0379)	-0.0245 (0.0356)	0.0311 (0.0517)	0.0172 (0.0287)	0.0609 (0.0399)	0.0435 (0.0381)	0.149** (0.0444)
Priority School 2014-2015	0.00226 (0.0240)	0.0444 (0.0387)	-0.0185 (0.0308)	0.0371 (0.0568)	-0.000845 (0.0247)	0.0428 (0.0395)	-0.0549+ (0.0283)	0.0503+ (0.0270)
Priority School 2015-2016	-0.0422 (0.0333)		-0.0556 (0.0470)		-0.0437 (0.0337)		-0.105** (0.0358)	
Priority School 2016-2017		0.0422 (0.0333)		0.0556 (0.0470)		0.0437 (0.0337)		0.105** (0.0358)
Priority School 2017-2018	0.0142 (0.0406)	0.0564 (0.0465)	-0.00304 (0.0623)	0.0525 (0.0684)	0.0185 (0.0414)	0.0622 (0.0488)	0.0504 (0.0547)	0.156* (0.0602)
Partnership School 2013-2014	-0.0219 (0.0416)	0.0180 (0.0494)	0.000724 (0.0449)	0.0343 (0.0568)	-0.0645 (0.0452)	0.0193 (0.0550)	-0.0516 (0.0547)	-0.0361 (0.0652)
Partnership School 2014-2015	-0.0133 (0.0372)	0.0266 (0.0527)	-0.00193 (0.0420)	0.0317 (0.0682)	-0.0395 (0.0405)	0.0443 (0.0553)	0.0388 (0.0382)	0.0544 (0.0416)
Partnership School 2015-2016	-0.0399 (0.0503)		-0.0336 (0.0609)		-0.0839+ (0.0498)		-0.0155 (0.0515)	
Partnership School 2016-2017		0.0399 (0.0503)		0.0336 (0.0609)		0.0839+ (0.0498)		0.0155 (0.0515)
Partnership School 2017-2018	0.0623 (0.0503)	0.102+ (0.0526)	0.0713 (0.0685)	0.105 (0.0720)	0.0280 (0.0468)	0.112+ (0.0567)	0.00982 (0.0554)	0.0254 (0.0646)
School-level: % Non-White Students	0.558 (1.109)	0.558 (1.109)	2.663* (1.189)	2.663* (1.189)	0.488 (1.117)	0.488 (1.117)	0.431 (4.487)	0.431 (4.487)
School-level: % African-American Students	0.278 (0.603)	0.278 (0.603)	-0.124 (0.702)	-0.124 (0.702)	0.375 (0.631)	0.375 (0.631)	1.352 (4.291)	1.352 (4.291)
School-level: % Hispanic Students	-0.224 (0.811)	-0.224 (0.811)	-1.161 (0.987)	-1.161 (0.987)	-0.441 (1.013)	-0.441 (1.013)	1.017 (5.092)	1.017 (5.092)
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	0.0581 (0.230)	0.0581 (0.230)	0.0893 (0.265)	0.0893 (0.265)	0.0135 (0.274)	0.0135 (0.274)	-0.278 (0.384)	-0.278 (0.384)
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	0.434 (0.482)	0.434 (0.482)	0.710 (0.559)	0.710 (0.559)	0.540 (0.491)	0.540 (0.491)	-0.367 (0.598)	-0.367 (0.598)
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	-0.536 (0.391)	-0.536 (0.391)	-0.153 (0.433)	-0.153 (0.433)	-0.592 (0.393)	-0.592 (0.393)	-0.393 (0.357)	-0.393 (0.357)
Log of School's Student Enrollment	0.0287 (0.0554)	0.0287 (0.0554)	0.0488 (0.0616)	0.0488 (0.0616)	0.0378 (0.0586)	0.0378 (0.0586)	-0.0629 (0.0448)	-0.0629 (0.0448)
Constant	-1.322* (0.657)	-1.374* (0.654)	-1.243+ (0.668)	-1.311+ (0.664)	-1.368+ (0.695)	-1.428* (0.688)	-1.626 (4.585)	-1.739 (4.582)
Observations	**265**	**265**	**194**	**194**	**245**	**245**	**93**	**93**
R-squared	**0.858**	**0.858**	**0.876**	**0.876**	**0.857**	**0.857**	**0.840**	**0.840**
Adjusted R-squared	**0.808**	**0.808**	**0.827**	**0.827**	**0.805**	**0.805**	**0.751**	**0.751**

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10*

APPENDIX 5 - FULL RESULTS FOR TABLE 5.2

SCHOOL-LEVEL OUTCOMES PERCENT GRADUATING HIGH SCHOOL ON-TRACK

School-Level Outcomes								
	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
Sample	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools
Outcome	Percent Graduating High School On-Track							
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
Priority School 2013-2014	-0.0431 (0.0318)	-0.00214 (0.0412)	-0.00818 (0.0335)	0.0130 (0.0512)	-0.0398 (0.0339)	0.00491 (0.0420)	-0.00218 (0.0437)	0.0214 (0.0360)
Priority School 2014-2015	-0.0571+ (0.0312)	-0.0161 (0.0347)	-0.0186 (0.0197)	0.00257 (0.0310)	-0.0579+ (0.0331)	-0.0132 (0.0356)	-0.0264 (0.0325)	-0.00283 (0.0254)
Priority School 2015-2016	-0.0409 (0.0263)		-0.0212 (0.0262)		-0.0447+ (0.0266)		-0.0236 (0.0212)	
Priority School 2016-2017		0.0409 (0.0263)		0.0212 (0.0262)		0.0447+ (0.0266)		0.0236 (0.0212)
Priority School 2017-2018	0.0104 (0.0235)	0.0514 (0.0405)	-0.00987 (0.0326)	0.0113 (0.0454)	0.0278 (0.0221)	0.0725+ (0.0400)	0.00653 (0.0399)	0.0301 (0.0341)
Partnership School 2013-2014	0.0219 (0.0370)	-0.00398 (0.0474)	0.0159 (0.0388)	0.00186 (0.0558)	0.00142 (0.0404)	-0.00103 (0.0567)	0.00254 (0.0472)	0.00926 (0.0545)
Partnership School 2014-2015	0.0699 (0.0448)	0.0440 (0.0448)	0.0532 (0.0439)	0.0391 (0.0440)	0.0397 (0.0392)	0.0373 (0.0489)	0.0311 (0.0421)	0.0378 (0.0431)
Partnership School 2015-2016	0.0259 (0.0354)		0.0141 (0.0378)		0.00245 (0.0341)		-0.00672 (0.0341)	
Partnership School 2016-2017		-0.0259 (0.0354)		-0.0141 (0.0378)		-0.00245 (0.0341)		0.00672 (0.0341)
Partnership School 2017-2018	0.0191 (0.0382)	-0.00682 (0.0533)	0.0503 (0.0389)	0.0363 (0.0576)	0.0187 (0.0537)	0.0162 (0.0631)	0.0579 (0.0563)	0.0646 (0.0617)
School-level: % Non-White Students	-0.198 (0.429)	-0.198 (0.429)	0.861 (0.615)	0.861 (0.615)	-0.248 (0.417)	-0.248 (0.417)	-0.762 (1.911)	-0.762 (1.911)
School-level: % African-American Students	0.535 (0.381)	0.535 (0.381)	0.0610 (0.313)	0.0610 (0.313)	0.744 (0.446)	0.744 (0.446)	0.553 (2.060)	0.553 (2.060)
School-level: % Hispanic Students	0.360 (0.403)	0.360 (0.403)	0.615 (0.366)	0.615 (0.366)	0.0631 (0.519)	0.0631 (0.519)	4.824+ (2.627)	4.824+ (2.627)
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	-0.0459 (0.244)	-0.0459 (0.244)	-0.0460 (0.292)	-0.0460 (0.292)	-0.279 (0.206)	-0.279 (0.206)	-0.305 (0.269)	-0.305 (0.269)
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	0.347 (0.223)	0.347 (0.223)	0.132 (0.139)	0.132 (0.139)	0.497+ (0.265)	0.497+ (0.265)	1.161+ (0.670)	1.161+ (0.670)
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	-0.878* (0.333)	-0.878* (0.333)	-1.080*** (0.279)	-1.080*** (0.279)	-0.909* (0.344)	-0.909* (0.344)	-1.132* (0.394)	-1.132* (0.394)
Log of School's Student Enrollment	0.0722 (0.0817)	0.0722 (0.0817)	-0.0192 (0.0387)	-0.0192 (0.0387)	0.0530 (0.0821)	0.0530 (0.0821)	-0.0736 (0.0844)	-0.0736 (0.0844)
Constant	-0.0544 (0.734)	-0.0888 (0.737)	0.790+ (0.467)	0.774+ (0.459)	0.125 (0.756)	0.0813 (0.760)	0.856 (2.280)	0.829 (2.280)
Observations	**273**	**273**	**199**	**199**	**253**	**253**	**93**	**93**
R-squared	**0.844**	**0.844**	**0.878**	**0.878**	**0.853**	**0.853**	**0.857**	**0.857**
Adjusted R-squared	**0.788**	**0.788**	**0.829**	**0.829**	**0.799**	**0.799**	**0.778**	**0.778**

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10*

APPENDIX 5 - FULL RESULTS FOR TABLE 5.2

SCHOOL-LEVEL OUTCOMES HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUT RATE

School-Level Outcomes								
	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)
Sample	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	Students in All Round 1 Partnership and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools that did not become Partnership schools in Rounds 2 or 3	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools	All Students in DPSCD Round 1 Partnership Schools and 2016-17 DPSCD Priority Schools
Outcome	High School Dropout Rate							
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
Priority School 2013-2014	-0.00678 (0.0287)	-0.0286 (0.0381)	-0.0363 (0.0346)	-0.0321 (0.0507)	-0.0108 (0.0297)	-0.0359 (0.0387)	0.0411+ (0.0221)	0.0588* (0.0250)
Priority School 2014-2015	0.00298 (0.0167)	-0.0189 (0.0229)	-0.0141 (0.0174)	-0.00983 (0.0279)	0.00314 (0.0177)	-0.0220 (0.0232)	0.0113 (0.0136)	0.0290* (0.0128)
Priority School 2015-2016	0.0218 (0.0287)		-0.00422 (0.0241)		0.0251 (0.0292)		-0.0177 (0.0185)	
Priority School 2016-2017		-0.0218 (0.0287)		0.00422 (0.0241)		-0.0251 (0.0292)		0.0177 (0.0185)
Priority School 2017-2018	-0.00229 (0.0227)	-0.0241 (0.0413)	0.000394 (0.0316)	0.00461 (0.0408)	-0.0183 (0.0217)	-0.0434 (0.0418)	0.000337 (0.0284)	0.0181 (0.0241)
Partnership School 2013-2014	0.0291 (0.0340)	0.0379 (0.0409)	0.0481 (0.0386)	0.0352 (0.0503)	0.0456 (0.0347)	0.0433 (0.0458)	0.0109 (0.0321)	-0.0375 (0.0351)
Partnership School 2014-2015	-0.00114 (0.0270)	0.00771 (0.0298)	0.00339 (0.0303)	-0.00950 (0.0308)	0.0143 (0.0252)	0.0120 (0.0334)	0.0231 (0.0242)	-0.0254 (0.0237)
Partnership School 2015-2016	-0.00885 (0.0308)		0.0129 (0.0300)		0.00229 (0.0282)		0.0484* (0.0198)	
Partnership School 2016-2017		0.00885 (0.0308)		-0.0129 (0.0300)		-0.00229 (0.0282)		-0.0484* (0.0198)
Partnership School 2017-2018	-0.0134 (0.0287)	-0.00453 (0.0468)	-0.0136 (0.0359)	-0.0265 (0.0493)	-0.0227 (0.0297)	-0.0250 (0.0407)	-0.0401 (0.0367)	-0.0885* (0.0314)
School-level: % Non-White Students	0.0463 (0.372)	0.0463 (0.372)	-0.240 (0.594)	-0.240 (0.594)	0.108 (0.353)	0.108 (0.353)	2.691+ (1.309)	2.691+ (1.309)
School-level: % African-American Students	-0.554 (0.356)	-0.554 (0.356)	-0.289 (0.378)	-0.289 (0.378)	-0.722 (0.440)	-0.722 (0.440)	1.593 (1.365)	1.593 (1.365)
School-level: % Hispanic Students	-0.329 (0.337)	-0.329 (0.337)	-0.462 (0.414)	-0.462 (0.414)	-0.0789 (0.400)	-0.0789 (0.400)	1.873 (2.343)	1.873 (2.343)
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	0.0266 (0.223)	0.0266 (0.223)	0.00185 (0.258)	0.00185 (0.258)	0.243 (0.199)	0.243 (0.199)	0.246 (0.177)	0.246 (0.177)
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	-0.430* (0.201)	-0.430* (0.201)	-0.244* (0.118)	-0.244* (0.118)	-0.559* (0.241)	-0.559* (0.241)	-0.899* (0.426)	-0.899* (0.426)
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	0.513+ (0.264)	0.513+ (0.264)	0.308 (0.218)	0.308 (0.218)	0.512+ (0.278)	0.512+ (0.278)	0.549* (0.193)	0.549* (0.193)
Log of School's Student Enrollment	-0.0346 (0.0438)	-0.0346 (0.0438)	0.00290 (0.0341)	0.00290 (0.0341)	-0.0152 (0.0413)	-0.0152 (0.0413)	-0.0616 (0.0435)	-0.0616 (0.0435)
Constant	0.736+ (0.414)	0.755+ (0.421)	0.386 (0.413)	0.386 (0.405)	0.549 (0.413)	0.575 (0.421)	-1.335 (1.506)	-1.328 (1.504)
Observations	**273**	**273**	**199**	**199**	**253**	**253**	**93**	**93**
R-squared	**0.734**	**0.734**	**0.715**	**0.715**	**0.752**	**0.752**	**0.857**	**0.857**
Adjusted R-squared	**0.639**	**0.639**	**0.602**	**0.602**	**0.660**	**0.660**	**0.777**	**0.777**

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10*

APPENDIX 6 - COMPOSITION CHECK DETROIT

DETROIT •VS• ALL PRIORITY

Student Mobility in DPSCD by M-STEP Math Achievement										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Sample	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools: 1st Quartile (lowest) of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools: 1st Quartile (lowest) of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools: 2nd Quartile (lowest) of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools: 2nd Quartile of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools: 3rd Quartile of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools: 3rd Quartile of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools: 4th Quartile (highest) of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools: 4th Quartile (highest) of M-STEP Math Performance
Outcome	Probability of Out-of-District Transfer									
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
Priority School 2013-2014	0.0931*	0.0853**	-0.0545	0.00573	0.183+	0.167*	0.0467	0.0566	0.402*	0.262**
	(0.0462)	(0.0298)	(0.0760)	(0.0494)	(0.0989)	(0.0692)	(0.114)	(0.0763)	(0.157)	(0.0993)
Priority School 2014-2015	0.0426	0.0348*	-0.0630	-0.00284	0.110+	0.0926**	0.0145	0.0244	0.249*	0.109*
	(0.0316)	(0.0150)	(0.0524)	(0.0261)	(0.0640)	(0.0344)	(0.0756)	(0.0388)	(0.108)	(0.0504)
Priority School 2015-2016	0.00778		-0.0602+		0.0169		-0.00988		0.140*	
	(0.0231)		(0.0311)		(0.0344)		(0.0440)		(0.0629)	
Priority School 2016-2017		-0.00778		0.0602+		-0.0169		0.00988		-0.140*
		(0.0231)		(0.0311)		(0.0344)		(0.0440)		(0.0629)
Priority School 2017-2018	-0.162***	-0.169***	-0.122***	-0.0619	-0.177***	-0.193**	-0.137**	-0.127	-0.247***	-0.387**
	(0.0187)	(0.0396)	(0.0320)	(0.0591)	(0.0349)	(0.0655)	(0.0427)	(0.0826)	(0.0571)	(0.118)
Partnership School 2013-2014	-0.0849***	0.0123	-0.0166	0.0197	-0.0542	0.0335	-0.144***	-0.00353	-0.0905**	0.0424
	(0.0174)	(0.0161)	(0.0284)	(0.0243)	(0.0412)	(0.0306)	(0.0400)	(0.0364)	(0.0288)	(0.0307)
Partnership School 2014-2015	-0.0489**	0.0483***	0.00138	0.0377*	-0.0721**	0.0157	-0.119***	0.0214	-0.0760**	0.0569**
	(0.0168)	(0.0111)	(0.0220)	(0.0166)	(0.0250)	(0.0178)	(0.0309)	(0.0237)	(0.0235)	(0.0216)
Partnership School 2015-2016	-0.0972***		-0.0363		-0.0878***		-0.140***		-0.133***	
	(0.0197)		(0.0227)		(0.0249)		(0.0347)		(0.0293)	
Partnership School 2016-2017		0.0972***		0.0363		0.0878***		0.140***		0.133***
		(0.0197)		(0.0227)		(0.0249)		(0.0347)		(0.0293)
Partnership School 2017-2018	0.121***	0.218***	0.133***	0.169***	0.120***	0.207***	0.108**	0.248***	0.0547+	0.188***
	(0.0188)	(0.0290)	(0.0267)	(0.0292)	(0.0321)	(0.037)	(0.0368)	(0.0417)	(0.0324)	(0.0470)
Economically Disadvantaged	0.00368	0.00368	0.0102	0.0102	-0.00863	-0.00863	-0.0166	-0.0166	0.00791	0.00791
	(0.00938)	(0.00938)	(0.0191)	(0.0191)	(0.0216)	(0.0216)	(0.0188)	(0.0188)	(0.0152)	(0.0152)
English Language Learner	-0.0552**	-0.0552**	0.0425	0.0425	-0.116	-0.116	-0.0830	-0.0830	-0.0319	-0.0319
	(0.0195)	(0.0195)	(0.0862)	(0.0862)	(0.0737)	(0.0737)	(0.0520)	(0.0520)	(0.0239)	(0.0239)
Receives Special Education Services	0.00699	0.00699	-0.0506*	-0.0506*	0.0156	0.0156	0.0560	0.0560	0.0215	0.0215
	(0.0102)	(0.0102)	(0.0228)	(0.0228)	(0.0302)	(0.0302)	(0.0389)	(0.0389)	(0.0310)	(0.0310)
School-level: % Non-White Students	-0.188	-0.188	-0.172	-0.172	-0.0930	-0.093	-0.168	-0.168	-0.159	-0.159
	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.242)	(0.242)	(0.278)	(0.278)	(0.250)	(0.250)	(0.170)	(0.170)
School-level: % African-American Students	-0.159***	-0.159***	-0.154*	-0.154*	-0.189**	-0.189**	-0.129*	-0.129*	-0.0810	-0.0810
	(0.0314)	(0.0314)	(0.0686)	(0.0686)	(0.0625)	(0.0625)	(0.0611)	(0.0611)	(0.0570)	(0.0570)
School-level: % Hispanic Students	-0.257**	-0.257**	-0.244	-0.244	-0.103	-0.103	-0.323+	-0.323+	-0.240+	-0.240+
	(0.0885)	(0.0885)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.136)	(0.136)
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	0.0458	0.0458	0.0713	0.0713	0.0402	0.0402	-0.0476	-0.0476	0.0243	0.0243
	(0.0416)	(0.0416)	(0.0866)	(0.0866)	(0.0748)	(0.0748)	(0.0711)	(0.0711)	(0.0636)	(0.0636)
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	0.0151	0.0151	-0.0796	-0.0796	-0.293+	-0.293+	0.108	0.108	0.131	0.131
	(0.0788)	(0.0788)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.124)	(0.124)
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	-0.287*	-0.287*	-0.261	-0.261	-0.316	-0.316	-0.0996	-0.0996	-0.494**	-0.494**
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.209)	(0.209)	(0.211)	(0.211)	(0.174)	(0.174)
Log of Student Enrollment	-0.0244*	-0.0244*	-0.0356*	-0.0356*	-0.0290	-0.029	-0.00393	-0.00393	-0.0489*	-0.0489*
	(0.0108)	(0.0108)	(0.0164)	(0.0164)	(0.0208)	(0.0208)	(0.0181)	(0.0181)	(0.0218)	(0.0218)
In Their School's Terminal Grade	0.715***	0.715***	0.679***	0.679***	0.701***	0.701***	0.744***	0.744***	0.756***	0.756***
	(0.0207)	(0.0207)	(0.0332)	(0.0332)	(0.0300)	(0.03)	(0.0295)	(0.0295)	(0.0296)	(0.0296)

Student Mobility in DPSCD by M-STEP Math Achievement										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Sample	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools: 1st Quartile (lowest) of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools: 1st Quartile (lowest) of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools: 2nd Quartile (lowest) of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools: 2nd Quartile of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools: 3rd Quartile of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools: 3rd Quartile of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools: 4th Quartile (highest) of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and All 2016-17 Priority Schools: 4th Quartile (highest) of M-STEP Math Performance
Outcome	Probability of Out-of-District Transfer									
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
Left Michigan Data	0.525***	0.525***	0.594***	0.594***	0.498***	0.498***	0.450***	0.450***	0.502***	0.502***
	(0.0439)	(0.0439)	(0.0686)	(0.0686)	(0.0640)	(0.064)	(0.0729)	(0.0729)	(0.0976)	(0.0976)
2nd Grade	-0.533	-0.533								
	(0.578)	(0.578)								
3rd Grade	-0.649	-0.649	0.0413	0.0413						
	(0.468)	(0.468)	(0.494)	(0.494)						
4th Grade	-0.621	-0.621	0.0259	0.0259	0.0505	0.0505	0.0206	0.0206	0.141**	0.141**
	(0.473)	(0.473)	(0.496)	(0.496)	(0.0353)	(0.0353)	(0.0404)	(0.0404)	(0.0547)	(0.0547)
5th Grade	-0.580	-0.580	0.0202	0.0202	0.137*	0.137*	0.0418	0.0418	0.291**	0.291**
	(0.477)	(0.477)	(0.501)	(0.501)	(0.0665)	(0.0665)	(0.0778)	(0.0778)	(0.104)	(0.104)
6th Grade	-0.530	-0.530	0.0186	0.0186	0.207*	0.207*	0.0743	0.0743	0.435**	0.435**
	(0.479)	(0.479)	(0.505)	(0.505)	(0.0988)	(0.0988)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.155)	(0.155)
7th Grade	-0.499	-0.499	0.0128	0.0128	0.261*	0.261*	0.0748	0.0748	0.570**	0.570**
	(0.484)	(0.484)	(0.511)	(0.511)	(0.130)	(0.13)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.206)	(0.206)
8th Grade	-0.420	-0.420	0.0228	0.0228	0.391*	0.391*	0.137	0.137	0.778**	0.778**
	(0.486)	(0.486)	(0.517)	(0.517)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.254)	(0.254)
9th Grade	-0.219	-0.219	0.746	0.746			-0.248	-0.248		
	(0.528)	(0.528)	(0.582)	(0.582)			(0.388)	(0.388)		
12th Grade	-1.145*	-1.145*	-0.502	-0.502						
	(0.479)	(0.479)	(0.519)	(0.519)						
Constant	1.041*	1.039*	0.547	0.481	0.391*	0.399*	0.358+	0.338*	0.177	0.311+
	(0.496)	(0.488)	(0.526)	(0.520)	(0.185)	(0.17)	(0.185)	(0.157)	(0.236)	(0.182)
Observations	**100,186**	**100,186**	**17,781**	**17,781**	**13,678**	**13,678**	**14,240**	**14,240**	**18,967**	**18,967**
R-squared	**0.613**	**0.613**	**0.636**	**0.636**	**0.679**	**0.679**	**0.679**	**0.679**	**0.653**	**0.653**
Adjusted R-squared	**0.411**	**0.411**	**0.378**	**0.378**	**0.416**	**0.416**	**0.423**	**0.423**	**0.429**	**0.429**

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Quartiles were calculated within DPSCD. Grade indicators refer to the grade in which a student was enrolled rather than the student's assessed grade.*

APPENDIX 6 - COMPOSITION CHECK DETROIT

DETROIT •VS• DETROIT PRIORITY

	All Students with M-STEP Math Score	All Students with M-STEP Math Score	Quartile 1 (Lowest) Math Performance	Quartile 1 (Lowest) Math Performance	Quartile 2 Math Performance	Quartile 2 Math Performance	Quartile 3 Math Performance	Quartile 3 Math Performance	Quartile 4 (highest) Math Peformance	Quartile 4 (highest) Math Peformance
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Sample	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools: 1st Quartile (lowest) of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools: 1st Quartile (lowest) of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools: 2nd Quartile (lowest) of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools: 2nd Quartile of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools: 3rd Quartile of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools: 3rd Quartile of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools: 4th Quartile (highest) of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools: 4th Quartile (highest) of M-STEP Math Performance
Outcome	Probability of Out-of-District Transfer									
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
Priority School 2013-2014	-0.140*	-0.0685+	-0.309**	-0.182**	-0.135	-0.0533	-0.110	-0.0240	0.406	0.280
	(0.0612)	(0.0381)	(0.0940)	(0.0580)	(0.126)	(0.0880)	(0.190)	(0.134)	(0.271)	(0.180)
Priority School 2014-2015	-0.0872*	-0.0156	-0.188*	-0.0610+	-0.119	-0.0372	-0.0730	0.0132	0.284	0.159+
	(0.0425)	(0.0196)	(0.0716)	(0.0355)	(0.0836)	(0.0454)	(0.125)	(0.0669)	(0.180)	(0.0895)
Priority School 2015-2016	-0.0716*		-0.127**		-0.0819+		-0.0861		0.126	
	(0.0286)		(0.0448)		(0.0435)		(0.0634)		(0.0931)	
Priority School 2016-2017		0.0716*		0.127**		0.0819+		0.0861		-0.126
		(0.0286)		(0.0448)		(0.0435)		(0.0634)		(0.0931)
Priority School 2017-2018	-0.0246	0.0470	-0.00846	0.119	-0.0193	0.0626	-0.0562	0.0299	-0.164+	-0.289
	(0.0217)	(0.0435)	(0.0355)	(0.0751)	(0.0474)	(0.0842)	(0.0631)	(0.120)	(0.0945)	(0.186)
Partnership School 2013-2014	0.0339	0.0868***	0.104**	0.103**	0.0670	0.0966*	0.0306	0.102*	-0.00659	0.0753**
	(0.0212)	(0.0197)	(0.0379)	(0.0372)	(0.0564)	(0.0436)	(0.0438)	(0.0490)	(0.0250)	(0.0243)
Partnership School 2014-2015	0.00698	0.0598***	0.0487	0.0475*	0.0441	0.0738*	-0.0397	0.0312	-0.0333	0.0486*
	(0.0178)	(0.0110)	(0.0297)	(0.0221)	(0.0377)	(0.0296)	(0.0303)	(0.0300)	(0.0223)	(0.0241)
Partnership School 2015-2016	-0.0529*		0.00120		-0.0297		-0.0710+		-0.0819***	
	(0.0212)		(0.0273)		(0.0342)		(0.0362)		(0.0232)	
Partnership School 2016-2017		0.0529*		-0.00120		0.0297		0.0710+		0.0819***
		(0.0212)		(0.0273)		(0.0342)		(0.0362)		(0.0232)
Partnership School 2017-2018	0.0210	0.0739**	0.0502*	0.0490	0.0707	0.100*	0.0343	0.105**	-0.0179	0.0640+
	(0.0198)	(0.0244)	(0.0236)	(0.0324)	(0.0444)	(0.0484)	(0.0315)	(0.0335)	(0.0280)	(0.0345)
Economically Disadvantaged	-0.0150+	-0.0150+	0.0142	0.0142	-0.0363	-0.0363	-0.0219	-0.0219	-0.0110	-0.0110
	(0.00806)	(0.00806)	(0.0335)	(0.0335)	(0.0309)	(0.0309)	(0.0194)	(0.0194)	(0.0168)	(0.0168)
English Language Learner	0.0272	0.0272	0.0433	0.0433	-0.0812	-0.0812	0.0419+	0.0419+	0.0336	0.0336
	(0.0254)	(0.0254)	(0.0539)	(0.0539)	(0.0922)	(0.0922)	(0.0245)	(0.0245)	(0.0327)	(0.0327)
Receives Special Education Services	0.0349*	0.0349*	-0.0233	-0.0233	0.0807+	0.0807+	0.193**	0.193**	0.0382**	0.0382**
	(0.0155)	(0.0155)	(0.0326)	(0.0326)	(0.0450)	(0.0450)	(0.0618)	(0.0618)	(0.0126)	(0.0126)
School-level: % Non-White Students	-0.158	-0.158	0.294	0.294	1.569	1.569	0.552	0.552	-0.0561	-0.0561
	(0.251)	(0.251)	(1.411)	(1.411)	(0.984)	(0.984)	(0.595)	(0.595)	(0.502)	(0.502)
School-level: % African-American Students	0.216	0.216	-0.371	-0.371	1.382*	1.382*	0.496	0.496	0.526	0.526
	(0.208)	(0.208)	(0.451)	(0.451)	(0.600)	(0.600)	(0.473)	(0.473)	(0.465)	(0.465)
School-level: % Hispanic Students	-0.109	-0.109	-0.490	-0.490	1.397+	1.397+	0.119	0.119	-0.139	-0.139
	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.378)	(0.378)	(0.765)	(0.765)	(0.537)	(0.537)	(0.571)	(0.571)
School-level: % Economically Disadvantaged Students	0.101	0.101	0.238*	0.238*	0.187	0.187	-0.0200	-0.0200	0.0800	0.0800
	(0.0694)	(0.0694)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.0744)	(0.0744)	(0.0984)	(0.0984)
School-level: % English Language Learner Students	0.319+	0.319+	0.139	0.139	0.294	0.294	0.226	0.226	0.202	0.202
	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.383)	(0.383)	(0.297)	(0.297)	(0.358)	(0.358)	(0.174)	(0.174)
School-level: % Students Receiving Special Education Services	-0.161	-0.161	-0.0101	-0.0101	0.188	0.188	-0.137	-0.137	-0.0241	-0.0241
	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.300)	(0.300)	(0.343)	(0.343)	(0.219)	(0.219)
Log of Student Enrollment	-0.0152	-0.0152	0.0158	0.0158	0.0139	0.0139	-0.0419	-0.0419	-0.0418	-0.0418
	(0.0208)	(0.0208)	(0.0285)	(0.0285)	(0.0439)	(0.0439)	(0.0514)	(0.0514)	(0.0383)	(0.0383)

	All Students with M-STEP Math Score	All Students with M-STEP Math Score	Quartile 1 (Lowest) Math Performance	Quartile 1 (Lowest) Math Performance	Quartile 2 Math Performance	Quartile 2 Math Performance	Quartile 3 Math Performance	Quartile 3 Math Performance	Quartile 4 (highest) Math Peformance	Quartile 4 (highest) Math Peformance
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Sample	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools: 1st Quartile (lowest) of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools: 1st Quartile (lowest) of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools: 2nd Quartile (lowest) of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools: 2nd Quartile of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools: 3rd Quartile of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools: 3rd Quartile of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools: 4th Quartile (highest) of M-STEP Math Performance	DPSCD Partnership Schools and DPSCD 2016-17 Priority Schools: 4th Quartile (highest) of M-STEP Math Performance
Outcome	Probability of Out-of-District Transfer									
Reference Year in Event Study Model:	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**	**16-17**	**15-16**
In Their School's Terminal Grade	0.845***	0.845***	0.799***	0.799***	0.914***	0.914***	0.892***	0.892***	0.907***	0.907***
	(0.0226)	(0.0226)	(0.0622)	(0.0622)	(0.0545)	(0.0545)	(0.0427)	(0.0427)	(0.0267)	(0.0267)
Left Michigan Data	0.537***	0.537***	0.534***	0.534***	0.515***	0.515***	0.600***	0.600***	0.326*	0.326*
	(0.0628)	(0.0628)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.153)	(0.153)
3rd Grade	0.385	0.385	0.312	0.312						
	(0.497)	(0.497)	(0.528)	(0.528)						
4th Grade	0.405	0.405	0.275	0.275	0.00876	0.00876	0.0230	0.0230	0.183+	0.183+
	(0.499)	(0.499)	(0.529)	(0.529)	(0.0458)	(0.0458)	(0.0658)	(0.0658)	(0.0921)	(0.0921)
5th Grade	0.398	0.398	0.226	0.226	-0.0151	-0.0151	0.0481	0.0481	0.345+	0.345+
	(0.502)	(0.502)	(0.535)	(0.535)	(0.0834)	(0.0834)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.179)	(0.179)
6th Grade	0.391	0.391	0.173	0.173	-0.0238	-0.0238	0.0500	0.0500	0.514+	0.514+
	(0.505)	(0.505)	(0.540)	(0.540)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.272)	(0.272)
7th Grade	0.387	0.387	0.142	0.142	-0.0264	-0.0264	0.0465	0.0465	0.676+	0.676+
	(0.508)	(0.508)	(0.548)	(0.548)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.248)	(0.248)	(0.362)	(0.362)
8th Grade	0.338	0.338	-0.0234	-0.0234	-0.142	-0.142	0.0182	0.0182	0.804+	0.804+
	(0.513)	(0.513)	(0.565)	(0.565)	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.310)	(0.310)	(0.450)	(0.450)
9th Grade	0.437	0.437			-0.0238	-0.0238				
	(0.515)	(0.515)			(0.204)	(0.204)				
12th Grade	-0.417	-0.417	-0.600	-0.600						
	(0.512)	(0.512)	(0.557)	(0.557)						
Constant	-0.430	-0.519	-0.0306	-0.158	-1.514*	-1.606*	-0.0676	-0.175	-0.662	-0.558
	(0.551)	(0.550)	(0.722)	(0.714)	(0.641)	(0.633)	(0.524)	(0.521)	(0.497)	(0.457)
Observations	**31,509**	**31,509**	**5,266**	**5,266**	**4,125**	**4,125**	**4,011**	**4,011**	**5,604**	**5,604**
R-squared	**0.619**	**0.619**	**0.591**	**0.591**	**0.655**	**0.655**	**0.696**	**0.696**	**0.693**	**0.693**
Adjusted R-squared	**0.404**	**0.404**	**0.273**	**0.273**	**0.360**	**0.360**	**0.435**	**0.435**	**0.484**	**0.484**

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Quartiles were calculated within DPSCD. Grade indicators refer to the grade in which a student was enrolled rather than the student's assessed grade.*

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