



Commissioners not pictured: Anthony Eid, Rhonda Lange, and Erin Wagner

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# LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS

From the Inaugural Commission

October 2022

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## FOREWORD

After the 2010 election, federal judges criticized Michigan's legislative electoral districts as a "[political gerrymander of historic proportions](#)."

To address that imbalance, Michigan voters in 2018 approved a constitutional amendment to establish the **Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (MICRC)**, which was given exclusive authority to adopt new district boundaries based on census data for the Michigan Senate, Michigan House of Representatives and U.S. House of Representatives every 10 years beginning in 2021.

The [amendment](#) to the Michigan Constitution outlines a specific process for the random selection of the 13 MICRC commissioners. The Michigan Department of State used data from the 2018 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimate (which is available to the general public via the American Community Survey Data Profiles online search tool) to define the demographic and geographic makeup of the state for the purposes of the random selection. The Secretary of State's office was required to randomly select commissioners from the pool of eligible applicants. This selection process was completed between June and August 2020.

As mandated by the constitution, the 13 commissioners included four members who affiliated with the Democratic party, four members who affiliated with the Republican party and five Independent members who were not affiliated with any major political party.

Together, the MICRC completed the first open, citizen-led redistricting process in Michigan history while far surpassing the MICRC's goals for public comment, public hearing attendance and news media coverage. The MICRC also successfully defended the fairness of its maps during four separate legal challenges in state and federal courts. The court rulings reinforced the belief by many that the MICRC ultimately produced the fairest maps we've ever had in Michigan.

At the time of this publication, two legal challenges are pending in federal court against the MICRC's work. However, per court order, the MICRC's adopted congressional and legislative redistricting plans are being used for the 2022 primary and general elections.

The mission since the MICRC began was to lead Michigan's redistricting process to ensure the state's congressional, state Senate and state House district lines were drawn fairly in a transparent manner, meeting constitutional mandates through citizen input.

The aims in the redistricting process included modeling transparency, heightening awareness, ensuring fairness, encouraging citizens to participate in the map-making process, generating consistent news media coverage to inform the public and answering questions from the news media and public about the commission's work. Throughout the process, MICRC members remained committed to the objectives of fairness, awareness, transparency and engagement.

Before commissioners could draft any plan, the MICRC was constitutionally mandated to host at least 10 public hearings throughout the state to inform the public about the redistricting process and the purpose and responsibilities of the commission, as well as solicit information about potential plans. The MICRC hosted 21 public forums and 130 open meetings (both virtual and on-site) during the first phase of the campaign, from late 2020 through early fall 2021.

The MICRC was constitutionally mandated to hold at least five public hearings throughout the state for the purpose of soliciting comment about the proposed plans. This second phase of the campaign, from October through December 2021, focused on drawing and finalizing the actual maps and required coordination and constant promotion by the MICRC's staff, partners and promotional contractor. The five hearings were held in Detroit, Lansing, Grand Rapids, Gaylord and Flint.

Michiganders' response to the MICRC's map-making process was inspiring, far exceeding the MICRC's hope to generate at least 10,000 public comments. The commission received nearly 30,000 comments from across the state.

Planning and research were fundamental to the MICRC's work. The MICRC consulted with leaders of redistricting commissions from California and Arizona, the first and second states in the nation to approve similar commissions, respectively. They heard from experts from leading Michigan universities. They received feedback on proposed maps that helped shape their decisions from hundreds of organizations, elected officials, civic leaders and the general public.

Getting public input and promoting transparency in the MICRC process was of the utmost importance so that the public had confidence in the inaugural MICRC's work as well as that of future Michigan redistricting commissions. Holding dozens of meetings in every region of the state was instrumental to the MICRC's ability to gain knowledge and insights from the public, then systematically assess and make the changes needed to comply with the seven ranked redistricting criteria, which include compliance with the Voting Rights Act and partisan fairness.

The MICRC's final maps, approved Dec. 28, 2021, were based on the state's constitutionally set mapping criteria (in rank order):

1. Districts shall be of equal population as mandated by the United States Constitution and shall comply with the Voting Rights Act and other federal laws.
2. Districts shall be geographically contiguous. Island areas are considered to be contiguous by land to the county of which they are a part.
3. Districts shall reflect the state's diverse population and communities of interest. Communities of interest may include, but shall not be limited to, populations that share cultural or historical characteristics or economic interests. Communities of interest do not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.
4. Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.
5. Districts shall not favor or disfavor an incumbent elected official or a candidate.
6. Districts shall reflect consideration of county, city and township boundaries.
7. Districts shall be reasonably compact.

The MICRC is proud of what we achieved. We are not alone in that belief.



**"If you're feeling discouraged about our democracy, (learn) about how citizens in Michigan took politics out of the redistricting process. It's why the work ... to fight gerrymandering is so important."**

Former U.S. President Barack Obama



**"Congratulations to the Michigan Independent Redistricting Commissioners. ... A bipartisan vote created fair districts for the state's voters. You proved that when the people, not the politicians, draw the lines, the voters win."**

Former California Republican Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger

The Princeton Gerrymandering Project, a nonpartisan research group that analyzes redistricting with the aim of eliminating partisan gerrymandering across the country, graded the MICRC's congressional map with an overall score of "A" and a "B" for the state House and Senate maps, saying "compared to a lot of maps across the country, they did very well."

“This is the quintessential success story of redistricting,” Sam Wang, director of the Princeton Gerrymandering Project, [told The New York Times for a story published Dec. 29, 2021](#). “These (Michigan) maps treated the two parties, Democrats and Republicans, about as fairly as you could ever imagine a map being. There’s competition in all three maps.”

As one [New York newspaper editorial](#) observed after the MICRC’s landmark maps were announced: “The state of Michigan has just done something almost miraculous in this time of political acrimony — and something every citizen in America should want their state to do: It has done away, as much as possible, with political gerrymandering and taken a giant leap toward guaranteeing fair state and federal representation.”

Equally important, the MICRC commissioned the Glengariff Group Inc. to conduct pre- and post-campaign statewide surveys of Michigan voters. The benchmarking survey was conducted March 27-31, 2021. The post-survey was a 600-sample, live-operator telephone survey conducted Feb. 11-14, 2022, and has a margin of error of +/-4.0% with a 95% level of confidence.

Key results from the post-campaign public opinion survey show:

- Most impressively, at the conclusion of the survey, all voters were asked if Michigan should continue to allow the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission to redraw the state’s maps or should Michigan go back to allowing elected representatives who have control in the state Legislature to redraw the maps. By an overwhelming margin of 65.5% to 10.1%, Michigan voters say the state should continue with the redistricting commission moving forward.
- Voters were asked if Michigan citizens did or did not have a greater role in deciding how new districts would be drawn compared with previous efforts by politicians. By a margin of 45% to 22.1%, voters aware of the MICRC’s work believe Michigan citizens did have a greater role.
- Voters were asked if the commission succeeded or failed in giving Michigan citizens a greater role than politicians in designing new districts. By a margin of 49.6% to 22.1%, voters aware of the MICRC’s work said the MICRC succeeded in giving Michigan citizens a greater role.
- At the same time, the MICRC recognizes there was a significant discrepancy between white and Black respondents on their views of how well the commission honored communities of interest: 53% of white voters approved of the commission’s communities of interest interpretation, while 14% disapproved. By contrast, 31% of Black voters approved, while 54%

disapproved. This divide merits consideration during deliberations by the next Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission.

Our democracy is stronger thanks to Michigan citizens' engagement and vision for a fair, inclusive and transparent process that puts voters above politics and ensures gerrymandering in Michigan is done once and for all.



M.C. Rothhorn  
Chair  
Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission



Edward Woods III  
Executive Director  
Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this report is to help inform future commissions on the lessons learned from the members of the inaugural MICRC.

Here is a summary of the highest-priority recommendations that the 2020 MICRC members suggest for consideration in 2030 and beyond (which are explained in more detail throughout this report):

- The Michigan Legislature **should approve an annual budget for the MICRC that is more in line with the actual costs of its work**, incorporates the likely costs of anticipated fees for legal bills related to inevitable court challenges, and is on par with other states' redistricting commission budgets.
- The Michigan Department of State **should begin the candidate recruitment process earlier**, asking eligible Michiganders to serve on the MICRC at least two years before members are selected to better ensure diversity and regional representation.
- Serious consideration should be given to **hiring a larger staff** than the 2021 MICRC employed, including more support on communications and outreach, legal counsel, information technology and financial management.
- MICRC members stress the importance of **developing relationships with their colleagues**, particularly by attending meetings in person whenever possible instead of joining online.
- Because the knowledge of technology is likely to vary among future MICRC members, **more time should be dedicated to map-drawing training**.
- It would be helpful to **ensure mapping software is compatible with other platforms** to maximize public engagement in submitting proposed district maps.
- Future MICRCs **should have access to all partisan fairness and political data** and reporting functionality while drafting maps.
- Commissioners, **not staff or consultants**, should make decisions regarding access to data, tools and maps, although the MICRC should evaluate objections raised by staff and consultants.
- Measures should be taken to **ensure the MICRC website is updated** in a more timely manner.

- More time and training should be allocated by future MICRCs to an **orientation about Michigan's unique regional populations**, distinguished by economic and demographic diversity. Specifically, while the 2021 MICRC members were very familiar with the characteristics of the region of the state where they lived, many expressed they lacked knowledge about other regions of the state with which they were unfamiliar.
- Developing a more precise definition of what comprises communities of interest (COIs) is an important goal for future MICRCs to weigh. A common concern about the MICRC's work in 2021 is that members could have spent **more time and resources to better educate the public on what constitutes a community of interest** and where COIs rank on the constitutionally mandated map-drawing priority list.
- A significant challenge to future MICRCs is **developing a better system to sort and analyze the overwhelming amount of public comment** received.
- Implicit **bias training should continue on a regular and ongoing basis** throughout the work, rather than a single two-hour session early on.
- Future MICRC panels should take great pains to **avoid going into closed meetings** except for private personnel or lawsuit-related matters.
- Future commissions should follow the inaugural approach implemented by MICRC staff to media relations and **use of online platforms** (Zoom, Facebook, etc.) that encourages news media and public participation in events and news conferences without having to attend in person.

# RECRUITMENT

The amendment to the Michigan Constitution that voters approved to create the MICRC charges the Michigan Department of State (MDOS) with the responsibility of recruiting and selecting the members who serve on the MICRC with oversight, input and participation of the Michigan Legislature. While this issue is beyond the control of the 2031 MICRC, this work directly impacts the future commission, and recommendations are included for consideration.

In mid-2019 and through 2020, MDOS and Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson tasked Gŭd Marketing with the high priority of developing a public relations and marketing campaign that would achieve three distinct goals:

- Achieve a high return of applications from those who are randomly mailed the application.
- Build a diverse pool of applicants who are representative of Michigan for the commission from both mailed applications and general public submissions.
- Create awareness and interest in applying to be on the Michigan redistricting commission that would outperform the results of California’s first-in-the-nation independent citizens redistricting commission. (California received 4,500 applications in 2010.)

The constitutional amendment requires that 50% of the commissioners be randomly selected as a result of a statewide mailing to registered voters, while the other 50% must be drawn from a pool of people who completed the application without receiving it in the mail. In addition, research revealed that the target audience would be Michiganders eligible/registered to vote by Aug. 14, 2020 (U.S. citizens, living in Michigan, ages 18-plus, not in jail or prison) — 7.4 million people were registered to vote in 2018 and 4.3 million voted.

Testing of the application language completed by Center for Civic Design underscored the importance of telling people **why it’s important to apply** and **why it’s exciting**. The research showed key questions and information sought that Michigan would need to address in messaging, including **what redistricting is** and **what the job of a commissioner might be**.

The total budget for 2019-20 was \$200,000 for planning, development, implementation and measurement. Strategy was based on three phases of messaging:

- 1. Public Awareness Phase** (October-December 2019): Promote statewide awareness of application and opportunity.
- 2. Encouragement of Randomly Selected Voters** (January 2020): Targeted communications to randomly selected voters who were mailed applications to encourage them to apply to the commission.
- 3. Last Call Phase** (April-June 2020): Targeted communications to audiences underrepresented in the applicant pool from the randomly selected voter list.

During the public awareness phase, the goal was to raise public awareness of the commission, answer questions about the commission and encourage Michiganders to apply through a mix of earned media coverage and social promotion of in-person events and TV ads.

Michigan voters began applying to serve as commissioners in October 2019.

The Secretary of State's office mailed applications to 250,000 selected voters on Dec. 30, 2019.

As part of an ongoing effort to increase accessibility to applications, MDOS held two periods of public comment, as well as 59 in-person events across the state pre-COVID-19 and 11 virtual town halls in the last month of the application period. MDOS and G&D Marketing partnered with more than 150 organizations and philanthropic groups in the state to spread the word, host workshops, air public service announcements on television and encourage prospective applicants to apply.

News conferences featuring Secretary of State Benson and bipartisan groups of local officials announcing the opening of the online application were held in Detroit, Lansing, Grand Rapids and Traverse City on two days in late October 2019. Additionally, the town hall workshops held across the state, promoted through earned and paid social media placements, educated community leaders about the application process and commission responsibilities. Television ads placed on the Michigan Association of Broadcasters network were used to raise overall awareness of the commission and drive interest.

The second phase began in January 2020 with the Encouragement of Randomly Selected Voters initiative. This phase focused on encouraging randomly selected individuals to send in the mailed application they had received. Paid media combined broad-reaching TV placements with highly targeted Facebook and Instagram ads that were sent directly to the randomly selected voters who received the application, as well as a general message to the overall voting-age population of Michigan, throughout the month of January.

Phase three was the Last Call Phase, which allowed us to analyze the current application pool before selecting audiences. Digital and social media ads were used to boost the number of applicants with a focus on underrepresented demographics in the pool, such as individuals under age 55.

## RESULTS

More than 9,000 Michiganders submitted applications for one of the 13 seats on the commission — delivering far above Michigan Department of State campaign leaders' expectations. The final days of the application window ending June 1, 2020, saw a surge of applications that left the final applicant pool more diverse and representative of Michigan's demographics, including applicants from all 83 Michigan counties.

The commission received 9,367 completed applications, including 3,412 from individuals randomly selected to be mailed the application (36.6% of the pool and 1.4% of those mailed the application). That means we surpassed the number of final submissions processed by California when it launched its similar commission. Despite having a population nearly quadruple that of Michigan, [California processed 4,546 final applications in 2010](#).

Voters Not Politicians, the Michigan Nonprofit Association and the Michigan League of Women Voters, among others, remained energetically engaged in promoting awareness of applying to serve on the MICRC after successfully spearheading the 2018 constitutional amendment ballot proposal.

They and many other advocacy organizations and interest groups deserve Michigan voters' gratitude for their aggressive efforts to recruit redistricting commission applicants from populations that have historically been excluded from the state's political life. Voters Not Politicians' user-friendly website was especially helpful in assisting political newcomers and veterans alike to navigate the application process, even connecting them with volunteers who were ready to assist with video notarization of the required forms.

## RECRUITMENT: LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS

MICRC members and outside leaders interviewed for this report recommend that the State of Michigan partner again with the same organizations and even more groups for the 2031 iteration of the MICRC.

A consensus agreed that the process is strengthened when any group of citizens mobilizes to recruit redistricting commission applicants, and future success will depend on vigorous input from voters all over the state.

However, many of the contributors to this report recommend consideration of **increasing the budget** to promote the awareness campaign and **starting earlier** on the statewide awareness campaign to promote applications to serve on the MICRC, such as in 2027 or 2028, to help ensure the candidate pool is as large and diverse as possible.

In addition, future versions of the MICRC application to serve should include language that **more accurately reflects the true amount of time and work that is required**. A nearly unanimous sentiment expressed by those interviewed was that the projected workload was completely underestimated. The MICRC application stipulated an expected workload of 20-40 hours per week until the maps were approved. The reality proved quite different. Many MICRC members said their duties far exceeded expectations for attending public hearings, traveling to meetings and during the map-making process, with the arduous task essentially becoming greater than a full-time job.

Commissioners also suggested future MICRC applicants consider the sacrifice to their family that comes with serving before they submit the form and that they should anticipate MICRC service as a full-time job.

Also, many of the MICRC members interviewed for this report said future MICRC panels should **consider increasing the members' salary as a way to better promote diversity on the commission**.

- They noted, for example, that the inaugural panel largely skewed younger and older than Michigan's median-age population, meaning that middle-aged/middle-income residents were less likely to apply to the MICRC.
- Some MICRC members suggested future commissions consider **providing health insurance** as a way to recruit and attract more diversity in the candidate pool.

- The MICRC acknowledges the Michigan Department of State (MDOS) has no authority to set the MICRC members' salary or provide health benefits in the recruitment phase.
- The MICRC is vested within the Michigan Constitution to set members' salary. The Michigan Constitution simply states that the minimum level of funding for MICRC members' compensation will be at least 25% of the governor's salary. The MICRC has the power to go beyond that funding floor if members believe it's warranted.
- That means the MDOS could promote via its candidate recruitment campaign that the opportunity exists for future members of the MICRC in 2031 and beyond to schedule a vote among themselves that would determine whether a higher salary or provision of health insurance is appropriate.

## SELECTION

The Secretary of State's office hired Saginaw-based Rehmann LLC, an independent third-party certified accounting firm, to randomly select the 13 Michigan residents who would serve on the state's first Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission. The office used the standard bidding process.

The constitutional amendment that created the MICRC included factors that can disqualify a voter from serving on the commission, like being an elected partisan official or immediate family member of that official, an employee of the Legislature or a lobbyist.

The Secretary of State's office processed [more than 9,300](#) applications from across the state. Rehmann LLC randomly selected [200 semifinalists](#) in June 2020, including 60 who affiliated with Democrats, 60 who affiliated with Republicans and 80 who didn't affiliate with either major party. The random selection process considered the geographic and demographic makeup of the applicants to ensure the final pool of semifinalists mirrored the state's population as closely as possible.

The list of 200 semifinalists was submitted to the top GOP and Democratic leaders in the Michigan Senate and House. They were given the chance to remove up to [20 applicants](#) before Aug. 1, 2020. Rehmann LLC input the names of the remaining applicants into software primarily used in the auditing community to make random selections. The software extracted four names each from the list of Democratic and Republican applicants and five names from the list of independent applicants.

The final selections of the 13 MICRC members were made in a [livestreamed drawing Monday, Aug. 17, 2020](#). The commission was seated Sept. 17, 2020, to begin the yearlong process of reconfiguring the state's political boundaries.

Each selected commissioner expressed in their applications a desire to serve their community and country. In their applications and in interviews with the MLive newspaper chain and other news outlets, all of the commissioners expressed a common theme — they saw their work as a civic duty that, if done correctly, could help change the state's redistricting process for the better.

## The inaugural MICRC members include:



**Douglas Clark**

- **Party:** Republican
- **Age:** 74
- **Occupation:**  
Retired operations and development manager



**Rhonda Lange**

- **Party:** Republican
- **Age:** 48
- **Occupation:** Real estate broker



**Juanita Curry**

- **Party:** Democrat
- **Age:** 72
- **Occupation:**  
Retired specialized foster care worker



**Steven Terry Lett**

- **Party:**  
Independent
- **Age:** 74
- **Occupation:**  
Semiretired lawyer




**Anthony Eid**

- **Party:**  
Independent
- **Age:** 28
- **Occupation:**  
Medical student



**Cynthia Orton**

- **Party:** Republican
- **Age:** 55
- **Occupation:**  
College student



**Brittnei Kellom**

- **Party:** Democrat
- **Age:** 34
- **Occupation:**  
Entrepreneur and trauma practitioner



**M.C. Rothhorn**

- **Party:** Democrat
- **Age:** 48
- **Occupation:**  
Financial cooperator



**Rebecca Szetela**

- **Party:** Independent
- **Age:** 47
- **Occupation:** Lawyer



**Richard Weiss**

- **Party:** Independent
- **Age:** 73
- **Occupation:** Retired autoworker and handyman



**Janice Vallette**

- **Party:** Independent
- **Age:** 68
- **Occupation:** Retired banker



**Dustin Witjes**

- **Party:** Democrat
- **Age:** 31
- **Occupation:** Payroll specialist



**Erin Wagner**

- **Party:** Republican
- **Age:** 54
- **Occupation:** Household engineer

For more details about the MICRC members, [click here](#).

## SELECTION: LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS

The MICRC was composed of six men and seven women. Two are Black, one is Middle Eastern and the rest are white. Their ages range between 28 and 74 — only one was under 30 at the time of his selection. A majority of the commission — seven members — live in Southeast Michigan. Two live in the northern Lower Peninsula, two live in or near Lansing, one lives in Battle Creek and one lives in Saginaw.

The inaugural MICRC generally reflects Michigan's diverse population, which the large majority of MICRC members and others interviewed for this report agree means the algorithm used by Rehmann LLC in the MICRC applicant selection process proved successful.

However, the inaugural MICRC did not include any residents from the Upper Peninsula; no one identifying as Hispanic or Latino, Native American, Asian or Pacific Islander; and nobody from Grand Rapids, the state's second-largest city. This drew some public criticism.

Some of the contributors to this report believe slight adjustments could be made to the algorithm Rehmann LLC employed that might bring more geographic and racial diversity to the future MICRC candidate pool.

But the majority of those interviewed for this report, including a majority of the MICRC members, said **rather than changing the algorithm, more energy should be devoted to recruiting more residents** from the Upper Peninsula, Grand Rapids, other populous communities and ethnic populations and urging them to apply to serve on future MICRC panels.

The consensus opinion was that greater interest in serving on the MICRC in 2031 and beyond will occur over the next decade because those who felt underrepresented in the inaugural process will strive to ensure they are better represented in the next MICRC iteration.

In addition, Voters Not Politicians (VNP) and the Michigan Nonprofit Association (MNA) shared separate post-campaign findings and suggestions with MICRC for its development of this report. The VNP report is based on VNP interviews with the leaders of 10 community of interest (COI) partner groups across Michigan that VNP worked closely with during the inaugural redistricting cycle. The MNA report is based on interviews with leaders of MNA member organizations.

Recommendations for the 2030 selection process from MICRC members, VNP, MNA and third-party organizations that contributed to the report include **increasing public education on the process for selection of the commissioners**, particularly regarding how the semifinalist pool and final commissioners are weighted and selected. Collectively, they recommended considering **additional mechanisms for hearing marginalized voices** not included on the commission when convened.

VNP says COIs reported concerns about representation and historical/cultural competence on MICRC. According to VNP, some of these concerns could have been alleviated had the public understood how the final 13 commissioners were chosen (i.e., that they were not individually selected by the secretary of state, and that the constitution does not allow a certain number of seats to be reserved for Detroit residents, for example, or members of a particular ethnic group).

For more details about the MICRC membership selection process “mechanics,” [click here](#).

For more details about the MICRC membership random selection process, [click here](#).

## TRAINING & TECHNOLOGY

Michigan is one of only a handful of states where a citizen initiative led to the creation of a citizen-led, independent redistricting commission, according to the [National Conference of State Legislatures](#).

In order to prepare the 13 members of the inaugural MICRC for the task of redistricting, training and education was crucial.

In September 2020, commissioners attended a two-day orientation organized by the Michigan Department of State covering:

- Introduction to Role as a Commissioner
- Basics of Article IV, Section 6
  - » Process and mapping criteria
  - » Panel discussion on Criteria and Public Hearings featuring Matt Grossmann, director of the Institute for Public Policy and Social Research at Michigan State University; John Chamberlin, professor emeritus at University of Michigan; and Jon Eguia, professor at Michigan State University
- Lessons from California and Arizona commissions
  - » Presentation and reflections from other citizen commissions nationwide. Panelists: Andre Parvenu (CA, no party preference), Vincent Barabba (CA, Republican), Cynthia Dai (CA, Democrat), Colleen Mathis (AZ, independent)
- Redistricting 101
  - » Panel presentation and discussion on redistricting history and basics. Panelists: Tom Ivacko, executive director of the Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy at the University of Michigan Ford School of Public Policy; Ellen Katz, professor of law at the University of Michigan Law School; and Justin Levitt, professor of law at Loyola Law School
- Redistricting in Michigan
  - » Panel presentation by Matt Grossmann, director of the Institute for Public Policy and Social Research at Michigan State University; Chris Thomas, former director of the Michigan Bureau of Elections; and John Pirich, faculty at the Michigan State University Law School

- Transparency & Independence Workshop
  - » Overview of Open Meetings Act and the Freedom of Information Act

The orientation and resource materials compiled for the inaugural commission are [available here](#).

In addition to the initial orientation, the MICRC relied on support from experts including:

- **Thomas Ivacko**, executive director, Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy at the University of Michigan Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, and
- **Matt Grossman**, director of the Institute for Public Policy and Social Research (IPPSR) and professor of Political Science at Michigan State University

Grossman's and Ivacko's teams partnered to enhance MICRC members' knowledge of best practices implemented in other states on such complex issues as communities of interest (COIs) and included materials for MICRC review in its inaugural packet. UM also shared with MICRC a database of more than 1,200 potential COI groups and hosted a series of webinars inviting those groups to get involved with the MICRC's work. In addition, UM and MSU provided technical support in test-mapping sessions. They encouraged the MICRC to invest more funding in data management and analysis of the public comments on maps, noting the sheer volume of comments in California's experience proved overwhelming.

- **Matthew Petering**, a professor from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, who presented a map-drawing algorithm he developed.
- **Moon Duchin**, a math professor at Tufts University, who specializes in geometry and has been immersed in redistricting problems since 2016. She is the founder of [MGGG Redistricting Lab](#), an effort to apply data science to redistricting. The lab, which grew out of an informal research collective called the Metric Geometry and Gerrymandering Group, has helped refine techniques that construct representative samples of the universe of valid redistricting maps for a given jurisdiction. When human-generated maps deviate far from statistical norms, it can be a sign of gerrymandering or some other agenda, Duchin and other mathematicians say. Duchin has worked with commissions and groups across the country, including the [People's Maps Commission in Wisconsin](#) and [Arizona's Independent Redistricting Commission](#). Her work has flagged numerous instances of gerrymandering by both parties.

These experts, as well as others, provided continuing education to the commissioners.

## Mapping Software Training

Redistricting has been called one of the most complicated undertakings of state government, and part of this difficulty arises from the amount of math and data that goes into the process in order to comply with legal requirements.

The MICRC members had access to mapping software so they could draw their own districts. The cost to the MICRC to purchase the software from Electronic Data Services was approximately \$4,000-plus per member. Not all MICRC members chose to use the software, citing their lack of IT knowledge. Some commissioners who did download the software with the MICRC paying the fee said they attended training sessions to learn how to use the technology, but they said the training was insufficient given their relative lack of IT knowledge, so they ultimately did not use the tool. This proved to be a waste of MICRC resources.

## Bias Training

Members of the MICRC received one two-hour session on bias training on July 8, 2021, from consultant Bruce Adelson during an in-person meeting in Lansing. Natural bias is defined as “a predisposition or a preconceived opinion that prevents a person from impartially evaluating facts that have been presented for determination; a prejudice.”

There are at least 14 different types of bias people experience that influence and affect the way people think, behave and perceive others. Understanding personal biases and assumptions is crucial to clear thinking and scientific literacy. All individuals, no matter their education, intellectual commitment or good intentions, are susceptible to biases.

According to Adelson and other experts on the topic, the **14 types of bias** are:

- |                               |                                   |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Confirmation bias          | 8. Information bias               |
| 2. The Dunning-Kruger Effect  | 9. Selection bias                 |
| 3. Cultural bias              | 10. Availability bias             |
| 4. In-group bias              | 11. Fundamental attribution error |
| 5. Decline bias               | 12. Hindsight bias                |
| 6. Optimism or pessimism bias | 13. Anchoring bias                |
| 7. Self-serving bias          | 14. Observer bias                 |

**After Adelson's presentation, MICRC members expressed more confidence that they were cognizant of the need to remain alert to their individual natural biases.**

Commissioners also praised the media trainings they received, which helped inform them on what they could and could not discuss in terms of the MICRC's work with reporters and the public. Special attention was devoted to Section 11 of the new amendment that stipulated the MICRC — its members, staff, attorneys and consultants — could not discuss redistricting matters with members of the public outside of an open meeting of the commission, except that a commissioner may communicate about redistricting matters with members of the public to gain information relevant to the performance of his or her duties if such communication occurs (a) in writing or (b) at a previously publicly noticed forum or town hall open to the general public.

## **Technology Shortfalls**

MICRC members and staff did not receive state-issued computers and cell phones until January-February 2021 due to COVID-19-related supply chain issues. The delay frustrated commissioners and MICRC staff, who said during interviews that they hoped that those problems would not exist in 2031. Additionally, the computers issued to commissioners were not well equipped to run the mapping software. They did not have discrete graphic cards or enough processing power to carry out key functions with ease.

## TRAINING & TECHNOLOGY: LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for improvement include:

- Commissioners interviewed for this report said future MICRC leaders should receive **more extensive training** on how to use the mapping software more effectively and **earlier in the process**.
- Commissioners who found the mapping software training sessions helpful **cited the two-hour, one-on-one trainings as especially beneficial** and encouraged that more individualized training be available to commissioners.
- Commissioners, not staff or consultants, **should make decisions regarding access to data, tools and maps**, although the MICRC should evaluate objections raised by staff and consultants.
- MICRC members found certain aspects of their training especially helpful:
  - » **Presentations by the University of Michigan and Michigan State University** were generally deemed instrumental in providing the MICRC with a base-level foundation of the challenges and opportunities surrounding redistricting. Some MICRC members, however, felt the presentations could have been discussed in more accessible laymen's terms.
  - » Presentations by the leaders of previous redistricting commissions for the states of California and Arizona.
- Subject matter that some commissioners cited as deserving of more training and expedited timing included:
  - » **Providing MICRC members with a stronger understanding of Robert's Rules of Order should be mandatory for future MICRC panels because virtually all of the MICRC members had little to no experience conducting formal meetings.** Robert's Rules was first published in 1876 as an adaptation of the rules and practice of the U.S. Congress to the needs of non-legislative societies. It is the most widely used manual of parliamentary procedure in the United States and has a proven track record of helping membership groups apply codes of conduct to serve as a parliamentary authority within a given assembly.

- **Getting the redistricting software into the MICRC's hands earlier** would have been helpful so commissioners could have started practicing sooner with the map-drawing technology.
  - » MICRC members could have started learning about map drawing in July 2021, but they did not begin the practice until September 2021.
  - » Several commissioners felt more of their colleagues should have devoted additional time with consultants and on their own practicing how to draw blocks, precincts, etc.
  - » Several commissioners also expressed frustration that the Auto Bound Edge software the MICRC used to understand partisan fairness features was disabled around August 2021 and not reenabled until October 2021. Future MICRCs **should have access to all partisan fairness and political data and reporting functionality** while drafting maps.
  - » The sentiment expressed from these commissioners was that it would be better for the MICRC to have all software functions available to them in order to see partisan fairness numbers.
- Providing **more in-depth education to commissioners about Michigan's geography, population and local economies** should be considered for future MICRC panels, as many of the inaugural MICRC members admitted they were unfamiliar with communities big and small in different regions of the state. They eventually came to understand how these factors play into what defines communities of interest, but wished they understood these factors earlier.
  - » Commissioners felt they could have benefited from initial demography lessons to orient them to the size, locations and nature of the diverse cultural, ethnic, religious, economic and other communities that make up our state. Many commissioners reported being unfamiliar with Michigan's demographics in certain parts of the state, such as metro Detroit, at the start of the process.
  - » Others said they were unaware which areas of the state have the highest populations of senior citizens, where tourism is highest and how the changes of seasons impact local and regional economies.
- As noted above, MICRC members received a single training session on recognizing potential preexisting individual biases from MICRC consultant Bruce Adelson. But some commissioners lamented **there was no follow-up training on identifying and remedying personal bias** and wished the panel would have taken more tests to measure individual bias. Having this task assigned to an MICRC staff member may be advisable for future MICRC panels.

## Public Comment on Improving the Process

**"Please hire a registered parliamentarian to review and provide written advice and recommendations concerning your approved Parliamentary Authority Manual and proposed Rules of Procedure amendments."**

James Gallant, Marquette

**"If there was just one lesson to be learned, in my opinion, it is that, after developing these plans through whatever algorithm you may have used, you could've gone back and applied a human touch to these plans. It appears that some communities may have split unnecessarily. Had you gone back and taken a really close look at those plans, you might have been able to fix some of them without having an adverse effect on the integrity of the plan. As good as computers and algorithms are, sometimes, there is no substitute for a final touch by the human hand."**

Jack Bengtsson, Kentwood

## HIRING PERSONNEL

Staffing is among the first decisions that future iterations of the MICRC will need to make, and some potentially helpful resources for making those decisions are listed below.

The 2021 MICRC was tasked with hiring the personnel described below (this list is meant purely as a starting point and not necessarily in order of priority):

- Executive director to oversee all operations of the commission, administration and commission staff and assist with navigation of government agencies and protocols.
- General counsel to serve as the primary legal counsel for implementation and legal compliance with Michigan Constitution article IV sec. 6, helping guide and assist the commission in executing a robust, independent, fair, citizen-led and transparent redistricting process.
- Communications and outreach director to handle all media logistics, advise the commission on its messaging and otherwise manage all public information aspects, as well as to organize public hearings and serve as a primary point of contact for stakeholders, public input and engagement.
- Office manager to serve as support staff in overseeing day-to-day operations and correspondence of the commission.

To begin the hiring process, the MICRC asked the Michigan Department of State (MDOS) to place advertisements and job postings on relevant websites during late 2020 to solicit applicants for the positions of executive director, communications and outreach director, and legal counsel.

The MICRC then created three subcommittees from its membership that were tasked with a singular focus on each position. MDOS collected all the resumes and applications for delivery to the MICRC, and the MICRC divided up the files based on the job being sought. Throughout the process, all MICRC members could review all applications as they wished. In addition to reviewing each candidate's resume, the MICRC conducted social media history searches for further insights and background.

Each subcommittee then provided the entire MICRC with its recommendations for interviews with the top-ranked candidates. The MICRC scheduled interviews with each prospective candidate that were held as part of open public meetings.

The Princeton Gerrymandering Project estimated that for a state the size of Michigan in 2021, the budget for commissioners and staff salaries, payroll taxes and human resource expenses should total approximately \$1.48 million. That line item in the MICRC budget from the 2021 fiscal year totaled \$1.034 million.

In September 2020, the randomly selected commission convened for the first time and voted to proceed with its first hire — an executive director. The executive director would be charged with assisting the commission in all its duties as it embarked on a new process involving new redistricting criteria and requiring transparency and public engagement throughout the map-drawing process.

Suann Hammersmith, who retired as president and CEO of the Lenawee Community Foundation on Aug. 1, 2020, received the highest number of votes out of six finalists during a Dec. 1, 2020, meeting for the position to facilitate the state's redistricting. She told news media at the time of her official hiring on Dec. 17 that she expected to serve 1½ years in the role, which proved accurate.

The MICRC's second hire was Julianne Pastula as general counsel on Jan. 11, 2021. Edward Woods III was hired Feb. 1 as communications and outreach director. Executive Assistant Sara Martinez was hired June 1 as a part-time staff member.

On March 31, 2022, the MICRC officially announced the appointment of Woods as its new executive director to replace Hammersmith, who retired from the helm effective the same day.

Across the board, MICRC members praised the diligence of the staff they hired, with particular gratitude expressed for the service of Hammersmith, Martinez, Pastula and Woods. The MICRC recognized they worked extremely long hours, often six or seven days per week for months on end.

They were especially impressed such a small staff produced several key policy documents that proved essential to the process, such as developing a rules and procedures guideline that was so effective it was later adopted by the Colorado Independent Redistricting Commissions.

The policy and procedural documents relevant to future iterations of the MICRC to review that were created by the [inaugural MICRC staff](#) include:

- [Public Record Requests Procedures](#)
- [Document and Record Retention Policy](#)
- [Financial Procedures, Procurement Review Policy](#)

- [Policy for Approval of Expenses](#)
- [Conflict of Interest Policy](#)
- [Code of Conduct](#)
- [Strategic Plan](#)
- [Communications and Outreach Policy](#)
- [Communications and Outreach Plan](#)
- [Mapping Policies and Procedures](#)
- [Rules of Procedures](#)

## HIRING PERSONNEL: LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS

At least four common themes emerged among the MICRC members interviewed for this report regarding hiring practices that they recommend for future MICRC panel consideration:

- Without question, they said **future MICRC panels should hire more support staff from the beginning** to assist the executive team. They noted Michigan, in comparison with previous redistricting states like California and Arizona, had staffing levels routinely insufficient to its needs. Assistants for the executive director and general counsel were eventually hired, but far later in the process than would have been preferable.
- Given the heavy workload for the MICRC's legal team, some commissioners suggested **future MICRC panels should hire two attorneys as legal counsel**, as opposed to one. These commissioners noted that 11 of their 13 MICRC colleagues were not attorneys and had no legal expertise or background whatsoever.
- **The importance of the MICRC communications and outreach director is critical** to informing the public, and particularly the news media, about MICRC activities, which the MICRC did not sufficiently appreciate in the initial hiring process. In retrospect, some commissioners said they would advise future MICRC panels to consider selecting a communications and outreach director even before hiring the executive director.
- **Future commissions should consider hiring their own IT staff** rather than relying on the Michigan Department of State to provide that service. While using the MDOS staff helped save budget resources, it also resulted in overly long delays in uploading maps and meeting minutes to the MICRC website, prompting criticism from the public and news media.

## CONSULTANTS

In addition to full-time staff, the MICRC hired a team of consultants to assist in its duties. This included marketing and public relations experts who helped support the MICRC's public awareness and education activities.

For the first phase of the map-making public awareness campaign, the MICRC hired Detroit-based Van Dyke Horn and McConnell Communications Inc. The MICRC teamed with Gúd Marketing to handle the PR and communications efforts during the second phase of the MICRC's public hearings. The MICRC contracted with Lansing-based Good Fruit to handle video production and with Chase Creative for audio visual assistance at live events.

Consultants who assisted in map-making were of particular importance to the citizen-led panel.

For example, the term "gerrymandering" refers to the manipulation of congressional district boundaries to favor a particular party. Many district boundaries in Michigan historically were intentionally weaved around specific homes, neighborhoods and streets to include voters with a particular ideology in one voting district.

To better understand how to address the gerrymandering challenges that existed in Michigan, a team of experts was hired to help MICRC draw new congressional and legislative districts for the state. Its contract with Virginia-based Election Data Services (EDS) to serve as the commission's line-drawing firm was finalized May 25, 2021.

EDS President Kimball Brace, who worked for many Democratic clients over the years, led the mapping team that included John Morgan, a redistricting expert frequently hired by Republicans; Fred Hejazi, who developed the mapping software the commission used to draw the new districts; and Kent Stigall, who had recently retired from Virginia's nonpartisan legislative services agency.

In addition, an EDS partner, Dr. Lisa Handley, a racial polarization voting and partisan fairness rights expert who has become the premier racial bloc voting expert in the country for the past three decades, was brought onto the team at the commission's request to undertake an analysis of racial voting patterns in Michigan's communities to ensure the new districts didn't dilute the political representation of minority populations.

In response to [concerns](#) about Brace's and Morgan's history of working with Democratic and Republican clients, respectively, Hejazi told the commissioners that "the person who's going to be drawing is actually Kent (Stigall), who's not a partisan person."

[Brace](#) worked with Arizona's commission, which is similarly structured to Michigan's, during previous redistricting cycles. Stigall previously worked for Virginia's nonpartisan legislative services agency for 35 years. The composition of the team was designed to protect the commission against allegations of redistricting that favors one party over the other, [Hejazi asserted in a Detroit Free Press interview](#).

"Nobody's going to be able to come back and say, 'Well, you guys had this drawn by people that strictly work with the Democrats or people that strictly work for Republicans, so the map is going to be skewed.'"

The partisan makeup of the team was a [deliberate attempt](#) to achieve political balance, Brace told the Free Press.

Brace pulled together the census data that helped the commission determine where the lines should be drawn. He told the Free Press he saw his role as more than just crunching numbers, but rather as that of an educator to the group of randomly selected citizens who make up the commission. Brace delivered this advice during a [March 4 presentation](#) to the group:

**Don't expect everyone to be happy with the final maps.**

"I've always said that when I get finished with a project, I think I've probably been successful if everyone is just a little bit mad at me," he told the commissioners.

Morgan saw himself as the commission's problem-solver who could step in when the commission needed to reach a compromise on where the lines should be drawn.

"Ideally I'll put a bunch of options in front of them or help them assess options that other people propose," Morgan told the Free Press. But ultimately, Morgan said, the commissioners are the decision-makers.

The MICRC selected Bruce Adelson, the president of Federal Compliance Consulting LLC, in early April 2021. Adelson was tasked with ensuring the congressional and legislative districts drawn by the MICRC would comply with state and federal law. Adelson previously worked with Arizona's Independent Redistricting Commission.

He told the MICRC that keeping "a very robust, transparent record" as the commission drew its maps would help defend the commission's work and decision-making.

“As we all learned back in elementary school in math, we were all told, ‘show our work.’ That is absolutely true when it comes to redistricting,” he said to the MICRC. “You want everybody to know what you’re doing and then, in the event of a legal challenge, you can just ... cite the record to confirm what it is that you actually did.”

Members of the MICRC interviewed for this report were unanimous in their support for, and appreciation of, the services provided by the consulting team they hired to help in their map-making deliberations, as well as experts from across the nation who provided expertise free of charge.

**The MICRC members gained fundamental knowledge from these experts. With that said, it's important to note all of the MICRC's line-drawing decisions were made by the commission itself.**

It also should be noted the Michigan Department of Civil Rights disagreed with MICRC's consultants' assessment of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) compliance criteria. The state's civil rights department recommended to the MICRC a 40% Black-population district was insufficient to comply with the Voting Rights Act.

Adelson advised the MICRC the VRA did not require a specific number of minority-majority districts (e.g., districts with greater than 50% Black Voting Age Population, or BVAP); however, MICRC did need to create “opportunity to elect” districts.

MICRC was advised by Adelson that an “opportunity to elect” district is one where the district contains the requisite number of minority voters to enable those voters an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. Hanley's analysis was intended to determine the necessary percentage of Black Voting Age Population needed to provide the opportunity for Black voters to elect their candidates of choice in elections in four racially polarized counties (Wayne, Oakland, Saginaw and Genesee).

The Michigan Department of Civil Rights wrote in an analysis of the MICRC's proposed maps they would dilute the votes of people who live in places with heavy minority populations by cracking them into different districts and combining them with predominantly white areas.

The MICRC recognizes its lines drew heavy criticism during a public hearing in October 2021 in Detroit, where nearly 80% of the population is Black. The proposed maps linked voters in Detroit with voters in whiter suburban areas.

The commission's [advisers have said](#) it's possible for minority voters to elect the candidate of their choice in districts, even if they don't comprise a majority of the population. Determining the appropriate percentage of a minority population needed to comply with the Voting Rights Act can be a complex analysis that depends on the unique political characteristics of an area.

## **CONSULTANTS: LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS**

The majority of the MICRC members interviewed for this report expressed overall satisfaction with the performance and counsel provided by its consultants. Commissioners recommend future MICRC should use the experts they hire to the fullest extent possible.

### **Public Comment on Improving the Process**

**"Don't take spurious advice about the VRA and have multiple sources for that sort of stuff. One voice dominated this time when there should always be multiple viewpoints, which resulted in some questionable choices."**

Mark Graham

# COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST

One of the most complex and difficult challenges the MICRC faced during the map-making process was defining “communities of interest,” which is the third-ranked priority in the state constitution preceded only by complying with federal population size and Voting Rights Act requirements and a directive to make districts geographically contiguous.

The guidance provided in the Michigan Constitution is as follows:

**“Districts shall reflect the state's diverse population and communities of interest. Communities of interest may include, but shall not be limited to, populations that share cultural or historical characteristics or economic interests. Communities of interest do not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.”**

MICRC members noted during interviews there is no definitive list of communities of interest in Michigan to draw from, and a community of interest is not a traditional city or county borders. In order to fulfill this criteria, the MICRC identified a [communities of interest process](#).

This process included identifying characteristics of a COI to be:

- Self-defined by the local community members.
- Associated with a contiguous area on a map.
- Shared common bonds linked to public policy issues that would be affected by legislation, likely to result in a desire to share the same legislative district in order to secure more effective representation.

And defining “cultural,” “historical” and “economic” characteristics as:

- **Cultural:** Artistic and intellectual pursuits/products, including the arts, letters, manners; ways of living transmitted from one generation to the next; a form or stage of civilization; behaviors and beliefs characteristic of a social, ethnic or age group.
- **Historical:** Past events and times relating to people, country or time period; aggregate or record of past events; a notable past; acts, ideas or events that will shape the future.

- **Economic:** The production, distribution and use of income, wealth and commodities; affecting or apt to affect the welfare of material resources; financial considerations; wealth and wage disparities.

Communities of interest could include places of worship, neighborhoods, ethnic communities, social service organizations, local historical societies, school districts, outdoor recreation areas, arts and cultural institutions or a group of vacation homeowners.

Communities that have a shared interest that makes them want to stay together in one district for purposes of political representation can tell MICRC where they want to be located geographically. MICRC did consider the maps it received from communities of interest when drawing the new congressional and legislative lines. However, it didn't consider COIs where citizens mentioned not wanting to be a part of a community.

While many states consider communities of interest, no other state assigns them such a high priority in its criteria for redrawing districts as Michigan. Redistricting experts interviewed for this report said making communities of interest a top priority was meant as a corrective to gerrymandered districts that split up communities in the past. Groups including [Voters Not Politicians](#), the [Michigan Nonprofit Association](#) and the [University of Michigan's Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy](#) compiled resources to learn more about communities of interest and how to encourage public participation in the new redistricting process.

One of the main factors MICRC has to consider is keeping residents with similar interests together. Because the definition is so vague, Michigan citizens have a lot of leeway to help chart MICRC's course.

"It's very elastic," John Chamberlin, professor emeritus of political science and public policy at the University of Michigan's Ford School of Public Policy, [told the MLive newspaper chain in a story published May 25, 2021](#). "As long as you're not a political party or a front group for a candidate, you could be a community of interest."

According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, [25 states, including Michigan, currently include communities of interest](#) as a qualifying form of criteria in drawing state legislative maps, congressional maps or both. The most comparable system to Michigan's is the state of California, which also has an independent redistricting commission that relies in part on communities of interest.

The term itself isn't unusual for people who are familiar with the redistricting process, but for the average citizen it's nebulous, Chamberlin told MLive.

He and other researchers at the University of Michigan's Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy [drew up a list of examples](#) for MICRC review of what [communities of interest could be](#) after looking at various state organizations, associations and groups. They suggested communities of interest include populations sharing cultural or historical characteristics, economic interests or bonds through policy issues that would be affected by legislation.

"The fact that there's no exhaustive list of these things means that either communities of interest, on their own, need to decide, 'We are one and let's participate,' or some other group needs to get in touch with them to say, 'Have you thought about this? Here's how the process works,'" he told MLive.

In remaining steadfast and not disregarding the seven ranked redistricting criteria, the MICRC heard sentiments of former state Supreme Court Justice Stephen Markman. He teaches constitutional law at Hillsdale College, which commissioned him to write a report summarizing his concerns with the MICRC's definition of community of interest in forming district lines.

Markman urged the MICRC against using racial, ethnic or religious groups as a determiner of the state's new voting boundaries for the 2022 election. He also said a redistricting commission that prioritizes traditional municipal boundaries when redrawing voting maps should avoid using "'racial, ethnic and religious' calculations" as proxies for drawing maps that provided partisan advantage in the past.

Instead, Markman called on the commission to consider actual neighborhood and municipal boundaries when redrawing the state voting maps instead of more nebulous bonds such as shared concerns over the environment, creative arts communities, media markets or tax assessment districts — elements the University of Michigan study offered as examples of "communities of interest."

Here is a link to a July 7, 2021, [story published by The Detroit News about Markman's views](#).

## COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST: LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS

A common critique on the MICRC's COI application from Markman, dissenting MICRC commissioners and some members of the public who submitted comments is that city/county lines were broken in pursuit of COIs and/or that certain cities/counties were not considered COIs.

The counterpoint to that sentiment is that the sixth-ranked criteria states, "Districts shall reflect consideration of county, city and township boundaries," which is lower than the third-ranked COI criteria.

The following content represents VNP's contribution to MICRC's Lessons Learned & Recommendations report. The findings and observations are based on VNP interviews with the leaders of 10 COI partner groups across Michigan that both the MICRC and VNP worked closely with during the inaugural redistricting cycle.

According to VNP, COI partners reported multiple challenges during the 2021-22 redistricting process, such as a lack of awareness among their members of the redistricting process in general. In addition, there was confusion as to what would or would not be considered a COI in MICRC's eyes and how MICRC would weigh submissions from a few motivated individuals as compared with large COIs. The COI partners recommended MICRC:

- Publicize and share widely a definition of "community of interest" and clearly and proactively explain how it will weigh different pieces of public input.
- Provide COI examples and counterexamples.
- Prioritize public education and presentations in more populous areas.
- Have adequate financing and staffing for its important public education role.

### Public Comment on Improving the Process

**"Earlier public education before public testimony begins would give more time for communities of interest to understand how they can participate in the process."**

Susan Demeuse, Caledonia

"I believe I watched every meeting and hearing held by the MICRC, and if there was one takeaway I could offer by way of suggested process improvement, I believe greater clarification surrounding what constitutes a COI as it relates to mapping criteria priorities taken as a whole.

"For example, there were obvious tensions with which the commission struggled when it was necessary to weigh issues of partisan fairness against the interests of a COI."

Karen

# PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROCESS

Public participation was key to the work of the inaugural MICRC. Despite the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic — limited in-person meetings, changing local and state health rules, etc. — MICRC sought to exceed the requirements of the Michigan Constitution by hosting more public hearings. Additionally, all meetings of the MICRC were livestreamed via YouTube to maximize public participation and transparency.

The MICRC's work in collecting public feedback is segmented into **two phases**:

## Phase One | May-July 2021

The constitution required the MICRC to hold at least 10 public hearings around the state to inform Michiganders about the redistricting process and the purpose and responsibilities of MICRC, and to gather information from the public about potential plans.

The 16 public hearings were held in the following cities and hosted by specific commissioners familiar with each area. Commissioners attended in person, as required by the Open Meetings Act:

- **Jackson** — May 11 at American 1 Event Center
- **Kalamazoo** — May 13 at Wings Event Center
- **Marquette** — May 18 at Northern Michigan University
- **Gaylord** — May 20 at Treetop Resorts
- **Midland** — May 25 at the Great Hall Banquet and Convention Center
- **Lansing** — May 27 at the Lansing Center
- **Pontiac** — June 1 at Centerpointe Marriott
- **Flint** — June 3 at Dort Financial Center
- **Novi** — June 8 at the Suburban Collection Showplace
- **Dearborn** — June 10 at the Ford Community and Performing Arts Center
- **Detroit** — June 15 at The Village Dome at Fellowship Chapel

- **Detroit** — June 17 at the TCF Center
- **Port Huron** — June 22 at the Blue Water Convention Center
- **Warren** — June 24 at the MRCC Banquet Center
- **Muskegon** — June 29 at the VanDyke Mortgage Convention Center
- **Grand Rapids** — July 1 at DeVos Place

The MICRC also launched an online public comment portal in May 2021 that made it easy for residents to submit written comments, draw or upload maps, and more. The public comment portal served as a one-stop shop for members of the public to engage in the redistricting process. This comprehensive tool was developed by the MICRC in partnership with the [MGGG Redistricting Lab](#), a nonpartisan research group at Tisch College of Tufts University and procured by the Michigan Department of State (MDOS). The public comment portal enabled members of the public to easily do the following:

- Submit written public comments.
- Draw and submit a community of interest map.
- Draw and submit a complete or partial district map (congressional, Michigan House and Michigan Senate).
- Upload or link to a map/shapefile or document.
- Comment on other maps or submissions.

Commissioners and the public were able to see submissions and comments in real time. The public comment portal can be found at [Michigan.gov/MICRC](https://Michigan.gov/MICRC).

Members of the public were encouraged to use the public comment portal to submit materials. The MICRC also received comments via email, mail and/or paper submissions at public meetings. MDOS continued to provide these comments to the commission and uploaded them to the website for public viewing regularly.

## Phase Two | August-December 2021

After months of preparation, public input and a long wait for updated U.S. census data due to COVID-19 delays in data collection, the MICRC began the process it was created to do — draw political maps for the state’s congressional, state House and state Senate districts and invite the public to participate by weighing in on its draft maps.

It should be noted the MICRC began its map-drawing process by dividing the state into 10 regions, then focused on each region. The MICRC chose to start with the Upper Peninsula and northern Lower Peninsula first, then worked its way downward to address the rest of the state.

Critics have suggested that approach did not leave sufficient time for drawing maps in Michigan's most populous regions, such as metro Detroit and Greater Grand Rapids. They recommend that in the future the MICRC build outlying maps after those two regions are completed.

On Oct. 14, 2021, the MICRC unveiled several draft federal and state legislative district maps built collaboratively, as well as maps drawn by a single commissioner. The MICRC also announced details for a new phase of public hearings and comments. The MICRC was required to hold at least five public hearings throughout the state for the purpose of soliciting comments from the public about the proposed maps being considered for redistricting of the Michigan congressional, House and Senate districts.

The five hearings were held:

- **Wednesday, Oct. 20, 1-8 p.m., recess 3:30-5 p.m.**  
TCF Center, 1 Washington Blvd., Detroit
- **Thursday, Oct. 21, 1-8 p.m., recess 3:30-5 p.m.**  
Lansing Center, 333 E. Michigan Ave., Lansing
- **Friday, Oct. 22, 1-8 p.m., recess 3:30-5 p.m.**  
DeVos Place, 303 Monroe Ave. NW, Grand Rapids
- **Monday, Oct. 25, 1-8 p.m., recess 3:30-5 p.m.**  
Treetops Resort, 3962 Wilkinson Road, Gaylord
- **Tuesday, Oct. 26, 1-8 p.m., recess 3:30-5 p.m.**  
Dort Financial Center, 3501 Lapeer Road, Flint

At each of the five public hearings, the MICRC established an on-site public portal station with volunteers to assist the public in submitting comments, used monitors to enhance viewing of draft proposed maps and provided technical assistance in displaying information available on the public comment portal or mapping portal for Michigan residents to reference during their public comments.

Michiganders also were invited to provide comments on the proposed maps via another online portal — My Districting. Individuals could comment on specific maps or districts. The MICRC also continued to accept comments submitted via email and mail.

To review the public comments, visit:

- [Comments on Final Congressional Map \(Chestnut\)](#)  
[Comments on All Proposed Maps](#)  
[Public Comment Portal Comments](#)  
[Commission Meeting Comments](#)
- [Comments on Final State Senate Map \(Linden\)](#)  
[Comments on All Proposed Maps](#)  
[Public Comment Portal Comments](#)  
[Commission Meeting Comments](#)
- [Comments on Final State House Map \(Hickory\)](#)  
[Comments on All Proposed Maps](#)  
[Public Comment Portal Comments](#)  
[Commission Meeting Comments](#)

## Summary

As a result, the MICRC obtained nearly 30,000 public comments for consideration in drawing Michigan's congressional, state Senate and state House maps.

Collectively, the MICRC received 2,141 in-person comments, 1,023 written/ emailed comments, 1,369 remote (virtual) comments, 7,580 comments through the public comment portal and 17,731 remarks through the mapping comment portal, for a final total of 29,484 comments.

## PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROCESS: LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS

Several MICRC members reflected that more time was needed to draw and refine maps to incorporate public comment more fully.

In its defense, the MICRC's ability to meet its constitutionally mandated deadline for approving maps was challenging due to unforeseen circumstances, including:

- The outbreak of the historically deadly global COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 forced the commission to initiate its public participation campaign strategy virtually.
- The pandemic resulted in the U.S. Census Bureau creating a new timeline. The U.S. Census Bureau was to provide census data to the MICRC by April 1, 2021, under federal law, but it was not released until Sept. 16, 2021.
- While the lack of timely census data did not ultimately impede the commission from faithfully serving the people of Michigan, it did contribute to the MICRC not adopting final maps until Dec. 28, 2021.
- Much discussion during the completion of this report about public participation raised the issue of **what is the appropriate length of time for public comment** during MICRC hearings (e.g., two to three minutes, one minute, 30 seconds, etc.).
  - » The time allotted at public hearings for comments about the MICRC's work varied, beginning at two minutes in the first phase of public hearings but eventually decreasing to one minute for the second phase.
  - » Some MICRC members expressed a preference for the shorter time span because of the repetitive nature of the public comments; others expressed a desire for two or even three minutes of public comments to ensure Michigan residents felt their voices and opinions were heard.
- Some MICRC members **also questioned whether large, organized groups' voices drowned out** those of lone citizens who provided valuable input.
- Frustration also was expressed by outside experts and some MICRC members **that the public comments submitted during the map-making process were not adequately taken into consideration by the MICRC** using a data-driven method.

The Voters Not Politicians (VNP) contribution to MICRC's Lessons Learned report, based on VNP interviews with the leaders of 10 community of interest partner groups across Michigan that VNP worked closely with during this redistricting cycle, offered several recommendations on future public engagement planning, including:

- COIs reported **participant engagement was much more likely and more effective when the public had draft maps to respond to** and comment on.
- MICRC **should release draft maps** as early as possible.
- Each map should be **accompanied by a description** of why the commission drew these particular lines and rejected other options, with specific questions to elicit meaningful responses from the public.
- COIs reported some features, such as the public comment portal and website, for the map-making process **were slow to launch and challenging to use**.
- COIs and other stakeholders **urged a future commission to decide on its map-drawing process and pick its software** (e.g., District during this cycle) **much earlier**.
- COIs observed the commission was left with too little time and restricted options for Southeast Michigan because it began districting in the more rural north.
- MICRC should budget mapping time on a per capita basis or start in populous areas.
- COIs report feeling that digital submissions were not considered by commissioners.
- MICRC should quickly develop a system of analyzing online comments and maps, perhaps through a consulting service accustomed to analyzing textual "big data."

## Public Comment on Improving the Process

**"Our group submitted public comment in several ways: in writing through the public comment portal; in person at the hearings held in Detroit in October and December; and virtually over Zoom following in-person public comments in October and December. The process of submitting written comments via the portal and giving in-person and/or Zoom comments at public hearings was**

not difficult and the instructions for participants were clear.

**"However, the commission kept changing the dates for in-person meetings in the fall, making it difficult to plan for a group. Also, the allotted time for speaking — either one minute or 30 seconds — made it difficult to get important points across during the in-person comments. Finally, at the public hearings, some members of the commission seemed to be disengaged. They were looking at computers, their cell phones, etc., instead of paying attention to the comments from the speakers, many of whom represented communities of interest."**

Judy Davis, Southfield

**"A robust system of cataloging public comments for later use, providing answers to questions not addressed in formal meetings, and documenting the scope of the work to all stakeholders is essential to a commission of this sort. It will minimize confusion, provide attribution for future discourse on the issues and add to the level of trust stakeholders have for the work being done."**

Keith Cooley, Detroit

# COMMUNICATIONS & OUTREACH STRATEGIES

The MICRC adopted and revised a Communications and Outreach Plan regularly. The core goals were to:

1. Ensure fairness in the redistricting process.
2. Heighten awareness of the redistricting process.
3. Model transparency in the redistricting process.
4. Increase engagement in the redistricting process.

In order to meet those goals, the MICRC used the following communication and outreach methods:

- Ads
- Direct mail
- Editorials
- Events
- Fact sheets
- Infographics
- Mail
- Press
- Twitter
- Website
- Billboards
- Emails
- Facebook
- Frequently asked questions
- Instagram
- Presentations
- Text alerts
- Videos
- YouTube

**The full Communications and Outreach Plan is in the Appendix (page 69).**

During the first phase of outreach, MICRC hosted 16 meetings in all regions of the state. The meetings began at 6 p.m. and were tentatively scheduled to end at 9 p.m., though they continued until every person who signed up to speak was given the chance to do so. Time was allotted from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. to give presentations on the redistricting commission's work for people who couldn't attend the evening public hearings.

To support this initial phase of the public outreach and awareness campaign, MICRC hired public relations firms McConnell Communications and Van Dyke Horn.

Both agencies provided extensive media relations, community outreach, new and traditional media services and communication/staffing services.

Those services included:

- Staffing news conferences and distributing news releases for public hearings.
- Making ongoing media pitches and securing television and radio talk show appearances.
- Creating custom graphics for social media.
- Managing social media posting/online advertising.
- Designing and revising two flyers, creating convention hall banners and updating the grassroots toolkit.
- Attending weekly virtual meetings.
- Providing media outreach for news conferences as well as for each public hearing; securing talk show presentations and media coverage.
- Reviewing several hours of video footage; locating and advising on pull quotes from videos recorded during public hearings.
- Converting video clip snippets for use on social media.
- Drafting newsletter articles for use in community newsletters.
- Making outreach to dozens of groups and organizations to request opportunities to present; arranging presentations.
- Staffing both virtual and in-person public presentations.



The MICRC partnered with Michigan Area Agencies on Aging; the Disability Network Eastern Michigan (DNEM), formerly known as the Center for Independent Living for Oakland and Macomb Counties; and many other partner organizations with regard to participation of people who couldn't attend the evening hearings.

“We commend the MICRC for its efforts to be inclusive and accessible for all Michigan residents,” said Chip Werner, associate director – Thumb Region of the Disability Network Eastern Michigan.

“We specifically thank the MICRC for hearing our voices during in-person gatherings and providing an open platform to share recommendations, which created an equitable environment for people with disabilities,” Werner said.

“DNEM also appreciates the actions taken by all MICRC committee members to enhance accessibility of digital media, social media campaigns and written testimony submissions. The inclusion efforts of the MICRC supported the mission of DNEM by breaking down barriers and opening paths towards independence and personal choice,” Werner said.

After the first round of public hearings, the MICRC intentionally increased awareness and engagement in 34 rural counties and 15 municipalities in the Downriver Detroit community through a direct mail campaign to bridge the digital divide.

The MICRC also engaged a Flint consultant to foster community engagement because of government distrust due to the city’s historic water crisis. Finally, it purchased table banners, tablecloths with the commission logo and promotional materials for county fairs and neighborhood meetings to increase engagement in rural and urban areas.

As mentioned previously, the MICRC’s grassroots efforts were supported by dozens of local, regional and statewide organizations, such as the **Michigan Nonprofit Association** (MNA), that represent a range of interests, including labor, business and minority populations. In 2021, MNA worked with nonprofit organizations in and around Detroit, Flint and Grand Rapids to provide people of color, immigrant communities and low-income populations information about redistricting, highlighting its importance and demonstrating how to successfully participate in the process.

### **The MNA’s full redistricting campaign report is in the Appendix (page 69).**

From the kickoff to the first round of public hearings to the approval of the maps, the commission made 195 presentations, 42 scheduled interviews and eight outreach activities. This does not include media interviews before or after events, press forums and other promotional opportunities.

In the campaign’s second phase to inform the public about MICRC’s work, the MICRC tasked Gŭd Marketing with promoting a series of five statewide public hearings, in Detroit, Lansing, Grand Rapids, Gaylord

and Flint. Part of the promotion was television ads encouraging the public to attend the public hearings or provide comment online.

MICRC held a virtual kickoff news conference Oct. 18, 2021, in advance of the Detroit hearing. The online event attracted more than 35 TV, print and radio reporters from every media market in the state — which represents **one of the highest turnouts by news media** for a state government news conference not involving Gov. Gretchen Whitmer since virtual news conferences became common in 2020 due to COVID-19.

The MICRC also generated extensive pre- and post-news media coverage surrounding the five hearings, both in the respective regional markets where events were held and statewide and nationally. Highlights include:

- From Oct. 18 to Dec. 31, 2021, news coverage of the kickoff news conference and subsequent public hearings and press conferences **reached an estimated 139.2 million people** (calculated by the number of unique IP addresses that visit a news article within a given time, as well as television viewers during a newscast) with over 500 articles and newscasts that mentioned Michigan redistricting or the MICRC.

## COMMUNICATIONS & OUTREACH STRATEGIES: LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS

By and large, the MICRC members interviewed for this report felt outreach and engagement strategies were robust and overwhelmingly successful.

Recommendations for improvement include:

- Several MICRC members, staff, outside experts and the news media expressed some level of frustration with the delays experienced uploading meeting minutes, transcripts and draft maps for public review. Emphasis should go toward **posting minutes and maps on the MICRC website as quickly as possible**.
- Furthermore, a number of MICRC commissioners believe it's worth exploration by future MICRC panels whether to **hire their own IT staff and develop their own website** to improve timeliness of distributing information to the public, rather than relying on the Michigan Department of State to provide that service.
- MICRC should **prioritize providing more education to the public** on key facets of its map-making criteria, such as what defines a community of interest.
- The overwhelming majority of MICRC members interviewed for this report were satisfied that the number of public forums and locations in every region of the state met or surpassed the requirements of the state constitution.
- Agreement among MICRC members was not unanimous, however, with at least one commissioner recommending that more outreach and engagement activities be directed toward Northern Michigan and the Upper Peninsula in the future.

Outside experts interviewed for this report cited examples of how MICRC's communication and outreach efforts could be improved moving forward.

For example, the VNP's contribution to MICRC's Lessons Learned report identified barriers to attending MICRC meetings, including technology, language, inconvenient times and inadequate notice.

VNP's recommendations include:

- The online attendance option was helpful. **Meetings should occur both online and in person** even outside the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
- MICRC should **publish a meeting calendar at least two weeks in advance** and should **publish meeting agendas at least 72 hours prior** to the day of the meeting.
- The calendar and agendas should be easy to find on the landing page of the MICRC's website.
- Meeting **materials should be translated into Michigan's most common languages** (English, Arabic, Spanish and Bengali).
- **Meetings should be held on different days and different times of day** to accommodate participants' varying work schedules.
- At least 25% of public meetings and public comment opportunities should be scheduled outside of standard 9-to-5, Monday-Friday business hours.

## Public Comment on Improving the Process

"The Commission had PDF files on the Michigan.gov/MICRC website which explained the redistricting criteria. It laid out the seven criteria in order of priority with definitions and explanations. However, in our experience, you had to know this information was on the website and then go to the website and find it. However, there were so many PDF files and pieces of information on the website that the sheer amount of information was rather overwhelming."

Judy Davis, Southfield

"The commission should find convenient meeting/hearing times **AHEAD OF THE EVENTS**, publish them to the public and scrupulously abide by them. Changing times for discussion and input contributed significantly to residents' lack of and loss of trust with the commission.

"Web/hyperlinks for future meetings must be posted in a timely fashion. At least 72 hours in advance should be the target and 48 hours in advance should be the minimum time allowed. Anything less drives the suspicions among those offering comment that the commission doesn't really want their input."

Keith Cooley, Detroit

**"The commission should be much clearer with meeting times and updating information in a timely manner and stick to them without last-minute changes. The result of this was that people began to distrust the process and disengage because they thought there was a lack of transparency and conspiracy to disenfranchise them."**

Joel Arnold, Flint

## BUDGET

An annual budget of \$3.1 million was allocated for MICRC work from the state's general fund by the Michigan Legislature beginning in FY 2020, based on the constitutional mandate that requires the MICRC to receive funding equivalent to at least 25% of the Secretary of State's general fund/general purpose budget.

By comparison, California funded its 2021 redistricting commission with \$20.3 million, which is about twice as much as its previous independent redistricting commission received a decade ago. One reason for the California commission's bigger 2021 budget is that it started its work four months earlier and — like Michigan's experience — had to extend it due to the delay in U.S. census data.

Also similar to Michigan's experience, having to conduct public outreach virtually over the summer of 2021 due to COVID-19 also drove up California's costs for audio and video, translation, captions and interpretation, Fredy Ceja, director of communications for the commission, told online news outlet CalMATTER for a [story published Dec. 15, 2021](#). It says it had received more than 27,000 public input entries by then.

The Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission was appropriated \$7.9 million for its efforts in the FY 2022 budget approved by the legislature. And, in Colorado, state lawmakers allocated a combined total of \$3.95 million toward the state's redistricting campaign during FY 2021 and FY 2022, according to data provided by Jessika Shipley, staff director of the Colorado Independent Redistricting Commissions.

At the time when the MICRC's budget was approved by the Legislature, [Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson told the news media](#): "We believe, based on evaluations from outside experts, (the budget) is only about a third of the cost of what they'll need to complete their job."

Her assessment of the budget allocation proved prophetic.

Projections show a shortfall after April 2022 of nearly \$1.2 million through the fiscal year that ends Sept. 30, 2022. The MICRC attributes legal fees related to state and federal lawsuits for driving its costs much higher than budgeted, which news media reports confirmed as accurate.

"If you look at budget year to year, there is virtually no difference," MICRC Executive Director Suann Hammersmith told reporters during a March

24 media availability. "Some areas have gone down significantly. So, really, the only expense that makes this budget have a shortfall would be the litigation in defending the maps, which is active at this point in time."

Letters from the MICRC asking the Michigan Legislature for more funding were sent to the legislative appropriations committee chairs. The MICRC's budget requests were ultimately approved by the Michigan Legislature.

It's worth noting MICRC [received a clean audit report with no findings](#) from the Office of Auditor General for fiscal year 2021 and fiscal year 2022 through March 31, based on an MICRC request to ensure openness and transparency as stewards of taxpayer funds.

The commission hopes this audit report supports its fiscal year 2023 budget request before the Michigan Legislature to defend its drawing of fair maps through citizen input.

## **BUDGET: LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS**

The MICRC recommends future commissions better define the role of the Michigan Legislature in funding the entire scope of the MICRC's work, including costs associated with lawsuits.

The state constitution is not specifically clear when it comes to identifying what say, if any, the Legislature would have in funding the commission's legal defense. It reads, "The legislature shall appropriate funds sufficient to compensate the commissioners and to enable the commission to carry out its functions, operations and activities."

But it doesn't describe in detail what should happen if lawmakers disagree about how much would be sufficient, saying only that the state should indemnify the commission if the Legislature doesn't cover costs.

## COMMISSIONER RELATIONSHIPS

MICRC members interviewed for this report stressed the importance of developing relationships with their colleagues, particularly by attending meetings in person whenever possible instead of joining online.

Commissioners who chose to attend MICRC meetings online expressed frustration at times about feeling disconnected from other commissioners and final decisions.

Because of the COVID-19 pandemic that existed during the MICRC's work, members had the option of attending meetings electronically. The majority of commissioners chose to attend public hearings in person, which they said proved extremely valuable as opportunities to bond and develop team-building camaraderie in what was often an extremely stressful work environment. Outside experts interviewed for this report also emphasized that while a hybrid model is fine for meeting attendance, the importance of gathering in person to help build trust and foster a positive working culture cannot be overestimated.

Some news media attention that focused on MICRC members' attendance was critical of the number of absences by some commissioners. Those members who were unable to attend either online or in person attributed their absence to health problems, inclement weather that made travel prohibitive or scheduling conflicts with their full-time jobs.

## COMMISSIONER RELATIONSHIPS: LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS

Much discussion in the development of this report centered on whether future MICRC panels should establish a mandatory attendance policy that sets limits on absences and would require in-person attendance at a minimum number of public meetings.

Proposals that were suggested included changing the MICRC application language to require 100% attendance at meetings (either virtually or in person except for health reasons or family/work emergencies).

However, no consensus emerged on this issue other than commissioners agreed it should be addressed by the Michigan Department of State in creating the application for the 2030 panel and by future MICRC members in establishing by-laws.

### Public Comment on Improving the Process

**"Expecting commissioners to be physically present at the majority of the meetings is so important. I attended several of the MICRC meetings and was so impressed with the camaraderie and respect that grew throughout their time together. This developed from them traveling together, sharing meals and talking."**

Susan Demeuse, Caledonia

**"I do appreciate the way the team created the maps. I forgot who was what political affiliation at times. I loved that you took turns to create the maps. Good, fair work. I loved the way the maps were evaluated according to set standards in the same way for each map. Very good plan."**

**"The group process is tough and annoying when you are in the thick of it. I always felt that I would just rather do it myself. That is not the group process. The group process is messy and full of compromise to get the work done. You did this. I watched you."**

Joyce Kowatch, Grand Rapids

**"I really thought it would be an impossible task for inexperienced citizens to learn what was needed and then design fair maps. I didn't think an independent citizen would be able to handle the public scrutiny, criticism"**

from partisans, emotional opinions, accusations against their character. ... This is tough stuff, and that's a lot to ask of a citizen. You rose to the occasion. You stormed, you normed, and you formed. You behaved like humans, sometimes bickering but more times solving things by listening and compromising. You did it with extraordinary transparency. I can't thank you enough for making this work. I think it's good for Michigan and good for democracy. And it even gives me a little more hope that our country can come together to ensure that all citizens have a voice. Ladies and gentlemen, you done us proud!"

Donna Mullins, East Lansing

# TRANSPARENCY

With one exception, the MICRC earned overwhelmingly high praise for ensuring the map-drawing process was clear, open and transparent to the public. This was especially true when outside experts interviewed for this report compared the MICRC's transparency efforts with past map-drawing activities by the Michigan Legislature.

The exception to the commission's transparency efforts drew heavy criticism and prompted a legal challenge on Dec. 7, 2021, when three news outlets and the Michigan Press Association filed suit in the Michigan Supreme Court to force the MICRC to release records they said should be public. The emergency complaint from The Detroit News, Bridge Magazine and Detroit Free Press sought recordings from an Oct. 27, 2021, closed-door session and several confidential memos submitted to the commission on the basis that the state constitution requires the commission to conduct all business in public and to publish "all data and supporting materials" used while preparing the redistricting plans.

On Dec. 20, 2021, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled the MICRC violated the state constitution by meeting in closed session and keeping some legal memos from the public. In a 4-3 decision, the high court ruled the commission is required to conduct all of its business at open meetings and should have published seven of 10 legal memos that constituted "supporting materials" for map drawing under the Michigan Constitution. The four-justice majority ordered recordings of the meeting be released along with the seven legal memos.

The public release of the recorded meeting minutes and related materials from the Oct. 27, 2021, session shows the MICRC members discussed two memos titled "Voting Rights Act" and "The History of Discrimination in the State of Michigan and Its Influence on Voting."

Upon the release, no further controversies or lawsuits emerged surrounding the MICRC's efforts to promote transparency.

Even Tony Daunt, executive director of FAIR Maps Michigan and a staunch critic of the MICRC's creation, said he was impressed by the MICRC's overall commitment to transparency during a Jan. 26, 2022, video luncheon forum hosted by Bridge Magazine.

"I was pleasantly surprised that they were able to get all three maps voted on in a way that we all understood who was voting for what, and it was transparent. I will give them credit for that," Daunt said. The video is [here](#).

**One of the best methods to ensure transparency and build public confidence about the MICRC's work was by having the news media shine a light on its deliberations.**

The MICRC and its staff devoted much energy to keeping the news media apprised with consistent advance notifications of MICRC events and activities and ongoing outreach to schedule interviews or answer any questions reporters may have had about the process. That included scheduling strategically timed news conferences with Q&As afterward where the news media routinely submitted inquiries to MICRC members and staff. The news conferences were staged both in person and virtually on Zoom (due to COVID-19 restrictions), but the virtual aspect allowed reporters from around the state to cover the events and ask questions without having to travel to Lansing to attend, which helped produce more coverage.

It should be noted that, by any measure, the MICRC's constitutionally mandated second phase of five public hearings scheduled around the state in late 2021 proved to be an overwhelming success from a transparency and earned media perspective.

One of the unforeseen benefits from the COVID-19 pandemic is that it spurred the implementation of new and innovative technologies to communicate with each other through virtual meetings (as opposed to traditional in-person conversations). Holding public meetings publicly as well as remotely allowed Michiganders to make their voice heard about the redistricting process from the comfort of their home or office, rather than having to attend a meeting at a brick-and-mortar building.

As a result, Michiganders had unprecedented access to the 2021 redistricting effort. All commission meetings were livestreamed and recorded on YouTube — delivering a transparent process where all people could watch the MICRC discuss and draw each new district. Live and recorded videos of the MICRC meetings were viewed more than 50,000 times with the public watching nearly 30,000 hours of MICRC at work.

Highlights include:

- The average watch duration totaled 29 minutes per video.
- On average, the MICRC videos had 2,782 impressions, meaning that 21% of individuals who saw the thumbnail of the video clicked and watched for an average of 29 minutes.
- These metrics include both hours-long meetings and press events posted to the MICRC YouTube page.
- These metrics also include both subscribers and nonsubscribers of the MICRC YouTube page.

## **TRANSPARENCY: LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS**

In retrospect, all of the MICRC members interviewed for this report said they should not have closed the Oct. 27, 2021, meeting, but attributed the decision to following the advice of their legal counsel. They would advise future MICRC panels to take great pains to avoid going into closed meetings again unless it's a private personnel or lawsuit-related matter.

In addition, the MICRC would suggest future commissions follow the inaugural approach implemented by MICRC staff to media relations and use online platforms (Zoom, Facebook, etc.) that encourage news media participation in press events without having to attend in person. This strategy produced enormous dividends in the amount of coverage the MICRC's work received compared with taking a more traditional approach with respect to news conferences and public hearings.

### **Public Comment on Improving the Process**

**"Moreover, explanation concerning application of the tools that the commission used to assess the seven criteria was unclear to us. It seemed that the commission had access to consultants who were advising them on the tools and how to use and/or interpret them. But this information seemed to be beyond the reach of those of us in the citizens interest groups."**

Judy Davis, Southfield

## RESULTS & OUTCOMES

Leaders of the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Committee held a news conference Tuesday, Dec. 28, 2021, to speak on the officially adopted congressional [maps](#) for the state of Michigan.

See a story about the press conference published by Bridge Magazine [here](#).

MICRC [adopted](#) the [Chestnut Congressional map](#), [Linden state Senate map](#) and [Hickory state House map](#). The approved maps will be in place until the next redistricting cycle in 2031. The Chestnut map — which removes the state’s two majority-Black congressional districts — was [backed](#) by eight commissioners and gives Democrats a 7-6 advantage in the next election. The Linden map was backed by nine commissioners and [leans](#) 21-17 Democrat, a move that shifts the control away from Republicans in the state Senate for the first time since the early 1980s. The Hickory map was backed by 11 commissioners and leans 56-54 Republican.

MICRC Chairperson Rebecca Szetela said during the news conference that the most exciting aspect of this redistricting process was the citizen participation.

“This has been an exciting and invigorating process, and I am so proud to have been a part of it,” Szetela said. “This is the first time that we have had citizens throughout the state have the ability to comment, participate and assist in the drafting of congressional districts, state House districts and state Senate districts, and that is a fantastic testament to Michigan and a fantastic testament to this commission that we were able to do it.”

Commissioner Brittnei Kellom agreed, saying she appreciated the ways in which the commission was able to work together.

“We live in a society where voting and trust and being a caring brother or sister to your fellow citizen isn’t always the value, and I think we had an opportunity to re-instill that in Michigan,” Kellom said. “I think that that above all is a testament to what true democracy looks like. It’s a testament to what it looks like to work together and build community no matter what your race is, no matter what you believe in, no matter what you do in your personal life, so that has been the beauty of the commission.”

A lack of time was the biggest challenge for the MICRC leading up to the vote, Szetela asserted during the news conference.

“Unfortunately, we happen to have this inaugural commission come into play during a pandemic, which created all sorts of challenges both with the ability for us to meet in person and with the ability to get data from the Census Bureau that assisted us in drawing the maps,” she said. “So despite that extraordinary challenge, we rose to the occasion, we worked really hard, and we managed to get these maps done in a timely manner.”

Commissioner Douglas J. Clark said during the news conference he is proud of these maps, and the commission worked hard to represent all communities as best they could.

“We just can’t meet everybody’s needs 100%, so we chose to move forward and do the best we could to get to that point, and we recognize there’s probably some things that some folks like and other things they don’t,” Clark said. “There’s conflicts in everything that we went forward to discuss. We made it where we thought it represented the largest part of the society, and I’m personally very proud of the products that we’ve produced.”

Voters Not Politicians’ Wang, speaking during the Bridge Michigan Jan. 26 video luncheon discussion about the MICRC’s work and outcomes, said the map-making process and final outcomes ultimately proved to be a “huge success.”

“Our election results are no longer preordained,” she said. “I think these maps — finally — breathe new life and fairness and some chance of voters to determine our political fate in this state, which is remarkable. It’s because of that that we are now a (redistricting) model for the rest of the nation.”

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The MICRC partnered with Lansing-based Gúd Marketing to serve as its marketing and public relations agency of record for the second phase of promoting awareness about the proposed maps. As part of that work, Gud Marketing has helped the MICRC to develop this report to assess what worked well during the inaugural MICRC’s work process and identify potential improvements for the next iteration of the commission to consider.

On behalf of the MICRC, Gúd Marketing contacted dozens of individuals and organizations to respectfully ask for their help with one simple question:

**Would they be willing to share their time and expertise with us in the development of a white paper that will provide guidance to the next members of the MICRC who will draw our state’s new legislative maps in 2031?**

The response was overwhelmingly positive, with a few exceptions. Some organizations chose not to participate because they were in the process of developing their own research and analysis reports and did not want to comment until their assessments were complete. Others declined the MICRC’s invitation due to pending litigation in state or federal courts.

The goal of our conversations was to collect thoughts and recommendations from key experts who participated in Michigan’s redistricting process and to offer advice to the next generation of MICRC leaders.

We thank the following individuals and organizations for their invaluable contributions:

### MICRC Commissioners

- Doug Clark
- Juanita Curry
- Anthony Eid
- Brittni Kellom
- Rhonda Lange
- Steven Lett
- Cynthia Orton
- M.C. Rothhorn
- Rebecca Szetela
- Janice Vallette
- Erin Wagner
- Richard Weiss
- Dustin Witjes

## Staff

- Executive Director Suann Hammersmith
- Communications and Outreach Director Edward Woods III (appointed executive director April 1, 2022)
- General Counsel Julianne Pastula
- Executive Assistant Sara Martinez

## Organizations

- Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services (ACCESS)
- AARP Michigan
- Asian & Pacific Islander (APIA) Vote Michigan
- Bridge Magazine
- Campus Election Engagement Project
- Campus Vote Project
- Commission of Middle Eastern American Affairs
- Common Cause
- Council of Michigan Foundations
- Detroit Hispanic Development Corporation
- Disability Network Eastern Michigan
- Equality Michigan
- eMage Michigan
- Hispanic Latino Commission of Michigan
- Jewish Community Relations Council/American Jewish Committee
- League of Women Voters of Michigan
- Michigan 2-1-1
- Michigan AFL-CIO
- Michigan Association of Counties

- Michigan Association of School Boards
- Michigan Association of United Ways
- Michigan Community College Association
- Michigan Department of Civil Rights
- Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) Aging & Adult Services
- Michigan Department of State
- Michigan Department of Technology, Management and Budget
- Michigan Department of Transportation
- Michigan Farm Bureau
- Michigan League of Conservation Voters
- Michigan Library Association
- Michigan Municipal League
- Michigan Nonprofit Association
- Michigan Roundtable for Diversity and Inclusion
- Michigan Statewide Independent Living Council
- Michigan State University Extension Centers
- Michigan Township Association
- Michigan Voices
- Miigwech Inc.
- NAACP Michigan
- Princeton Gerrymandering Project
- Progress Michigan
- Rural Partners of Michigan
- Small Business Association of Michigan
- United Tribal Council
- University of Michigan Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy
- Voters Not Politicians

Equally important, the MICRC thanks the Michiganders who provided valuable public feedback with nearly 30,000 comments on the redistricting and map-drawing processes.

## APPENDIX

1. Citizens Research Council of Michigan [2018 report](#) on gerrymandering
2. Dr. Lisa Handley report for MICRC on Voting Rights Act implications
3. 2021-22 Pre- and Post-MICRC Public Opinion Poll Results by Glengariff Group
4. MICRC Communications and Outreach Plan
5. MICRC Strategic Plan
6. Michigan Nonprofit Association MICRC assessment report
7. Voters Not Politicians MICRC assessment report
8. Michigan Department of Civil Rights report on Voting Rights Act and communities of interest
9. The University of Michigan's Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy report that [drew up a list of examples](#) for MICRC review of what [communities of interest](#) could be
10. Former state Supreme Court Justice Stephan Markman report commissioned by Hillsdale College summarizing his concerns about the MICRC [with its definition](#) of community in forming district lines
11. MICRC's Report on 2021 Redistricting adopted Aug 18 2022

## **APPENDIX 1**

Citizens Research Council of Michigan 2018 report  
on gerrymandering



## QUANTIFYING THE LEVEL OF GERRYMANDERING IN MICHIGAN

This paper accompanies a longer paper, *Quantifying the Level of Gerrymandering in Michigan*. That paper is available at <https://crcmich.org/quantifying-the-level-of-gerrymandering-in-michigan/>.

### In a Nutshell

- The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that partisan gerrymandering is subject to judicial review, but has not accepted a standard that can be used to evaluate whether any state redistricting plan violates the U.S. Constitution.
- While the U.S. Supreme Court sent recent cases back to the District Courts, it is likely new cases will attempt to set a standard for how the courts should evaluate gerrymandering.
- Michigan's congressional and legislative district maps fail several tests that are currently being discussed to evaluate partisan gerrymandering.

Partisan gerrymandering is not a new phenomenon in the United States. State legislatures have tried to draw district maps to advantage the majority party since at least 1812, when Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry's maps were lampooned, resulting in the term "Gerry-mander". But attempts to resolve gerrymandering through the courts are much more recent.

In 1986, the United States Supreme Court heard its first partisan gerrymandering case, *Davis v. Bandemer*. While the Court agreed that the issue of partisan gerrymandering was something that courts could resolve, they also ruled that the plaintiffs did not present a standard that provided acceptable evidence for the Court to overturn the maps. This charted the course for all partisan gerrymandering cases since; finding a standard that the Court deems acceptable is a necessary step to overturn a biased map.

With the U.S. Supreme Court recently sending two partisan gerrymandering cases back to the lower courts, political scientists are still looking for the holy grail of a court standard. Michigan is

one of several states that has had claims that its maps are gerrymandered. Republicans held unitary control of the state legislature during the 2001 and 2011 redistricting processes, and there have been claims Republicans have had a consistent electoral advantage. Based on available gerrymandering metrics, how do Michigan's congressional and legislative districts grade?

It turns out, not too well. A handful of tests show that Michigan's maps are beyond the threshold for what is considered gerrymandering, and show other signs that would indicate gerrymandering occurred.

The case regarding Wisconsin's State Assembly, *Gill v. Whitford*, hoped to test out one of several new metrics to evaluate gerrymandering, the **efficiency gap**, which calculates the frequency that a party 'wastes' votes. A wasted vote, according to the method, is a vote cast for a party that is not helpful in putting the candidate past 50 percent of the two-party share of votes. Any vote cast for a losing candidate, and any vote cast for a candidate after they receive a majority of the two-party vote share, is considered wasted by the metric. Each party's

total wasted votes for an office type (congressional, state house, or state senate) would then be summed and the difference is taken and divided by the total votes cast to create a metric that can be compared across different states and years.

Wasted votes line up well with the theories of **packing** and **cracking**, the two primary methods used to create a partisan gerrymander. When districts are packed, an overwhelming majority of voters from the same party are put into one district. As most of the votes go to one party, the party that wins the district will waste many of their votes in an election that is not close. If a district is cracked, it means that regions are split so that one party wins a large number of districts by a narrow margin. While the voters for the losing party in those districts could elect several candidates if they were districted fairly, they typically are unable to elect any candidate, and thus waste votes.

The original creators of the efficiency gap recommended any score above an absolute value of eight would signal partisan bias beyond variability

for state legislative districts, and any value beyond 2 seats for congressional districts, would signify partisan bias.

**Table 1** shows the efficiency gap scores for Michigan’s congressional, state house, and state senate districts, with a positive value indicating the maps favored Republicans and a negative value indicating the maps favored Democrats. For most years after the 2000s redistricting process, Michigan’s maps exhibited an efficiency gap that was beyond the test’s recommended threshold. The results also show areas of interest in election trends; in 2006, a year where Democrats saw more success at the ballot box in the state (including winning 54 percent of the statewide vote), Republicans maintained a 22-16 majority in the state senate.

The results also show a large increase in the efficiency gap after the 2010s redistricting process as well, with the efficiency gap more than doubling for congressional and state house districts between the last election under the 2000s map and the first election in the 2010s map, and the state senate

**Table 1**  
Michigan’s Efficiency Gap for Congressional and Legislative Districts, 1998-2016

	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016
Congress	-9.7	6.6	15.2	11.5	23.5	8.0	5.6	19.7	17.6	14.6
MI House	8.1	11.9	11.0	9.7	11.6	8.2	5.8	13.6	13.3	10.1
MI Senate	9.6		10.2		18.5		14.7		22.6	

\*See Appendix A for a discussion of the effects on the efficiency gap values of uncontested elections.

Note: The efficiency gap calculates the frequency that a party ‘wastes’ votes. A wasted vote, according to the method, is a vote cast for a party that is not helpful in putting the candidate past 50 percent of the two-party share of votes. Any vote cast for a losing candidate, and any vote cast for a candidate after they receive a majority of the two-party vote share, is considered wasted by the metric. Each party’s total wasted votes for an office type (congressional, state house, or state senate) would then be summed and the difference is taken and divided by the total votes cast to create a metric that can be compared across different states and years. The original creators of the efficiency gap recommended any score above an absolute value of eight would signal partisan bias beyond variability for state legislative districts, and any value beyond 2 seats for congressional districts, would signify partisan bias.

Source: Michigan Secretary of State voting data, Citizens Research Council calculations.

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efficiency gap increased to its highest point the first year the 2010s map was used. While year to year variation can exist in the efficiency gap due to population shifts, changes in voter turnout, and the popularity of candidates, the magnitude of these increases the first year the 2010s map was used is a strong indication that gerrymandering may have occurred. This is an especially important consideration, as the increase from map cycle to map cycle provides evidence that the levels are not entirely caused by the self-sorting of the state's population (e.g., the idea that Democrats tend to live in cities and Republicans in rural areas).

While the efficiency gap is at the center of *Gill*, many are not enamored with the test, and several other alternatives have been offered. The **mean-median** test compares the average and median vote share of all districts for each party. If the median is higher than the mean, it indicates that the party has more districts above the party's average vote share than below, which would make it easier for the party to win seats. Unlike the efficiency gap, this test does not take into account seats actually won, eliminating large swings in the metric that occur when a close district flips.

A positive mean-median score (indicating a higher median) is evidence that the party had an electoral advantage from the redistricting scheme, while a negative result would indicate a party was hindered

by the scheme. If a party has more than half of its districts above the party's average vote share, it means that their populations are distributed so that they outperform their statewide average in more districts than they underperform. If the populations were distributed fairly, it is likely that the mean-median score would be close to zero. The national average mean-median score for states that showed no partisan advantage was 1.9 in 2012.

Michigan's mean-median test results (see **Table 2**) paint a similar picture as the state's efficiency gap results. The scores reflected an extreme advantage for Republicans the first three elections after the 2001 redistricting process, and a large increase in advantage for Republicans after the 2011 re-drawing of districts. Since 2001, only one year for one election type had a difference below five points, which indicates there has been a consistent partisan advantage due to the maps. The state's congressional districts after the 2000s redistricting process show an extreme increase in the measure; switching from a slight bias for Democrats to an extreme advantage for Republicans.

These scores show that Republicans are consistently advantaged by the maps, while Democrats have been consistently disadvantaged. Because the mean-median test does not account for the number of seats won in any given year, the metric does not see as large of swings in the Democratic wave election

**Table 2**

Michigan's Mean-Median Difference for Congressional and Legislative Districts, 1998-2016

		1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016
Congress	Republicans	-5.0	-4.0	12.4	10.3	10.1	3.9	1.6	6.3	7.4	7.8
	Democrats	5.1	4.4	-12.0	-10.2	-9.8	-5.0	-5.4	-6.9	-8.4	-7.8
MI House	Republicans	4.1	7.4	5.9	6.0	5.3	0.4	4.0	6.9	5.4	5.9
	Democrats	-5.0	-7.3	-6.4	-5.2	-4.6	0.4	-3.5	-6.5	-6.1	-5.6
MI Senate	Republicans	7.7		5.6		7.0		3.3		7.5	
	Democrats	-6.7		-5.3		-7.5		-8.6		-6.8	

Note: The mean-median test is a simple way to determine if a dataset is skewed, or not distributed normally across the average. To apply this test, the average vote share for a party across the state is subtracted from its vote share in the median district. A positive number (indicating a higher median) is evidence that the party had an electoral advantage from the redistricting scheme, while a negative result would indicate a party was hindered by the scheme.

Source: Michigan Secretary of State voting data, Citizens Research Council calculations.

in 2006 or the Republican wave election in 2010. Similar to the efficiency gap, the mean-median test shows a trend of an increase in partisan advantage under the 2010s maps.

The **t-test** is a statistical method to determine if two groups are likely to be assigned randomly from the same population. For evaluating gerrymandering, the test is used to compare the vote-share for each party. Districts are split based on the winning party, and given a value equal to the winner’s vote share. The test then determines the probability that the two groups of districts are statistically similar, or if they are distinct groups. Any results below .05, or 5 percent chance of the difference occurring randomly from the same group, is considered to be statistically significant evidence that the two populations are distinct.

If one party is winning districts by large margins, and the other wins several closer races, it can be an indication that some districts were intentionally designed to have an over-abundance of voters from one party, while others were drawn to give a narrow advantage to the opposite party. This test does not address the magnitude of gerrymandering, or which party benefited from gerrymandering, but is a good indicator of if the difference in district results is likely to have occurred by chance, or was intentional.

Results from the t-test (see **Table 3**) show that there are significant differences between the districts Republicans win and the districts Democrats win. Since the redistricting process in 2001, only two elections have had a t-test score above .05, which is

the threshold for the test. This would indicate that the margin of victory for the districts Republicans win, and the margin of victory for districts Democrats win, is different across congressional, state house, and state senate districts. When combined with the previous two tests, it would suggest that Republicans have had a consistent advantage in all election types.

These tests share one flaw; they do not account for how voters from each party are distributed throughout the state. As a result, these tests do not have a mechanism to distinguish abnormal scores due to highly concentrated Democratic populations, and intentional gerrymandering. An analysis by Jowei Chen and David Cottrell, professors at the University of Michigan and Dartmouth respectively, found that some of the bias in Michigan is due to the distribution of the state’s population, but the maps drawn in 2011 still produced an advantage for Republicans compared to the several congressional district schemes drawn by their algorithm. This would imply that, while the extent of gerrymandering implied by some of the tests may be exaggerated slightly, that political geography does not completely account for the bias in Michigan’s current congressional map.

The recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions leave open the question to how the courts will handle partisan gerrymandering cases in the future. While the Court avoided creating a new standard or ending the possibility of one being created, it seems likely that another case will eventually force the Court to decide on the issue of partisan gerrymandering. Until then, Michiganders will have to evaluate what to do about gerrymandering without the federal court system.

**Table 3**  
Michigan’s T-Test Results

	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016
Congress	0.195	0.060	0.004	0.005	0.000	0.055	0.394	0.002	0.005	0.009
MI House	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.037	0.000	0.000	0.000
MI Senate	0.069		0.019		0.000		0.006		0.000	

Note: The T-Test is a statistical method to determine if two groups are likely to be assigned randomly from the same population. Districts are split based on the winning party, and given a value equal to the winner’s vote share. The test then determines the probability that the two groups of districts are statistically similar, or if they are distinct groups. Any results below .05, or 5 percent chance of the difference occurring randomly from the same group, is considered to be statistically significant evidence that the two populations are distinct.

Source: Michigan Secretary of State voting data, Citizens Research Council calculations.

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## **APPENDIX 2**

Dr. Lisa Handley report for MICRC on Voting Rights Act implications

# **Report to the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission**

## **Dr. Lisa Handley**

### **Preface**

This report outlines the analyses I conducted on behalf of the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (MICRC) and relays my findings. I also briefly explain the partisan fairness measures I advised the MICRC to adopt as a component of the redistricting software and why I made these recommendations. The legal implications of my findings and the assessment of any proposed plans have been left to the MICRC legal team.

### **I. The Voting Rights Act and Racially Polarized Voting**

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits any voting standard, practice or procedure – including redistricting plans – that result in the denial or dilution of minority voting strength. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was amended in 1982 to establish that intentional discrimination need not be proven (as the Supreme Court determined was required under the 15<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the Constitution). The U.S. Supreme Court first interpreted the amended Act in *Thornburg v. Gingles*,<sup>1</sup> a challenge to the 1982 North Carolina state legislative plans. In this case the U.S. Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must satisfy three preconditions to qualify for relief:

- The minority group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single-member district
- The minority group must be politically cohesive
- Whites must vote as a bloc to usually defeat the minority-preferred candidates

What do we mean when we say minority voters must be politically cohesive? And how do we know if white voters usually vote as a bloc to defeat the candidates preferred by minority voters? According to the Court, racially polarized voting is the “evidentiary linchpin” of a vote dilution claim. Voting is racially polarized if minorities and whites consistently vote for different candidates. More specifically, if minorities consistently support the same candidates, they are said to be politically cohesive. If whites are consistently *not* supporting these candidates, they are said to be bloc voting against the minority-preferred candidates.

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<sup>1</sup> 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

The Voting Rights Act requires a state or local jurisdiction to create districts that provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice if voting is racially polarized and the candidates preferred by minority voters usually lose. If districts that provide minority voters with the opportunity to elect their preferred candidates already exist, these must be maintained.

### **A. Analyzing Voting Patterns by Race**

An analysis of voting patterns by race serves as the foundation of two of the three elements of the “results test” as outlined in *Gingles*: a racial bloc voting analysis is needed to determine whether the minority group is politically cohesive; and the analysis is required to determine if whites are voting sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat the candidates preferred by minority voters. The voting patterns of white and minority voters must be estimated using statistical techniques because direct information the race of the voters is not, of course, available on the ballots cast.

To carry out an analysis of voting patterns by race, an aggregate level database must be constructed, usually employing election precincts as the units of observation. Information relating to the demographic composition and election results in these precincts is collected, merged and statistically analyzed to determine if there is a relationship between the racial composition of the precincts and support for specific candidates across the precincts.

***Standard Statistical Techniques*** Three standard statistical techniques have been developed over time to estimate vote choices by race: homogeneous precinct analysis, ecological regression, and ecological inference.<sup>2</sup> Two of these analytic procedures – homogeneous precinct analysis and ecological regression – were employed by the plaintiffs’ expert in *Gingles*, have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s approval in that case, and have been used in most subsequent voting rights cases. The third technique, ecological inference, was developed after the *Gingles* decision and was designed, in part, to address some of the disadvantages associated with ecological regression analysis. Ecological inference analysis has been introduced and accepted in numerous court proceedings.

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<sup>2</sup> For a detailed explanation of homogenous precinct analysis and ecological regression see Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi, *Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality* (Cambridge University Press, 1992). See Gary King, *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem* (Princeton University Press, 1997) for a more detailed explanation of ecological inference.

Homogeneous precinct (HP) analysis is the simplest technique. It involves comparing the percentage of votes received by each of the candidates in precincts that are racially or ethnically homogeneous. The general practice is to label a precinct as homogeneous if at least 90 percent of the voting age population is composed of a single race.<sup>3</sup> In fact, the homogeneous results reported are not estimates – they are the actual precinct results. However, most voters in Michigan do not reside in homogeneous precincts and voters who reside in homogeneous precincts may not be representative of voters who live in more racially diverse precincts. For this reason, I refer to these percentages as estimates.

The second statistical technique employed, ecological regression (ER), uses information from all precincts, not simply the homogeneous ones, to derive estimates of the voting behavior of minorities and whites. If there is a strong linear relationship across precincts between the percentage of minorities and the percentage of votes cast for a given candidate, this relationship can be used to estimate the percentage of minority (and white) voters supporting the candidate.

The third technique, ecological inference (EI), was developed by Professor Gary King. This approach also uses information from all precincts but, unlike ecological regression, it does not rely on an assumption of linearity. Instead, it incorporates maximum likelihood statistics to produce estimates of voting patterns by race. In addition, it utilizes the method of bounds, which uses more of the available information from the precinct returns as well as providing more information about the voting behavior being estimated.<sup>4</sup> Unlike ecological regression, which can produce percentage estimates of less than 0 or more than 100 percent, ecological inference was designed to produce only estimates that fall within the possible limits. However, EI does not guarantee that the estimates for all of the candidates add to 100 percent for each of the racial groups examined.

In conducting my analysis of voting patterns by race in statewide elections in Michigan, I also used a more recently developed version of ecological inference, which I have labeled “EI

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<sup>3</sup> If turnout or registration by race is available, this information is used to identify homogenous precincts.

<sup>4</sup> The following is an example of how the method of bounds works: if a given precinct has 100 voters, of whom 75 are Black and 25 are white, and the Black candidate received 80 votes, then at least 55 of the Black voters voted for the Black candidate and at most all 75 did. (The method of bounds is less useful for calculating estimates for white voters in this example as anywhere between none of the whites and all of the whites could have voted for the candidate.)

RxC” in the summary tables found in the Appendices at the end of the report. EI RxC expands the analysis so that more than two racial/ethnic groups can be considered simultaneously. It also allows us to take into account differences in the relative rates of minority and white turnout when, as is the case in Michigan, we do not have turnout by race but instead must rely on voting age population by race to derive estimates of minority and white support for each of the candidates.

**Database** To analyze voting patterns by race using aggregate level information, a database that combines election results with demographic information is required. This database is almost always constructed using election precincts as the unit of analysis. The demographic composition of the precincts is based on voter registration or turnout by race/ethnicity if this information is available; if it is not, then voting or citizen voting age population is used. Michigan does not collect voter registration data by race and therefore voting age population (VAP) by race and ethnicity as reported in the PL94-171 census redistricting data was used for ascertaining the demographic composition of the precincts.<sup>5</sup>

The precinct election returns for the general elections, as well as precinct shape files, census block-to-precinct assignment files,<sup>6</sup> and election results disaggregated to the block level were supplied by the Michigan Secretary of State. The Democratic primary results had to be collected county by county and were either downloaded directly or cut and pasted from pdf files.

**Geographic areas** Producing reliable estimates of voting patterns by race requires an adequate number of minority and white voters, an adequate number of election precincts, and sufficient variation in the percentage of minority and white voters across the precincts. Only a few counties in Michigan satisfied these conditions, and only for one group of minority voters – Black voters. It was not possible to produce reliable statewide or countywide estimates for Hispanic or Asian voters in Michigan. However, estimates for Hispanics, as well as some additional minority groups, were produced for very localized areas in Michigan and this analysis is discussed below in a separate section entitled “Voting Patterns of Minority Voters other than Black Voters.” As a

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<sup>5</sup> Since the only minority group sufficiently large enough in the State of Michigan to produce estimates of voting patterns is Black residents and there is not a high non-citizenship rate to account for when conducting the analysis, estimates of citizen voting age population by race were not included in the database.

<sup>6</sup> Shape files and block-to-precinct equivalency files made it possible to account for changes in precinct boundaries, and therefore precinct demographics, over time.

consequence of the three limitations listed above, I was able to reliably estimate the voting patterns of Blacks and whites statewide and in the four counties: Wayne, Oakland, Genesee, and Saginaw.

***Elections analyzed*** All statewide elections held in the State during the preceding decade (2012-2020) were analyzed, both for voters within the state as a whole and in the four counties that had a sufficient number of Black VAP conduct the analysis – Wayne, Oakland, Genesee, and Saginaw. The general elections analyzed included: U.S. President (2012, 2016, 2020), U.S. Senate (2012, 2014, 2018, 2020), and the statewide offices of Governor, Secretary of State, and Attorney General in 2014 and 2018.

Four of these contests included African American candidates:<sup>7</sup> the 2012 presidential election, the 2014 election contest for Secretary of State, and the U.S. Senate contests in 2018 and 2020. Only two of these four contests included African American candidates supported by Black voters, however: Barack Obama in his bid for re-election in 2012 and Godfrey Dillard in his race for Secretary of State in 2014. John James, an African American Republican who ran for U.S. Senate in 2018 and 2020, was not the candidate of choice of Black voters. In addition, two election contests included African American candidates as running mates: the 2018 gubernatorial race in which Garlin Gilchrist ran for Lieutenant Governor and Gretchen Whitmer as Governor, and the 2020 presidential race in which Kamala Harris ran for Vice President. Both sets of running mates were strongly supported by Black voters.

There was only one statewide Democratic primary for statewide office the previous decade: the 2018 race for governor. I analyzed this Democratic primary (as well as congressional and state legislative Democratic primaries) and not Republican primaries because the overwhelming majority of Black voters who choose to vote in primaries cast their ballots in Democratic rather than Republican primaries. As a consequence, Democratic primaries are far more probative than Republican primaries for ascertaining the candidates preferred by Black voters.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, this

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<sup>7</sup> Courts consider election contests that include minority candidates more probative than contests that include only white candidates for determining if voting is racially polarized. This is because it is not sufficient for minority voters to be able to elect their candidates of choice only if these candidates are white. On the other hand, it is important to recognize that not all minority candidates are the preferred candidates of minority voters.

<sup>8</sup> In addition, producing reliable estimates for Black voters in Republican primaries would not have been possible.

primary included two minority candidates: Abdul El-Sayed, who is of Egyptian descent, and Shri Thanedar, who is Indian-American.

In addition to these statewide elections, I also analyzed recent congressional and state legislative elections in districts that fell within Wayne, Oakland, Saginaw and Genesee Counties and had a Black VAP that was large enough to produce reliable estimates.<sup>9</sup> Because of the very substantial changes in district boundaries between the current district boundaries and any of the proposed district plan boundaries, these election contests cannot be considered indicative of voting patterns in any proposed districts. However, they are important for at least two reasons. First, although few minority candidates ran for office statewide, there were many who ran in legislative elections, especially in Wayne County. Second, while there was only one statewide Democratic primary conducted over the course of the previous decade, there have been numerous recent Democratic primaries for congressional and state legislative office.

## **B. Statewide and County Results**

Table 1, below, lists the number of statewide election contests that were racially polarized, both for Michigan as a whole, and for each of the four counties considered individually. This tabulation is based on the racial bloc voting summary tables found in Appendix A. The second column indicates the number of contests that included African American candidates that were polarized (over the total number of contests with African American candidates), the third column is the number of statewide general elections (out of the 13 analyzed) that were polarized and the final column reports the results of the only statewide Democratic primary.

Statewide, all election contests other than the 2012 US. Senate race won by Debbie Stabenow were racially polarized. (Her 2018 election contest, however, was racially polarized.) The candidate who obtained the lowest vote percentage statewide was African American candidate for Secretary of State in 2014, Godfrey Dillard. This was because he received less white crossover votes than any other candidate – the percentage of Black voters supporting him was comparable to the percentage of Black voters supporting the other Democratic candidates competing statewide.

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<sup>9</sup> In some state house districts, there was not enough whites of voting age to conduct an analysis of voting patterns by race.

**Table 1: Number of Statewide Elections Analyzed that were Polarized**

	General Elections with Minority Candidates	All Statewide General Election Contests	Statewide Democratic Primary
Statewide	6/6	12/13	1/1
Genesee	5/6	9/13	1/1
Saginaw	6/6	11/13	1/1
Oakland	6/6	13/13	0/1
Wayne	3/6	7/13	1/1

Every statewide general election contest analyzed was polarized in Oakland County – only in the Democratic primary for Governor in 2018 did Black and white voters support the same candidate (Gretchen Whitmer). Voting in Saginaw County was nearly as polarized: two U.S. Senate contests (2012 and 2014) were not polarized, but the gubernatorial primary was polarized. Black and white voters agreed on the same candidates slightly more often in Genesee County – in addition to supporting U.S. senate candidates Debbie Stabenow in 2012 and Gary Peters in 2014, they both supported Barack Obama in 2012 and Democrat Mark Schauer for Governor in 2014.

Voting in Wayne County was considerably less racially polarized than statewide or in the other three counties studied. However, slightly more than half of the general election contests and the one statewide Democratic primary analyzed were polarized, with Black and white voters supporting the same candidates in 2012, disagreeing on the three statewide offices, but supporting the same U.S. Senate candidate in 2014, supporting different candidates for U.S. President in 2016 and 2020, and voting for most of the same candidates in 2018.

### **C. Congressional and State Legislative Election Results**

This section provides a summary of my racial bloc voting analysis of recent congressional and state legislative districts in the four-county area of Wayne, Oakland, Genesee and Saginaw. I analyzed 2018 and 2020 general elections, and the 2018 and 2020 Democratic primaries if at least one African American candidate competed in the election contest. However, for a number of state

legislative elections, there were too many candidates and too few votes cast to obtain reliable estimates. In addition, there were three state house districts – districts 3, 7, 8 – where there were an insufficient number of white voters to produce reliable estimates. The summary tables reporting each of estimates for these contests are found in Appendix B.

Table 2, below, summarizes the congressional district results for congressional districts 5, 9, 12, 13 and 14.<sup>10</sup> In most instances, voting was not racially polarized – in 80% of the general elections and 75% of the contested Democratic primaries analyzed, Black and white voters supported the same candidates. Three of the contests analyzed were, however, polarized. The Black-preferred candidate won two of these contests: Districts 5 and 13 in the 2020 general election. The other polarized contest was the 2018 bid for the Democratic nomination for full two-year term the in District 13. Six candidates competed in this contest, four African American candidates, including the candidate of choice of a plurality of Black voters, Brenda Jones; Bill Wild, a white candidate; and Rashida Tlaib, an American of Palestinian descent. White voters divided their votes between Wild and Tlaib. Tlaib won the nomination with 27,841 votes (31.17%), and Benda Jones came in a close second with 26,941 votes (30.16%).<sup>11</sup>

**Table 2: Summary of Congressional District Racial Bloc Voting Analysis**

<b>Congress District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Percent BVAP</b>	<b>2018 Democratic primary</b>	<b>2018 General election</b>	<b>2020 Democratic primary</b>	<b>2020 General election</b>
5	Genesee & Saginaw, plus	16.63	no contest	not polarized	no contest	polarized - won
9	Oakland & Macomb	13.83	only white candidates	not polarized	no contest	not polarized
12	Wayne & Washtenaw	11.73	no contest	not polarized	not polarized	not polarized

<sup>10</sup> Congressional District 11, which is also located in the area of interest (Oakland and Wayne), as well as Districts 8 (partially in Oakland) and 4 (partially in Saginaw), had too few Black voters to produce reliable estimates of their vote choices.

<sup>11</sup> A special election for filling the partial term for District 13 – left vacant when John Conyers resigned – was conducted at the same time with many of the same candidates. Brenda Jones won this contest with 32,769 (37.75%) votes; Rashida Tlaib came in second with 31,121 (35.85%) votes.

<b>Congress District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Percent BVAP</b>	<b>2018 Democratic primary</b>	<b>2018 General election</b>	<b>2020 Democratic primary</b>	<b>2020 General election</b>
13	Wayne	54.78	polarized - lost	not polarized	not polarized	polarized - won
14	Wayne & Oakland	55.16	no contest	not polarized	not polarized	not polarized

The results of my analysis recent state senate elections is found in Table 3, below. There were no Democratic primaries in two districts (12 and 27), and no minority candidates competed in a third (District 32). In addition, there was one Democratic primary in which 11 candidates competed – too many to produce reliable estimates. Of the 16 contests analyzed, 10 were not polarized (three primaries and seven general elections), four were polarized but the Black-preferred candidate won (two primaries and two generals), and two were polarized and the candidates of choice of Black voters lost. One of these contests was the general election in District 32, which has only 13.45% BVAP.<sup>12</sup> The other polarized contest that the Black-preferred candidate lost was the Democratic primary in State Senate District 1 in 2018. Six candidates competed in this election. The plurality choice of Black voters was African American candidate, Alberta Tinsley Talabi. A very large majority of white voters supported the Asian candidates, Stephanie Chang, who was the second choice of Black voters. Chang won with 49.8% of the vote (Talabi received 26.4%).

**Table 3: Summary of State Senate District Racial Bloc Voting Analysis**

<b>State Senate District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Percent BVAP</b>	<b>2018 Democratic primary</b>	<b>2018 General election</b>
1	Wayne	44.68	polarized - lost	not polarized
2	Wayne	50.82	<i>na</i> (11 candidates)	not polarized

<sup>12</sup> The Black VAP percentages listed throughout this report are from the MICRC redistricting GIS active matrix tab labeled “5A,” which indicates the percentage of non-Hispanic voting age population who indicated they were Black or Black in combination with any other race. This produces the maximum number of individuals within each racial group, including Black, but will result in totals over 100% since persons identifying as more than one race will be counted more than once.

<b>State Senate District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Percent BVAP</b>	<b>2018 Democratic primary</b>	<b>2018 General election</b>
3	Wayne	48.14	polarized - won	not polarized
4	Wayne	47.00	not polarized	not polarized
5	Wayne	54.25	polarized - won	not polarized
6	Wayne	21.29	not polarized	polarized - won
11	Oakland	35.48	not polarized	not polarized
12	Oakland	14.87	no contest	polarized - won
27	Genesee	30.42	no contest	not polarized
32	Genesee & Saginaw	13.45	no minority candidates	polarized - lost

The final table in this section, Table 4, summarized the results of my analysis of recent state house election. A number of the cells in the table have “na” as an entry because estimates are not available. This was for one of two reasons: there were too many candidates and too few votes cast to obtain reliable estimates, or there were an insufficient number of white voters to produce reliable estimates (state house districts 3, 7, 8).

It was possible to produce estimates for 54 contests. The majority of these contests were not polarized – in 37 contests (68.5%), white and Black voters supported the same candidates. In another 13 contests, voting was polarized but the candidate preferred by Black voters won. There were four contests – all Democratic primaries – that were racially polarized and the Black-preferred candidate lost. In three of these contests, the BVAP of the districts was less than 30% (Districts 12, 16, and 37). The Black-preferred candidates also lost the 2018 Democratic primary in House District 29, which has a 36.04% BVAP. All six of the candidates competing were African Americans. The plurality choice of Black voters was Kermit Williams; Brenda Carter was the candidate of choice of a majority of white voters. Carter won with 30.7% of the vote and Williams came in second with 24.7% of the vote.

**Table 4: Summary of State House District Racial Bloc Voting Analysis**

State House District	Location	Percent BVAP	2018 Democratic primary	2018 General election	2020 Democratic primary	2020 General election
1	Wayne	64.76	not polarized	polarized - won	no contest	polarized - won
2	Wayne	57.70	<i>na</i> (7 candidates)	not polarized	not polarized	not polarized
3	Wayne	90.93	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>
4	Wayne	47.27	<i>na</i> (15 candidates)	not polarized	<i>na</i> (13 candidates)	not polarized
5	Wayne	54.12	polarized - won	not polarized	not polarized	not polarized
6	Wayne	52.86	<i>na</i> (10 candidates)	not polarized	polarized - won	no contest
7	Wayne	94.27	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>
8	Wayne	92.42	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>
9	Wayne	74.22	not polarized	not polarized	polarized - won	not polarized
10	Wayne	67.41	not polarized	not polarized	<i>na</i> (8 candidates)	not polarized
11	Wayne	26.53	polarized - won	not polarized	no contest	not polarized
12	Wayne	26.97	polarized - lost	polarized - won	not polarized	polarized - won
16	Wayne	23.25	polarized - lost	not polarized	no contest	not polarized
27	Oakland	24.35	not polarized	not polarized	<i>na</i> (8 candidates)	not polarized

State House District	Location	Percent BVAP	2018 Democratic primary	2018 General election	2020 Democratic primary	2020 General election
29	Oakland	36.04	polarized - lost	not polarized	no contest	not polarized
35	Oakland	62.50	polarized - won	not polarized	not polarized	not polarized
37	Oakland	17.91	no contest	not polarized	polarized - lost	not polarized
34	Genesee	60.96	not polarized	polarized - won	not polarized	polarized - won
49	Genesee	29.47	not polarized	not polarized	no contest	not polarized
95	Saginaw	35.50	no contest	not polarized	polarized - won	polarized - won

#### **D. Voting Patterns of Minority Voters other than Black Voters**

As noted above, it was not possible to produce estimates of voting patterns by race for any groups other than Blacks and whites (more specifically, non-Hispanic whites) statewide or by county. However, by localizing the analysis in geographic areas much smaller than counties, it was possible to derive estimates for several additional minority groups: Hispanics, Arab Americans, Chaldeans, and Bangladeshi Americans.<sup>13</sup> Because these estimates could not be generated statewide, it is difficult to know if the voters included in the analysis are representative of the group as a whole statewide. The summary tables reporting the estimates for these groups can be found in the Appendix C.



***Hispanic Voters*** Hispanics live in large enough concentrations to produce estimates in two areas of Michigan. Because these concentrations are in different areas of the state, I did not combine them. Instead, I have produced estimates for Hispanics living in the area of Detroit depicted in the first map below (“Areas included in Analysis of Voting Patterns – Hispanics

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<sup>13</sup> Interest in the voting patterns of Arab Americans, Chaldeans and Bangladeshi Americans was prompted by comments received in public hearings and on the public portal.

(Detroit)) and in the Grand Rapids area depicted in the second map (“Areas included in Analysis of Voting Patterns – Hispanics in Grand Rapids”). In both maps, the precincts are shaded based on the percentage Hispanic in the precinct.<sup>14</sup>


While the voting patterns do not appear to be very different – both groups provide strong support for Democratic candidates in general elections – the turnout levels differ. In the Grand Rapids area, turnout among Hispanics of voting age is lower than it is in the Detroit area.



<sup>14</sup> The Hispanic VAP used for shading the map and conducting the racial bloc voting analysis was derived from the 2020 94-171 census redistricting data, which reports Hispanic VAP by census block. This data was then aggregated up to the precinct level.


***Arab American Voters*** Approximately 38% of the Arab American population in Michigan is concentrated in the Dearborn and Dearborn Heights area. Localizing the racial bloc voting analysis to this specific area offered sufficient variation across the precincts to produce estimates of the voting behavior of this group. The map below indicates the geographic area included in the analysis; the precincts are shaded by the percentage of residents who are Arab American.<sup>15</sup>

Arab Americans voters, at least in this area of Michigan, strongly support Democratic candidates in general elections – over 80% consistently supported the Democratic candidate in the six 2018-2020 general elections examined. These voters, unlike other groups of voters studied, were also very cohesive in 2018 Democratic primary for Governor – they strongly supported of Abdul El-Sayed in his bid for the nomination.




<sup>15</sup> The Arab American data was derived from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS), Table B04004, “People Reporting Single Ancestry.” This data, reported at the census tract level, was attributed down to the census block level and then aggregated up to the election precinct level.

*Chaldeans*, like Arab Americans in Michigan, tend to reside in a geographically concentrated area of Michigan – in this instance, Sterling Heights. Over 40% of the Chaldean population can be found here.<sup>16</sup> Localizing the voting analysis to Sterling Heights produced reliable estimates of the voting patterns of this community. Chaldeans are not nearly as cohesive as Arab Americans – they consistently divided their support between the Democratic and Republican candidates. However, a clear majority of Chaldean voters supported Donald Trump in his bid for re-election in 2020.



<sup>16</sup> The Chaldean data was derived from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS), Table B04004, “People Reporting Single Ancestry” using the Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac designation. This census tract level data was attributed down to the census block level and then aggregated up to the election precinct level.

**Bangladeshi American Voters** Using a map identifying the Bangladeshi American community of interest submitted to the MICRC,<sup>17</sup> this localized analysis focused on West Warren and Hamtramck to produce estimates of the vote choices of this group. Bangladeshi American voting patterns are very similar to Arab American voting patterns.<sup>18</sup> Both groups provided strong support for Democratic candidates in general elections and both groups were cohesive in their support of Abdul El-Sayed in the 2018 Democratic primary for Governor.



<sup>17</sup> The map was submitted on the public comment portal on 9/8/2021 by Hayg Oshagan with the following comment “This is the Bengali community of SE MI. The area around Hamtramck (to the South) is most densely populated and is the center of the community.”

<sup>18</sup> Asian VAP by census block as reported by the 2020 94-171 census redistricting data was used to create the shading on the map and the racial bloc voting database.

## II. Drawing Minority Opportunity Districts

Because voting in Michigan is racially polarized, districts that provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice must be drawn. If they already exist – as many do in Michigan – they must be maintained. But maintaining minority opportunity districts does not necessarily require that the districts be redrawn with the same percentage minority voting age population. In fact, many of the minority districts in the current plan are packed with far more Black VAP than needed to elect candidates of choice, as indicated by the percentage of votes the minority candidates are garnering. (See Tables 9 and 10, in the next section of this report, for the Black VAP of the current state house and senate districts, the current incumbents and their race and party, and the percentage of votes each of the incumbents received in 2020.)

An analysis must be undertaken to determine if a proposed district is likely to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice to office. This analysis must be district-specific – that is, must recognize there are likely to be differences in participation rates and voting patterns in districts across the state – and it must be functional – that is, it must be based on actual voting behavior of whites and minorities. There is no single universal or statewide demographic target that can be applied for Black voters to elect their candidates of choice in Michigan.<sup>19</sup>

There are two related approaches to conducting a district-specific, functional analysis, both of which take into account the relative turnout rates and voting patterns of minorities and whites. The first approach uses estimates derived from racial bloc voting analysis to calculate the percent minority population needed in a specific area for minority-preferred candidates to win a district in that area.

The second approach relies on election results from previous contests that included minority-preferred candidates (as identified by the racial bloc voting analysis) to determine if these candidates would win election in the proposed districts. The election results for these “bellwether elections” – racially polarized elections that include minority candidates who are preferred by minority voters – are disaggregated down from the election precinct to the census block level and then recompiled to reflect the boundaries of the proposed district. If the minority-

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<sup>19</sup> Establishing a demographic target (e.g., 55% black voting age population) for all minority districts across the jurisdiction was, in fact, expressly forbidden by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama*, 575 U.S. 254 (2015).

preferred candidates in these bellwether elections win in the proposed district, this district is likely to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. This latter approach can be used only if proposed district boundaries have been drawn. The former approach can be carried out before any new boundaries are drafted.

### **A. Calculating the Black VAP Needed to Elect Black-Preferred Candidates**

The percentage of minority voting age population needed in a district to provide minority voters with the opportunity to elect minority-preferred candidates to congress or to the state legislature varies. Using the estimates produced from the racial bloc voting analysis, I calculated the Black VAP percentages needed to elect minority-preferred candidates in each of the general elections included in the summary tables in the Appendix. This calculation takes into account the relative participation rates of age eligible Blacks and whites, as well as the level of Black support for the Black-preferred candidate (the "cohesiveness" of Black voters), and the level of whites "crossing over" to vote for the Black-preferred candidate.

***Equalizing minority and white turnout*** Because Blacks who are age eligible to vote often turn out to vote at lower rates than white voters in Michigan, the Black VAP needed to ensure that Black voters comprise at least half of the voters in an election is often higher than 50%. Once the respective turnout rates of Black and Whites eligible to vote have been estimated using the statistical techniques described above (HP, ER and EI), the percentage needed to equalize Black and white voters can be calculated mathematically.<sup>20</sup> But equalizing turnout is

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<sup>20</sup> The equalizing percentage is calculated mathematically by solving the following equation:

Let

M = the proportion of the district's voting age population that is Black

W = 1-M = the proportion of the district's voting age population that is white

A = the proportion of the Black voting age population that turned out to vote

B = the proportion of the white voting age population that turned out to vote

Therefore,

M(A) = the proportion of the population that is Black and turned out to vote (1)

(1-M)B = the proportion of total population that is white and turned out to vote (2)

To find the value of M that is needed for (1) and (2) to be equal, (1) and (2) are set as equal and we solve for M algebraically:

$$M(A) = (1 - M) B$$

$$M(A) = B - M(B)$$

$$M(A) + M(B) = B$$

$$M(A + B) = B$$

$$M = B / (A+B)$$

only the first step in the process – it does not take into account the voting patterns of Black and white voters. If voting is racially polarized but a significant number of white voters typically “crossover” to vote for Black voters’ preferred candidate, it may be the case that crossover voting can more than compensate for depressed Black turnout.

***Incorporating Minority Cohesion and White Crossover Voting*** Even if Black citizens are turning out at lower rates than whites, and voting is racially polarized, if a relatively consistent percentage of white voters support Black-preferred candidates, the candidates preferred by Black voters can be elected in districts that are less than majority Black. On the other hand, if voting is starkly polarized, with few or no whites crossing over to vote for the candidates supported by Black voters, it may be the case that a district that is more than 50% Black VAP is needed to elect Black-preferred candidates. A district-specific, functional analysis should take into account not only differences in turnout rates, but also the voting patterns of Black and white voters.<sup>21</sup>

To illustrate this mathematically, consider a district that has 1000 persons of voting age, 50% of who are Black and 50% of who are white. Let us begin by assuming that Black turnout is lower than white turnout in a two-candidate general election. In our hypothetical election example, 42% of the Black VAP turn out to vote and 60% of the white VAP vote. This means that, for our illustrative election, there are 210 Black voters and 300 white voters. Further suppose that 96% of the Black voters supported their candidate of choice and 25% of the white voters cast their votes for this candidate (with the other 75% supporting her opponent in the election contest). Thus, in our example, Black voters cast 200 of their 210 votes for the Black-preferred candidate and their other 10 votes for her opponent; white voters cast 75 of their 300 votes for the Black-preferred candidate and 225 votes for their preferred candidate:

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Thus, for example, if 39.3% of the Black population turned out and 48.3% of the white population turned out,  $B = .483$  and  $A = .393$ , and  $M = .483 / (.393 + .483) = .483 / .876 = .5513$ , therefore a Black VAP of 55.1% would produce an equal number of Black and white voters. (For a more in-depth discussion of equalizing turnout see Kimball Brace, Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi, “Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice,” *Law and Policy*, 10 (1), January 1988.)

<sup>21</sup> For an in-depth discussion of this approach to creating effective minority districts, see Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and David Lublin, “Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence,” *North Carolina Law Review*, volume 79 (5), June 2001.

				support for Black- preferred candidate	votes for Black- preferred candidate	support for white- preferred candidate	votes for white- preferred candidate
	VAP	turnout	voters				
Black	500	0.42	210	0.96	202	0.04	8
White	500	0.60	300	0.25	75	0.75	225
			510		277		233

The candidate of choice of Black voters would receive a total of 277 votes (202 from Black voters and 75 from white voters), while the candidate preferred by white voters would receive only 233 votes (8 from Black voters and 225 from white voters). The Black-preferred candidate would win the election with 55.4% (277/500) of the vote in this hypothetical 50% Black VAP district. And the Black-preferred candidate would be successful despite the fact that the election was racially polarized and that Blacks turned out to vote at a lower rate than whites.

The candidate of choice of Black voters would still win the election by a very small margin (50.9%) in a district that is 45% Black with these same voting patterns:

				support for Black- preferred candidate	votes for Black- preferred candidate	support for white- preferred candidate	votes for white- preferred candidate
	VAP	turnout	voters				
Black	450	0.42	189	0.96	181	0.04	8
White	550	0.60	330	0.25	83	0.75	248
			519		264		255

In a district with a 40% BVAP, however, the Black-preferred candidate would garner only 47.5% of the vote in this example.

***Percent Black VAP needed to win recent general elections in Michigan Counties***

Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 utilize the results of the racial bloc voting analysis (see Appendix A) to indicate the percentage of vote a Black-preferred candidate would receive, given the turnout rates of Blacks and whites and the degree of black cohesion and white crossover voting for each

general election contests examined, in a 55%, 50%, 45%, 40% and 35% BVAP district in Wayne, Oakland, Genesee, and Saginaw Counties.<sup>22</sup> Because voting patterns vary by county, the percentage of votes the Black-preferred candidates would receive also varies. However, in no county is a 50% BVAP district required for the Black-preferred candidates to carry the district in a general election.

Table 5 reports the percentage of votes the Black-preferred candidate would receive in Wayne County, given voting patterns in previous general elections. The Black-preferred candidate would win every general election in a district with a BVAP of 35% or more, and would win with at least 54.4% of the vote – and in most election contests, a substantially higher percentage of the vote. The variation in the percentage of votes received by the Black-preferred candidate is due to the variation in the white vote rather than the Black vote because in every election contest considered at least 95% of Black voters supported the Black-preferred candidate. The Black-preferred candidate of choice who would receive the lowest percentage of the vote would be African American Godfrey Dillard, a candidate for Secretary of State in 2014.

The voting patterns by race, and therefore the percent BVAP needed to win general elections is very similar in Genesee County, as shown in Table 6. Unlike Wayne County, however, the percentage of vote the Black-preferred candidate would garner in a 35% BVAP district in this county is declining slightly over the course of the decade – although the Black-preferred candidate would still win every general election in a 35% BVAP district.

In Oakland County, the Black-preferred candidate does not win every general election contest in a 35% BVAP district. It is not until the 40% BVAP column in Table 7 that the candidate of choice of Black voters wins every election examined. The most challenging election is again the race for Secretary of State in 2014. And even at 40% BVAP, Dillard would receive only 51.3% of the vote.

Saginaw County (Table 8) is similar to Oakland County in that it is only at 40% that the Black-preferred candidate wins every general election contest – and at 40% a couple of the contests are very close. Not only are the winning percentages for the Black-preferred candidates consistently lower in Saginaw County than they are for Oakland County, they have been decreasing over the course of the decade.

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<sup>22</sup> Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 are generated using EI RxC estimates reported in the racial bloc voting tables in the Appendix.

**Table 5: Percent BVAP Needed to Win, Wayne County**

WAYNE COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes							
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	58.0	97.5	2.5	76.6	47.5	52.5	71.5	69.0	66.6	64.3	62.0
2020 US Senate	W	57.8	95.2	4.8	75.6	47.2	52.8	70.4	68.0	65.7	63.4	61.2
2018 Governor	W	33.2	97.0	3.0	63.2	53.5	46.5	70.5	68.5	66.6	64.8	63.1
2018 Secretary of State	W	33.1	97.0	3.0	62.2	53.6	46.4	70.7	68.7	66.8	65.0	63.3
2018 Attorney General	W	32.7	95.5	4.5	61.3	49.4	50.6	67.6	65.4	63.4	61.5	59.7
2018 US Senate	W	33.1	95.8	4.2	63.1	52.3	47.7	69.3	67.3	65.4	63.6	61.9
2016 President	W	57.0	98.4	1.6	64.0	39.7	60.3	70.3	67.4	64.4	61.6	58.7
2014 Governor	W	35.8	96.5	3.5	47.7	41.3	58.7	67.7	65.0	62.3	59.7	57.2
2014 Secretary of State	AA	35.5	96.8	3.2	46.1	36.8	63.2	65.9	62.9	60.0	57.2	54.4
2014 Attorney General	W	35.3	95.7	4.3	45.9	41.0	59.0	67.5	64.8	62.1	59.5	57.0
2014 US Senate	W	35.7	98.0	2.0	46.8	53.4	46.6	74.9	72.7	70.5	68.4	66.4
2012 President	AA	60.4	99.0	1.0	65.7	51.9	48.1	76.8	74.5	72.1	69.8	67.5
2012 US Senate	W	59.9	98.1	1.9	64.4	57.6	42.4	79.1	77.1	75.1	73.1	71.1

**Table 6: Percent BVAP Needed to Win, Genesee County**

GENESEE COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes							
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	53.0	96.1	3.9	79.6	42.1	57.9	66.3	63.7	61.1	58.7	56.4
2020 US Senate	W	56.6	95.0	5.0	78.7	43.5	56.5	67.6	65.0	62.6	60.2	57.9
2018 Governor	W	45.1	95.3	4.7	59.8	46.2	53.8	69.8	67.3	64.9	62.6	60.4
2018 Secretary of State	W	44.9	95.2	4.8	58.6	48.0	52.0	70.8	68.5	66.2	64.0	61.8
2018 Attorney General	W	44.6	94.1	5.9	58.4	41.1	58.9	66.7	64.0	61.5	59.0	56.5
2018 US Senate	W	45.1	95.2	4.8	59.6	45.8	54.2	69.5	67.1	64.7	62.4	60.1
2016 President	W	59.0	96.4	3.6	67.3	37.4	62.6	67.9	65.0	62.0	59.2	56.3
2014 Governor	W	35.8	95.8	4.2	47.5	51.8	48.2	72.9	70.7	68.6	66.5	64.5
2014 Secretary of State	AA	35.9	95.6	4.4	46.1	46.2	53.8	70.3	67.8	65.4	63.1	60.8
2014 Attorney General	W	35.9	95.6	4.4	45.5	45.2	54.8	69.9	67.4	65.0	62.6	60.2
2014 US Senate	W	36.1	95.6	4.4	47.1	58.6	41.4	76.5	74.7	72.9	71.1	69.4
2012 President	AA	61.0	97.6	2.4	68.4	53.7	46.3	76.6	74.4	72.2	70.1	67.9
2012 US Senate	W	60.7	96.7	3.3	67.5	60.2	39.8	79.3	77.5	75.7	73.9	72.1

**Table 7: Percent BVAP Needed to Win, Oakland County**

OAKLAND COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates							percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes								
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others						
GENERAL ELECTIONS													
2020 President	W	71.6	93.4	6.6	86.4	45.9	54.1	69.8	67.4	65.1	62.8	60.6	
2020 US Senate	W	71.4	92.1	7.9	85.4	43.5	56.5	68.1	65.6	63.2	60.9	58.6	
2018 Governor	W	53.2	94.1	5.9	68.8	47.4	52.6	70.1	67.8	65.5	63.3	61.1	
2018 Secretary of State	W	53.1	94.2	5.8	67.7	47.5	52.5	70.4	68.0	65.8	63.5	61.4	
2018 Attorney General	W	52.5	93.8	6.2	67.0	43.0	57.0	67.9	65.3	62.8	60.4	58.1	
2018 US Senate	W	53.2	93.0	7.0	68.7	45.5	54.5	68.6	66.2	63.9	61.7	59.5	
2016 President	W	65.6	95.1	4.9	73.5	39.1	60.9	68.3	65.5	62.7	60.0	57.3	
2014 Governor	W	46.3	94.8	5.2	54.6	30.6	69.4	63.3	60.1	56.9	53.8	50.7	
2014 Secretary of State	AA	45.9	94.6	5.4	53.1	26.4	73.6	61.4	58.0	54.7	51.3	48.1	
2014 Attorney General	W	45.8	94.1	5.9	52.6	32.9	67.1	64.5	61.4	58.4	55.4	52.4	
2014 US Senate	W	46.5	95.0	5.0	53.7	46.7	53.3	71.5	69.1	66.7	64.4	62.1	
2012 President	AA	68.9	95.7	4.3	75.7	42.1	57.9	70.3	67.6	65.0	62.3	59.7	
2012 US Senate	W	67.8	95.8	4.2	74.0	47.6	52.4	73.1	70.6	68.3	65.9	63.5	

**Table 8: Percent BVAP Needed to Win, Saginaw County**

SAGINAW COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes							
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	48.6	95.3	4.7	79.6	36.3	63.7	61.5	58.7	56.0	53.4	50.9
2020 US Senate	W	48.4	93.8	6.2	78.7	37.5	62.5	61.7	58.9	56.3	53.9	51.5
2018 Governor	W	37.7	93.6	6.4	63.0	40.9	59.1	63.2	60.6	58.2	55.9	53.7
2018 Secretary of State	W	38.0	93.7	6.3	61.4	39.2	60.8	62.7	60.0	57.5	55.1	52.8
2018 Attorney General	W	37.6	93.4	6.6	61.0	33.3	66.7	59.1	56.2	53.4	50.8	48.3
2018 US Senate	W	37.8	93.5	6.5	62.8	39.3	60.7	62.3	59.7	57.2	54.8	52.6
2016 President	W	52.3	95.0	5.0	70.2	30.6	69.4	61.3	58.1	55.0	52.0	49.0
2014 Governor	W	32.7	94.1	5.9	50.8	42.2	57.8	65.1	62.5	60.1	57.8	55.6
2014 Secretary of State	AA	32.6	94.4	5.6	49.2	36.3	63.7	62.3	59.5	56.7	54.1	51.6
2014 Attorney General	W	32.4	94.1	5.9	50.1	32.6	67.4	59.8	56.8	53.9	51.1	48.5
2014 US Senate	W	32.7	94.1	5.9	50.1	50.6	49.4	69.9	67.8	65.7	63.8	61.9
2012 President	AA	56.2	95.7	4.3	70.3	42.9	57.1	69.0	66.4	63.8	61.3	58.8
2012 US Senate	W	55.7	95.4	4.6	68.7	52.3	47.7	73.8	71.6	69.5	67.4	65.4

It is important to remember that winning office in the United States usually requires winning two elections: a primary and a general election. The tables above consider only general election contests. Producing a comparable set of tables for Democratic primaries is not possible. First, there was only one statewide Democratic primary – the 2018 primary contest for Governor. There were three candidates competing in this election and because 50% of the vote was not required to win the election, a mathematical equation setting the percentage needed to win 50% of the vote does not work. Second, Black voters were not cohesive in support of any one of these three candidates. In fact, the candidate preferred by even the plurality of Black voters was not the same in the four counties examined. Drawing a district that Black-preferred candidate could win this primary is not possible when there is no Black-preferred candidate.

In areas where most of the white voters are likely to vote in Republican primaries, the inability to calculate the percent needed to win in Democratic primaries is not particularly important. Black voters will dominate the Democratic primary unless they make up only a very small portion of the voters in the district. However, in the counties examined in Michigan, many white voters elect to participate in the Democratic primary, especially in Wayne County. As the percentage Black VAP of proposed districts decreases, it may become more challenging for Black-preferred candidates to win not only the general election but the Democratic primary – but only if voting in Democratic primaries is racially polarized. Unfortunately, it is not possible to ascertain exactly how much more difficult it would be – or even if it would be more difficult – given the lack of Democratic primary election data.

## **B. Threshold of Representation in the Current State House and Senate Districts**

A useful check on the percent needed to win estimates found in Tables 5-8 that can be done prior to drawing any districts is to produce what have been referred to by some political scientists as “threshold of representation” tables. These tables are designed to identify the lowest minority percentage above which minority candidates are consistently elected. Tables 9 and 10, below, report the BVAP of the current Michigan state house and senate districts with over 20% BVAP, and indicate the race and party of the candidate elected to represent the district.<sup>23</sup> Sorted

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<sup>23</sup> There are no African American state senators or representatives elected from districts that are less than 20% Black in VAP. However, there are other minority candidates (Hispanic, Asian, and Middle Eastern) elected to state house districts with considerably less than 20% BVAP.

by the percent BVAP, the tables can sometimes provide evidence of a clear breakpoint between those districts that are probably electing candidates of choice and those that are not.<sup>24</sup>

An examination Table 9 indicates that every Michigan state house district with a BVAP of at least 35% elects a minority representative to the state house. In fact, every district with a BVAP of more than 26.53% elects a minority to office with the exception of District 49 in Genesee County. And the racial bloc voting analysis of House District 49 indicates that the white incumbent, John Cherry, is the candidate of choice of Black voters, even in the 2018 Democratic primary when he faced several African American candidates.

**Table 9: Threshold of Representation for State House Districts, 2021**

State House District	Total VAP	Black VAP	Percent Black VAP	Name	Party	Race	Percent of Vote 2020
7	60347	57256	94.27%	Helena Scott	D	Black	93.00%
8	62448	58042	92.42%	Stephanie A. Young	D	Black	96.70%
3	54130	49536	90.93%	Shri Thanedar	D	Asian	93.30%
9	62529	46806	74.22%	Karen Whitsett	D	Black	94.20%
10	69209	46977	67.41%	Mary Cavanagh	D	Hispanic	84.80%
1	59788	38993	64.76%	Tenisha R. Yancey	D	Black	75.80%
35	78306	49325	62.50%	Kyra Harris Bolden	D	Black	82.90%
34	49491	30419	60.96%	Cynthia R. Neeley	D	Black	86.70%
2	57031	33142	57.70%	Joe Tate	D	Black	74.10%
5	49290	27190	54.12%	Cynthia A. Johnson	D	Black	93.40%
6	67505	36182	52.86%	Tyrone Carter	D	Black	100.00%
4	68749	32761	47.27%	Abraham Aiyash	D	ME	89.80%
29	72319	26621	36.04%	Brenda Carter	D	Black	72.90%
95	58640	21320	35.50%	Amos O'Neal	D	Black	70.10%
49	64844	19308	29.47%	John D. Cherry	D	White	68.90%
54	72426	21212	28.79%	Ronnie Peterson	D	Black	77.70%
12	73883	20207	26.97%	Alex Garza	D	Hispanic	62.40%
11	73586	19760	26.53%	Jewell Jones	D	Black	65.20%
92	66135	16957	25.34%	Terry J. Sabo	D	White	65.30%
27	73337	18051	24.35%	Regina Weiss	D	White	74.40%
16	74617	17556	23.25%	Kevin Coleman	D	White	62.50%
75	76956	18127	22.56%	David LaGrand	D	White	74.60%
68	71672	16808	22.44%	Sarah Anthony	D	Black	75.90%
18	75251	16519	21.76%	Kevin Hertel	D	White	60.30%
22	68758	14588	21.00%	Richard Steenland	D	White	59.90%
60	74176	15887	20.97%	Julie M. Rogers	D	White	71.40%

<sup>24</sup> Without the confirmation provided by a racial bloc voting analysis, it could conceivably be the case that the minority legislator is not the candidate of choice of minority voters.

Interpreting Table 10, for the Michigan state senate, is less straightforward. The four districts with BVAP percentages over 47% elect African Americans to office. However, Stephanie Chang, the state senator in District 1, which is 44.68% BVAP, was not the candidate of choice of Black voters in the 2018 Democratic primary, though she is the candidate of choice in the general election.

**Table 10: Threshold of Representation for State Senate Districts, 2021**

<b>State Senate District</b>	<b>Total VAP</b>	<b>Black VAP</b>	<b>Percent Black VAP</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>party</b>	<b>race</b>	<b>Percent of vote 2018</b>
5	203828	111418	54.25%	Betty Alexander	D	Black	77.4%
2	169357	86961	50.82%	Adam Hollier	D	Black	75.7%
3	186758	90737	48.14%	Sylvia Santana	D	Black	81.8%
4	180199	85691	47.00%	Marshall Bullock	D	Black	78.3%
1	193087	87075	44.68%	Stephanie Chang	D	Asian	72.0%
11	229870	82336	35.48%	Jeremy Moss	D	White	76.7%
27	175918	54071	30.42%	Jim Ananich	D	White	71.2%
9	219325	50800	22.95%	Paul Wojno	D	White	65.9%
6	217734	46997	21.29%	Erika Geiss	D	Black	61.4%

### **C. Recompiled Election Results**

As noted above, once draft districts have been drawn, there is a second approach available for ascertaining whether a proposed district is likely to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice to legislative or congressional office. This approach relies on recompiling election results from previous elections to see if the candidates preferred by minority voters would win in the draft district. This process entails (1) identifying “bellwether” elections, (2) disaggregating the precinct level results for these elections down to the census block level and then (3) re-aggregating the results up to conform to proposed district boundaries to determine if the minority-preferred candidate would win. This recompilation can only be done

for elections that cover a broad enough area to encompass all of the draft districts, hence only statewide elections can be used for this exercise. “Bellwether” elections are statewide elections that included minority candidates who were the candidates of choice of minority voters but were not supported by white voters.

Although there were six statewide general elections that included African American candidates or running mates, the African American was the candidate of choice of Black voters in only four of these contests: U.S. President in 2012 and 2020, Secretary of State in 2014, and Governor in 2018. All of these contests were racially polarized statewide, but only the 2014 Secretary of State contest was polarized in all four counties. This election contest was also the contest in which the candidate strongly preferred by Black voters garnered the least amount of white crossover votes. Thus, while recompiled elections results for all four elections provide important information for determining if a proposed district would provide Black voters with an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates in general elections, the single best “bellwether” contest for that purpose is the vote for Godfrey Dillard in 2014.

The redistricting software used by MICRC automatically included recompiled election results for all draft districts for all four of these elections – in fact, it included this information for every statewide general election conducted between 2012 and 2020. Ascertaining if the African American candidates of choice of Black voters, especially Dillard in 2014, carried a proposed district provides evidence that the proposed district in a draft plan will provide Black voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice in general elections.

The redistricting software also reported recompiled election results for the one statewide Democratic primary conducted in the past decade: the 2018 race for Governor. However, because there were three candidates and because Black voters were not cohesive in supporting any of these candidates, these recompiled results are not particularly useful in ascertaining whether a proposed district would provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates in Democratic primaries.

### **III. Measuring Partisan Fairness in Redistricting Plans**

According to 13(d) of Article IV, Section 6 of the Michigan State Constitution: “Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.” A number of objective mathematical measures have been developed by social scientists and mathematicians to determine if an existing or proposed redistricting map disadvantages one political party relative to the other. Using these measures, we can compare an existing or proposed redistricting map to a large set of other possible maps to determine if the proposed map exhibits more or less political bias. The maps used for comparative purposes can be previous redistricting maps used in the state, or the redistricting maps of other states, or they can be computer simulated maps.

I proposed incorporating three measures of partisan fairness measures into the redistricting software used by the MICRC to draw redistricting maps. The reasons for my choice were as follows:

- The measures are easy to understand and straightforward to calculate. They produce scores that indicate both the direction and the magnitude of any political bias in the redistricting map.
- Because I easily calculated the scores for each of these measures in excel, I knew it would be possible to incorporate an automated report function into the redistricting software that could provide these scores for any draft plans drawn.
- Although these three measures have only recently been developed, they have all have been introduced and accepted by federal and state courts as useful tools for determining if a redistricting map is politically fair.

The three partisan fairness measures I selected are the lopsided margins test, the mean-median difference, and the efficiency gap.

In addition to these three measures, a simple metric for indicating whether a redistricting plan is fair is to compare the proportion of the statewide vote each party receives to the proportion of the districts each party wins or is likely to win under the proposed plan. The proportionality of a redistricting plan is calculated by subtracting the percentage of votes won by the party from the percentage of seats that party won (or would win) in congressional and state

legislative elections. So, for example, if Party A won 52.3% of the vote statewide but only won 44.7% of the seats in the state senate, the proportionality bias would be  $44.7 - 52.3$  or  $-7.6$  in favor of Party B.

Each of these measures use historical election results to evaluate the partisan fairness of redistricting plans. However, in the case of proposed districts, previous election results must be reconfigured to conform to the proposed district boundaries to evaluate the partisan fairness of the proposed plans.<sup>25</sup> A composite election index was constructed using the statewide general elections between 2012 and 2020 – all 13 of the election contests included in the GIS redistricting database and analyzed in the racial bloc voting analysis. The composite index was weighted to give each election cycle equal weight in the index. However, the partisan fairness report function in the redistricting software was designed so that any of the individual 13 elections could be substituted for the composite index in calculating the partisan fairness scores.

### **A. Lopsided Margins Test**

In a perfectly fair plan – at least in a state in which the two political parties are competitive (closely divided) – we would expect a mix of districts, some strongly partisan districts, some moderately reliable districts, and some tossups – but each party would have a roughly similar mix. If one party has a smaller number of victories with larger margins of victory than the other party, this is an indication that one party is being disfavored over the other in the map. This pattern of outcomes can be quantified by sorting the districts into two groups, by winning party. Each party's winning vote share can then be compared to see if one party has significantly higher margin of victories than the other.<sup>26</sup> The following is an example of how this is calculated:

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<sup>25</sup> Both the efficiency gap and the mean-median difference have been used to evaluate computer simulated alternative redistricting maps for comparative purposes in partisan gerrymandering challenges. Election results for select statewide elections were reconfigured to determine how the candidates in these elections would have fared in the alternative districts.

<sup>26</sup> This measure was first discussed in Sam Wang, "Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering," *Stanford Law Journal*, 16, June 2016. Available at: <https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/three-tests-for-practical-evaluation-of-partisan-gerrymandering/>

District	Party A	Party B	Total Votes	Percent of Votes		Party Wins	
				Party A	Party B	Party A	Party B
1	279	120	399	69.9%	30.1%	69.9%	
2	172	198	370	46.5%	53.5%		53.5%
3	167	192	359	46.5%	53.5%		53.5%
4	148	212	360	41.1%	58.9%		58.9%
5	185	180	365	50.7%	49.3%	50.7%	
6	139	193	332	41.9%	58.1%		58.1%
7	169	201	370	45.7%	54.3%		54.3%
8	179	206	385	46.5%	53.5%		53.5%
9	234	99	333	70.3%	29.7%	70.3%	
10	178	199	377	47.2%	52.8%		52.8%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1850</b>	<b>1800</b>	<b>3650</b>	<b>50.7%</b>	<b>49.3%</b>	<b>63.6%</b>	<b>54.9%</b>

Party A in the example is winning districts with a much higher average vote (63.6%) than Party B (54.9%) – and the difference between the two percentages is 8.7 (63.6 – 54.9). This indicates that Party A supporters are packed into a few districts that it wins by large margins. Party B, on the other hand, is winning substantially more districts with substantially lower vote margins.

## B. Mean-Median Difference

Comparing a dataset's mean and median is a common statistical analysis used to assess how skewed the dataset is – if the dataset is balanced, the mean will be very close in value to its median. As a dataset becomes more skewed, the mean and median begin to diverge; looking at the difference between the two can be used determine the extent to which the data is skewed.

Based on this principle, the mean-median district vote share difference compares a party's mean district vote share to its median district vote share:<sup>27</sup>

- Mean = average party vote share across all districts
- Median = party vote share in the median district when districts are sorted on share of party vote

<sup>27</sup> This approach to ascertaining political bias in redistricting maps was proposed by Michael D. McDonald and Robin Best in "Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics and Law: A Diagnostic Applied to Six Cases," *Election Law Journal* 14(4), 2015 (available at: <https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/elj.2015.0358>). It was further quantified by Wang (see full citation above).

The difference between the mean and median vote shares provides a measure of whether the redistricting map produces skewed election results. The following is an example of how this is calculated:

Party A	Percentages
	41.1%
	41.9%
	45.7%
	46.5%
	46.5%
	46.5%
	47.2%
	50.7%
	69.9%
	70.3%
District median percentage	46.5%
Statewide mean percentage	50.7%
Mean-Median Difference	4.2%

In this example, Party A received 50.7% of the statewide vote. Party A's median vote share (46.5%) is 4.2% lower than its mean vote share of 50.7%. This indicates that Party A must win more districts than Party B to win half of the seats – the redistricting map is skewed in favor of Party B. In fact, Party A would have had to win 54.2% ( $50.0 + 4.2$ ) of the statewide vote to win 50% of the seats.

### C. Efficiency Gap

This measure, introduced by University of Chicago law professor Nick Stephanopoulos and Public Policy Institute of California research fellow Eric McGhee, looks at the number of “wasted votes” across districts.<sup>28</sup>

In any election, nearly 50 percent of votes are wasted: all votes cast for a losing candidate, and any votes cast for a winning candidate beyond the threshold needed to win (50 percent in a two-candidate contest). In a hypothetical map with perfect partisan symmetry, both

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<sup>28</sup> Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos and Eric M. McGhee, “Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap,” *University of Chicago Law Review*: Vol. 82 (2), 2015. Available at: <https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol82/iss2/4>.

parties would waste the same number of votes. A large difference between the parties' wasted votes indicates one party is treated more favorably than the other by the redistricting map. This is because the plan packs and cracks one party's supporters more than the other party's supporters.

The efficiency gap is calculated by taking one party's total wasted votes in an election, subtracting the other party's total wasted votes, and dividing this by the total number of votes cast. It captures in a single number the extent to which district lines waste the two parties votes unequally.

$$\text{Efficiency Gap} = \frac{[\text{Party A wasted votes}] - [\text{Party B wasted votes}]}{\text{total number of votes cast statewide}}$$

Example:

District	Party A	Party B	Total Votes	Lost Votes		minimum to win	Surplus Votes		Total Wasted Votes	
				Party A	Party B		Party A	Party B	Party A	Party B
1	279	120	399	0	120	200	79	0	79	120
2	172	198	370	172	0	185	0	13	172	13
3	167	192	359	167	0	180	0	12	167	12
4	148	212	360	148	0	180	0	32	148	32
5	185	180	365	0	180	183	2	0	2	180
6	139	193	332	139	0	166	0	27	139	27
7	169	201	370	169	0	185	0	16	169	16
8	179	206	385	179	0	193	0	13	179	13
9	234	99	333	0	99	167	67	0	67	99
10	178	199	377	178	0	189	0	10	178	10
TOTAL	1850	1800	3650	1152	399		148	123	1300	522

In this example, supporters of Party A cast 1152 votes for losing candidates and 148 surplus votes – votes beyond what was necessary to elect Party A candidates. Supporters of Party B, on the other hand, cast only 399 of their votes for losing candidates and 522 surplus votes. Adding together these two sets of votes, Party A had a total of 1300 wasted votes; Party B had a total of only 522 votes. The efficiency gap is therefore calculated as 21.3% ( $(1300-522)/3650 = 778/3650 = .213$ ). This efficiency gap in favor of Party B can be interpreted as the percentage of seats Party B won above what would be expected in a politically fair or neutral map.

#### D. Court Acceptance of these Measures

These three measures have all been developed within the last decade and therefore do not have a long history of consideration by the courts. However, they have been introduced recently

in the context of partisan gerrymandering challenges. While recognizing each of the measures have some disadvantages, the courts in each instance relied on these measures (in addition to other measures introduced) to find the plans before them were politically biased towards one of the political parties at the expense of the other.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Examples of court cases relying on at least one of the measures of political fairness described in this report include: *League of Women Voters of Michigan v. Benson*, in which the federal court held the congressional and state legislative plans in Michigan to be an unconstitutional gerrymander; *Ohio A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Householder*, which held the Ohio congressional map to be an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander; *League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania* in which the State Supreme Court held the Pennsylvania congressional districts to be in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution; *Whitford v. Gill* in which the federal court determined the Wisconsin state assembly districts were unconstitutional; *Common Cause v. Rucho* in which the federal court found the North Carolina congressional district plan adopted in 2016 was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. This North Carolina decision, along with the Maryland case, *Lamone v. Benisek*, was later overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court on unrelated grounds, but grounds that served to moot all of the federal decisions discussed above. However, in a separate challenge before the North Carolina Superior Court, *Common Cause v. Lewis*, the court held that the state legislative districts violated the North Carolina State Constitution.

## **APPENDIX A**

[illegible]

[illegible]

Statewide				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>											
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	52.3%	93.9	102.5	97.5	94.3	40.3	38.1	39.5	43.7
John James	R	AA	45.8%	3.8	-5.1	1.1	2.0	57.8	59.9	58.4	55.1
others				2.3	2.5	2.4	3.7	1.9	2.0	1.7	1.2
<i>votes for office</i>				36.5	31.5	35.0	35.0	61.8	61.6	63.1	63.1
<b>2020 General</b>											
<b>U.S. President</b>											
Joseph Biden	D	W	50.6%	95.4	105.0	98.4	96.2	37.0	34.7	36.9	40.0
Donald Trump	R	W	47.8%	3.8	-5.4	1.1	1.9	61.5	63.6	61.2	59.1
others				0.8	0.8	1.3	1.9	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.0
<i>votes for office</i>				61.2	53.3	55.2	55.2	79.1	77.7	79.0	79.0
<b>U.S. Senate</b>											
Gary Peters	D	W	49.9%	93.4	102.3	97.2	93.9	36.9	34.8	36.4	39.4
John James	R	AA	48.2%	3.8	-5.6	1.1	1.7	61.5	63.5	61.7	59.8
others				2.7	3.1	3.7	4.4	1.6	1.6	1.4	0.9
<i>votes for office</i>				59.9	53.0	55.0	55.0	78.3	76.8	78.1	78.1

County: Genesee			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2012 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Barack Obama	D	AA	99.0	107.0	99.5	97.6	52.9	52.7	52.8	53.7
Mitt Romney	R	W	0.7	-6.7	0.5	1.3	46.1	46.0	46.0	45.5
others			0.2	0.3	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.3	0.9	0.8
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>64.1</i>	<i>57.4</i>	<i>61.0</i>	<i>61.0</i>	<i>70.1</i>	<i>65.1</i>	<i>68.4</i>	<i>68.4</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	97.8	103.9	99.7	96.7	59.7	59.8	59.4	60.2
Peter Hoekstra	R	W	0.9	-5.3	0.5	1.3	36.7	36.3	36.5	35.2
others			1.3	1.3	1.1	2.0	3.6	3.9	3.8	32.2
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>63.7</i>	<i>57.3</i>	<i>60.7</i>	<i>60.7</i>	<i>69.2</i>	<i>64.4</i>	<i>67.5</i>	<i>67.5</i>
<b>2014 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Mark Schauer	D	W	97.1	104.2	99.3	95.8	50.7	50.5	49.5	51.8
Rick Snyder	R	W	2.0	-5.0	0.6	2.3	46.5	46.5	47.5	45.8
others			0.9	0.9	1.1	1.9	2.8	3.0	2.8	2.4
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>37.6</i>	<i>31.4</i>	<i>35.8</i>	<i>35.8</i>	<i>48.8</i>	<i>44.6</i>	<i>47.5</i>	<i>67.5</i>
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Godfrey Dillard	D	AA	96.1	104.3	99.0	95.6	45.3	45.8	44.2	46.2
Ruth Johnson	R	W	2.6	-5.3	0.3	2.2	50.7	50.5	51.5	50.2
others			1.3	1.1	1.1	2.2	4.1	4.3	4.1	3.6
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>37.4</i>	<i>31.5</i>	<i>35.9</i>	<i>35.9</i>	<i>47.4</i>	<i>43.3</i>	<i>46.1</i>	<i>46.1</i>
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Mark Totten	D	W	95.2	103.4	98.7	95.6	44.2	43.9	43.3	45.2
Bill Schuette	R	W	3.7	-4.4	0.8	2.4	52.6	52.6	53.3	51.9
others			1.1	1.1	0.9	2.0	3.3	3.5	3.3	2.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>37.3</i>	<i>31.4</i>	<i>35.9</i>	<i>35.9</i>	<i>46.8</i>	<i>42.8</i>	<i>45.5</i>	<i>45.5</i>

County: Genesee			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	97.2	103.9	99.5	95.6	57.0	57.0	56.4	58.6
Terry Lynn Land	R	W	1.7	-4.8	0.6	2.2	38.7	38.3	39.0	37.5
others			1.2	0.9	0.8	2.2	4.3	4.6	4.4	3.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>37.6</i>	<i>31.5</i>	<i>36.1</i>	<i>36.1</i>	<i>48.3</i>	<i>44.3</i>	<i>47.1</i>	<i>47.1</i>
<b>2016 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Hillary Clinton	D	W	97.5	106.0	99.5	96.4	37.8	34.5	35.3	37.4
Donald Trump	R	W	1.5	-7.0	0.4	1.7	57.0	59.4	58.5	57.1
others			1.0	1.1	1.0	1.9	5.2	6.1	6.1	5.5
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>70.6</i>	<i>59.8</i>	<i>59.0</i>	<i>59.0</i>	<i>70.9</i>	<i>63.5</i>	<i>67.3</i>	<i>67.3</i>
<b>2018 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Whitmer/Gilchrist	D	W/AA	96.2	103.6	99.2	95.3	46.7	45.5	45.8	46.2
Schuette/Lyons	R	W/W	2.2	-5.5	0.2	2.0	50.5	50.9	50.5	50.8
others			1.6	1.9	1.7	2.7	2.8	3.6	3.2	3.0
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>54.2</i>	<i>43.5</i>	<i>45.1</i>	<i>45.1</i>	<i>62.6</i>	<i>57.0</i>	<i>59.8</i>	<i>59.8</i>
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	96.5	103.7	99.2	95.2	45.7	44.7	44.9	48.0
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	2.0	-5.8	0.3	2.0	50.9	51.2	50.8	48.7
others			1.5	2.1	1.4	2.8	3.4	4.2	3.7	3.4
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>53.9</i>	<i>43.5</i>	<i>44.9</i>	<i>44.9</i>	<i>61.3</i>	<i>55.7</i>	<i>58.6</i>	<i>58.6</i>
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Dana Nessel	D	W	94.5	102.3	98.6	94.1	39.9	37.6	37.9	41.1
Tom Leonard	R	W	2.3	-5.8	0.6	2.0	55.3	56.3	55.9	53.7
others			3.2	3.5	3.8	3.9	47.7	6.0	5.1	5.1
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>53.7</i>	<i>43.2</i>	<i>44.6</i>	<i>44.6</i>	<i>61.0</i>	<i>55.6</i>	<i>58.4</i>	<i>58.4</i>

County: Genesee			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	95.3	103.2	98.9	95.2	43.8	42.6	42.8	45.8
John James	R	AA	3.0	-5.3	0.7	2.1	54.3	54.8	54.6	52.6
others			1.7	2.2	1.7	2.8	1.9	2.6	1.8	1.6
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>54.2</i>	<i>43.8</i>	<i>45.1</i>	<i>45.1</i>	<i>62.4</i>	<i>56.8</i>	<i>59.6</i>	<i>59.6</i>
<b>2020 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Joseph Biden	D	W	96.5	104.4	99.3	96.1	39.9	37.7	38.6	42.1
Donald Trump	R	W	3.0	-5.1	0.5	2.1	58.7	60.5	59.6	56.7
others			0.5	0.7	0.9	1.8	1.4	1.8	1.8	1.2
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>67.3</i>	<i>54.8</i>	<i>53.0</i>	<i>53.0</i>	<i>81.5</i>	<i>75.4</i>	<i>79.6</i>	<i>79.6</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	95.1	103.0	98.9	95.0	41.1	39.7	40.1	43.5
John James	R	AA	3.2	-5.3	0.7	1.8	57.4	58.4	57.6	55.5
others			1.7	2.1	2.7	3.2	1.6	2.0	1.5	1.1
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>67.1</i>	<i>54.8</i>	<i>56.6</i>	<i>56.6</i>	<i>80.6</i>	<i>74.4</i>	<i>78.7</i>	<i>78.7</i>

County: Saginaw			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2012 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Barack Obama	D	AA		114.3	99.5	95.7	41.6	39.2	41.1	42.9
Mitt Romney	R	W		-14.8	0.4	2.5	57.0	59.1	57.1	55.9
others				0.2	0.6	1.8	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.2
<i>votes for office</i>				56.7	56.2	56.2	71.4	69.5	70.3	70.3
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W		111.0	99.5	95.4	51.0	49.0	50.1	52.3
Peter Hoekstra	R	W		-11.6	0.7	2.2	46.0	47.6	46.3	44.9
others				0.7	0.0	2.4	2.9	3.3	3.3	2.8
<i>votes for office</i>				56.3	55.7	55.7	69.9	67.7	68.7	68.7
<b>2014 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Mark Schauer	D	W		11.2	99.6	94.1	41.1	38.4	39.1	42.2
Rick Snyder	R	W		-12.3	0.5	3.0	56.3	58.9	58.1	55.7
others				1.0	0.7	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.1
<i>votes for office</i>				31.1	32.7	32.7	51.5	49.9	50.8	50.8
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Godfrey Dillard	D	AA		111.3	99.2	94.4	35.3	32.6	33.5	36.3
Ruth Johnson	R	W		-12.5	0.5	2.8	60.5	63.0	62.0	59.9
others				1.1	0.9	2.8	4.2	4.5	4.4	3.8
<i>votes for office</i>				31.4	32.6	32.6	49.9	48.4	49.2	49.2
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Mark Totten	D	W		110.7	98.6	94.1	32.1	28.9	29.8	32.6
Bill Schuette	R	W		-12.1	0.5	2.9	65.2	68.2	67.2	65.1
others				1.3	1.1	3.0	2.7	3.0	2.9	23.3
<i>votes for office</i>				31.0	32.4	32.4	50.8	49.3	50.1	50.1

County: Saginaw			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W		110.3	99.5	94.1	48.3	46.7	47.6	50.6
Terry Lynn Land	R	W		-10.6	0.7	3.0	47.8	49.2	47.9	45.8
others				0.5	0.4	2.9	3.9	4.3	4.2	3.5
<i>votes for office</i>				31.2	32.7	32.7	50.8	49.2	50.1	50.1
<b>2016 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Hillary Clinton	D	W		116.7	99.6	95.0		25.1	28.1	30.6
Donald Trump	R	W		-17.2	0.5	2.5		69.0	66.1	64.0
others				0.4	0.0	2.5		5.8	5.6	5.4
<i>votes for office</i>				55.5	52.3	52.3		69.0	70.2	70.2
<b>2018 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Whitmer/Gilchrist	D	W/AA		112.4	99.4	93.6		34.8	36.4	40.9
Schuetz/Lyons	R	W/W		-14.2	0.6	2.9		62.4	60.3	56.9
others				1.8	1.6	3.5		2.8	2.5	2.2
<i>votes for office</i>				38.9	37.7	37.7		61.5	63.0	63.0
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Jocelyn Benson	D	W		113.3	99.6	93.7		33.6	35.4	39.2
Mary Treder Lang	R	W		-14.9	0.6	3.2		62.8	60.6	57.7
others				3.5	1.2	3.1		3.6	3.3	3.0
<i>votes for office</i>				39.7	38.0	38.0		60.0	61.4	61.4
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Dana Nessel	D	W		112.5	99.0	93.4		27.6	29.0	33.3
Tom Leonard	R	W		-15.5	0.5	2.6		66.8	64.6	61.7
others				3.0	2.1	4.0		5.6	5.5	5.0
<i>votes for office</i>				38.7	37.6	37.6		59.7	61.0	61.0

County: Saginaw			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W		110.6	99.3	93.5		33.7	34.6	39.3
John James	R	AA		-13.0	0.8	2.9		64.5	63.0	59.6
others				2.4	2.2	3.6		1.8	1.8	1.2
<i>votes for office</i>				39.2	37.8	37.8		61.5	62.8	62.8
<b>2020 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Joseph Biden	D	W		114.2	99.0	95.3		29.3	32.0	36.3
Donald Trump	R	W		-14.9	0.6	2.7		69.0	66.2	62.6
others				0.6	1.1	2.0		1.6	1.5	1.1
<i>votes for office</i>				50.7	48.6	48.6		78.3	79.6	79.6
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W		112.5	99.5	93.8		31.1	33.1	37.5
John James	R	AA		-14.7	0.6	3.0		67.3	65.0	61.6
others				2.1	2.8	3.2		1.5	1.2	0.9
<i>votes for office</i>				50.7	48.4	48.4		77.2	78.7	78.7

County: Oakland			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2012 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Barack Obama	D	AA	98.2	111.7	99.4	95.7	43.9	39.5	40.7	42.1
Mitt Romney	R	W	1.6	-11.8	0.5	2.3	55.0	59.4	58.1	57.2
others			0.3	0.2	1.7	2.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.6
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>78.9</i>	<i>69.2</i>	<i>68.9</i>	<i>68.2</i>	<i>75.7</i>	<i>74.8</i>	<i>75.7</i>	<i>75.7</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	97.3	110.5	99.1	95.8	48.4	44.5	45.7	47.6
Peter Hoekstra	R	W	1.6	-11.4	0.0	1.9	47.9	51.8	50.3	49.2
others			1.1	0.9	0.8	2.3	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.2
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>78.3</i>	<i>69.2</i>	<i>67.8</i>	<i>67.8</i>	<i>74.0</i>	<i>73.0</i>	<i>74.0</i>	<i>74.0</i>
<b>2014 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Mark Schauer	D	W	94.5	108.9	99.1	94.8	33.9	27.9	28.2	30.6
Rick Snyder	R	W	5.0	-9.5	0.8	2.8	64.1	70.1	69.8	68.1
others			0.5	1.9	1.0	2.5	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>51.5</i>	<i>44.4</i>	<i>46.3</i>	<i>46.3</i>	<i>54.5</i>	<i>53.6</i>	<i>54.6</i>	<i>54.6</i>
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Godfrey Dillard	D	AA	93.3	109.7	99.1	94.6	29.1	23.5	24.3	26.4
Ruth Johnson	R	W	5.4	-9.5	0.4	2.7	67.9	73.5	72.7	71.4
others			1.3	1.9	1.2	2.7	2.9	3.0	2.7	2.2
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>51.1</i>	<i>44.4</i>	<i>45.9</i>	<i>45.9</i>	<i>53.2</i>	<i>52.1</i>	<i>53.1</i>	<i>53.1</i>
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Mark Totten	D	W	93.0	107.5	98.8	94.1	35.0	30.1	30.3	32.9
Bill Schuette	R	W	5.6	-8.8	0.8	3.0	61.3	66.2	65.9	64.0
others			1.4	1.3	1.5	2.9	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.1
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>51.1</i>	<i>44.2</i>	<i>45.8</i>	<i>45.8</i>	<i>52.7</i>	<i>51.7</i>	<i>52.6</i>	<i>52.6</i>

County: Oakland			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	96.8	110.6	99.4	95.0	46.9	43.0	44.0	46.7
Terry Lynn Land	R	W	2.0	-10.9	0.0	2.4	48.7	52.6	51.5	49.7
others			1.2	0.3	0.5	2.6	4.4	4.4	4.4	3.6
<i>votes for office</i>			51.5	44.7	46.5	46.5	53.7	53.7	53.7	53.7
<b>2016 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Hillary Clinton	D	W	95.2	108.8	99.4	95.1	36.0	34.2	34.3	39.1
Donald Trump	R	W	3.4	-9.7	0.8	2.4	58.6	59.8	59.6	55.8
others			1.4	0.7	0.1	2.5	5.4	6.0	6.0	5.1
<i>votes for office</i>			73.0	61.1	65.6	65.6	74.6	72.4	73.5	73.5
<b>2018 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Whitmer/Gilchrist	D	W/AA	95.3	107.6	99.3	94.1	44.2	42.4	42.2	47.4
Schuetten/Lyons	R	W/W	3.5	-9.0	0.7	2.7	53.3	55.0	54.6	50.7
others			1.2	1.3	1.4	3.3	2.5	2.6	2.6	1.9
<i>votes for office</i>			62.5	51.6	53.2	53.2	69.6	68.2	68.8	68.8
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	95.2	108.1	99.1	94.2	44.3	42.4	42.3	47.5
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	3.4	-9.4	0.7	2.7	53.0	54.7	54.5	50.5
others			1.4	1.3	1.3	3.1	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.0
<i>votes for office</i>			62.1	51.5	53.1	53.1	68.7	67.1	67.7	67.7
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Dana Nessel	D	W	93.8	107.3	99.2	93.8	40.2	37.9	37.5	43.0
Tom Leonard	R	W	3.5	-9.7	0.6	2.6	55.4	96.8	57.5	53.0
others			2.7	2.4	2.0	3.6	4.4	0.5	4.4	4.0
<i>votes for office</i>			61.4	50.7	52.5	52.5	67.9	66.4	67.0	67.0

County: Oakland			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	93.8	106.5	98.7	93.0	42.7	41.1	40.9	45.5
John James	R	AA	4.8	-8.4	0.8	2.8	55.9	57.5	57.5	53.6
others			1.5	1.7	1.6	4.2	1.4	1.4	1.5	0.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>62.5</i>	<i>51.5</i>	<i>53.2</i>	<i>53.2</i>	<i>69.5</i>	<i>68.1</i>	<i>68.7</i>	<i>68.7</i>
<b>2020 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Joseph Biden	D	W	94.2	105.1	99.0	93.4	42.0	41.6	41.2	45.9
Donald Trump	R	W	5.3	-5.7	1.3	3.6	56.4	56.8	57.2	53.1
others			0.6	1.6	1.7	3.0	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.0
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>76.1</i>	<i>64.6</i>	<i>71.6</i>	<i>71.6</i>	<i>85.7</i>	<i>84.9</i>	<i>86.4</i>	<i>86.4</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	93.1	104.5	98.8	92.1	40.7	39.9	39.4	43.5
John James	R	AA	5.2	-6.7	0.8	2.9	57.9	58.9	59.3	55.7
others			1.8	2.2	2.2	5.0	1.4	1.2	1.2	0.8
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>75.7</i>	<i>64.7</i>	<i>71.4</i>	<i>71.4</i>	<i>84.8</i>	<i>84.1</i>	<i>85.4</i>	<i>85.4</i>

County: Wayne			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2012 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Barack Obama	D	AA	98.6	102.2	99.5	99.0	51.1	51.2	51.1	51.9
Mitt Romney	R	W	1.2	-2.4	0.5	0.6	48.0	47.8	47.7	47.3
others			0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.9	1.1	0.9	0.8
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>61.3</i>	<i>58.3</i>	<i>60.4</i>	<i>60.4</i>	<i>68.9</i>	<i>63.4</i>	<i>65.7</i>	<i>65.7</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	97.3	100.2	98.9	98.1	56.8	57.2	56.6	57.6
Peter Hoekstra	R	W	1.2	-1.6	0.4	0.6	39.6	38.8	39.1	38.6
others			1.5	1.5	1.5	1.3	3.6	4.0	4.0	3.8
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>60.8</i>	<i>57.8</i>	<i>59.9</i>	<i>59.9</i>	<i>67.6</i>	<i>62.1</i>	<i>64.4</i>	<i>64.4</i>
<b>2014 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Mark Schauer	D	W	94.2	97.8	96.4	96.5	41.1	41.2	39.2	41.3
Rick Snyder	R	W	5.0	1.4	2.9	2.6	56.9	56.3	58.4	56.6
others			0.8	0.8	0.7	0.9	2.0	2.5	2.3	2.0
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>36.3</i>	<i>33.0</i>	<i>35.8</i>	<i>35.8</i>	<i>50.7</i>	<i>44.1</i>	<i>47.7</i>	<i>47.7</i>
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Godfrey Dillard	D	AA	94.3	98.4	96.7	96.8	36.8	36.6	35.0	36.8
Ruth Johnson	R	W	4.3	0.3	2.1	1.9	59.7	59.2	61.2	59.6
others			1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	3.4	4.1	3.8	3.6
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>35.9</i>	<i>32.7</i>	<i>35.5</i>	<i>35.5</i>	<i>49.0</i>	<i>42.5</i>	<i>46.1</i>	<i>46.1</i>
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Mark Totten	D	W	93.2	97.0	95.5	95.7	41.0	40.7	39.1	41.0
Bill Schuette	R	W	5.3	1.5	3.2	2.9	55.4	54.9	56.8	55.1
others			1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	3.7	4.4	4.1	3.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>35.7</i>	<i>32.5</i>	<i>35.3</i>	<i>35.3</i>	<i>48.8</i>	<i>42.3</i>	<i>45.9</i>	<i>45.9</i>

County: Wayne			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	96.8	100.0	98.5	98.0	52.8	52.7	51.4	53.4
Terry Lynn Land	R	W	2.0	-1.1	0.6	1.0	42.7	42.0	43.4	41.8
others			1.2	1.1	1.0	1.1	4.5	5.3	5.0	4.7
<i>votes for office</i>			36.2	32.9	35.7	35.7	49.8	43.2	46.8	46.8
<b>2016 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Hillary Clinton	D	W	96.8	101.0	99.0	98.4	47.1	39.1	38.2	39.7
Donald Trump	R	W	2.0	-2.1	0.6	0.7	47.8	54.8	55.4	54.4
others			1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9	5.1	6.1	6.0	5.9
<i>votes for office</i>			57.7	55.7	57.0	57.0	72.2	61.6	64.0	64.0
<b>2018 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Whitmer/Gilchrist	D	W/AA	95.6	99.0	97.6	97.0	53.4	49.7	47.9	53.5
Schuetter/Lyons	R	W/W	2.5	-1.0	0.9	1.1	44.6	47.3	49.1	44.0
others			2.0	2.0	2.1	1.9	2.0	3.0	2.8	2.5
<i>votes for office</i>			33.9	30.9	33.2	33.2	67.2	59.8	63.2	63.2
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	95.7	99.0	97.7	97.0	53.1	50.0	49.1	53.6
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	2.4	-1.0	1.0	1.1	44.7	46.8	48.5	43.6
others			2.0	2.0	2.0	1.8	2.2	3.2	3.2	2.8
<i>votes for office</i>			33.7	30.8	33.1	33.1	66.2	58.8	62.2	62.2
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Dana Nessel	D	W	94.1	97.7	96.3	95.5	49.6	45.6	43.6	49.4
Tom Leonard	R	W	2.4	-1.3	0.8	1.0	47.2	49.9	51.8	46.6
others			3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.3	44.9	4.3	4.1
<i>votes for office</i>			33.3	30.4	32.7	32.7	65.4	58.0	61.3	61.3

County: Wayne			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	93.8	97.1	95.9	95.8	52.4	48.9	47.1	52.3
John James	R	AA	3.8	0.4	1.9	1.5	46.5	49.4	52.2	46.5
others			2.4	2.5	2.4	2.7	1.1	1.7	1.4	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>33.7</i>	<i>30.8</i>	<i>33.1</i>	<i>33.1</i>	<i>67.2</i>	<i>59.6</i>	<i>63.1</i>	<i>63.1</i>
<b>2020 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Joseph Biden	D	W	95.4	99.0	97.9	97.5	53.3	45.9	44.5	47.5
Donald Trump	R	W	3.8	0.2	1.6	1.5	45.4	52.6	53.9	51.3
others			0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.3	0.8	1.5	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>59.2</i>	<i>55.6</i>	<i>58.0</i>	<i>58.0</i>	<i>81.3</i>	<i>74.1</i>	<i>76.6</i>	<i>76.6</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	93.3	967.0	95.3	95.2	51.7	46.6	44.4	47.2
John James	R	AA	3.8	0.3	1.7	1.6	47.0	52.1	53.7	51.5
others			2.8	3.0	2.9	3.2	1.3	1.9	1.8	1.4
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>58.9</i>	<i>55.3</i>	<i>57.8</i>	<i>57.8</i>	<i>80.6</i>	<i>73.0</i>	<i>75.6</i>	<i>75.6</i>

2018 Democratic Primary for Governor				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>STATEWIDE</b>											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	30.2%	21.0	24.2	23.5	26.0	25.7	27.1	30.2	28.5
Shri Thanedar	D	A	17.7%	42.5	44.2	42.2	39.0	15.8	12.9	10.8	9.4
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	52.0%	36.5	31.6	33.5	35.0	58.6	60.0	59.4	62.0
<i>votes for office</i>				23.0	22.5	24.5	24.5	13.9	12.0	14.0	14.0
<b>Genesee</b>											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	22.9%	16.5	18.6	17.9	21.0	22.3	24.8	24.2	23.5
Shri Thanedar	D	A	23.6%	46.0	49.9	47.2	43.4	15.7	13.6	13.3	11.5
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	53.4%	37.5	31.6	34.5	35.7	62.0	61.6	61.9	65.1
<i>votes for office</i>				26.9	23.4	25.9	25.9	15.5	13.3	14.8	14.8
<b>Saginaw</b>											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	22.2%		18.9	17.5	21.0		21.9	23.6	21.0
Shri Thanedar	D	A	24.7%		51.5	51.1	44.7		16.8	14.7	14.5
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	53.1%		29.6	31.3	34.4		61.4	61.8	64.5
<i>votes for office</i>					19.7	20.7	20.7		12.4	13.2	13.2
<b>Oakland</b>											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	32.5%	23.2	24.1	23.2	25.3	29.8	34.2	36.0	34.9
Shri Thanedar	D	A	13.4%	32.7	38.5	37.5	34.7	8.4	4.3	4.3	3.0
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	54.1%	44.1	37.5	39.0	40.0	61.8	61.4	61.0	62.1
<i>votes for office</i>				31.4	33.3	35.0	35.0	20.8	16.1	18.2	18.2
<b>Wayne</b>											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	32.0%	21.2	20.8	21.0	22.2	43.4	41.3	41.3	41.6
Shri Thanedar	D	A	24.3%	42.8	45.6	43.8	42.5	7.5	4.8	5.4	3.9
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	43.7%	36.1	33.7	34.8	35.3	49.2	53.9	54.0	54.5
<i>votes for office</i>				22.4	21.1	23.5	23.5	19.3	16.0	17.4	17.4

## **APPENDIX B**

Congressional District General Elections				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
Congressional District 5											
2018 General											
Daniel Kildee	D	W	59.5%	96.2	104.4	99.1	95.0	48.4	46.5	47.5	50.5
Travis Wines	R	W	35.9%	1.3	-7.8	0.2	1.7	47.0	48.3	46.9	44.9
others				2.5	3.3	3.2	3.3	4.6	5.2	4.9	4.7
votes for office				53.8	42.7	43.8	43.8	59.2	56.5	58.3	58.3
2020 General											
Daniel Kildee	D	W	54.5%	95.4	105.2	99.0	95.0	41.6	39.6	41.0	44.2
Tim Kelly	R	W	41.8%	2.1	-8.4	0.6	1.6	54.8	56.3	54.4	52.3
others				2.6	3.2	3.0	3.4	3.6	4.1	3.9	3.5
votes for office				67.1	54.5	54.5	54.5	76.6	73.8	76.0	76.0
Congressional District 9											
2018 General											
Andy Levin	D	W	59.7%		95.2	98.2	71.5		50.2	48.9	55.7
Candius Stearns	R	W	36.8%		-3.5	0.3	62.9		47.5	47.4	43.2
others					8.4	9.4	22.2		2.4	2.3	1.1
votes for office					17.9	17.5	17.5		66.2	66.4	66.4
2020 General											
Andy Levin	D	W	57.7%		92.6	96.6	74.7		48.3	45.9	52.0
Charles Langworthy	R	W	38.4%		-0.6	0.5	5.6		48.8	50.0	46.7
others					7.9	8.1	19.7		3.0	2.7	1.3
votes for office					37.9	27.6	27.6		80.2	82.7	82.7
Congressional District 12											
2018 General											
Debbie Dingell	D	W	68.1%		91.9	97.3	75.5		58.4	57.5	63.3
Jeff Jones	R	W	28.9%		3.1	1.8	9.8		38.6	38.9	35.6
others					5.0	4.4	14.7		3.0	3.0	1.1
votes for office					33.4	37.1	37.1		58.9	62.4	62.4

Congressional District General Elections				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2020 General</b>											
Debbie Dingell	D	W	66.4%		91.2	95.9	75.3		56.4	55.3	58.7
Jeff Jones	R	W	30.7%		4.2	2.7	11.4		40.6	41.6	40.0
others					4.3	4.2	13.2		3.0	3.2	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>					50.3	58.2	58.2		73.8	75.0	75.0
<b>Congressional District 13</b>											
<b>2018 General</b>											
Rashida Tlaib	D	ME	84.2%	93.4	95.5	94.9	95.2		64.2	64.5	65.6
others				6.6	4.5	5.4	4.8		35.7	35.7	34.4
<i>votes for office</i>				32.5	32.3	34.7	34.7		39.1	41.3	41.3
<b>2020 General</b>											
Rashida Tlaib	D	ME	78.1%	94.6	97.8	96.5	96.1		46.5	47.0	46.9
David Dudenhoefer	R	W	18.7%	2.7	-0.4	1.1	1.2		49.2	48.7	49.0
others				2.7	2.7	2.6	2.7		4.4	4.2	4.1
<i>votes for office</i>				587.0	57.5	60.0	60.0		59.0	61.1	61.1
<b>Congressional District 14</b>											
<b>2018 General</b>											
Brenda Lawrence	D	AA	80.9%	96.3	99.3	98.1	96.7	40.8	51.3	52.3	61.1
Marc Herschfus	R	W	17.3%	1.7	-1.4	0.5	1.6	58.1	46.9	40.9	36.9
others				2.0	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.1	1.8	2.2	2.1
<i>votes for office</i>				36.1	33.8	40.0	40.0	74.3	72.6	74.5	74.5
<b>2020 General</b>											
Brenda Lawrence	D	AA	79.3%	95.0	97.9	96.6	96.5	41.6	49.3	50.3	55.6
Robert Vance Patrick	R	W	18.3%	2.6	-0.3	0.9	1.3	56.4	48.2	47.5	41.7
others				2.4	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.0	2.5	2.4	2.6
<i>votes for office</i>				59.9	57.4	61.7	61.7	90.7	85.0	86.3	86.3

2018 General: State Senate Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 1 (Wayne)</b>											
Stephanie Chang	D	A	72.0%	91.3	97.8	94.1	93.2	47.2	49.0	48.8	53.3
Pauline Montie	R	W	24.2%	2.1	-4.2	0.8	1.1	51.0	49.4	48.6	44.6
others			3.8%	6.1	6.4	6.3	5.6	1.8	1.6	1.6	2.1
<i>votes for office</i>				33.3	27.8	31.0	31.0	66.6	54.7	57.3	57.3
<b>District 2 (Wayne)</b>											
Adam Hollier	D	AA	75.7%	96.4	99.5	98.0	97.9	37.7	47.7	46.5	52.8
Lisa Papas	R	W	24.3%	3.6	0.5	2.0	2.1	62.3	52.2	53.4	47.2
<i>votes for office</i>				31.3	28.0	30.9	30.9	74.1	69.6	73.3	73.3
<b>District 3 (Wayne)</b>											
Sylvia Santana	D	AA	81.8%	94.2	95.6	95.4	95.6	78.8	67.9	64.4	66.3
Kathy Stecker	R	W	15.3%	2.5	1.1	1.5	1.3	18.9	29.3	32.6	31.0
others			2.9%	3.9	3.3	3.3	3.1	2.3	2.8	2.7	2.7
<i>votes for office</i>				30.7	29.2	30.0	30.0	38.7	42.8	45.4	45.4
<b>District 4 (Wayne)</b>											
Marshall Bullock	D	AA	78.3%		97.0	100.2	98.7		45.3	46.1	51.1
Angela Savino	R	W	21.7%		3.0	-0.1	1.3		54.7	53.9	48.9
<i>votes for office</i>				32.4	30.6	32.2	32.2		50.2	51.2	51.2
<b>District 5 (Wayne)</b>											
Betty Jean Alexander	D	AA	77.4%	93.4	95.5	95.4	95.3		49.9	48.9	50.7
DeShawn Wilkins	R	AA	18.2%	3.3	1.2	1.6	1.6		43.7	44.5	43.1
others			4.4%	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.1		6.4	6.5	6.2
<i>votes for office</i>				34.9	36.2	39.4	39.4		44.2	44.1	44.1
<b>District 6 (Wayne)</b>											
Erika Geiss	D	AA	61.4%		107.3	99.4	92.8		42.6	43.8	47.8
Brenda Jones	R	AA	38.7%		-7.2	0.5	7.2		57.4	56.4	52.3
<i>votes for office</i>					38.3	35.9	35.9		50.0	52.9	52.9

2018 General: State Senate Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 11 (Oakland)</b>											
Jeremy Moss	D	W	76.7%		99.0	99.2	96.3	80.9	60.2	56.9	60.2
Boris Tuman	R	W	20.9%		0.0	0.4	2.0	17.5	36.0	39.2	36.6
others			12.4%		1.0	1.0	1.7	1.6	3.7	3.8	3.2
<i>votes for office</i>					60.6	63.4	63.4	83.7	59.9	60.1	60.1
<b>District 12 (Oakland)</b>											
Rosemary Bayer	D	W	49.4%		122.0	99.6	87.9		33.2	33.3	42.1
Michael D. McCready	R	W	48.6%		-23.8	0.6	4.6		64.9	64.2	56.7
others			2.0%		1.7	2.0	7.4		2.0	2.0	1.2
<i>votes for office</i>					14.5	25.6	25.6		75.1	74.4	74.4
<b>District 27 (Genesee)</b>											
Jim Ananich	D	W	71.2%	97.6	103.0	99.3	97.7	53.9	53.3	54.2	55.6
Donna Kekesis	R	W	28.8%	2.4	-3.0	0.7	2.3	46.1	46.7	45.8	44.4
<i>votes for office</i>				53.7	46.5	50.5	50.5	58.7	46.9	49.9	49.9
<b>District 32 (Genesee and Saginaw)</b>											
Phil Phelps	D	W	44.5%		113.0	99.7	96.1		29.5	30.1	33.5
Ken Horn	R	W	55.5%		-13.0	0.4	3.9		70.5	69.9	66.5
<i>votes for office</i>					37.9	37.6	37.6		61.4	62.3	62.3

[illegible]

2018 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 7 (Wayne)</b>				insufficient white voters to produce estimates of voting patterns by race							
LaTanya Garrett	D	AA	97.6%								
Marcelis Turner	R	AA	2.4%								
others											
<i>votes for office</i>											
<b>District 8 (Wayne)</b>				insufficient white voters to produce estimates of voting patterns by race							
Sherry Gay Dagnogo	D	AA	96.4%								
Valerie R. Parker	R	AA	3.7%								
others											
<i>votes for office</i>											
<b>District 9 (Wayne)</b>											
Karen Whitsett	D	AA	95.1%		97.5	97.7	98.5		85.2	84.1	78.8
James Stephens	R		4.9%		2.5	2.3	1.5		14.8	16.0	21.2
<i>votes for office</i>					30.8	31.4	31.4		18.1	17.6	17.6
<b>District 10 (Wayne)</b>											
Leslie Love	D	AA	84.0%		99.1	98.7	96.7		48.3	48.8	59.3
William Brang	R	W	14.2%		-0.3	0.6	2.2		47.8	46.1	37.5
others			1.8%		1.2	1.2	1.2		3.9	3.6	3.3
<i>votes for office</i>					33.4	34.8	34.8		65.1	69.4	69.4
<b>District 11 (Wayne)</b>											
Jewell Jones	D	AA	66.9%		106.0	99.2	96.2		50.4	51.0	51.9
James Townsend	R	W	33.1%		-6.0	0.8	3.8		49.8	49.1	48.1
<i>votes for office</i>					37.9	38.9	38.9		44.9	45.2	45.2
<b>District 12 (Wayne)</b>											
Alex Garza	D	H	66.6%		104.7	98.8	90.6		43.9	46.3	49.0
Michelle Bailey	R	W	33.4%		-4.7	1.1	9.4		56.1	54.1	51.0
<i>votes for office</i>					47.8	48.0	48.0		41.8	42.8	42.8

[illegible]

2018 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 49 (Genesee)</b>											
John D. Cherry	D	W	72.4%		104.9	99.2	94.1		55.6	57.2	61.4
Patrick Duvendeck	R	W	27.6%		-5.0	0.8	6.0		44.4	42.7	38.7
<i>votes for office</i>					<i>40.0</i>	<i>42.3</i>	<i>42.3</i>		<i>53.0</i>	<i>57.8</i>	<i>57.8</i>
<b>District 95 (Saginaw)</b>											
Vanessa Guerra	D	H	73.1%		109.8	99.0	96.0		43.3	47.3	50.5
Dorothy Tanner	R	W	26.9%		-9.9	0.8	4.0		56.7	52.8	49.5
<i>votes for office</i>					<i>44.9</i>	<i>46.1</i>	<i>46.1</i>		<i>50.1</i>	<i>49.4</i>	<i>49.4</i>



[illegible]

2020 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 16 (Wayne)</b>											
Kevin Coleman	D	W	62.5%		111.3	99.0	84.8		44.4	45.6	54.2
Emily Bauman	R	W	37.5%		-11.4	1.0	15.2		55.7	54.4	45.8
<i>votes for office</i>					29.9	33.5	33.5		75.1	76.0	76.0
<b>District 27 (Oakland)</b>											
Regina Weiss	D	W	74.4%		95.4	97.3	93.3	68.7	64.2	63.4	66.4
Elizabeth Goss	R	W	22.4%		2.6	1.5	3.9	28.8	32.0	32.5	30.6
others			3.2%		1.7	1.6	2.8	2.5	3.9	4.1	33.0
<i>votes for office</i>					73.8	76.6	76.6	88.1	77.7	77.4	77.4
<b>District 29 (Oakland)</b>											
Brenda Carter	D	AA	72.9%		111.1	99.1	94.7		37.1	38.8	51.3
S. Dave Sullivan	R	W	27.1%		-11.0	0.8	53.3		62.7	61.5	48.7
<i>votes for office</i>					47.6	61.1	61.1		67.5	61.5	61.5
<b>District 34 (Oakland)</b>											
Cynthia R. Neeley	D	AA	86.7%		100.5	99.2	98.3		51.6	56.1	45.9
James Miraglia	R	W	13.3%		-4.8	0.7	1.7		48.4	43.8	54.1
<i>votes for office</i>					65.6	67.6	67.6		32.5	36.8	36.8
<b>District 35 (Oakland)</b>											
Kyra Harris Bolden	D	AA	82.9%		99.8	99.4	97.2		51.5	51.2	58.5
Daniela Davis	R	AA	15.9%		-0.4	0.3	2.3		46.4	46.2	39.3
others			1.0%		0.6	0.5	0.5		2.1	2.4	2.2
<i>votes for office</i>					70.1	68.4	68.4		93.4	94.5	94.5
<b>District 37 (Oakland)</b>											
Samantha Steckloff	D	W	63.9%		106.1	96.4	<b>57.5</b>		56.8	56.9	<b>66.4</b>
Mitch Swoboda	R	W	34.1%		-8.7	0.8	<b>34.2</b>		41.7	40.8	<b>32.2</b>
others			2.0%		2.5	6.3	<b>8.3</b>		1.7	1.3	<b>1.4</b>
<i>votes for office</i>					55.5	54.9	<b>54.9</b>		106.2	94.0	<b>94.0</b>

2020 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 49 (Genesee)</b>											
John D. Cherry	D	W	68.9%		104.3	98.8	94.8		50.2	51.9	56.6
Bryan Lutz	R	W	31.1%		-4.3	1.0	5.2		49.8	48.3	43.6
<i>votes for office</i>					52.5	60.7	60.7		68.0	69.1	69.1
<b>District 95 (Saginaw)</b>											
Amos O'Neal	D	AA	70.1%		111.7	99.2	96.6		34.7	41.1	42.7
Charlotte DeMaet	R	W	29.9%		-11.5	0.9	3.4		65.2	58.9	57.3
<i>votes for office</i>					59.0	60.6	60.6		62.9	61.5	61.5

Recent Democratic Primaries: Congress			Estimates for Black Voters			Estimates for White Voters		
	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI	HP	ER	EI
<b>2018</b>								
<b>Congressional District 13</b>								
Ian Conyers	B	6.6	8.3	9.1	9.3		1.3	1.1
Shanelle Jackson	B	5.4	7.7	7.1	7.5		1.6	1.2
Brenda Jones	B	30.2	42.5	43.7	43.5		2.9	5.3
Rashinda Tlaib	ME	31.2	22.3	21.3	22.4		48.1	45.3
Bill Wild	W	14.1	1.6	-1.4	0.7		46.2	43.9
Coleman Young II	B	12.5	17.7	20.1	18.9		-0.3	1.1
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			23.0	22.2	24.3		12.2	14.1
<b>2020</b>								
<b>Congressional District 12</b>								
Debbie Dingell	W	80.9		81.4	81.2		87.9	87.7
Solomon Rajput	A	19.1		18.9	19.0		12.1	12.2
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				18.8	24.2		13.6	13.1
<b>Congressional District 13</b>								
Brenda Jones	B	33.7	37.8	37.7	37.3		27.0	27.9
Rashida Tlaib	ME	66.3	62.2	62.3	62.7		72.9	72.1
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			28.0	26.7	29.5		14.1	15.8
<b>Congressional District 14</b>								
Brenda Lawrence	B	93.2	92.7	92.7	92.8	92.1	91.6	92.0
Terrance Morrison		6.8	7.3	7.3	7.5	7.9	8.4	8.7
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			25.9	23.7	28.0	22.4	13.3	18.5

Recent Democratic Primaries: 2018 State Senate			Estimates for Black Voters			Estimates for White Voters		
	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI	HP	ER	EI
<b>State Senate District 1 (Wayne)</b>								
Stephanie Chang	A	49.8	24.6	23.5	27.1	71.6	79.2	76.7
James Cole	B	5.2	6.2	7.8	6.2	4.3	3.6	3.9
Nicholas Rivera	H	2.9	1.3	0.9	0.8	4.3	5.9	5.2
Stephanie Roehm		4.4	2.1	1.0	1.5	8.6	9.9	8.7
Bettie Cook Scott	B	11.2	18.2	17.9	15.7	6.6	17.0	6.1
Alberta Tinsley Talabi	B	26.4	47.7	48.9	47.1	4.7	-2.7	2.9
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			20.0	20.9	23.3	17.4	13.3	13.9
<b>State Senate District 3 (Wayne)</b>								
Anita Belle	B	14.3	23.7	25.5	25.4	4.9	1.9	1.9
Terry Burrell	W	5.5	8.5	8.6	8.4	3.9	2.1	2.2
Sylvia Santana	B	41.5	56.6	60.2	60.3	20.2	19.9	18.7
Gary Woronchak	W	38.7	11.2	5.7	8.0	71.0	76.2	76.0
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			18.7	16.8	17.9	17.2	17.3	17.8
<b>State Senate District 4 (Wayne)</b>								
Marshall Bullock	B	44.3	46.8	44.5	47.2		39.2	38.6
Fred Durhal	B	38.3	39.4	42.6	40.6		30.8	31.3
Carron Pinkins	B	17.5	13.8	12.8	12.6		30.0	29.1
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			21.5	21.8	26.3		8.7	10.5
<b>State Senate District 5 (Wayne)</b>								
Betty Jean Alexander	B	54.5	66.9	69.1	68.1		27.2	27.5
David Knezek	W	45.5	33.1	30.9	31.9		72.8	72.6
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			22.2	21.6	23.1		10.7	11.4
<b>State Senate District 6</b>								
Erika Geiss	B	65.4		86.1	89.5		55.6	55.9
Robert Kosowski	W	34.6		13.9	10.3		44.4	44.0
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				19.5	18.0		12.4	14.3
<b>State Senate District 11 (Oakland)</b>								
Crystal Bailey	B	21.2	36.6	27.0	24.9	7.9	16.7	17.3
Jeremy Moss	W	51.8	35.4	49.0	53.1	78.1	51.9	51.0
Vanessa Moss	B	18.5	20.2	17.5	16.2	10.2	20.4	20.3
James Turner	B	8.6	7.8	6.5	5.8	3.7	11.0	10.9
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			29.0	30.8	33.4	43.3	20.5	20.6

## **APPENDIX C**

Detroit area			Estimates for Hispanics	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>2020 General</b>				
<b>U.S. President</b>				
Joseph Biden	D	W	75.4	76.0
Donald Trump	R	W	24.3	23.9
others			0.3	0.2
<i>votes for office</i>			13.9	14.8
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Gary Peters	D	W	73.6	74.8
John James	R	W	22.6	21.9
others			3.8	3.2
<i>votes for office</i>			13.5	14.6
<b>2018 General</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	83.1	80.0
Bill Schuette	R	W	15.3	14.8
others			1.5	1.8
<i>votes for office</i>			3.5	5.1
<b>Secretary of State</b>				
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	84.0	82.6
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	14.4	13.5
others			1.7	14.0
<i>votes for office</i>			3.3	4.4
<b>Attorney General</b>				
Dana Nessel	D	W	80.1	78.9
Tom Leonard	R	W	16.4	15.2
others			3.4	3.7
<i>votes for office</i>			3.4	4.8

Detroit area			Estimates for Hispanics	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	82.5	82.2
John James	R	W	16.4	17.1
others			1.3	0.0
<i>votes for office</i>			3.3	4.5
<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	55.5	58.5
Shri Thanedar	D	A	13.6	12.7
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	30.8	28.7
<i>votes for office</i>			-2.0	1.0

Grand Rapids area			Estimates for Hispanics	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>2020 General</b>				
<b>U.S. President</b>				
Joseph Biden	D	W	98.6	94.8
Donald Trump	R	W	0.5	0.1
others			1.0	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>0.0</i>	<i>8.6</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Gary Peters	D	W	96.1	93.3
John James	R	W	-1.6	3.2
others			5.3	9.2
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>0.0</i>	<i>7.3</i>
<b>2018 General</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	99.5	95.0
Bill Schuette	R	W	-4.5	1.6
others			5.6	6.1
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>-9.0</i>	<i>1.1</i>
<b>Secretary of State</b>				
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	102.1	97.0
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	-5.3	1.1
others			3.3	6.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>-9.0</i>	<i>0.3</i>
<b>Attorney General</b>				
Dana Nessel	D	W	97.2	93.1
Tom Leonard	R	W	-6.4	1.2
others			9.3	9.8
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>-9.0</i>	<i>0.8</i>

Grand Rapids area			Estimates for Hispanics	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	97.2	93.2
John James	R	W	-3.4	2.0
others			6.2	10.4
<i>votes for office</i>			-9.0	1.1
<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	51.1	51.3
Shri Thanedar	D	A	39.8	42.4
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	8.9	11.9
<i>votes for office</i>			-2.3	0.1

			Estimates for Arab Americans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>2020 General</b>				
<b>U.S. President</b>				
Joseph Biden	D	W	98.3	98.9
Donald Trump	R	W	1.3	0.8
others			0.6	1.0
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>24.1</i>	<i>26.7</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Gary Peters	D	W	100.7	99.0
John James	R	W	-2.9	0.8
others			2.1	2.1
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>22.2</i>	<i>24.9</i>
<b>2018 General</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	103.9	99.3
Bill Schuette	R	W	-6.2	1.1
others			2.5	2.1
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>8.6</i>	<i>10.3</i>
<b>Secretary of State</b>				
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	104.7	99.3
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	-6.3	0.9
others			1.7	1.7
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>8.5</i>	<i>9.8</i>
<b>Attorney General</b>				
Dana Nessel	D	W	106.8	99.5
Tom Leonard	R	W	-8.0	0.6
others			1.3	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>8.6</i>	<i>10.1</i>

			Estimates for Arab Americans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	107.2	99.1
John James	R	W	-9.0	1.1
others			1.9	1.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>8.4</i>	<i>10.0</i>
<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	116.4	92.8
Shri Thanedar	D	A	-0.3	0.2
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	-16.0	0.6
<i>votes for office</i>			15.0	15.1

			Estimates for Chaldeans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>2020 General</b>				
<b>U.S. President</b>				
Joseph Biden	D	W	19.5	20.5
Donald Trump	R	W	81.9	80.3
others			-0.8	2.0
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>31.2</i>	<i>29.6</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Gary Peters	D	W	26.3	26.2
John James	R	W	74.0	72.8
others			-0.6	0.2
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>27.9</i>	<i>27.2</i>
<b>2018 General</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	52.9	48.9
Bill Schuette	R	W	47.9	47.4
others			0.2	8.0
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>-12.2</i>	<i>0.0</i>
<b>Secretary of State</b>				
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	55.3	53.7
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	44.7	42.0
others			0.4	7.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>-10.8</i>	<i>0.3</i>
<b>Attorney General</b>				
Dana Nessel	D	W	52.5	48.0
Tom Leonard	R	W	47.4	47.4
others			0.4	0.1
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>-10.3</i>	<i>2.5</i>

			Estimates for Chaldeans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	55.2	55.6
John James	R	W	43.2	44.0
others			0.7	0.9
<i>votes for office</i>			-11.4	0.4
<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	50.1	na
Shri Thanedar	D	A	11.2	na
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	38.7	na
<i>votes for office</i>			-1.1	0.1

			Estimates for Bangladeshi Americans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>2020 General</b>				
<b>U.S. President</b>				
Joseph Biden	D	W	104.7	96.1
Donald Trump	R	W	-4.4	3.2
others			0.1	0.1
<i>votes for office</i>			31.6	25.2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Gary Peters	D	W	104.4	96.2
John James	R	W	-5.2	3.3
others			0.9	1.1
<i>votes for office</i>			31.6	24.6
<b>2018 General</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	105.7	99.1
Bill Schuette	R	W	-7.4	1.1
others			1.1	1.1
<i>votes for office</i>			13.7	18.7
<b>Secretary of State</b>				
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	105.7	98.9
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	-7.1	1.3
others			2.5	2.4
<i>votes for office</i>			13.9	19.3
<b>Attorney General</b>				
Dana Nessel	D	W	107.5	98.2
Tom Leonard	R	W	-8.0	0.7
others			2.3	2.3
<i>votes for office</i>			13.8	19.2

			Estimates for Bangladeshi Americans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	107.1	99.1
John James	R	W	-7.7	0.9
others			1.7	0.7
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>13.9</i>	<i>18.4</i>
<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	98.8	97.3
Shri Thanedar	D	A	6.5	5.1
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	-5.2	4.5
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>16.4</i>	<i>14.7</i>

# **Report to the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission**

## **Dr. Lisa Handley**

### **Preface**

This report outlines the analyses I conducted on behalf of the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (MICRC) and relays my findings. I also briefly explain the partisan fairness measures I advised the MICRC to adopt as a component of the redistricting software and why I made these recommendations. The legal implications of my findings and the assessment of any proposed plans have been left to the MICRC legal team.

### **I. The Voting Rights Act and Racially Polarized Voting**

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits any voting standard, practice or procedure . including redistricting plans – that result in the denial or dilution of minority voting strength. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was amended in 1982 to establish that intentional discrimination need not be proven (as the Supreme Court determined was required under the 15<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the Constitution). The U.S. Supreme Court first interpreted the amended Act in *Thornburg v. Gingles*,<sup>1</sup> a challenge to the 1982 North Carolina state legislative plans. In this case the U.S. Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must satisfy three preconditions to qualify for relief:

- The minority group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single-member district
- The minority group must be politically cohesive
- Whites must vote as a bloc to usually defeat the minority-preferred candidates

What do we mean when we say minority voters must be politically cohesive? And how do we know if white voters usually vote as a bloc to defeat the candidates preferred by minority voters? According to the Court, racially polarized voting is the “evidentiary linchpin” of a vote dilution claim. Voting is racially polarized if minorities and whites consistently vote for different candidates. More specifically, if minorities consistently support the same candidates, they are said to be politically cohesive. If whites are consistently *not* supporting these candidates, they are said to be bloc voting against the minority-preferred candidates.

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<sup>1</sup> 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

The Voting Rights Act requires a state or local jurisdiction to create districts that provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice if voting is racially polarized and the candidates preferred by minority voters usually lose. If districts that provide minority voters with the opportunity to elect their preferred candidates already exist, these must be maintained.

### **A. Analyzing Voting Patterns by Race**

An analysis of voting patterns by race serves as the foundation of two of the three elements of the “results test” as outlined in *Gingles*: a racial bloc voting analysis is needed to determine whether the minority group is politically cohesive; and the analysis is required to determine if whites are voting sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat the candidates preferred by minority voters. The voting patterns of white and minority voters must be estimated using statistical techniques because direct information the race of the voters is not, of course, available on the ballots cast.

To carry out an analysis of voting patterns by race, an aggregate level database must be constructed, usually employing election precincts as the units of observation. Information relating to the demographic composition and election results in these precincts is collected, merged and statistically analyzed to determine if there is a relationship between the racial composition of the precincts and support for specific candidates across the precincts.

***Standard Statistical Techniques*** Three standard statistical techniques have been developed over time to estimate vote choices by race: homogeneous precinct analysis, ecological regression, and ecological inference.<sup>2</sup> Two of these analytic procedures – homogeneous precinct analysis and ecological regression – were employed by the plaintiffs’ expert in *Gingles*, have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s approval in that case, and have been used in most subsequent voting rights cases. The third technique, ecological inference, was developed after the *Gingles* decision and was designed, in part, to address some of the disadvantages associated with ecological regression analysis. Ecological inference analysis has been introduced and accepted in numerous court proceedings.

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<sup>2</sup> For a detailed explanation of homogenous precinct analysis and ecological regression see Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi, *Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality* (Cambridge University Press, 1992). See Gary King, *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem* (Princeton University Press, 1997) for a more detailed explanation of ecological inference.

Homogeneous precinct (HP) analysis is the simplest technique. It involves comparing the percentage of votes received by each of the candidates in precincts that are racially or ethnically homogeneous. The general practice is to label a precinct as homogeneous if at least 90 percent of the voting age population is composed of a single race.<sup>3</sup> In fact, the homogeneous results reported are not estimates – they are the actual precinct results. However, most voters in Michigan do not reside in homogeneous precincts and voters who reside in homogeneous precincts may not be representative of voters who live in more racially diverse precincts. For this reason, I refer to these percentages as estimates.

The second statistical technique employed, ecological regression (ER), uses information from all precincts, not simply the homogeneous ones, to derive estimates of the voting behavior of minorities and whites. If there is a strong linear relationship across precincts between the percentage of minorities and the percentage of votes cast for a given candidate, this relationship can be used to estimate the percentage of minority (and white) voters supporting the candidate.

The third technique, ecological inference (EI), was developed by Professor Gary King. This approach also uses information from all precincts but, unlike ecological regression, it does not rely on an assumption of linearity. Instead, it incorporates maximum likelihood statistics to produce estimates of voting patterns by race. In addition, it utilizes the method of bounds, which uses more of the available information from the precinct returns as well as providing more information about the voting behavior being estimated.<sup>4</sup> Unlike ecological regression, which can produce percentage estimates of less than 0 or more than 100 percent, ecological inference was designed to produce only estimates that fall within the possible limits. However, EI does not guarantee that the estimates for all of the candidates add to 100 percent for each of the racial groups examined.

In conducting my analysis of voting patterns by race in statewide elections in Michigan, I also used a more recently developed version of ecological inference, which I have labeled “EI

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<sup>3</sup> If turnout or registration by race is available, this information is used to identify homogenous precincts.

<sup>4</sup> The following is an example of how the method of bounds works: if a given precinct has 100 voters, of whom 75 are Black and 25 are white, and the Black candidate received 80 votes, then at least 55 of the Black voters voted for the Black candidate and at most all 75 did. (The method of bounds is less useful for calculating estimates for white voters in this example as anywhere between none of the whites and all of the whites could have voted for the candidate.)

RxC” in the summary tables found in the Appendices at the end of the report. EI RxC expands the analysis so that more than two racial/ethnic groups can be considered simultaneously. It also allows us to take into account differences in the relative rates of minority and white turnout when, as is the case in Michigan, we do not have turnout by race but instead must rely on voting age population by race to derive estimates of minority and white support for each of the candidates.

**Database** To analyze voting patterns by race using aggregate level information, a database that combines election results with demographic information is required. This database is almost always constructed using election precincts as the unit of analysis. The demographic composition of the precincts is based on voter registration or turnout by race/ethnicity if this information is available; if it is not, then voting or citizen voting age population is used. Michigan does not collect voter registration data by race and therefore voting age population (VAP) by race and ethnicity as reported in the PL94-171 census redistricting data was used for ascertaining the demographic composition of the precincts.<sup>5</sup>

The precinct election returns for the general elections, as well as precinct shape files, census block-to-precinct assignment files,<sup>6</sup> and election results disaggregated to the block level were supplied by the Michigan Secretary of State. The Democratic primary results had to be collected county by county and were either downloaded directly or cut and pasted from pdf files.

**Geographic areas** Producing reliable estimates of voting patterns by race requires an adequate number of minority and white voters, an adequate number of election precincts, and sufficient variation in the percentage of minority and white voters across the precincts. Only a few counties in Michigan satisfied these conditions, and only for one group of minority voters – Black voters. It was not possible to produce reliable statewide or countywide estimates for Hispanic or Asian voters in Michigan. However, estimates for Hispanics, as well as some additional minority groups, were produced for very localized areas in Michigan and this analysis is discussed below in a separate section entitled “Voting Patterns of Minority Voters other than Black Voters.” As a

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<sup>5</sup> Since the only minority group sufficiently large enough in the State of Michigan to produce estimates of voting patterns is Black residents and there is not a high non-citizenship rate to account for when conducting the analysis, estimates of citizen voting age population by race were not included in the database.

<sup>6</sup> Shape files and block-to-precinct equivalency files made it possible to account for changes in precinct boundaries, and therefore precinct demographics, over time.

consequence of the three limitations listed above, I was able to reliably estimate the voting patterns of Blacks and whites statewide and in the four counties: Wayne, Oakland, Genesee, and Saginaw.

***Elections analyzed*** All statewide elections held in the State during the preceding decade (2012-2020) were analyzed, both for voters within the state as a whole and in the four counties that had a sufficient number of Black VAP conduct the analysis – Wayne, Oakland, Genesee, and Saginaw. The general elections analyzed included: U.S. President (2012, 2016, 2020), U.S. Senate (2012, 2014, 2018, 2020), and the statewide offices of Governor, Secretary of State, and Attorney General in 2014 and 2018.

Four of these contests included African American candidates:<sup>7</sup> the 2012 presidential election, the 2014 election contest for Secretary of State, and the U.S. Senate contests in 2018 and 2020. Only two of these four contests included African American candidates supported by Black voters, however: Barack Obama in his bid for re-election in 2012 and Godfrey Dillard in his race for Secretary of State in 2014. John James, an African American Republican who ran for U.S. Senate in 2018 and 2020, was not the candidate of choice of Black voters. In addition, two election contests included African American candidates as running mates: the 2018 gubernatorial race in which Garlin Gilchrist ran for Lieutenant Governor and Gretchen Whitmer as Governor, and the 2020 presidential race in which Kamala Harris ran for Vice President. Both sets of running mates were strongly supported by Black voters.

There was only one statewide Democratic primary for statewide office the previous decade: the 2018 race for governor. I analyzed this Democratic primary (as well as congressional and state legislative Democratic primaries) and not Republican primaries because the overwhelming majority of Black voters who choose to vote in primaries cast their ballots in Democratic rather than Republican primaries. As a consequence, Democratic primaries are far more probative than Republican primaries for ascertaining the candidates preferred by Black voters.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, this

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<sup>7</sup> Courts consider election contests that include minority candidates more probative than contests that include only white candidates for determining if voting is racially polarized. This is because it is not sufficient for minority voters to be able to elect their candidates of choice only if these candidates are white. On the other hand, it is important to recognize that not all minority candidates are the preferred candidates of minority voters.

<sup>8</sup> In addition, producing reliable estimates for Black voters in Republican primaries would not have been possible.

primary included two minority candidates: Abdul El-Sayed, who is of Egyptian descent, and Shri Thanedar, who is Indian-American.

In addition to these statewide elections, I also analyzed recent congressional and state legislative elections in districts that fell within Wayne, Oakland, Saginaw and Genesee Counties and had a Black VAP that was large enough to produce reliable estimates.<sup>9</sup> Because of the very substantial changes in district boundaries between the current district boundaries and any of the proposed district plan boundaries, these election contests cannot be considered indicative of voting patterns in any proposed districts. However, they are important for at least two reasons. First, although few minority candidates ran for office statewide, there were many who ran in legislative elections, especially in Wayne County. Second, while there was only one statewide Democratic primary conducted over the course of the previous decade, there have been numerous recent Democratic primaries for congressional and state legislative office.

## **B. Statewide and County Results**

Table 1, below, lists the number of statewide election contests that were racially polarized, both for Michigan as a whole, and for each of the four counties considered individually. This tabulation is based on the racial bloc voting summary tables found in Appendix A. The second column indicates the number of contests that included African American candidates that were polarized (over the total number of contests with African American candidates), the third column is the number of statewide general elections (out of the 13 analyzed) that were polarized and the final column reports the results of the only statewide Democratic primary.

Statewide, all election contests other than the 2012 US. Senate race won by Debbie Stabenow were racially polarized. (Her 2018 election contest, however, was racially polarized.) The candidate who obtained the lowest vote percentage statewide was African American candidate for Secretary of State in 2014, Godfrey Dillard. This was because he received less white crossover votes than any other candidate – the percentage of Black voters supporting him was comparable to the percentage of Black voters supporting the other Democratic candidates competing statewide.

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<sup>9</sup> In some state house districts, there was not enough whites of voting age to conduct an analysis of voting patterns by race.

**Table 1: Number of Statewide Elections Analyzed that were Polarized**

	General Elections with Minority Candidates	All Statewide General Election Contests	Statewide Democratic Primary
Statewide	6/6	12/13	1/1
Genesee	5/6	9/13	1/1
Saginaw	6/6	11/13	1/1
Oakland	6/6	13/13	0/1
Wayne	3/6	7/13	1/1

Every statewide general election contest analyzed was polarized in Oakland County – only in the Democratic primary for Governor in 2018 did Black and white voters support the same candidate (Gretchen Whitmer). Voting in Saginaw County was nearly as polarized: two U.S. Senate contests (2012 and 2014) were not polarized, but the gubernatorial primary was polarized. Black and white voters agreed on the same candidates slightly more often in Genesee County – in addition to supporting U.S. senate candidates Debbie Stabenow in 2012 and Gary Peters in 2014, they both supported Barack Obama in 2012 and Democrat Mark Schauer for Governor in 2014.

Voting in Wayne County was considerably less racially polarized than statewide or in the other three counties studied. However, slightly more than half of the general election contests and the one statewide Democratic primary analyzed were polarized, with Black and white voters supporting the same candidates in 2012, disagreeing on the three statewide offices, but supporting the same U.S. Senate candidate in 2014, supporting different candidates for U.S. President in 2016 and 2020, and voting for most of the same candidates in 2018.

### **C. Congressional and State Legislative Election Results**

This section provides a summary of my racial bloc voting analysis of recent congressional and state legislative districts in the four-county area of Wayne, Oakland, Genesee and Saginaw. I analyzed 2018 and 2020 general elections, and the 2018 and 2020 Democratic primaries if at least one African American candidate competed in the election contest. However, for a number of state

legislative elections, there were too many candidates and too few votes cast to obtain reliable estimates. In addition, there were three state house districts – districts 3, 7, 8 – where there were an insufficient number of white voters to produce reliable estimates. The summary tables reporting each of estimates for these contests are found in Appendix B.

Table 2, below, summarizes the congressional district results for congressional districts 5, 9, 12, 13 and 14.<sup>10</sup> In most instances, voting was not racially polarized – in 80% of the general elections and 75% of the contested Democratic primaries analyzed, Black and white voters supported the same candidates. Three of the contests analyzed were, however, polarized. The Black-preferred candidate won two of these contests: Districts 5 and 13 in the 2020 general election. The other polarized contest was the 2018 bid for the Democratic nomination for full two-year term the in District 13. Six candidates competed in this contest, four African American candidates, including the candidate of choice of a plurality of Black voters, Brenda Jones; Bill Wild, a white candidate; and Rashida Tlaib, an American of Palestinian descent. White voters divided their votes between Wild and Tlaib. Tlaib won the nomination with 27,841 votes (31.17%), and Benda Jones came in a close second with 26,941 votes (30.16%).<sup>11</sup>

**Table 2: Summary of Congressional District Racial Bloc Voting Analysis**

<b>Congress District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Percent BVAP</b>	<b>2018 Democratic primary</b>	<b>2018 General election</b>	<b>2020 Democratic primary</b>	<b>2020 General election</b>
5	Genesee & Saginaw, plus	16.63	no contest	not polarized	no contest	polarized - won
9	Oakland & Macomb	13.83	only white candidates	not polarized	no contest	not polarized
12	Wayne & Washtenaw	11.73	no contest	not polarized	not polarized	not polarized

<sup>10</sup> Congressional District 11, which is also located in the area of interest (Oakland and Wayne), as well as Districts 8 (partially in Oakland) and 4 (partially in Saginaw), had too few Black voters to produce reliable estimates of their vote choices.

<sup>11</sup> A special election for filling the partial term for District 13 – left vacant when John Conyers resigned – was conducted at the same time with many of the same candidates. Brenda Jones won this contest with 32,769 (37.75%) votes; Rashida Tlaib came in second with 31,121 (35.85%) votes.

<b>Congress District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Percent BVAP</b>	<b>2018 Democratic primary</b>	<b>2018 General election</b>	<b>2020 Democratic primary</b>	<b>2020 General election</b>
13	Wayne	54.78	polarized - lost	not polarized	not polarized	polarized - won
14	Wayne & Oakland	55.16	no contest	not polarized	not polarized	not polarized

The results of my analysis recent state senate elections is found in Table 3, below. There were no Democratic primaries in two districts (12 and 27), and no minority candidates competed in a third (District 32). In addition, there was one Democratic primary in which 11 candidates competed – too many to produce reliable estimates. Of the 16 contests analyzed, 10 were not polarized (three primaries and seven general elections), four were polarized but the Black-preferred candidate won (two primaries and two generals), and two were polarized and the candidates of choice of Black voters lost. One of these contests was the general election in District 32, which has only 13.45% BVAP.<sup>12</sup> The other polarized contest that the Black-preferred candidate lost was the Democratic primary in State Senate District 1 in 2018. Six candidates competed in this election. The plurality choice of Black voters was African American candidate, Alberta Tinsley Talabi. A very large majority of white voters supported the Asian candidates, Stephanie Chang, who was the second choice of Black voters. Chang won with 49.8% of the vote (Talabi received 26.4%).

**Table 3: Summary of State Senate District Racial Bloc Voting Analysis**

<b>State Senate District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Percent BVAP</b>	<b>2018 Democratic primary</b>	<b>2018 General election</b>
1	Wayne	44.68	polarized - lost	not polarized
2	Wayne	50.82	<i>na</i> (11 candidates)	not polarized

<sup>12</sup> The Black VAP percentages listed throughout this report are from the MICRC redistricting GIS active matrix tab labeled “5A,” which indicates the percentage of non-Hispanic voting age population who indicated they were Black or Black in combination with any other race. This produces the maximum number of individuals within each racial group, including Black, but will result in totals over 100% since persons identifying as more than one race will be counted more than once.

<b>State Senate District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Percent BVAP</b>	<b>2018 Democratic primary</b>	<b>2018 General election</b>
3	Wayne	48.14	polarized - won	not polarized
4	Wayne	47.00	not polarized	not polarized
5	Wayne	54.25	polarized - won	not polarized
6	Wayne	21.29	not polarized	polarized - won
11	Oakland	35.48	not polarized	not polarized
12	Oakland	14.87	no contest	polarized - won
27	Genesee	30.42	no contest	not polarized
32	Genesee & Saginaw	13.45	no minority candidates	polarized - lost

The final table in this section, Table 4, summarized the results of my analysis of recent state house election. A number of the cells in the table have “na” as an entry because estimates are not available. This was for one of two reasons: there were too many candidates and too few votes cast to obtain reliable estimates, or there were an insufficient number of white voters to produce reliable estimates (state house districts 3, 7, 8).

It was possible to produce estimates for 54 contests. The majority of these contests were not polarized – in 37 contests (68.5%), white and Black voters supported the same candidates. In another 13 contests, voting was polarized but the candidate preferred by Black voters won. There were four contests – all Democratic primaries – that were racially polarized and the Black-preferred candidate lost. In three of these contests, the BVAP of the districts was less than 30% (Districts 12, 16, and 37). The Black-preferred candidates also lost the 2018 Democratic primary in House District 29, which has a 36.04% BVAP. All six of the candidates competing were African Americans. The plurality choice of Black voters was Kermit Williams; Brenda Carter was the candidate of choice of a majority of white voters. Carter won with 30.7% of the vote and Williams came in second with 24.7% of the vote.

**Table 4: Summary of State House District Racial Bloc Voting Analysis**

State House District	Location	Percent BVAP	2018 Democratic primary	2018 General election	2020 Democratic primary	2020 General election
1	Wayne	64.76	not polarized	polarized - won	no contest	polarized - won
2	Wayne	57.70	<i>na</i> (7 candidates)	not polarized	not polarized	not polarized
3	Wayne	90.93	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>
4	Wayne	47.27	<i>na</i> (15 candidates)	not polarized	<i>na</i> (13 candidates)	not polarized
5	Wayne	54.12	polarized - won	not polarized	not polarized	not polarized
6	Wayne	52.86	<i>na</i> (10 candidates)	not polarized	polarized - won	no contest
7	Wayne	94.27	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>
8	Wayne	92.42	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>
9	Wayne	74.22	not polarized	not polarized	polarized - won	not polarized
10	Wayne	67.41	not polarized	not polarized	<i>na</i> (8 candidates)	not polarized
11	Wayne	26.53	polarized - won	not polarized	no contest	not polarized
12	Wayne	26.97	polarized - lost	polarized - won	not polarized	polarized - won
16	Wayne	23.25	polarized - lost	not polarized	no contest	not polarized
27	Oakland	24.35	not polarized	not polarized	<i>na</i> (8 candidates)	not polarized

State House District	Location	Percent BVAP	2018 Democratic primary	2018 General election	2020 Democratic primary	2020 General election
29	Oakland	36.04	polarized - lost	not polarized	no contest	not polarized
35	Oakland	62.50	polarized - won	not polarized	not polarized	not polarized
37	Oakland	17.91	no contest	not polarized	polarized - lost	not polarized
34	Genesee	60.96	not polarized	polarized - won	not polarized	polarized - won
49	Genesee	29.47	not polarized	not polarized	no contest	not polarized
95	Saginaw	35.50	no contest	not polarized	polarized - won	polarized - won

#### **D. Voting Patterns of Minority Voters other than Black Voters**

As noted above, it was not possible to produce estimates of voting patterns by race for any groups other than Blacks and whites (more specifically, non-Hispanic whites) statewide or by county. However, by localizing the analysis in geographic areas much smaller than counties, it was possible to derive estimates for several additional minority groups: Hispanics, Arab Americans, Chaldeans, and Bangladeshi Americans.<sup>13</sup> Because these estimates could not be generated statewide, it is difficult to know if the voters included in the analysis are representative of the group as a whole statewide. The summary tables reporting the estimates for these groups can be found in the Appendix C.



***Hispanic Voters*** Hispanics live in large enough concentrations to produce estimates in two areas of Michigan. Because these concentrations are in different areas of the state, I did not combine them. Instead, I have produced estimates for Hispanics living in the area of Detroit depicted in the first map below (“Areas included in Analysis of Voting Patterns – Hispanics

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<sup>13</sup> Interest in the voting patterns of Arab Americans, Chaldeans and Bangladeshi Americans was prompted by comments received in public hearings and on the public portal.

(Detroit)) and in the Grand Rapids area depicted in the second map (“Areas included in Analysis of Voting Patterns – Hispanics in Grand Rapids”). In both maps, the precincts are shaded based on the percentage Hispanic in the precinct.<sup>14</sup>


While the voting patterns do not appear to be very different – both groups provide strong support for Democratic candidates in general elections – the turnout levels differ. In the Grand Rapids area, turnout among Hispanics of voting age is lower than it is in the Detroit area.



<sup>14</sup> The Hispanic VAP used for shading the map and conducting the racial bloc voting analysis was derived from the 2020 94-171 census redistricting data, which reports Hispanic VAP by census block. This data was then aggregated up to the precinct level.


**Arab American Voters** Approximately 38% of the Arab American population in Michigan is concentrated in the Dearborn and Dearborn Heights area. Localizing the racial bloc voting analysis to this specific area offered sufficient variation across the precincts to produce estimates of the voting behavior of this group. The map below indicates the geographic area included in the analysis; the precincts are shaded by the percentage of residents who are Arab American.<sup>15</sup>

Arab Americans voters, at least in this area of Michigan, strongly support Democratic candidates in general elections – over 80% consistently supported the Democratic candidate in the six 2018-2020 general elections examined. These voters, unlike other groups of voters studied, were also very cohesive in 2018 Democratic primary for Governor – they strongly supported of Abdul El-Sayed in his bid for the nomination.




<sup>15</sup> The Arab American data was derived from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS), Table B04004, “People Reporting Single Ancestry.” This data, reported at the census tract level, was attributed down to the census block level and then aggregated up to the election precinct level.

*Chaldeans*, like Arab Americans in Michigan, tend to reside in a geographically concentrated area of Michigan – in this instance, Sterling Heights. Over 40% of the Chaldean population can be found here.<sup>16</sup> Localizing the voting analysis to Sterling Heights produced reliable estimates of the voting patterns of this community. Chaldeans are not nearly as cohesive as Arab Americans – they consistently divided their support between the Democratic and Republican candidates. However, a clear majority of Chaldean voters supported Donald Trump in his bid for re-election in 2020.



<sup>16</sup> The Chaldean data was derived from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS), Table B04004, “People Reporting Single Ancestry” using the Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac designation. This census tract level data was attributed down to the census block level and then aggregated up to the election precinct level.

**Bangladeshi American Voters** Using a map identifying the Bangladeshi American community of interest submitted to the MICRC,<sup>17</sup> this localized analysis focused on West Warren and Hamtramck to produce estimates of the vote choices of this group. Bangladeshi American voting patterns are very similar to Arab American voting patterns.<sup>18</sup> Both groups provided strong support for Democratic candidates in general elections and both groups were cohesive in their support of Abdul El-Sayed in the 2018 Democratic primary for Governor.



<sup>17</sup> The map was submitted on the public comment portal on 9/8/2021 by Hayg Oshagan with the following comment “This is the Bengali community of SE MI. The area around Hamtramck (to the South) is most densely populated and is the center of the community.”

<sup>18</sup> Asian VAP by census block as reported by the 2020 94-171 census redistricting data was used to create the shading on the map and the racial bloc voting database.

## II. Drawing Minority Opportunity Districts

Because voting in Michigan is racially polarized, districts that provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice must be drawn. If they already exist – as many do in Michigan – they must be maintained. But maintaining minority opportunity districts does not necessarily require that the districts be redrawn with the same percentage minority voting age population. In fact, many of the minority districts in the current plan are packed with far more Black VAP than needed to elect candidates of choice, as indicated by the percentage of votes the minority candidates are garnering. (See Tables 9 and 10, in the next section of this report, for the Black VAP of the current state house and senate districts, the current incumbents and their race and party, and the percentage of votes each of the incumbents received in 2020.)

An analysis must be undertaken to determine if a proposed district is likely to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice to office. This analysis must be district-specific – that is, must recognize there are likely to be differences in participation rates and voting patterns in districts across the state – and it must be functional – that is, it must be based on actual voting behavior of whites and minorities. There is no single universal or statewide demographic target that can be applied for Black voters to elect their candidates of choice in Michigan.<sup>19</sup>

There are two related approaches to conducting a district-specific, functional analysis, both of which take into account the relative turnout rates and voting patterns of minorities and whites. The first approach uses estimates derived from racial bloc voting analysis to calculate the percent minority population needed in a specific area for minority-preferred candidates to win a district in that area.

The second approach relies on election results from previous contests that included minority-preferred candidates (as identified by the racial bloc voting analysis) to determine if these candidates would win election in the proposed districts. The election results for these “bellwether elections” – racially polarized elections that include minority candidates who are preferred by minority voters – are disaggregated down from the election precinct to the census block level and then recompiled to reflect the boundaries of the proposed district. If the minority-

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<sup>19</sup> Establishing a demographic target (e.g., 55% black voting age population) for all minority districts across the jurisdiction was, in fact, expressly forbidden by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama*, 575 U.S. 254 (2015).

preferred candidates in these bellwether elections win in the proposed district, this district is likely to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. This latter approach can be used only if proposed district boundaries have been drawn. The former approach can be carried out before any new boundaries are drafted.

### **A. Calculating the Black VAP Needed to Elect Black-Preferred Candidates**

The percentage of minority voting age population needed in a district to provide minority voters with the opportunity to elect minority-preferred candidates to congress or to the state legislature varies. Using the estimates produced from the racial bloc voting analysis, I calculated the Black VAP percentages needed to elect minority-preferred candidates in each of the general elections included in the summary tables in the Appendix. This calculation takes into account the relative participation rates of age eligible Blacks and whites, as well as the level of Black support for the Black-preferred candidate (the "cohesiveness" of Black voters), and the level of whites "crossing over" to vote for the Black-preferred candidate.

***Equalizing minority and white turnout*** Because Blacks who are age eligible to vote often turn out to vote at lower rates than white voters in Michigan, the Black VAP needed to ensure that Black voters comprise at least half of the voters in an election is often higher than 50%. Once the respective turnout rates of Black and Whites eligible to vote have been estimated using the statistical techniques described above (HP, ER and EI), the percentage needed to equalize Black and white voters can be calculated mathematically.<sup>20</sup> But equalizing turnout is

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<sup>20</sup> The equalizing percentage is calculated mathematically by solving the following equation:

Let

M = the proportion of the district's voting age population that is Black

W = 1-M = the proportion of the district's voting age population that is white

A = the proportion of the Black voting age population that turned out to vote

B = the proportion of the white voting age population that turned out to vote

Therefore,

M(A) = the proportion of the population that is Black and turned out to vote (1)

(1-M)B = the proportion of total population that is white and turned out to vote (2)

To find the value of M that is needed for (1) and (2) to be equal, (1) and (2) are set as equal and we solve for M algebraically:

$$M(A) = (1 - M) B$$

$$M(A) = B - M(B)$$

$$M(A) + M(B) = B$$

$$M(A + B) = B$$

$$M = B / (A+B)$$

only the first step in the process – it does not take into account the voting patterns of Black and white voters. If voting is racially polarized but a significant number of white voters typically “crossover” to vote for Black voters’ preferred candidate, it may be the case that crossover voting can more than compensate for depressed Black turnout.

***Incorporating Minority Cohesion and White Crossover Voting*** Even if Black citizens are turning out at lower rates than whites, and voting is racially polarized, if a relatively consistent percentage of white voters support Black-preferred candidates, the candidates preferred by Black voters can be elected in districts that are less than majority Black. On the other hand, if voting is starkly polarized, with few or no whites crossing over to vote for the candidates supported by Black voters, it may be the case that a district that is more than 50% Black VAP is needed to elect Black-preferred candidates. A district-specific, functional analysis should take into account not only differences in turnout rates, but also the voting patterns of Black and white voters.<sup>21</sup>

To illustrate this mathematically, consider a district that has 1000 persons of voting age, 50% of who are Black and 50% of who are white. Let us begin by assuming that Black turnout is lower than white turnout in a two-candidate general election. In our hypothetical election example, 42% of the Black VAP turn out to vote and 60% of the white VAP vote. This means that, for our illustrative election, there are 210 Black voters and 300 white voters. Further suppose that 96% of the Black voters supported their candidate of choice and 25% of the white voters cast their votes for this candidate (with the other 75% supporting her opponent in the election contest). Thus, in our example, Black voters cast 200 of their 210 votes for the Black-preferred candidate and their other 8 votes for her opponent; white voters cast 75 of their 300 votes for the Black-preferred candidate and 225 votes for their preferred candidate:

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Thus, for example, if 39.3% of the Black population turned out and 48.3% of the white population turned out,  $B = .483$  and  $A = .393$ , and  $M = .483 / (.393 + .483) = .483 / .876 = .5513$ , therefore a Black VAP of 55.1% would produce an equal number of Black and white voters. (For a more in-depth discussion of equalizing turnout see Kimball Brace, Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi, “Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice,” *Law and Policy*, 10 (1), January 1988.)

<sup>21</sup> For an in-depth discussion of this approach to creating effective minority districts, see Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and David Lublin, “Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence,” *North Carolina Law Review*, volume 79 (5), June 2001.

	VAP	turnout	voters	support for Black- preferred candidate	votes for Black- preferred candidate	support for white- preferred candidate	votes for white- preferred candidate
Black	500	0.42	210	0.96	202	0.04	8
White	500	0.60	300	0.25	75	0.75	225
			510		277		233

The candidate of choice of Black voters would receive a total of 277 votes (202 from Black voters and 75 from white voters), while the candidate preferred by white voters would receive only 233 votes (8 from Black voters and 225 from white voters). The Black-preferred candidate would win the election with 55.4% (277/500) of the vote in this hypothetical 50% Black VAP district. And the Black-preferred candidate would be successful despite the fact that the election was racially polarized and that Blacks turned out to vote at a lower rate than whites.

The candidate of choice of Black voters would still win the election by a very small margin (50.9%) in a district that is 45% Black with these same voting patterns:

	VAP	turnout	voters	support for Black- preferred candidate	votes for Black- preferred candidate	support for white- preferred candidate	votes for white- preferred candidate
Black	450	0.42	189	0.96	181	0.04	8
White	550	0.60	330	0.25	83	0.75	248
			519		264		255

In a district with a 40% BVAP, however, the Black-preferred candidate would garner only 47.5% of the vote in this example.

***Percent Black VAP needed to win recent general elections in Michigan Counties***

Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 utilize the results of the racial bloc voting analysis (see Appendix A) to indicate the percentage of vote a Black-preferred candidate would receive, given the turnout rates of Blacks and whites and the degree of black cohesion and white crossover voting for each

general election contests examined, in a 55%, 50%, 45%, 40% and 35% BVAP district in Wayne, Oakland, Genesee, and Saginaw Counties.<sup>22</sup> Because voting patterns vary by county, the percentage of votes the Black-preferred candidates would receive also varies. However, in no county is a 50% BVAP district required for the Black-preferred candidates to carry the district in a general election.

Table 5 reports the percentage of votes the Black-preferred candidate would receive in Wayne County, given voting patterns in previous general elections. The Black-preferred candidate would win every general election in a district with a BVAP of 35% or more, and would win with at least 54.4% of the vote – and in most election contests, a substantially higher percentage of the vote. The variation in the percentage of votes received by the Black-preferred candidate is due to the variation in the white vote rather than the Black vote because in every election contest considered at least 95% of Black voters supported the Black-preferred candidate. The Black-preferred candidate of choice who would receive the lowest percentage of the vote would be African American Godfrey Dillard, a candidate for Secretary of State in 2014.

The voting patterns by race, and therefore the percent BVAP needed to win general elections is very similar in Genesee County, as shown in Table 6. Unlike Wayne County, however, the percentage of vote the Black-preferred candidate would garner in a 35% BVAP district in this county is declining slightly over the course of the decade – although the Black-preferred candidate would still win every general election in a 35% BVAP district.

In Oakland County, the Black-preferred candidate does not win every general election contest in a 35% BVAP district. It is not until the 40% BVAP column in Table 7 that the candidate of choice of Black voters wins every election examined. The most challenging election is again the race for Secretary of State in 2014. And even at 40% BVAP, Dillard would receive only 51.3% of the vote.

Saginaw County (Table 8) is similar to Oakland County in that it is only at 40% that the Black-preferred candidate wins every general election contest – and at 40% a couple of the contests are very close. Not only are the winning percentages for the Black-preferred candidates consistently lower in Saginaw County than they are for Oakland County, they have been decreasing over the course of the decade.

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<sup>22</sup> Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 are generated using EI RxC estimates reported in the racial bloc voting tables in the Appendix.

**Table 5: Percent BVAP Needed to Win, Wayne County**

WAYNE COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	tumout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes							
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	58.0	97.5	2.5	76.6	47.5	52.5	71.5	69.0	66.6	64.3	62.0
2020 US Senate	W	57.8	95.2	4.8	75.6	47.2	52.8	70.4	68.0	65.7	63.4	61.2
2018 Governor	W	33.2	97.0	3.0	63.2	53.5	46.5	70.5	68.5	66.6	64.8	63.1
2018 Secretary of State	W	33.1	97.0	3.0	62.2	53.6	46.4	70.7	68.7	66.8	65.0	63.3
2018 Attorney General	W	32.7	95.5	4.5	61.3	49.4	50.6	67.6	65.4	63.4	61.5	59.7
2018 US Senate	W	33.1	95.8	4.2	63.1	52.3	47.7	69.3	67.3	65.4	63.6	61.9
2016 President	W	57.0	98.4	1.6	64.0	39.7	60.3	70.3	67.4	64.4	61.6	58.7
2014 Governor	W	35.8	96.5	3.5	47.7	41.3	58.7	67.7	65.0	62.3	59.7	57.2
2014 Secretary of State	AA	35.5	96.8	3.2	46.1	36.8	63.2	65.9	62.9	60.0	57.2	54.4
2014 Attorney General	W	35.3	95.7	4.3	45.9	41.0	59.0	67.5	64.8	62.1	59.5	57.0
2014 US Senate	W	35.7	98.0	2.0	46.8	53.4	46.6	74.9	72.7	70.5	68.4	66.4
2012 President	AA	60.4	99.0	1.0	65.7	51.9	48.1	76.8	74.5	72.1	69.8	67.5
2012 US Senate	W	59.9	98.1	1.9	64.4	57.6	42.4	79.1	77.1	75.1	73.1	71.1

**Table 6: Percent BVAP Needed to Win, Genesee County**

GENESEE COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes							
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	53.0	96.1	3.9	79.6	42.1	57.9	66.3	63.7	61.1	58.7	56.4
2020 US Senate	W	56.6	95.0	5.0	78.7	43.5	56.5	67.6	65.0	62.6	60.2	57.9
2018 Governor	W	45.1	95.3	4.7	59.8	46.2	53.8	69.8	67.3	64.9	62.6	60.4
2018 Secretary of State	W	44.9	95.2	4.8	58.6	48.0	52.0	70.8	68.5	66.2	64.0	61.8
2018 Attorney General	W	44.6	94.1	5.9	58.4	41.1	58.9	66.7	64.0	61.5	59.0	56.5
2018 US Senate	W	45.1	95.2	4.8	59.6	45.8	54.2	69.5	67.1	64.7	62.4	60.1
2016 President	W	59.0	96.4	3.6	67.3	37.4	62.6	67.9	65.0	62.0	59.2	56.3
2014 Governor	W	35.8	95.8	4.2	47.5	51.8	48.2	72.9	70.7	68.6	66.5	64.5
2014 Secretary of State	AA	35.9	95.6	4.4	46.1	46.2	53.8	70.3	67.8	65.4	63.1	60.8
2014 Attorney General	W	35.9	95.6	4.4	45.5	45.2	54.8	69.9	67.4	65.0	62.6	60.2
2014 US Senate	W	36.1	95.6	4.4	47.1	58.6	41.4	76.5	74.7	72.9	71.1	69.4
2012 President	AA	61.0	97.6	2.4	68.4	53.7	46.3	76.6	74.4	72.2	70.1	67.9
2012 US Senate	W	60.7	96.7	3.3	67.5	60.2	39.8	79.3	77.5	75.7	73.9	72.1

**Table 7: Percent BVAP Needed to Win, Oakland County**

OAKLAND COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	tumout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes							
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	71.6	93.4	6.6	86.4	45.9	54.1	69.8	67.4	65.1	62.8	60.6
2020 US Senate	W	71.4	92.1	7.9	85.4	43.5	56.5	68.1	65.6	63.2	60.9	58.6
2018 Governor	W	53.2	94.1	5.9	68.8	47.4	52.6	70.1	67.8	65.5	63.3	61.1
2018 Secretary of State	W	53.1	94.2	5.8	67.7	47.5	52.5	70.4	68.0	65.8	63.5	61.4
2018 Attorney General	W	52.5	93.8	6.2	67.0	43.0	57.0	67.9	65.3	62.8	60.4	58.1
2018 US Senate	W	53.2	93.0	7.0	68.7	45.5	54.5	68.6	66.2	63.9	61.7	59.5
2016 President	W	65.6	95.1	4.9	73.5	39.1	60.9	68.3	65.5	62.7	60.0	57.3
2014 Governor	W	46.3	94.8	5.2	54.6	30.6	69.4	63.3	60.1	56.9	53.8	50.7
2014 Secretary of State	AA	45.9	94.6	5.4	53.1	26.4	73.6	61.4	58.0	54.7	51.3	48.1
2014 Attorney General	W	45.8	94.1	5.9	52.6	32.9	67.1	64.5	61.4	58.4	55.4	52.4
2014 US Senate	W	46.5	95.0	5.0	53.7	46.7	53.3	71.5	69.1	66.7	64.4	62.1
2012 President	AA	68.9	95.7	4.3	75.7	42.1	57.9	70.3	67.6	65.0	62.3	59.7
2012 US Senate	W	67.8	95.8	4.2	74.0	47.6	52.4	73.1	70.6	68.3	65.9	63.5

**Table 8: Percent BVAP Needed to Win, Saginaw County**

OAKLAND COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes							
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	71.6	93.4	6.6	86.4	45.9	54.1	69.8	67.4	65.1	62.8	60.6
2020 US Senate	W	71.4	92.1	7.9	85.4	43.5	56.5	68.1	65.6	63.2	60.9	58.6
2018 Governor	W	53.2	94.1	5.9	68.8	47.4	52.6	70.1	67.8	65.5	63.3	61.1
2018 Secretary of State	W	53.1	94.2	5.8	67.7	47.5	52.5	70.4	68.0	65.8	63.5	61.4
2018 Attorney General	W	52.5	93.8	6.2	67.0	43.0	57.0	67.9	65.3	62.8	60.4	58.1
2018 US Senate	W	53.2	93.0	7.0	68.7	45.5	54.5	68.6	66.2	63.9	61.7	59.5
2016 President	W	65.6	95.1	4.9	73.5	39.1	60.9	68.3	65.5	62.7	60.0	57.3
2014 Governor	W	46.3	94.8	5.2	54.6	30.6	69.4	63.3	60.1	56.9	53.8	50.7
2014 Secretary of State	AA	45.9	94.6	5.4	53.1	26.4	73.6	61.4	58.0	54.7	51.3	48.1
2014 Attorney General	W	45.8	94.1	5.9	52.6	32.9	67.1	64.5	61.4	58.4	55.4	52.4
2014 US Senate	W	46.5	95.0	5.0	53.7	46.7	53.3	71.5	69.1	66.7	64.4	62.1
2012 President	AA	68.9	95.7	4.3	75.7	42.1	57.9	70.3	67.6	65.0	62.3	59.7
2012 US Senate	W	67.8	95.8	4.2	74.0	47.6	52.4	73.1	70.6	68.3	65.9	63.5

It is important to remember that winning office in the United States usually requires winning two elections: a primary and a general election. The tables above consider only general

election contests. Producing a comparable set of tables for Democratic primaries is not possible. First, there was only one statewide Democratic primary – the 2018 primary contest for Governor. There were three candidates competing in this election and because 50% of the vote was not required to win the election, a mathematical equation setting the percentage needed to win 50% of the vote does not work. Second, Black voters were not cohesive in support of any one of these three candidates. In fact, the candidate preferred by even the plurality of Black voters was not the same in the four counties examined. Drawing a district that Black-preferred candidate could win this primary is not possible when there is no Black-preferred candidate.

In areas where most of the white voters are likely to vote in Republican primaries, the inability to calculate the percent needed to win in Democratic primaries is not particularly important. Black voters will dominate the Democratic primary unless they make up only a very small portion of the voters in the district. However, in the counties examined in Michigan, many white voters elect to participate in the Democratic primary, especially in Wayne County. As the percentage Black VAP of proposed districts decreases, it may become more challenging for Black-preferred candidates to win not only the general election but the Democratic primary – but only if voting in Democratic primaries is racially polarized. Unfortunately, it is not possible to ascertain exactly how much more difficult it would be – or even if it would be more difficult – given the lack of Democratic primary election data.

## **B. Threshold of Representation in the Current State House and Senate Districts**

A useful check on the percent needed to win estimates found in Tables 5-8 that can be done prior to drawing any districts is to produce what have been referred to by some political scientists as “threshold of representation” tables. These tables are designed to identify the lowest minority percentage above which minority candidates are consistently elected. Tables 9 and 10, below, report the BVAP of the current Michigan state house and senate districts with over 20% BVAP, and indicate the race and party of the candidate elected to represent the district.<sup>23</sup> Sorted

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<sup>23</sup> There are no African American state senators or representatives elected from districts that are less than 20% Black in VAP. However, there are other minority candidates (Hispanic, Asian, and Middle Eastern) elected to state house districts with considerably less than 20% BVAP.

by the percent BVAP, the tables can sometimes provide evidence of a clear breakpoint between those districts that are probably electing candidates of choice and those that are not.<sup>24</sup>

An examination Table 9 indicates that every Michigan state house district with a BVAP of at least 35% elects a minority representative to the state house. In fact, every district with a BVAP of more than 26.53% elects a minority to office with the exception of District 49 in Genesee County. And the racial bloc voting analysis of House District 49 indicates that the white incumbent, John Cherry, is the candidate of choice of Black voters, even in the 2018 Democratic primary when he faced several African American candidates.

**Table 9: Threshold of Representation for State House Districts, 2021**

State House District	Total VAP	Black VAP	Percent Black VAP	Name	Party	Race	Percent of Vote 2020
7	60347	57256	94.27%	Helena Scott	D	Black	93.00%
8	62448	58042	92.42%	Stephanie A. Young	D	Black	96.70%
3	54130	49536	90.93%	Shri Thanedar	D	Asian	93.30%
9	62529	46806	74.22%	Karen Whitsett	D	Black	94.20%
10	69209	46977	67.41%	Mary Cavanagh	D	Hispanic	84.80%
1	59788	38993	64.76%	Tenisha R. Yancey	D	Black	75.80%
35	78306	49325	62.50%	Kyra Harris Bolden	D	Black	82.90%
34	49491	30419	60.96%	Cynthia R. Neeley	D	Black	86.70%
2	57031	33142	57.70%	Joe Tate	D	Black	74.10%
5	49290	27190	54.12%	Cynthia A. Johnson	D	Black	93.40%
6	67505	36182	52.86%	Tyrone Carter	D	Black	100.00%
4	68749	32761	47.27%	Abraham Aiyash	D	ME	89.80%
29	72319	26621	36.04%	Brenda Carter	D	Black	72.90%
95	58640	21320	35.50%	Amos O'Neal	D	Black	70.10%
49	64844	19308	29.47%	John D. Cherry	D	White	68.90%
54	72426	21212	28.79%	Ronnie Peterson	D	Black	77.70%
12	73883	20207	26.97%	Alex Garza	D	Hispanic	62.40%
11	73586	19760	26.53%	Jewell Jones	D	Black	65.20%
92	66135	16957	25.34%	Terry J. Sabo	D	White	65.30%
27	73337	18051	24.35%	Regina Weiss	D	White	74.40%
16	74617	17556	23.25%	Kevin Coleman	D	White	62.50%
75	76956	18127	22.56%	David LaGrand	D	White	74.60%
68	71672	16808	22.44%	Sarah Anthony	D	Black	75.90%
18	75251	16519	21.76%	Kevin Hertel	D	White	60.30%
22	68758	14588	21.00%	Richard Steenland	D	White	59.90%
60	74176	15887	20.97%	Julie M. Rogers	D	White	71.40%

<sup>24</sup> Without the confirmation provided by a racial bloc voting analysis, it could conceivably be the case that the minority legislator is not the candidate of choice of minority voters.

Interpreting Table 10, for the Michigan state senate, is less straightforward. The three districts with BVAP percentages over 48% elect African Americans to office, but District 4, with a BVAP of 47% does not. However, the racial bloc voting analysis indicates that the incumbent state senator in this Wayne County district, Marshall Bullock, was elected with strong support from Black voters in the 2018 general election and with plurality support from Black voters in the Democratic primary in which he faced two African American opponents. On the other hand, Stephanie Chang, the state senator in District 1 (also Wayne County), which is 44.68% BVAP, was not the candidate of choice of Black voters in the 2018 Democratic primary.

**Table 10: Threshold of Representation for State Senate Districts, 2021**

<b>State Senate District</b>	<b>Total VAP</b>	<b>Black VAP</b>	<b>Percent Black VAP</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>party</b>	<b>race</b>	<b>Percent of vote 2018</b>
5	203828	111418	54.25%	Betty Alexander	D	Black	77.4%
2	169357	86961	50.82%	Adam Hollier	D	Black	75.7%
3	186758	90737	48.14%	Sylvia Santana	D	Black	81.8%
4	180199	85691	47.00%	Marshall Bullock	D	White	78.3%
1	193087	87075	44.68%	Stephanie Chang	D	Asian	72.0%
11	229870	82336	35.48%	Jeremy Moss	D	White	76.7%
27	175918	54071	30.42%	Jim Ananich	D	White	71.2%
9	219325	50800	22.95%	Paul Wojno	D	White	65.9%
6	217734	46997	21.29%	Erika Geiss	D	Black	61.4%

### **C. Recompiled Election Results**

As noted above, once draft districts have been drawn, there is a second approach available for ascertaining whether a proposed district is likely to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice to legislative or congressional office. This approach relies on recompiling election results from previous elections to see if the candidates preferred by minority voters would win in the draft district. This process entails (1) identifying “bellwether” elections, (2) disaggregating the precinct level results for these elections down to the census block level and then (3) re-aggregating the results up to conform to proposed district boundaries to determine if the minority-preferred candidate would win. This recompilation can only be done

for elections that cover a broad enough area to encompass all of the draft districts, hence only statewide elections can be used for this exercise. “Bellwether” elections are statewide elections that included minority candidates who were the candidates of choice of minority voters but were not supported by white voters.

Although there were six statewide general elections that included African American candidates or running mates, the African American was the candidate of choice of Black voters in only four of these contests: U.S. President in 2012 and 2020, Secretary of State in 2014, and Governor in 2018. All of these contests were racially polarized statewide, but only the 2014 Secretary of State contest was polarized in all four counties. This election contest was also the contest in which the candidate strongly preferred by Black voters garnered the least amount of white crossover votes. Thus, while recompiled elections results for all four elections provide important information for determining if a proposed district would provide Black voters with an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates in general elections, the single best “bellwether” contest for that purpose is the vote for Godfrey Dillard in 2014.

The redistricting software used by MICRC automatically included recompiled election results for all draft districts for all four of these elections – in fact, it included this information for every statewide general election conducted between 2012 and 2020. Ascertaining if the African American candidates of choice of Black voters, especially Dillard in 2014, carried a proposed district provides evidence that the proposed district in a draft plan will provide Black voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice in general elections.

The redistricting software also reported recompiled election results for the one statewide Democratic primary conducted in the past decade: the 2018 race for Governor. However, because there were three candidates and because Black voters were not cohesive in supporting any of these candidates, these recompiled results are not particularly useful in ascertaining whether a proposed district would provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates in Democratic primaries.

### **III. Measuring Partisan Fairness in Redistricting Plans**

According to 13(d) of Article IV, Section 6 of the Michigan State Constitution: “Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.” A number of objective mathematical measures have been developed by social scientists and mathematicians to determine if an existing or proposed redistricting map disadvantages one political party relative to the other. Using these measures, we can compare an existing or proposed redistricting map to a large set of other possible maps to determine if the proposed map exhibits more or less political bias. The maps used for comparative purposes can be previous redistricting maps used in the state, or the redistricting maps of other states, or they can be computer simulated maps.

I proposed incorporating three measures of partisan fairness measures into the redistricting software used by the MICRC to draw redistricting maps. The reasons for my choice were as follows:

- The measures are easy to understand and straightforward to calculate. They produce scores that indicate both the direction and the magnitude of any political bias in the redistricting map.
- Because I easily calculated the scores for each of these measures in excel, I knew it would be possible to incorporate an automated report function into the redistricting software that could provide these scores for any draft plans drawn.
- Although these three measures have only recently been developed, they have all have been introduced and accepted by federal and state courts as useful tools for determining if a redistricting map is politically fair.

The three partisan fairness measures I selected are the lopsided margins test, the mean-median difference, and the efficiency gap.

In addition to these three measures, a simple metric for indicating whether a redistricting plan is fair is to compare the proportion of the statewide vote each party receives to the proportion of the districts each party wins or is likely to win under the proposed plan. The proportionality of a redistricting plan is calculated by subtracting the percentage of votes won by the party from the percentage of seats that party won (or would win) in congressional and state

legislative elections. So, for example, if Party A won 52.3% of the vote statewide but only won 44.7% of the seats in the state senate, the proportionality bias would be  $44.7 - 52.3$  or  $-7.6$  in favor of Party B.

Each of these measures use historical election results to evaluate the partisan fairness of redistricting plans. However, in the case of proposed districts, previous election results must be reconfigured to conform to the proposed district boundaries to evaluate the partisan fairness of the proposed plans.<sup>25</sup> A composite election index was constructed using the statewide general elections between 2012 and 2020 – all 13 of the election contests included in the GIS redistricting database and analyzed in the racial bloc voting analysis. The composite index was weighted to give each election cycle equal weight in the index. However, the partisan fairness report function in the redistricting software was designed so that any of the individual 13 elections could be substituted for the composite index in calculating the partisan fairness scores.

#### **A. Lopsided Margins Test**

In a perfectly fair plan – at least in a state in which the two political parties are competitive (closely divided) – we would expect a mix of districts, some strongly partisan districts, some moderately reliable districts, and some tossups – but each party would have a roughly similar mix. If one party has a smaller number of victories with larger margins of victory than the other party, this is an indication that one party is being disfavored over the other in the map. This pattern of outcomes can be quantified by sorting the districts into two groups, by winning party. Each party's winning vote share can then be compared to see if one party has significantly higher margin of victories than the other.<sup>26</sup> The following is an example of how this is calculated:

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<sup>25</sup> Both the efficiency gap and the mean-median difference have been used to evaluate computer simulated alternative redistricting maps for comparative purposes in partisan gerrymandering challenges. Election results for select statewide elections were reconfigured to determine how the candidates in these elections would have fared in the alternative districts.

<sup>26</sup> This measure was first discussed in Sam Wang, "Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering," *Stanford Law Journal*, 16, June 2016. Available at: <https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/three-tests-for-practical-evaluation-of-partisan-gerrymandering/>

District	Party A	Party B	Total Votes	Percent of Votes		Party Wins	
				Party A	Party B	Party A	Party B
1	279	120	399	69.9%	30.1%	69.9%	
2	172	198	370	46.5%	53.5%		53.5%
3	167	192	359	46.5%	53.5%		53.5%
4	148	212	360	41.1%	58.9%		58.9%
5	185	180	365	50.7%	49.3%	50.7%	
6	139	193	332	41.9%	58.1%		58.1%
7	169	201	370	45.7%	54.3%		54.3%
8	179	206	385	46.5%	53.5%		53.5%
9	234	99	333	70.3%	29.7%	70.3%	
10	178	199	377	47.2%	52.8%		52.8%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1850</b>	<b>1800</b>	<b>3650</b>	<b>50.7%</b>	<b>49.3%</b>	<b>63.6%</b>	<b>54.9%</b>

Party A in the example is winning districts with a much higher average vote (63.6%) than Party B (54.9%) – and the difference between the two percentages is 8.7 (63.6 – 54.9). This indicates that Party A supporters are packed into a few districts that it wins by large margins. Party B, on the other hand, is winning substantially more districts with substantially lower vote margins.

## B. Mean-Median Difference

Comparing a dataset's mean and median is a common statistical analysis used to assess how skewed the dataset is – if the dataset is balanced, the mean will be very close in value to its median. As a dataset becomes more skewed, the mean and median begin to diverge; looking at the difference between the two can be used determine the extent to which the data is skewed.

Based on this principle, the mean-median district vote share difference compares a party's mean district vote share to its median district vote share:<sup>27</sup>

- Mean = average party vote share across all districts
- Median = party vote share in the median district when districts are sorted on share of party vote

<sup>27</sup> This approach to ascertaining political bias in redistricting maps was proposed by Michael D. McDonald and Robin Best in "Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics and Law: A Diagnostic Applied to Six Cases," *Election Law Journal* 14(4), 2015 (available at: <https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/elj.2015.0358>). It was further quantified by Wang (see full citation above).

The difference between the mean and median vote shares provides a measure of whether the redistricting map produces skewed election results. The following is an example of how this is calculated:

Party A	Percentages I
	41.1%
	41.9%
	45.7%
	46.5%
	46.5%
	46.5%
	47.2%
	50.7%
	69.9%
	70.3%
District median percentage	46.5%
Statewide mean percentage	50.7%
Mean-Median Difference	4.2%

In this example, Party A received 50.7% of the statewide vote. Party A's median vote share (46.5%) is 4.2% lower than its mean vote share of 50.7%. This indicates that Party A must win more districts than Party B to win half of the seats – the redistricting map is skewed in favor of Party B. In fact, Party A would have had to win 54.2% ( $50.0 + 4.2$ ) of the statewide vote to win 50% of the seats.

### C. Efficiency Gap

This measure, introduced by University of Chicago law professor Nick Stephanopoulos and Public Policy Institute of California research fellow Eric McGhee, looks at the number of “wasted votes” across districts.<sup>28</sup>

In any election, nearly 50 percent of votes are wasted: all votes cast for a losing candidate, and any votes cast for a winning candidate beyond the threshold needed to win (50 percent in a two-candidate contest). In a hypothetical map with perfect partisan symmetry, both

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<sup>28</sup> Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos and Eric M. McGhee, “Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap,” *University of Chicago Law Review*: Vol. 82 (2), 2015. Available at: <https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol82/iss2/4>.

parties would waste the same number of votes. A large difference between the parties' wasted votes indicates one party is treated more favorably than the other by the redistricting map. This is because the plan packs and cracks one party's supporters more than the other party's supporters.

The efficiency gap is calculated by taking one party's total wasted votes in an election, subtracting the other party's total wasted votes, and dividing this by the total number of votes cast. It captures in a single number the extent to which district lines waste the two parties votes unequally.

$$\text{Efficiency Gap} = \frac{[\text{Party A wasted votes}] - [\text{Party B wasted votes}]}{\text{total number of votes cast statewide}}$$

Example:

District	Party A	Party B	Total Votes	Lost Votes		minimum to win	Surplus Votes		Total Wasted Votes	
				Party A	Party B		Party A	Party B	Party A	Party B
1	279	120	399	0	120	200	79	0	79	120
2	172	198	370	172	0	185	0	13	172	13
3	167	192	359	167	0	180	0	12	167	12
4	148	212	360	148	0	180	0	32	148	32
5	185	180	365	0	180	183	2	0	2	180
6	139	193	332	139	0	166	0	27	139	27
7	169	201	370	169	0	185	0	16	169	16
8	179	206	385	179	0	193	0	13	179	13
9	234	99	333	0	99	167	67	0	67	99
10	178	199	377	178	0	189	0	10	178	10
TOTAL	1850	1800	3650	1152	399		148	123	1300	522

In this example, supporters of Party A cast 1152 votes for losing candidates and 148 surplus votes – votes beyond what was necessary to elect Party A candidates. Supporters of Party B, on the other hand, cast only 399 of their votes for losing candidates and 522 surplus votes. Adding together these two sets of votes, Party A had a total of 1300 wasted votes; Party B had a total of only 522 votes. The efficiency gap is therefore calculated as 21.3% ( $(1300-522)/3650 = 778/3650 = .213$ ). This efficiency gap in favor of Party B can be interpreted as the percentage of seats Party B won above what would be expected in a politically fair or neutral map.

#### D. Court Acceptance of these Measures

These three measures have all been developed within the last decade and therefore do not have a long history of consideration by the courts. However, they have been introduced recently

in the context of partisan gerrymandering challenges. While recognizing each of the measures have some disadvantages, the courts in each instance relied on these measures (in addition to other measures introduced) to find the plans before them were politically biased towards one of the political parties at the expense of the other.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Examples of court cases relying on at least one of the measures of political fairness described in this report include: *League of Women Voters of Michigan v. Benson*, in which the federal court held the congressional and state legislative plans in Michigan to be an unconstitutional gerrymander; *Ohio A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Householder*, which held the Ohio congressional map to be an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander; *League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania* in which the State Supreme Court held the Pennsylvania congressional districts to be in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution; *Whitford v. Gill* in which the federal court determined the Wisconsin state assembly districts were unconstitutional; *Common Cause v. Rucho* in which the federal court found the North Carolina congressional district plan adopted in 2016 was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. This North Carolina decision, along with the Maryland case, *Lamone v. Benisek*, was later overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court on unrelated grounds, but grounds that served to moot all of the federal decisions discussed above. However, in a separate challenge before the North Carolina Superior Court, *Common Cause v. Lewis*, the court held that the state legislative districts violated the North Carolina State Constitution.

## **APPENDIX A**

[illegible]

[illegible]

Statewide				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>											
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	52.3%	93.9	102.5	97.5	94.3	40.3	38.1	39.5	43.7
John James	R	AA	45.8%	3.8	-5.1	1.1	2.0	57.8	59.9	58.4	55.1
others				2.3	2.5	2.4	3.7	1.9	2.0	1.7	1.2
<i>votes for office</i>				36.5	31.5	35.0	35.0	61.8	61.6	63.1	63.1
<b>2020 General</b>											
<b>U.S. President</b>											
Joseph Biden	D	W	50.6%	95.4	105.0	98.4	96.2	37.0	34.7	36.9	40.0
Donald Trump	R	W	47.8%	3.8	-5.4	1.1	1.9	61.5	63.6	61.2	59.1
others				0.8	0.8	1.3	1.9	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.0
<i>votes for office</i>				61.2	53.3	55.2	55.2	79.1	77.7	79.0	79.0
<b>U.S. Senate</b>											
Gary Peters	D	W	49.9%	93.4	102.3	97.2	93.9	36.9	34.8	36.4	39.4
John James	R	AA	48.2%	3.8	-5.6	1.1	1.7	61.5	63.5	61.7	59.8
others				2.7	3.1	3.7	4.4	1.6	1.6	1.4	0.9
<i>votes for office</i>				59.9	53.0	55.0	55.0	78.3	76.8	78.1	78.1

[illegible]

County: Genesee			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	97.2	103.9	99.5	95.6	57.0	57.0	56.4	58.6
Terry Lynn Land	R	W	1.7	-4.8	0.6	2.2	38.7	38.3	39.0	37.5
others			1.2	0.9	0.8	2.2	4.3	4.6	4.4	3.9
<i>votes for office</i>			37.6	31.5	36.1	36.1	48.3	44.3	47.1	47.1
<b>2016 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Hillary Clinton	D	W	97.5	106.0	99.5	96.4	37.8	34.5	35.3	37.4
Donald Trump	R	W	1.5	-7.0	0.4	1.7	57.0	59.4	58.5	57.1
others			1.0	1.1	1.0	1.9	5.2	6.1	6.1	5.5
<i>votes for office</i>			70.6	59.8	59.0	59.0	70.9	63.5	67.3	67.3
<b>2018 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Whitmer/Gilchrist	D	W/AA	96.2	103.6	99.2	95.3	46.7	45.5	45.8	46.2
Schuette/Lyons	R	W/W	2.2	-5.5	0.2	2.0	50.5	50.9	50.5	50.8
others			1.6	1.9	1.7	2.7	2.8	3.6	3.2	3.0
<i>votes for office</i>			54.2	43.5	45.1	45.1	62.6	57.0	59.8	59.8
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	96.5	103.7	99.2	95.2	45.7	44.7	44.9	48.0
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	2.0	-5.8	0.3	2.0	50.9	51.2	50.8	48.7
others			1.5	2.1	1.4	2.8	3.4	4.2	3.7	3.4
<i>votes for office</i>			53.9	43.5	44.9	44.9	61.3	55.7	58.6	58.6
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Dana Nessel	D	W	94.5	102.3	98.6	94.1	39.9	37.6	37.9	41.1
Tom Leonard	R	W	2.3	-5.8	0.6	2.0	55.3	56.3	55.9	53.7
others			3.2	3.5	3.8	3.9	47.7	6.0	5.1	5.1
<i>votes for office</i>			53.7	43.2	44.6	44.6	61.0	55.6	58.4	58.4

County: Genesee			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	95.3	103.2	98.9	95.2	43.8	42.6	42.8	45.8
John James	R	AA	3.0	-5.3	0.7	2.1	54.3	54.8	54.6	52.6
others			1.7	2.2	1.7	2.8	1.9	2.6	1.8	1.6
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>54.2</i>	<i>43.8</i>	<i>45.1</i>	<i>45.1</i>	<i>62.4</i>	<i>56.8</i>	<i>59.6</i>	<i>59.6</i>
<b>2020 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Joseph Biden	D	W	96.5	104.4	99.3	96.1	39.9	37.7	38.6	42.1
Donald Trump	R	W	3.0	-5.1	0.5	2.1	58.7	60.5	59.6	56.7
others			0.5	0.7	0.9	1.8	1.4	1.8	1.8	1.2
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>67.3</i>	<i>54.8</i>	<i>53.0</i>	<i>53.0</i>	<i>81.5</i>	<i>75.4</i>	<i>79.6</i>	<i>79.6</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	95.1	103.0	98.9	95.0	41.1	39.7	40.1	43.5
John James	R	AA	3.2	-5.3	0.7	1.8	57.4	58.4	57.6	55.5
others			1.7	2.1	2.7	3.2	1.6	2.0	1.5	1.1
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>67.1</i>	<i>54.8</i>	<i>56.6</i>	<i>56.6</i>	<i>80.6</i>	<i>74.4</i>	<i>78.7</i>	<i>78.7</i>

County: Saginaw			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2012 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Barack Obama	D	AA		114.3	99.5	95.7	41.6	39.2	41.1	42.9
Mitt Romney	R	W		-14.8	0.4	2.5	57.0	59.1	57.1	55.9
others				0.2	0.6	1.8	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.2
<i>votes for office</i>				56.7	56.2	56.2	71.4	69.5	70.3	70.3
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W		111.0	99.5	95.4	51.0	49.0	50.1	52.3
Peter Hoekstra	R	W		-11.6	0.7	2.2	46.0	47.6	46.3	44.9
others				0.7	0.0	2.4	2.9	3.3	3.3	2.8
<i>votes for office</i>				56.3	55.7	55.7	69.9	67.7	68.7	68.7
<b>2014 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Mark Schauer	D	W		11.2	99.6	94.1	41.1	38.4	39.1	42.2
Rick Snyder	R	W		-12.3	0.5	3.0	56.3	58.9	58.1	55.7
others				1.0	0.7	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.1
<i>votes for office</i>				31.1	32.7	32.7	51.5	49.9	50.8	50.8
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Godfrey Dillard	D	AA		111.3	99.2	94.4	35.3	32.6	33.5	36.3
Ruth Johnson	R	W		-12.5	0.5	2.8	60.5	63.0	62.0	59.9
others				1.1	0.9	2.8	4.2	4.5	4.4	3.8
<i>votes for office</i>				31.4	32.6	32.6	49.9	48.4	49.2	49.2
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Mark Totten	D	W		110.7	98.6	94.1	32.1	28.9	29.8	32.6
Bill Schuette	R	W		-12.1	0.5	2.9	65.2	68.2	67.2	65.1
others				1.3	1.1	3.0	2.7	3.0	2.9	23.3
<i>votes for office</i>				31.0	32.4	32.4	50.8	49.3	50.1	50.1

[illegible]

County: Saginaw			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W		110.6	99.3	93.5		33.7	34.6	39.3
John James	R	AA		-13.0	0.8	2.9		64.5	63.0	59.6
others				2.4	2.2	3.6		1.8	1.8	1.2
<i>votes for office</i>				39.2	37.8	37.8		61.5	62.8	62.8
<b>2020 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Joseph Biden	D	W		114.2	99.0	95.3		29.3	32.0	36.3
Donald Trump	R	W		-14.9	0.6	2.7		69.0	66.2	62.6
others				0.6	1.1	2.0		1.6	1.5	1.1
<i>votes for office</i>				50.7	48.6	48.6		78.3	79.6	79.6
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W		112.5	99.5	93.8		31.1	33.1	37.5
John James	R	AA		-14.7	0.6	3.0		67.3	65.0	61.6
others				2.1	2.8	3.2		1.5	1.2	0.9
<i>votes for office</i>				50.7	48.4	48.4		77.2	78.7	78.7

County: Oakland			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2012 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Barack Obama	D	AA	98.2	111.7	99.4	95.7	43.9	39.5	40.7	42.1
Mitt Romney	R	W	1.6	-11.8	0.5	2.3	55.0	59.4	58.1	57.2
others			0.3	0.2	1.7	2.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.6
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>78.9</i>	<i>69.2</i>	<i>68.9</i>	<i>68.2</i>	<i>75.7</i>	<i>74.8</i>	<i>75.7</i>	<i>75.7</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	97.3	110.5	99.1	95.8	48.4	44.5	45.7	47.6
Peter Hoekstra	R	W	1.6	-11.4	0.0	1.9	47.9	51.8	50.3	49.2
others			1.1	0.9	0.8	2.3	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.2
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>78.3</i>	<i>69.2</i>	<i>67.8</i>	<i>67.8</i>	<i>74.0</i>	<i>73.0</i>	<i>74.0</i>	<i>74.0</i>
<b>2014 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Mark Schauer	D	W	94.5	108.9	99.1	94.8	33.9	27.9	28.2	30.6
Rick Snyder	R	W	5.0	-9.5	0.8	2.8	64.1	70.1	69.8	68.1
others			0.5	1.9	1.0	2.5	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>51.5</i>	<i>44.4</i>	<i>46.3</i>	<i>46.3</i>	<i>54.5</i>	<i>53.6</i>	<i>54.6</i>	<i>54.6</i>
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Godfrey Dillard	D	AA	93.3	109.7	99.1	94.6	29.1	23.5	24.3	26.4
Ruth Johnson	R	W	5.4	-9.5	0.4	2.7	67.9	73.5	72.7	71.4
others			1.3	1.9	1.2	2.7	2.9	3.0	2.7	2.2
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>51.1</i>	<i>44.4</i>	<i>45.9</i>	<i>45.9</i>	<i>53.2</i>	<i>52.1</i>	<i>53.1</i>	<i>53.1</i>
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Mark Totten	D	W	93.0	107.5	98.8	94.1	35.0	30.1	30.3	32.9
Bill Schuette	R	W	5.6	-8.8	0.8	3.0	61.3	66.2	65.9	64.0
others			1.4	1.3	1.5	2.9	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.1
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>51.1</i>	<i>44.2</i>	<i>45.8</i>	<i>45.8</i>	<i>52.7</i>	<i>51.7</i>	<i>52.6</i>	<i>52.6</i>

County: Oakland			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	96.8	110.6	99.4	95.0	46.9	43.0	44.0	46.7
Terry Lynn Land	R	W	2.0	-10.9	0.0	2.4	48.7	52.6	51.5	49.7
others			1.2	0.3	0.5	2.6	4.4	4.4	4.4	3.6
<i>votes for office</i>			51.5	44.7	46.5	46.5	53.7	53.7	53.7	53.7
<b>2016 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Hillary Clinton	D	W	95.2	108.8	99.4	95.1	36.0	34.2	34.3	39.1
Donald Trump	R	W	3.4	-9.7	0.8	2.4	58.6	59.8	59.6	55.8
others			1.4	0.7	0.1	2.5	5.4	6.0	6.0	5.1
<i>votes for office</i>			73.0	61.1	65.6	65.6	74.6	72.4	73.5	73.5
<b>2018 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Whitmer/Gilchrist	D	W/AA	95.3	107.6	99.3	94.1	44.2	42.4	42.2	47.4
Schuetten/Lyons	R	W/W	3.5	-9.0	0.7	2.7	53.3	55.0	54.6	50.7
others			1.2	1.3	1.4	3.3	2.5	2.6	2.6	1.9
<i>votes for office</i>			62.5	51.6	53.2	53.2	69.6	68.2	68.8	68.8
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	95.2	108.1	99.1	94.2	44.3	42.4	42.3	47.5
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	3.4	-9.4	0.7	2.7	53.0	54.7	54.5	50.5
others			1.4	1.3	1.3	3.1	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.0
<i>votes for office</i>			62.1	51.5	53.1	53.1	68.7	67.1	67.7	67.7
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Dana Nessel	D	W	93.8	107.3	99.2	93.8	40.2	37.9	37.5	43.0
Tom Leonard	R	W	3.5	-9.7	0.6	2.6	55.4	96.8	57.5	53.0
others			2.7	2.4	2.0	3.6	4.4	0.5	4.4	4.0
<i>votes for office</i>			61.4	50.7	52.5	52.5	67.9	66.4	67.0	67.0

County: Oakland			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	93.8	106.5	98.7	93.0	42.7	41.1	40.9	45.5
John James	R	AA	4.8	-8.4	0.8	2.8	55.9	57.5	57.5	53.6
others			1.5	1.7	1.6	4.2	1.4	1.4	1.5	0.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>62.5</i>	<i>51.5</i>	<i>53.2</i>	<i>53.2</i>	<i>69.5</i>	<i>68.1</i>	<i>68.7</i>	<i>68.7</i>
<b>2020 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Joseph Biden	D	W	94.2	105.1	99.0	93.4	42.0	41.6	41.2	45.9
Donald Trump	R	W	5.3	-5.7	1.3	3.6	56.4	56.8	57.2	53.1
others			0.6	1.6	1.7	3.0	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.0
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>76.1</i>	<i>64.6</i>	<i>71.6</i>	<i>71.6</i>	<i>85.7</i>	<i>84.9</i>	<i>86.4</i>	<i>86.4</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	93.1	104.5	98.8	92.1	40.7	39.9	39.4	43.5
John James	R	AA	5.2	-6.7	0.8	2.9	57.9	58.9	59.3	55.7
others			1.8	2.2	2.2	5.0	1.4	1.2	1.2	0.8
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>75.7</i>	<i>64.7</i>	<i>71.4</i>	<i>71.4</i>	<i>84.8</i>	<i>84.1</i>	<i>85.4</i>	<i>85.4</i>

County: Wayne			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2012 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Barack Obama	D	AA	98.6	102.2	99.5	99.0	51.1	51.2	51.1	51.9
Mitt Romney	R	W	1.2	-2.4	0.5	0.6	48.0	47.8	47.7	47.3
others			0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.9	1.1	0.9	0.8
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>61.3</i>	<i>58.3</i>	<i>60.4</i>	<i>60.4</i>	<i>68.9</i>	<i>63.4</i>	<i>65.7</i>	<i>65.7</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	97.3	100.2	98.9	98.1	56.8	57.2	56.6	57.6
Peter Hoekstra	R	W	1.2	-1.6	0.4	0.6	39.6	38.8	39.1	38.6
others			1.5	1.5	1.5	1.3	3.6	4.0	4.0	3.8
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>60.8</i>	<i>57.8</i>	<i>59.9</i>	<i>59.9</i>	<i>67.6</i>	<i>62.1</i>	<i>64.4</i>	<i>64.4</i>
<b>2014 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Mark Schauer	D	W	94.2	97.8	96.4	96.5	41.1	41.2	39.2	41.3
Rick Snyder	R	W	5.0	1.4	2.9	2.6	56.9	56.3	58.4	56.6
others			0.8	0.8	0.7	0.9	2.0	2.5	2.3	2.0
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>36.3</i>	<i>33.0</i>	<i>35.8</i>	<i>35.8</i>	<i>50.7</i>	<i>44.1</i>	<i>47.7</i>	<i>47.7</i>
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Godfrey Dillard	D	AA	94.3	98.4	96.7	96.8	36.8	36.6	35.0	36.8
Ruth Johnson	R	W	4.3	0.3	2.1	1.9	59.7	59.2	61.2	59.6
others			1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	3.4	4.1	3.8	3.6
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>35.9</i>	<i>32.7</i>	<i>35.5</i>	<i>35.5</i>	<i>49.0</i>	<i>42.5</i>	<i>46.1</i>	<i>46.1</i>
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Mark Totten	D	W	93.2	97.0	95.5	95.7	41.0	40.7	39.1	41.0
Bill Schuette	R	W	5.3	1.5	3.2	2.9	55.4	54.9	56.8	55.1
others			1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	3.7	4.4	4.1	3.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>35.7</i>	<i>32.5</i>	<i>35.3</i>	<i>35.3</i>	<i>48.8</i>	<i>42.3</i>	<i>45.9</i>	<i>45.9</i>

County: Wayne			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	96.8	100.0	98.5	98.0	52.8	52.7	51.4	53.4
Terry Lynn Land	R	W	2.0	-1.1	0.6	1.0	42.7	42.0	43.4	41.8
others			1.2	1.1	1.0	1.1	4.5	5.3	5.0	4.7
<i>votes for office</i>			36.2	32.9	35.7	35.7	49.8	43.2	46.8	46.8
<b>2016 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Hillary Clinton	D	W	96.8	101.0	99.0	98.4	47.1	39.1	38.2	39.7
Donald Trump	R	W	2.0	-2.1	0.6	0.7	47.8	54.8	55.4	54.4
others			1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9	5.1	6.1	6.0	5.9
<i>votes for office</i>			57.7	55.7	57.0	57.0	72.2	61.6	64.0	64.0
<b>2018 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Whitmer/Gilchrist	D	W/AA	95.6	99.0	97.6	97.0	53.4	49.7	47.9	53.5
Schuette/Lyons	R	W/W	2.5	-1.0	0.9	1.1	44.6	47.3	49.1	44.0
others			2.0	2.0	2.1	1.9	2.0	3.0	2.8	2.5
<i>votes for office</i>			33.9	30.9	33.2	33.2	67.2	59.8	63.2	63.2
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	95.7	99.0	97.7	97.0	53.1	50.0	49.1	53.6
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	2.4	-1.0	1.0	1.1	44.7	46.8	48.5	43.6
others			2.0	2.0	2.0	1.8	2.2	3.2	3.2	2.8
<i>votes for office</i>			33.7	30.8	33.1	33.1	66.2	58.8	62.2	62.2
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Dana Nessel	D	W	94.1	97.7	96.3	95.5	49.6	45.6	43.6	49.4
Tom Leonard	R	W	2.4	-1.3	0.8	1.0	47.2	49.9	51.8	46.6
others			3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.3	44.9	4.3	4.1
<i>votes for office</i>			33.3	30.4	32.7	32.7	65.4	58.0	61.3	61.3

County: Wayne			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	93.8	97.1	95.9	95.8	52.4	48.9	47.1	52.3
John James	R	AA	3.8	0.4	1.9	1.5	46.5	49.4	52.2	46.5
others			2.4	2.5	2.4	2.7	1.1	1.7	1.4	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>33.7</i>	<i>30.8</i>	<i>33.1</i>	<i>33.1</i>	<i>67.2</i>	<i>59.6</i>	<i>63.1</i>	<i>63.1</i>
<b>2020 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Joseph Biden	D	W	95.4	99.0	97.9	97.5	53.3	45.9	44.5	47.5
Donald Trump	R	W	3.8	0.2	1.6	1.5	45.4	52.6	53.9	51.3
others			0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.3	0.8	1.5	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>59.2</i>	<i>55.6</i>	<i>58.0</i>	<i>58.0</i>	<i>81.3</i>	<i>74.1</i>	<i>76.6</i>	<i>76.6</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	93.3	96.0	95.3	95.2	51.7	46.6	44.4	47.2
John James	R	AA	3.8	0.3	1.7	1.6	47.0	52.1	53.7	51.5
others			2.8	3.0	2.9	3.2	1.3	1.9	1.8	1.4
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>58.9</i>	<i>55.3</i>	<i>57.8</i>	<i>57.8</i>	<i>80.6</i>	<i>73.0</i>	<i>75.6</i>	<i>75.6</i>

2018 Democratic Primary for Governor				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>STATEWIDE</b>											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	30.2%	21.0	24.2	23.5	26.0	25.7	27.1	30.2	28.5
Shri Thanedar	D	A	17.7%	42.5	44.2	42.2	39.0	15.8	12.9	10.8	9.4
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	52.0%	36.5	31.6	33.5	35.0	58.6	60.0	59.4	62.0
<i>votes for office</i>				23.0	22.5	24.5	24.5	13.9	12.0	14.0	14.0
<b>Genesee</b>											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	22.9%	16.5	18.6	17.9	21.0	22.3	24.8	24.2	23.5
Shri Thanedar	D	A	23.6%	46.0	49.9	47.2	43.4	15.7	13.6	13.3	11.5
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	53.4%	37.5	31.6	34.5	35.7	62.0	61.6	61.9	65.1
<i>votes for office</i>				26.9	23.4	25.9	25.9	15.5	13.3	14.8	14.8
<b>Saginaw</b>											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	22.2%		18.9	17.5	21.0		21.9	23.6	21.0
Shri Thanedar	D	A	24.7%		51.5	51.1	44.7		16.8	14.7	14.5
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	53.1%		29.6	31.3	34.4		61.4	61.8	64.5
<i>votes for office</i>					19.7	20.7	20.7		12.4	13.2	13.2
<b>Oakland</b>											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	32.5%	23.2	24.1	23.2	25.3	29.8	34.2	36.0	34.9
Shri Thanedar	D	A	13.4%	32.7	38.5	37.5	34.7	8.4	4.3	4.3	3.0
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	54.1%	44.1	37.5	39.0	40.0	61.8	61.4	61.0	62.1
<i>votes for office</i>				31.4	33.3	35.0	35.0	20.8	16.1	18.2	18.2
<b>Wayne</b>											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	32.0%	21.2	20.8	21.0	22.2	43.4	41.3	41.3	41.6
Shri Thanedar	D	A	24.3%	42.8	45.6	43.8	42.5	7.5	4.8	5.4	3.9
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	43.7%	36.1	33.7	34.8	35.3	49.2	53.9	54.0	54.5
<i>votes for office</i>				22.4	21.1	23.5	23.5	19.3	16.0	17.4	17.4

## **APPENDIX B**

Congressional District General Elections				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
Congressional District 5											
2018 General											
Daniel Kildee	D	W	59.5%	96.2	104.4	99.1	95.0	48.4	46.5	47.5	50.5
Travis Wines	R	W	35.9%	1.3	-7.8	0.2	1.7	47.0	48.3	46.9	44.9
others				2.5	3.3	3.2	3.3	4.6	5.2	4.9	4.7
votes for office				53.8	42.7	43.8	43.8	59.2	56.5	58.3	58.3
2020 General											
Daniel Kildee	D	W	54.5%	95.4	105.2	99.0	95.0	41.6	39.6	41.0	44.2
Tim Kelly	R	W	41.8%	2.1	-8.4	0.6	1.6	54.8	56.3	54.4	52.3
others				2.6	3.2	3.0	3.4	3.6	4.1	3.9	3.5
votes for office				67.1	54.5	54.5	54.5	76.6	73.8	76.0	76.0
Congressional District 9											
2018 General											
Andy Levin	D	W	59.7%		95.2	98.2	71.5		50.2	48.9	55.7
Candius Stearns	R	W	36.8%		-3.5	0.3	62.9		47.5	47.4	43.2
others					8.4	9.4	22.2		2.4	2.3	1.1
votes for office					17.9	17.5	17.5		66.2	66.4	66.4
2020 General											
Andy Levin	D	W	57.7%		92.6	96.6	74.7		48.3	45.9	52.0
Charles Langworthy	R	W	38.4%		-0.6	0.5	5.6		48.8	50.0	46.7
others					7.9	8.1	19.7		3.0	2.7	1.3
votes for office					37.9	27.6	27.6		80.2	82.7	82.7
Congressional District 12											
2018 General											
Debbie Dingell	D	W	68.1%		91.9	97.3	75.5		58.4	57.5	63.3
Jeff Jones	R	W	28.9%		3.1	1.8	9.8		38.6	38.9	35.6
others					5.0	4.4	14.7		3.0	3.0	1.1
votes for office					33.4	37.1	37.1		58.9	62.4	62.4

Congressional District General Elections				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2020 General</b>											
Debbie Dingell	D	W	66.4%		91.2	95.9	75.3		56.4	55.3	58.7
Jeff Jones	R	W	30.7%		4.2	2.7	11.4		40.6	41.6	40.0
others					4.3	4.2	13.2		3.0	3.2	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>					50.3	58.2	58.2		73.8	75.0	75.0
<b>Congressional District 13</b>											
<b>2018 General</b>											
Rashida Tlaib	D	ME	84.2%	93.4	95.5	94.9	95.2		64.2	64.5	65.6
others				6.6	4.5	5.4	4.8		35.7	35.7	34.4
<i>votes for office</i>				32.5	32.3	34.7	34.7		39.1	41.3	41.3
<b>2020 General</b>											
Rashida Tlaib	D	ME	78.1%	94.6	97.8	96.5	96.1		46.5	47.0	46.9
David Dudenhoefer	R	W	18.7%	2.7	-0.4	1.1	1.2		49.2	48.7	49.0
others				2.7	2.7	2.6	2.7		4.4	4.2	4.1
<i>votes for office</i>				587.0	57.5	60.0	60.0		59.0	61.1	61.1
<b>Congressional District 14</b>											
<b>2018 General</b>											
Brenda Lawrence	D	AA	80.9%	96.3	99.3	98.1	96.7	40.8	51.3	52.3	61.1
Marc Herschfus	R	W	17.3%	1.7	-1.4	0.5	1.6	58.1	46.9	40.9	36.9
others				2.0	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.1	1.8	2.2	2.1
<i>votes for office</i>				36.1	33.8	40.0	40.0	74.3	72.6	74.5	74.5
<b>2020 General</b>											
Brenda Lawrence	D	AA	79.3%	95.0	97.9	96.6	96.5	41.6	49.3	50.3	55.6
Robert Vance Patrick	R	W	18.3%	2.6	-0.3	0.9	1.3	56.4	48.2	47.5	41.7
others				2.4	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.0	2.5	2.4	2.6
<i>votes for office</i>				59.9	57.4	61.7	61.7	90.7	85.0	86.3	86.3

2018 General: State Senate Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 1 (Wayne)</b>											
Stephanie Chang	D	A	72.0%	91.3	97.8	94.1	93.2	47.2	49.0	48.8	53.3
Pauline Montie	R	W	24.2%	2.1	-4.2	0.8	1.1	51.0	49.4	48.6	44.6
others			3.8%	6.1	6.4	6.3	5.6	1.8	1.6	1.6	2.1
<i>votes for office</i>				33.3	27.8	31.0	31.0	66.6	54.7	57.3	57.3
<b>District 2 (Wayne)</b>											
Adam Hollier	D	AA	75.7%	96.4	99.5	98.0	97.9	37.7	47.7	46.5	52.8
Lisa Papas	R	W	24.3%	3.6	0.5	2.0	2.1	62.3	52.2	53.4	47.2
<i>votes for office</i>				31.3	28.0	30.9	30.9	74.1	69.6	73.3	73.3
<b>District 3 (Wayne)</b>											
Sylvia Santana	D	AA	81.8%	94.2	95.6	95.4	95.6	78.8	67.9	64.4	66.3
Kathy Stecker	R	W	15.3%	2.5	1.1	1.5	1.3	18.9	29.3	32.6	31.0
others			2.9%	3.9	3.3	3.3	3.1	2.3	2.8	2.7	2.7
<i>votes for office</i>				30.7	29.2	30.0	30.0	38.7	42.8	45.4	45.4
<b>District 4 (Wayne)</b>											
Marshall Bullock	D	W	78.3%		97.0	100.2	98.7		45.3	46.1	51.1
Angela Savino	R	W	21.7%		3.0	-0.1	1.3		54.7	53.9	48.9
<i>votes for office</i>				32.4	30.6	32.2	32.2		50.2	51.2	51.2
<b>District 5 (Wayne)</b>											
Betty Jean Alexander	D	AA	77.4%	93.4	95.5	95.4	95.3		49.9	48.9	50.7
DeShawn Wilkins	R	AA	18.2%	3.3	1.2	1.6	1.6		43.7	44.5	43.1
others			4.4%	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.1		6.4	6.5	6.2
<i>votes for office</i>				34.9	36.2	39.4	39.4		44.2	44.1	44.1
<b>District 6 (Wayne)</b>											
Erika Geiss	D	AA	61.4%		107.3	99.4	92.8		42.6	43.8	47.8
Brenda Jones	R	AA	38.7%		-7.2	0.5	7.2		57.4	56.4	52.3
<i>votes for office</i>					38.3	35.9	35.9		50.0	52.9	52.9

2018 General: State Senate Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 11 (Oakland)</b>											
Jeremy Moss	D	W	76.7%		99.0	99.2	96.3	80.9	60.2	56.9	60.2
Boris Tuman	R	W	20.9%		0.0	0.4	2.0	17.5	36.0	39.2	36.6
others			12.4%		1.0	1.0	1.7	1.6	3.7	3.8	3.2
<i>votes for office</i>					60.6	63.4	63.4	83.7	59.9	60.1	60.1
<b>District 12 (Oakland)</b>											
Rosemary Bayer	D	W	49.4%		122.0	99.6	87.9		33.2	33.3	42.1
Michael D. McCready	R	W	48.6%		-23.8	0.6	4.6		64.9	64.2	56.7
others			2.0%		1.7	2.0	7.4		2.0	2.0	1.2
<i>votes for office</i>					14.5	25.6	25.6		75.1	74.4	74.4
<b>District 27 (Genesee)</b>											
Jim Ananich	D	W	71.2%	97.6	103.0	99.3	97.7	53.9	53.3	54.2	55.6
Donna Kekesis	R	W	28.8%	2.4	-3.0	0.7	2.3	46.1	46.7	45.8	44.4
<i>votes for office</i>				53.7	46.5	50.5	50.5	58.7	46.9	49.9	49.9
<b>District 32 (Genesee and Saginaw)</b>											
Phil Phelps	D	W	44.5%		113.0	99.7	96.1		29.5	30.1	33.5
Ken Horn	R	W	55.5%		-13.0	0.4	3.9		70.5	69.9	66.5
<i>votes for office</i>					37.9	37.6	37.6		61.4	62.3	62.3

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2018 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 7 (Wayne)</b>				insufficient white voters to produce estimates of voting patterns by race							
LaTanya Garrett	D	AA	97.6%								
Marcelis Turner	R	AA	2.4%								
others											
<i>votes for office</i>											
<b>District 8 (Wayne)</b>				insufficient white voters to produce estimates of voting patterns by race							
Sherry Gay Dagnogo	D	AA	96.4%								
Valerie R. Parker	R	AA	3.7%								
others											
<i>votes for office</i>											
<b>District 9 (Wayne)</b>											
Karen Whitsett	D	AA	95.1%		97.5	97.7	98.5		85.2	84.1	78.8
James Stephens	R		4.9%		2.5	2.3	1.5		14.8	16.0	21.2
<i>votes for office</i>					30.8	31.4	31.4		18.1	17.6	17.6
<b>District 10 (Wayne)</b>											
Leslie Love	D	AA	84.0%		99.1	98.7	96.7		48.3	48.8	59.3
William Brang	R	W	14.2%		-0.3	0.6	2.2		47.8	46.1	37.5
others			1.8%		1.2	1.2	1.2		3.9	3.6	3.3
<i>votes for office</i>					33.4	34.8	34.8		65.1	69.4	69.4
<b>District 11 (Wayne)</b>											
Jewell Jones	D	AA	66.9%		106.0	99.2	96.2		50.4	51.0	51.9
James Townsend	R	W	33.1%		-6.0	0.8	3.8		49.8	49.1	48.1
<i>votes for office</i>					37.9	38.9	38.9		44.9	45.2	45.2
<b>District 12 (Wayne)</b>											
Alex Garza	D	H	66.6%		104.7	98.8	90.6		43.9	46.3	49.0
Michelle Bailey	R	W	33.4%		-4.7	1.1	9.4		56.1	54.1	51.0
<i>votes for office</i>					47.8	48.0	48.0		41.8	42.8	42.8

2018 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
District 16 (Wayne)											
Kevin Coleman	D	W	67.3%		111.8	99.1	81.5		50.2	51.5	60.1
Jody Rice-White	R	W	32.8%		-11.9	1.1	18.5		49.8	48.9	39.9
votes for office					18.3	48.0	18.7		56.1	57.0	57.0
District 27 (Oakland)											
Robert Wittenberg	D	W	78.5%		96.3	97.6	93.0	75.4	71.2	70.3	73.8
Janet Flessland	R	W	18.5%		1.7	1.0	3.0	22.5	35.6	26.2	24.3
others			3.0%		2.1	2.1	4.0	2.0	3.2	3.4	1.9
votes for office					53.6	58.1	58.1	78.1	67.4	65.8	65.8
District 29 (Oakland)											
Brenda Carter	D	AA	74.1%		114.5	99.2	94.5		36.7	41.8	54.6
Timothy D. Carrier	R	W	25.9%		-14.5	1.1	5.5		63.1	58.3	45.4
votes for office					32.8	46.3	46.3		54.5	52.1	52.1
District 34 (Genesee)											
Sheldon A. Neeley	D	AA	90.0%		101.5	99.5	98.7		58.9	64.0	46.7
Henry Swift	R		10.0%		-1.4	0.5	9.3		41.1	0.5	53.4
votes for office					52.6	54.7	54.7		18.8	22.1	22.1
District 35 (Oakland)											
Kyra Harris Bolden	D	AA	85.5%		102.7	99.6	98.2		53.5	57.2	63.1
Theodore Alfonsetti III	R	W	14.6%		-2.7	0.3	1.8		46.5	42.9	36.9
votes for office					56.1	55.6	55.6		74.5	77.2	77.2
District 37 (Oakland)											
Christine Greig	D	W	67.2%		111.4	98.2	69.5		59.6	61.5	68.2
Mitch Swoboda	R	W	32.8%		-11.2	2.2	30.5		40.6	38.7	31.8
votes for office					34.8	35.6	35.6		85.0	82.3	82.3

2018 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 49 (Genesee)</b>											
John D. Cherry	D	W	72.4%		104.9	99.2	94.1		55.6	57.2	61.4
Patrick Duvendeck	R	W	27.6%		-5.0	0.8	6.0		44.4	42.7	38.7
<i>votes for office</i>					<i>40.0</i>	<i>42.3</i>	<i>42.3</i>		<i>53.0</i>	<i>57.8</i>	<i>57.8</i>
<b>District 95 (Saginaw)</b>											
Vanessa Guerra	D	H	73.1%		109.8	99.0	96.0		43.3	47.3	50.5
Dorothy Tanner	R	W	26.9%		-9.9	0.8	4.0		56.7	52.8	49.5
<i>votes for office</i>					<i>44.9</i>	<i>46.1</i>	<i>46.1</i>		<i>50.1</i>	<i>49.4</i>	<i>49.4</i>



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2020 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 16 (Wayne)</b>											
Kevin Coleman	D	W	62.5%		111.3	99.0	84.8		44.4	45.6	54.2
Emily Bauman	R	W	37.5%		-11.4	1.0	15.2		55.7	54.4	45.8
<i>votes for office</i>					29.9	33.5	33.5		75.1	76.0	76.0
<b>District 27 (Oakland)</b>											
Regina Weiss	D	W	74.4%		95.4	97.3	93.3	68.7	64.2	63.4	66.4
Elizabeth Goss	R	W	22.4%		2.6	1.5	3.9	28.8	32.0	32.5	30.6
others			3.2%		1.7	1.6	2.8	2.5	3.9	4.1	33.0
<i>votes for office</i>					73.8	76.6	76.6	88.1	77.7	77.4	77.4
<b>District 29 (Oakland)</b>											
Brenda Carter	D	AA	72.9%		111.1	99.1	94.7		37.1	38.8	51.3
S. Dave Sullivan	R	W	27.1%		-11.0	0.8	53.3		62.7	61.5	48.7
<i>votes for office</i>					47.6	61.1	61.1		67.5	61.5	61.5
<b>District 34 (Oakland)</b>											
Cynthia R. Neeley	D	AA	86.7%		100.5	99.2	98.3		51.6	56.1	45.9
James Miraglia	R	W	13.3%		-4.8	0.7	1.7		48.4	43.8	54.1
<i>votes for office</i>					65.6	67.6	67.6		32.5	36.8	36.8
<b>District 35 (Oakland)</b>											
Kyra Harris Bolden	D	AA	82.9%		99.8	99.4	97.2		51.5	51.2	58.5
Daniela Davis	R	AA	15.9%		-0.4	0.3	2.3		46.4	46.2	39.3
others			1.0%		0.6	0.5	0.5		2.1	2.4	2.2
<i>votes for office</i>					70.1	68.4	68.4		93.4	94.5	94.5
<b>District 37 (Oakland)</b>											
Samantha Steckloff	D	W	63.9%		106.1	96.4	<b>57.5</b>		56.8	56.9	<b>66.4</b>
Mitch Swoboda	R	W	34.1%		-8.7	0.8	<b>34.2</b>		41.7	40.8	<b>32.2</b>
others			2.0%		2.5	6.3	<b>8.3</b>		1.7	1.3	<b>1.4</b>
<i>votes for office</i>					55.5	54.9	<b>54.9</b>		106.2	94.0	<b>94.0</b>

2020 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 49 (Genesee)</b>											
John D. Cherry	D	W	68.9%		104.3	98.8	94.8		50.2	51.9	56.6
Bryan Lutz	R	W	31.1%		-4.3	1.0	5.2		49.8	48.3	43.6
<i>votes for office</i>					52.5	60.7	60.7		68.0	69.1	69.1
<b>District 95 (Saginaw)</b>											
Amos O'Neal	D	AA	70.1%		111.7	99.2	96.6		34.7	41.1	42.7
Charlotte DeMaet	R	W	29.9%		-11.5	0.9	3.4		65.2	58.9	57.3
<i>votes for office</i>					59.0	60.6	60.6		62.9	61.5	61.5

Recent Democratic Primaries: Congress			Estimates for Black Voters			Estimates for White Voters		
	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI	HP	ER	EI
<b>2018</b>								
<b>Congressional District 13</b>								
Ian Conyers	B	6.6	8.3	9.1	9.3		1.3	1.1
Shanelle Jackson	B	5.4	7.7	7.1	7.5		1.6	1.2
Brenda Jones	B	30.2	42.5	43.7	43.5		2.9	5.3
Rashinda Tlaib	ME	31.2	22.3	21.3	22.4		48.1	45.3
Bill Wild	W	14.1	1.6	-1.4	0.7		46.2	43.9
Coleman Young II	B	12.5	17.7	20.1	18.9		-0.3	1.1
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			23.0	22.2	24.3		12.2	14.1
<b>2020</b>								
<b>Congressional District 12</b>								
Debbie Dingell	W	80.9		81.4	81.2		87.9	87.7
Solomon Rajput	A	19.1		18.9	19.0		12.1	12.2
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				18.8	24.2		13.6	13.1
<b>Congressional District 13</b>								
Brenda Jones	B	33.7	37.8	37.7	37.3		27.0	27.9
Rashida Tlaib	ME	66.3	62.2	62.3	62.7		72.9	72.1
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			28.0	26.7	29.5		14.1	15.8
<b>Congressional District 14</b>								
Brenda Lawrence	B	93.2	92.7	92.7	92.8	92.1	91.6	92.0
Terrance Morrison		6.8	7.3	7.3	7.5	7.9	8.4	8.7
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			25.9	23.7	28.0	22.4	13.3	18.5

Recent Democratic Primaries: 2018 State Senate			Estimates for Black Voters			Estimates for White Voters		
	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI	HP	ER	EI
<b>State Senate District 1</b>								
Stephanie Chang	A	49.8	24.6	23.5	27.1	71.6	79.2	76.7
James Cole	B	5.2	6.2	7.8	6.2	4.3	3.6	3.9
Nicholas Rivera	H	2.9	1.3	0.9	0.8	4.3	5.9	5.2
Stephanie Roehm		4.4	2.1	1.0	1.5	8.6	9.9	8.7
Bettie Cook Scott	B	11.2	18.2	17.9	15.7	6.6	17.0	6.1
Alberta Tinsley Talabi	B	26.4	47.7	48.9	47.1	4.7	-2.7	2.9
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			20.0	20.9	23.3	17.4	13.3	13.9
<b>State Senate District 3</b>								
Anita Belle	B	14.3	23.7	25.5	25.4	4.9	1.9	1.9
Terry Burrell	W	5.5	8.5	8.6	8.4	3.9	2.1	2.2
Sylvia Santana	B	41.5	56.6	60.2	60.3	20.2	19.9	18.7
Gary Woronchak	W	38.7	11.2	5.7	8.0	71.0	76.2	76.0
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			18.7	16.8	17.9	17.2	17.3	17.8
<b>State Senate District 4</b>								
Marshall Bullock	W	44.3	46.8	44.5	47.2		39.2	38.6
Fred Durhal	B	38.3	39.4	42.6	40.6		30.8	31.3
Carron Pinkins	B	17.5	13.8	12.8	12.6		30.0	29.1
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			21.5	21.8	26.3		8.7	10.5
<b>State Senate District 5</b>								
Betty Jean Alexander	B	54.5	66.9	69.1	68.1		27.2	27.5
David Knezek	W	45.5	33.1	30.9	31.9		72.8	72.6
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			22.2	21.6	23.1		10.7	11.4
<b>State Senate District 6</b>								
Erika Geiss	B	65.4		86.1	89.5		55.6	55.9
Robert Kosowski	W	34.6		13.9	10.3		44.4	44.0
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				19.5	18.0		12.4	14.3
<b>State Senate District 11</b>								
Crystal Bailey	B	21.2	36.6	27.0	24.9	7.9	16.7	17.3
Jeremy Moss	W	51.8	35.4	49.0	53.1	78.1	51.9	51.0
Vanessa Moss	B	18.5	20.2	17.5	16.2	10.2	20.4	20.3
James Turner	B	8.6	7.8	6.5	5.8	3.7	11.0	10.9
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			29.0	30.8	33.4	43.3	20.5	20.6

Recent Democratic primaries: State House			Estimates for Black Voters			Estimates for White Voters		
	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI	HP	ER	EI
<b>2018</b>								
<b>State House District 1</b>								
Shaun Maloy	B	20.2	15.1	14.9	13.9		31.3	32.2
Tenisha Yancey	B	79.8	84.9	85.1	86.1		68.8	67.7
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			14.0	14.8	14.9		17.5	20.4
<b>State House District 5</b>								
Cynthia Johnson	B	37.0	39.6	42.0	40.5		12.0	12.9
Mark Anthony Murphy	B	5.5	5.6	5.6	5.4		4.5	0.1
Mark Payne	B	12.5	11.3	11.8	11.9		25.4	0.0
Rita Ross	B	36.9	35.9	34.2	35.7		48.1	72.2
Jermaine Tobey	B	2.6	1.4	0.8	1.3		1.4	0.6
Cliff Woodwards	B	5.6	6.3	5.7	6.8		-8.6	0.0
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			18.3	18.4	19.5		-23.6	0.6
<b>State House District 9</b>								
Gary Pollard	B	34.6		32.7	35.4		33.0	32.4
Donald Stuckey	B	8.9		7.4	6.7		20.8	20.6
Karen Whitsett	B	56.4		60.0	58.2		45.7	45.7
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				17.7	18.7		3.7	6.1
<b>State House District 10</b>								
Rhonda Barley	B	14.2		13.3	13.2		19.1	17.3
James Brenner	W	10.4		4.9	5.2		28.3	25.6
Tyson Kelley	B	4.3		4.7	4.5		3.8	3.6
Leslie Love	B	71.2		77.0	78.0		48.8	51.5
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				22.3	24.3		9.2	9.3
<b>State House District 11</b>								
Jewell Jones	B	62.2		101.2	97.5		42.2	42.5
Randy Walker	W	37.8		-1.1	2.5		57.6	57.5
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				18.1	17.8		11.7	12.3
<b>State House District 12</b>								
Tomeka Boles	B	11.2		29.3	28.9		0.0	1.3
Alex Garza	H	46.6		0.0	2.7		76.3	74.9
Lauretha Shelton	B	6.0		11.9	12.6		2.4	1.9
Alexandria Taylor	B	36.3		59.9	61.9		21.7	21.2
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				22.1	21.3		7.9	9.3

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Recent Democratic primaries: State House			Estimates for Black Voters			Estimates for White Voters		
	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI	HP	ER	EI
<b>State House District 49 (Genesee)</b>								
John Cherry	W	46.8		34.0	37.0		53.0	53.3
LaShaya Darisaw	B	8.7		14.4	15.8		5.7	4.4
Justin Dickerson		1.8		0.9	0.4		2.5	2.8
Jacky King	B	9.0		30.9	23.1		-2.4	0.5
Dayne Walling	W	31.0		18.9	20.1		37.7	36.3
Don Wright	W	2.7		0.9	0.4		3.5	4.1
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				22.0	24.8		14.6	17.5
<b>2020</b>								
<b>State House District 2 (Wayne)</b>								
Taylor Harrell	B	31.0	38.4	38.6	39.1	21.0	20.3	19.8
Joe Tate	B	69.0	61.6	61.4	60.9	79.0	79.6	80.1
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			24.5	23.0	25.1	23.8	27.8	28.3
<b>State House District 5 (Wayne)</b>								
Cynthia Johnson	B	65.0	67.1	66.2	66.5		36.7	38.0
Rita Ross	B	28.4	27.3	28.2	27.8		40.4	28.6
Jermaine Tobey	B	6.6	5.7	5.8	5.6		23.3	18.8
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			23.1	23.2	24.7		-26.8	1.3
<b>State House District 6 (Wayne)</b>								
Tyrone Carter	B	62.5	59.9	68.7	75.6		38.4	26.8
Ivy Nichole O'Neal	B	20.1	23.4	20.2	18.6		27.1	24.3
David Palmer	W	17.4	16.7	11.2	9.2		34.9	30.9
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			23.4	30.7	33.3		3.0	14.5
<b>State House District 9 (Wayne)</b>								
Marc Cummings	B	18.2		18.7	18.5		15.7	13.5
Nicole Elcock	B	6.4		5.6	5.4		12.5	13.3
Roslyn Ogburn	B	30.7		28.8	29.6		38.2	37.7
Karen Whitsett	B	44.7		46.9	46.3		33.7	34.8
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				22.9	23.7		2.3	3.6
<b>State House District 12 (Wayne)</b>								
Alex Garza	H	76.5		62.0	62.5		84.8	85.7
Derrick Gyorkos	W	6.4		5.8	5.0		7.2	6.2
Ed Martell	H	17.1		32.3	33.1		8.2	7.1
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				29.4	29.8		9.2	10.5

Recent Democratic primaries: State House			Estimates for Black Voters			Estimates for White Voters		
	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI	HP	ER	EI
<b>State House District 35 (Oakland)</b>								
Kyra Harris Bolden	B	90.2		92.2	92.9		84.4	84.5
Shadia Martini	ME	9.8		7.8	7.3		15.5	15.6
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				39.4	42.3		26.0	25.3
<b>State House District 37 (Oakland)</b>								
Michael Bridges	B	30.6		102.4	99.0		22.9	19.7
Randy Bruce	W	20.7		3.1	3.5		22.6	22.8
Samantha Steckloff	W	48.8		-5.4	0.1		54.3	57.4
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				34.2	33.6		36.9	40.2
<b>State House District 34 (Genesee)</b>								
DelTonya Burns	B	4.8		5.2	5.4		1.7	1.1
Cynthia Neeley	B	67.4		66.5	67.3		66.1	70.2
Claudia Perkins-Milton	B	11.1		15.2	13.7		4.8	3.6
Diana Phillips	W	4.2		0.6	0.8		15.8	14.7
Arthur Woodson	B	12.6		12.4	12.5		11.6	12.2
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				29.5	32.1		3.3	6.1
<b>State House District 95 (Saginaw)</b>								
Brandell Cortez Adams	B	4.7		3.0	2.6		6.3	7.1
Clint Bryant	B	25.2		21.7	20.2		25.0	29.7
James Graham	W	8.7		-3.0	0.8		19.3	18.2
Carly Rose Hammond	W	15.4		-3.3	0.1		36.2	32.3
Amos O'Neal	B	46.0		82.2	81.9		13.0	13.1
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				28.3	29.8		13.4	14.4

## **APPENDIX C**

Detroit area			Estimates for Hispanics	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>2020 General</b>				
<b>U.S. President</b>				
Joseph Biden	D	W	75.4	76.0
Donald Trump	R	W	24.3	23.9
others			0.3	0.2
<i>votes for office</i>			13.9	14.8
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Gary Peters	D	W	73.6	74.8
John James	R	W	22.6	21.9
others			3.8	3.2
<i>votes for office</i>			13.5	14.6
<b>2018 General</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	83.1	80.0
Bill Schuette	R	W	15.3	14.8
others			1.5	1.8
<i>votes for office</i>			3.5	5.1
<b>Secretary of State</b>				
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	84.0	82.6
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	14.4	13.5
others			1.7	14.0
<i>votes for office</i>			3.3	4.4
<b>Attorney General</b>				
Dana Nessel	D	W	80.1	78.9
Tom Leonard	R	W	16.4	15.2
others			3.4	3.7
<i>votes for office</i>			3.4	4.8

Detroit area			Estimates for Hispanics	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	82.5	82.2
John James	R	W	16.4	17.1
others			1.3	0.0
<i>votes for office</i>			3.3	4.5
<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	55.5	58.5
Shri Thanedar	D	A	13.6	12.7
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	30.8	28.7
<i>votes for office</i>			-2.0	1.0

Grand Rapids area			Estimates for Hispanics	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>2020 General</b>				
<b>U.S. President</b>				
Joseph Biden	D	W	98.6	94.8
Donald Trump	R	W	0.5	0.1
others			1.0	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>0.0</i>	<i>8.6</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Gary Peters	D	W	96.1	93.3
John James	R	W	-1.6	3.2
others			5.3	9.2
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>0.0</i>	<i>7.3</i>
<b>2018 General</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	99.5	95.0
Bill Schuette	R	W	-4.5	1.6
others			5.6	6.1
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>-9.0</i>	<i>1.1</i>
<b>Secretary of State</b>				
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	102.1	97.0
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	-5.3	1.1
others			3.3	6.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>-9.0</i>	<i>0.3</i>
<b>Attorney General</b>				
Dana Nessel	D	W	97.2	93.1
Tom Leonard	R	W	-6.4	1.2
others			9.3	9.8
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>-9.0</i>	<i>0.8</i>

Grand Rapids area			Estimates for Hispanics	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	97.2	93.2
John James	R	W	-3.4	2.0
others			6.2	10.4
<i>votes for office</i>			-9.0	1.1
<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	51.1	51.3
Shri Thanedar	D	A	39.8	42.4
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	8.9	11.9
<i>votes for office</i>			-2.3	0.1

			Estimates for Arab Americans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>2020 General</b>				
<b>U.S. President</b>				
Joseph Biden	D	W	98.3	98.9
Donald Trump	R	W	1.3	0.8
others			0.6	1.0
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>24.1</i>	<i>26.7</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Gary Peters	D	W	100.7	99.0
John James	R	W	-2.9	0.8
others			2.1	2.1
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>22.2</i>	<i>24.9</i>
<b>2018 General</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	103.9	99.3
Bill Schuette	R	W	-6.2	1.1
others			2.5	2.1
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>8.6</i>	<i>10.3</i>
<b>Secretary of State</b>				
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	104.7	99.3
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	-6.3	0.9
others			1.7	1.7
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>8.5</i>	<i>9.8</i>
<b>Attorney General</b>				
Dana Nessel	D	W	106.8	99.5
Tom Leonard	R	W	-8.0	0.6
others			1.3	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>8.6</i>	<i>10.1</i>

			Estimates for Arab Americans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	107.2	99.1
John James	R	W	-9.0	1.1
others			1.9	1.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>8.4</i>	<i>10.0</i>
<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	116.4	92.8
Shri Thanedar	D	A	-0.3	0.2
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	-16.0	0.6
<i>votes for office</i>			15.0	15.1

			Estimates for Chaldeans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>2020 General</b>				
<b>U.S. President</b>				
Joseph Biden	D	W	19.5	20.5
Donald Trump	R	W	81.9	80.3
others			-0.8	2.0
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>31.2</i>	<i>29.6</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Gary Peters	D	W	26.3	26.2
John James	R	W	74.0	72.8
others			-0.6	0.2
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>27.9</i>	<i>27.2</i>
<b>2018 General</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	52.9	48.9
Bill Schuette	R	W	47.9	47.4
others			0.2	8.0
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>-12.2</i>	<i>0.0</i>
<b>Secretary of State</b>				
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	55.3	53.7
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	44.7	42.0
others			0.4	7.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>-10.8</i>	<i>0.3</i>
<b>Attorney General</b>				
Dana Nessel	D	W	52.5	48.0
Tom Leonard	R	W	47.4	47.4
others			0.4	0.1
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>-10.3</i>	<i>2.5</i>

			Estimates for Chaldeans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	55.2	55.6
John James	R	W	43.2	44.0
others			0.7	0.9
<i>votes for office</i>			-11.4	0.4
<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	50.1	na
Shri Thanedar	D	A	11.2	na
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	38.7	na
<i>votes for office</i>			-1.1	0.1

			Estimates for Bangladeshi Americans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>2020 General</b>				
<b>U.S. President</b>				
Joseph Biden	D	W	104.7	96.1
Donald Trump	R	W	-4.4	3.2
others			0.1	0.1
<i>votes for office</i>			31.6	25.2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Gary Peters	D	W	104.4	96.2
John James	R	W	-5.2	3.3
others			0.9	1.1
<i>votes for office</i>			31.6	24.6
<b>2018 General</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	105.7	99.1
Bill Schuette	R	W	-7.4	1.1
others			1.1	1.1
<i>votes for office</i>			13.7	18.7
<b>Secretary of State</b>				
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	105.7	98.9
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	-7.1	1.3
others			2.5	2.4
<i>votes for office</i>			13.9	19.3
<b>Attorney General</b>				
Dana Nessel	D	W	107.5	98.2
Tom Leonard	R	W	-8.0	0.7
others			2.3	2.3
<i>votes for office</i>			13.8	19.2

			Estimates for Bangladeshi Americans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	107.1	99.1
John James	R	W	-7.7	0.9
others			1.7	0.7
<i>votes for office</i>			13.9	18.4
<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	98.8	97.3
Shri Thanedar	D	A	6.5	5.1
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	-5.2	4.5
<i>votes for office</i>			16.4	14.7

## **APPENDIX 3**

### **2021-22 Pre- and Post-MICRC Public Opinion Poll Results by Glengariff Group**



**MICHIGAN INDEPENDENT CITIZENS' REDISTRICTING COMMISSION  
MICHIGAN VOTER SURVEY  
600 SAMPLE**

**February 17, 2022**

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## METHODOLOGY

The Glengariff Group, Inc. conducted a Michigan statewide survey of voters. The 600 sample, live operator telephone survey was conducted on February 11-14, 2022 and has a margin of error of +/-4.0% with a 95% level of confidence. 25.0% of respondents were contacted via landline telephone. 75.0% of respondents were contacted via cell phone telephone. This survey is a follow up survey to a benchmarking survey conducted March 27-31, 2021. This survey was commissioned by the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission.

## KEY FINDINGS

### 41.3% of Respondents Are Familiar With Michigan's Redistricting Changes

- \* By a margin of 41.3%-58.0%, Michigan voters have heard something about the 2018 constitutional amendment Michigan voters passed changing how redistricting is conducted.

This figure represents a nearly 12% point drop from the benchmarking survey conducted in March 2021 when 53.0% of voters had heard about the changes.

- \* Voters were asked how engaged they were in the political process:

20.2%	Very Engaged
57.6%	Somewhat Engaged
15.6%	Not Really Engaged
5.7%	Not Engaged At All

The shift in awareness of Michigan's redistricting changes came among the large proportion of voters that said they were 'somewhat engaged' and 'not really engaged' in the political process. Among voters very engaged in the political process, there was no statistical change in the percentage that knew something about Michigan's change in the redistricting process.

The chart below compares awareness levels of the redistricting process from the benchmarking survey in March 2021 to the post survey in February 2022 based on how engaged the voter said they were in the political process.

<u>Engagement Level</u>	<u>Aware 3/21</u>	<u>Aware 2/22</u>	<u>Change in Awareness</u>
Very Engaged	62.6%	60.5%	-2.1%
Somewhat Engaged	52.9%	44.1%	-8.8%
Not Very Engaged	41.5%	27.9%	-13.6%
Not At All Engaged	12.0%	31.6%	+19.6%

*[Note: Only 5.7% of respondents they were not at all engaged representing a cell size of only 35 respondents.]*

### 35.2% Have Heard of the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission

- \* 35.2% of Michigan voters have heard of the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission. This figure represents a 10.9% increase from the 2021 benchmarking survey. 81.8% of those voters that are familiar with the 2018 redistricting amendment had heard of the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission.

The percentage of respondents that have heard of the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission is directly tied to their engagement level in the political process. Among those very engaged in the political process awareness of the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission increased from 33.7% to 51.6%. Among those 'somewhat engaged' awareness increased from 23.4% to 35.6%.

Engagement Level	Awareness of MICRC		
	Pre Survey	Post Survey	Change
Very Engaged	33.7%	51.6%	+17.9%
Somewhat Engaged	23.4%	35.6%	+12.2%
Not Very Engaged	16.9%	17.7%	+0.8%
Not At All Engaged	0.0%	8.6%	+8.6%

As the chart below indicates, awareness of the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission was also tied to educational attainment with 43.6% awareness among college educated voters, 31.8% awareness among those with some post high school education, and 17.0% awareness with those with a high school education.

Education Attainment	Awareness of the MICRC		
	Pre Survey	Post Survey	Change
High School	11.1%	17.0%	+5.9%
Some Post Education	23.8%	31.8%	+8.0%
College Education	33.2%	43.6%	+10.4%

Strong Democratic and Independent voters saw a double digit increase in their awareness of the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission. But Strong Republican awareness increased by only 2.8% from benchmarking levels.

Party Affiliation	Awareness of the MICRC		
	Pre Survey	Post Survey	Change
Strong Democratic	27.8%	44.8%	+17.0%
Lean Democratic	44.8%	43.5%	- 0.7%
Independent	17.6%	31.9%	+14.3%
Lean Republican	20.8%	32.8%	+12.0%
Strong Republican	20.8%	23.6%	+2.8%

\* Respondents that had heard about the commission were asked what they had heard about the commission.

19.4% knew that they were redrawing legislative lines.

12.8% knew of the name or that the commission existed.

11.4% knew of the commission and the commission's make up.

8.5% said that people were upset about it.

6.6% said it was to fight gerrymandering.

6.2% knew about the applications to be on the commission/ or that they themselves had applied.

5.7% said they thought the redrawn maps were unfair.

5.2% knew the new maps were being contested/ that there were lawsuits.

4.7% said the maps were still biased towards one political party.

3.8% said the maps had been passed and their job was done.

1.4% said that minority communities were not properly represented.

#### Majority Have No Opinion on Commission's Overall Performance

\* Respondents that had heard something about Michigan's redistricting changes were asked if their views on the commission were positive or negative.

50.8% said they had no opinion of the MICRC.

34.1% said they had a positive opinion of the MICRC.

12.0% said they had a negative opinion of the MICRC.

\* The 34.1% of respondents that had a positive opinion were asked why their opinion was positive:

27.3% said the commission was fair and unbiased.

13.6% said they reduced gerrymandering.

13.6% said that citizens were handling redistricting, not politicians.

12.5% generally said they have done a good job.

9.1% said that people from both parties were working together.

8.0% said that people were given a voice.

8.0% said that change was good.

\* The 12.0% of respondents that had a negative opinion were asked why their opinion was negative:

25.6% said the commission had done a bad job and were incompetent.

22.5% said the maps were not fair.

9.7% said it favors one party over another.

9.7% said that we should not change things.

6.5% said the commission was a form of gerrymandering.

6.5% said it was a political ploy.

6.5% said they would be adversely affected.

6.5% said the commission was a scam.

Those Aware Approve of Commission 33.7%-18.2%.

\* For the remainder of the survey, the 41.3% of voters that had heard something about Michigan's redistricting changes were asked questions specifically about the performance of the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission.

\* For those respondents that were aware of Michigan's redistricting changes, 33.7% approve of the performance of the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission while 18.2% disapprove of their performance. But 48.1% of those aware of redistricting changes could not offer an opinion of the commission's performance.

- \* Not surprisingly, those respondents most engaged in the political process were most able to offer an opinion of the commission's performance.

79.2% of those not very engaged or not engaged at all could not offer an opinion on the Commission's performance.

<u>Engagement Level</u>	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
Very Engaged	38.2%	26.3%	35.5%
Somewhat Engaged	35.0%	15.9%	49.0%
Not Very Engaged	10.6%	10.6%	78.9%
Not Engaged At all	20.0%	0.0%	80.0%

- \* These voters were asked how closely they paid attention to the work being done by the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission. Overall, 25.5% of the state's voters said they watched the process very closely or somewhat closely.

8.1% Very Closely	(Represents 3.5% of the state population.)
51.2% Some Attention	(Represents 22.0% of the state population.)
20.5% Not Too Much Attention	(Represents 8.8% of the state population.)
20.2% No Attention At All	(Represents 8.7% of the state population.)

The chart below compares how much attention respondents paid based on how engaged they were in the political process.

<u>Political Engagement</u>	<u>Very/Some</u>	<u>Not Too Much/ No Attention</u>
Very Engaged	71.0%	28.9%
Somewhat Engaged	58.6%	41.4%
Not Very Engaged	26.3%	72.7%
Not Engaged At All	20.0%	80.0%

## Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission Receives Positive Scores On All Key Measures

- \* Voters that were aware of Michigan's redistricting changes were asked to rate the commission's performance on seven key measurements that voters in the benchmarking survey indicated were important characteristics of the redistricting process. At least a plurality gave the commission positive marks on all seven metrics. A majority of aware voters approved of the Commission's performance on five of the seven metrics.

Approval fell just short of 50% on the communities of interest metric –but still came in at a strong 48.4%-19.0% approval, with 22.1% unsure. While still positive, the Commission's lowest approval level came in on transparency at 45.7% approve to 29.0% disapprove.

Approve	Disapprove	Neutral	DK	Measurement
60.8%	17.1%	5.4%	16.7%	Making sure that they designed the districts rather than politicians.
60.8%	19.4%	6.6%	13.2%	Making sure that neither party gets an unfair advantage by gerrymandering districts.
60.1%	18.2%	7.4%	14.3%	Making sure that Michigan voters, not elected officials, have input in designing Michigan's new congressional and legislative districts.
57.0%	19.8%	7.0%	16.3%	Making sure the maps were redesigned in public view so that all sides could watch the deliberations.
55.4%	19.8%	9.3%	15.5%	Making sure that citizens had input into the design of the new districts through public meetings, the public comment portal, the mapping portal that allowed everyone to make comments about the proposed maps.
48.4%	19.0%	10.5%	22.1%	Making sure communities with common historical, cultural and Economic interests are put in districts together instead of divided to weaken their voices.
45.7%	29.0%	8.1%	17.1%	Making sure they were transparent in how they made their decisions.

- \* There was one statistically significant difference in how aware voters rated the Commission on the metric of communities of interest.

Caucasian voters rated the Commission 52.8%-14.1% on communities of interest. African American voters rated the Commission 30.7%-53.9% on communities of interest.

#### 80.1% Of Aware Voters Followed On News Media

- \* Respondents that were aware of the redistricting changes in Michigan were read a list of several ways they could have become engaged in the redistricting process and asked if they used that vehicle. (The percentage in parenthesis represents the total state population.)

<u>Aware</u>	<u>Overall Pop</u>	<u>Engaged Using This Method</u>
80.1%	(27.5%)	Reading or following news stories
28.2%	(9.7%)	By looking at the commission's website
19.9%	(6.8%)	By viewing a virtual or in-person informational redistricting presentation
13.1%	(4.5%)	By watching a meeting online
8.3%	(2.8%)	By providing public comment before the commission or submitting written comment
2.9%	(1.0%)	By attending a public hearing held by the commission

- \* Participation beyond reading or following in new stories was nearly exclusively engaged in by those voters that are very engaged in the political process.

<u>Engagement</u>	<u>Online Mtg</u>	<u>Public Hearing</u>	<u>Website</u>	<u>Comment</u>	<u>Virtual</u>	<u>Listening</u>
Very Engaged	<b>28.6%</b>	<b>7.9%</b>	<b>44.4%</b>	<b>17.5%</b>	<b>34.9%</b>	<b>3.2%</b>
Somewhat Engaged	7.1%	0.8%	22.2%	4.0%	14.3%	6.3%
Not Very Engaged	0.0%	0.0%	7.1%	7.1%	7.1%	0.0%
Not At All Engaged	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

- \* While Democrats and Republicans were nearly equal in Online Meeting viewing or using the website, Democratic voters were significantly more likely to attend a public hearing or offer comment.

Party Affiliation	Online Mtg	Public Hearing	Website	Comment	Virtual	Listening
Strong Democratic	17.7%	<b>6.3%</b>	26.6%	<b>13.9%</b>	21.5%	6.3%
Independent	6.5%	0.0%	34.8%	2.2%	19.6%	2.2%
Strong Republican	14.7%	0.0%	26.5%	0.0%	14.7%	8.8%

#### Aware Voters Divided on Social Media Engagement

- \* Aware voters were read a list of different social media platforms and asked if they followed the redistricting process on that platform. 51.5% of aware voters did not follow the redistricting process on any social media platform. 43.6% did engage on a social media platform. 4.9% did not know.

51.5%	Not engaged in any social media platforms listed
25.7%	Facebook
17.5%	Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission mapping portal
12.1%	Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission public comment portal
11.2%	Twitter
10.2%	You Tube
8.3%	Instagram

- \* Among those that are very engaged in the political process, 68.3% of these voters followed the redistricting process on social media while 31.7% did not engage on social media.

Engagement	Facebook	Twitter	Instagram	YouTube	Mapping	Public Comment
Very Engaged	36.5%	17.5%	20.6%	19.0%	22.2%	20.6%

- \* Age had a strong influence on whether the respondent engaged on social media.

<u>Age</u>	<u>Did Not Use Social Media</u>
18-29	36.4%
30-39	45.2%
40-49	40.0%
50-64	61.3%
65+	59.3%

### 34.9% of Aware Voters Recall Seeing or Hearing Advertisements

- \* Aware voters were asked if they had seen or heard any advertisements by the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission. 34.9% of aware voters had seen or heard an advertisement of some sort while 62.8% of aware voters had not seen or heard advertisement. 2.3% of aware voters could not remember.

16.3%	Television
13.2%	Internet
10.9%	Radio
4.7%	Newspaper
1.6%	Billboard

- \* Aware Republican voters were more likely than Democratic or Independent voters to have seen or heard an advertisement.

<u>Party Affiliation</u>	<u>Did NOT See or Hear</u>
Strong Democratic	68.2%
Lean Democratic	60.0%
Independent	67.2%
Lean Republican	36.4%
Strong Republican	58.7%

- \* Traditional Republican votes were the most likely to have seen or heard an advertisement.

<u>Party Philosophy</u>	<u>Did NOT See or Hear</u>
Sanders Democratic	57.5%
Democratic	64.3%
Independent	70.8%
Republican	<b>41.2%</b>
Trump Republican	73.3%

#### Aware Voters Say Commission Succeeded By Better Than 2-1 Margin

- \* Aware voters were asked if Michigan citizens did or did not have a greater role in deciding how new districts would be drawn. By a margin of 45.0%-22.1%, aware voters believe Michigan citizens DID have a great role. 26.0% of aware voters could not offer an opinion.
- \* ***Aware voters were asked if the Commission succeeded or failed in giving Michigan citizens a greater role than politicians in designing new districts. By a margin of 49.6%-22.1%, aware voters said the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission succeeded in giving Michigan citizens a greater role. 28.3% of aware voters could not offer an opinion.***

#### 60.9% of Aware Voters Have No Suggestions Moving Forward

- \* Aware voters were asked in an open-ended question what suggestions they have for improving the redistricting process. 60.9% of these voters could not offer a suggestion. The primary suggestion was to invest more in communications with voters.
- |       |   |
|-------|---|
| 14.0% | Keep the people better informed                               |
| 13.2% | Help the citizens be more involved                            |
| 2.7%  | Be more transparent   |
| 2.3%  | Keep politicians out of it                                    |
| 2.3%  | Become more educated about what you are doing                 |
| 2.3%  | Disband the commission  |
| 1.2%  | Put the redrawn districts on the ballot for voters to approve |

Final Call: 65.5% of All Voters Say Continue With Commission

- \* At the conclusion of the survey, ALL voters were asked if Michigan should continue to allow the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission to redraw the state's maps or should Michigan go back to allowing elected representatives that have control in the State Legislature to redraw the maps.

***By an overwhelming margin of 65.5% to 10.1%, Michigan voters say the state should continue with the redistricting commission. 24.4% of voters were undecided or said both should be involved.***

- \* ***By a margin of 78.7%-4.7% voters that were aware of the redistricting changes said Michigan should stay with the redistricting commission.***

- \* A majority of all party affiliations say Michigan should continue with the redistricting commission to redraw the state's maps.

Party Affiliation	Commission	Legislature	Undecided/Both
Strong Democratic	75.2%	5.5%	19.4%
Lean Democratic	74.2%	1.6%	24.2%
Independent	61.6%	11.6%	26.8%
Lean Republican	67.2%	6.9%	25.9%
Strong Republican	59.4%	18.2%	22.4%

**MICHIGAN INDEPENDENT CITIZENS' REDISTRICTING COMMISSION  
2022 POST SURVEY**

Hello, my name is \_\_\_\_\_. I'm not selling anything. I'm doing a quick survey of voters' attitudes in Michigan. It should take approximately six minutes.

A. Are you registered to vote at the address I am calling?

- |    |                  |        |
|----|------------------|--------|
| 1. | Yes.....CONTINUE | 100.0% |
| 2. | No....TERMINATE  |        |

1. CODE CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

- |     |       |      |
|-----|-------|------|
| 1.  | CD 1  | 7.0% |
| 2.  | CD 2  | 7.3% |
| 3.  | CD 3  | 7.2% |
| 4.  | CD 4  | 7.2% |
| 5.  | CD 5  | 7.2% |
| 6.  | CD 6  | 7.2% |
| 7.  | CD 7  | 7.2% |
| 8.  | CD 8  | 7.2% |
| 9.  | CD 9  | 7.2% |
| 10. | CD 10 | 7.1% |
| 11. | CD 11 | 7.2% |
| 12. | CD 12 | 7.2% |
| 13. | CD 13 | 7.1% |
| 14. | CD 14 | 7.0% |

2. And could you tell me in what county you vote in?

1.	UP/North	8.3%
2.	West	12.4%
3.	Southwest	8.9%
4.	Mid-Michigan	9.9%
5.	East Central	12.4%
6.	Oakland	13.5%
7.	Macomb	9.4%
8.	Wayne	11.2%
9.	City of Detroit	4.7%
10.	Remainder of Detroit MSA	9.3%

3. CODE:

1.	Outstate (UP/North, West, Southwest, Mid, East Central)	51.9%
2.	Metro Detroit (Oakland, Macomb, Wayne, Detroit, Detroit MSA)	48.1%

4. In 2018, Michigan voters approved an amendment to the state's constitution that changed how Michigan conducts redistricting -- the process of drawing new congressional and state legislative districts every ten years. Would you say you have or have not heard anything about this change?

1.	Have heard....MOVE TO Q5	41.3%
2.	Have not heard....MOVE TO Q27	58.0%
3.	Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER/ MOVE TO Q27	0.7%

5. The new constitutional amendment approved by voters creates a Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission comprised of citizens who have the authority to draw district boundaries for the Michigan Senate, Michigan House of Representatives and Michigan congressional districts every 10 years. The Commission is made up of thirteen Michigan citizens selected through a random application process. Four members affiliate with the Republican Party, four members affiliate with the Democratic Party, and five members are Independent and do not affiliate with either party. Have you seen or heard anything about this Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission or about redrawing Michigan's district boundaries? IF YES, ASK: AND WHAT HAVE YOU SEEN OR HEARD?

1. Yes..... 81.8%  
ASK: AND WHAT HAVE YOU SEEN OR HEARD?

---

[RECORD AS STATED/ CODE]

2. No 17.8%  
3. Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER 0.4%

AND WHAT HAVE YOU SEEN OR HEARD?	Number	Percent
The new map is contested/There are lawsuits	11	5.2 %
They're redistricting/redrawing lines	41	19.4 %
About the commission themselves and the make up	24	11.4 %
The redrawn maps are unfair	12	5.7 %
People are upset about it	18	8.5 %
Things about the applications/ I applied	13	6.2 %
It's to fight gerrymandering	14	6.6 %
It's still biased toward one political party	10	4.7 %
Minority communities aren't properly represented	3	1.4 %
Advertising for their meetings	1	0.5 %
It passed/ It's been done	8	3.8 %
Just the name/ That it exists	27	12.8 %
Misc	0	0.0 %
Don't Know/ Refused	29	13.7 %
Total	211	100.0 %

6. How important would you say the work of the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission is to you. Would you say it is very important, somewhat important, not very important or not important at all?

1.	Very important	45.7%
2.	Somewhat important	32.2%
3.	Not very important	10.1%
4.	Not important at all	8.1%
5.	Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER	3.9%

7. And would you say your views of the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission is positive, negative, or would you say you have no opinion of it?

1.	Positive....MOVE TO Q8	34.1%
2.	Negative....MOVE TO Q9	12.0%
3.	No Opinion...MOVE TO Q10	50.8%
4.	Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER/ MOVE TO Q10	3.1%

8. And why would you say your opinion is positive?....MOVE TO Q10

And why would you say your opinion is positive?	Percent
It's fair/ unbiased	27.3 %
It reduces gerrymandering	13.6 %
Citizens are handling it, not politicians	13.6 %
People from both parties are working together	9.1 %
The people are being given a voice	8.0 %
Change is good	8.0 %
They've done a good job	12.5 %
Minorities are being represented	2.3 %
Misc	0.0 %
Don't Know/ Refused	5.7 %
Total	100.0 %

9. And why would you say your opinion is negative?

And why would you say your opinion is negative?	Percent
It isn't fair	22.6 %
It's a form of gerrymandering	6.5 %
It's a political ploy	6.5 %
It favors one party over the other	9.7 %
We shouldn't change things	9.7 %
They did a bad job/ They're incompetent	25.8 %
We'll be adversely affected	6.5 %
It's a scam/ They aren't helping	6.5 %
Misc	0.0 %
Don't Know/ Refused	6.5 %
Total	100.0 %

10. Based on what you know so far, would you say that you approve or disapprove of the job that the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission has done. ASK; WOULD THAT BE STRONGLY APPROVE/DISAPPROVE OR JUST SOMEWHAT APPROVE/DISAPPROVE?

1.	Strongly approve...MOVE TO Q11	12.8%
2.	Somewhat approve...MOVE TO Q11	20.9%
3.	Somewhat disapprove...MOVE TO Q12	8.1%
4.	Strongly disapprove...MOVE TO Q12	10.1%
5.	Don't Know/ Not Sure/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER/ Q13	48.1%

11. And why do you approve of the job they have done?/ MOVE TO Q13

And why do you approve of the job they have done?	Percent
The map is more fair/accurate	18.4 %
It reflects the population to reduce gerrymandering	13.8 %
They're better than the politicians	5.7 %
They're working together/ Non-partisan	6.9 %
Citizens are able to be involved	5.7 %
Change is needed	14.9 %
They've worked hard/ Someone has to do it	8.0 %
I like what they've done so far	16.1 %
Their support for minorities	1.1 %
Misc	1.1 %
Don't Know/ Refused	8.0 %
Total	100.0 %

12. And why do you disapprove of the job they have done?

And why do you disapprove of the job they have done?	Percent
The map isn't fair	21.3 %
It's biased toward one party over the other	12.8 %
It's gerrymandering to dilute minority votes	14.9 %
They weren't open and didn't involve the citizens	12.8 %
They did a bad job	14.9 %
It's a political move	6.4 %
Nothing had to change	6.4 %
I'm adversely affected	4.3 %
Misc	2.1 %
Don't Know/ Refused	4.3 %
Total	100.0 %

I am going to read you several goals of the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission. For each, please tell me if you approve or disapprove of the job they have done when it comes to that goal.

13. Do you approve or disapprove of the job the commission has done in making sure that neither party gets an unfair advantage by gerrymandering districts? ASK: WOULD THAT BE STRONGLY APPROVE/DISAPPROVE OF JUST SOMEWHAT APPROVE/DISAPPROVE?

1.	Strongly approve	29.8%
2.	Somewhat approve	31.0%
3.	Somewhat disapprove	7.4%
4.	Strongly disapprove	12.0%
5.	Neither approve, nor disapprove...DO NOT OFFER	6.6%
6.	Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER	13.2%

14. Do you approve or disapprove of the job the commission has done in making sure that Michigan voters, not elected officials, have input in designing Michigan's new congressional and legislative districts? ASK: WOULD THAT BE STRONGLY APPROVE/DISAPPROVE OF JUST SOMEWHAT APPROVE/DISAPPROVE?

1.	Strongly approve	34.9%
2.	Somewhat approve	25.2%
3.	Somewhat disapprove	5.8%
4.	Strongly disapprove	12.4%
5.	Neither approve, nor disapprove...DO NOT OFFER	7.4%
6.	Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER	14.3%

15. Do you approve or disapprove of the job the commission has done in making sure that communities with common historical, cultural and economic interests are put in districts together instead of divided to weaken their voice? ASK: WOULD THAT BE STRONGLY APPROVE/DISAPPROVE OF JUST SOMEWHAT APPROVE/DISAPPROVE?

1.	Strongly approve	27.9%
2.	Somewhat approve	20.5%
3.	Somewhat disapprove	9.3%
4.	Strongly disapprove	9.7%
5.	Neither approve, nor disapprove...DO NOT OFFER	10.5%
6.	Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER	22.1%

16. Do you approve or disapprove of the job the commission has done in making sure that they designed the districts, rather than politicians who would design districts to get themselves re-elected? ASK: WOULD THAT BE STRONGLY APPROVE/DISAPPROVE OF JUST SOMEWHAT APPROVE/DISAPPROVE?

1.	Strongly approve	43.4%
2.	Somewhat approve	17.4%
3.	Somewhat disapprove	7.8%
4.	Strongly disapprove	9.3%
5.	Neither approve, nor disapprove...DO NOT OFFER	5.4%
6.	Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER	16.7%

17. Do you approve or disapprove of the job the commission has done in making sure that citizens had input into the design of the new districts through public meetings, the public comment portal, and mapping portal that allowed everyone to make comments about the proposed maps? ASK: WOULD THAT BE STRONGLY APPROVE/DISAPPROVE OF JUST SOMEWHAT APPROVE/DISAPPROVE?

1.	Strongly approve	30.6%
2.	Somewhat approve	24.8%
3.	Somewhat disapprove	7.8%
4.	Strongly disapprove	12.0%
5.	Neither approve, nor disapprove...DO NOT OFFER	9.3%
6.	Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER	15.5%

18. Do you approve or disapprove of the job the commission has done in redesigning Michigan's maps in public view so that all sides could watch the deliberations? ASK: WOULD THAT BE STRONGLY APPROVE/DISAPPROVE OF JUST SOMEWHAT APPROVE/DISAPPROVE?

1.	Strongly approve	34.1%
2.	Somewhat approve	22.9%
3.	Somewhat disapprove	10.5%
4.	Strongly disapprove	9.3%
5.	Neither approve, nor disapprove...DO NOT OFFER	7.0%
6.	Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER	16.3%

19. Do you approve or disapprove of the job the commission has done in making sure they were transparent in how they made their decisions? ASK: WOULD THAT BE STRONGLY APPROVE/DISAPPROVE OF JUST SOMEWHAT APPROVE/DISAPPROVE?

1.	Strongly approve	27.5%
2.	Somewhat approve	18.2%
3.	Somewhat disapprove	14.7%
4.	Strongly disapprove	14.3%
5.	Neither approve, nor disapprove...DO NOT OFFER	8.1%
6.	Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER	17.1%

20. Would you say you paid very close attention, some attention, not too much attention or no attention to the work being done by the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission?

1.	Very close attention...MOVE TO Q21	8.1%
2.	Some attention...MOVE TO Q21	51.2%
3.	Not too much attention ....MOVE TO Q21	20.5%
4.	No attention...MOVE TO Q22	20.2%
5.	Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER/ MOVE TO Q21	0.0%

21. I am going to read you several ways that Michigan citizens could have become engaged in the redistricting process. For each, please tell me if you did or did not engage in the redistricting process that way. [CIRCLE ALL WAYS RESPONDENT WAS ENGAGED]

- |    |  |       |
|----|--|-------|
| 1. | By reading or following news stories   | 80.1% |
| 2. | By watching a meeting online   | 13.1% |
| 3. | By attending a public hearing held by the commission.                              | 2.9%  |
| 4. | By looking at the commission's website.  | 28.2% |
| 5. | By providing public comment before the commission or submitting a written comment. | 8.3%  |
| 6. | By viewing a virtual or in-person informational redistricting presentation.        | 19.9% |
| 7. | Was there any other way you may have been engaged with the commission?             | 4.9%  |
|    | ASK: AND WHAT WOULD THAT HAVE BEEN?  | 14.1% |

[Word of mouth (4), Social media (5) I applied (1), Looking online (1), Through a friend working passively not actively (1), The application process (1), Emails sent by the commission (1), Another survey about this issue (1)]

- |    |   |      |
|----|---|------|
| 8. | CODE: Not engaged in 1-7.....DO NOT OFFER | 1.0% |
| 9. | Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER        | 0.0% |

22. I am going to read you several places that Michigan citizens could become engaged on social media in the redistricting process whether by getting information or following along with the process. For each, please tell me you did or did not following the redistricting process on that platform.

1.	Facebook	25.7%
2.	Twitter	11.2%
3.	Instagram	8.3%
4.	You Tube	10.2%
5.	The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission mapping portal	17.5%
6.	The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission public comment portal	12.1%
7.	CODE: NOT ENGAGED IN 1-6	51.5%
8.	Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER	4.9%

23. And would you say you did or did not see or hear any advertisements by the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission? IF YES, ASK: AND WHERE DID YOU SEE OR HEAR THIS ADVERTISEMENT [ACCEPT MULTIPLE ANSWERS]

1.	No	62.8%
2.	Yes, Radio	10.9%
3.	Yes, Television	16.3%
4.	Yes, Internet	13.2%
5.	Yes, Billboard	1.6%
6.	Yes, Newspaper	4.7%
7.	Yes, Not Sure/ Can't Remember	2.7%
8.	Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER	2.3%

24. And would you say that Michigan citizens did or did not have a greater role this time around in deciding how Michigan's new districts would be drawn?

- |    |  |       |
|----|--|-------|
| 1. | Did have a greater role                        | 45.0% |
| 2. | Did not have a greater role                    | 22.1% |
| 3. | Citizens' role was no different...DO NOT OFFER | 7.0%  |
| 4. | Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER             | 26.0% |

25. Generally speaking, would you say Michigan's redistricting commission has succeeded or failed in giving Michigan citizens a greater role than politicians in designing new districts? WOULD YOU SAY THEY HAVE STRONGLY SUCCEEDED/FAILED OR JUST SOMEWHAT SUCCEEDED/FAILED?

- |    |                                    |       |
|----|------------------------------------|-------|
| 1. | Strongly succeeded                 | 21.7% |
| 2. | Somewhat succeeded                 | 27.9% |
| 3. | Somewhat failed                    | 9.7%  |
| 4. | Strongly failed                    | 12.4% |
| 5. | Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER | 28.3% |

26. And would you have any suggestions going forward that would help the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission to improve the redistricting process?

And would you have any suggestions going forward that would help the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission to improve the redistricting process?	<u>Percent</u>
Help the citizens to be more involved/ Listen to us	13.2 %
Keep the people better informed	14.0 %
Be more transparent	2.7 %
Keep politicians out of it	2.3 %
Put the redrawn districts on the ballot for us to vote on	1.2 %
Become more educated about what you're doing and how	2.3 %
Disband	2.3 %
Hold yourselves accountable to the political system	0.8 %
Misc	0.4 %
Don't Know/ Refused/ No	60.9 %
Total	100.0 %

27. Now that Michigan has redrawn legislative maps for the first time with the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission, would you say Michigan should continue to allow an Independent Citizens Commission to redraw political maps every ten years or do you think Michigan should go back to allowing elected representatives that have control in the State Legislature to redraw the state's political maps?

1. Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission	65.5%
2. Elected representatives in the State Legislature	10.1%
3. Both/ Neither/ Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER	24.4%

Now just a couple of questions for statistical purposes.

28. Generally speaking, would you say you tend to vote mostly for Republican candidates, do you vote mostly for Democratic candidates, or would you say you vote equally for both Republican and Democratic candidates? IF VOTE EQUALLY ASK: WOULD YOU SAY YOU LEAN MORE TO THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OR MORE TO THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, OR WOULD YOU SAY YOU ARE AN INDEPENDENT VOTER?

1.	Strongly Democratic	26.8%
2.	Lean Democratic	10.1%
3.	Independent	22.4%
4.	Lean Republican	9.4%
5.	Strong Republican	26.8%
6.	Other/ Refused/ Don't Know....DO NOT OFFER	4.4%

29. Which of the following best describes your political leanings: A Sanders Democrat, a Democrat, an Independent, a Republican, or a Trump Republican.

1.	Sanders Democrat	12.2%
2.	Democrat	21.8%
3.	Independent	23.9%
4.	Republican	19.8%
5.	Trump Republican	15.4%
6.	Something else _____..DO NOT OFFER [Libertarian (3), Moderate (1), Classic Liberal (1)]	0.8%
7.	None/ Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER	6.0%

30. And when it comes to the political process, would you say you are very engaged, somewhat engaged, not really engaged or not at all engaged in the political process?

1.	Very engaged	20.2%
2.	Somewhat engaged	57.6%
3.	Not really engaged	15.6%
4.	Not at all engaged	5.7%
5.	Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER	1.0%

31. What would be the last year of schooling you completed?
- |    |   |       |
|----|---|-------|
| 1. | High school graduate or less                              | 21.0% |
| 2. | Vocational Training/ Some Community College/ Some College | 31.2% |
| 3. | College Graduate  | 46.7% |
| 4. | Don't Know/ Refused....DO NOT OFFER                       | 1.1%  |
32. Could you please tell me in what year you were born?
- |    |                                     |       |
|----|-------------------------------------|-------|
| 1. | 18-29 (1993-2004)                   | 14.0% |
| 2. | 30-39 (1983-1992)                   | 19.7% |
| 3. | 40-49 (1973-1982)                   | 19.0% |
| 4. | 50-64 (1958-1972)                   | 25.7% |
| 5. | 65+ (1957 and before)               | 20.2% |
| 6. | Don't Know/ Refused....DO NOT OFFER | 1.5%  |
33. And what is your race or ethnic background?
- |    |   |       |
|----|---|-------|
| 1. | Caucasian                                 | 74.1% |
| 2. | African American                          | 12.0% |
| 3. | Hispanic/ Puerto Rican/ Mexican American  | 2.6%  |
| 4. | Arab American                             | 0.8%  |
| 5. | Asian                                     | 0.8%  |
| 6. | Native American                           | 0.8%  |
| 7. | Mixed Race....DO NOT OFFER                | 2.0%  |
| 8. | Other/ Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER | 6.8%  |

34. And when it comes to getting your news, which of the following would you say is your MAIN SOURCE of news information.

1.	Local newspapers or their websites	6.0%
2.	National newspapers or their websites	7.3%
3.	Local tv news	21.5%
4.	CNN or MSNBC	6.5%
5.	Fox News	8.6%
6.	Newsmax or One Network	2.6%
7.	NBC/CBS/ ABC or PBS	6.3%
8.	Facebook or Twitter	8.5%
9.	Parler	0.2%
10.	Internet news sites	19.8%
11.	NPR/Radio	4.6%
12.	Word of mouth	5.2%
13.	Podcasts	0.7%
14.	You Tube	0.7%
15.	Or something else? _____	1.6%
	[Rumble (3), Voting records (1), Mlive (1), Reddit (1), ESPN (1), CSPAN (1), DNC Newsletter (1), Phone App (1)]	
16.	Don't Know/ Refused...DO NOT OFFER	0.0%

35. Gender: BY OBSERVATION

1.	Male	49.4%
2.	Female	50.6%

36. Telephone

1.	Cell	75.0%
2.	Landline	25.0%

4. In 2018, Michigan voters approved an amendment to the state's constitution that changed how Michigan conducts redistricting -- the process of drawing new congressional and state legislative districts every ten years. Would you say you have or have not heard anything about this change?

	Have Heard	Have Not Heard
Strong Democratic	52.7%	46.7%
Lean Democratic	53.2%	43.5%
Independent	41.3%	58.0%
Lean Republican	37.9%	62.1%
Strong Republican	27.9%	72.1%
Sanders Dem	53.3%	46.7%
Democratic	50.0%	47.8%
Independent	44.2%	55.8%
Republican	27.9%	72.1%
Trump Rep	31.6%	68.4%
Very Engaged	60.5%	38.7%
Some Eng	44.1%	55.6%
Not Very Eng	17.7%	80.2%
Not Engaged	14.3%	85.7%
High School	20.9%	76.7%
Some Post	42.2%	57.8%
College	49.8%	49.8%
18-29	26.7%	72.1%
30-39	30.6%	69.4%
40-49	37.6%	61.5%
50-64	51.3%	47.5%
65+	53.2%	46.8%

Male	44.4%	54.9%
Female	38.3%	61.1%
1	61.1%	38.9%
2	41.9%	58.1%
3	45.5%	54.5%
4	43.9%	53.7%
5	34.8%	63.0%
6	38.6%	61.4%
7	15.0%	85.0%
8	48.9%	51.1%
9	45.3%	52.8%
10	31.5%	68.5%
11	39.6%	60.4%
12	45.7%	52.2%
13	50.0%	50.0%
14	41.7%	58.3%
Caucasian	41.4%	58.1%
African Amer	34.2%	64.4%

5. The new constitutional amendment approved by voters creates a Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission comprised of citizens who have the authority to draw district boundaries for the Michigan Senate, Michigan House of Representatives and Michigan congressional districts every 10 years. The Commission is made up of thirteen Michigan citizens selected through a random application process. Four members affiliate with the Republican Party, four members affiliate with the Democratic Party, and five members are Independent and do not affiliate with either party. Have you seen or heard anything about this Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission or about redrawing Michigan's district boundaries? IF YES, ASK: AND WHAT HAVE YOU SEEN OR HEARD?

	Yes	No
Strong Democratic	84.1%	14.8%
Lean Democratic	77.1%	22.9%
Independent	75.9%	24.1%
Lean Republican	86.4%	13.6%
Strong Republican	84.8%	15.2%
Sanders Dem	82.5%	17.5%
Democratic	82.9%	17.1%
Independent	76.9%	21.5%
Republican	85.3%	14.7%
Trump Rep	83.3%	16.7%
Very Engaged	84.2%	15.8%
Some Eng	80.3%	19.1%
Not Very Eng	89.5%	10.5%
Not Engaged	60.0%	40.0%
High School	73.3%	26.7%
Some Post	75.3%	24.7%
College	86.8%	12.5%

18-29	62.5%	37.5%
30-39	91.9%	8.1%
40-49	86.7%	13.3%
50-64	83.1%	15.7%
65+	77.3%	22.7%
Male	86.1%	13.1%
Female	76.9%	23.1%
1	77.3%	22.7%
2	94.4%	5.6%
3	75.0%	25.0%
4	78.9%	21.1%
5	58.8%	41.2%
6	64.7%	35.3%
7	50.0%	50.0%
8	65.2%	34.8%
9	96.0%	4.0%
10	94.1%	5.9%
11	85.7%	14.3%
12	90.9%	9.1%
13	100.0%	0.0%
14	93.3%	0.0%
Caucasian	78.5%	20.9%
African Amer	88.5%	11.5%

6. How important would you say the work of the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission is to you. Would you say it is very important, somewhat important, not very important or not important at all?

	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Not Important At All
Strong Democratic	60.2%	31.8%	3.4%	2.3%
Lean Democratic	48.6%	37.1%	11.4%	0.0%
Independent	39.7%	36.2%	10.3%	8.6%
Lean Republican	36.4%	13.6%	13.6%	31.8%
Strong Republican	32.6%	37.0%	19.6%	4.3%
Sanders Dem	70.0%	25.0%	2.5%	2.5%
Democratic	60.0%	30.0%	5.7%	1.4%
Independent	33.8%	41.5%	9.2%	7.7%
Republican	32.4%	26.5%	26.5%	11.8%
Trump Rep	30.0%	36.7%	16.7%	10.0%
Very Engaged	64.5%	19.7%	10.5%	3.9%
Some Eng	41.4%	37.6%	9.6%	7.6%
Not Very Eng	15.8%	47.4%	0.0%	26.3%
Not Engaged	20.0%	0.0%	60.0%	0.0%
High School	30.0%	43.3%	13.3%	10.0%
Some Post	54.3%	25.9%	7.4%	6.2%
College	44.4%	33.3%	11.1%	8.3%
18-29	37.5%	50.0%	4.2%	8.3%
30-39	51.4%	35.1%	8.1%	2.7%
40-49	46.7%	33.3%	4.4%	11.1%
50-64	41.0%	28.9%	15.7%	10.8%
65+	50.0%	27.3%	10.6%	6.1%

Male	42.3%	31.4%	10.9%	11.7%
Female	49.6%	33.1%	9.1%	4.1%
1	31.8%	36.4%	18.2%	0.0%
2	38.9%	33.3%	0.0%	22.2%
3	45.0%	35.0%	15.0%	5.0%
4	42.1%	21.1%	5.3%	31.6%
5	47.1%	29.4%	11.8%	5.9%
6	29.4%	52.9%	11.8%	0.0%
7	66.7%	16.7%	16.7%	0.0%
8	52.2%	26.1%	13.0%	0.0%
9	32.0%	40.0%	16.0%	12.0%
10	64.7%	23.5%	5.9%	5.9%
11	38.1%	42.9%	0.0%	19.0%
12	54.5%	22.7%	9.1%	4.55
13	68.8%	25.0%	6.3%	0.0%
14	53.3%	33.3%	13.3%	0.0%
Caucasian	46.1%	29.8%	11.0%	8.9%
African Amer	61.5%	30.8%	3.8%	3.8%

7. And would you say your views of the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission is positive, negative, or would you say you have no opinion of it?

	Positive	Negative	No Opinion
Strong Democratic	51.1%	9.1%	38.6%
Lean Democratic	51.4%	2.9%	42.9%
Independent	29.3%	13.8%	48.3%
Lean Republican	13.6%	18.2%	63.6%
Strong Republican	6.5%	17.4%	76.1%
Sanders Dem	50.0%	5.0%	42.5%
Democratic	47.1%	10.0%	41.4%
Independent	36.9%	10.8%	46.2%
Republican	11.8%	20.6%	64.7%
Trump Rep	10.0%	16.7%	73.3%
Very Engaged	36.8%	14.5%	47.4%
Some Eng	33.1%	10.8%	52.9%
Not Very Eng	36.8%	10.5%	42.1%
Not Engaged	20.0%	0.0%	80.0%
High School	16.7%	3.3%	80.0%
Some Post	37.0%	12.3%	48.1%
College	36.1%	13.2%	46.5%
18-29	45.8%	8.3%	41.7%
30-39	59.5%	2.7%	37.8%
40-49	22.2%	15.6%	57.8%
50-64	27.7%	13.3%	55.4%
65+	30.3%	15.2%	51.5%

Male	30.7%	8.8%	56.2%
Female	38.0%	15.7%	44.6%
1	31.8%	13.6%	54.5%
2	38.9%	16.7%	44.4%
3	25.0%	15.0%	55.0%
4	31.6%	5.3%	52.6%
5	29.4%	5.9%	52.9%
6	29.4%	11.8%	52.9%
7	16.7%	33.3%	50.0%
8	65.2%	8.7%	26.1%
9	20.0%	12.0%	64.0%
10	29.4%	17.6%	52.9%
11	28.6%	9.5%	61.9%
12	36.4%	13.6%	50.0%
13	31.3%	12.5%	56.3%
14	53.3%	6.7%	33.3%
Caucasian	33.0%	11.0%	52.4%
African Amer	38.5%	23.1%	34.6%

10. Based on what you know so far, would you say that you approve or disapprove of the job that the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission has done. ASK; WOULD THAT BE STRONGLY APPROVE/DISAPPROVE OR JUST SOMEWHAT APPROVE/DISAPPROVE?

	Strongly Approve	Somewhat Approve	Somewhat Disapprove	Strongly Disapprove	Don't Know
Strong Democratic	23.9%	21.6%	11.4%	10.2%	33.0%
Lean Democratic	20.0%	25.7%	2.9%	2.9%	48.6%
Independent	6.9%	25.9%	6.9%	12.1%	48.3%
Lean Republican	0.0%	27.3%	4.5%	13.6%	54.5%
Strong Republican	0.0%	10.9%	10.9%	10.9%	67.4%
Sanders Dem	17.5%	17.5%	12.5%	5.0%	47.5%
Democratic	24.3%	28.6%	7.1%	12.9%	27.1%
Independent	10.8%	18.5%	6.2%	9.2%	55.4%
Republican	0.0%	17.6%	11.8%	8.8%	61.8%
Trump Rep	3.3%	20.0%	6.7%	10.0%	60.0%
Very Engaged	13.2%	25.0%	10.5%	15.8%	35.5%
Some Eng	14.0%	21.0%	7.6%	8.3%	49.0%
Not Very Eng	5.3%	5.3%	5.3%	5.3%	78.9%
Not Engaged	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	80.0%
High School	3.3%	33.3%	13.3%	3.3%	46.7%
Some Post	16.0%	17.3%	8.6%	9.9%	48.1%
College	13.2%	20.8%	6.9%	11.1%	47.9%
18-29	20.8%	25.0%	0.0%	4.2%	50.0%
30-39	18.9%	18.9%	13.5%	0.0%	48.6%
40-49	17.8%	13.3%	4.4%	20.0%	44.4%
50-64	8.4%	21.7%	7.2%	10.8%	51.8%
65+	9.1%	25.8%	12.1%	9.1%	43.9%

Male	11.7%	21.9%	7.3%	6.6%	52.6%
Female	14.0%	19.8%	9.1%	14.0%	43.0%
1	9.1%	13.6%	13.6%	9.1%	54.5%
2	5.6%	27.8%	5.6%	11.1%	50.0%
3	5.0%	15.0%	10.0%	20.0%	50.0%
4	10.5%	21.1%	5.3%	5.3%	57.9%
5	11.8%	17.6%	5.9%	0.0%	64.7%
6	17.6%	17.6%	5.9%	5.9%	52.9%
7	0.0%	16.7%	33.3%	16.7%	33.3%
8	39.1%	21.7%	8.7%	4.3%	26.1%
9	4.0%	36.0%	8.0%	4.0%	48.0%
10	5.9%	17.6%	0.0%	41.2%	35.3%
11	9.5%	9.5%	0.0%	14.3%	66.7%
12	13.6%	22.7%	4.5%	0.0%	59.1%
13	25.0%	25.0%	12.5%	12.5%	25.0%
14	13.3%	26.7%	20.0%	6.7%	33.3%
Caucasian	12.6%	19.9%	7.9%	7.9%	51.8%
African Amer	11.5%	26.9%	15.4%	19.2%	26.9%

13. Do you approve or disapprove of the job the commission has done in making sure that neither party gets an unfair advantage by gerrymandering districts? ASK: WOULD THAT BE STRONGLY APPROVE/DISAPPROVE OF JUST SOMEWHAT APPROVE/DISAPPROVE?

	Strongly Approve	Somewhat Approve	Somewhat Disapprove	Strongly Disapprove	Neither	Don't Know
Strong Democratic	43.2%	29.5%	4.5%	13.6%	2.3%	6.8%
Lean Democratic	28.6%	34.3%	5.7%	2.9%	14.3%	14.3%
Independent	25.9%	29.3%	5.2%	15.5%	5.2%	19.0%
Lean Republican	9.1%	36.4%	13.6%	9.1%	13.6%	18.2%
Strong Republican	19.6%	37.0%	15.2%	10.9%	6.5%	10.9%
Sanders Dem	47.5%	20.0%	2.5%	12.5%	10.0%	7.5%
Democratic	32.9%	37.1%	5.7%	14.3%	2.9%	7.1%
Independent	30.8%	27.7%	6.2%	12.3%	3.1%	20.0%
Republican	23.5%	44.1%	14.7%	5.9%	8.8%	2.9%
Trump Rep	13.3%	33.3%	13.3%	10.0%	10.0%	20.0%
Very Engaged	31.6%	23.7%	10.5%	19.7%	6.6%	7.9%
Some Eng	29.9%	32.5%	5.7%	8.9%	7.0%	15.9%
Not Very Eng	15.8%	47.4%	10.5%	5.3%	5.3%	15.8%
Not Engaged	60.0%	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
High School	20.0%	53.3%	0.0%	6.7%	6.7%	13.3%
Some Post	30.9%	24.7%	9.9%	9.9%	4.9%	19.8%
College	31.9%	30.6%	7.6%	13.2%	6.9%	9.7%
18-29	29.2%	37.5%	12.5%	4.2%	4.2%	12.5%
30-39	40.5%	37.8%	2.7%	2.7%	8.1%	8.1%
40-49	28.9%	17.8%	4.4%	24.4%	11.1%	13.3%
50-64	34.9%	27.7%	10.8%	7.2%	2.4%	16.9%
65+	19.7%	39.4%	6.1%	16.7%	6.1%	12.1%

Male	28.5%	34.3%	6.6%	8.8%	7.3%	14.6%
Female	31.4%	27.3%	8.3%	15.7%	5.8%	11.6%
1	27.3%	27.3%	9.1%	9.1%	13.6%	13.6%
2	16.7%	38.9%	0.0%	16.7%	11.1%	16.7%
3	15.0%	40.0%	10.0%	15.0%	15.0%	5.0%
4	47.4%	26.3%	15.8%	5.3%	0.0%	5.3%
5	35.3%	23.5%	0.0%	5.9%	5.9%	29.4%
6	17.6%	47.1%	0.0%	5.9%	5.9%	23.5%
7	16.7%	0.0%	50.0%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%
8	47.8%	30.4%	4.3%	4.3%	0.0%	13.0%
9	24.0%	44.0%	4.0%	16.0%	4.0%	8.0%
10	23.5%	29.4%	5.9%	35.3%	5.9%	0.0%
11	42.9%	0.0%	0.0%	9.5%	9.5%	38.1%
12	18.2%	36.4%	22.7%	0.0%	4.5%	18.2%
13	56.3%	6.3%	0.0%	25.0%	12.5%	0.0%
14	20.0%	66.7%	6.7%	6.7%	0.0%	0.0%
Caucasian	31.9%	31.9%	9.4%	7.9%	5.2%	13.6%
African Amer	26.9%	30.8%	3.8%	30.8%	3.8%	3.8%

14. Do you approve or disapprove of the job the commission has done in making sure that Michigan voters, not elected officials, have input in designing Michigan's new congressional and legislative districts? ASK: WOULD THAT BE STRONGLY APPROVE/DISAPPROVE OF JUST SOMEWHAT APPROVE/DISAPPROVE?

	Strongly Approve	Somewhat Approve	Somewhat Disapprove	Strongly Disapprove	Neither	Don't Know
Strong Democratic	47.7%	23.9%	6.8%	13.6%	2.3%	5.7%
Lean Democratic	40.0%	20.0%	0.0%	2.9%	14.3%	22.9%
Independent	37.9%	25.9%	3.4%	15.5%	5.2%	12.1%
Lean Republican	22.7%	18.2%	4.5%	9.1%	18.2%	27.3%
Strong Republican	13.0%	30.4%	13.0%	15.2%	10.9%	17.4%
Sanders Dem	55.0%	17.5%	5.0%	5.0%	7.5%	10.0%
Democratic	42.9%	24.3%	5.7%	15.7%	2.9%	8.6%
Independent	30.8%	29.2%	3.1%	15.4%	4.6%	16.9%
Republican	26.5%	32.4%	8.8%	5.9%	5.9%	20.6%
Trump Rep	20.0%	16.7%	10.0%	13.3%	23.3%	16.7%
Very Engaged	34.2%	21.1%	10.5%	15.8%	7.9%	10.5%
Some Eng	36.9%	26.1%	3.8%	12.7%	7.0%	13.4%
Not Very Eng	21.1%	42.1%	5.3%	0.0%	10.5%	21.1%
Not Engaged	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	60.0%
High School	36.7%	23.3%	3.3%	10.0%	6.7%	20.0%
Some Post	39.5%	22.2%	6.2%	14.8%	8.6%	8.6%
College	32.6%	27.8%	6.3%	11.8%	6.3%	15.3%
18-29	37.5%	29.2%	4.2%	4.2%	8.3%	16.7%
30-39	48.6%	29.7%	2.7%	2.7%	2.7%	13.5%
40-49	35.6%	17.8%	4.4%	28.9%	4.4%	8.9%
50-64	30.1%	31.3%	6.0%	7.2%	4.8%	20.5%
65+	31.8%	19.7%	9.1%	16.7%	13.6%	9.1%

Male	31.4%	28.5%	2.9%	9.5%	8.0%	19.7%
Female	38.8%	21.5%	9.1%	15.7%	6.6%	8.3%
1	22.7%	22.7%	0.0%	9.1%	18.2%	27.3%
2	16.7%	27.8%	0.0%	22.2%	5.6%	27.8%
3	20.0%	30.0%	0.0%	25.0%	10.0%	15.0%
4	47.4%	36.8%	0.0%	10.5%	0.0%	5.3%
5	47.1%	5.9%	5.9%	5.9%	5.9%	29.4%
6	35.3%	35.3%	5.9%	0.0%	5.9%	17.6%
7	16.7%	16.7%	50.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%
8	52.2%	13.0%	4.3%	4.3%	13.0%	13.0%
9	29.4%	23.5%	5.9%	35.3%	5.9%	0.0%
10	29.4%	23.5%	5.9%	35.3%	5.9%	0.0%
11	42.9%	19.0%	0.0%	9.5%	4.8%	23.8%
12	31.8%	18.2%	18.2%	0.0%	9.1%	22.7%
13	56.3%	12.5%	0.0%	25.05	6.3%	0.0%
14	40.0%	26.7%	0.0%	26.7%	6.7%	0.0%
Caucasian	35.1%	26.7%	6.3%	7.3%	7.3%	17.3%
African Amer	38.5%	11.5%	7.7%	42.3%	0.05	0.0%

15. Do you approve or disapprove of the job the commission has done in making sure that communities with common historical, cultural and economic interests are put in districts together instead of divided to weaken their voice? ASK: WOULD THAT BE STRONGLY APPROVE/DISAPPROVE OF JUST SOMEWHAT APPROVE/DISAPPROVE?

	Strongly Approve	Somewhat Approve	Somewhat Disapprove	Strongly Disapprove	Neither	Don't Know
Strong Democratic	38.6%	21.6%	13.6%	8.0%	4.5%	13.6%
Lean Democratic	28.6%	25.7%	8.6%	5.7%	22.9%	8.6%
Independent	27.6%	17.2%	8.6%	12.1%	6.9%	27.6%
Lean Republican	13.6%	27.3%	4.5%	18.2%	9.1%	27.3%
Strong Republican	15.2%	13.0%	6.5%	6.5%	19.6%	39.1%
Sanders Dem	30.0%	20.0%	7.5%	12.5%	10.0%	20.0%
Democratic	32.9%	28.6%	15.7%	5.7%	7.1%	10.0%
Independent	38.5%	15.4%	3.1%	9.2%	9.2%	24.6%
Republican	11.8%	20.6%	8.8%	5.9%	14.7%	38.2%
Trump Rep	16.7%	16.7%	6.7%	10.0%	16.7%	33.3%
Very Engaged	25.0%	22.4%	3.9%	17.1%	9.2%	22.4%
Some Eng	31.2%	19.1%	10.8%	7.0%	12.1%	19.7%
Not Very Eng	21.1%	26.3%	21.1%	0.0%	5.3%	26.3%
Not Engaged	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	80.0%
High School	36.7%	33.3%	10.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%
Some Post	30.9%	16.0%	12.3%	7.4%	8.6%	24.7%
College	25.0%	20.8%	7.6%	12.5%	13.2%	20.8%
18-29	37.5%	16.7%	8.3%	4.2%	16.7%	16.7%
30-39	35.1%	29.7%	10.8%	2.7%	8.1%	13.5%
40-49	33.3%	13.3%	4.4%	15.6%	13.3%	20.0%
50-64	26.5%	24.1%	6.0%	8.4%	9.6%	25.3%
65+	18.2%	18.2%	16.7%	13.6%	7.6%	25.8%

Male	25.5%	24.8%	8.8%	5.1%	13.9%	21.9%
Female	30.6%	15.7%	9.9%	14.9%	6.6%	22.3%
1	9.1%	18.2%	9.1%	4.5%	13.6%	45.5%
2	22.2%	22.2%	11.1%	11.1%	0.0%	33.3%
3	10.0%	35.0%	5.0%	20.0%	10.0%	20.0%
4	31.6%	36.8%	5.3%	10.5%	5.3%	10.5%
5	41.2%	5.9%	5.9%	0.0%	11.8%	35.3%
6	41.2%	5.9%	11.8%	5.9%	5.9%	29.4%
7	16.7%	33.3%	0.05	0.0%	16.7%	33.3%
8	56.5%	4.3%	4.3%	8.7%	13.0%	13.0%
9	12.0%	44.0%	16.0%	16.0%	4.0%	8.0%
10	35.3%	29.4%	0.0%	23.5%	11.8%	0.0%
11	28.6%	14.3%	0.0%	9.5%	14.3%	33.3%
12	18.2%	13.6%	13.6%	0.0%	9.1%	45.5%
13	62.5%	0.0%	6.3%	12.5%	18.8%	0.0%
14	6.7%	26.7%	40.0%	6.7%	20.0%	0.0%
Caucasian	27.7%	25.1%	7.3%	6.8%	8.4%	24.6%
African Amer	26.9%	3.8%	30.8%	23.1%	11.5%	3.8%

16. Do you approve or disapprove of the job the commission has done in making sure that they designed the districts, rather than politicians who would design districts to get themselves re-elected? ASK: WOULD THAT BE STRONGLY APPROVE/DISAPPROVE OF JUST SOMEWHAT APPROVE/DISAPPROVE?

	Strongly Approve	Somewhat Approve	Somewhat Disapprove	Strongly Disapprove	Neither	Don't Know
Strong Democratic	48.9%	21.6%	10.2%	9.1%	1.1%	9.1%
Lean Democratic	54.3%	14.3%	0.0%	5.7%	11.4%	14.3%
Independent	50.0%	10.3%	0.0%	13.8%	8.6%	17.2%
Lean Republican	27.3%	22.7%	9.1%	9.1%	13.6%	18.2%
Strong Republican	21.7%	21.7%	19.6%	6.5%	0.0%	30.4%
Sanders Dem	50.0%	17.5%	12.5%	2.5%	5.0%	12.5%
Democratic	52.9%	20.0%	4.3%	15.7%	2.9%	4.3%
Independent	44.6%	16.9%	3.1%	7.7%	6.2%	21.5%
Republican	29.4%	17.6%	14.7%	5.9%	2.9%	29.4%
Trump Rep	33.3%	20.0%	13.3%	3.3%	3.3%	26.7%
Very Engaged	40.8%	22.4%	11.8%	10.5%	3.9%	10.5%
Some Eng	47.8%	13.4%	5.7%	9.6%	6.4%	17.2%
Not Very Eng	21.1%	36.8%	10.5%	5.3%	0.0%	26.3%
Not Engaged	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	60.0%
High School	46.7%	30.0%	0.0%	6.7%	3.3%	13.3%
Some Post	46.9%	14.8%	6.2%	9.9%	4.9%	17.3%
College	41.0%	16.7%	10.4%	9.7%	4.9%	17.4%
18-29	29.2%	33.3%	4.2%	0.0%	12.5%	20.8%
30-39	51.4%	18.9%	2.7%	2.7%	5.4%	18.9%
40-49	44.4%	15.6%	6.7%	13.3%	4.4%	15.6%
50-64	47.0%	13.3%	6.0%	7.2%	3.6%	22.9%
65+	37.9%	18.2%	15.2%	16.7%	4.5%	7.6%

Male	39.4%	22.6%	5.1%	8.0%	5.8%	19.0%
Female	47.9%	11.6%	10.7%	10.7%	5.0%	14.0%
1	22.7%	36.4%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	27.3%
2	22.2%	22.2%	16.7%	11.1%	5.6%	22.2%
3	25.0%	30.0%	15.0%	5.0%	10.0%	15.0%
4	78.9%	0.0%	5.3%	0.0%	5.3%	10.5%
5	41.2%	11.8%	0.0%	5.9%	11.8%	29.4%
6	41.2%	23.5%	5.9%	5.9%	5.9%	17.6%
7	16.7%	33.35	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	33.3%
8	60.9%	13.0%	4.3%	4.3%	4.3%	13.0%
9	44.0%	28.0%	12.0%	8.0%	4.0%	4.0%
10	41.2%	11.8%	11.8%	35.3%	0.0%	0.0%
11	52.4%	9.5%	4.8%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%
12	40.9%	9.1%	4.5%	9.1%	4.5%	31.8%
13	75.0%	0.0%	12.5%	6.3%	6.3%	0.0%
14	26.7%	20.05	6.7%	40.0%	6.7%	0.0%
Caucasian	47.6%	19.9%	5.8%	6.3%	4.7%	15.7%
African Amer	30.8%	15.4%	15.4%	26.9%	3.8%	7.7%

17. Do you approve or disapprove of the job the commission has done in making sure that citizens had input into the design of the new districts through public meetings, the public comment portal, and mapping portal that allowed everyone to make comments about the proposed maps? ASK: WOULD THAT BE STRONGLY APPROVE/DISAPPROVE OF JUST SOMEWHAT APPROVE/DISAPPROVE?

	Strongly Approve	Somewhat Approve	Somewhat Disapprove	Strongly Disapprove	Neither	Don't Know
Strong Democratic	45.5%	25.0%	4.5%	8.0%	10.2%	6.8%
Lean Democratic	34.3%	28.6%	5.7%	5.7%	14.3%	11.4%
Independent	29.3%	24.1%	8.6%	12.1%	10.3%	15.5%
Lean Republican	9.1%	22.7%	9.1%	22.7%	9.1%	27.3%
Strong Republican	15.2%	23.9%	10.9%	17.4%	4.3%	28.3%
Sanders Dem	42.5%	27.5%	2.5%	5.0%	15.0%	7.5%
Democratic	45.7%	22.9%	7.1%	8.6%	10.0%	5.7%
Independent	27.7%	23.1%	9.2%	15.4%	7.7%	16.9%
Republican	23.5%	23.5%	5.9%	17.6%	5.9%	23.5%
Trump Rep	6.7%	30.0%	13.3%	10.0%	10.0%	30.0%
Very Engaged	36.8%	18.4%	3.9%	18.4%	5.3%	17.1%
Some Eng	28.0%	25.5%	10.2%	10.2%	12.1%	14.0%
Not Very Eng	31.6%	47.4%	5.3%	0.0%	5.3%	10.5%
Not Engaged	20.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	60.0%
High School	36.7%	30.0%	3.3%	3.3%	13.3%	13.3%
Some Post	29.6%	22.2%	14.8%	7.4%	9.9%	16.0%
College	30.6%	25.7%	4.9%	15.3%	7.6%	16.0%
18-29	29.2%	41.7%	0.0%	12.5%	4.2%	12.5%
30-39	40.5%	27.0%	10.8%	2.7%	8.1%	10.8%
40-49	28.9%	17.8%	4.4%	17.8%	15.6%	15.6%
50-64	31.3%	22.9%	8.4%	10.8%	3.6%	22.9%
65+	25.8%	25.8%	10.6%	13.6%	13.6%	10.6%

Male	26.3%	32.1%	8.0%	10.9%	5.8%	16.8%
Female	35.5%	16.5%	7.4%	13.2%	13.2%	14.0%
1	22.7%	27.3%	9.1%	9.1%	13.6%	18.2%
2	16.7%	16.7%	16.7%	27.8%	0.0%	22.2%
3	30.0%	20.0%	5.0%	10.0%	25.0%	10.0%
4	36.8%	31.6%	10.5%	0.0%	10.5%	10.5%
5	29.4%	23.5%	0.0%	5.9%	5.9%	35.3%
6	23.5%	23.5%	5.9%	11.8%	11.8%	23.5%
7	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%	50.0%
8	43.5%	30.4%	4.3%	4.3%	0.0%	17.4%
9	24.0%	36.0%	8.0%	16.0%	4.0%	12.0%
10	35.3%	11.8%	0.0%	47.1%	5.9%	0.0%
11	38.1%	23.8%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	23.8%
12	27.3%	22.7%	9.1%	9.1%	18.2%	13.6%
13	68.8%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	6.3%	0.0%
14	6.7%	60.0%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Caucasian	29.8%	25.7%	6.3%	7.9%	11.5%	18.8%
African Amer	30.85	26.9%	19.2%	23.1%	0.0%	0.0%

18. Do you approve or disapprove of the job the commission has done in redesigning Michigan's maps in public view so that all sides could watch the deliberations? ASK: WOULD THAT BE STRONGLY APPROVE/DISAPPROVE OF JUST SOMEWHAT APPROVE/DISAPPROVE?

	Strongly Approve	Somewhat Approve	Somewhat Disapprove	Strongly Disapprove	Neither	Don't Know
Strong Democratic	50.0%	22.7%	9.1%	8.0%	6.8%	3.4%
Lean Democratic	31.4%	25.7%	5.7%	8.6%	14.3%	14.3%
Independent	34.5%	25.9%	8.6%	6.9%	5.2%	19.0%
Lean Republican	9.1%	13.6%	9.1%	27.3%	13.6%	27.3%
Strong Republican	23.9%	17.4%	21.7%	6.5%	2.2%	28.3%
Sanders Dem	50.0%	30.0%	5.0%	5.0%	7.5%	2.5%
Democratic	44.3%	21.4%	11.4%	5.7%	8.6%	8.6%
Independent	33.8%	21.5%	10.8%	15.4%	4.6%	13.8%
Republican	23.5%	11.8%	17.6%	11.8%	8.8%	26.5%
Trump Rep	20.0%	26.7%	13.3%	3.3%	3.3%	33.3%
Very Engaged	36.8%	19.7%	11.8%	11.8%	3.9%	15.8%
Some Eng	33.8%	24.2%	9.6%	9.6%	7.6%	15.3%
Not Very Eng	31.6%	26.3%	15.8%	0.0%	15.8%	10.5%
Not Engaged	20.0%	20.0%	0.05	0.0%	0.0%	60.0%
High School	46.7%	23.3%	13.3%	6.7%	0.0%	10.0%
Some Post	29.6%	32.1%	11.1%	8.6%	4.9%	13.6%
College	34.7%	18.1%	9.7%	9.7%	9.0%	18.8%
18-29	37.5%	29.2%	8.3%	12.5%	0.0%	12.5%
30-39	48.6%	27.0%	0.0%	5.4%	8.1%	10.8%
40-49	26.7%	22.2%	15.6%	6.7%	6.7%	22.2%
50-64	41.0%	18.1%	10.8%	3.6%	4.8%	21.7%
65+						

Male	32.8%	25.5%	7.3%	9.5%	6.6%	18.2%
Female	35.5%	19.8%	14.0%	9.1%	7.4%	14.0%
1	18.2%	18.2%	13.6%	9.1%	13.6%	27.3%
2	5.6%	38.9%	11.1%	16.7%	0.0%	27.8%
3	20.0%	25.0%	10.0%	30.0%	10.0%	5.0%
4	68.4%	10.5%	5.3%	0.0%	5.3%	10.5%
5	47.1%	0.0%	11.8%	5.9%	5.9%	29.4%
6	29.4%	23.5%	0.0%	11.8%	11.8%	23.5%
7	16.7%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	50.0%
8	43.5%	30.4%	13.0%	0.0%	0.0%	13.0%
9	20.0%	32.0%	16.0%	12.0%	0.0%	20.0%
10	35.3%	11.8%	11.8%	11.8%	17.6%	11.8%
11	38.1%	38.1%	0.0%	0.0%	9.5%	14.3%
12	31.8%	31.8%	9.1%	9.1%	9.1%	9.1%
13	56.3%	6.3%	12.5%	12.5%	6.3%	6.3%
14	46.7%	20.0%	26.7%	6.7%	0.0%	0.0%
Caucasian	35.6%	20.9%	7.9%	7.9%	8.4%	19.4%
African Amer	30.8%	19.2%	30.8%	11.5%	0.0%	7.7%

19. Do you approve or disapprove of the job the commission has done in making sure they were transparent in how they made their decisions? ASK: WOULD THAT BE STRONGLY APPROVE/DISAPPROVE OF JUST SOMEWHAT APPROVE/DISAPPROVE?

	Strongly Approve	Somewhat Approve	Somewhat Disapprove	Strongly Disapprove	Neither	Don't Know
Strong Democratic	38.6%	19.3%	17.0%	10.2%	3.4%	11.4%
Lean Democratic	28.6%	20.0%	5.7%	8.6%	22.9%	14.3%
Independent	34.5%	13.8%	12.1%	19.0%	3.4%	17.2%
Lean Republican	0.0%	13.6%	18.2%	22.7%	27.3%	18.2%
Strong Republican	15.2%	19.6%	21.7%	17.4%	4.3%	21.7%
Sanders Dem	42.5%	20.0%	17.5%	2.5%	7.5%	10.0%
Democratic	35.7%	21.4%	10.0%	15.7%	7.1%	10.0%
Independent	30.8%	10.8%	13.8%	18.5%	6.2%	20.0%
Republican	14.7%	29.4%	17.6%	14.7%	8.8%	14.7%
Trump Rep	10.0%	10.0%	26.7%	13.3%	13.3%	26.7%
Very Engaged	28.9%	15.8%	13.2%	21.1%	9.2%	11.8%
Some Eng	29.9%	18.5%	14.0%	12.1%	8.3%	17.2%
Not Very Eng	5.3%	26.3%	31.6%	10.5%	5.3%	21.1%
Not Engaged	20.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	60.0%
High School	30.0%	20.0%	26.7%	10.0%	3.3%	10.0%
Some Post	29.6%	13.6%	17.3%	17.3%	7.4%	14.8%
College	26.4%	20.8%	11.1%	13.2%	9.0%	19.4%
18-29	20.8%	25.0%	4.2%	16.7%	8.3%	25.0%
30-39	35.2%	21.6%	10.8%	2.7%	8.1%	21.6%
40-49	37.8%	8.9%	4.4%	28.9%	8.9%	11.1%
50-64	28.9%	20.5%	16.9%	6.0%	4.8%	22.9%
65+	18.2%	16.7%	25.8%	19.7%	10.6%	9.1%

Male	26.3%	22.6%	15.3%	12.4%	7.3%	16.1%
Female	28.9%	13.25	14.0%	16.5%	9.1%	18.2%
1	13.6%	22.7%	18.2%	13.6%	9.1%	22.7%
2	5.6%	16.7%	33.3%	11.1%	5.6%	27.8%
3	15.0%	15.0%	15.0%	20.0%	30.0%	5.0%
4	21.1%	15.8%	21.1%	5.3%	10.5%	26.3%
5	35.3%	11.8%	5.9%	11.8%	5.9%	29.4%
6	35.3%	23.5%	0.0%	11.8%	11.8%	17.6%
7	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%	33.3%	16.7%	16.7%
8	39.1%	13.0%	17.4%	13.0%	0.0%	17.4%
9	20.0%	32.0%	20.0%	4.0%	8.0%	16.0%
10	17.6%	11.8%	23.5%	41.2%	5.9%	0.0%
11	52.4%	4.8%	0.0%	9.5%	4.8%	28.6%
12	27.3%	22.7%	13.6%	9.1%	4.5%	22.7%
13	62.5%	6.3%	0.0%	25.0%	6.3%	0.0%
14	20.0%	46.7%	20.0%	13.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Caucasian	27.7%	20.4%	12.6%	11.5%	9.9%	17.8%
African Amer	34.6%	11.5%	19.2%	30.8%	0.0%	3.8%

20. Would you say you paid very close attention, some attention, not too much attention or no attention to the work being done by the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission?

	Very Close	Some Attention	Not Too Much	No Attention
Strong Democratic	12.5%	55.7%	21.6%	10.2%
Lean Democratic	8.6%	45.7%	17.1%	28.6%
Independent	5.2%	50.0%	24.1%	20.7%
Lean Republican	4.5%	59.1%	9.1%	27.3%
Strong Republican	4.3%	50.0%	19.6%	26.1%
Sanders Dem	12.5%	50.0%	25.0%	12.5%
Democratic	10.0%	60.0%	15.7%	14.3%
Independent	6.2%	49.2%	24.6%	20.0%
Republican	8.8%	44.1%	23.5%	23.5%
Trump Rep	3.3%	46.7%	10.0%	40.0%
Very Engaged	19.7%	51.3%	11.8%	17.1%
Some Eng	3.8%	54.8%	21.7%	19.7%
Not Very Eng	0.0%	26.3%	47.4%	26.3%
Not Engaged	0.0%	20.0%	20.0%	60.0%
High School	6.7%	46.7%	26.7%	20.0%
Some Post	6.2%	51.9%	22.2%	19.8%
College	9.0%	52.1%	18.8%	20.1%
18-29	8.3%	54.2%	29.2%	8.3%
30-39	5.4%	62.2%	16.2%	16.2%
40-49	13.3%	48.9%	15.6%	22.2%
50-64	4.8%	48.2%	21.7%	25.3%
65+	9.1%	50.0%	22.7%	18.2%

Male	9.5%	43.8%	21.2%	25.5%
Female	6.6%	59.5%	19.8%	14.0%
1	0.0%	45.5%	18.2%	36.4%
2	16.7%	38.9%	22.2%	22.2%
3	10.0%	40.0%	20.0%	30.0%
4	15.8%	36.8%	36.8%	10.5%
5	5.9%	52.9%	17.6%	23.5%
6	0.0%	76.5%	23.5%	0.0%
7	0.0%	83.3%	0.0%	16.7%
8	4.3%	47.8%	13.0%	34.8%
9	0.0%	48.0%	36.0%	16.0%
10	11.8%	76.5%	11.8%	0.0%
11	0.0%	38.1%	19.0%	42.9%
12	13.6%	45.5%	27.3%	13.6%
13	31.3%	50.0%	6.3%	12.5%
14	6.7%	73.3%	13.3%	6.7%
Caucasian	6.8%	49.2%	22.0%	22.0%
African Amer	19.2%	61.5%	11.5%	7.7%

21. I am going to read you several ways that Michigan citizens could have become engaged in the redistricting process. For each, please tell me if you did or did not engage in the redistricting process that way. [CIRCLE ALL WAYS RESPONDENT WAS ENGAGED]

	News	Online	Attending	Website	Comment	Virtual	Listening	None
Strong Democratic	86.1%	17.7%	6.3%	26.6%	13.9%	21.5%	6.3	1.3%
Lean Democratic	80.0%	4.0%	0.0%	32.0%	8.0%	28.0%	4.0%	0.0%
Independent	78.3%	6.5%	0.0%	34.8%	2.2%	19.6%	2.2%	2.2%
Lean Republican	62.5%	12.5%	0.0%	12.5%	6.3%	6.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Strong Republican	73.5%	14.7%	0.0%	26.5%	0.0%	14.7%	8.8%	0.0%
Sanders Dem	85.7%	20.0%	5.7%	34.3%	14.3%	25.7%	8.6%	0.0%
Democratic	86.7%	13.3%	5.0%	28.3%	11.7%	26.7%	6.7%	0.0%
Independent	73.1%	5.8%	0.0%	30.8%	3.8%	13.5%	0.0%	1.9%
Republican	69.2%	11.5%	0.0%	15.4%	0.0%	3.8%	7.7%	0.0%
Trump Rep	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Very Engaged	84.1%	28.6%	7.9%	44.4%	17.5%	34.9%	3.2%	1.6%
Some Eng	81.0%	7.1%	0.8%	22.2%	4.0%	14.3%	6.3%	0.8%
Not Very Eng	57.1%	0.0%	0.0%	7.1%	7.1%	7.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Not Engaged	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
High School	83.3%	12.5%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%	20.8%	0.0%	0.0%
Some Post	80.0%	9.2%	0.0%	18.5%	9.2%	18.5%	1.5%	1.5%
College	80.0%	15.7%	5.2%	36.5%	9.6%	20.9%	7.8%	0.0%
18-29	72.7%	13.6%	4.5%	31.8%	0.0%	36.4%	9.1%	0.0%
30-39	96.8%	16.1%	0.0%	48.4%	16.1%	19.4%	3.2%	0.0%
40-49	80.0%	20.0%	5.7%	22.9%	5.7%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%
50-64	79.0%	8.1%	3.2%	25.8%	11.3%	21.0%	4.8%	0.0%
65+	75.9%	11.1%	1.9%	20.4%	3.7%	11.1%	7.4%	0.0%

Male	77.5%	12.7%	2.0%	29.4%	7.8%	17.6%	1.0%	2.0%
Female	82.7%	13.5%	3.8%	26.9%	8.7%	22.1%	8.7%	0.0%
1	85.7%	0.0%	0.0%	35.7%	0.0%	14.3%	7.1%	0.0%
2	64.3%	21.4%	0.0%	14.3%	7.1%	14.3%	7.1%	7.1%
3	78.6%	21.4%	0.0%	42.9%	7.1%	21.4%	0.0%	0.0%
4	76.5%	11.8%	0.0%	29.4%	5.9%	23.5%	5.9%	0.0%
5	92.3%	7.7%	0.0%	15.4%	0.05	23.1%	0.0%	0.0%
6	88.2%	5.9%	0.0%	41.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
7	100.0%	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%
8	73.3%	6.7%	0.0%	13.3%	0.0%	6.7%	0.0%	0.0%
9	81.0%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	4.8%	19.0%	4.8%	0.0%
10	82.4%	23.5%	17.6%	23.5%	23.5%	29.4%	0.0%	0.0%
11	83.3%	0.0%	0.0%	41.7%	8.3%	8.3%	0.0%	0.0%
12	73.7%	10.5%	5.3%	31.6%	10.5%	21.1%	26.3%	0.0%
13	78.6%	42.9%	14.3%	42.95	21.4%	42.9%	7.1%	7.1%
14	78.6%	14.3%	0.05	35.7%	21.4%	35.7%	0.05	0.0%
Caucasian	77.9%	12.8%	2.0%	28.9%	7.4%	16.8%	4.7%	0.7%
African Amer	79.2%	16.7%	0.0%	33.3%	16.7%	37.5%	4.2%	0.0%

22. I am going to read you several places that Michigan citizens could become engaged on social media in the redistricting process whether by getting information or following along with the process. For each, please tell me you did or did not following the redistricting process on that platform.

	Facebook	Twitter	Instagram	YouTube	Mapping	Public Comment	None
Strong Democratic	24.1%	11.4%	10.1%	7.6%	19.0%	12.7%	54.4%
Lean Democratic	28.0%	24.0%	12.0%	20.0%	20.0%	16.0%	44.4%
Independent	19.6%	6.5%	2.2%	6.5%	28.3%	17.4%	43.5%
Lean Republican	37.5%	0.0%	6.3%	6.3%	0.0%	6.3%	62.5%
Strong Republican	23.5%	8.8%	5.9%	14.7%	5.9%	2.9%	58.8%
Sanders Dem	28.6%	14.3%	2.9%	8.6%	34.3%	25.7%	45.7%
Democratic	25.0%	16.7%	15.0%	11.7%	20.0%	10.0%	46.7%
Independent	17.3%	5.8%	1.9%	5.8%	15.4%	13.5%	61.5%
Republican	19.2%	11.5%	0.0%	7.7%	3.8%	0.0%	65.4%
Trump Rep	44.4%	0.0%	16.7%	22.2%	6.7%	11.1%	38.9%
Very Engaged	36.5%	17.5%	20.6%	19.0%	22.2%	20.6%	31.7%
Some Eng	23.0%	9.5%	3.2%	5.6%	17.5%	9.5%	57.1%
Not Very Eng	7.1%	0.0%	0.0%	7.1%	0.0%	0.0%	85.7%
Not Engaged	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%
High School	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	4.2%	4.2%	66.7%
Some Post	29.2%	9.2%	9.2%	15.4%	16.9%	12.3%	49.2%
College	26.1%	14.8%	9.6%	7.0%	20.9%	13.9%	49.6%
18-29	45.5%	27.3%	18.2%	18.2%	18.2%	13.6%	36.4%
30-39	29.0%	16.1%	3.2%	9.7%	35.5%	22.6%	45.2%
40-49	20.0%	14.3%	17.1%	22.9%	17.1%	8.6%	40.0%
50-64	25.8%	6.5%	8.1%	4.8%	8.1%	12.9%	61.3%
65+	18.5%	3.7%	0.0%	5.6%	18.5%	7.4%	59.3%

Male	22.5%	10.8%	6.9%	9.8%	16.7%	10.8%	53.9%
Female	28.8%	11.5%	9.6%	10.6%	18.3%	13.5%	49.0%
1	14.3%	7.1%	0.0%	0.0%	21.4%	0.0%	64.3%
2	14.3%	14.3%	0.0%	7.1%	7.1%	14.3%	71.4%
3	21.4%	14.3%	7.1%	0.0%	28.6%	14.3%	50.0%
4	29.4%	5.9%	5.9%	23.5%	11.8%	5.9%	41.2%
5	23.1%	7.7%	0.0%	7.7%	15.4%	15.4%	69.2%
6	11.8%	5.9%	5.9%	5.9%	5.9%	0.0%	70.6%
7	40.0%	0.0%	40.0%	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	60.0%
8	20.0%	6.7%	6.7%	0.0%	20.0%	13.3%	66.7%
9	42.9%	0.0%	14.3%	4.8%	9.5%	0.0%	47.6%
10	17.6%	11.8%	17.6%	11.8%	17.6%	5.9%	52.9%
11	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%	33.3%	58.3%
12	42.1%	21.1%	0.0%	10.5%	47.4%	21.1%	21.1%
13	28.6%	50.0%	35.7%	35.7%	14.3%	28.6%	28.6%
14	28.6%	7.1%	0.0%	14.3%	21.4%	21.4%	35.7%
Caucasian	26.2%	6.7%	6.0%	7.4%	17.4%	8.7%	53.0%
African Amer	20.8%	29.2%	12.5%	16.7%	20.8%	29.2%	41.7%

23. And would you say you did or did not see or hear any advertisements by the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission? IF YES, ASK: AND WHERE DID YOU SEE OR HEAR THIS ADVERTISEMENT [ACCEPT MULTIPLE ANSWERS]

	No	Radio	TV	Internet	Billboard	Newspaper	Not Sure
Strong Democratic	68.2%	5.7%	13.6%	15.9%	2.3%	3.4%	3.4%
Lean Democratic	60.0%	17.1%	11.4%	22.9%	0.0%	5.7%	2.9%
Independent	67.2%	8.6%	19.0%	5.2%	1.7%	3.4%	3.4%
Lean Republican	36.4%	27.3%	27.3%	27.3%	4.5%	13.6%	0.0%
Strong Republican	58.7%	13.0%	17.4%	6.5%	0.0%	2.2%	2.2%
Sanders Dem	57.5%	12.5%	7.5%	25.0%	5.0%	7.5%	0.0%
Democratic	64.3%	8.6%	20.0%	15.7%	0.0%	5.7%	4.3%
Independent	70.8%	12.3%	7.7%	7.7%	1.5%	0.0%	3.1%
Republican	41.2%	11.8%	29.4%	17.6%	2.9%	11.8%	2.9%
Trump Rep	73.3%	6.7%	13.3%	6.7%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%
Very Engaged	65.8%	11.8%	9.2%	17.1%	1.3%	3.9%	2.6%
Some Eng	60.5%	9.6%	19.1%	13.4%	0.6%	5.7%	3.2%
Not Very Eng	63.2%	21.1%	21.1%	0.0%	10.5%	0.0%	0.0%
Not Engaged	80.0%	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
High School	53.3%	13.3%	23.3%	10.0%	3.3%	3.3%	3.3%
Some Post	71.6%	6.2%	18.5%	7.4%	2.5%	4.9%	0.0%
College	59.0%	13.2%	13.9%	17.4%	0.7%	4.9%	3.5%
18-29	41.7%	20.8%	20.8%	29.2%	4.2%	8.3%	0.0%
30-39	62.2%	16.2%	2.7%	21.6%	2.7%	0.0%	2.7%
40-49	62.2%	17.8%	11.1%	8.9%	2.2%	2.2%	6.7%
50-64	63.9%	7.2%	16.9%	15.7%	0.0%	3.6%	1.2%
65+	69.7%	4.5%	24.2%	3.0%	1.5%	9.1%	3.0%

Male	61.3%	16.8%	16.8%	13.1%	2.9%	3.6%	1.5%
Female	64.5%	4.1%	15.7%	13.2%	0.05	5.8%	4.1%
1	63.6%	18.2%	13.6%	13.6%	0.0%	9.1%	4.5%
2	61.1%	11.1%	22.2%	11.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
3	75.0%	15.0%	15.0%	20.0%	5.0%	10.0%	0.0%
4	78.9%	0.0%	10.5%	5.3%	0.0%	10.5%	0.0%
5	52.9%	17.6%	23.5%	11.8%	5.9%	0.0%	5.9%
6	47.1%	11.8%	11.8%	5.9%	0.0%	5.9%	11.8%
7	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
8	87.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.3%	0.0%	4.3%	4.3%
9	56.0%	16.0%	20.0%	8.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.0%
10	64.7%	0.0%	11.8%	5.9%	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%
11	81.0%	4.8%	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
12	40.9%	22.7%	31.8%	31.8%	4.5%	9.1%	0.0%
13	56.3%	25.0%	18.8%	18.8%	6.3%	6.3%	6.3%
14	26.7%	0.0%	46.7%	26.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Caucasian	62.8%	11.0%	17.8%	13.1%	1.6%	6.3%	3.1%
African Amer	65.4%	15.4%	11.5%	7.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

24. And would you say that Michigan citizens did or did not have a greater role this time around in deciding how Michigan's new districts would be drawn?

	Did	Did Not	No Different
Strong Democratic	55.7%	21.6%	6.8%
Lean Democratic	48.6%	17.1%	11.4%
Independent	39.7%	29.3%	1.7%
Lean Republican	22.7%	22.7%	22.7%
Strong Republican	43.5%	19.6%	2.2%
Sanders Dem	67.5%	15.0%	2.5%
Democratic	47.1%	27.1%	11.4%
Independent	40.0%	26.2%	3.1%
Republican	32.4%	20.6%	11.8%
Trump Rep	50.0%	10.0%	6.7%
Very Engaged	50.0%	25.0%	9.2%
Some Eng	44.6%	21.0%	7.0%
Not Very Eng	36.8%	21.1%	0.0%
Not Engaged	20.0%	20.0%	0.0%
High School	53.3%	20.0%	3.3%
Some Post	43.2%	22.2%	8.6%
College	45.1%	22.2%	6.9%
18-29	54.2%	12.5%	8.3%
30-39	67.6%	8.1%	5.4%
40-49	62.2%	24.4%	0.0%
50-64	27.7%	22.9%	7.2%
65+	40.9%	30.3%	10.6%

Male	49.6%	18.2%	8.0%
Female	39.7%	26.4%	5.8%
1	31.8%	27.3%	4.5%
2	50.0%	27.8%	0.0%
3	25.0%	25.0%	15.0%
4	42.1%	21.1%	0.0%
5	64.7%	11.8%	0.0%
6	52.9%	11.8%	5.9%
7	33.3%	33.3%	0.0%
8	60.9%	21.7%	4.3%
9	32.0%	28.0%	20.0%
10	35.3%	41.2%	5.9%
11	57.1%	4.8%	0.0%
12	50.0%	13.6%	0.0%
13	50.0%	18.8%	12.5%
14	40.0%	33.3%	26.7%
Caucasian	48.2%	18.3%	6.3%
African Amer	26.9%	38.5%	19.2%

25. Generally speaking, would you say Michigan's redistricting commission has succeeded or failed in giving Michigan citizens a greater role than politicians in designing new districts? WOULD YOU SAY THEY HAVE STRONGLY SUCCEEDED/FAILED OR JUST SOMEWHAT SUCCEEDED/FAILED?

	Strongly Succeeded	Somewhat Succeeded	Somewhat Failed	Strongly Failed	Don't Know
Strong Democratic	35.2%	27.3%	8.0%	9.1%	20.5%
Lean Democratic	22.9%	28.6%	8.6%	2.9%	37.1%
Independent	20.7%	24.1%	6.9%	24.1%	24.1%
Lean Republican	9.1%	22.7%	18.2%	9.1%	40.9%
Strong Republican	6.5%	37.0%	13.0%	13.0%	30.4%
Sanders Dem	50.0%	20.0%	7.5%	5.0%	17.5%
Democratic	30.0%	28.6%	10.0%	12.9%	18.6%
Independent	15.4%	30.8%	6.2%	13.8%	33.8%
Republican	14.7%	29.4%	17.6%	2.9%	35.3%
Trump Rep	0.0%	33.3%	13.3%	20.0%	33.3%
Very Engaged	26.3%	35.5%	9.2%	10.5%	18.4%
Some Eng	22.9%	24.2%	8.3%	13.4%	31.2%
Not Very Eng	0.0%	31.6%	26.3%	5.3%	36.8%
Not Engaged	0.0%	20.05	0.0%	20.0%	60.0%
High School	23.3%	30.0%	16.7%	6.7%	23.3%
Some Post	21.0%	33.3%	8.6%	16.0%	21.0%
College	22.2%	25.0%	9.0%	10.4%	33.3%
18-29	25.0%	29.2%	4.2%	4.2%	37.5%
30-39	32.4%	40.5%	5.4%	2.7%	18.9%
40-49	26.7%	24.4%	8.9%	17.8%	22.2%
50-64	19.3%	26.5%	6.0%	7.2%	41.0%
65+	15.2%	25.8%	19.7%	22.7%	16.7%

Male	21.2%	26.3%	11.75	8.0%	32.8%
Female	22.3%	29.8%	7.4%	17.4%	23.1%
1	18.2%	31.8%	4.5%	13.6%	31.8%
2	11.1%	38.9%	11.1%	11.1%	27.8%
3	15.0%	15.0%	20.0%	15.0%	35.0%
4	15.8%	31.6%	15.8%	10.5%	26.3%
5	23.5%	11.8%	5.9%	5.9%	52.9%
6	17.6%	29.4%	0.0%	11.8%	41.2%
7	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	33.3%	16.7%
8	30.4%	34.8%	13.0%	13.0%	8.7%
9	16.0%	28.0%	8.0%	16.0%	32.0%
10	23.5%	29.4%	5.9%	29.4%	11.8%
11	38.1%	28.6%	4.8%	0.0%	28.6%
12	22.7%	18.2%	13.6%	4.5%	40.9%
13	37.5%	6.3%	18.8%	6.3%	31.3%
14	20.0%	53.3%	6.7%	20.0%	0.0%
Caucasian	21.5%	31.4%	7.3%	7.3%	32.5%
African Amer	23.1%	19.2%	19.2%	30.8%	7.7%

27. Now that Michigan has redrawn legislative maps for the first time with the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission, would you say Michigan should continue to allow an Independent Citizens Commission to redraw political maps every ten years or do you think Michigan should go back to allowing elected representatives that have control in the State Legislature to redraw the state's political maps?

	MICRC	Legislature	Both/ Don't Know
Strong Democratic	75.2%	5.5%	19.4%
Lean Democratic	74.2%	1.6%	24.2%
Independent	61.6%	11.6%	26.8%
Lean Republican	67.2%	6.9%	25.9%
Strong Republican	59.4%	18.2%	22.4%
Sanders Dem	70.7%	4.0%	25.3%
Democratic	76.1%	6.0%	17.9%
Independent	65.3%	8.8%	25.9%
Republican	63.1%	14.8%	22.1%
Trump Rep	58.9%	15.8%	25.3%
Very Engaged	65.3%	11.3%	23.4%
Some Eng	69.5%	9.0%	21.5%
Not Very Eng	64.6%	12.5%	22.9%
Not Engaged	40.0%	11.4%	48.6%
High School	61.2%	14.7%	24.0%
Some Post	67.7%	10.4%	21.9%
College	67.2%	7.7%	25.1%
18-29	73.3%	5.8%	20.9%
30-39	76.0%	5.0%	19.0%
40-49	55.6%	17.1%	27.4%
50-64	67.7%	9.5%	22.8%
65+	58.9%	12.9%	28.2%

Male	70.4%	10.5%	19.1%
Female	60.8%	9.6%	29.6%
1	77.8%	8.3%	13.9%
2	65.1%	7.0%	27.9%
3	65.9%	9.1%	25.0%
4	70.7%	9.8%	19.5%
5	58.7%	6.5%	34.8%
6	72.7%	11.4%	15.9%
7	67.5%	15.0%	17.5%
8	74.5%	0.0%	25.5%
9	50.9%	18.9%	30.2%
10	66.7%	11.1%	22.2%
11	58.5%	13.2%	28.3%
12	69.6%	6.5%	23.9%
13	62.5%	3.1%	34.4%
14	61.1%	19.4%	19.4%
Caucasian	68.0%	9.6%	22.4%
African Amer	56.2%	17.8%	26.0%

# APPENDIX A: QUESTION 5/ WHAT HAVE YOU SEEN OR HEARD?

AND WHAT HAVE YOU SEEN OR HEARD?	Number	Percent
I don't trust it.	1	0.5 %
Don't know.	28	13.3 %
It's about the Gerrymandering process.	3	1.4 %
It would make it easier for Republican candidates.	1	0.5 %
It would be slanted for the more affluent.	1	0.5 %
I heard about drawing the boundaries and unfairness.	1	0.5 %
I'm informed and have seen the maps.	1	0.5 %
I know they redrew the map and it was approved.	1	0.5 %
That there's a new commission.	1	0.5 %
That they came up with a plan but many people are unhappy with it.	1	0.5 %
It's happening.	1	0.5 %
The composition of people did change.	1	0.5 %
Just that the commission exists.	1	0.5 %
The redistricting process.	1	0.5 %
They took an island and connected it with a township.	1	0.5 %
Online on social media I saw there would be a committee.	1	0.5 %
I saw the drafts coming out and the lawsuits.	1	0.5 %
I heard about the issue in 2018 but not the latest news.	1	0.5 %
That I don't agree with it.	1	0.5 %
Exactly what you just said.	1	0.5 %
I saw something about it on the news.	1	0.5 %
They're biased by Democrats.	1	0.5 %
I saw on the news that it was done.	1	0.5 %
I heard that it's been done.	1	0.5 %
That it was redrawn or will be.	1	0.5 %
People are upset about it.	1	0.5 %
There's always renewed complaints of neighborhoods		

split up.	1	0.5 %
I heard some people aren't happy with it.	1	0.5 %
Demographics are important.	1	0.5 %
It's comprised of citizens.	1	0.5 %
The proposal about the make up of the commission.	1	0.5 %
My husband applied to be one.	1	0.5 %
They want to redraw the boundaries.	1	0.5 %
I've talked to people who applied for it.	1	0.5 %
I read a couple of news articles, can't remember what they said.	1	0.5 %
The map showed that the whole west/southwest regions of Michigan was Republican which is totally out of whack.	1	0.5 %
I applied but didn't get accepted.	1	0.5 %
They mentioned it on NPR.	1	0.5 %
I saw the app and remembered I voted for it.	1	0.5 %
I saw when they delivered a report of the maps and the controversy around them.	1	0.5 %
I heard about the ballot issue.	1	0.5 %
Last year there was something on the news but I can't remember what.	1	0.5 %
There's a lot of discussion about it on the news and people feel good about the maps.	1	0.5 %
People think it will cause problems.	2	0.9 %
I know about the redistricting by the citizens commission.	1	0.5 %
I just heard about it.	2	0.9 %
There's an issue now because they're not on time.	1	0.5 %
The controversies that have cropped up.	1	0.5 %
On the news the districts were redrawn, some people think it's unfair to minorities.	1	0.5 %
The redistricting process was in the newspaper and the 13 citizens that it was made up of.	1	0.5 %

I knew the redistricting was happening, not about the committee.	1	0.5 %
They're sharing how they're redistricting.	1	0.5 %
I heard about it having some Republicans, some Democrats, and some Independents.	1	0.5 %
On the ballot.	1	0.5 %
I received mail about it.	1	0.5 %
I've seen an article on Reddit that applications were being put in.	1	0.5 %
They were creating the commission.	1	0.5 %
I heard it passed.	1	0.5 %
I watched and read about redistricting online.	1	0.5 %
It's about redistricting.	1	0.5 %
There has been controversy on whether or not it's a non balanced committee.	1	0.5 %
It's independent with people from both sides of the party.	2	0.9 %
I've seen the maps online.	1	0.5 %
Local representative no longer living in district because of redistricting.	1	0.5 %
Advertising for their meetings in the area.	1	0.5 %
That they were the new way of redistricting.	1	0.5 %
It's not fair.	1	0.5 %
That it was going to be redistricted.	1	0.5 %
They're trying to stop the confirmed districting in place.	1	0.5 %
I heard they lean more Democrat.	1	0.5 %
They're controversial.	1	0.5 %
That they would organize a commission.	1	0.5 %
The redrawing of lines of the districts.	1	0.5 %
I've applied and I've heard the map is now being challenged.	1	0.5 %
They've come up with a plan and the map is being challenged.	1	0.5 %

They were redrawing the maps that were Republican favored, it wasn't fair before, now it is.	4	1.9 %
There are still some people who are unhappy with the results.	1	0.5 %
The Republicans say they did a bad job and the Democrats said a good job.	2	0.9 %
Some people believe it was done in an unfair manner.	1	0.5 %
I heard about the redistricting plan.	2	0.9 %
When the application for redistricting came about.	2	0.9 %
That new boundaries have been set.	1	0.5 %
A lawsuit against the redistricting process.	1	0.5 %
They're protecting us from gerrymandering.	1	0.5 %
The newly proposed districts.	1	0.5 %
I've heard they changed districts.	2	0.9 %
Just that they exist.	1	0.5 %
Lawsuits were filed in dissatisfaction with the maps.	2	0.9 %
One of our representatives will be affected by the new change.	1	0.5 %
Only aware that the commission was formed.	1	0.5 %
They were debating about the redistricting process.	2	0.9 %
That the law was going to change.	1	0.5 %
I heard about the boundaries.	1	0.5 %
I work in city government and I'm aware of the process and pushback from people about it.	2	0.9 %
I just heard some local information.	1	0.5 %
They redid the map so it isn't so janky.	1	0.5 %
That they would stop Gerrymandering.	1	0.5 %
They were the people selected to do the redistricting.	1	0.5 %
I heard they made a decision to go forward with that.	1	0.5 %
Refused.	1	0.5 %
They've redrawn lines.	2	0.9 %
Something on the news.	1	0.5 %
We'll see more libertarians.	1	0.5 %

I heard something on the news.	2	0.9 %
It's been on the news.	1	0.5 %
I'm aware of it.	1	0.5 %
Podcast.	1	0.5 %
That the Democrats aren't happy with it.	2	0.9 %
There was a problem not letting African Americans have enough say in Detroit.	2	0.9 %
They're redoing districts.	1	0.5 %
Their new plan is being contested in court.	1	0.5 %
We notarized the paperwork.	1	0.5 %
I've been sent emails to open invitations to be a part of the commission.	1	0.5 %
The process was under way and they were in the process of gathering the people they needed to proceed.	1	0.5 %
Researched the proposal personally for information.	1	0.5 %
That it passed, some people thought it needed to be redrawn.	1	0.5 %
The process of the changing of district lines.	2	0.9 %
The progress and what's going on currently with the maps.	2	0.9 %
Everyone who redistricts fails.	1	0.5 %
Looked into it to try to get involved but I didn't pursue it.	1	0.5 %
Nothing since last year.	1	0.5 %
I know that they have met and that it's supposedly bi- partisan.	1	0.5 %
I actually submitted an application to be considered to be on the commission and I kept an eye on them throughout the redistricting process.	1	0.5 %
They're redistricting.	1	0.5 %
It's very vague, just that they were doing something.	1	0.5 %
Why the districts cut into cities and more conservative people are unfairly represented.	1	0.5 %

Reporting on the radio.	1	0.5 %
I saw one Facebook commercial about it and that's it.	1	0.5 %
Republicans took over a couple of districts so it benefited them.	1	0.5 %
I just heard about the redistricting.	1	0.5 %
The Detroit area was having controversy over the districts.	1	0.5 %
The new maps that came out recently.	1	0.5 %
It's well balanced.	1	0.5 %
I read an article presented by U of M to help select members of the commission.	1	0.5 %
Some of the rules that are suggested are way out of line.	1	0.5 %
That they existed.	2	0.9 %
I know they have redrawn them.	1	0.5 %
It will be redone.	1	0.5 %
I've seen a little about the committee and how it's made up.	1	0.5 %
I've heard about the boundaries that's it.	1	0.5 %
They're redoing our districts.	1	0.5 %
Something about being tied up in the courts.	2	0.9 %
I've seen a couple posts on Facebook from friends who are against gerrymandering about redistricting.	1	0.5 %
It's diverse to make it fair for everybody.	2	0.9 %
I heard about them redrawing the boundaries.	1	0.5 %
They came to our committee and did a presentation.	1	0.5 %
I voted on it.	1	0.5 %
They had a committee of citizens coming together to draw the district lines.	2	0.9 %
Other people called to inform about it.	1	0.5 %
I don't like state maps the way they were drawn.	1	0.5 %
My district got redistricted.	2	0.9 %
Talk around the campus talking about redrawing the lines.	1	0.5 %

The committee has met and drawn the lines which caused controversy.	3	1.4 %
Conflict and discussion about unfair redistricting.	1	0.5 %
That people didn't like the way they redrew it.	1	0.5 %
They've put Dearborn with Wayne county.	1	0.5 %
Total	211	100.0 %

## APPENDIX B: QUESTION 8/ WHY WAS YOUR OPINION POSITIVE?

And why would you say your opinion is positive?	Number	Percent
Sometimes change like that would be very good for all of us.	1	1.1 %
Because it's a nonbiased board.	1	1.1 %
The situation seems better in the hands of average citizens.	1	1.1 %
They did it for the right reason.	1	1.1 %
It's important to have fair maps.	1	1.1 %
They're making progress.	1	1.1 %
Changes have been made.	1	1.1 %
An equal amount of representatives seems fair.	1	1.1 %
I wasn't a fan of how districts were drawn the last 3 decades.	1	1.1 %
The old system was unfair and this effort was to fix it.	1	1.1 %
I support it.	1	1.1 %
They could be unbiased by the left.	1	1.1 %
They're trying to make things more fair.	1	1.1 %
It's important.	2	2.3 %
The lines are being drawn more equitably.	1	1.1 %
They did a good job, it's more accurate.	1	1.1 %
The whole process needs to be more independent.	1	1.1 %
Redrawing of districts they've done is good.	1	1.1 %
It's a fair way to draw the districts and not leave it up to the politicians.	1	1.1 %
They have done what the voters want.	1	1.1 %
It's is more fairly comprised now.	2	2.3 %
Change isn't necessarily bad and this might be positive.	1	1.1 %
It's better than the alternative.	1	1.1 %
It's a non-biased point of view.	1	1.1 %
It's giving everyone an opportunity to vote.	1	1.1 %

It's important for people to have the independence.	1	1.1 %
This is the only way to get away from gerrymandering.	1	1.1 %
Gerrymandering and swaying voting districts is the worst thing we can do.	1	1.1 %
To get rid of gerrymandering.	1	1.1 %
You have to keep doing things to make the system better and this is 1 way how.	1	1.1 %
The citizens do a better job than Republicans in the Legislature.	1	1.1 %
Don't know.	4	4.5 %
I like the work they've done.	1	1.1 %
Some things need changes.	1	1.1 %
It will represent more people accurately.	1	1.1 %
It's set up to be a lot more fair.	1	1.1 %
It should be balanced and more fair, this will keep it unbiased.	1	1.1 %
Equal representation from everyone.	1	1.1 %
It's important to get the voice of the people.	1	1.1 %
It's way better than having one party draw the map.	1	1.1 %
It's a balanced group, fairly neutral.	1	1.1 %
It shows the citizens have a voice.	1	1.1 %
The maps weren't fair before.	4	4.5 %
It's made up of people from different parties to keep it neutral.	1	1.1 %
It's better left to the citizens.	1	1.1 %
They're trying to make sure our elections are fair.	1	1.1 %
They're trying to do better by citizens.	1	1.1 %
Stopping gerrymandering.	1	1.1 %
They're drawing power away from politicians and being nonpartisan.	1	1.1 %
The voters should have a say in districts.	1	1.1 %
It takes it out of the hands of the government so it can be more balanced.	2	2.3 %

Refused.	1	1.1 %
All of the changes to reduce previous gerrymandering.	2	2.3 %
It's a more impartial way to draw the districts.	1	1.1 %
They're very transparent with information making efforts to make it available to everyone.	2	2.3 %
Partisanship has gone too far, a system to reflect all parties is what we need.	1	1.1 %
It's an important issues because of minorities being served.	1	1.1 %
People from different political parties are working together for a greater good.	1	1.1 %
Vast improvement over the old system giving voice to citizens.	1	1.1 %
A lot of people have moved to the suburbs and when it comes to getting state aid a lot of places have fallen short due to old boundaries.	1	1.1 %
I agree with the statistic models.	1	1.1 %
It's a more fair way to draw districts.	1	1.1 %
The objective is a more fair map and this is an improvement on the system we used to have.	1	1.1 %
The issue of gerrymandering.	1	1.1 %
Making everyone and all get their fair share.	1	1.1 %
I'm against Gerrymandering.	1	1.1 %
The people should have a say.	1	1.1 %
The districting should represent the minority voices.	1	1.1 %
They did their job well.	1	1.1 %
It took control from the actual parties affiliation and gave it to the citizens.	1	1.1 %
It's better than what it was before.	1	1.1 %
The redistricting is necessary and I approve of how the commission was put together.	2	2.3 %
People in congress should stay out of it because they tamper with is and the committee is a good way to		

address it.	3	3.4 %
They're trying to protect our vote.	1	1.1 %
Total	88	100.0 %

# APPENDIX C: QUESTION 9/ WHY WAS YOUR OPINION NEGATIVE?

And why would you say your opinion is negative?	Number	Percent
I don't approve of the formation of the commission, nothing against the people on the commission just the commission itself.	1	3.2 %
Refused.	2	6.5 %
They redistricted Sugar Island and Sioux Township together.	1	3.2 %
I don't agree with changing things.	1	3.2 %
It's political garbage.	1	3.2 %
It's just another organization that will steal funds and get rich off of the people.	1	3.2 %
The Democrats are trying to change it so it helps them.	1	3.2 %
They made a problem where there wasn't one.	1	3.2 %
Because they haven't been able to execute their deadlines, they couldn't comply with basic requests.	1	3.2 %
It puts a cap on the people who can vote.	1	3.2 %
It's a scam by politicians.	1	3.2 %
It's not good for citizens who don't have enough experience.	1	3.2 %
They did it unfairly.	1	3.2 %
It doesn't make sense, how it was redrawn.	1	3.2 %
It's not a non-biased commission.	1	3.2 %
I don't think we should redistrict.	1	3.2 %
Not a good enough selection of people.	1	3.2 %
Nobody can guarantee independency.	1	3.2 %
I don't trust that it's bipartisan, I think it will be Republican leaning and biased.	1	3.2 %
We're now cluttered with cities that have different views and religious beliefs, some will probably lose us reps that we like.	1	3.2 %

The way the lines are drawn doesn't seem to be fair.	2	6.5 %
I don't believe in the bill of the system.	1	3.2 %
There's too many complaints from people about it.	1	3.2 %
I don't like how they redrew the maps.	1	3.2 %
I think it's biased.	2	6.5 %
It adversely affects Wayne County.	1	3.2 %
It's a form of gerrymandering.	1	3.2 %
They didn't draw the lines very well.	1	3.2 %
Total	31	100.0 %

# APPENDIX D: QUESTON 11/ WHY DO YOU APPROVE?

And why do you approve of the job they have done?	Number	Percent
It's looking out for the well being of all people.	1	1.1 %
They're doing their job to the best of their ability.	1	1.1 %
So far they've done their goal.	1	1.1 %
Things change over the years.	1	1.1 %
They've deviated from corruption.	1	1.1 %
Seems like they did a fair job.	1	1.1 %
The maps are much more fair.	1	1.1 %
It was unfair before.	1	1.1 %
I agree with it.	1	1.1 %
They're working to make things equal with the parties.	1	1.1 %
Somebody had to do it.	1	1.1 %
From the map, it's more equitable.	1	1.1 %
It was more fair and accurate.	1	1.1 %
It's needed and overdue.	1	1.1 %
Don't know.	6	6.9 %
It has allowed a voice for voters to be involved.	1	1.1 %
They're giving voters a chance to have input.	1	1.1 %
They have a tough job but they're trying.	1	1.1 %
They're doing the job as tasked.	1	1.1 %
They worked hard to come up with a non-partisan way of redistricting.	1	1.1 %
They laid it out well and haven't drawn the lines too out of bounds.	1	1.1 %
It's time we have someone who isn't either party to decide.	1	1.1 %
Seems like things are doing good.	1	1.1 %
We're still here and haven't been taken down.	1	1.1 %
It seems to be going okay.	1	1.1 %
It's more fair.	1	1.1 %

They do a better job than politicians.	1	1.1 %
It's supposed to be a voter approved amendment and balanced.	1	1.1 %
I'm grateful they're willing to do it.	1	1.1 %
They did a fair job at redistricting.	1	1.1 %
It breaks down the districts and the people who live there.	1	1.1 %
The boundaries should change all the time.	1	1.1 %
I have communicated personally with them.	1	1.1 %
I like that they included district 15 into another district.	1	1.1 %
They managed to get the map completed through the pandemic.	1	1.1 %
It's fairly balanced.	1	1.1 %
They put a lot of time and effort into it and I appreciate that.	1	1.1 %
It's important someone has to fight for the right thing.	4	4.6 %
They've been fair with getting citizens involved.	1	1.1 %
I give them credit for the job they're all doing.	2	2.3 %
I'm in a different district.	2	2.3 %
They're attempting to make changes for districts.	2	2.3 %
They're making better boundaries for voting.	1	1.1 %
I'm trusting that they're redistricting as needed.	1	1.1 %
It doesn't look as janky.	1	1.1 %
It needs to be done once in a while.	1	1.1 %
Refused.	1	1.1 %
We have to have fair maps.	1	1.1 %
With the changes it reflects the population.	2	2.3 %
This system is better than the legislative system.	2	2.3 %
They've collaborated together and are transparent.	2	2.3 %
It's not perfect but a huge improvement.	1	1.1 %
The numbers were adequate.	1	1.1 %
Districting is unfair with the legislature.	1	1.1 %
It's done every 10 years.	1	1.1 %

The way they did it is a more fair distribution of the parties.	1	1.1 %
It's a better map that better represents the population.	1	1.1 %
They have taken in all the areas of our state.	1	1.1 %
It was time to be updated a bit.	1	1.1 %
I'm not sure if they've actually done anything yet but I'm waiting to see what they do.	1	1.1 %
I'm not a Republican.	1	1.1 %
They've made it so little people have more of a chance.	2	2.3 %
This would lead to the most unbiased redrawing of boundaries.	1	1.1 %
Democracy is our only hope, without it we have nothing.	1	1.1 %
They're taking a lead in supporting smaller voices.	1	1.1 %
They got it right.	1	1.1 %
They've done the best they could with the amount of people they have, no more gerrymandering.	1	1.1 %
They want to create more opportunities.	1	1.1 %
The committee is the right approach to addressing gerrymandering.	3	3.4 %
Just to get a discussion going about what's best for the people.	1	1.1 %
Total	87	100.0 %

# APPENDIX E: QUESTION 12/ WHY DO YOU DISAPPROVE?

And why do you disapprove of the job they have done?	Number	Percent
I think it's a power grab for both parties.	1	2.1 %
They don't put their information out there for the average citizen to find.	1	2.1 %
I think the map was redrawn to benefit a certain political party.	1	2.1 %
Refused.	2	4.3 %
They down districted when they combined the island and township.	1	2.1 %
They've done nothing to benefits the voters.	1	2.1 %
It's biased.	1	2.1 %
It's too political, just another choice of a political group.	1	2.1 %
I don't think it was fair.	1	2.1 %
Leave it how it is so they don't take advantage of voters.	1	2.1 %
They have done a terrible job maintaining the guidelines.	1	2.1 %
I just don't understand it.	1	2.1 %
They lumped too much area into one Representative or Senator.	1	2.1 %
The Detroit Community isn't represented right.	1	2.1 %
The current lines favor certain parties instead of others.	1	2.1 %
They haven't done enough to involve the citizens.	1	2.1 %
I think they're doing it for a political agenda.	1	2.1 %
There's still gerrymandering going on and not all groups are getting representation.	1	2.1 %
I don't think they did it fairly.	1	2.1 %
I lost my democratic representative.	1	2.1 %
They're redrawing district lines again.	1	2.1 %
It's not a non-biased commission.	1	2.1 %
They're taking over rural areas with urban areas.	1	2.1 %
They separated some communities of interest in order		

to dilute voters of color.	1	2.1 %
The selected group wasn't unbiased.	1	2.1 %
It was good the way it was.	2	4.3 %
I feel it's biased toward the Republican side.	1	2.1 %
The districts aren't fairly drawn.	2	4.3 %
There was a rule that didn't create balance.	2	4.3 %
It's not local.	1	2.1 %
There wasn't a lot of information publicly.	1	2.1 %
They're disenfranchising minority populations.	1	2.1 %
I didn't vote for it.	1	2.1 %
They aren't doing a good job selling what they did.	1	2.1 %
There have been some problems of discriminatory racial practices.	1	2.1 %
Because of the way it affects where I live.	1	2.1 %
Some smaller districts get swallowed up which causes misrepresentation of the area.	2	4.3 %
Gerrymandering against minorities.	1	2.1 %
The maps were drawn more Republican leaning and they went off of previous maps.	1	2.1 %
It unfairly creates a distribution of black voters for less representation.	2	4.3 %
<u>They didn't draw the lines very well.</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2.1 %</u>
Total	47	100.0 %

## APPENDIX F: QUESTION 26/ FUTURE SUGGESTIONS

And would you have any suggestions going forward that would help the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission to improve the redistricting process?		
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Tell us how the 13 were selected.	1	0.4 %
Advertise more especially to rural areas.	1	0.4 %
No.	140	54.3 %
Give an advertisement and a letter saying this is an opportunity in your area for redistricting.	1	0.4 %
A lot of prayer.	1	0.4 %
Dissolve the commission.	1	0.4 %
Send me a map of where they redistricted and why.	1	0.4 %
Make voters more aware.	1	0.4 %
Advertise.	1	0.4 %
It just needs tinkering and time.	1	0.4 %
They need to let us know about it more publicly.	1	0.4 %
Make sure things are done in the open and are transparent.	1	0.4 %
More social awareness and getting the word out more.	1	0.4 %
More transparency.	1	0.4 %
Direct mail more information to us so we know what's going on.	1	0.4 %
Remove all Democrats.	1	0.4 %
Don't know.	17	6.6 %
Keep Democrats out.	1	0.4 %
Make the people aware of what's going on.	1	0.4 %
Listen to the residents.	1	0.4 %
Keep the public informed.	1	0.4 %
Just leave it alone.	1	0.4 %
Disband the group.	1	0.4 %
They need to be held accountable by the governor,		

currently they answer to no one and most of them are inept at this kind of work.	1	0.4 %
Get the word out more.	1	0.4 %
Put more information in the press like the newspaper.	1	0.4 %
Getting the word out better.	1	0.4 %
Put more on MLive.	1	0.4 %
Send flyers out by mail so people would understand it better.	1	0.4 %
Get the word out a bit more.	1	0.4 %
Seek clarification on all boundaries they have so there isn't so much disagreement.	1	0.4 %
Trying to educate people about what it is and why it's needed.	1	0.4 %
More outreach to the public.	1	0.4 %
Give each county the right to give opinions.	1	0.4 %
Better advertising so people know what's going on.	1	0.4 %
Get it on TV from 7-7:30 with a panel set up to discuss what it is and who is working with it.	1	0.4 %
Make sure it's 100 percent transparent to the public.	2	0.8 %
Just keep listening to the public.	1	0.4 %
Keep exposing more to get more people involved.	1	0.4 %
Just a little bit more advertisement.	1	0.4 %
It should have been more public.	1	0.4 %
Kibosh this process.	1	0.4 %
Maybe put more ads and things out to get people involved.	1	0.4 %
More public involvements in the rural area.	1	0.4 %
They should care less about which party is involved.	1	0.4 %
Don't put politicians in districts where they didn't run or get elected into.	1	0.4 %
More of an informal approach.	1	0.4 %
Let the people vote on the districts themselves.	1	0.4 %
Term limits enforced.	1	0.4 %

Make more available information, like advertising more.	1	0.4 %
Reaching out to the community.	1	0.4 %
Get more information out there.	1	0.4 %
Gathering public opinion.	1	0.4 %
Maybe advertise more about what they're doing.	1	0.4 %
Should be more public meetings, online access doesn't reach everybody.	1	0.4 %
Listen to what the critics are telling you.	2	0.8 %
Just citizens should have a lot more involvement.	1	0.4 %
Put the districts on the ballot.	1	0.4 %
They need to advertise more into the lead up so people can engage.	1	0.4 %
Mailing out information to Michigan citizens.	1	0.4 %
More information for the average voter.	1	0.4 %
More investment in advertisement.	2	0.8 %
Put the information in targeted ads.	1	0.4 %
They have to allow and make effort to include everybody, every voice should be heard.	2	0.8 %
Put it to a vote to people.	1	0.4 %
Get citizens to give them information and opinions.	1	0.4 %
Stop splitting counties.	1	0.4 %
Put it in the local newspaper.	1	0.4 %
Get a flyer out in the mail describing how it affects people and when meetings are.	2	0.8 %
Not lumping the city together with the suburbs.	1	0.4 %
Keep the transparency available for public access.	2	0.8 %
Make the people more aware that their personal input is accepted, I had no idea about the meetings of the committee or the portal or anything.	1	0.4 %
Put me on the commission.	1	0.4 %
More advertising to promote greater visibility.	1	0.4 %
They need to do a much better job informing the citizenry about when all this stuff was going on.	1	0.4 %

They could have improved early on in the mathematical literacy of the members of commission, they seemed to be a little behind in some of the math involved in redistricting.	1	0.4 %
General information on good models and information on the redistricting itself.	1	0.4 %
Just keep the service with citizen control.	1	0.4 %
Try to advertise more to the public.	1	0.4 %
Put more in the news media about how important it is.	2	0.8 %
Make their information more accessible.	1	0.4 %
More time providing the maps online for review.	1	0.4 %
Don't do it.	2	0.8 %
A little more reaching out to us to keep us better informed.	1	0.4 %
More engagement in communities being gentrified.	1	0.4 %
Possibly more advertising for younger voters 18-30 years old.	1	0.4 %
Stay transparent and keep political and corporate money out of the process.	1	0.4 %
They need more advertisement.	1	0.4 %
Take one person from every congressional district and make that into a council say there's more say from the community.	1	0.4 %
More advertising and exposure.	1	0.4 %
Come up with a way to keep politicians from monkeying with the results.	3	1.2 %
Keep visible so people are aware.	1	0.4 %
Spend more money on putting information out about what they're doing.	1	0.4 %
Total	258	100.0 %

## APPENDIX 4

### MICRC Communications and Outreach Plan



**MICHIGAN  
INDEPENDENT  
CITIZENS  
REDISTRICTING  
COMMISSION**

The logo features the text "MICHIGAN INDEPENDENT CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION" in a bold, sans-serif font. The word "CITIZENS" is highlighted in orange, while the other words are in dark blue. To the right of the text is a stylized orange outline of the state of Michigan, with a dark blue silhouette of the state's outline overlaid on it. Below the text and the Michigan map are several horizontal lines in orange and dark blue.

# ***PROPOSED COMMUNICATIONS AND OUTREACH PLAN***

***April 8, 2021***




**MICHIGAN  
INDEPENDENT  
CITIZENS  
REDISTRICTING  
COMMISSION**

## ***STRATEGIC PLAN***

**MISSION:** Lead Michigan's redistricting process to assure Michigan's Congressional, State Senate, and State House district lines are drawn fairly in a citizen-led, transparent process, meeting Constitutional mandates.

**VISION:** Chart a positive course for elections based on fair maps for Michigan today and for the future.

**CORE VALUES:** Integrity—Respect—Transparency—Purposeful




## **MICHIGAN INDEPENDENT CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION**



### ***BACKGROUND***

- In 2018, Michigan voters passed Proposal 2 to amend the Michigan Constitution.
  - Prevent gerrymandering
  - Openness and transparency
  - Reduce partisanship by letting citizens execute the redistricting process
- Created the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (MICRC).
- 13 randomly selected Michigan residents—four Democrats, five Independents, and four Republicans.
- The MICRC is responsible for redistricting Michigan's U.S. Congressional, and State House and Senate districts.




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REDISTRICTING  
COMMISSION**



***MARKET RESEARCH  
METHODOLOGY***

- The Glengariff Group, Inc. conducted a Michigan statewide survey of voters. The 600 sample, live operator telephone survey was conducted on March 27-31, 2021 and has a margin of error of +/-4.0% with a 95% level of confidence.
- 50.0% of respondents were contacted via landline telephone. 50.0% of respondents were contacted via cell phone telephone.
- This survey was commissioned by the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission.




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***MARKET RESEARCH  
KEY FINDINGS***

- 53 percent of respondents have heard of the new redistricting change
- 24.3 percent have heard of the MICRC
- Plurality of voters have no opinion of commission
- The two strongest testing facts emphasized map fairness and public feedback
- No unfair advantage, citizen input, and transparency are key messages that resonate with voters
- News stories and website most likely avenues for engagement
- 48.2 percent believe participation will have an impact



**MICHIGAN  
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***GOAL #1: Ensure fairness in the redistricting process.***

Objective 1—Share the process for random selection of commissioners.

Objective 2—Address gerrymandering through the composition of the commission.

Objective 3—Emphasize that MICRC requires hiring and mapping decisions to include at least a member from the Democrats, Independents, and Republicans.




***GOAL #2: Heighten awareness in the redistricting process.***

Objective 1—Recruit Michigan residents to sign-up for alerts.

Objective 2—Reinforce that commissioners are everyday citizens.

Objective 3—Collaborate with statewide organizations and their affiliates/members to inform residents about Michigan's new redistricting process.



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


***GOAL #3: Model transparency in the redistricting process.***

Objective 1—Create a robust, accessible, and user-friendly website that promotes and documents every action of the Commission.

Objective 2—Cite how the Commission follows the laws, rules, and procedures.

Objective 3—Establish and maintain solid and ethical relationships with media for accurate, balanced, and timely information release.



**MICHIGAN  
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***GOAL #4: Increase engagement in the redistricting process.***

Objective 1—Execute three multimedia education campaigns (public hearings, map submission, adoption of maps) for residents to participate in the redistricting process through public comments and hearings.

Objective 2—Identify and engage stakeholders in Communities of Interest to maximize the voices of residents.

Objective 3—Utilize Town Hall Forums to partner with local organizations and inform residents about the redistricting process.



**MICHIGAN  
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CITIZENS  
REDISTRICTING  
COMMISSION**



The logo features the text 'MICHIGAN INDEPENDENT CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION' in blue and orange. To the right is a blue silhouette of Michigan with orange lines indicating redistricting. Below the text are three horizontal lines: two orange and one blue.

## ***COMMUNICATIONS AND OUTREACH PLAN PROCESS***

- Present to the Commission—April 8
- Receive feedback and public comment—April 8-14
- Commission Vote—April 15



## ***COMMUNICATIONS AND OUTREACH PLAN PLATFORMS***

Ads

Emails

Facebook

Frequently Asked Questions

Instagram

Press

Twitter

Website

Editorials

Events

Fact Sheets

Infographics

Presentations

Text Alerts

Videos

YouTube



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*COMMUNICATIONS AND OUTREACH PLAN*



# APPENDIX 5

## MICRC Strategic Plan

**MICHIGAN  
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# Strategic Plan

DRAFT Presented to the MICRC on March 25, 2021

# Guiding Principles


**Mission:** To lead Michigan's redistricting process to assure Michigan's Congressional, State Senate, and State House district lines are drawn fairly in a citizen-led, transparent process, meeting Constitutional mandates.

**Vision:** To chart a positive course for elections based on fair maps for Michigan today and for the future.



## Core Values:

- ✓ Integrity
- ✓ Respect
- ✓ Transparency
- ✓ Purposeful



# Core Competencies




- ✓ Actions exemplify honesty and professionalism.
- ✓ Responsibilities and integrity are put above personal or political gain.
- ✓ Thoughtful and purposeful dialogue, and collegiality are fostered.
- ✓ Respect, tolerance, and equality are extended towards others.



# Critical Success Factors


- ✓ Michigan citizens from across the state and with diverse backgrounds participate meaningfully in the redistricting process.
- ✓ The Constitution is upheld and always at the forefront.
- ✓ All actions are undertaken with a commitment to fairness.
- ✓ The Code of Conduct, policies and procedures are followed.
- ✓ Discussion and deliberations occur in open meetings with the utmost transparency.
- ✓ Commissioners, consultants, and staff members work in an impartial manner to instill public confidence in the integrity of the redistricting process.



## Goal #1: Fairness

### STRATEGIES


1. Commissioners will assure that lines are drawn in a fair, independent manner in live, open meetings.
2. The line drawing contractor will present redistricting plans that are fair, include input from public comments, are guided by RPV/RBV data analysis, and meet the criteria detailed in the Michigan Constitution in rank order.
3. The Voting Rights Act legal counsel will provide guidance to assure Federal criteria are met, including equal population and adherence to the Voting Rights Act.
4. Michigan residents will have fair and meaningful opportunities to participate in the process through public comment and submission of proposed maps.



## Goal #2: Awareness

### STRATEGIES

1. There will be multiple opportunities for residents of Michigan to learn about the redistricting process.
2. Both paid and earned media, as well as social media, will be utilized to share information.
3. Meetings of the MICRC will be open meetings, broadcast in 'real time' and recorded for later viewing.
4. A robust website will serve as a repository of information for the public.
5. Public Hearings, presentations, and town hall forums will engage directly with the public to provide information.
6. There will be continuing education provided to increase knowledge of the Commissioners and the general public.



## Goal #3: Transparency

### STRATEGIES


1. Meetings of the Commission, including Public Hearings, will be open meetings. Meeting agendas with supporting documents and other Commissioner materials will be made available on the website [Michigan.gov/MICRC](https://Michigan.gov/MICRC).
2. While it is the goal to be open and transparent, should a member of the public request additional information through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the request will be addressed according to the MICRC FOIA policy.
3. Work of the Commission will exemplify transparency in process and procedure in order to instill public trust.
4. Public comments, which will be accepted verbally at Public Hearings and Commission meetings, in writing via email or mail, and through a public comment tool, will be made available.



## Goal #4: Engagement

### STRATEGIES

1. Members of the public will have multiple means and be encouraged to address the Commission and provide public comment.
2. Members of the public will be encouraged to identify Communities of Interest and inform the Commission about their locations and shared interests.
3. Statewide community groups with a shared interest in fair, transparent, citizen-led redistricting, will be encouraged to advocate on the characteristics of their communities.



## Goal #5: Maximize Resources

### STRATEGIES

1. The fiscal appropriation provided to the MICRC, through taxpayer dollars, will be deployed effectively and efficiently.
2. Statewide partnerships and collaboration will be utilized to increase the capacity of the MICRC, including through volunteerism.
3. Staff will be hired to assist the Commission in achieving its goals.



# Questions?



## **APPENDIX 6**

### **Michigan Nonprofit Association MICRC assessment report**


## REDISTRICTING ADVOCACY

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

To achieve fair and impartial district maps for Michigan, the Michigan Nonprofit Association (MNA) began mobilizing nonprofits in early 2021 using the 2020 Census engagement model. This model is designed to create a lasting infrastructure for nonprofits to address future democracy issues, especially anything that could threaten the health and wellbeing of our communities. In total, 38 organizations were commissioned, to various degrees, to educate their communities about the newly implemented Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (ICRC) and to facilitate citizen participation in the process. A core group of 18 received funding, technical assistance, and one-on-one support to work with communities in Detroit, Flint, and Grand Rapids. This core group reported on specific activities and outcomes of their work. The cohort was also invited to provide feedback by responding to a survey and participate in focus groups. Select key findings are displayed below and additional findings can be found in the full report.

### KEY FINDINGS

MNA's ICRC Engagement Initiative saw many successes in 2021. Paramount was MNA's successful provision of appropriate tools and resources to its nonprofit grant partners. Furthermore, grant partners reported overwhelmingly that members of their communities better understand how to participate in the redistricting process and the importance and consequences of redistricting. Also, a large majority agree that the final maps were based on input from my community as a result of participating in this initiative.




Agree that MNA provided the right tools and resources needed to engage the community in redistricting discussions and activities.



Agree to some extent that because of this initiative, members of my community better understand how to participate in the redistricting process.




Agree to some extent that because of this initiative, members of my community better understand the importance and consequences of redistricting.



Agree to some extent that because of this initiative, final maps were based on input from my community.

Activities from cohort members resulted in...



**145+**

Meetings, Townhalls, and/or Presentations across Michigan



**11,400+**

Individuals Engaged in ICRC Discussions Statewide



**50+**

Informational and Outreach Campaigns (Social Media, Flyers, etc.)



**12,600+**

Individuals Reached Through Informational and Outreach Campaigns

### INTRODUCTION

In 2021, MNA worked with nonprofit organizations in and around Detroit, Flint, and Grand Rapids, to provide people of color, immigrant communities, and low-income populations information about redistricting, highlighting its importance, and

demonstrating how to successfully participate in the process. Realizing that equitable participation in redistricting will lead to more accurate and effective representation through fair maps and districts, MNA has armed grassroots organizations with resources to educate their communities how to successfully engage public bodies and participate in the Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (ICRC) process. MNA sought to mirror the recent successes of its Census engagement work. In many ways, these resources will further empower historically underrepresented populations to use the tools, awareness, and experience to engage in other local, state-wide, and national civic activities. In using a cohort design, this initiative also created a means for nonprofits to address future democracy issues, especially anything that could threaten the health and wellbeing of our communities.

A cohort of 19 organizations formed in early 2021, and later, in the summer of 2021, a second cohort was formed, adding an additional 19 organizations to the fold. A list of cohort members can be found in the table below:

Cohort #1	Cohort #2
African Bureau of Immigration and Social Affairs (ABISA)	Association of Chinese Americans
ACCESS	American Citizens for Justice
APIA Vote	Southfield Alumnae Chapter, Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Inc.
Better Men Outreach (BMO)	North Flint Neighborhood Action Council
Caribbean Community Service Center	Nonprofit Network
Communities First, Inc	Arab American Heritage Council
Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Inc., Detroit Alumnae Chapter	Emgage USA
Detroit Change Initiative	Flint Innovative Solutions
Detroit Hispanic Development Corp (DHDC)	Southwestern Michigan Urban League
Disability Network Oakland & Macomb	A Glimpse of Africa
Global Detroit	Littlefield Community Association
Hispanic Center of Western Michigan	Fitzgerald Community Council
International Institute of Metropolitan Detroit (IIMD)	West Grand Boulevard Collaborative (WGBC)
LGBT Detroit	Usp4GG (Filipino Americans)
Michigan United	National Federation of Filipino American Associations (NaFFAA)
Our Own Wallstreet	Islamic Center of Detroit (ICD)
Proactive Project	Detroit Branch NAACP
Rising Voices of Asian American Families	Disability Network Wayne County/Detroit
Urban Core Collective	Miigwech Inc.

## EVALUATION OVERVIEW

The Michigan Nonprofit Association (MNA) has partnered with JFM Consulting Group, Inc. (JFM), a Detroit-based independent evaluation firm, to design and implement an evaluation framework for its advocacy work around redistricting in Michigan. The evaluation includes a number of components to identify and measure the outcomes of this work. This includes the development of a logic model and the collection of qualitative and quantitative data from partner (grantee) organizations. JFM collected and analyzed monthly activity reports from members of its first cohort. The following evaluation report identifies select outcomes and emergent findings from the analysis of the activity reports, as well as focus groups and surveys.

In addition to the collection of activity and perception data, JFM assisted in the development of a logic model for the initiative. The logic model provides a succinct framework for identifying the key components of the initiative, as well as important resources needed for goal attainment and measures of success. In this particular logic model both short-term outcomes and longer-term impacts were identified. The logic model will be a useful tool for understanding the engagement process in more detail and will provide a “NorthStar” for future engagement activities.

## COHORT TRAININGS AND MEETINGS

The members of the cohort were provided with the opportunity to participate in the following trainings:

1. Orientation (Thu Jan 21, 2021)
2. Redistricting 101 (February 8, 2021)
3. Redistricting 201 (March 22, 2021)
4. Public Comment (April 19, 2021)
5. Social Media Campaigns (June 23, 2021)



The cohort generally agreed that these presentations would be useful tools for engaging the community. Participants reported that the trainings were easy to follow, the facilitators were engaging, and the trainings provided practical ways to share the information they learned with others. Moreover, participants left the trainings feeling confident sharing the information that they learned with the community in which they work.

In addition to the trainings noted above, cohort members were also invited to participate in monthly check-ins (approximately 10), whereby grant partners were invited to share updates, challenges, and successes related to their engagements with the community about the redistricting process. These meetings were generally well attended and well received. These training outcomes exemplify MNA’s mastery in engaging and supporting nonprofits in furthering impact in communities across Michigan.

## COHORT ACTIVITIES

A review of over 94 entries in the cohort reporting tool, found that the members engaged in a wide variety of activities to support the ICRC Advocacy work. Since the winter of 2021, cohort members reported hosting or participating in nearly 150 meetings, townhalls, and presentations. As a result, around 11,400 individuals were actively engaged across the state. These meetings took on many forms and were executed in ways that were both creative and culturally appropriate. For example, organizations such as Detroit Hispanic Development Corporation adapted and translated materials for its Spanish-speaking Latinx community. Similarly, APIA Vote hosted a presentation in Lao. In addition to the traditional community meetings, organizations also conducted phone banking outreach to its members. Rising Voices of Asian American Families calls into specific communities with large Asian American and Pacific Islander populations including Warren, Canton, Rochester, Troy, Ann Arbor. Phone bank callers were able to communicate to respondents in Bangla, Cantonese, Mandarin, Urdu. This same phone banking activity allowed the organization to better define its Communities of Interest for the purpose of mapping. In addition to funding provided to the members of the cohorts, MNA provided numerous translated documents for broad distribution. Furthermore, the Disability Network Oakland & Macomb worked with MNA staff to ensure printed and electronic materials were accessible to disabled persons using screen readers. Overall, members of the cohort were able to effectively reach and communicate directly with community members, stressing the importance of Michigan's Citizens Redistricting Commission.

In addition to the active engagement activities, members of the cohort developed and executed outreach activities through targeted flyer distribution and social media posts. Collectively, the cohort implemented over 50 outreach and information campaigns, which was estimated to reach some 12,600 or more Michiganders. Like the meetings and presentations described previously, the outreach campaigns were versatile and organizations leveraged other events to allow for the distribution of informational materials. Organizations have also found success in getting the word out regarding the importance of the Citizens Redistricting Commission by posting on social media.

In addition to the distribution of informational materials and presenting at community meetings, representatives from the cohort organizations provided formal public comment at ICRC public meetings and helped to develop maps based on relevant Communities of Interest. Organizations outside of the cohort, such as Voters Not Politicians and NextVote, were invited to speak with and provide technical assistance to the cohort. ACCESS partnered with Voters Not Politicians to create a webinar on redistricting and how to provide public comment. The webinar also covered communities of interest and different tools that could be used for mapping, as well as the commission's new public portal. A representative from Rising Voices of Asian American Families took gathered responses and testified as to the Burmese community of interest at the Jackson hearing. Their team worked with individuals on follow up, offering template comments as well as feedback on personalized comment to submit via the ICRC website. Staff from the Hispanic Center of Western Michigan also provided public comment during meetings in Grand Rapids. The Hispanic Center, like other organizations, worked with their community to develop and submit a Community of Interested map and narrative to the Commission.

Collaboration was key among members of the cohort, leveraging both new and old relationships to expand knowledge around the redistricting initiative. ABISA with 5 other organizations organized a Townhall with two ICRC Commissioners. As a result, these organizations created a bigger map to represent their Communities of Interest. Detroit Hispanic Development Corporation, and others, participated in a collective of minority groups in SW Detroit with the goal of creating multiple COIs in the area that do not oppose each other and reinforce the need of keeping SW Detroit amalgamated. Collaboration was also common with organizations that were not part of the cohort. LGBT Detroit, for example, partnered with Detroit Jews For Justice to develop plans to encourage Jewish communities to engage the ICRC.

Organizations also partnered with non-cohort members in an effort to further expand the outreach efforts. In June, Global Detroit hosted a Michigan State Legislator, Abraham Aiyash, and Hamtramck Mayor, Karen Majewski, to better understand the ways that redistricting impacts their power to serve their constituents. The elected leaders also emphasized the importance of having community members address the Commission directly via public comment. Global Detroit also used the opportunity to receive feedback on their draft COI map, greatly improving their understanding of current trends of immigrant expansion from Hamtramck.

## SURVEY RESULTS

At the end of the cohort's grant cycle, grant partners from cohort #1 were asked to participate in a survey about their perceptions and activities as a cohort member and grantee. Grantee feedback is vital to learning more about successes and challenges of the initiative, thereby helping MNA become more effective in engaging organizations in future Civic Engagement and Advocacy work. A total of 17 organizations completed the survey, resulting in an 89% response rate. Of those who responded, 59% were new grant partners.

### General Perceptions of the Initiative

Overall, members of the cohort were very appreciative of the opportunity to work with MNA on engaging citizens in the redistricting process. They also appreciated the individualized support they received from MNA staff and others. Select verbatim responses describing cohort member's experiences working with MNA are detailed below:

*"We loved working with Loida and Bob from nextvote. I think our engagement improved over time because while learning the mapping seemed useful in a more abstract way, working on talking points once maps were created (not just COIs) was really helpful to see how all the pieces fit together rather than each COI approaching the process in a zero-sum way. We really appreciate how Loida continued to keep us looped into other ways for our organization to be involved."*

*"Our experience with MNA on this project was very good. We have worked with MNA on other initiatives in the past and they are always very helpful and informative. Even in the midst of a personnel change, there was no lapse of service or information."*

*"MNA provided helpful tools to inform cohort members and their respective communities on the redistricting process. I appreciated the flow of the cohort sessions and the accessibility of MNA's redistricting team."*

*"This has been one of the best cohort/table experiences that I've had. The tools and resources provided through Next Vote and the PR team helped tell our community's story and make the case why we should be in one voting district."*

*"While I believe this experience was valuable, the redistricting work should have started with the census. I think a lot of organizations were confused about what they needed to do at the beginning, and I think we wasted a lot of time."*


### Collaborations

Collaborative activities played a major role in the initiative. A large majority of grant partners (77%) combined at least some of their activities with other organizations in the cohort. Furthermore, 77% stated they anticipated collaborating with other cohort members in the future. Some organized themselves regionally, holding a Flint or Detroit subgroup for example, while others organized themselves by other common interests, such as by immigrant populations. One organization, however, sought to break the mold by honing in on a multi-racial perspective, focused on achieving partisan fairness and protecting all communities of interest, beyond singular COIs. The organization noted that, "[similar] organizations writ large could do a better job of showing solidarity with BIPOC organizations and see ourselves as leaders in that lane."

## Resources & Technical Assistance

When asked about the most helpful aspect in engaging your community in the Redistricting Process, 100% of grantees agreed that the funding was crucial to fulfilling its goal of authentically engaging the communities in which they serve. As noted in the following figure, technical assistance, and one-on-one conversations with MNA staff also ranked highly in terms of helpfulness to cohort members, at 77% and 59%, respectively.


*Which of the following were most helpful in engaging your community in the Redistricting Process? (Select up to 3)*



Although the grant funding was viewed as helpful by


all respondents, evidence suggests that it may not have been adequate enough. Just over half (53%) of the cohort members reported they “agree” that MNA provided enough funding to authentically engage their community in redistricting discussion and activities; however, 41% indicated they “somewhat agree. Notably, one respondent completely disagreed with the sentiment that they had enough funding to authentically engage.

### Funding & Resources



Conversely, MNA cohort members agreed to a much greater extent when asked whether or not MNA provided them with the right tools and resources they needed to engage their community. This suggests that, while the technical support was ample, additional funding would have been useful to members of the cohort.

### Because of this initiative...



■ Agree ■ Somewhat Agree ■ Somewhat Disagree ■ Disagree

The grant partners also generally agreed that being a member of the cohort increased their understanding of Michigan's new redistricting process, with 88% of respondents in full agreement. More importantly, however, 100% of the respondents agreed that because of this initiative, members of their communities better understand the importance and consequences of redistricting, and their communities better understand how to participate in the redistricting process.

historically underrepresented and underserved communities with tools to successfully engage in the political process. Continued efforts in this domain will be crucial in future civic and community engagement initiatives, including voter engagement in the 2022 election cycle.

The figure above also highlights MNA's path towards success at equipping

Besides the technical assistance and training, MNA also offered language translation services for all of its materials. These offerings were by request, and 59% of the organizations used translated materials. The languages utilized and the number of organizations using those materials are as follows:

- Spanish (5)
- Bangla (4)
- Chinese/Mandarin (2)

▪ French (1)


▪ Haitian Creole (1)

▪ Arabic (1)

As noted elsewhere, cohort members were invited to participate in a training on social media campaigns. In the end, 41% felt that they were very successful and 35% felt they were somewhat successful at reaching their intended audience through social media. Only 3 organizations reported were not very successful in engaging online. For many, success using social media was based on leveraging their existing network. One grant partner noted, “having translated materials and conversations/ audio in our languages being distributed through WhatsApp,” was particularly helpful.

### Community Voice

Although adoption of the final maps were ultimately out of MNA’s control, this initiative acted as a concerted effort to ensure that they were objective, fair, and considered the public’s input. To that end, cohort members were asked about the extent to which they agree that as a result of this initiative, final maps were based on input from their community. Nearly 1 in 4 (24%) indicated that the maps were not reflective of their community’s input; however, the vast majority (76%) felt the maps took community input into account.



## FOCUS GROUP FEEDBACK

A series of three focus groups were convened with members of the cohort to share experiences and perceptions of the process. The 60-minute guided discussion provided grant partners with the space to speak openly and candidly about the initiative. The conversation focused on the resources received from MNA and how MNA can better support organizations such as yours in the future. There were a total of 9 participants across the three sessions.

### ICRC Engagement Successes

Members of the cohort sang the praises of MNA and its staff. While the redistricting process itself was cumbersome, difficult to understand, and at times, highly technical, MNA was seen as a one-stop resource. One grant partner, an affiliate of a national organization, indicated that they had already planned to engage in redistricting, so they were grateful that MNA was able to provide such a rich toolkit of resources on which they could rely on. Some activities and resources that were frequently mentioned include:

- Presentations – Easily adaptable for community needs
- Mapping Technical Assistance – Individualized support from NextVote
- Translated Materials – Informational handouts and brochures in a variety of languages

Partners were highly appreciative of MNA for its regular updates, responsiveness to questions, and being a source of feedback for strategic engagement in the community. One participant noted,

*“Even though we had a past relationship with the Michigan Nonprofit Association, working on voter registration and education, this was totally different where we 100% needed the technical support. I think the training and technical support that we received really helped us in communicating the importance to the community, where it just became almost second nature. I feel like you can plop me down any place in the state and I can have at least an intelligent conversation. I may not be an expert at it, but, I feel comfortable having a conversation about the process of redistricting and what the commission did.”*

Cohort members also mentioned they felt MNA was doing a great job connecting small nonprofits to the process. Furthermore, this initiative helped to build and strengthen a network of community members who have an interest in civic engagement work. These individuals can be re-engaged in future work. This network is especially important, as many who participated in the

redistricting process come from communities without robust histories of civic engagement as a result of decades of intentional disenfranchisement and systemic racism.


### Lessons Learned

Looking at the lessons learned among grant partners, focus group participants were able to identify some key areas for consideration. First, grant partners found that hosting smaller events or conversations, more frequently were more impactful than less frequent, larger events. Building on the idea of hosting more effective meetings, participants suggested leveraging the work of others, piggybacking on other events and work others are already doing. Redistricting's universality allows organizers to connect this initiative's work with other agendas in the community. For example, discussing redistricting at a small business roundtable might be effective if the conversation is framed in a way that showcases how redistricting might affect small businesses. This not only brings the message to a captive audience, but it provides a mechanism for reaching new members of the community that may not have otherwise been interested in learning more about the initiative.

Cohort members also found that being proactive about addressing perceived and potential barriers, helped to level the playing field. The biggest example in this area was the submission of public comment via the Independent Citizen Redistricting Commission's online portal. Grant partners quickly found that it was not enough to simply provide community members with examples of effective feedback as some lacked the means to engage online. Some cohort members began to bring computers to the meetings so that public comment could be submitted on the spot, removing the technology barriers for some.

Building and sustaining momentum was also seen as a key component of effectiveness during this project. Grant partners found that they were able to start a groundswell movement in the early Spring of 2021; however, some were not able to sustain the momentum as the ICRC deliberated and held meetings outside of the geography in which they had engaged the community. Focus group respondents noted that once a community was engaged in a topic, there should be a clear plan for sustaining that engagement over time, with each touch point identified.

Equity was another theme identified in the focus group responses. Some members of the cohort realized that they may not be the best messenger to the community, and that they needed to train community gatekeepers to carry out the work. These gatekeepers often already had deep ties to the community and were seen as authentic, trusted voices. To that end, cohort members were encouraged when they received additional funding as they were able to appropriately compensate these critical members of the community for their time.



### Areas of Improvement

While most of the critical commentary was aimed at the ICRC, there were a few points of enhancement that were aimed at MNA's processes. While there was a large amount of highly organic partnerships formed among members of the group, some felt the collaborations could have used more structure and facilitation. At times, even task delegation was difficult due to the lack of structure within the working groups. One cohort member suggested incentivizing the cooperative aspect. MNA may consider establishing workgroups or tables within the cohort design, allowing members to freely associate with the tables that align most with their shared goals or geography. Key to the creation of these subgroups would be the selection of a lead facilitator, either an external partner or someone selected from within the cohort. The facilitator would help to regulate conversations and tasks and be compensated for this role.

Another area of improvement suggested by grant partners are the one-on-one meetings between MNA and grant partners. Nearly all members of the cohort expressed their gratitude for MNA's one-on-one meetings, as they were helpful for providing guidance and potential next steps, particularly in the early days of the cohort. However, as the year progressed, one-on-one meetings became less frequent, though still available on an as-requested basis. Members of the cohort felt the monthly group meetings were extremely helpful for sharing ideas and communicating upcoming activities, but some didn't feel comfortable asking more nuanced questions as they felt they were best suited for one-on-ones. Balancing the frequency of interactions with grant partners can be challenging. On one hand, funders don't want to overburden grant partners with unnecessary meetings. On the other hand, establishing regular lines of communication often lead to successful partnerships. Adding in quarterly one-

on-one check-ins and continued promotion of an “open door” policy or routine office hours can provide grant partners with additional options for personalized discussions.

## CONCLUSION

The findings in this report describe an initiative that has shown measurable, positive outcomes in key areas related to the increased understanding of the importance and consequences of redistricting as a decennial process, as well as increased awareness of political processes among historically underrepresented and underserved communities. The in developing the findings, the analysis has revealed areas which warrant further exploration and examination. The continued collection and utilization of data, whether collected informally or as part of the external evaluation, will allow MNA to better understand the longer-term impact of its efforts. As the evaluation of MNA's ICRC advocacy initiative continues, additional findings will be identified and elevated.

## **APPENDIX 7**

### **Voters Not Politicians MICRC assessment report**

## Feedback from Voters Not Politicians' Communities of Interest Partners

What follows is VNP's contribution to MICRC's Lessons Learned report, based on VNP interviews with the leaders of 10 Community of Interest partner groups (COIs) across the State of Michigan that VNP worked closely with during this redistricting cycle.

Submitted to the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission on April 5th, 2022

### ***Community of interest partners reported multiple challenges during the 2021-22 redistricting process***

1. COIs report a lack of awareness among their members of the redistricting process in general. In addition, there was confusion as to what would or would not be considered a community of interest in the Commission's eyes and how the Commission would weigh submissions from a few motivated individuals as compared to large COIs.
  - **MICRC should publicize and share widely a definition of "community of interest" and clearly and proactively explain how it will weigh different pieces of public input. MICRC should provide COI examples and counterexamples.**
  - MICRC should prioritize public education and presentations in more populous areas.
  - MICRC has an important role to play in public education, and **the Commission must have adequate financing and staffing to do it.**
2. COIs report barriers to attending MICRC meetings, including technology, language, inconvenient times, and inadequate notice.
  - **The online option was helpful. Meetings should occur both online and in-person even outside the context of a pandemic.**
  - MICRC should publish a meeting calendar at least 2 weeks in advance and should publish meeting agendas at least 72 hours prior to the day of the meeting. The calendar and agendas should be easy to find on the landing page of the MICRC's website.
  - **Meeting materials should be translated** into Michigan's most common languages (English, Arabic, Spanish, and Bengali).
  - Meetings should be held on different days and different times of day to accommodate participants' varying work schedules. **At least 25% of public meetings and public comment opportunities should be scheduled outside of standard 9-to-5, Monday-Friday business hours.**

3. COIs report that participant engagement was much more likely and more effective when the public had draft maps to respond to and comment on.
  - MICRC should **release draft maps as early as possible**. Each map should be accompanied by a description of why the Commission drew these particular lines and rejected other options, with specific questions to elicit meaningful responses from the public.
4. COIs report that some features, such as the public comment portal and website, for the map making process were slow to launch and challenging to use.
  - COIs and other **stakeholders need the Commission to decide on its map drawing process** and pick its software (i.e., Districtr during this cycle) much earlier.
5. COIs report concerns about representation and historical/cultural competence on MICRC. Some of these concerns could have been alleviated had the public understood how the final 13 commissioners were chosen (i.e., that they were not individually selected by the Secretary of State, and that the Constitution does not allow a certain number of seats to be reserved for Detroit residents for example, or members of a particular ethnic group).
  - The Department of State should expand public education on the Constitutional amendment's process for the selection of commissioners; particularly to raise public awareness regarding how the semi-finalist pool and final commissioners are weighted and selected.
  - The Department of State and MICRC should **consider mechanisms for hearing marginalized voices** not included on the commission, including through staffing.
6. COIs observed that the commission was left with too little time and restricted options for southeastern Michigan because they began districting in the more rural north.
  - MICRC **should budget mapping time on a per-capita basis or start in populous areas**.
7. COIs report feeling that digital submissions were not considered by commissioners.
  - MICRC should quickly develop a system of analyzing online comments and maps, perhaps through a consulting service accustomed to analyzing textual "big data."

## **APPENDIX 8**

Michigan Department of Civil Rights report on Voting Rights Act  
and communities of interest



## MEMORANDUM

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DATE: December 9, 2021

TO: Members of the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission

FROM: John E. Johnson, Jr., Executive Director of the Michigan Department of Civil Rights on behalf of the MDCR and the Michigan Civil Rights Commission

SUBJECT: **Analysis of MICRC's Proposed Maps**

Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commissions' (MICRC) proposed, maps may lead to forbidden retrogression in minority voting strength. Election district maps cannot be drawn that will impair the ability of geographically insular and politically cohesive groups of black voters to participate equally in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice. *Thornburg v. Gingles* (1986).

No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.

—Voting Rights Act of 1965

Coalitions of Black, Asian, Hispanic, Native American, "Other," and those who identify with "two or more" racial groups have had the ability to coalesce and elect candidates of their choice. The VRA requires majority-minority districts be drawn to prevent vote dilution in Saginaw, Southfield, Flint, Pontiac, Taylor, Inkster, Redford, Hamtramck, and Detroit. Each of these communities of interest could be denied the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice if the present percentages of majority-minority districts are diluted.

The U.S. Supreme Court determined three threshold measures in *Thornburg v. Gingles* (1986) to evaluate whether or not an electoral map violates the rights of minority groups set forth in the Voting Rights Act.

- A minority group must demonstrate it is large enough and compact enough to constitute a majority in a electoral district;
- A minority group must demonstrate it is politically united;
- A minority group must demonstrate the majority group historically votes

sufficiently as a group to defeat the minority group's preferred candidate; coalitions of Black, Asian, Hispanic, Native American, "Other," and those who identify with "two or more" racial groups have had the ability to come together and elect candidates of their choice.

Justice Brennan said in *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 36-37, that there are several additional “objective factors” in determining the “totality of circumstances” surrounding an alleged violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Some objective factors include the extent to which the members of the minority group bear the effects of discrimination in areas like education, employment, and health, which hinder effective participation, is one measure.

In Michigan the effects of discrimination that help demonstrate the “totality of circumstances”, that surround the potential violation of the Voting Rights Act in the MICRC is proposed November 5, 2021, maps include:

- Until the 1954 election of Charles Diggs in the old 15<sup>th</sup> District (13<sup>th</sup> today) followed by the election of John Conyers 10 years later in 1964 in the old 1<sup>st</sup> District (14<sup>th</sup> today) Detroit’s majority-minority community could not elect a Congressional candidate of their choice
- The quality of education in Michigan depends greatly on where students live. Residency is dependent on household income, which in turn is dependent on the opportunities provided to families, which is also dependent on parents’ own race and background.
- The continuing crisis in Flint, Michigan relating to its public water supply and delivery system includes allegations that the city’s residents are the victims of discrimination based on their race, color, national origin, age, and disability.
- Black, Hispanic, and Latino ethnicity, non-English speaking status, lower socioeconomic status, and are more likely to be admitted to the hospital as Michigan’s Covid-19 hospitalized patients. This creates a disparity in the ability to vote.

One measure of whether the majority-minority communities will be worse off than before is whether they are likely to be able to elect fewer minority representatives than before redistricting. If they are able to elect fewer minority representatives, then there is a dilution of present Black voting strength.

Table 1 demonstrates the number of predominantly Black Michigan districts under the Legislative Plans that are current and the collaborative and individual Commissioner plans.

The collaborative MICRC plans are Apple V2, Birch V2 Chestnut, Magnolia, Magnolia am, Hickory, Cherry V2, Palm, and Linden. The individual MICR Commissioner plans are: Stzetela Congressional, Stzetela House, Stzetela Senate, Kellom Senate, and Lange Senate.

Citizen Voting Age by Race and Ethnicity (CVAP) is tabulated by the US Census Bureau at the request of the US Department of Justice. Work on a CVAP directly from the 2020 Census data has been suspended indefinitely.

### Voting Rights Act and Citizen Voting Age Population Statistics

Table 1

Table 1		
Legislative Plan	Majority- Black Districts (2019 CVAP)	
Current US House	2	
Apple V2	0	
Birch V2	0	
Chestnut	0	
Lange	0	
Stzetela	0	
Current State House	12	
Magnolia am	6	
Magnolia	6	
Hickory	6	
Stzetela House	6	
Current State Senate	4	
Cherry V2	0	
Palm	0	
Linden	0	
Stzetela Senate	0	
Kellom Senate	3	
Lange Senate	0	
Based on Black-alone and Black/White 2-race		

<https://promotethevotemi.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/2021-rd-metric-report-with-charts.pdf>

Using the latest available 2019 Citizens Voting Age Population (CVAP) none of the five Nov. 5, 2021, proposed Congressional District maps has a majority Black district (50% plus) while currently there are two.

With 2019 CVAP data there twelve State House Districts that are majority Black (with three majority-minority districts). MICRC Nov. 5, 2021, proposed maps would cut the number of majority Black districts in half.

Similarly, the four State Senate Districts that are majority Black using 2019 CVAP data would be reduced in five of the six Nov. 5, 2021, maps. Commissioner Kellom's map contains three majority Black State Senate districts.

An act that reduces minorities' opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice is a violation of the Voting Rights Act, 42 USC § 1973(b).

## APPENDIX 9

The University of Michigan's Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy report that drew up a list of examples for MICRC review of what communities of interest could be



## **The Role of Communities of Interest in Michigan's New Approach to Redistricting: Recommendations to the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission**

Prepared by Professor Emeritus John Chamberlin and a team of graduate students  
at the Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy, in the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy



GERALD R. FORD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY  
CENTER FOR LOCAL, STATE, AND URBAN POLICY  
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

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## Foreword

The Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy (CLOSUP) was launched at the University of Michigan's Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy in 2001 to provide public service to the people and communities of Michigan. Over the years, CLOSUP has approached that mission in a variety of ways, most fundamentally through the creation of the Michigan Public Policy Survey (MPPS) program, an ongoing survey of the state's local government leaders designed to increase government transparency and accountability and help improve policymaking in Michigan. The views of Michigan's local government leaders, collected through the MPPS, contribute to [the following report](#).

Now, as our state embarks on a new approach to drawing political districts through an Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission, we at CLOSUP saw a need and opportunity to address at least one major new criteria in that process: the issue of "Communities of Interest" (COIs). While COIs are included in redistricting approaches in other states, this is a new concept in Michigan, and nowhere else do COIs play as key a role as they will here. By design, Michigan's new redistricting approach makes COIs one of the highest priorities to be addressed by the Commission as it draws our new maps.

Since the COI concept is both new and so central to Michigan's new redistricting process, we launched the CLOSUP Michigan Redistricting project in partnership with the Michigan Department of State, to research best practices for how other states handle COIs in their redistricting efforts, to learn about the opportunities and potential challenges around these approaches, and to share these findings with Michigan's new Commission. This report presents the lessons we have uncovered for how to approach COIs in Michigan's case.

At CLOSUP we're grateful for the talented team of Ford School students who undertook this work, and for their dedicated project leader, Professor Emeritus John Chamberlin, who has spent a career working to improve the public sector in Michigan, and beyond. The students included Alissa Graff, Sarah Gruen, Safiya Merchant, Nick Najor, Gerson Ramirez, and James Vansteel. This team shared the common goal of helping make Michigan's new experience with redistricting as successful as possible. Our state is fortunate to have young leaders like these six students who wanted to help Michigan move toward a better future.

We're also grateful to Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson and her team at the Michigan Department of State, who were eager to leverage the Ford School's talent pool, and who we found to be equally dedicated to making sure Michigan's new approach to redistricting is successful.

Thomas Ivacko  
Executive Director, CLOSUP  
August 20, 2020

## Executive Summary

In November 2018 Michigan voters approved a constitutional amendment that made major changes to legislative redistricting in the state. Among the changes was the addition of a set of redistricting criteria to be followed in drawing new districts for Congress, the State Senate, and the State House of Representatives. One of these criteria concerns “communities of interest” (COIs) and it is the focus of this report. Section 13 (c) of the Amendment states:

Districts shall reflect the state’s diverse population and communities of interest. Communities of interest may include, but shall not be limited to, populations that share cultural or historical characteristics or economic interests. Communities of interest do not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.

The COI criterion ranks high in the priority list of criteria, behind only compliance with federal law and a requirement that all districts be contiguous. Communities of interest have not been an important consideration in Michigan until now, and therefore will not be familiar to most Michiganders. The combination of not being familiar to the public and being assigned a high priority in the list of criteria presents a significant challenge and opportunity for the Commission to faithfully implement in the next round of redistricting.

What is a Community of Interest? Beyond the Amendment’s broad definition, the Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (ICRC) is responsible for determining the meaning and application of COI to use in Michigan’s upcoming redistricting process. This report capitalizes “Community of Interest” to highlight the special usage of the term in the redistricting context.

We suggest the following list of characteristics of a COI as a starting point for the ICRC’s consideration:

- Communities of interest “may include, but shall not be limited to, populations that share cultural or historical characteristics or economic interests.”
- A Community of Interest is associated with a contiguous area on a map.
- The common bonds associated with a Community of Interest are linked to a set of

public policy issues that would be affected by legislation. These shared interests in legislation are likely to result in a desire to share the same legislative district in order to secure more effective representation.

### COIs as Basic Building Blocks of Legislative Districts.

The reasoning for COIs as one of the bases for redistricting is that it will lead to fairer and more effective representation. Most COIs will probably prefer to be kept intact in new districts rather than be split among several districts, since this will allow its members to elect representatives who will be attentive to their interests. Keeping a COI intact also promotes continuing interaction among community members so that they will be more active in the life of the communities in which they live.

Information about Communities of Interest provided by the public will help the ICRC draw lines that influence how a COI is represented and how responsive elected officials will be to the Community’s needs.

Outreach to the Public. In order for the ICRC to use the information about COIs in drawing maps it will be important for it to hear from the broadest possible range of members of the public, especially those most familiar with their communities. For this to happen, given the current lack of familiarity with COIs among Michiganders, the ICRC should consider an extensive outreach campaign that results in a large number of COIs participating in public hearings around the state and/or submitting written or digital information about themselves and how they would like to be treated in the design of new districts.

First Round of Public Hearings. The ICRC is committed by the Constitution to hold at least ten initial public hearings to gather public input about new districts. In planning these hearings, the Commission should consider locations around the state, being attentive to factors that will facilitate broad participation. The Commission should also consider contingency plans based on the status of the coronavirus pandemic at the close of 2020, including virtual opportunities for public input if in-person meetings are not possible. The Appendix to this report contains suggestions for a template that a COI could use to guide its testimony at



public hearings and its written/digital submissions to the ICRC.

Developing New Districts. Once the initial round of public hearings is underway, the ICRC will begin to work with its staff and consultants on designing new congressional and state legislative districts. Once the US Census data are released on July 31, 2021, the Commissioners will develop districting plans using Census data, data on counties, cities, and townships, data on recent voting patterns, and other important statistical features of Michigan. Plans may be proposed by individual Commissioners or by a group of Commissioners. After plans have been proposed for each legislative body, the Constitution requires that the Commission publish the proposed plans and any data and supporting materials used to develop the plans.

Second Round of Public Hearings. The Amendment requires that the Commission hold at least five public hearings throughout the state for the purpose of soliciting comment from the public about the proposed plans.

Final Adoption of the Three Redistricting Plans. By November 1, 2021, the Commission will adopt new district maps for Congress, the State Senate, and the State House, using the procedures specified in Section 14 of the Amendment. Within 30 days of adopting a plan, the Commission will publish the plan and their supporting materials as specified in Sections 15 and 16 of the Amendment. A plan will become law 60 days after its publication.

## Section 1: Communities of Interest in the New Redistricting Process

When voters amended Michigan's Constitution by passing Proposal 18-2 in November 2018, they removed responsibility for redistricting from the legislature and placed it in the hands of an Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission, imposed strong transparency and public participation requirements, specified a set of criteria to be used in drawing new district maps, and provided procedures to be used by the ICRC in adopting maps for Congress, the State Senate, and the State House of Representatives.

Section 13 of the Amendment specifies the criteria to be used in drawing maps:<sup>i</sup>

The Commission shall abide by the following criteria in proposing and adopting each plan, in order of priority:

- (a) Districts shall be of equal population as mandated by the United States Constitution, and shall comply with the voting rights act and other federal laws.
- (b) Districts shall be geographically contiguous. Island areas are considered to be contiguous by land to the county of which they are a part.
- (c) **Districts shall reflect the state's diverse population and communities of interest. Communities of interest may include, but shall not be limited to, populations that share cultural or historical characteristics or economic interests. Communities of interest do not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.**
- (d) Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.
- (e) Districts shall not favor or disfavor an incumbent elected official or a candidate.
- (f) Districts shall reflect consideration of county, city, and township boundaries.
- (g) Districts shall be reasonably compact.

The principal focus of this report is the criterion in bold concerning "communities of interest," which ranks high in the list of criteria. This concept is not new to the practice of redistricting nationwide. Until now, however, it was not a feature of redistricting in

Michigan. Because it is new here, most Michiganders are unfamiliar with it. The combination of being both unfamiliar and playing a very significant role in future redistricting creates a challenge if the Amendment is to be faithfully implemented when the new Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (ICRC) approves new congressional and state legislative districts for Michigan in 2021.

Once members of the ICRC are selected and begin their work, the Commissioners will need to make some key decisions concerning communities of interest (COIs). According to the Constitution, the Commission must hold at least ten public hearings around the state to allow communities of interest (and others) to express their views about how they would like to be treated when new districts are drawn. In addition to public hearings, there will be opportunities to submit written or digital materials for the Commission to consider. Information on COIs that choose to participate in one of these ways, along with data on the state's population, and its local political jurisdictions, and voting patterns in previous elections, will provide the building blocks for new district maps for the congressional delegation, the State Senate, and the State House.

Information on Michigan's population, its local political jurisdictions, and voting patterns are relatively easy to compile and make available to the ICRC. The same is not true for communities of interest. There is no comprehensive definition of a COI beyond the words in the Constitution, and as a result there is no compilation of information about the state's COIs.

The Commission will plan the series of public hearings beginning in the Fall of 2020. Depending on the status of the coronavirus pandemic when the hearings are scheduled, it may not be possible to carry them out in-person. Planning will need to establish alternative formats for the hearings and inform the public about how public testimony will be handled. In any case, communities of interest (and others) will be able to communicate with the Commission in writing or by sending digital documents.



## Section 2: What is a Community of Interest?

The concept of a COI is subjective and in no state is it well-defined. Examples are usually included in states' constitutions or legislation, but they are not intended to exhaust the types of communities that fit the definition. For example:

- Michigan: "Communities of interest may include, but shall not be limited to, populations that share cultural or historical characteristics or economic interests."<sup>ii</sup>
- California: "A community of interest is a contiguous population which shares common social and economic interests that should be included within a single district for purposes of its effective and fair representation."<sup>iii</sup>
- Colorado: "... communities of interest, including ethnic, cultural, economic, trade area, geographic, and demographic factors, shall be preserved within a single [legislative] district wherever possible."<sup>iv</sup>

And from two election-related organizations:

- The Brennan Center for Justice: "A community of interest is defined as an area with recognized similarities of interests, including but not limited to racial, ethnic, economic, social, cultural, geographic, or historic identities."<sup>v</sup>
- Ballotpedia.org: "A community of interest refers to a group of people with a common set of concerns that may be affected by legislation. Examples of communities of interest include ethnic, racial, and economic groups. Some states require that the preservation of communities of interest be taken in[to] account when drawing electoral districts in an effort to enable these communities to elect representatives whose platforms or policy proposals align with their interests."<sup>vi</sup>

Among the types of Communities of interest that have been mentioned in these various definitions as being relevant to redistricting are:

- Historical communities
- Economic communities
- Racial communities
- Ethnic communities
- Cultural communities
- Religious communities
- Immigrant communities
- Language communities
- Geographic communities

- Neighborhoods
- Economic opportunity zones
- Tourism Areas
- School districts
- Outdoor recreation areas
- Communities defined by natural resource features
- Creative arts communities
- Media markets

The Michigan ICRC is responsible for articulating the definition of a COI that will be used in Michigan's upcoming redistricting. This document capitalizes "Community of Interest" to highlight the special usage of the term in the redistricting process.

We suggest the following list of characteristics of a COI as a starting point for the ICRC's consideration:

- A Community of Interest is a group of individuals who share common bonds (economic, ethnic, cultural, etc.).
- A Community of Interest is associated with a contiguous area on a map. It needn't be the case that 100% of the population within the boundaries of the Community of Interest share the bonds of the Community of Interest. It is possible for Communities of Interest to overlap.
- The common bonds associated with a Community of Interest are linked to a set of public policy issues that may reasonably be expected to be affected by legislation. In most cases, these shared interests in legislation lead the community to wish to remain intact in legislative districts in order to secure more effective representation rather than be split across two or more districts.
- A Community of Interest is not a political party or a group affiliated or acting on behalf of a party, an incumbent, or a political candidate.
- A Community of Interest is not a political jurisdiction (in Michigan, a county, city, village, or township), since they are considered in a separate section of the Amendment.

These characteristics of Communities of Interest reflect the approach to representation imbedded in the Amendment. The focus is on groups of individuals who live in proximity with one another and who share common bonds and interests in legislation and public

policy. The ties that might bind them together are illustrated by the list above. These communities are basic building blocks of new districts in Michigan's new redistricting process.

The population of Communities of Interest is varied and potentially vast. They vary in size, location, the nature of their shared interests/bonds, the extent to which they are formally organized, and other attributes. It will be extremely important that the ICRC articulate a clear definition of a COI as they begin their work, since that definition will have a significant effect on who ends up participating in the public hearings, which will in turn influence the information the ICRC will use to draw new legislative districts. If the ICRC fails to hear from COIs in certain parts of the state or to hear from COIs that have certain kinds of bonds or certain kinds of policy interests, the public participation process will make it extremely difficult for new districts to be drawn that "reflect the state's diverse population and communities of interest" as prescribed in the Constitution.

There is no directory of Communities of Interest that can be consulted to ascertain which Communities do or don't participate. Contrast this situation with determining whether parts of the state are over- or underrepresented in the pool of citizens who apply to serve on the ICRC. When the Michigan Department of State randomly selected members of the ICRC, it used statistical weighting to correct for over- and underrepresentation of areas and groups of citizens within the state, as called for in the Amendment. This is possible because the census provides extensive demographic data on each area. When it comes to Communities of Interest, there is no comparable database, so the ICRC cannot know for certain if the Communities of Interest that participate in public hearings are representative of the population of Communities of Interest in the state.

Thus, absent an extensive outreach campaign to encourage participation by Communities of Interest, the ICRC will very likely hear from a biased selection of Communities of Interest, with the bias favoring economic Communities of Interest, well-organized and well-resourced Communities of Interest, and Communities of Interest that regularly engage in policy advocacy and lobbying on behalf of their members.

### Recommendations for the Commission:

- Articulate a clear definition of Communities of Interest early in the ICRC's work.
- Begin planning an outreach campaign early to encourage participation by Communities of Interest. The plan should include options if in-person public hearings are unable to be scheduled because of the continuing coronavirus pandemic.



## Section 3: Using Communities of Interest as Building Blocks for Legislative Districts

The basic building blocks of new districts are Communities of Interest, local political jurisdictions, voting patterns in past elections, and information from the census and other sources about Michigan's diverse population. Because COIs are assigned high priority by the Amendment, they play a leading role in the process. The argument in favor of COIs being the basic building blocks of legislative districts is that it will lead to fairer and more effective representation. Information about Communities of Interest will help the ICRC draw lines that influence how well a community is represented and how responsive elected officials will be to the Community's needs.

Most COIs will prefer to be kept intact in new districts rather than be split among several districts. Keeping a COI intact in a new district allows its members to combine their votes to help elect representatives who will be attentive to their interests. Keeping a COI intact also promotes continuing interaction among community members so that they will be more active in the life of the communities in which they live. At the same time, this facilitates the job of elected representatives. As Judge Posner wrote in *Prosser v. Elections Board*: "To be an effective representative, a legislator must represent a district that has a reasonable homogeneity of needs and interests; otherwise the policies he supports will not represent the preferences of most of his constituents."<sup>vii</sup>

Although COIs may not be contained within individual political jurisdictions, they nonetheless can pick up the texture of bonds and interests within a political jurisdiction such as a county or city. COIs can capture the current patterns of community life on a smaller scale than traditional political jurisdictions, whose boundaries might be a century old. If jurisdictional boundaries must be broken in designing new districts to achieve equal population or compliance with the Voting Rights Act, information about COIs will allow this to be done without sacrificing effective representation for members of COIs. This information is likely to be particularly helpful in larger cities (where COIs often reflect neighborhoods) and in sparsely populated counties that might need to be divided between districts.

If the purpose of keeping a COI intact is to avoid diluting the voting power of its members, then placing the

COI in a district with substantially similar interests will also avoid vote dilution and improve the effectiveness of its representation. Even small COIs benefit when paired with like-minded Communities. The goal of promoting the quality of a COI's representation could be advanced by soliciting information about:

- Nearby Communities of interest that the COI would like to have included in its district.
- Nearby Communities of Interest that the COI would NOT like to have included in its district.
- A rough outline of the district the COI would prefer as its district for Congress, the State Senate, and the State House.

This same information would be relevant for local political jurisdictions. They are not COIs in the sense used in the Amendment, but they are important communities for their citizens and they should have the opportunity to indicate their preferences concerning what other political jurisdictions they would like to see included in (or excluded from) their districts because they share (or don't share) interests and histories of interaction. In addition to hearing the views of counties, cities, and townships, the Commission is likely to hear from villages as well.

### Recommendations for the Commission:

- Communities of Interest are primary elements of the new redistricting process, as are local political jurisdictions (counties, cities, and townships). The new redistricting criteria elevate COIs above local political jurisdictions, which will have an impact on how district lines are drawn. Both sets of communities are geographically defined and will be among the most important factors in the new redistricting process. The public hearings and other opportunities for these communities to communicate their views to the Commission are of prime importance and this should be reflected in the Commission's planning.
- When gathering input from COIs, the ICRC should ask not just about the COIs' boundaries, but also about other COIs they would like included in (or excluded from) their district.

## Section 4: Outreach to Communities of Interest

In order for the Commission to use the information about COIs in drawing maps it will be important for it to hear from the broadest possible range of members of the public, especially those most familiar with their communities. For this to happen, an extensive outreach campaign will be required that results in a large number of COIs participating in public hearings around the state and/or submitting written or digital information about themselves and how they would like to be treated in the design of new districts.

In prior rounds of redistricting in Michigan, COIs played no part. The new Amendment makes members of the public key participants in the process for the first time. Most Michiganders will not be familiar with the term COI and many communities that would fit the definition will be unaware that they do. On the other hand, many others will be existing organizations that are well-resourced, with paid staff, and a history of engagement with politics and the political process. They are likely to be well-prepared to participate.

Recent findings from CLOSUP's 2020 Michigan Public Policy Survey of the state's local government leaders demonstrates the challenges the ICRC will face in trying to expand understanding of COIs and their role in the state's new redistricting approach, and in actually identifying COIs across the state.

A total of 1,342 jurisdictions participated in the spring 2020 MPPS, including leaders from 59 counties, 216 cities, 163 villages, and 904 townships. These local officials, who should be among the most informed local actors when it comes to the range of COIs in Michigan communities, were asked how familiar they were with the state's new approach to redistricting via the ICRC, as well as being asked to identify COIs in their communities. The survey found:

- **Familiarity with the Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission itself, even among local community leaders, is not high across the state.** Well more than a third (41%) of local officials statewide say they are either somewhat unfamiliar (29%), completely unfamiliar (6%), or don't know (6%) about the Commission, even when prompted with a description of 2018's Proposal 2. By contrast, just under half (49%) are somewhat familiar—they “have heard of it, and

understand it fairly well, but don't know many details”—while 9% say they are very familiar and know a great deal about the Commission.

- **For many, reaction to the concept of COIs is uncertainty or skepticism.** Over 480 local leaders wrote in answers to the question regarding COIs in their areas. Of those written responses, nearly half (46%) indicated the local official believed either that there were no significant local COIs, that the question was not applicable to their jurisdiction, that they didn't understand what the question was asking, or that COIs and/or the new redistricting process were not legitimate.
- **For those who did identify local COIs, they often reflect examples from the list provided earlier in this report.** Few identified *specific* groups of citizens or organizations that could be easily contacted by the ICRC and encouraged to participate in public hearings or to otherwise submit testimony to the Commission. Meanwhile, among the most commonly mentioned types of interests, 16% of local leaders described COIs based on economic communities as diverse as manufacturing, lumber, real estate, tourism, agriculture, and downtown development, among others. Many also mention shared public service areas such as fire fighting, policing, or other interlocal agreements. Another 10% specifically describe rural or urban identities that they believe are shared in their area. In addition, around 6% mention geographic features (particularly linked coastal communities) or shared outdoor recreational areas as local COIs.
- **When asked about COIs, local officials often defend current municipal or jurisdictional boundaries, or identify affinity groups among neighboring jurisdictions.** Among the open end responses on COIs, 14% of local leaders specifically asked to preserve current township, city, or county boundary lines, or to redraw lines that currently split the township or city, so that they can instead be together within a single district. Also, in thinking about COIs, local leaders are clearly thinking about ties among their neighboring units of government.<sup>viii</sup>



For the COI criterion of the Amendment to be successfully implemented, a broad outreach program must allow groups to understand what a COI is, whether they qualify as a COI, how to participate in the public hearings or to submit materials, and what the ICRC would like to know about them. The outreach program must find ways to ensure that COIs that might otherwise remain “invisible” end up participating in the process.

In 2011 in California their commission did not have time and resources to undertake outreach on their own. The Irvine Foundation provided \$6 million to groups to undertake outreach and to assist COIs in preparing to participate in public hearings. In addition, a sizable number of nonprofit organizations played important roles in these efforts.

To generate widespread awareness of the role COIs will play in the upcoming redistricting, the ICRC might seek partners in the philanthropic and nonprofit sectors and in print and broadcast media around the state. A number of organizations have been active in urging residents to respond to the 2020 Census. Some of them might be willing to promote participation in the public hearings on redistricting. The Commission might also enlist partners among public and college/university libraries, where members of the public could access ICRC documents and archives. Online workshops, informative videos, and a short, well-designed information card would help the public to do research and communicate with the Commission. The outreach program might also actively promote the use of social media to inform Michiganders about the new redistricting process and the vital role that COIs play in the process.

The outreach campaign might focus on several key issues:

- What is a COI? This will explain the concept of a COI and help citizens to understand whether they are a member of one or more COIs.
- How can a COI apply to participate in public hearings?
- What does the ICRC want to know about a COI in its public testimony?
- Who else may participate in the public hearings?
- How will the ICRC use information provided by COIs when they begin designing new districts?

## Recommendations for the Commission:

- Dedicate considerable time and resources to outreach for soliciting information on COI.
- If the ICRC budget is not adequate, consider seeking additional funds (including from foundations) to promote COI outreach and education on how to participate.
- Consider seeking partners for the outreach campaign including foundations, nonprofits, media (print, broadcast, social), libraries, etc.
- Consider promoting online workshops, videos, information cards, etc., as part of the outreach campaign.

## Section 5: Public Hearings

Section 8 of the Amendment states:

Before commissioners draft any plan, the commission shall hold at least ten public hearings throughout the state for the purpose of informing the public about the redistricting process and the purpose and responsibilities of the commission and soliciting information from the public about potential plans. The commission shall receive for consideration written submissions of proposed redistricting plans and any supporting materials, including underlying data, from any member of the public. These written submissions are public records.

The ICRC is committed by the amendment to holding at least ten public hearings, but it has the option of holding additional meetings, an option it might consider early in its tenure so that planning and logistics can get underway. The distance members of the public would have to travel to speak at a hearing would most likely affect how many do so, particularly if winter weather affects travel. Other factors that could affect participation rates include scheduling (daytime or evening meetings, weekend meetings) and the availability of translation services. The Commission might divide the state into regions and hold hearings in each region, with an eye toward travel time within the regions. This would allow the public to know where they should attend to make a presentation at a hearing. The fact that about two-thirds of Michigan's population is in Southeast Michigan would be another factor in designing regions for these hearings. This might be addressed by holding several days of hearings in regions with large populations and only a single day in less populous regions.

At the same time, the Commission will need to formulate contingency plans that are feasible based on the status of the coronavirus pandemic at the close of 2020, including virtual opportunities for public input.

It is difficult to estimate in advance how much interest there will be in testifying at public hearings or submitting written or digital materials. As a point of reference, California's commission held 34 public hearings, at which 2,700 people provided in-person testimony. In addition, members of the public submitted over 20,000 written comments. The sheer volume of this

participation revealed a tension between the capacity of the Commission to appropriately consider testimony and the need to hear from the public.

To comply with the Amendment's commitment to openness and transparency, the Commission will want to archive and index the proceedings of its meetings, testimony at public hearings, and submissions to the Commission. This will allow commissioners to consult the record as they draw district lines and will allow the public to follow the Commission's work. Commissioners will have the opportunity to hear (and watch on video) testimony offered at the hearings. They might consider ways that will allow them to become equally familiar with written and digital submissions.

The second sentence in Section 8 focuses on written submissions of proposed districting plans. It is silent on what members of the public may include in their testimony at public hearings, or how long each individual testimony can be. The ICRC can help itself and members of the public by clarifying these matters. To the extent that the ICRC chooses to do so, doing this prior to the launch of an outreach campaign would allow prospective participants to be aware of the ICRC's rules and expectations.

The hearings clearly seem intended for Communities of Interest to indicate to the Commission the nature of their community and how they would like to be treated in the upcoming redistricting. Other types of organizations might wish to offer testimony as well and the Commission can decide how to include them. These include:

- Counties, Cities, and Townships, which are included in the list of redistricting criteria in the Amendment
- Statewide organizations with local affiliates, such as the Chamber of Commerce, the League of Women Voters, the NAACP, the Sierra Club, etc.
- Statewide organizations without local affiliates, such as the Citizen's Research Council of Michigan, Michigan League of Conservation Voters, Michigan League for Public Policy, etc.
- Community-based, regional grassroots organizations



- Individuals
- Political parties
- Elected officials
- Candidates for public office

All of these seem entitled by the language of the Amendment to submit proposed districting plans. The Commission could adopt a policy that these organizations and individuals could submit other materials if they wished. It could also set a policy that addresses who can participate in the public hearings and who can submit only written or digital material. Such decisions may be important in allocating speaking time in the public hearings.

On the question of submitting proposed maps, it is important to keep in mind that during the first round of public hearings members of the public will not have access to the 2020 census information or to information about the array of COIs that might participate in the public phase of the process.

The Commission should keep in mind that a disproportionate share of complete maps submitted early in the process are likely to come from well-resourced organizations that have the capacity and resources to devote to this complex task. The Commission may still benefit from seeing an array of plans that might be submitted, but it might consider asking that, whenever possible, those submitting maps wait until a specific date to submit them, base them on the most recent data on population, and use counties, cities, and townships as the building blocks for their districts, forgoing details based on smaller areas such as precincts and census blocks.

## Recommendations for the Commission:

- Consider holding more than the minimum number (10) of public hearings.
- Consider days/times for hearing that will maximize public participation.
- Consider geographic coverage of hearings by region, and consider holding more hearings in areas of greater population density.
- Consider how to archive and index the proceedings of commission meetings, testimony at public hearings, and submissions to the Commission.
- Consider defining what members of the public may include in their testimony, then disseminate these rules well in advance of public hearings, as part of the outreach campaign.
- Consider deciding if, and how, other types of communities or groups could offer testimony, such as local governments, statewide organizations, individuals, etc.
- Be aware that COI and other groups participating initially may represent a biased sample of better-resourced groups and individuals, and that smaller, less sophisticated or resourced groups may be less likely to know of the ICRC and the public hearings without significant effort and outreach.
- For the first round of public hearings before 2020 Census data have been released, consider requiring that submitted maps be based on the most recent data on population and use counties, cities, and townships as the building blocks for their districts, forgoing details at the census block level in pursuit of population equality.
- Prepare alternate options to in-person public hearings in case these turn out to be impossible because of the coronavirus pandemic.

## Section 6: Templates for COIs and Others to Use in Applying to Participate in Public Hearings or to Submit Materials to the Commission

We include in an Appendix some suggestions for the content of a template that a COI could use to guide testimony at public hearings and submit written/digital submissions to the ICRC. In California, a significant challenge was not just the volume of submissions but also their varied nature. Thus, a template or streamlined submission criteria could be very helpful in organizing the submissions to the ICRC. The Commission should consider developing several versions of the template that could be used by members of the public who wish to participate as individuals, as representatives of corporations or interest groups, or as representatives of counties, cities, townships, etc. The information from these templates would be archived, made available to the public, and used later when district lines are being drawn.

### Recommendations for the Commission:

- Establish and adopt templates for COIs and others to guide testimony at public hearings or written or digital submissions.
- Disseminate these templates as part of the outreach campaign.
- Archive all submitted templates for public access and for subsequent use by the Commission.



## Section 7: Drawing New Districts

Once the initial round of public hearings is underway, the ICRC will begin to work with its hired staff and consultants on designing new congressional and state legislative districts. The testimony and written submissions from COIs, testimony from local political jurisdictions and other members of the public, data on voting patterns in recent elections, and additional supplementary data on the state will form the raw material for designing districts. It would probably be best if the data do not include the home addresses of incumbents and active political candidates.

The ICRC will eventually choose a districting plan for Congress, the State Senate, and the State House. It seems likely that Michigan will lose one of its current 14 congressional seats. The population of Michigan in mid-July 2019 was estimated to be 9,986,856. Using that estimate, the congressional map will have 13 districts (with an average size of 768,200), the senate map 38 districts (with an average size of 262,800), and the house map 110 districts (with an average size of 90,790).

### Clarifying Some Redistricting Criteria

Section 14(a) of the Amendment reads: “Before voting to adopt a plan, the Commission shall ensure that the plan is tested, using appropriate technology, for compliance with the criteria described above [in Section 13].” In order to do this, the Commission will need to decide on a way to test a plan on each of the criteria. Contiguity is the only criterion that is straightforward.

The criterion that focuses on COIs says: “Districts shall reflect the state’s diverse population and communities of interest.” Similarly, the criterion that focuses on local political jurisdictions says “Districts shall reflect consideration of county, city, and township boundaries.” The Commission and its consultants should consider designing a metric to transform “reflect” into a clear measure of compliance with these criteria.

### Getting Down to the Work of Drawing Districts

After the first round of public hearings and the collection of data on counties, cities, and townships, data on recent voting patterns, and other important statistical features of Michigan, the ICRC will begin the process

of developing plans, scoring them on their compliance with the redistricting criteria, and producing maps. The Amendment allows each commissioner to propose a plan for each of the bodies being redistricted. This could mean as many as 39 plans in all. There is no requirement that a commissioner who proposes a plan accompany it with the reasoning that led to it being proposed, but commissioners should probably have that option.

New districting plans will need to comply with the standards listed in Section 13 of the Amendment. The Commission should consider beginning by consulting their attorneys about areas of the state that may fall under the Voting Rights Act, since compliance with the VRA, along with complying with equal population standards, is assigned the highest priority among the criteria.

If, as expected, most COIs wish to be kept intact in new districts, the next step in drafting districting plans should seek to keep COIs intact to the extent possible, even if doing so requires that a county, city, or township boundary must be crossed. The Commission should also consider whether proposed district lines reinforce the effectiveness of representation for COIs. Small COIs in particular would benefit from being placed in districts with like-minded nearby communities.

A strategy for proceeding might be to begin with Congress, move to the Senate, and finish with the House, for these reasons:

- The VRA will have a smaller impact on the congressional districts and will make it easier to accommodate the expressed desires of COIs.
- The larger the district, the greater the opportunities are to include like-minded communities in a common district.
- The larger the district, the greater the likelihood that jurisdictional boundaries of counties, cities, and township can be honored.

A similar argument can be made for starting in each plan with the areas where population density is low and moving to areas with greater population density. In practice, this would mean beginning with the Upper

Peninsula, moving downstate from there, and finishing with Southeast Michigan. The Commission could also start in Southeast Michigan and move north.

*Recommendations for the Commission:*

- Consider requiring that when beginning to draw its own maps, that the data used not include the home addresses of incumbents, active political candidates, or the current boundaries of congressional and state legislative districts.
- Consider challenges concerning the redistricting criteria in Section 13 of the Amendment. The Commission might want to address these challenges early in its tenure so that members of the

public will be aware of how the Commission will implement the criteria. The challenges include: population equality, requirements in the Voting Rights Act, no advantage by the district design to be conferred to any political party, incumbent, or candidate, and the requirement that districts be reasonably compact.

- When drawing draft maps, consider starting with the Congress, then the Michigan Senate, and then the Michigan House of Representatives; also, starting geographically in the U.P. and moving down toward Southeast Michigan (and its particularly high population density), or the reverse.



## Section 8: The Second Round of Public Hearings

Section 9 of the Amendment includes:

After developing at least one proposed redistricting plan for each type of district, the commission shall publish the proposed redistricting plans and any data and supporting materials used to develop the plans. ... The commission shall hold at least five public hearings throughout the state for the purpose of soliciting comment from the public about the proposed plans.

The ICRC should publish the proposed plans and supporting materials on its website and invite written and electronic comments as well as in-person testimony at the public meetings. The Commission should schedule its public hearings and devise ways to process written and digital comments in a way that the Commission can take them into consideration as it begins to weigh the proposals on the table.

If the California experience provides a useful indication of the public's interest in commenting on the proposed plans, there will be an outpouring of public comments. The experience in California was that once members of the public had an opportunity to see a concrete proposal showing district boundaries, they had plenty to say, even if they hadn't availed themselves of earlier opportunities.

### Recommendations for the Commission:

- Publish the proposed plans for each type of district, including maps and supporting material on the ICRC's website and inviting written/digital comments, in addition to in-person testimony.
- Consider holding more than the required number of public hearings (5) to receive input on the proposed plans.
- Decide how to test a proposed plan on each of the redistricting criteria.
- Release the results of these tests to the public so they can refer to them in the public hearings or written testimony.
- Prepare plans for soliciting public comment should the coronavirus pandemic make in-person public hearings impossible.

## APPENDIX

### Draft Template for a Community of Interest to request to participate in a public hearing of the ICRC or to submit written or digital materials for the Commission's consideration

#### COVER PAGE

The new redistricting amendment in Michigan assigns a high priority to the desires of communities of interest in the composition of their districts for Congress, the State Senate, and the State House:

“Districts shall reflect the state’s diverse population and communities of interest. Communities of interest may include, but are not limited to, populations that share cultural or historical characteristics or economic interests.”

The amendment also mandates that the Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission hold at least ten public hearings around the state to receive testimony from communities of interest about the desired composition of their districts. This document provides a definition of a Community of Interest and allows them to register to participate in a public hearing or to submit written or digital material to the Commission to be considered in drawing new district maps.

The basic features of a community of interest are:

- It is a group of individuals who share common bonds. Such groups include (but are not limited to) groups with cultural or historical bonds, shared economic interests, shared racial, ethnic or religious identities, neighborhoods, enterprise zones, school districts, media markets, transportation districts, special assessment tax districts, communities concerned about environmental hazards, or a shared vision of the future of a community.
- It is a contiguous area that can be identified on a map. It needn't be the case that 100% of the population within the geographical boundaries of the community of interest share the bonds of the community of interest. It is possible for communities of Interest to overlap.
- The common bonds that define a community of interest are linked to a set of public policy issues that are affected by legislation. In most cases, these shared interests in legislation lead the community to wish to remain intact in legislative districts, rather than be split across two or more districts, in order to secure more effective representation.
- It is not a group affiliated or acting on behalf of a party, an incumbent, or a political candidate.
- It is not a local political jurisdiction (a county, city, or township), since they are considered in a separate section of the amendment.

#### DRAFT TEMPLATE FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Please answer the following questions about your community (or communities) of interest, which will help the Commission understand why and how it should be considered when drafting Michigan's districting maps for Congress, the State Senate, and the State House.

How would you like to participate in the information gathering phase of the redistricting process? (You may check as many options as you like):

- \_\_\_ offer testimony at a public hearing
- \_\_\_ submit written materials for the consideration by the Commission
- \_\_\_ submit digital materials for consideration by the Commission



1. In order to access your comments in the future, we need to attach a name to your community of interest. How would you like it to be identified?
2. One of the primary functions of this application is to understand the geographic scope of your community of interest. What are the geographic boundaries of your COI? Please indicate these boundaries on a map of your local area. This can be a computer-generated map or a paper map.
3. What binds your Community together or creates its shared identity? An identity can include the types of shared histories, values, and interests included in the list above, as well as others. You may include demographic data about the residents of the community, information about the community's history, and how this community currently engages with the political process.
4. Are there particular governmental policies that are high priorities for your community? If so, what are they?
5. In what ways would keeping your community intact in new district maps enhance the quality of its representation in Congress or the Michigan legislature?
6. Are there nearby areas whose inclusion in your district would strengthen representation for your COI? Are there any areas whose inclusion in your district would weaken representation for your COI?
7. You may include a rough sketch of the district you would prefer your community to be in for Congress, the State Senate, and the State House.
8. Roughly estimate the population size of your COI:
9. If you wish to include additional comments for consideration by the Commission, add them here:

## Contact Information

The Commission needs contact information for your COI so that it can be in touch with you if the need arises.

### Personal Contact Information

1. Your name (first and last name):

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2. Personal address (street, city, state, zip code):

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3. Personal phone number and/or email:

phone: 

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email: 

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4. What is your role in this community or your relationship to this COI? (ex: community member, leader, new resident, etc.):

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## Endnotes

<sup>i</sup> Constitution of Michigan of 1963, Article IV, § 6, Section 13.

<http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/mcl/pdf/mcl-chap1.pdf>

<sup>ii</sup> Constitution of Michigan of 1963, Article IV, § 6, Section 13 (c).

<http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/mcl/pdf/mcl-chap1.pdf>

<sup>iii</sup> California Constitution, Article XXI, Section 2(4).

[https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes\\_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=CONS&division=&title=&part=&chapter=&article=XXI#:~:text=Congressional%20districts%20shall%20achieve%20population,federal%20Voting%20Rights%20Act%20or](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=CONS&division=&title=&part=&chapter=&article=XXI#:~:text=Congressional%20districts%20shall%20achieve%20population,federal%20Voting%20Rights%20Act%20or)

<sup>iv</sup> Constitution of the State of Colorado, Article V, Section 47(3).

[https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/info\\_center/laws/COConstitution/ColoradoConstitution.pdf](https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/info_center/laws/COConstitution/ColoradoConstitution.pdf)

<sup>v</sup> Brennan Center for Justice: “Creating Strong Rules for Drawing Maps,” January 29, 2020.

<https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/creating-strong-rules-drawing-maps>

<sup>vi</sup> Brennan Center for Justice: “Creating Strong Rules for Drawing Maps,” January 29, 2020.

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<sup>vii</sup> Prosser v. Elections Board (793 F. Supp. 859 (W.D. Wis. 1992), p. 864.

<https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/793/859/1369102/>

<sup>viii</sup> Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan: “Initial Findings on Communities of Interest from the Spring 2020 Michigan Public Policy Survey,” August 24, 2020. <http://myumi.ch/Nxzdy>

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# The Role of Communities of Interest in Michigan's New Approach to Redistricting: Recommendations to the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission

August 2020 | John Chamberlin </faculty/john-chamberlin>, Alissa Graff, Sarah Gruen, Safiya Merchant, Nick Najor, Gerson Ramirez, James VanSteel

**Download PDF** <<http://closup.umich.edu/sites/closup.umich.edu/files/policy-reports/closup%20communities%20of%20interest%20redistricting%20report.pdf>>

The Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy (CLOSUP) was launched at the University of Michigan's Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy in 2001 to provide public service to the people and communities of Michigan. Over the years, CLOSUP has approached that mission in a variety of ways, most fundamentally through the creation of the Michigan Public Policy Survey (MPPS) program, an ongoing survey of the state's local government leaders designed to increase government transparency and accountability and help improve policymaking in Michigan. The views of Michigan's local government leaders, collected through the MPPS, contribute to the following report. Now, as our state embarks on a new approach to drawing political

districts through an Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission, we at CLOSUP saw a need and opportunity to address at least one major new criteria in that process: the issue of “Communities of Interest” (COIs). While COIs are included in redistricting approaches in other states, this is a new concept in Michigan, and

nowhere else do COIs play as key a role as they will here. By design, Michigan’s new redistricting approach makes COIs one of the highest priorities to be addressed by the Commission as it draws our new maps. Since the COI concept is both new and so central to Michigan’s new redistricting process, we launched the CLOSUP Michigan Redistricting project in partnership with the Michigan Department of State, to research best practices for how other states handle COIs in their redistricting efforts, to learn about the opportunities and potential challenges around these approaches, and to share these findings with Michigan’s new Commission. This report presents the lessons we have uncovered for how to approach COIs in Michigan’s case. At CLOSUP we’re grateful for the talented team of Ford School students who undertook this work, and for their dedicated project leader, Professor Emeritus John Chamberlin, who has spent a career working to improve the public sector in Michigan, and beyond. The students included Alissa Graff, Sarah Gruen, Safiya Merchant, Nick Najor, Gerson Ramirez, and James Vansteel. This team shared the common goal of helping make Michigan’s new experience with redistricting as successful as possible. Our state is fortunate to have young leaders like these six students who wanted to help Michigan move toward a better future. We’re also grateful to Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson and her team at the Michigan Department of State, who were eager to leverage the Ford School’s talent pool, and who we found to be equally dedicated to making sure Michigan’s new approach to redistricting is successful.

CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT </tags/citizen-engagement>

DEMOCRACY </tags/democracy>

REDISTRICTING </tags/redistricting>

MICRC </tags/micrc>

COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST </tags/communities-interest>

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RELATED RESEARCH PROJECT

## The CLOSUP Redistricting Project

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# Communities of interest and Michigan's new redistricting process

After the passage of Michigan's Proposal 2, one of Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission's (MICRC) highest priorities was to redraw the new district maps taking into account 'communities of interest' <<http://closup.umich.edu/redistricting-project/communities-of-interest>>,' or COIs.

Section Menu 

List of redistricting resources → <</redistricting-project/redistricting-resources>>

## What are communities of interest (COI)?

Previously, redistricting in Michigan has often been marred by "gerrymandering," where political representatives designed electoral districts to maximize their own political power. But in 2018, Michigan voters took the enormous step of changing the approach to redistricting in our state, removing it from the purview of the state legislature, and placing it instead in the hands of a new Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission, composed of a balanced bi-partisan/non-partisan

group of 13 randomly selected Michigan residents.

The state's new approach prioritizes "Communities of Interest" (COIs) as one of the most important factors the Redistricting Commission must address when designing our new districts

While there is no set definition of COIs, we think of a COI as a group of people in a specific geographic area who share common interests (such as economic, historic, cultural, or other bonds) that are linked to public policy issues that may be affected by legislation. CLOSUP's research </policy-reports/18/the-role-of-communities-of-interest-in-michigans-new-approach-to-redistricting-recommendations> suggests that COIs can consist of religious, ethnic, or immigrant communities, neighborhoods, people in tourism areas, regional media markets, outdoor recreation or natural resource areas, economic zones, and much more.

Examples of COIs include:

Historical communities; economic communities; racial communities; ethnic communities; cultural communities; religious communities; immigrant communities; language communities; geographic communities; neighborhoods; economic opportunity zones; tourism areas; school districts; outdoor recreation areas; communities defined by natural features; creative arts communities; media markets, etc.

CLOSUP's 2020 recommendations to the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission </policy-reports/18/the-role-of-communities-of-interest-in-michigans-new-approach-to-redistricting-recommendations> (MICRC) identified potential concepts and definitions of COIs based on experience in Michigan and across the U.S., and as handled in the academic literature; potential COIs in Michigan, and how to make them aware of the role of COIs in Michigan's new approach; how other states and the

courts have addressed COIs in redistricting; and best practices that the MICRC might consider as it plans its work in the redistricting process.

## How can COIs get involved?

Since the concept of COIs is new and not well-understood in Michigan, **CLOSUP encourages all COIs to engage in this process, learn more about it, and consider submitting their information and preferences to the Redistricting Commission.**

We are partnering with other stakeholder organizations to foster better understanding of the state's new process, the role of COIs, and engagement by COIs that want to represent their interests in the upcoming redistricting process. Contact us for more information: [closup@umich.edu](mailto:closup@umich.edu). Or explore our COI resources.

[redistricting-project/redistricting-resources](https://redistricting-project/redistricting-resources)



<http://closup.umich.edu/sites/closup.umich.edu/files/closup-coi-infographic.pdf>

## COI INFOGRAPHIC

### What are COIs? Why do they matter? What can you do?

<http://closup.umich.edu/sites/closup.umich.edu/files/closup-coi-infographic.pdf>

Click the infographic image to see a full-scale version, or download the infographic here, to share it with others

Download the infographic <http://closup.umich.edu/sites/closup.umich.edu/files/closup-coi-infographic.pdf> here





<<https://closup.umich.edu/sites/closup.umich.edu/images/closup-coi-database-infographic-20210204.png>>

## ENGAGING COIS

**COI Database** <<https://closup.umich.edu/sites/closup.umich.edu/images/closup-coi-database-infographic-20210204.png>>

CLOSUP's contact database of potential COIs in Michigan is the first of its kind and a first attempt to identify the breadth of COIs so they may be engaged in the state's redistricting process. To date, the database houses information on more than 1200 possible COIs all across the state, representing 20+ categories. The database is not publicly downloadable at this time, however, if you are interested in using the database to engage COIs in the redistricting process please contact us by email at [closup@umich.edu](mailto:closup@umich.edu).

Learn more <<https://closup.umich.edu/sites/closup.umich.edu/images/closup-coi-database-infographic-20210204.png>>

## Panel discussions on communities of interest

In the fall of 2019, CLOSUP hosted a panel discussion with experts on the topic of communities of interest, and opening remarks by Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson. A video recording <<https://www.onedetroitpbs.org/communities-of-interest/>> is now available.

CLOSUP hosted a webinar <<https://fordschool.umich.edu/event/2021/communities-interest-michigans-new-redistricting-process>> on Michigan's new approach to redistricting and how communities of interest can engage with the Commission on February 25, 2021. Watch the video recording <<https://fordschool.umich.edu/event/2021/communities-interest-michigans-new-redistricting-process>>.

## COMMUNITIES IDENTIFIED

1200+

The COI database includes over 1200 potential communities of interest across the state.

COIS IN DETROIT AND METRO  
DETROIT

224

A large number of potential communities of interest were identified in Detroit and the surrounding areas.

## COIS IN THE U.P.

67


The database includes communities across the state, including in the Upper Peninsula.

# Have any questions?

Tom Ivacko </staff/tom-ivacko>

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## APPENDIX 10

Former state Supreme Court Justice Stephan Markman report commissioned by Hillsdale College summarizing his concerns about the MICRC with its definition of community in forming district lines

# The Detroit News

**OPINION** *This piece expresses the views of its author(s), separate from those of this publication.*

## Opinion: Redistricting Michigan depends on definition of 'community'

**Stephen Markman**

Published 11:00 p.m. ET July 7, 2021

Defining the term “community of interest” is the predominant issue at stake for Michigan’s new redistricting commission. The term serves as the foundation, or “building block,” of our new redistricting process adopted by state voters in 2018. Rather than dividing the people of Michigan by politicizing this process, the commission should adopt an understanding of “communities of interest” that will unite us by what our citizens share in common.

The commission was placed into the Michigan Constitution in an attempt to remove partisanship, political self-interest and gerrymandering from the decennial process of establishing state and federal election districts. It replaces the Legislature with a randomly-selected body of 13 citizens of differing partisan backgrounds in this process. These citizens are to work together in constructing districts built upon “communities of interest.”

But what is a community of interest? A report prepared by the University of Michigan, with support from the Secretary of State’s office, urges the commission to define this term largely by identifying interest, affinity and identity communities.

For example, it would assess such factors as whether people can be joined together who are commonly “concerned about environmental hazards”; who are “linked to a set of public policy issues that are affected by legislation”; who possess a “shared vision of the future”; who are united by such characteristics as immigration, language or the creative arts; who are connected by common media markets or who are related by race, ethnicity or religion. The latter assessment would be the first time that such considerations were placed into Michigan’s Constitution, with two existing constitutional provisions expressly forbidding considerations of these types.

The author of the UM report describes these and other recommendations as offering a “new theory of representation.” I was asked by Hillsdale College, where I have long taught, to prepare a report in response. While the UM’s theory of representation is indeed “new,” such theory risks undermining the unifying purposes of the new amendment.

The Hillsdale Report instead would define “community of interest,” as it has been historically understood in Michigan law and practice, to refer to geographic communities: counties, cities, townships and villages. That is, the communities in which Michigan residents actually live and call home, and whose boundaries — dating as far back as two centuries — limit the unfettered discretion of public bodies to rearrange Michigan’s electoral map. Ironically, such genuine communities are the only communities specifically excluded by the UM report as potential “communities of interest.”

Apart from the utterly invented quality of the UM definition of “communities of interest,” its fundamental flaw is that it encourages the commission to engage in the very redistricting practices that prompted the establishment of the new commission in the first place, although by more camouflaged means:

- ▶ UM's report encourages gerrymandered, or irregularly-shaped districts, by what are likely to be the oddly-shaped or squiggly electoral boundaries necessary to aggregate people who may not be bound by county, city, township or village communities, but rather by non-geographic interest, affinity and identity “communities;”
- ▶ The report encourages partisanship by enabling “racial, ethnic or religious” considerations that may effectively obscure, more explicitly partisan redistricting calculations; and
- ▶ UM's report encourages politicized decision-making by imposing upon the commission a broad range of decisions concerning which among uncountable numbers of interest, affinity and identity groups should be favored with “community of interest” status, and which should not. Thus reconfiguring Michigan’s system of representative self-government absent coherent legal standards and at the plenary discretion of the commission.

When, on the other hand, geographic considerations predominate, each citizen belongs equally to a community of interest. Any redistricting process is capable of abuse and requires a commitment by its architects to the highest standards of integrity. But geographic communities are simply less susceptible to political, ideological and partisan gamesmanship than interest, affinity and identity communities imagined out of whole cloth placed into competition for preferred status before a governmental body.

Hillsdale’s theory of representation, built upon the individual citizen residing within his home community, should not be replaced by UM’s new theory in which citizens are transformed into a means to an end — to supply a critical population mass for the empowerment of select interest, affinity and identity groups.

The commission possesses the discretion to adopt either the UM or the Hillsdale models of representation. But should it accept the broad power that UM would confer — assessing, for example, where communities hold “shared visions of the future”; the “texture of bonds and interests within a political jurisdiction”; “patterns of community life”; communities with linkages to a set of “public policy issues that would be affected by legislation”; and the development of metrics for measuring such things, it should bear the following in mind.

Almost certainly as a result, the commission will have sacrificed its status as a genuine citizens commission, becoming just one more public body in which experts are in charge, in this case the philanthropic, nonprofit and media partners urged upon it by UM.

It would be a remarkable and uniting achievement for the commission to transform our state’s redistricting process into one earning broad public respect and serving as a national model. This can only be achieved by a commission that maintains a disciplined focus upon the creation of a fair-minded, neutral and non-partisan process. It cannot be achieved by a new set of electoral architects perpetuating old abuses or by the establishment of “communities of interest” in which polarizing and political considerations are dominant.

What is required in Michigan is not a “new theory of representation,” but an enduring theory of representation more faithfully and responsibly administered.

*Stephen Markman is a retired Michigan Supreme Court justice and professor of constitutional law at Hillsdale College, which commissioned his report to the state redistricting commission.*

## **APPENDIX 11**

MICRC's Report on 2021 Redistricting adopted Aug 18 2022



# Report on 2021 Redistricting

Commission Report adopted on Aug. 18,2022



## **FOREWORD**

For most of Michigan's history, redistricting was conducted by the State Legislature—a process that all too often sparked political controversy and judicial intervention when the Legislature and Governor could not agree on a plan. In response, Michigan voters approved a constitutional amendment in 2018 that created a **Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (MICRC)** and vested it with exclusive authority to adopt new district boundaries based on census data for the Michigan Senate, Michigan House of Representatives, and U.S. House of Representatives every 10 years beginning in 2021.

The [Michigan Constitution](#) vests the State's redistricting process in the hands of the MICRC, led by 13 Commissioners who are selected using a process designed to provide for balanced, independent, and transparent governance. Commissioners were selected and appointed by August 2020 using the process outlined in the constitutional amendment. In order to ensure balance, under the Michigan Constitution, our 13 Commissioners are politically balanced: four members who affiliated with the Democratic party, four members who affiliated with the Republican party, and five members who were not affiliated with any political party.

Together, we completed the first open, independent and citizen-led redistricting process in Michigan history while far surpassing the MICRC's goals for public comment, public hearing attendance and news media coverage. The Michigan Constitution mandated at least 10 public hearings around the state during 2020-21. We held at least 139 public meetings, including 16 hearings prior to drafting maps, and received over 29,000 public comments.

Our mission since we began in 2020 was to lead Michigan's redistricting process to assure Michigan's Congressional, State Senate, and State House district lines were drawn fairly in a transparent manner, meeting Constitutional mandates. Our aim throughout the process was to raise public awareness of the commission, encourage citizens to participate in the map-making process, generate consistent news media coverage to inform the public and answer questions from the news media and public about the commission's work.

Without question, the MICRC's efforts to complete its responsibilities was challenged by the greatest public health crisis in more than a century caused by the devastating spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Michigan census data the commission anticipated using in early 2021 was not provided by the U.S. Census Bureau until late September due to COVID-related delays. While the lack of timely census data did not ultimately impede the commission from faithfully serving the people of Michigan, it did contribute to the MICRC's final maps not being approved until Dec. 28.

Despite these challenges, the MICRC fulfilled its constitutional mandate. We met or surpassed every metric of public observation and participation. From September 17, 2020, through May 6, 2021, before map drawing began we held 35 public meetings to address preliminary matters like hiring staff, procurement activities, and adoption of procedures. While the Michigan Constitution required the Commission to hold ten public hearings before drafting any maps, we held sixteen. After the release of 2020 census data by the U.S. Census Bureau, we created draft proposed maps. At this stage, we held 38 more public meetings, including five public hearings, throughout the state.

After winnowing the list of draft proposed U.S. House of Representatives, Michigan House of Representatives, and Michigan Senate plans to 15 plans, we published those proposed plans, accepted more feedback, and held an additional four meetings before adopting, at our December 28, 2021, meeting, new redistricting plans. As the Constitution requires, each plan was adopted by the vote of at

least two Commissioners affiliated with the two major parties and two Commissioners affiliated with no party.

Getting public input and promoting transparency in the MICRC process was of the utmost importance so that the public had confidence in our work as well as the work of future Michigan redistricting commissions. Holding dozens of meetings in every region of the state throughout 2020-21 was instrumental to the MICRC's ability to gain knowledge and insights from the public, allowing the MICRC to then systematically go through and make the changes that we needed to comply with the seven ranked redistricting criteria, which include compliance with the Voting Rights Act and partisan fairness.

Planning and research was fundamental to the MICRC's work. The MICRC consulted with leaders of redistricting commissions from California and Arizona, the first and second states in the nation, respectively, to approve similar commissions, respectively. We heard from experts with the University of Michigan and Michigan State University. We received feedback on our proposed maps from dozens of organizations that helped shape our decisions.

"Redistricting is never easy," as the U.S. Supreme Court stated in *Abbott v. Perez*. This process has proved that although redistricting presents unique challenges, the MICRC has been successful in collaboratively overcoming those challenges. The adopted redistricting plan with new legislative boundaries will be used for the 2022 primary and general elections.

The MICRC is proud of what we achieved. We are not alone in that belief.

The Princeton Gerrymandering Project, a nonpartisan research group that analyzes redistricting with the aim of eliminating partisan gerrymandering across the country, graded the MICRC's congressional map with an overall score of "A" and a "B" for the state House and Senate maps, saying "compared to a lot of maps across the country, they did very well."

As one [New York newspaper editorial](#) observed after the MICRC's landmark maps were announced: "The state of Michigan has just done something almost miraculous in this time of political acrimony – and something every citizen in America should want their state to do: It has done away, as much as possible, with political gerrymandering and taken a giant leap toward guaranteeing fair state and federal representation."

Equally important, the MICRC commissioned the Glengariff Group, Inc. to conduct two pre- and post-campaign statewide surveys of Michigan voters. The benchmarking survey was conducted March 27-31, 2021. The post-survey was a 600 sample, live operator telephone survey conducted on Feb. 11-14, 2022 and has a margin of error of +/-4.0% with a 95% level of confidence.

Key results from the post-campaign public opinion survey show:

- Most impressively, at the conclusion of the survey, all voters were asked if Michigan should continue to allow the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission to redraw the state's maps or should Michigan go back to allowing elected representatives that have control in the State Legislature to redraw the maps. **By an overwhelming margin of 65.5% to 10.1%, Michigan voters say the state should continue with the redistricting commission moving forward.**
- Voters were asked if Michigan citizens did or did not have a greater role in deciding how new districts would be drawn. By a margin of 45.0%-22.1%, voters aware of the MICRC's work believe Michigan citizens did have a great role.

- Voters were asked if the Commission succeeded or failed in giving Michigan citizens a greater role than politicians in designing new districts. By a margin of 49.6%-22.1%, voters aware of the MICRC's work said the MICRC succeeded in giving Michigan citizens a greater role.

We believe our democracy is stronger thanks to Michigan citizens' engagement, leadership and vision for a fair, inclusive and transparent process that puts voters above politics and hopefully ensures gerrymandering in Michigan is done once and for all.

## **PURPOSE STATEMENT**

This report fulfills the MICRC's requirement enumerated as follows in the Michigan Constitution:

*"(16) For each adopted plan, the commission shall issue a report that explains the basis on which the commission made its decisions in achieving compliance with plan requirements and shall include the map and legal description required in part (9) of this section. A commissioner who votes against a redistricting plan may submit a dissenting report which shall be issued with the commission's report."*

The seven ranked, constitutionally mandated criteria below were used to draw new district boundaries for the state's Congressional, State Senate and State House districts:

*"(a) Districts shall be of equal population as mandated by the United States constitution, and shall comply with the voting rights act and other federal laws.*

*(b) Districts shall be geographically contiguous. Island areas are considered to be contiguous by land to the county of which they are a part.*

*(c) Districts shall reflect the state's diverse population and communities of interest. Communities of interest may include, but shall not be limited to, populations that share cultural or historical characteristics or economic interests. Communities of interest do not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.*

*(d) Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.*

*(e) Districts shall not favor or disfavor an incumbent elected official or a candidate.*

*(f) Districts shall reflect consideration of county, city, and township boundaries.*

*(g) Districts shall be reasonably compact."*

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
## Michigan Congressional Districts

Michigan was apportioned 13 congressional districts following the 2020 Decennial Census, a reduction of one district from the 2010 apportionment. The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission approved the following map and district boundaries.

### [Legal Description & Interactive Map](#)



## Metro Detroit



## POPULATION

*“(a) Districts shall be of equal population as mandated by the United States constitution, and shall comply with the voting rights act and other federal laws.”*

The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission sought and relied on legal counsel and expert advice in order to draw plans that complied with the requirements of the United States constitution, the Voting Rights Act and other federal laws. Material reflecting that counsel and advice is accessible on the Commission’s website.

## [Meeting Notices & Materials](#)

## [Meeting Notices & Materials Archives](#)

## [Mapping Data](#)

DISTRICT	Total Population				Racial Demographics as Percent of Total Population					Voting Age Population		Racial Demographics as Percent of Voting Population				
	All Persons	Target	Dev.	Difference	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority	VAP	% of Total	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority
1	775,375	775,179	0.03%✓	196	89.45%	0.92%	0.55%	2.04%	10.55%	633,080	81.6%	90.86%	0.99%	0.55%	1.62%	9.14%
2	774,997	775,179	-0.02%✓	-182	87.82%	1.99%	0.55%	4.65%	12.18%	606,868	78.3%	89.17%	2.21%	0.56%	3.82%	10.83%
3	775,414	775,179	0.03%✓	235	70.15%	11.06%	2.99%	10.67%	29.85%	597,448	77.0%	74.00%	10.25%	2.95%	8.81%	26.00%
4	774,600	775,179	-0.07%✓	-579	75.09%	8.32%	2.46%	8.56%	24.91%	593,972	76.7%	78.42%	7.71%	2.46%	7.05%	21.58%
5	774,544	775,179	-0.08%✓	-635	84.50%	4.07%	0.86%	5.18%	15.50%	606,306	78.3%	86.61%	4.04%	0.88%	4.13%	13.39%
6	775,273	775,179	0.01%✓	94	69.15%	9.90%	10.38%	4.96%	30.85%	619,426	79.9%	71.51%	9.53%	10.12%	4.34%	28.49%
7	775,238	775,179	0.01%✓	59	79.90%	5.89%	3.20%	5.66%	20.10%	611,160	78.8%	82.03%	5.67%	3.23%	4.77%	17.97%
8	775,229	775,179	0.01%✓	50	73.40%	14.85%	1.11%	5.35%	26.60%	606,390	78.2%	76.23%	13.91%	1.14%	4.44%	23.77%
9	774,962	775,179	-0.03%✓	-217	87.94%	2.25%	1.31%	3.86%	12.06%	606,770	78.3%	89.59%	2.18%	1.28%	3.14%	10.41%
10	775,218	775,179	0.00%✓	39	72.75%	13.27%	6.08%	3.03%	27.25%	620,272	80.0%	75.73%	12.09%	5.78%	2.56%	24.27%
11	775,568	775,179	0.05%✓	389	68.30%	12.94%	8.67%	5.33%	31.70%	624,065	80.5%	70.86%	12.50%	8.39%	4.47%	29.14%
12	775,247	775,179	0.01%✓	68	45.95%	44.43%	1.81%	3.26%	54.05%	596,111	76.9%	47.46%	43.81%	1.97%	2.85%	52.54%
13	775,666	775,179	0.06%✓	487	36.80%	45.33%	2.89%	10.26%	63.20%	592,734	76.4%	39.55%	44.70%	2.89%	8.77%	60.45%
Assigned	10077331															
Total Pop	10077331															
Unassigned	0															

---

## **COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST**

*“(c) Districts shall reflect the state's diverse population and communities of interest.”*

The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission sought to understand Michigan’s diverse population and communities of interest via public engagement and feedback opportunities. In total, MICRC received more than 29,000 comments.

### **[Comments on Final Congressional Map \(Chestnut\)](#)**

### **[Comments on All Proposed Maps](#)**

### **[Public Comment Portal Comments](#)**

### **[Commission Meeting Comments](#)**

This chart outlines considerations for change to all maps following the second round of public input hearings in Oct. 2021.

Suggested Change	Commissioner	Hearing	Map
Bangla Town	Szetela	Detroit	
Palmer Park adjustments for LGBTQ COI	Szetela	Detroit	
Dexter Davis area a street was split	Clark	Detroit	
Boston/Edison neighborhood split	Rothhorn	Detroit	Cherry
Generally examining neighborhoods	Rothhorn	Detroit	
Southfield	Eid	Detroit	
Troy wanted to be in Oakland County	Eid	Detroit	
Arab community wanted Dearborn Heights to remain whole	Eid	Detroit	
Morningside	Kellom	Detroit	
Woodward 8-mile area	Kellom	Detroit	
API community in Novi	Szetela	Detroit	
Seikh Community, Troy, Rochester, Rochester Hills and Sterling Heights	Lange	Detroit	
African Immigrant Community	Rothhorn	Detroit	
Orthodox Jewish Oak Park	Rothhorn	Detroit	
Examine keeping Detroit more together	Clark	Detroit	
Oxford, Addison, Lake Orion, Clarkston area assessment	Clark	Flint	
Flint split or single district	Clark	Flint	
Oxford Township two precincts (3 and 5)	Orton	Flint	House
Caro split from county	Orton	Flint	
Saginaw and Genessee County together	Lange	Flint	
Possibly remove Grand Blanc from Flint districts	Rothhorn	Flint	
Midland with Tri Cities	Witjes	Gaylord	
Midland and Midland Township together	Clark	Gaylord	
Watershed needs to be kept together	Szetela	Gaylord	

Suggested Change	Commissioner	Hearing	Map
Benzie County higher income vs lower income	Rothhorn	Gaylord	
Cheboygan Residents Identify with the West	Clark	Gaylord	
Traverse City area	Lange	Gaylord	
Leelanau keeping together	Lange	Gaylord	
Unpack Lansing into 5 instead of 4	Eid	Lansing	
Battle Creek/Albion Community of Interest	Eid	Grand Rapids	
KZ and BattleCreek	Eid	Grand Rapids	
Delhi and Eaton	Clark	Grand Rapids	
Grand Rapids and Kalamazoo	Witjes	Grand Rapids	
Lakeshore District extend up to Saugatuck	Eid	Grand Rapids	
Native American Nation Van Buren and Allegan	Rothhorn	Grand Rapids	
Indigenous population community examination	Clark		
College student populations	Lange		
Jackson with west side of AA	Szetela	Ann Arbor	
Break-up AA	Szetela	Ann Arbor	

## PARTISAN FAIRNESS

*(d) Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.*

The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission evaluated partisan fairness using four mathematical models. The adopted map did not provide 'disproportionate advantage' to any political party under any of the models used to measure partisan fairness.

### Lopsided Margins<sup>1</sup>



The lopsided margins test calculates the difference between the average winning margin for candidates from each political party. If one party tends to win elections by larger margins, it indicates the party's votes are packed.

Average Winning Margin	Dem	61.2%
	Rep	57.2%
<b>Finding</b>		
Rep	Districts have a lopsided margin advantage of <b>4.0%</b>	

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Percent Votes		Party Wins	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
1	2,014,575	2,729,623	4,744,198	42.5%	57.5%		57.5%
2	1,606,164	2,458,415	4,064,579	39.5%	60.5%		60.5%
3	2,060,007	2,067,194	4,127,201	49.9%	50.1%		50.1%
4	1,919,525	2,268,384	4,187,909	45.8%	54.2%		54.2%
5	1,639,749	2,383,861	4,023,610	40.8%	59.2%		59.2%
6	2,807,351	1,786,702	4,594,053	61.1%	38.9%	61.1%	
7	2,294,626	2,256,640	4,551,266	50.4%	49.6%	50.4%	
8	2,465,441	2,033,607	4,499,048	54.8%	45.2%	54.8%	
9	1,750,528	2,812,643	4,563,171	38.4%	61.6%		61.6%
10	2,205,758	2,098,661	4,304,419	51.2%	48.8%	51.2%	
11	2,734,755	2,010,497	4,745,252	57.6%	42.4%	57.6%	
12	3,023,910	990,719	4,014,629	75.3%	24.7%	75.3%	
13	2,756,127	791,495	3,547,622	77.7%	22.3%	77.7%	

<sup>1</sup> Sam Wang, "Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering," Stanford Law Journal, 16, June 2016. Available at: <https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/three-tests-for-practical-evaluation-ofpartisan-gerrymandering/>

## Lopsided Margins



## Mean-Median Difference<sup>2</sup>

The mean-median district vote share difference compares a party's mean district vote share to its median district vote share:

- Mean = average party vote share across all districts
- Median = party vote share in the median district when districts are sorted on share of party vote

The difference between the mean and median vote shares provides a measure of whether the redistricting map produces skewed election results.

$$\text{Mean-Median Difference} = \text{Party's Mean Vote} - \text{Party's Median Vote}$$

Comparing a data set's mean and median is a common statistical analysis used to assess how skewed data set is – if the dataset is balanced, the mean will be very close in value to its median. As a dataset becomes more skewed and extreme values are added only on one side, the mean and median begin to diverge and looking at the difference between the two can be used determine the extent to which the data is skewed.

District Median Percentage	Dem	50.4%
	Rep	49.6%
Statewide mean percentage	Dem	52.7%
	Rep	47.3%
Mean-Median Difference	Dem	2.3%
	Rep	-2.3%

Findings		
Rep	Districts have a mean-median advantage of <b>2.3%</b>	

DISTRICT	Party	
	Dem	Rep
1	42.5%	57.5%
2	39.5%	60.5%
3	49.9%	50.1%
4	45.8%	54.2%
5	40.8%	59.2%
6	61.1%	38.9%
7	50.4%	49.6%
8	54.8%	45.2%
9	38.4%	61.6%
10	51.2%	48.8%
11	57.6%	42.4%
12	75.3%	24.7%
13	77.7%	22.3%

<sup>2</sup> Michael D. McDonald and Robin Best in "Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics and Law: A Diagnostic Applied to Six Cases," Election Law Journal 14(4), 2015 (available at: <https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/elj.2015.0358>)

## Efficiency Gap<sup>3</sup>

The efficiency gap is calculated by taking one party's total wasted votes in an election, subtracting the other party's total wasted votes, and dividing this by the total number of votes cast. It captures in a single number the extent to which district lines waste the two parties votes unequally.

$$\text{Efficiency Gap} = \frac{[\text{Party A wasted votes}] - [\text{Party B wasted votes}]}{\text{total number of votes cast statewide}}$$

		Total Wasted Votes	% Wasted Votes of Total Votes
Statewide % Wasted Votes	Dem	14,150,372	25.28%
	Rep	13,833,107	24.72%

Finding	
Rep	Candidates have an efficiency gap advantage of <b>0.6%</b>

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Lost Votes		Minimum to win	Surplus Votes		Total Wasted Votes	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
1	2,014,575	2,729,623	4,744,198	2,014,575	0	2,372,099	0	357,524	2,014,575	357,524
2	1,606,164	2,458,415	4,064,579	1,606,164	0	2,032,290	0	426,126	1,606,164	426,126
3	2,060,007	2,067,194	4,127,201	2,060,007	0	2,063,601	0	3,594	2,060,007	3,594
4	1,919,525	2,268,384	4,187,909	1,919,525	0	2,093,955	0	174,430	1,919,525	174,430
5	1,639,749	2,383,861	4,023,610	1,639,749	0	2,011,805	0	372,056	1,639,749	372,056
6	2,807,351	1,786,702	4,594,053	0	1,786,702	2,297,027	510,325	0	510,325	1,786,702
7	2,294,626	2,256,640	4,551,266	0	2,256,640	2,275,633	18,993	0	18,993	2,256,640
8	2,465,441	2,033,607	4,499,048	0	2,033,607	2,249,524	215,917	0	215,917	2,033,607
9	1,750,528	2,812,643	4,563,171	1,750,528	0	2,281,586	0	531,058	1,750,528	531,058
10	2,205,758	2,098,661	4,304,419	0	2,098,661	2,152,210	53,549	0	53,549	2,098,661
11	2,734,755	2,010,497	4,745,252	0	2,010,497	2,372,626	362,129	0	362,129	2,010,497
12	3,023,910	990,719	4,014,629	0	990,719	2,007,315	1,016,596	0	1,016,596	990,719
13	2,756,127	791,495	3,547,622	0	791,495	1,773,811	982,316	0	982,316	791,495

<sup>3</sup> Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos and Eric M. McGhee, "Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap," University of Chicago Law Review: Vol. 82 (2), 2015. Available at: <https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol82/iss2/4>)

## Seats to Votes Ratio

The seats to votes ratio measures the party's control of seats after the election in proportion to its share of the total state vote. For example, a major party held 80 percent of the 12 seats for the United States House of Representatives in Michigan while winning only 50 percent of the total vote. The seats/votes ratio is 80/50. This could suggest partisan gerrymandering.

	Vote Share	Count of Seats	Seat Share	Proportionality Bias
Dem	52.3%	7	53.8%	1.5%
Rep	47.7%	6	46.2%	-1.5%

DISTRICT	Composite Score			
	Dem	Dem %	Rep	Rep %
1	2,014,575	42.5%	2,729,623	57.5%
2	1,606,164	39.5%	2,458,415	60.5%
3	2,060,007	49.9%	2,067,194	50.1%
4	1,919,525	45.8%	2,268,384	54.2%
5	1,639,749	40.8%	2,383,861	59.2%
6	2,807,351	61.1%	1,786,702	38.9%
7	2,294,626	50.4%	2,256,640	49.6%
8	2,465,441	54.8%	2,033,607	45.2%
9	1,750,528	38.4%	2,812,643	61.6%
10	2,205,758	51.2%	2,098,661	48.8%
11	2,734,755	57.6%	2,010,497	42.4%
12	3,023,910	75.3%	990,719	24.7%
13	2,756,127	77.7%	791,495	22.3%

## COMPACTNESS

The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission evaluated the requirement of "(g) Districts shall be reasonably compact" using five mathematical models. The adopted map was deemed 'reasonably compact' under each model.

## POLSBY-POPPER

The Polsby-Popper ( $PP$ ) measure (Polsby & Popper, 1991) is the ratio of the area of the district ( $A_D$ ) to the area of a circle whose circumference is equal to the perimeter of the district ( $P_D$ ). A district's Polsby-Popper score falls with the range of [0,1] and a score closer to 1 indicates a more compact district.

$$PP = 4\pi \times \frac{A_D}{P_D^2}$$

Compactness measure: Polsby-Popper					
District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	57,170	1,351	145,227	848	0.39
2	13,068	637	32,265	405	0.41
3	1,886	280	6,246	154	0.30
4	3,904	347	9,586	222	0.41
5	6,478	554	24,419	285	0.27
6	1,018	180	2,580	113	0.39
7	2,814	252	5,038	188	0.56
8	2,454	267	5,678	176	0.43
9	6,899	404	13,020	294	0.53
10	242	80	506	55	0.48
11	336	101	814	65	0.41
12	192	71	396	49	0.48
13	253	106	888	56	0.28

**Most Compact: 0.56 For District: 7**

**Least Compact: 0.27 For District: 5**

## SCHWARTZBERG

The Schwartzberg score (S) compactness score is the ratio of the perimeter of the district ( $P_D$ ) to the circumference of a circle whose area is equal to the area of the district. A district's Schwartzberg score as calculated below falls with the range of [0,1] and a score closer to 1 indicates a more compact district.

$$S = \frac{1}{P_D/C} = \frac{1}{P_D/(2\pi\sqrt{A_D/\pi})}$$

### Compactness measure: Schwartzberg

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	57,170	1,351	145,227	848	0.63
2	13,068	637	32,265	405	0.64
3	1,886	280	6,246	154	0.55
4	3,904	347	9,586	222	0.64
5	6,478	554	24,419	285	0.52
6	1,018	180	2,580	113	0.63
7	2,814	252	5,038	188	0.75
8	2,454	267	5,678	176	0.66
9	6,899	404	13,020	294	0.73
10	242	80	506	55	0.69
11	336	101	814	65	0.64
12	192	71	396	49	0.70
13	253	106	888	56	0.53

Most Compact: 0.75 For District: 7

Least Compact: 0.52 For District: 5

## REOCK SCORE

The Reock Score (R) is the ratio of the area of the district  $A_D$  to the area of a minimum bounding circle ( $A_{MBC}$ ) that encloses the district's geometry. A district's Reock score falls within the range of [0,1] and a score closer to 1 indicates a more compact district.

$$R = \frac{A_D}{A_{MBC}}$$

### Compactness measure: Reock Score

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	57,170	1,351	145,227	848	0.38
2	13,068	637	32,265	405	0.57
3	1,886	280	6,246	154	0.32
4	3,904	347	9,586	222	0.43
5	6,478	554	24,419	285	0.18
6	1,018	180	2,580	113	0.39
7	2,814	252	5,038	188	0.55
8	2,454	267	5,678	176	0.41
9	6,899	404	13,020	294	0.53
10	242	80	506	55	0.48
11	336	101	814	65	0.48
12	192	71	396	49	0.59
13	253	106	888	56	0.21

Most Compact: 0.59 For District: 12

Least Compact: 0.18 For District: 5

## CONVEX HULL

The Convex Hull score is a ratio of the area of the district to the area of the minimum convex polygon that can enclose the district's geometry. A district's Convex Hull score falls within the range of [0,1] and a score closer to 1 indicates a more compact district.

$$CH = \frac{A_D}{A_{MCP}}$$

**Compactness measure: Convex Hull**

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	57,170	1,351	145,227	848	0.87
2	13,068	637	32,265	405	0.78
3	1,886	280	6,246	154	0.76
4	3,904	347	9,586	222	0.78
5	6,478	554	24,419	285	0.77
6	1,018	180	2,580	113	0.73
7	2,814	252	5,038	188	0.90
8	2,454	267	5,678	176	0.78
9	6,899	404	13,020	294	0.88
10	242	80	506	55	0.76
11	336	101	814	65	0.82
12	192	71	396	49	0.84
13	253	106	888	56	0.66

**Most Compact: 0.9 For District: 7**

**Least Compact: 0.66 For District: 13**

## LENGTH-WIDTH

The Length-Width Ratio ( $LW$ ) is calculated as the ratio of the length ( $L_{MBR}$ ) to the width ( $W_{MBR}$ ) of the minimum bounding rectangle surrounding the district. To orient the Length-Width score towards other compactness measures the maximum value of a district's width or length has been set to the denominator, making scores close to 1 more compact, and scores closer to zero less compact.

$$LW = \frac{W_{MBR}}{L_{MBR}}$$

**Compactness measure: Length-Width**

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	57,170	1,351	145,227	848	1.83
2	13,068	637	32,265	405	1.42
3	1,886	280	6,246	154	3.31
4	3,904	347	9,586	222	2.20
5	6,478	554	24,419	285	5.62
6	1,018	180	2,580	113	2.03
7	2,814	252	5,038	188	2.14
8	2,454	267	5,678	176	0.85
9	6,899	404	13,020	294	0.92
10	242	80	506	55	1.70
11	336	101	814	65	1.78
12	192	71	396	49	1.11
13	253	106	888	56	2.49


**Most Compact: 5.62 For District: 5**

**Least Compact: 0.85 For District: 8**


## Michigan State Senate Districts

The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission approved the following map and district boundaries for the 38 state senate districts.

### Legal Description & Interactive Map



## METRO DETROIT



## **POPULATION**

*“(a) Districts shall be of equal population as mandated by the United States constitution, and shall comply with the voting rights act and other federal laws.”*

The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission sought and relied on legal counsel and expert advice in order to draw plans that complied with the requirements of the United States constitution, the Voting Rights Act and other federal laws. Material reflecting that counsel and advice is accessible on the Commission’s website.

**[Meeting Notices & Materials](#)**

**[Meeting Notices & Materials Archives](#)**

**[Mapping Data](#)**

DISTRICT	Total Population				Racial Demographics as Percent of Total Population					Voting Age Population		Racial Demographics as Percent of Voting Population				
	All Persons	Target	Dev.	Difference	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority	VAP	% of Total	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority
1	270,366	265,193	1.95%✓	5,173	38.73%	34.78%	0.85%	19.30%	61.27%	201,593	74.6%	42.88%	35.03%	0.93%	16.83%	57.12%
2	260,296	265,193	-1.85%✓	-4,897	61.33%	24.66%	1.60%	8.81%	38.67%	188,578	72.4%	61.85%	24.47%	1.83%	7.88%	38.15%
3	268,291	265,193	1.17%✓	3,098	39.96%	42.25%	10.11%	2.40%	60.04%	212,874	79.3%	41.95%	42.09%	9.46%	2.19%	58.05%
4	259,877	265,193	-2.00%✓	-5,316	74.98%	14.56%	2.25%	6.09%	25.02%	214,717	82.6%	74.71%	13.32%	2.14%	4.98%	25.29%
5	260,723	265,193	-1.69%✓	-4,470	62.23%	19.28%	9.16%	3.96%	37.77%	205,113	78.7%	65.09%	18.25%	8.86%	3.42%	34.91%
6	269,435	265,193	1.60%✓	4,242	44.15%	39.61%	5.40%	2.93%	55.85%	205,711	76.3%	48.95%	39.15%	5.55%	2.60%	51.05%
7	258,715	265,193	-2.44%✓	-6,478	39.05%	45.54%	4.57%	7.55%	60.95%	208,010	80.4%	40.54%	44.78%	4.71%	6.20%	59.46%
8	267,500	265,193	0.87%✓	2,307	47.83%	40.57%	1.66%	2.48%	52.17%	206,961	77.4%	52.04%	40.25%	1.85%	2.28%	47.96%
9	260,091	265,193	-1.92%✓	-5,102	71.32%	4.34%	17.23%	3.75%	28.68%	206,406	79.4%	73.16%	4.24%	16.23%	3.18%	26.84%
10	260,891	265,193	-1.62%✓	-4,302	47.66%	44.75%	4.16%	2.22%	52.34%	207,211	79.4%	50.14%	40.43%	3.95%	1.90%	49.86%
11	267,881	265,193	1.01%✓	2,688	66.85%	20.46%	2.30%	2.76%	33.15%	204,523	76.3%	72.05%	19.19%	2.35%	2.38%	27.95%
12	270,210	265,193	1.89%✓	5,017	75.00%	12.13%	1.16%	2.78%	25.00%	207,870	76.9%	81.01%	11.52%	1.29%	2.34%	18.99%
13	258,822	265,193	-2.40%✓	-6,371	73.56%	8.54%	13.82%	3.34%	26.44%	213,186	82.4%	73.47%	8.19%	12.43%	2.77%	26.53%
14	262,085	265,193	-1.17%✓	-3,108	82.27%	6.31%	5.30%	4.33%	17.73%	218,191	83.3%	80.82%	5.96%	5.36%	3.37%	19.18%
15	260,766	265,193	-1.67%✓	-4,427	68.07%	14.59%	8.11%	6.21%	31.93%	221,289	84.9%	68.01%	13.28%	8.09%	5.32%	31.99%
16	262,182	265,193	-1.14%✓	-3,011	89.48%	2.47%	0.56%	5.66%	10.52%	213,755	81.5%	88.39%	2.36%	0.57%	4.46%	11.61%
17	266,557	265,193	0.51%✓	1,364	84.35%	4.39%	0.97%	6.06%	15.65%	209,069	78.4%	85.38%	4.32%	1.02%	4.72%	14.62%
18	268,135	265,193	1.11%✓	2,942	83.41%	4.92%	1.70%	4.49%	16.59%	205,401	76.6%	85.77%	4.66%	1.56%	3.62%	14.23%
19	262,619	265,193	-0.97%✓	-2,574	76.77%	11.36%	2.70%	5.88%	23.23%	211,508	80.5%	77.49%	10.03%	2.71%	4.80%	22.51%
20	262,284	265,193	-1.10%✓	-2,909	75.11%	9.05%	2.03%	8.53%	24.89%	200,292	76.4%	78.64%	8.34%	1.95%	6.73%	21.36%
21	271,390	265,193	2.34%✓	6,197	68.10%	11.61%	2.75%	8.46%	31.90%	205,416	75.7%	73.70%	11.23%	2.77%	7.38%	26.30%
22	264,573	265,193	-0.23%✓	-620	89.50%	0.65%	0.78%	2.86%	10.50%	204,483	77.3%	92.17%	0.65%	0.83%	2.37%	7.83%
23	263,780	265,193	-0.53%✓	-1,413	85.17%	3.66%	2.70%	5.03%	14.83%	211,880	80.3%	85.65%	3.52%	2.62%	4.05%	14.35%
24	271,211	265,193	2.27%✓	6,018	83.91%	1.69%	2.41%	3.77%	16.09%	203,066	74.9%	89.06%	1.70%	2.44%	3.24%	10.94%
25	264,345	265,193	-0.32%✓	-848	89.17%	2.24%	0.45%	3.64%	10.83%	209,073	79.1%	90.82%	2.19%	0.46%	2.94%	9.18%
26	266,938	265,193	0.66%✓	1,745	84.87%	3.15%	0.42%	4.46%	15.13%	206,886	77.5%	88.51%	3.13%	0.44%	3.71%	11.49%
27	269,043	265,193	1.45%✓	3,850	57.85%	27.73%	1.22%	4.07%	42.15%	200,250	74.4%	63.00%	27.27%	1.32%	3.66%	37.00%
28	265,180	265,193	0.00%✓	-13	78.73%	4.65%	5.09%	5.07%	21.27%	210,771	79.5%	81.43%	4.84%	5.29%	4.38%	18.57%
29	263,566	265,193	-0.61%✓	-1,627	55.33%	16.51%	4.61%	18.56%	44.67%	200,247	76.0%	60.57%	15.37%	4.63%	15.50%	39.43%
30	264,560	265,193	-0.24%✓	-633	81.65%	5.68%	2.38%	7.62%	18.35%	212,420	80.3%	82.52%	5.06%	2.30%	6.18%	17.48%
31	267,918	265,193	1.03%✓	2,725	79.46%	1.56%	2.85%	10.84%	20.54%	200,843	75.0%	83.32%	1.41%	2.92%	9.22%	16.68%
32	270,401	265,193	1.96%✓	5,208	75.58%	9.07%	0.52%	6.01%	24.42%	205,945	76.2%	80.98%	8.80%	0.55%	4.92%	19.02%
33	267,378	265,193	0.82%✓	2,185	87.59%	2.51%	0.43%	5.12%	12.41%	207,138	77.5%	88.65%	2.99%	0.43%	4.33%	11.35%
34	261,805	265,193	-1.28%✓	-3,388	90.54%	2.22%	0.72%	3.76%	9.46%	213,991	81.7%	89.33%	2.34%	0.72%	3.01%	10.67%
35	268,708	265,193	1.33%✓	3,515	74.07%	12.21%	1.54%	7.75%	25.93%	211,487	78.7%	76.93%	11.30%	1.55%	6.32%	23.07%
36	270,486	265,193	2.00%✓	5,293	92.65%	0.35%	0.36%	2.03%	7.35%	220,106	81.4%	93.79%	0.30%	0.37%	1.55%	6.21%
37	261,707	265,193	-1.31%✓	-3,486	87.54%	0.73%	0.59%	2.45%	12.46%	213,146	81.4%	89.30%	0.75%	0.57%	1.95%	10.70%
38	266,616	265,193	0.54%✓	1,423	88.14%	1.65%	0.69%	1.74%	11.86%	217,404	81.5%	89.52%	1.90%	0.72%	1.43%	10.48%

Assigned 10077331  
Total Pop 10077331  
Inassigne: 0

## **COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST**

The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission sought to understand Michigan's diverse population and communities of interest via public engagement and feedback opportunities. In total, MICRC received more than 29,000 comments.

*"(c) Districts shall reflect the state's diverse population and communities of interest."*

### **[Comments on Final Congressional Map \(Linden\)](#)**

#### **[Comments on All Proposed Maps](#)**

#### **[Public Comment Portal Comments](#)**

#### **[Commission Meeting Comments](#)**

## PARTISAN FAIRNESS

(d) Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.

The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission evaluated partisan fairness using four mathematical models. The adopted map did not provide 'disproportionate advantage' to any political party under any of the models used to measure partisan fairness.

### Lopsided Margins



Average Winning Margin	Dem	63.2%
	Rep	58.7%

Finding	
Rep	Districts have a lopsided margin advantage of <b>4.5%</b>

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Percent Votes		Party Wins	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
1	851,070	292,452	1,143,522	74.4%	25.6%	74.4%	
2	755,866	262,569	1,018,435	74.2%	25.8%	74.2%	
3	946,197	224,423	1,170,620	80.8%	19.2%	80.8%	
4	828,426	653,023	1,481,449	55.9%	44.1%	55.9%	
5	851,926	556,975	1,408,901	60.5%	39.5%	60.5%	
6	1,016,114	469,106	1,485,220	68.4%	31.6%	68.4%	
7	1,132,528	418,860	1,551,388	73.0%	27.0%	73.0%	
8	1,251,274	394,020	1,645,294	76.1%	23.9%	76.1%	
9	705,117	777,377	1,482,494	47.6%	52.4%		52.4%
10	914,105	420,349	1,334,454	68.5%	31.5%	68.5%	
11	770,214	657,708	1,427,922	53.9%	46.1%	53.9%	
12	802,043	830,837	1,632,880	49.1%	50.9%		50.9%
13	938,950	814,031	1,752,981	53.6%	46.4%	53.6%	
14	860,212	701,929	1,562,141	55.1%	44.9%	55.1%	
15	1,087,019	448,037	1,535,056	70.8%	29.2%	70.8%	
16	605,886	839,809	1,445,695	41.9%	58.1%		58.1%
17	503,371	806,208	1,309,579	38.4%	61.6%		61.6%
18	577,925	855,830	1,433,755	40.3%	59.7%		59.7%
19	857,354	656,945	1,514,299	56.6%	43.4%	56.6%	
20	580,817	834,128	1,414,945	41.0%	59.0%		59.0%
21	873,298	623,609	1,496,907	58.3%	41.7%	58.3%	
22	632,830	1,012,216	1,645,046	38.5%	61.5%		61.5%
23	678,270	941,820	1,620,090	41.9%	58.1%		58.1%
24	591,273	1,021,738	1,613,011	36.7%	63.3%		63.3%
25	570,630	894,868	1,465,498	38.9%	61.1%		61.1%
26	694,054	861,687	1,555,741	44.6%	55.4%		55.4%
27	948,759	485,590	1,434,349	66.1%	33.9%	66.1%	
28	822,315	659,345	1,481,660	55.5%	44.5%	55.5%	
29	742,769	530,176	1,272,945	58.4%	41.6%	58.4%	
30	705,493	818,997	1,524,490	46.3%	53.7%		53.7%
31	532,144	1,009,913	1,542,057	34.5%	65.5%		65.5%
32	717,007	710,001	1,427,008	50.2%	49.8%	50.2%	
33	494,983	873,196	1,368,179	36.2%	63.8%		63.8%
34	569,367	802,097	1,371,464	41.5%	58.5%		58.5%
35	832,714	734,835	1,567,549	53.1%	46.9%	53.1%	
36	618,130	1,010,985	1,629,115	37.9%	62.1%		62.1%
37	736,347	969,123	1,705,470	43.2%	56.8%		56.8%
38	691,811	823,414	1,515,225	45.7%	54.3%		54.3%

## Lopsided Margins



## Mean-Median Difference

District Median Percentage	Dem	51.7%
	Rep	48.3%
Statewide mean percentage	Dem	52.8%
	Rep	47.2%
Mean-Median Difference	Dem	1.2%
	Rep	-1.2%

Findings		
Rep	Districts have a mean-median advantage of <b>1.2%</b>	

DISTRICT	Party	
	Dem	Rep
1	74.4%	25.6%
2	74.2%	25.8%
3	80.8%	19.2%
4	55.9%	44.1%
5	60.5%	39.5%
6	68.4%	31.6%
7	73.0%	27.0%
8	76.1%	23.9%
9	47.6%	52.4%
10	68.5%	31.5%
11	53.9%	46.1%
12	49.1%	50.9%
13	53.6%	46.4%
14	55.1%	44.9%
15	70.8%	29.2%
16	41.9%	58.1%
17	38.4%	61.6%
18	40.3%	59.7%
19	56.6%	43.4%
20	41.0%	59.0%
21	58.3%	41.7%
22	38.5%	61.5%
23	41.9%	58.1%
24	36.7%	63.3%
25	38.9%	61.1%
26	44.6%	55.4%
27	66.1%	33.9%
28	55.5%	44.5%
29	58.4%	41.6%
30	46.3%	53.7%
31	34.5%	65.5%
32	50.2%	49.8%
33	36.2%	63.8%
34	41.5%	58.5%
35	53.1%	46.9%
36	37.9%	62.1%
37	43.2%	56.8%
38	45.7%	54.3%

## Efficiency Gap

		Total Wasted Votes	% Wasted Votes of Total Votes
Statewide % Wasted Votes	Dem	14,932,558	26.67%
	Rep	13,060,859	23.33%

Finding	
Rep	Candidates have an efficiency gap advantage of <b>3.3%</b>

DISTRICT	Dem	Rep	Total Votes	Dem	Rep	Minimum to win	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
1	851,070	292,452	1,143,522	0	292,452	571,761	279,309	0	279,309	292,452
2	755,866	262,569	1,018,435	0	262,569	509,218	246,649	0	246,649	262,569
3	946,197	224,423	1,170,620	0	224,423	585,310	360,887	0	360,887	224,423
4	828,426	653,023	1,481,449	0	653,023	740,725	87,702	0	87,702	653,023
5	851,926	556,975	1,408,901	0	556,975	704,451	147,476	0	147,476	556,975
6	1,016,114	469,106	1,485,220	0	469,106	742,610	273,504	0	273,504	469,106
7	1,132,528	418,860	1,551,388	0	418,860	775,694	356,834	0	356,834	418,860
8	1,251,274	394,020	1,645,294	0	394,020	822,647	428,627	0	428,627	394,020
9	705,117	777,377	1,482,494	705,117	0	741,247	0	36,130	705,117	36,130
10	914,105	420,349	1,334,454	0	420,349	667,227	246,878	0	246,878	420,349
11	770,214	657,708	1,427,922	0	657,708	713,961	56,253	0	56,253	657,708
12	802,043	830,837	1,632,880	802,043	0	816,440	0	14,397	802,043	14,397
13	938,950	814,031	1,752,981	0	814,031	876,491	62,460	0	62,460	814,031
14	860,212	701,929	1,562,141	0	701,929	781,071	79,142	0	79,142	701,929
15	1,087,019	448,037	1,535,056	0	448,037	767,528	319,491	0	319,491	448,037
16	605,886	839,809	1,445,695	605,886	0	722,848	0	116,962	605,886	116,962
17	503,371	806,208	1,309,579	503,371	0	654,790	0	151,419	503,371	151,419
18	577,925	855,830	1,433,755	577,925	0	716,878	0	138,953	577,925	138,953
19	857,354	656,945	1,514,299	0	656,945	757,150	100,205	0	100,205	656,945

## Efficiency Gap

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Lost Votes		Minimum to win	Surplus Votes		Total Wasted Votes	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
21	873,298	623,609	1,496,907	0	623,609	748,454	124,845	0	124,845	623,609
22	632,830	1,012,216	1,645,046	632,830	0	822,523	0	189,693	632,830	189,693
23	678,270	941,820	1,620,090	678,270	0	810,045	0	131,775	678,270	131,775
24	591,273	1,021,738	1,613,011	591,273	0	806,506	0	215,233	591,273	215,233
25	570,630	894,868	1,465,498	570,630	0	732,749	0	162,119	570,630	162,119
26	694,054	861,687	1,555,741	694,054	0	777,871	0	83,817	694,054	83,817
27	948,759	485,590	1,434,349	0	485,590	717,175	231,585	0	231,585	485,590
28	822,315	659,345	1,481,660	0	659,345	740,830	81,485	0	81,485	659,345
29	742,769	530,176	1,272,945	0	530,176	636,473	106,297	0	106,297	530,176
30	705,493	818,997	1,524,490	705,493	0	762,245	0	56,752	705,493	56,752
31	532,144	1,009,913	1,542,057	532,144	0	771,029	0	238,885	532,144	238,885
32	717,007	710,001	1,427,008	0	710,001	713,504	3,503	0	3,503	710,001
33	494,983	873,196	1,368,179	494,983	0	684,090	0	189,107	494,983	189,107
34	569,367	802,097	1,371,464	569,367	0	685,732	0	116,365	569,367	116,365
35	832,714	734,835	1,567,549	0	734,835	783,775	48,940	0	48,940	734,835
36	618,130	1,010,985	1,629,115	618,130	0	814,558	0	196,428	618,130	196,428
37	736,347	969,123	1,705,470	736,347	0	852,735	0	116,388	736,347	116,388
38	691,811	823,414	1,515,225	691,811	0	757,613	0	65,802	691,811	65,802

## Seats to Votes Ratio

	Vote Share	Count of Seats	Seat Share	Proportionality Bias
Dem	52.3%	20	52.6%	0.3%
Rep	47.7%	18	47.4%	-0.3%

DISTRICT	Composite Score			
	Dem	Dem %	Rep	Rep %
1	851,070	74.4%	292,452	25.6%
2	755,866	74.2%	262,569	25.8%
3	946,197	80.8%	224,423	19.2%
4	828,426	55.9%	653,023	44.1%
5	851,926	60.5%	556,975	39.5%
6	1,016,114	68.4%	469,106	31.6%
7	1,132,528	73.0%	418,860	27.0%
8	1,251,274	76.1%	394,020	23.9%
9	705,117	47.6%	777,377	52.4%
10	914,105	68.5%	420,349	31.5%
11	770,214	53.9%	657,708	46.1%
12	802,043	49.1%	830,837	50.9%
13	938,950	53.6%	814,031	46.4%
14	860,212	55.1%	701,929	44.9%
15	1,087,019	70.8%	448,037	29.2%
16	605,886	41.9%	839,809	58.1%
17	503,371	38.4%	806,208	61.6%
18	577,925	40.3%	855,830	59.7%
19	857,354	56.6%	656,945	43.4%
20	580,817	41.0%	834,128	59.0%
21	873,298	58.3%	623,609	41.7%
22	632,830	38.5%	1,012,216	61.5%
23	678,270	41.9%	941,820	58.1%
24	591,273	36.7%	1,021,738	63.3%
25	570,630	38.9%	894,868	61.1%
26	694,054	44.6%	861,687	55.4%
27	948,759	66.1%	485,590	33.9%
28	822,315	55.5%	659,345	44.5%
29	742,769	58.4%	530,176	41.6%
30	705,493	46.3%	818,997	53.7%
31	532,144	34.5%	1,009,913	65.5%
32	717,007	50.2%	710,001	49.8%
33	494,983	36.2%	873,196	63.8%
34	569,367	41.5%	802,097	58.5%
35	832,714	53.1%	734,835	46.9%
36	618,130	37.9%	1,010,985	62.1%
37	736,347	43.2%	969,123	56.8%
38	691,811	45.7%	823,414	54.3%

## COMPACTNESS

The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission evaluated the requirement of "(g) Districts shall be reasonably compact" using five mathematical models. The adopted map was deemed 'reasonably compact' under each model.

### Polsby-Popper

#### Compactness measure: Polsby-Popper

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	71	63	315	30	0.23
2	54	38	114	26	0.48
3	70	66	345	30	0.20
4	251	88	616	56	0.41
5	79	50	198	32	0.40
6	74	47	179	31	0.41
7	113	66	345	38	0.33
8	49	49	192	25	0.26
9	105	57	255	36	0.41
10	61	55	241	28	0.25
11	63	54	234	28	0.27
12	306	89	629	62	0.49
13	132	65	333	41	0.39
14	966	165	2,158	110	0.45
15	406	122	1,186	71	0.34
16	1,797	223	3,954	150	0.45
17	3,507	419	13,972	210	0.25
18	1,589	244	4,740	141	0.34
19	543	108	924	83	0.59
20	1,890	318	8,068	154	0.23
21	887	134	1,426	106	0.62
22	874	133	1,416	105	0.62
23	309	92	677	62	0.46
24	547	133	1,403	83	0.39
25	5,020	353	9,894	251	0.51
26	1,701	269	5,763	146	0.30
27	288	84	555	60	0.52
28	1,119	169	2,266	119	0.49
29	77	41	133	31	0.58
30	360	112	994	67	0.36
31	2,499	227	4,100	177	0.61
32	5,788	347	9,573	270	0.60
33	2,924	333	8,827	192	0.33
34	4,334	354	9,974	233	0.43
35	767	137	1,502	98	0.51
36	14,061	615	30,128	420	0.47
37	9,836	613	29,891	352	0.33
38	33,196	943	70,771	646	0.47

Most Compact: 0.62 For District: 22

Least Compact: 0.2 For District: 3

## Schwartzberg

### Compactness measure: Schwartzberg

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	71	63	315	30	0.47
2	54	38	114	26	0.69
3	70	66	345	30	0.45
4	251	88	616	56	0.64
5	79	50	198	32	0.63
6	74	47	179	31	0.64
7	113	66	345	38	0.57
8	49	49	192	25	0.51
9	105	57	255	36	0.64
10	61	55	241	28	0.50
11	63	54	234	28	0.52
12	306	89	629	62	0.70
13	132	65	333	41	0.63
14	966	165	2,158	110	0.67
15	406	122	1,186	71	0.59
16	1,797	223	3,954	150	0.67
17	3,507	419	13,972	210	0.50
18	1,589	244	4,740	141	0.58
19	543	108	924	83	0.77
20	1,890	318	8,068	154	0.48
21	887	134	1,426	106	0.79
22	874	133	1,416	105	0.79
23	309	92	677	62	0.68
24	547	133	1,403	83	0.62
25	5,020	353	9,894	251	0.71
26	1,701	269	5,763	146	0.54
27	288	84	555	60	0.72
28	1,119	169	2,266	119	0.70
29	77	41	133	31	0.76
30	360	112	994	67	0.60
31	2,499	227	4,100	177	0.78
32	5,788	347	9,573	270	0.78
33	2,924	333	8,827	192	0.58
34	4,334	354	9,974	233	0.66
35	767	137	1,502	98	0.71
36	14,061	615	30,128	420	0.68
37	9,836	613	29,891	352	0.57
38	33,196	943	70,771	646	0.68

**Most Compact: 0.79 For District: 22**

**Least Compact: 0.45 For District: 3**

## Reock Score

### Compactness measure: Reock Score

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	71	63	315	30	0.27
2	54	38	114	26	0.61
3	70	66	345	30	0.28
4	251	88	616	56	0.47
5	79	50	198	32	0.50
6	74	47	179	31	0.44
7	113	66	345	38	0.32
8	49	49	192	25	0.37
9	105	57	255	36	0.47
10	61	55	241	28	0.24
11	63	54	234	28	0.23
12	306	89	629	62	0.42
13	132	65	333	41	0.34
14	966	165	2,158	110	0.35
15	406	122	1,186	71	0.41
16	1,797	223	3,954	150	0.32
17	3,507	419	13,972	210	0.22
18	1,589	244	4,740	141	0.41
19	543	108	924	83	0.57
20	1,890	318	8,068	154	0.30
21	887	134	1,426	106	0.49
22	874	133	1,416	105	0.51
23	309	92	677	62	0.46
24	547	133	1,403	83	0.41
25	5,020	353	9,894	251	0.53
26	1,701	269	5,763	146	0.39
27	288	84	555	60	0.56
28	1,119	169	2,266	119	0.52
29	77	41	133	31	0.57
30	360	112	994	67	0.37
31	2,499	227	4,100	177	0.60
32	5,788	347	9,573	270	0.43
33	2,924	333	8,827	192	0.29
34	4,334	354	9,974	233	0.50
35	767	137	1,502	98	0.58
36	14,061	615	30,128	420	0.49
37	9,836	613	29,891	352	0.38
38	33,196	943	70,771	646	0.51

**Most Compact: 0.61 For District: 2**

**Least Compact: 0.22 For District: 17**

## Convex Hull

### Compactness measure: Convex Hull

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	71	63	315	30	0.59
2	54	38	114	26	0.84
3	70	66	345	30	0.59
4	251	88	616	56	0.78
5	79	50	198	32	0.77
6	74	47	179	31	0.79
7	113	66	345	38	0.79
8	49	49	192	25	0.72
9	105	57	255	36	0.79
10	61	55	241	28	0.63
11	63	54	234	28	0.73
12	306	89	629	62	0.86
13	132	65	333	41	0.75
14	966	165	2,158	110	0.91
15	406	122	1,186	71	0.77
16	1,797	223	3,954	150	0.94
17	3,507	419	13,972	210	0.64
18	1,589	244	4,740	141	0.71
19	543	108	924	83	0.86
20	1,890	318	8,068	154	0.62
21	887	134	1,426	106	0.96
22	874	133	1,416	105	0.89
23	309	92	677	62	0.86
24	547	133	1,403	83	0.81
25	5,020	353	9,894	251	0.87
26	1,701	269	5,763	146	0.70
27	288	84	555	60	0.95
28	1,119	169	2,266	119	0.83
29	77	41	133	31	0.93
30	360	112	994	67	0.74
31	2,499	227	4,100	177	0.90
32	5,788	347	9,573	270	0.91
33	2,924	333	8,827	192	0.70
34	4,334	354	9,974	233	0.78
35	767	137	1,502	98	0.80
36	14,061	615	30,128	420	0.79
37	9,836	613	29,891	352	0.76
38	33,196	943	70,771	646	0.87

Most Compact: 0.96 For District: 21

Least Compact: 0.59 For District: 1

## Length-Width

### Compactness measure: Length-Width

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	71	63	315	30	1.21
2	54	38	114	26	1.59
3	70	66	345	30	0.86
4	251	88	616	56	1.63
5	79	50	198	32	1.74
6	74	47	179	31	1.65
7	113	66	345	38	0.67
8	49	49	192	25	0.80
9	105	57	255	36	1.04
10	61	55	241	28	0.61
11	63	54	234	28	0.50
12	306	89	629	62	1.19
13	132	65	333	41	0.85
14	966	165	2,158	110	2.90
15	406	122	1,186	71	1.65
16	1,797	223	3,954	150	4.04
17	3,507	419	13,972	210	3.60
18	1,589	244	4,740	141	1.00
19	543	108	924	83	1.65
20	1,890	318	8,068	154	1.74
21	887	134	1,426	106	2.34
22	874	133	1,416	105	1.55
23	309	92	677	62	0.99
24	547	133	1,403	83	2.01
25	5,020	353	9,894	251	1.05
26	1,701	269	5,763	146	1.69
27	288	84	555	60	1.35
28	1,119	169	2,266	119	1.71
29	77	41	133	31	2.01
30	360	112	994	67	2.05
31	2,499	227	4,100	177	1.88
32	5,788	347	9,573	270	0.80
33	2,924	333	8,827	192	0.87
34	4,334	354	9,974	233	1.55
35	767	137	1,502	98	1.27
36	14,061	615	30,128	420	1.87
37	9,836	613	29,891	352	1.63
38	33,196	943	70,771	646	1.87


**Most Compact: 4.04 For District: 16**

**Least Compact: 0.5 For District: 11**


## Michigan State House Districts

The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission approved the following map and district boundaries for the 110 state house districts.


### [Legal Description & Interactive Map](#)



## METRO DETROIT



## GREATER GRAND RAPIDS



## **POPULATION**

*“(a) Districts shall be of equal population as mandated by the United States constitution, and shall comply with the voting rights act and other federal laws.”*

The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission sought and relied on legal counsel and expert advice in order to draw plans that complied with the requirements of the United States constitution, the Voting Rights Act and other federal laws. Material reflecting that counsel and advice is accessible on the Commission's website.

### **[Meeting Notices & Materials](#)**

### **[Meeting Notices & Materials Archives](#)**

### **[Mapping Data](#)**

## POPULATION

DISTRICT	Total Population				Racial Demographics as Percent of Total Population					Voting Age Population		Racial Demographics as Percent of Voting Population				
	All Person	Target	Dev.	Difference	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority	VAP	% of Total	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority
1	91,856	91,612	0.27%✓	244	16.79%	35.26%	0.33%	43.92%	83.21%	65,520	71.3%	18.67%	38.03%	0.38%	39.49%	81.33%
2	89,622	91,612	-2.17%✓	-1,990	63.27%	11.54%	1.13%	18.58%	36.73%	69,719	77.8%	67.61%	11.04%	1.21%	15.61%	32.39%
3	93,531	91,612	2.09%✓	1,919	51.18%	33.31%	2.34%	8.21%	48.82%	66,030	70.6%	52.34%	32.82%	2.77%	7.64%	47.66%
4	90,903	91,612	-0.77%✓	-709	41.08%	52.65%	0.47%	1.72%	58.92%	64,833	71.3%	38.61%	55.60%	0.50%	1.61%	61.39%
5	92,744	91,612	1.24%✓	1,132	36.68%	55.87%	1.53%	1.96%	63.32%	71,629	77.2%	38.11%	55.31%	1.55%	1.70%	61.89%
6	93,629	91,612	2.20%✓	2,017	36.10%	56.66%	1.15%	2.03%	63.90%	73,324	78.3%	38.54%	54.93%	1.31%	1.79%	61.46%
7	92,948	91,612	1.46%✓	1,336	44.28%	46.93%	1.51%	2.80%	55.72%	75,856	81.6%	47.68%	44.29%	1.71%	2.52%	52.32%
8	92,670	91,612	1.15%✓	1,058	41.68%	45.73%	4.16%	2.96%	58.32%	76,299	82.3%	44.50%	43.70%	4.57%	2.61%	55.50%
9	90,818	91,612	-0.87%✓	-794	28.46%	50.05%	15.19%	1.57%	71.54%	66,200	72.9%	28.03%	51.65%	14.68%	1.48%	71.97%
10	90,534	91,612	-1.18%✓	-1,078	53.11%	38.14%	2.08%	2.77%	46.89%	74,475	82.3%	53.31%	38.79%	2.32%	2.35%	46.69%
11	91,145	91,612	-0.51%✓	-467	46.16%	46.82%	0.80%	2.19%	53.84%	70,700	77.6%	51.18%	42.82%	0.93%	1.82%	48.82%
12	90,630	91,612	-1.07%✓	-982	45.97%	44.46%	1.33%	2.45%	54.03%	68,955	76.1%	51.03%	40.99%	1.28%	2.08%	48.97%
13	90,393	91,612	-1.33%✓	-1,219	47.56%	41.39%	4.11%	2.17%	52.44%	69,812	77.2%	52.03%	38.36%	3.91%	1.89%	47.97%
14	90,555	91,612	-1.15%✓	-1,057	38.99%	43.39%	10.11%	2.45%	61.01%	69,140	76.4%	43.17%	41.11%	9.31%	2.14%	56.83%
15	92,301	91,612	0.75%✓	689	80.88%	7.49%	1.72%	5.23%	19.12%	69,652	75.5%	82.15%	7.18%	1.87%	4.70%	17.85%
16	93,035	91,612	1.55%✓	1,423	34.88%	56.88%	0.94%	2.87%	65.12%	72,066	77.5%	38.03%	54.92%	1.02%	2.44%	61.97%
17	90,737	91,612	-0.96%✓	-875	45.56%	44.57%	1.80%	3.10%	54.44%	71,354	78.6%	48.90%	42.43%	1.94%	2.64%	51.10%
18	92,169	91,612	0.61%✓	557	36.50%	52.03%	4.21%	2.71%	63.50%	75,714	82.1%	37.44%	52.16%	4.12%	2.40%	62.56%
19	90,931	91,612	-0.74%✓	-681	60.63%	24.62%	7.86%	2.80%	39.37%	72,930	80.2%	61.39%	25.11%	8.00%	2.34%	38.61%
20	93,017	91,612	1.53%✓	1,405	75.60%	10.28%	7.26%	2.68%	24.40%	74,684	80.3%	76.81%	10.20%	7.42%	2.25%	23.19%
21	93,876	91,612	2.47%✓	2,264	57.07%	7.60%	27.76%	3.48%	42.93%	71,599	76.3%	59.96%	7.89%	26.00%	3.07%	40.04%
22	91,654	91,612	0.05%✓	42	85.05%	2.23%	5.67%	3.19%	14.95%	75,487	82.4%	86.64%	2.24%	5.33%	2.74%	13.36%
23	90,719	91,612	-0.97%✓	-893	70.61%	4.68%	14.87%	4.41%	29.39%	76,266	84.1%	71.65%	4.78%	14.75%	4.14%	28.35%
24	91,480	91,612	-0.14%✓	-132	61.18%	10.03%	20.19%	3.69%	38.82%	69,996	76.5%	63.53%	9.84%	19.60%	3.29%	36.47%
25	90,562	91,612	-1.15%✓	-1,050	64.13%	20.53%	4.87%	4.47%	35.87%	73,216	80.8%	66.72%	19.62%	4.96%	3.82%	33.28%
26	91,723	91,612	0.12%✓	111	50.52%	37.86%	1.05%	4.20%	49.48%	70,678	77.1%	54.11%	35.82%	1.14%	3.61%	45.89%
27	90,457	91,612	-1.26%✓	-1,155	84.33%	3.05%	1.18%	6.36%	15.67%	73,737	81.5%	86.29%	2.93%	1.21%	5.34%	13.71%
28	91,598	91,612	-0.02%✓	-14	74.98%	9.75%	3.36%	6.24%	25.02%	71,385	77.9%	77.44%	9.14%	3.23%	5.36%	22.56%
29	92,583	91,612	1.06%✓	971	72.48%	13.37%	1.38%	6.68%	27.52%	72,381	78.2%	76.05%	11.83%	1.40%	5.62%	23.95%
30	93,460	91,612	2.02%✓	1,848	87.42%	2.57%	0.64%	4.06%	12.58%	73,606	78.8%	89.60%	2.30%	0.67%	3.21%	10.40%
31	92,978	91,612	1.49%✓	1,366	72.74%	16.00%	1.27%	4.03%	27.26%	73,558	79.1%	74.55%	15.72%	1.28%	3.54%	25.45%
32	92,092	91,612	0.52%✓	480	53.20%	28.29%	3.69%	7.17%	46.80%	73,449	79.8%	57.13%	26.46%	3.89%	6.21%	42.87%
33	92,730	91,612	1.22%✓	1,118	68.50%	7.94%	11.52%	5.90%	31.50%	74,822	80.7%	70.65%	7.76%	11.65%	5.23%	29.35%
34	92,371	91,612	0.83%✓	759	83.11%	2.61%	0.48%	8.88%	16.89%	73,142	79.2%	85.26%	2.88%	0.49%	7.27%	14.74%
35	93,023	91,612	1.54%✓	1,411	89.55%	1.44%	0.48%	4.20%	10.45%	71,335	76.7%	90.73%	1.66%	0.49%	3.29%	9.27%
36	89,634	91,612	-2.16%✓	-1,978	84.12%	2.73%	0.69%	7.00%	15.88%	68,621	76.6%	86.65%	2.74%	0.72%	5.44%	13.35%
37	91,456	91,612	-0.17%✓	-156	78.38%	6.26%	1.89%	6.54%	21.62%	71,787	78.5%	81.10%	6.19%	2.00%	5.18%	18.90%
38	93,422	91,612	1.98%✓	1,810	67.57%	19.03%	1.75%	6.63%	32.43%	73,770	79.0%	72.12%	16.97%	1.68%	5.18%	27.88%
39	90,270	91,612	-1.46%✓	-1,342	81.17%	1.69%	0.44%	10.74%	18.83%	69,482	77.0%	84.59%	1.69%	0.45%	8.20%	15.41%
40	90,211	91,612	-1.53%✓	-1,401	77.97%	7.16%	4.56%	4.57%	22.03%	69,763	77.3%	80.75%	6.74%	4.45%	3.86%	19.25%

## POPULATION

DISTRICT	Total Population				Racial Demographics as Percent of Total Population					Voting Age Population		Racial Demographics as Percent of Voting Population				
	All Person	Target	Dev.	Difference	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority	VAP	% of Total	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority
41	91,872	91,612	0.28%✓	260	59.50%	21.99%	2.17%	8.66%	40.50%	72,876	79.3%	64.54%	19.61%	2.54%	7.40%	35.46%
42	91,192	91,612	-0.46%✓	-420	86.29%	3.44%	1.09%	3.41%	13.71%	70,454	77.3%	88.31%	3.13%	1.11%	2.69%	11.69%
43	92,518	91,612	0.99%✓	906	88.43%	0.80%	0.52%	5.52%	11.57%	70,016	75.7%	90.34%	0.65%	0.51%	4.58%	9.66%
44	89,974	91,612	-1.79%✓	-1,638	67.40%	15.11%	3.76%	6.67%	32.60%	68,782	76.4%	71.48%	14.34%	3.39%	5.53%	28.52%
45	90,612	91,612	-1.09%✓	-1,000	90.40%	1.29%	0.55%	3.08%	9.60%	71,054	78.4%	92.00%	1.14%	0.54%	2.48%	8.00%
46	91,041	91,612	-0.62%✓	-571	75.41%	12.23%	1.26%	4.62%	24.59%	71,551	78.6%	78.41%	12.17%	1.26%	3.54%	21.59%
47	91,302	91,612	-0.34%✓	-310	82.97%	3.10%	3.93%	4.17%	17.03%	73,378	80.4%	84.80%	3.07%	4.17%	3.43%	15.20%
48	92,373	91,612	0.83%✓	761	83.36%	1.79%	6.90%	3.00%	16.64%	74,656	80.8%	84.30%	1.79%	7.25%	2.56%	15.70%
49	93,247	91,612	1.78%✓	1,635	81.32%	5.78%	4.20%	4.03%	18.68%	74,267	79.6%	82.78%	5.82%	4.14%	3.38%	17.22%
50	93,139	91,612	1.67%✓	1,527	91.14%	0.44%	0.72%	3.01%	8.86%	72,160	77.5%	92.28%	0.44%	0.77%	2.54%	7.72%
51	91,507	91,612	-0.11%✓	-105	89.00%	1.30%	1.29%	3.41%	11.00%	72,488	79.2%	90.44%	1.25%	1.35%	2.70%	9.56%
52	91,098	91,612	-0.56%✓	-514	84.95%	2.75%	1.63%	5.77%	15.05%	72,818	79.9%	86.85%	2.66%	1.63%	4.81%	13.15%
53	93,056	91,612	1.58%✓	1,444	40.81%	33.94%	2.28%	17.60%	59.19%	71,476	76.8%	46.05%	32.59%	2.35%	14.72%	53.95%
54	92,949	91,612	1.46%✓	1,337	73.66%	6.77%	9.52%	5.16%	26.34%	73,853	79.5%	75.32%	6.95%	9.54%	4.33%	24.68%
55	91,805	91,612	0.21%✓	193	73.68%	3.41%	13.74%	4.69%	26.32%	71,848	78.3%	75.98%	3.51%	13.12%	3.98%	24.02%
56	90,410	91,612	-1.31%✓	-1,202	67.73%	3.39%	21.41%	3.38%	32.27%	71,737	79.3%	70.93%	3.44%	19.61%	2.94%	29.07%
57	89,693	91,612	-2.09%✓	-1,919	74.61%	5.19%	13.76%	2.60%	25.39%	71,864	80.1%	76.21%	4.89%	13.48%	2.27%	23.79%
58	90,454	91,612	-1.26%✓	-1,158	78.17%	8.23%	6.25%	2.72%	21.83%	73,423	81.2%	79.90%	7.86%	6.07%	2.41%	20.10%
59	89,336	91,612	-2.48%✓	-2,276	86.97%	2.68%	3.69%	2.91%	13.03%	70,271	78.7%	88.36%	2.58%	3.58%	2.50%	11.64%
60	92,742	91,612	1.23%✓	1,130	81.65%	7.23%	3.47%	3.23%	18.35%	72,453	78.1%	83.34%	7.08%	3.47%	2.69%	16.66%
61	93,156	91,612	1.69%✓	1,544	73.83%	15.25%	2.72%	3.08%	26.17%	75,006	80.5%	77.01%	13.83%	2.69%	2.52%	22.99%
62	90,539	91,612	-1.17%✓	-1,073	77.07%	13.35%	1.44%	2.83%	22.93%	74,114	81.9%	79.79%	12.07%	1.47%	2.35%	20.21%
63	90,638	91,612	-1.06%✓	-974	88.69%	3.12%	0.74%	2.65%	11.31%	72,589	80.1%	90.27%	2.86%	0.79%	2.13%	9.73%
64	91,060	91,612	-0.60%✓	-552	85.90%	3.78%	0.61%	4.08%	14.10%	71,638	78.7%	88.31%	3.56%	0.65%	3.30%	11.69%
65	92,892	91,612	1.40%✓	1,280	87.96%	2.29%	0.36%	5.03%	12.04%	73,184	78.8%	89.40%	2.39%	0.36%	4.12%	10.60%
66	93,014	91,612	1.53%✓	1,402	88.17%	1.18%	1.61%	4.41%	11.83%	71,767	77.2%	89.95%	1.10%	1.61%	3.59%	10.05%
67	92,816	91,612	1.31%✓	1,204	87.35%	3.28%	0.42%	3.56%	12.65%	73,721	79.4%	88.89%	3.28%	0.41%	2.70%	11.11%
68	93,065	91,612	1.59%✓	1,453	82.34%	6.24%	1.74%	4.12%	17.66%	73,273	78.7%	84.24%	6.00%	1.78%	3.37%	15.76%
69	91,698	91,612	0.09%✓	86	68.76%	21.07%	0.85%	3.62%	31.24%	71,476	77.9%	71.44%	19.84%	0.88%	3.15%	28.56%
70	90,738	91,612	-0.95%✓	-874	36.26%	51.87%	0.51%	4.87%	63.74%	68,117	75.1%	39.89%	50.13%	0.59%	4.37%	60.11%
71	91,966	91,612	0.39%✓	354	91.17%	0.69%	0.43%	3.06%	8.83%	72,963	79.3%	92.41%	0.64%	0.42%	2.51%	7.59%
72	92,844	91,612	1.34%✓	1,232	85.21%	4.89%	1.27%	3.55%	14.79%	72,890	78.5%	86.72%	4.79%	1.31%	2.88%	13.28%
73	91,543	91,612	-0.08%✓	-69	77.71%	5.83%	7.53%	4.34%	22.29%	75,397	82.4%	78.57%	6.50%	7.50%	3.80%	21.43%
74	90,782	91,612	-0.91%✓	-830	58.79%	18.25%	4.34%	11.02%	41.21%	70,233	77.4%	63.43%	17.05%	4.27%	9.39%	36.57%
75	93,554	91,612	2.12%✓	1,942	79.32%	4.35%	5.90%	5.12%	20.68%	75,207	80.4%	81.08%	4.26%	6.12%	4.27%	18.92%
76	92,354	91,612	0.81%✓	742	78.11%	7.92%	2.58%	6.26%	21.89%	73,043	79.1%	80.63%	7.67%	2.44%	5.18%	19.37%
77	92,594	91,612	1.07%✓	982	69.49%	11.08%	2.11%	10.61%	30.51%	72,106	77.9%	73.16%	10.25%	2.18%	9.15%	26.84%
78	92,264	91,612	0.71%✓	652	87.59%	3.62%	0.42%	4.31%	12.41%	71,687	77.7%	88.34%	4.48%	0.43%	3.47%	11.66%
79	90,952	91,612	-0.72%✓	-660	82.38%	4.41%	3.55%	5.05%	17.62%	67,213	73.9%	84.66%	4.13%	3.49%	4.15%	15.34%
80	92,350	91,612	0.81%✓	738	67.22%	12.08%	8.14%	7.64%	32.78%	69,344	75.1%	70.96%	11.28%	7.94%	6.32%	29.04%

## POPULATION

DISTRICT	Total Population				Racial Demographics as Percent of Total Population					Voting Age Population		Racial Demographics as Percent of Voting Population				
	All Persons	Target	Dev.	Difference	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority	VAP	% of Total	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority
81	91,516	91,612	-0.10%✓	-96	78.37%	7.75%	3.19%	5.49%	21.63%	71,975	78.6%	81.42%	7.03%	3.06%	4.63%	18.58%
82	91,219	91,612	-0.43%✓	-393	49.92%	26.76%	3.33%	14.62%	50.08%	70,814	77.6%	55.75%	24.58%	3.37%	12.03%	44.25%
83	91,341	91,612	-0.30%✓	-271	51.58%	9.19%	2.73%	31.56%	48.42%	67,461	73.9%	57.46%	8.69%	2.98%	26.96%	42.54%
84	91,890	91,612	0.30%✓	278	75.14%	6.21%	1.83%	11.25%	24.86%	73,379	79.9%	79.03%	5.36%	1.91%	9.31%	20.97%
85	90,127	91,612	-1.62%✓	-1,485	87.14%	1.21%	2.12%	5.70%	12.86%	66,158	73.4%	89.34%	1.11%	2.16%	4.64%	10.66%
86	90,575	91,612	-1.13%✓	-1,037	66.02%	2.62%	5.08%	22.19%	33.98%	70,221	77.5%	70.69%	2.33%	5.13%	18.69%	29.31%
87	91,376	91,612	-0.26%✓	-236	61.91%	24.21%	0.50%	6.83%	38.09%	70,829	77.5%	65.83%	22.94%	0.53%	5.55%	34.17%
88	90,900	91,612	-0.78%✓	-712	87.81%	1.47%	1.42%	4.62%	12.19%	71,051	78.2%	89.90%	1.37%	1.37%	3.68%	10.10%
89	93,134	91,612	1.66%✓	1,522	86.99%	1.96%	0.82%	5.55%	13.01%	71,969	77.3%	88.55%	2.04%	0.89%	4.58%	11.45%
90	91,549	91,612	-0.07%✓	-63	87.20%	1.60%	0.91%	5.69%	12.80%	68,467	74.8%	89.55%	1.47%	0.89%	4.50%	10.45%
91	91,350	91,612	-0.29%✓	-262	90.75%	0.53%	0.38%	3.79%	9.25%	70,036	76.7%	92.31%	0.44%	0.38%	3.02%	7.69%
92	92,520	91,612	0.99%✓	908	81.45%	4.58%	1.37%	5.84%	18.55%	73,959	79.9%	82.92%	5.11%	1.41%	4.77%	17.08%
93	89,410	91,612	-2.40%✓	-2,202	86.47%	3.80%	1.18%	5.25%	13.53%	72,182	80.7%	87.40%	4.20%	1.17%	4.50%	12.60%
94	90,438	91,612	-1.28%✓	-1,174	46.40%	33.75%	1.24%	13.25%	53.60%	69,020	76.3%	51.34%	31.92%	1.29%	11.32%	48.66%
95	91,439	91,612	-0.19%✓	-173	88.86%	1.05%	1.89%	3.11%	11.14%	71,873	78.6%	90.46%	1.01%	1.85%	2.48%	9.54%
96	90,544	91,612	-1.17%✓	-1,068	86.81%	1.69%	0.55%	6.14%	13.19%	72,724	80.3%	89.24%	1.54%	0.58%	4.84%	10.76%
97	93,159	91,612	1.69%✓	1,547	88.85%	2.28%	0.49%	4.03%	11.15%	73,355	78.7%	90.17%	2.33%	0.49%	3.30%	9.83%
98	92,049	91,612	0.48%✓	437	92.62%	0.32%	0.29%	3.35%	7.38%	72,801	79.1%	93.77%	0.31%	0.29%	2.76%	6.23%
99	89,375	91,612	-2.44%✓	-2,237	92.86%	0.38%	0.35%	2.09%	7.14%	72,792	81.4%	93.81%	0.34%	0.36%	1.64%	6.19%
100	91,751	91,612	0.15%✓	139	91.21%	1.17%	0.45%	2.19%	8.79%	72,641	79.2%	92.09%	1.15%	0.50%	1.89%	7.91%
101	92,604	91,612	1.08%✓	992	87.51%	1.49%	0.45%	5.48%	12.49%	72,534	78.3%	88.89%	1.50%	0.45%	4.81%	11.11%
102	91,886	91,612	0.30%✓	274	85.43%	1.22%	0.40%	7.30%	14.57%	72,924	79.4%	87.83%	1.25%	0.40%	5.68%	12.17%
103	93,426	91,612	1.98%✓	1,814	89.71%	0.53%	0.79%	3.36%	10.29%	76,458	81.8%	91.48%	0.46%	0.73%	2.69%	8.52%
104	89,466	91,612	-2.34%✓	-2,146	91.28%	0.35%	0.44%	2.58%	8.72%	71,871	80.3%	92.68%	0.30%	0.46%	1.96%	7.32%
105	89,541	91,612	-2.26%✓	-2,071	92.67%	0.32%	0.32%	2.12%	7.33%	72,736	81.2%	93.86%	0.28%	0.33%	1.56%	6.14%
106	90,875	91,612	-0.80%✓	-737	92.66%	0.27%	0.31%	1.34%	7.34%	75,466	83.0%	93.74%	0.22%	0.32%	1.05%	6.26%
107	92,701	91,612	1.19%✓	1,089	83.30%	1.24%	0.52%	1.77%	16.70%	75,875	81.8%	85.31%	1.39%	0.48%	1.42%	14.69%
108	89,366	91,612	-2.45%✓	-2,246	85.05%	2.21%	0.34%	1.69%	14.95%	72,443	81.1%	87.00%	2.62%	0.36%	1.25%	13.00%
109	89,410	91,612	-2.40%✓	-2,202	87.41%	2.21%	0.51%	1.84%	12.59%	73,187	81.9%	88.58%	2.58%	0.53%	1.63%	11.42%
110	90,788	91,612	-0.90%✓	-824	91.64%	0.48%	1.19%	1.70%	8.36%	74,036	81.5%	92.71%	0.46%	1.25%	1.41%	7.29%
Assigned		10077331														
Total Pop		10077331														
Unassigned		0														

## **COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST**

The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission sought to understand Michigan's diverse population and communities of interest via public engagement and feedback opportunities. In total, MICRC received more than 29,000 comments.

*"(c) Districts shall reflect the state's diverse population and communities of interest."*

### **[Comments on Final Congressional Map \(Hickory\)](#)**

### **[Comments on All Proposed Maps](#)**

### **[Public Comment Portal Comments](#)**

### **[Commission Meeting Comments](#)**

## PARTISAN FAIRNESS

(d) Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.

The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission evaluated partisan fairness using four mathematical models. The adopted map did not provide 'disproportionate advantage' to any political party under any of the models used to measure partisan fairness.

### Lopsided Margins

Average Winning Margin	Dem	64.5%
	Rep	59.2%

Finding	
Rep	Districts have a lopsided margin advantage of <b>5.3%</b>

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Percent Votes		Party Wins	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
1	258,502	20,654	279,156	92.6%	7.4%	92.6%	52.3%
2	261,320	174,928	436,248	59.9%	40.1%	59.9%	
3	265,267	72,758	338,025	78.5%	21.5%	78.5%	
4	328,745	19,885	348,630	94.3%	5.7%	94.3%	
5	438,662	126,246	564,908	77.7%	22.3%	77.7%	
6	470,863	102,192	573,055	82.2%	17.8%	82.2%	
7	463,517	102,015	565,532	82.0%	18.0%	82.0%	
8	341,385	88,387	429,772	79.4%	20.6%	79.4%	
9	311,310	17,291	328,601	94.7%	5.3%	94.7%	
10	366,472	198,627	565,099	64.9%	35.1%	64.9%	
11	353,187	168,158	521,345	67.7%	32.3%	67.7%	
12	313,082	125,555	438,637	71.4%	28.6%	71.4%	
13	303,076	144,266	447,342	67.8%	32.2%	67.8%	
14	306,099	104,625	410,724	74.5%	25.5%	74.5%	
15	270,884	173,183	444,067	61.0%	39.0%	61.0%	
16	405,317	123,360	528,677	76.7%	23.3%	76.7%	
17	334,631	153,279	487,910	68.6%	31.4%	68.6%	
18	491,476	126,756	618,232	79.5%	20.5%	79.5%	
19	412,797	235,189	647,986	63.7%	36.3%	63.7%	
20	349,902	284,833	634,735	55.1%	44.9%	55.1%	
21	259,240	241,843	501,083	51.7%	48.3%	51.7%	
22	309,321	339,589	648,910	47.7%	52.3%		
23	291,695	187,546	479,241	60.9%	39.1%	60.9%	
24	305,861	223,265	529,126	57.8%	42.2%	57.8%	
25	275,148	168,470	443,618	62.0%	38.0%	62.0%	

## Lopsided Margins



DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Percent Votes		Party Wins	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
26	312,525	129,982	442,507	70.6%	29.4%	70.6%	
27	281,073	271,239	552,312	50.9%	49.1%	50.9%	
28	251,831	229,455	481,286	52.3%	47.7%	52.3%	
29	238,070	218,638	456,708	52.1%	47.9%	52.1%	
30	230,506	290,674	521,180	44.2%	55.8%		55.8%
31	275,393	235,646	511,039	53.9%	46.1%	53.9%	
32	360,998	108,735	469,733	76.9%	23.1%	76.9%	
33	420,621	167,901	588,522	71.5%	28.5%	71.5%	
34	214,429	277,077	491,506	43.6%	56.4%		56.4%
35	143,815	295,685	439,500	32.7%	67.3%		67.3%
36	153,719	264,662	418,381	36.7%	63.3%		63.3%
37	179,718	274,797	454,515	39.5%	60.5%		60.5%
38	285,580	266,034	551,614	51.8%	48.2%	51.8%	
39	189,211	264,591	453,802	41.7%	58.3%		58.3%
40	297,007	253,141	550,148	54.0%	46.0%	54.0%	
41	318,040	108,655	426,695	74.5%	25.5%	74.5%	
42	246,225	295,466	541,691	45.5%	54.5%		54.5%
43	160,976	348,109	509,085	31.6%	68.4%		68.4%
44	217,430	200,803	418,233	52.0%	48.0%	52.0%	
45	189,025	329,707	518,732	36.4%	63.6%		63.6%
46	215,370	200,283	415,653	51.8%	48.2%	51.8%	
47	382,546	238,809	621,355	61.6%	38.4%	61.6%	
48	312,504	306,850	619,354	50.5%	49.5%	50.5%	
49	239,660	309,345	549,005	43.7%	56.3%		56.3%
50	196,227	359,878	556,105	35.3%	64.7%		64.7%
51	229,955	363,093	593,048	38.8%	61.2%		61.2%
52	239,488	344,546	584,034	41.0%	59.0%		59.0%
53	287,443	121,241	408,684	70.3%	29.7%	70.3%	
54	267,126	309,291	576,417	46.3%	53.7%		53.7%
55	267,990	306,710	574,700	46.6%	53.4%		53.4%
56	291,476	264,875	556,351	52.4%	47.6%	52.4%	
57	215,912	228,973	444,885	48.5%	51.5%		51.5%
58	239,623	242,137	481,760	49.7%	50.3%		50.3%
59	201,755	333,786	535,541	37.7%	62.3%		62.3%
60	234,995	299,708	534,703	43.9%	56.1%		56.1%
61	271,563	250,509	522,072	52.0%	48.0%	52.0%	
62	273,649	273,005	546,654	50.1%	49.9%	50.1%	
63	214,269	325,099	539,368	39.7%	60.3%		60.3%
64	217,142	262,173	479,315	45.3%	54.7%		54.7%
65	183,403	351,999	535,402	34.3%	65.7%		65.7%

## Lopsided Margins

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Percent Votes		Party Wins	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
66	202,864	377,939	580,803	34.9%	65.1%		65.1%
67	250,917	293,559	544,476	46.1%	53.9%		53.9%
68	276,355	278,227	554,582	49.8%	50.2%		50.2%
69	323,172	203,120	526,292	61.4%	38.6%	61.4%	
70	374,227	66,491	440,718	84.9%	15.1%	84.9%	
71	251,023	301,954	552,977	45.4%	54.6%		54.6%
72	260,583	305,018	565,601	46.1%	53.9%		53.9%
73	262,680	214,960	477,640	55.0%	45.0%	55.0%	
74	326,911	154,066	480,977	68.0%	32.0%	68.0%	
75	327,413	227,885	555,298	59.0%	41.0%	59.0%	
76	292,290	273,022	565,312	51.7%	48.3%	51.7%	
77	322,455	201,503	523,958	61.5%	38.5%	61.5%	
78	177,054	291,695	468,749	37.8%	62.2%		62.2%
79	160,508	353,131	513,639	31.2%	68.8%		68.8%
80	275,659	259,938	535,597	51.5%	48.5%	51.5%	
81	285,844	281,219	567,063	50.4%	49.6%	50.4%	
82	312,114	123,420	435,534	71.7%	28.3%	71.7%	
83	187,012	182,812	369,824	50.6%	49.4%	50.6%	
84	243,716	249,048	492,764	49.5%	50.5%		50.5%
85	138,039	405,083	543,122	25.4%	74.6%		74.6%
86	203,770	270,959	474,729	42.9%	57.1%		57.1%
87	268,142	156,618	424,760	63.1%	36.9%	63.1%	
88	245,387	325,594	570,981	43.0%	57.0%		57.0%
89	154,660	302,784	457,444	33.8%	66.2%		66.2%
90	207,162	349,053	556,215	37.2%	62.8%		62.8%
91	171,026	291,337	462,363	37.0%	63.0%		63.0%
92	203,368	208,285	411,653	49.4%	50.6%		50.6%
93	206,155	316,588	522,743	39.4%	60.6%		60.6%
94	336,647	148,685	485,332	69.4%	30.6%	69.4%	
95	227,166	319,003	546,169	41.6%	58.4%		58.4%
96	274,622	271,760	546,382	50.3%	49.7%	50.3%	
97	217,116	326,656	543,772	39.9%	60.1%		60.1%
98	180,381	338,681	519,062	34.8%	65.2%		65.2%
99	209,769	314,549	524,318	40.0%	60.0%		60.0%
100	182,482	298,484	480,966	37.9%	62.1%		62.1%
101	177,978	310,629	488,607	36.4%	63.6%		63.6%
102	230,242	295,320	525,562	43.8%	56.2%		56.2%
103	314,152	337,962	652,114	48.2%	51.8%		51.8%
104	218,901	344,830	563,731	38.8%	61.2%		61.2%
105	194,704	345,949	540,653	36.0%	64.0%		64.0%

## Lopsided Margins

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Percent Votes		Party Wins	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
106	223,939	351,534	575,473	38.9%	61.1%		61.1%
107	246,137	337,553	583,690	42.2%	57.8%		57.8%
108	202,307	297,105	499,412	40.5%	59.5%		59.5%
109	275,060	244,621	519,681	52.9%	47.1%	52.9%	
110	220,366	293,600	513,966	42.9%	57.1%		57.1%



## Mean-Median Difference

District Median Percentage	Dem	50.3%
	Rep	49.7%
Statewide mean percentage	Dem	53.1%
	Rep	46.9%
Mean-Median Difference	Dem	2.7%
	Rep	-2.7%

Findings	
Rep	Districts have a mean-median advantage of <b>2.7%</b>

DISTRICT	Party		DISTRICT	Party		DISTRICT	Party		DISTRICT	Party	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep
1	92.6%	7.4%	31	53.9%	46.1%	61	52.0%	48.0%	91	37.0%	63.0%
2	59.9%	40.1%	32	76.9%	23.1%	62	50.1%	49.9%	92	49.4%	50.6%
3	78.5%	21.5%	33	71.5%	28.5%	63	39.7%	60.3%	93	39.4%	60.6%
4	94.3%	5.7%	34	43.6%	56.4%	64	45.3%	54.7%	94	69.4%	30.6%
5	77.7%	22.3%	35	32.7%	67.3%	65	34.3%	65.7%	95	41.6%	58.4%
6	82.2%	17.8%	36	36.7%	63.3%	66	34.9%	65.1%	96	50.3%	49.7%
7	82.0%	18.0%	37	39.5%	60.5%	67	46.1%	53.9%	97	39.9%	60.1%
8	79.4%	20.6%	38	51.8%	48.2%	68	49.8%	50.2%	98	34.8%	65.2%
9	94.7%	5.3%	39	41.7%	58.3%	69	61.4%	38.6%	99	40.0%	60.0%
10	64.9%	35.1%	40	54.0%	46.0%	70	84.9%	15.1%	100	37.9%	62.1%
11	67.7%	32.3%	41	74.5%	25.5%	71	45.4%	54.6%	101	36.4%	63.6%
12	71.4%	28.6%	42	45.5%	54.5%	72	46.1%	53.9%	102	43.8%	56.2%
13	67.8%	32.2%	43	31.6%	68.4%	73	55.0%	45.0%	103	48.2%	51.8%
14	74.5%	25.5%	44	52.0%	48.0%	74	68.0%	32.0%	104	38.8%	61.2%
15	61.0%	39.0%	45	36.4%	63.6%	75	59.0%	41.0%	105	36.0%	64.0%
16	76.7%	23.3%	46	51.8%	48.2%	76	51.7%	48.3%	106	38.9%	61.1%
17	68.6%	31.4%	47	61.6%	38.4%	77	61.5%	38.5%	107	42.2%	57.8%
18	79.5%	20.5%	48	50.5%	49.5%	78	37.8%	62.2%	108	40.5%	59.5%
19	63.7%	36.3%	49	43.7%	56.3%	79	31.2%	68.8%	109	52.9%	47.1%
20	55.1%	44.9%	50	56.3%	43.7%	80	51.5%	48.5%	110	42.9%	57.1%
21	51.7%	48.3%	51	38.8%	61.2%	81	50.4%	49.6%			
22	47.7%	52.3%	52	41.0%	59.0%	82	71.7%	28.3%			
23	60.9%	39.1%	53	70.3%	29.7%	83	50.6%	49.4%			
24	57.8%	42.2%	54	46.3%	53.7%	84	49.5%	50.5%			
25	62.0%	38.0%	55	46.6%	53.4%	85	25.4%	74.6%			
26	70.6%	29.4%	56	52.4%	47.6%	86	42.9%	57.1%			
27	50.9%	49.1%	57	48.5%	51.5%	87	63.1%	36.9%			
28	52.3%	47.7%	58	49.7%	50.3%	88	43.0%	57.0%			
29	52.1%	47.9%	59	37.7%	62.3%	89	33.8%	66.2%			
30	44.2%	55.8%	60	43.9%	56.1%	90	37.2%	62.8%			

## Efficiency Gap

		Total Wasted Votes	% Wasted Votes of Total Votes
Statewide % Wasted Votes	Dem	15,201,004	27.16%
	Rep	12,782,476	22.84%

Finding	
Rep	Candidates have an efficiency gap advantage of 4.3%

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Lost Votes		Minimum to win	Surplus Votes		Total Wasted Votes	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
1	258,502	20,654	279,156	0	20,654	139,578	118,924	0	118,924	20,654
2	261,320	174,928	436,248	0	174,928	218,124	43,196	0	43,196	174,928
3	265,267	72,758	338,025	0	72,758	169,013	96,255	0	96,255	72,758
4	328,745	19,885	348,630	0	19,885	174,315	154,430	0	154,430	19,885
5	438,662	126,246	564,908	0	126,246	282,454	156,208	0	156,208	126,246
6	470,863	102,192	573,055	0	102,192	286,528	184,336	0	184,336	102,192
7	463,517	102,015	565,532	0	102,015	282,766	180,751	0	180,751	102,015
8	341,385	88,387	429,772	0	88,387	214,886	126,499	0	126,499	88,387
9	311,310	17,291	328,601	0	17,291	164,301	147,010	0	147,010	17,291
10	366,472	198,627	565,099	0	198,627	282,550	83,923	0	83,923	198,627
11	353,187	168,158	521,345	0	168,158	260,673	92,515	0	92,515	168,158
12	313,082	125,555	438,637	0	125,555	219,319	93,764	0	93,764	125,555
13	303,076	144,266	447,342	0	144,266	223,671	79,405	0	79,405	144,266
14	306,099	104,625	410,724	0	104,625	205,362	100,737	0	100,737	104,625
15	270,884	173,183	444,067	0	173,183	222,034	48,851	0	48,851	173,183
16	405,317	123,360	528,677	0	123,360	264,339	140,979	0	140,979	123,360
17	334,631	153,279	487,910	0	153,279	243,955	90,676	0	90,676	153,279
18	491,476	126,756	618,232	0	126,756	309,116	182,360	0	182,360	126,756
19	412,797	235,189	647,986	0	235,189	323,993	88,804	0	88,804	235,189
20	349,902	284,833	634,735	0	284,833	317,368	32,535	0	32,535	284,833

### Efficiency Gap

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Lost Votes		Minimum to win	Surplus Votes		Total Wasted Votes	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
21	259,240	241,843	501,083	0	241,843	250,542	8,699	0	8,699	241,843
22	309,321	339,589	648,910	309,321	0	324,455	0	15,134	309,321	15,134
23	291,695	187,546	479,241	0	187,546	239,621	52,075	0	52,075	187,546
24	305,861	223,265	529,126	0	223,265	264,563	41,298	0	41,298	223,265
25	275,148	168,470	443,618	0	168,470	221,809	53,339	0	53,339	168,470
26	312,525	129,982	442,507	0	129,982	221,254	91,272	0	91,272	129,982
27	281,073	271,239	552,312	0	271,239	276,156	4,917	0	4,917	271,239
28	251,831	229,455	481,286	0	229,455	240,643	11,188	0	11,188	229,455
29	238,070	218,638	456,708	0	218,638	228,354	9,716	0	9,716	218,638
30	230,506	290,674	521,180	230,506	0	260,590	0	30,084	230,506	30,084
31	275,393	235,646	511,039	0	235,646	255,520	19,874	0	19,874	235,646
32	360,998	108,735	469,733	0	108,735	234,867	126,132	0	126,132	108,735
33	420,621	167,901	588,522	0	167,901	294,261	126,360	0	126,360	167,901
34	214,429	277,077	491,506	214,429	0	245,753	0	31,324	214,429	31,324
35	143,815	295,685	439,500	143,815	0	219,750	0	75,935	143,815	75,935
36	153,719	264,662	418,381	153,719	0	209,191	0	55,472	153,719	55,472
37	179,718	274,797	454,515	179,718	0	227,258	0	47,540	179,718	47,540
38	285,580	266,034	551,614	0	266,034	275,807	9,773	0	9,773	266,034
39	189,211	264,591	453,802	189,211	0	226,901	0	37,690	189,211	37,690
40	297,007	253,141	550,148	0	253,141	275,074	21,933	0	21,933	253,141
41	318,040	108,655	426,695	0	108,655	213,348	104,693	0	104,693	108,655
42	246,225	295,466	541,691	246,225	0	270,846	0	24,621	246,225	24,621
43	160,976	348,109	509,085	160,976	0	254,543	0	93,567	160,976	93,567
44	217,430	200,803	418,233	0	200,803	209,117	8,314	0	8,314	200,803
45	189,025	329,707	518,732	189,025	0	259,366	0	70,341	189,025	70,341
46	215,370	200,283	415,653	0	200,283	207,827	7,544	0	7,544	200,283
47	382,546	238,809	621,355	0	238,809	310,678	71,869	0	71,869	238,809
48	312,504	306,850	619,354	0	306,850	309,677	2,827	0	2,827	306,850
49	239,660	309,345	549,005	239,660	0	274,503	0	34,843	239,660	34,843
50	196,227	359,878	556,105	196,227	0	278,053	0	81,826	196,227	81,826

## Efficiency Gap

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Lost Votes		Minimum to win	Surplus Votes		Total Wasted Votes	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
51	229,955	363,093	593,048	229,955	0	296,524	0	66,569	229,955	66,569
52	239,488	344,546	584,034	239,488	0	292,017	0	52,529	239,488	52,529
53	287,443	121,241	408,684	0	121,241	204,342	83,101	0	83,101	121,241
54	267,126	309,291	576,417	267,126	0	288,209	0	21,083	267,126	21,083
55	267,990	306,710	574,700	267,990	0	287,350	0	19,360	267,990	19,360
56	291,476	264,875	556,351	0	264,875	278,176	13,301	0	13,301	264,875
57	215,912	228,973	444,885	215,912	0	222,443	0	6,531	215,912	6,531
58	239,623	242,137	481,760	239,623	0	240,880	0	1,257	239,623	1,257
59	201,755	333,786	535,541	201,755	0	267,771	0	66,016	201,755	66,016
60	234,995	299,708	534,703	234,995	0	267,352	0	32,357	234,995	32,357
61	271,563	250,509	522,072	0	250,509	261,036	10,527	0	10,527	250,509
62	273,649	273,005	546,654	0	273,005	273,327	322	0	322	273,005
63	214,269	325,099	539,368	214,269	0	269,684	0	55,415	214,269	55,415
64	217,142	262,173	479,315	217,142	0	239,658	0	22,516	217,142	22,516
65	183,403	351,999	535,402	183,403	0	267,701	0	84,298	183,403	84,298
66	202,864	377,939	580,803	202,864	0	290,402	0	87,538	202,864	87,538
67	250,917	293,559	544,476	250,917	0	272,238	0	21,321	250,917	21,321
68	276,355	278,227	554,582	276,355	0	277,291	0	936	276,355	936
69	323,172	203,120	526,292	0	203,120	263,146	60,026	0	60,026	203,120
70	374,227	66,491	440,718	0	66,491	220,359	153,868	0	153,868	66,491
71	251,023	301,954	552,977	251,023	0	276,489	0	25,466	251,023	25,466
72	260,583	305,018	565,601	260,583	0	282,801	0	22,218	260,583	22,218
73	262,680	214,960	477,640	0	214,960	238,820	23,860	0	23,860	214,960
74	326,911	154,066	480,977	0	154,066	240,489	86,423	0	86,423	154,066
75	327,413	227,885	555,298	0	227,885	277,649	49,764	0	49,764	227,885
76	292,290	273,022	565,312	0	273,022	282,656	9,634	0	9,634	273,022
77	322,455	201,503	523,958	0	201,503	261,979	60,476	0	60,476	201,503
78	177,054	291,695	468,749	177,054	0	234,375	0	57,321	177,054	57,321
79	160,508	353,131	513,639	160,508	0	256,820	0	96,312	160,508	96,312
80	275,659	259,938	535,597	0	259,938	267,799	7,861	0	7,861	259,938

## Efficiency Gap

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Lost Votes		Minimum to win	Surplus Votes		Total Wasted Votes	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
81	285,844	281,219	567,063	0	281,219	283,532	2,313	0	2,313	281,219
82	312,114	123,420	435,534	0	123,420	217,767	94,347	0	94,347	123,420
83	187,012	182,812	369,824	0	182,812	184,912	2,100	0	2,100	182,812
84	243,716	249,048	492,764	243,716	0	246,382	0	2,666	243,716	2,666
85	138,039	405,083	543,122	138,039	0	271,561	0	133,522	138,039	133,522
86	203,770	270,959	474,729	203,770	0	237,365	0	33,595	203,770	33,595
87	268,142	156,618	424,760	0	156,618	212,380	55,762	0	55,762	156,618
88	245,387	325,594	570,981	245,387	0	285,491	0	40,104	245,387	40,104
89	154,660	302,784	457,444	154,660	0	228,722	0	74,062	154,660	74,062
90	207,162	349,053	556,215	207,162	0	278,108	0	70,946	207,162	70,946
91	171,026	291,337	462,363	171,026	0	231,182	0	60,156	171,026	60,156
92	203,368	208,285	411,653	203,368	0	205,827	0	2,459	203,368	2,459
93	206,155	316,588	522,743	206,155	0	261,372	0	55,217	206,155	55,217
94	336,647	148,685	485,332	0	148,685	242,666	93,981	0	93,981	148,685
95	227,166	319,003	546,169	227,166	0	273,085	0	45,919	227,166	45,919
96	274,622	271,760	546,382	0	271,760	273,191	1,431	0	1,431	271,760
97	217,116	326,656	543,772	217,116	0	271,886	0	54,770	217,116	54,770
98	180,381	338,681	519,062	180,381	0	259,531	0	79,150	180,381	79,150
99	209,769	314,549	524,318	209,769	0	262,159	0	52,390	209,769	52,390
100	182,482	298,484	480,966	182,482	0	240,483	0	58,001	182,482	58,001
101	177,978	310,629	488,607	177,978	0	244,304	0	66,326	177,978	66,326
102	230,242	295,320	525,562	230,242	0	262,781	0	32,539	230,242	32,539
103	314,152	337,962	652,114	314,152	0	326,057	0	11,905	314,152	11,905
104	218,901	344,830	563,731	218,901	0	281,866	0	62,965	218,901	62,965
105	194,704	345,949	540,653	194,704	0	270,327	0	75,623	194,704	75,623
106	223,939	351,534	575,473	223,939	0	287,737	0	63,798	223,939	63,798
107	246,137	337,553	583,690	246,137	0	291,845	0	45,708	246,137	45,708
108	202,307	297,105	499,412	202,307	0	249,706	0	47,399	202,307	47,399
109	275,060	244,621	519,681	0	244,621	259,841	15,220	0	15,220	244,621
110	220,366	293,600	513,966	220,366	0	256,983	0	36,617	220,366	36,617

## Seats to Votes Ratio

	Vote Share	Count of Seats	Seat Share	Proportionality Bias
Dem	52.3%	57	51.8%	-0.5%
Rep	47.7%	53	48.2%	0.5%

DISTRICT	Composite Score			
	Dem	Dem %	Rep	Rep %
1	258,502	92.6%	20,654	7.4%
2	261,320	59.9%	174,928	40.1%
3	265,267	78.5%	72,758	21.5%
4	328,745	94.3%	19,885	5.7%
5	438,662	77.7%	126,246	22.3%
6	470,863	82.2%	102,192	17.8%
7	463,517	82.0%	102,015	18.0%
8	341,385	79.4%	88,387	20.6%
9	311,310	94.7%	17,291	5.3%
10	366,472	64.9%	198,627	35.1%
11	353,187	67.7%	168,158	32.3%
12	313,082	71.4%	125,555	28.6%
13	303,076	67.8%	144,266	32.2%
14	306,099	74.5%	104,625	25.5%
15	270,884	61.0%	173,183	39.0%
16	405,317	76.7%	123,360	23.3%
17	334,631	68.6%	153,279	31.4%
18	491,476	79.5%	126,756	20.5%
19	412,797	63.7%	235,189	36.3%
20	349,902	55.1%	284,833	44.9%
21	259,240	51.7%	241,843	48.3%
22	309,321	47.7%	339,589	52.3%
23	291,695	60.9%	187,546	39.1%
24	305,861	57.8%	223,265	42.2%
25	275,148	62.0%	168,470	38.0%
26	312,525	70.6%	129,982	29.4%
27	281,073	50.9%	271,239	49.1%
28	251,831	52.3%	229,455	47.7%
29	238,070	52.1%	218,638	47.9%
30	230,506	44.2%	290,674	55.8%
31	275,393	53.9%	235,646	46.1%
32	360,998	76.9%	108,735	23.1%
33	420,621	71.5%	167,901	28.5%
34	214,429	43.6%	277,077	56.4%
35	143,815	32.7%	295,685	67.3%
36	153,719	36.7%	264,662	63.3%
37	179,718	39.5%	274,797	60.5%
38	285,580	51.8%	266,034	48.2%
39	189,211	41.7%	264,591	58.3%
40	297,007	54.0%	253,141	46.0%

## Seats to Votes Ratio

DISTRICT	Composite Score			
	Dem	Dem %	Rep	Rep %
41	318,040	74.5%	108,655	25.5%
42	246,225	45.5%	295,466	54.5%
43	160,976	31.6%	348,109	68.4%
44	217,430	52.0%	200,803	48.0%
45	189,025	36.4%	329,707	63.6%
46	215,370	51.8%	200,283	48.2%
47	382,546	61.6%	238,809	38.4%
48	312,504	50.5%	306,850	49.5%
49	239,660	43.7%	309,345	56.3%
50	196,227	35.3%	359,878	64.7%
51	229,955	38.8%	363,093	61.2%
52	239,488	41.0%	344,546	59.0%
53	287,443	70.3%	121,241	29.7%
54	267,126	46.3%	309,291	53.7%
55	267,990	46.6%	306,710	53.4%
56	291,476	52.4%	264,875	47.6%
57	215,912	48.5%	228,973	51.5%
58	239,623	49.7%	242,137	50.3%
59	201,755	37.7%	333,786	62.3%
60	234,995	43.9%	299,708	56.1%
61	271,563	52.0%	250,509	48.0%
62	273,649	50.1%	273,005	49.9%
63	214,269	39.7%	325,099	60.3%
64	217,142	45.3%	262,173	54.7%
65	183,403	34.3%	351,999	65.7%
66	202,864	34.9%	377,939	65.1%
67	250,917	46.1%	293,559	53.9%
68	276,355	49.8%	278,227	50.2%
69	323,172	61.4%	203,120	38.6%
70	374,227	84.9%	66,491	15.1%
71	251,023	45.4%	301,954	54.6%
72	260,583	46.1%	305,018	53.9%
73	262,680	55.0%	214,960	45.0%
74	326,911	68.0%	154,066	32.0%
75	327,413	59.0%	227,885	41.0%
76	292,290	51.7%	273,022	48.3%
77	322,455	61.5%	201,503	38.5%
78	177,054	37.8%	291,695	62.2%
79	160,508	31.2%	353,131	68.8%
80	275,659	51.5%	259,938	48.5%

DISTRICT	Composite Score			
	Dem	Dem %	Rep	Rep %
81	285,844	50.4%	281,219	49.6%
82	312,114	71.7%	123,420	28.3%
83	187,012	50.6%	182,812	49.4%
84	243,716	49.5%	249,048	50.5%
85	138,039	25.4%	405,083	74.6%
86	203,770	42.9%	270,959	57.1%
87	268,142	63.1%	156,618	36.9%
88	245,387	43.0%	325,594	57.0%
89	154,660	33.8%	302,784	66.2%
90	207,162	37.2%	349,053	62.8%
91	171,026	37.0%	291,337	63.0%
92	203,368	49.4%	208,285	50.6%
93	206,155	39.4%	316,588	60.6%
94	336,647	69.4%	148,685	30.6%
95	227,166	41.6%	319,003	58.4%
96	274,622	50.3%	271,760	49.7%
97	217,116	39.9%	326,656	60.1%
98	180,381	34.8%	338,681	65.2%
99	209,769	40.0%	314,549	60.0%
100	182,482	37.9%	298,484	62.1%
101	177,978	36.4%	310,629	63.6%
102	230,242	43.8%	295,320	56.2%
103	314,152	48.2%	337,962	51.8%
104	218,901	38.8%	344,830	61.2%
105	194,704	36.0%	345,949	64.0%
106	223,939	38.9%	351,534	61.1%
107	246,137	42.2%	337,553	57.8%
108	202,307	40.5%	297,105	59.5%
109	275,060	52.9%	244,621	47.1%
110	220,366	42.9%	293,600	57.1%

## COMPACTNESS

The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission evaluated the requirement of "(g) Districts shall be reasonably compact" using five mathematical models. The adopted map was deemed 'reasonably compact' under each model.

### Polsby-Popper

Compactness measure: Polsby-Popper					
District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	26	28	62	18	0.42
2	19	24	48	16	0.41
3	24	36	101	17	0.23
4	15	29	68	14	0.23
5	16	37	108	14	0.15
6	16	33	87	14	0.19
7	19	32	83	15	0.23
8	22	36	102	16	0.21
9	22	29	65	16	0.33
10	56	46	172	27	0.33
11	18	26	53	15	0.34
12	16	21	35	14	0.46
13	19	27	58	16	0.33
14	22	21	37	17	0.59
15	16	28	63	14	0.26
16	24	27	59	18	0.42
17	23	27	58	17	0.40
18	34	33	85	21	0.39
19	38	41	137	22	0.28
20	51	40	125	25	0.41
21	52	39	122	25	0.42
22	41	41	132	23	0.31
23	97	60	285	35	0.34
24	30	25	51	19	0.58
25	28	40	127	19	0.22
26	34	36	103	21	0.33
27	46	33	88	24	0.53
28	171	77	477	46	0.36
29	112	78	478	38	0.23
30	364	115	1,043	68	0.35
31	393	112	1,007	70	0.39
32	44	31	75	24	0.59
33	151	66	346	44	0.44
34	664	117	1,082	91	0.61
35	1,129	152	1,843	119	0.61
36	864	129	1,315	104	0.66
37	523	116	1,068	81	0.49
38	2,765	245	4,761	186	0.58
39	769	129	1,334	98	0.58
40	101	58	264	36	0.38

### Compactness measure: Polsby–Popper

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
41	33	38	113	20	0.29
42	388	147	1,709	70	0.23
43	815	190	2,877	101	0.28
44	255	100	795	57	0.32
45	969	213	3,620	110	0.27
46	163	88	615	45	0.26
47	338	132	1,393	65	0.24
48	285	119	1,122	60	0.25
49	106	71	397	36	0.27
50	405	106	901	71	0.45
51	138	69	378	42	0.36
52	83	50	202	32	0.41
53	38	44	152	22	0.25
54	70	62	307	30	0.23
55	42	30	72	23	0.58
56	32	29	68	20	0.48
57	28	30	70	19	0.39
58	25	48	184	18	0.14
59	40	38	113	23	0.36
60	33	34	91	20	0.36
61	27	38	115	18	0.23
62	114	61	295	38	0.39
63	229	96	739	54	0.31
64	296	86	590	61	0.50
65	808	141	1,581	101	0.51
66	209	79	499	51	0.42
67	452	119	1,118	75	0.40
68	149	71	396	43	0.38
69	158	70	390	45	0.41
70	40	43	150	23	0.27
71	683	131	1,375	93	0.50
72	175	77	472	47	0.37
73	443	111	982	75	0.45
74	49	32	81	25	0.60
75	291	88	611	60	0.48
76	425	102	824	73	0.52
77	202	82	531	50	0.38
78	832	160	2,026	102	0.41
79	250	92	667	56	0.38
80	63	50	201	28	0.31
81	77	48	186	31	0.42

### Compactness measure: Polsby–Popper

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
82	17	32	81	15	0.21
83	27	36	105	19	0.26
84	46	39	118	24	0.39
85	92	56	247	34	0.37
86	80	51	204	32	0.39
87	99	55	242	35	0.41
88	2,200	206	3,362	166	0.65
89	429	113	1,018	73	0.42
90	303	106	899	62	0.34
91	833	145	1,666	102	0.50
92	761	139	1,533	98	0.50
93	1,179	210	3,505	122	0.34
94	59	52	214	27	0.28
95	624	107	916	89	0.68
96	481	102	822	78	0.59
97	885	220	3,867	105	0.23
98	4,118	305	7,422	227	0.55
99	3,825	344	9,395	219	0.41
100	1,719	191	2,917	147	0.59
101	1,941	251	4,996	156	0.39
102	3,417	291	6,755	207	0.51
103	2,883	250	4,975	190	0.58
104	2,436	362	10,413	175	0.23
105	2,921	300	7,146	192	0.41
106	7,780	397	12,550	313	0.62
107	4,923	444	15,720	249	0.31
108	9,287	645	33,135	342	0.28
109	10,075	541	23,305	356	0.43
110	14,139	680	36,767	422	0.38

**Most Compact: 0.68 For District: 95**

**Least Compact: 0.14 For District: 58**

## Schwartzberg

Compactness measure: Schwartzberg					
District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	26	28	62	18	0.65
2	19	24	48	16	0.64
3	24	36	101	17	0.48
4	15	29	68	14	0.48
5	16	37	108	14	0.39
6	16	33	87	14	0.43
7	19	32	83	15	0.48
8	22	36	102	16	0.46
9	22	29	65	16	0.57
10	56	46	172	27	0.57
11	18	26	53	15	0.58
12	16	21	35	14	0.67
13	19	27	58	16	0.58
14	22	21	37	17	0.77
15	16	28	63	14	0.51
16	24	27	59	18	0.65
17	23	27	58	17	0.63
18	34	33	85	21	0.63
19	38	41	137	22	0.53
20	51	40	125	25	0.64
21	52	39	122	25	0.65
22	41	41	132	23	0.56
23	97	60	285	35	0.58
24	30	25	51	19	0.76
25	28	40	127	19	0.47
26	34	36	103	21	0.57
27	46	33	88	24	0.73
28	171	77	477	46	0.60
29	112	78	478	38	0.48
30	364	115	1,043	68	0.59
31	393	112	1,007	70	0.62
32	44	31	75	24	0.77
33	151	66	346	44	0.66
34	664	117	1,082	91	0.78
35	1,129	152	1,843	119	0.78
36	864	129	1,315	104	0.81
37	523	116	1,068	81	0.70
38	2,765	245	4,761	186	0.76
39	769	129	1,334	98	0.76
40	101	58	264	36	0.62
41	33	38	113	20	0.54
42	388	147	1,709	70	0.48
43	815	190	2,877	101	0.53
44	255	100	795	57	0.57
45	969	213	3,620	110	0.52

**Compactness measure: Schwartzberg**

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
46	163	88	615	45	0.51
47	338	132	1,393	65	0.49
48	285	119	1,122	60	0.50
49	106	71	397	36	0.52
50	405	106	901	71	0.67
51	138	69	378	42	0.60
52	83	50	202	32	0.64
53	38	44	152	22	0.50
54	70	62	307	30	0.48
55	42	30	72	23	0.76
56	32	29	68	20	0.69
57	28	30	70	19	0.63
58	25	48	184	18	0.37
59	40	38	113	23	0.60
60	33	34	91	20	0.60
61	27	38	115	18	0.48
62	114	61	295	38	0.62
63	229	96	739	54	0.56
64	296	86	590	61	0.71
65	808	141	1,581	101	0.71
66	209	79	499	51	0.65
67	452	119	1,118	75	0.64
68	149	71	396	43	0.61
69	158	70	390	45	0.64
70	40	43	150	23	0.52
71	683	131	1,375	93	0.70
72	175	77	472	47	0.61
73	443	111	982	75	0.67
74	49	32	81	25	0.78
75	291	88	611	60	0.69
76	425	102	824	73	0.72
77	202	82	531	50	0.62
78	832	160	2,026	102	0.64
79	250	92	667	56	0.61
80	63	50	201	28	0.56
81	77	48	186	31	0.64
82	17	32	81	15	0.46
83	27	36	105	19	0.51
84	46	39	118	24	0.63
85	92	56	247	34	0.61
86	80	51	204	32	0.63
87	99	55	242	35	0.64
88	2,200	206	3,362	166	0.81
89	429	113	1,018	73	0.65
90	303	106	899	62	0.58

### Compactness measure: Schwartzberg

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
91	833	145	1,666	102	0.71
92	761	139	1,533	98	0.70
93	1,179	210	3,505	122	0.58
94	59	52	214	27	0.53
95	624	107	916	89	0.82
96	481	102	822	78	0.76
97	885	220	3,867	105	0.48
98	4,118	305	7,422	227	0.74
99	3,825	344	9,395	219	0.64
100	1,719	191	2,917	147	0.77
101	1,941	251	4,996	156	0.62
102	3,417	291	6,755	207	0.71
103	2,883	250	4,975	190	0.76
104	2,436	362	10,413	175	0.48
105	2,921	300	7,146	192	0.64
106	7,780	397	12,550	313	0.79
107	4,923	444	15,720	249	0.56
108	9,287	645	33,135	342	0.53
109	10,075	541	23,305	356	0.66
110	14,139	680	36,767	422	0.62

**Most Compact: 0.82 For District: 95**

**Least Compact: 0.37 For District: 58**

## Reock Score

### Compactness measure: Reock Score

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	26	28	62	18	0.40
2	19	24	48	16	0.52
3	24	36	101	17	0.46
4	15	29	68	14	0.40
5	16	37	108	14	0.13
6	16	33	87	14	0.18
7	19	32	83	15	0.26
8	22	36	102	16	0.17
9	22	29	65	16	0.38
10	56	46	172	27	0.21

### Compactness measure: Reock Score

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
11	18	26	53	15	0.30
12	16	21	35	14	0.29
13	19	27	58	16	0.27
14	22	21	37	17	0.48
15	16	28	63	14	0.42
16	24	27	59	18	0.38
17	23	27	58	17	0.28
18	34	33	85	21	0.37
19	38	41	137	22	0.38
20	51	40	125	25	0.44
21	52	39	122	25	0.37
22	41	41	132	23	0.39
23	97	60	285	35	0.45
24	30	25	51	19	0.52
25	28	40	127	19	0.24
26	34	36	103	21	0.37
27	46	33	88	24	0.42
28	171	77	477	46	0.36
29	112	78	478	38	0.21
30	364	115	1,043	68	0.40
31	393	112	1,007	70	0.45
32	44	31	75	24	0.49
33	151	66	346	44	0.40
34	664	117	1,082	91	0.55
35	1,129	152	1,843	119	0.49
36	864	129	1,315	104	0.49
37	523	116	1,068	81	0.40
38	2,765	245	4,761	186	0.47
39	769	129	1,334	98	0.50
40	101	58	264	36	0.52
41	33	38	113	20	0.50
42	388	147	1,709	70	0.43
43	815	190	2,877	101	0.25
44	255	100	795	57	0.32
45	969	213	3,620	110	0.30
46	163	88	615	45	0.31
47	338	132	1,393	65	0.28
48	285	119	1,122	60	0.37
49	106	71	397	36	0.39
50	405	106	901	71	0.57
51	138	69	378	42	0.45
52	83	50	202	32	0.55
53	38	44	152	22	0.34
54	70	62	307	30	0.30
55	42	30	72	23	0.50
56	32	29	68	20	0.49
57	28	30	70	19	0.40
58	25	48	184	18	0.29
59	40	38	113	23	0.48
60	33	34	91	20	0.41

### Compactness measure: Reock Score

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
61	27	38	115	18	0.40
62	114	61	295	38	0.46
63	229	96	739	54	0.31
64	296	86	590	61	0.40
65	808	141	1,581	101	0.54
66	209	79	499	51	0.37
67	452	119	1,118	75	0.52
68	149	71	396	43	0.42
69	158	70	390	45	0.57
70	40	43	150	23	0.48
71	683	131	1,375	93	0.58
72	175	77	472	47	0.51
73	443	111	982	75	0.51
74	49	32	81	25	0.61
75	291	88	611	60	0.44
76	425	102	824	73	0.59
77	202	82	531	50	0.50
78	832	160	2,026	102	0.50
79	250	92	667	56	0.35
80	63	50	201	28	0.49
81	77	48	186	31	0.39
82	17	32	81	15	0.48
83	27	36	105	19	0.43
84	46	39	118	24	0.40
85	92	56	247	34	0.37
86	80	51	204	32	0.48
87	99	55	242	35	0.57
88	2,200	206	3,362	166	0.56
89	429	113	1,018	73	0.50
90	303	106	899	62	0.36
91	833	145	1,666	102	0.52
92	761	139	1,533	98	0.44
93	1,179	210	3,505	122	0.39
94	59	52	214	27	0.43
95	624	107	916	89	0.60
96	481	102	822	78	0.54
97	885	220	3,867	105	0.51
98	4,118	305	7,422	227	0.72
99	3,825	344	9,395	219	0.29
100	1,719	191	2,917	147	0.54
101	1,941	251	4,996	156	0.34
102	3,417	291	6,755	207	0.49
103	2,883	250	4,975	190	0.55
104	2,436	362	10,413	175	0.31
105	2,921	300	7,146	192	0.50
106	7,780	397	12,550	313	0.46
107	4,923	444	15,720	249	0.43
108	9,287	645	33,135	342	0.34
109	10,075	541	23,305	356	0.58
110	14,139	680	36,767	422	0.57

## Convex Hull

Compactness measure: Convex Hull					
District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	26	28	62	18	0.79
2	19	24	48	16	0.75
3	24	36	101	17	0.70
4	15	29	68	14	0.54
5	16	37	108	14	0.60
6	16	33	87	14	0.60
7	19	32	83	15	0.62
8	22	36	102	16	0.70
9	22	29	65	16	0.67
10	56	46	172	27	0.76
11	18	26	53	15	0.67
12	16	21	35	14	0.80
13	19	27	58	16	0.78
14	22	21	37	17	0.92
15	16	28	63	14	0.67
16	24	27	59	18	0.79
17	23	27	58	17	0.90
18	34	33	85	21	0.86
19	38	41	137	22	0.67
20	51	40	125	25	0.80
21	52	39	122	25	0.83
22	41	41	132	23	0.76
23	97	60	285	35	0.68
24	30	25	51	19	0.91
25	28	40	127	19	0.60
26	34	36	103	21	0.74
27	46	33	88	24	0.85
28	171	77	477	46	0.74
29	112	78	478	38	0.64
30	364	115	1,043	68	0.75
31	393	112	1,007	70	0.77
32	44	31	75	24	0.91
33	151	66	346	44	0.83
34	664	117	1,082	91	0.93
35	1,129	152	1,843	119	0.93
36	864	129	1,315	104	0.98
37	523	116	1,068	81	0.85
38	2,765	245	4,761	186	0.91
39	769	129	1,334	98	0.89
40	101	58	264	36	0.84
41	33	38	113	20	0.79
42	388	147	1,709	70	0.62
43	815	190	2,877	101	0.70
44	255	100	795	57	0.68
45	969	213	3,620	110	0.76
46	163	88	615	45	0.73
47	338	132	1,393	65	0.70
48	285	119	1,122	60	0.59
49	106	71	397	36	0.65
50	405	106	901	71	0.83

### Compactness measure: Convex Hull

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
51	138	69	378	42	0.78
52	83	50	202	32	0.83
53	38	44	152	22	0.69
54	70	62	307	30	0.61
55	42	30	72	23	0.92
56	32	29	68	20	0.85
57	28	30	70	19	0.74
58	25	48	184	18	0.47
59	40	38	113	23	0.77
60	33	34	91	20	0.77
61	27	38	115	18	0.72
62	114	61	295	38	0.73
63	229	96	739	54	0.71
64	296	86	590	61	0.88
65	808	141	1,581	101	0.81
66	209	79	499	51	0.84
67	452	119	1,118	75	0.79
68	149	71	396	43	0.82
69	158	70	390	45	0.89
70	40	43	150	23	0.79
71	683	131	1,375	93	0.83
72	175	77	472	47	0.84
73	443	111	982	75	0.86
74	49	32	81	25	0.96
75	291	88	611	60	0.87
76	425	102	824	73	0.85
77	202	82	531	50	0.80
78	832	160	2,026	102	0.79
79	250	92	667	56	0.77
80	63	50	201	28	0.80
81	77	48	186	31	0.83
82	17	32	81	15	0.66
83	27	36	105	19	0.63
84	46	39	118	24	0.79
85	92	56	247	34	0.69
86	80	51	204	32	0.86
87	99	55	242	35	0.79
88	2,200	206	3,362	166	0.93
89	429	113	1,018	73	0.75
90	303	106	899	62	0.70
91	833	145	1,666	102	0.82
92	761	139	1,533	98	0.83
93	1,179	210	3,505	122	0.78
94	59	52	214	27	0.73
95	624	107	916	89	0.95
96	481	102	822	78	0.86
97	885	220	3,867	105	0.61
98	4,118	305	7,422	227	0.91
St 99	St 99 Map	344	9,395	219	0.81

### Compactness measure: Convex Hull

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
100	1,719	191	2,917	147	0.86
101	1,941	251	4,996	156	0.73
102	3,417	291	6,755	207	0.87
103	2,883	250	4,975	190	0.87
104	2,436	362	10,413	175	0.56
105	2,921	300	7,146	192	0.74
106	7,780	397	12,550	313	0.93
107	4,923	444	15,720	249	0.68
108	9,287	645	33,135	342	0.67
109	10,075	541	23,305	356	0.79
110	14,139	680	36,767	422	0.78

**Most Compact: 0.98 For District: 36**

**Least Compact: 0.47 For District: 58**

### Length-Width

### Compactness measure: Length-Width

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	26	28	62	18	0.96
2	19	24	48	16	1.24
3	24	36	101	17	1.17
4	15	29	68	14	1.59
5	16	37	108	14	0.33
6	16	33	87	14	0.41
7	19	32	83	15	0.58
8	22	36	102	16	0.40
9	22	29	65	16	1.85
10	56	46	172	27	2.09
11	18	26	53	15	0.92
12	16	21	35	14	0.68
13	19	27	58	16	0.47
14	22	21	37	17	0.74
15	16	28	63	14	1.06
16	24	27	59	18	2.06
17	23	27	58	17	4.09
18	34	33	85	21	3.19
19	38	41	137	22	2.06
20	51	40	125	25	2.40

### Compactness measure: Length-Width

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
21	52	39	122	25	2.72
22	41	41	132	23	2.21
23	97	60	285	35	1.18
24	30	25	51	19	1.33
25	28	40	127	19	2.20
26	34	36	103	21	1.03
27	46	33	88	24	0.68
28	171	77	477	46	0.76
29	112	78	478	38	0.67
30	364	115	1,043	68	2.28
31	393	112	1,007	70	1.53
32	44	31	75	24	1.53
33	151	66	346	44	1.79
34	664	117	1,082	91	1.61
35	1,129	152	1,843	119	2.57
36	864	129	1,315	104	2.61
37	523	116	1,068	81	2.16
38	2,765	245	4,761	186	1.07
39	769	129	1,334	98	1.46
40	101	58	264	36	1.36
41	33	38	113	20	1.13
42	388	147	1,709	70	1.06
43	815	190	2,877	101	2.71
44	255	100	795	57	3.04
45	969	213	3,620	110	3.29
46	163	88	615	45	3.13
47	338	132	1,393	65	2.71
48	285	119	1,122	60	1.87
49	106	71	397	36	1.99
50	405	106	901	71	1.34
51	138	69	378	42	0.90
52	83	50	202	32	1.49
53	38	44	152	22	1.93
54	70	62	307	30	0.69
55	42	30	72	23	0.96
56	32	29	68	20	1.03
57	28	30	70	19	0.89
58	25	48	184	18	0.80
59	40	38	113	23	2.19
60	33	34	91	20	0.97
61	27	38	115	18	1.67
62	114	61	295	38	1.15
63	229	96	739	54	0.98
64	296	86	590	61	0.71
65	808	141	1,581	101	1.09
66	209	79	499	51	2.60
67	452	119	1,118	75	1.07
68	149	71	396	43	0.80
69	158	70	390	45	1.01
St: 70	District Map	43	150	23	1.14

### Compactness measure: Length-Width

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
71	683	131	1,375	93	1.43
72	175	77	472	47	0.91
73	443	111	982	75	1.30
74	49	32	81	25	0.93
75	291	88	611	60	0.98
76	425	102	824	73	1.36
77	202	82	531	50	1.50
78	832	160	2,026	102	0.97
79	250	92	667	56	1.82
80	63	50	201	28	2.17
81	77	48	186	31	1.63
82	17	32	81	15	1.35
83	27	36	105	19	1.09
84	46	39	118	24	0.89
85	92	56	247	34	1.47
86	80	51	204	32	1.00
87	99	55	242	35	1.22
88	2,200	206	3,362	166	1.59
89	429	113	1,018	73	1.06
90	303	106	899	62	1.37
91	833	145	1,666	102	1.89
92	761	139	1,533	98	1.10
93	1,179	210	3,505	122	1.92
94	59	52	214	27	1.76
95	624	107	916	89	1.01
96	481	102	822	78	1.10
97	885	220	3,867	105	1.21
98	4,118	305	7,422	227	1.56
99	3,825	344	9,395	219	3.54
100	1,719	191	2,917	147	1.37
101	1,941	251	4,996	156	0.73
102	3,417	291	6,755	207	0.90
103	2,883	250	4,975	190	1.39
104	2,436	362	10,413	175	1.80
105	2,921	300	7,146	192	1.39
106	7,780	397	12,550	313	1.85
107	4,923	444	15,720	249	1.71
108	9,287	645	33,135	342	1.58
109	10,075	541	23,305	356	1.35
110	14,139	680	36,767	422	1.30

**Most Compact: 4.09 For District: 17**

**Least Compact: 0.33 For District: 5**

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## **DISSENTING REPORTS**

Three commissioners of the inaugural Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission elected to submit a dissenting report as allowed by the Michigan State Constitution.

*“A commissioner who votes against a redistricting plan may submit a dissenting report which shall be issued with the commission's report.”*

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**DISSENTING REPORT**  
**Submitted by Commissioner**  
**Rhonda Lange**

Dissenting Report for Adopted Congressional, Senate and State House Maps

Commissioner Rhonda Lange

Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission

## Abstract

This report is an evaluation and assessment of why I objected to the recently adopted plans and details not only my personal opinions on the plans' creation but facts on input that the public gave that were ignored. I will not go into detail as to why I voted for other maps such as the Lange Congressional and Senate plans as the short and direct answer is I was told I HAD to vote for one. My personal choice would have been to not vote for any or abstain from voting due to not believing that we had reached truly fair maps that represented the voices of the public that we heard from. My stance was and still is that the Commission should have taken more time to work on maps and that none of the maps were truly fair.

## Dissenting Report for Adopted Congressional, Senate and State House Maps

### **Congressional Plan Chestnut**

The Congressional Chestnut Plan does a complete disservice to parts of Northern and Central Michigan. For example, District 2 takes the west coast of the state and runs it over and down to within two counties of the southern border of the state, which clearly is not compact and splits a total of six counties unnecessarily, which also goes against the criteria of considering county and township lines. District 8, while splitting three counties, needlessly splits off a township in Tuscola to add it to District 8 while splitting off a small township in Genesee County, that is in District 8 and putting it in District 7, again discounting county lines. District 3 needlessly splits three counties and ignores input about communities of interest. Such is the case with Districts 4 and 5. I will say that the SE part of the state, including Districts 6, 10, 11, 12 and 13, while not perfect from a split point of view due to population, I have no issues with; however, from a COI, it is my opinion that the Commission failed, especially as it relates to the African American population.

### **Michigan Senate Linden**

The Michigan Senate Linden Plan does a disservice to “some” citizens of Michigan. While in the Senate plan Northern Michigan is a little more compact, once you get to Districts 33, 34 and 31 multiple counties are needlessly split to make up districts. Districts 33 and 34 both have five county splits and consist mostly of rural areas that do not have high populations, so those splits are both unwarranted and unnecessary. While public comment about COIs for those areas was minimal due to a lack of outreach in my opinion, the comments that were received should have been taken into account. District 17 needlessly splits four counties in mostly rural areas and discounts the COI testimony given for those areas in my opinion. District 22 needlessly splits

five counties. As for districts 1-13, my opinion is the same as it was for the Congressional maps in that area. It is my thought that VRA could have been accomplished in conjunction with COI and I will expound on this in my conclusion. Allegan County is split needlessly three times and Ottawa County is split needlessly two times after hundreds of comments from its residents about the county being a COI and from what I saw maybe one or two (I distinctly remember one) views that felt otherwise, yet they were split, and it was said that was a “compromise” when there was no need for it. The Commission split up three counties so that 3 cities could be considered a COI in District 35. It can also be argued that District 15 could have been accomplished in one county without taking a chunk out of Lenawee.

### **State House Hickory Plan**

State House plan “Hickory” is the worst offender of them all not only in my opinion disenfranchising African American voters but as well as rural voters and voters in Northern Michigan. The U.P. commented that their counties are their COI and not to split them. District 107 needlessly splits three counties. District 104 is one of the most egregious splits in Northern Michigan, splitting 6 counties and not in the name of COI! District 110 splits two counties. While I drew this district, upon going back and editing and reviewing COI, I found it could have been redrawn in a way that kept counties whole and still maintained COI and county boundaries. District 97 splits four counties. Jackson County was split four times, which is completely unacceptable, and their voices were ignored when they expressed that their county WAS/IS THEIR COI. Even if they were over population for one house district, every attempt should have been made to do the least number of splits to maintain their COI. District 28 goes into Monroe County and the voices of those from Monroe County were ignored. In looking at this district it

could have been maintained in Wayne County. District 43 splits four counties and is not compact. Lapeer County, which again is mostly rural, was split three times unnecessarily. Then we move into SE Michigan: Macomb, Oakland, and Wayne counties. We as a Commission failed this area horribly. It is my opinion that not only with the overwhelming amount of input from the citizens, especially the African American community but also the overwhelming call from the communities for us to keep drawing and have their voices better represented, we should have made additional changes. It's my opinion that doing mediocre work is not OK when that work will affect communities for 10 years.

***Conclusion, Summary, Evaluation of Process including ranked criteria, public comment, etc.,  
and my personal opinions on the work that got us to these maps.***

It is my belief, based off just the minimal examples expressed in the body of this report, that the Commission failed in its duty to draw fair maps. It is also my belief based off not only what I saw but also heard, that there was a definite bias not only politically but also geographically and racially in the drawing of these maps both in favor and against. It is my belief that the Commission did not take into consideration all the ranked criteria when evaluating each criteria, making sure each was met simultaneously. While some criteria such as political fairness had to be evaluated once an entire map was completed, the others could have and should have been looked at sincerely after each district was drawn. The excuse that time was a factor when you have citizens from both sides of the aisle and all over the state saying that the maps needed more work is unacceptable. The citizens spoke and said they did not want these maps for the next 10 years and “we” ignored that because of time. It is my opinion that when the maps were being

drawn based on COIs, the Commission was doing a fairly good job, but once it got to political fairness things went off the track, by our own expert's opinion and court case evaluation.

ACCEPTABLE measures would be:

Lopsided Margin: Less than 8%

Mean Median: Less than 5

Efficiency Gap: Less than 7%

The Commission took these numbers to an extreme at the cost of breaking up COIs and, in my opinion, intentionally diluted the votes of rural populations by combining them with heavily populated urban areas that voted in a distinct way. It was also stated openly in a meeting by a commissioner that Northern Michigan was mostly white and really didn't have any diversity. That statement showed, in my opinion, there was bias and discrimination toward people in Northern Michigan, which consists mostly of rural areas.

When looking at criteria for SE Michigan, particularly those in the Detroit area, of course, the first is VRA, which we were given guidance from Mr. Adelson. While I personally did not agree with his and Dr Handley's evaluation, I am not an expert and did not object either. Where I think the Commission failed in this aspect with the maps is that we should have not only considered VRA (or possibly gotten a second opinion) but combined it with COI. The citizens of Detroit, especially African American citizens, came out in strong numbers about their COI, even listing exact streets in some cases. I think these maps failed because we listened to our experts and a set of proposed numbers over the voices of the citizens of the state who were told they would get to pick their representatives by having their communities of interest kept intact. In using the term "cracking and packing" as it relates to VRA, packing is the "INTENTIONAL" act

of concentrating a group to reduce their voting power. I believe we as a Commission could have listened to the African American community and given them the districts that they asked for based off of the COI standpoint, regardless of if those districts were at 51% or even higher as long as it was what the community asked for, but we didn't.

This brings me back to criteria 3, COI. We as a Commission received a lot of public comments on what citizens saw as their COIs. I feel that in drawing these maps the Commission showed a serious lack of consistency in what they saw as being acceptable for COI and, in my opinion, treated different areas of the state in different ways. Maybe this was unintentional, but it happened. Point of fact: the Tri-Cities (Midland, Saginaw, Bay City). The Commission decided that three cities in three different counties was a COI and drew it to be such in two maps based off of one set of public comments for the area; Ottawa County literally had hundreds of comments, including a petition saying that the entire county was their COI, and gave examples of why, and the Commission intentionally split the county unnecessarily and then had a commissioner say it was a "compromise" when there was no need for compromise to the best of my knowledge. I only recall one written comment against the whole county being a COI. I drew maps that made Northern Michigan more compact and considered the COIs that were given for what I will call Central Northern Michigan and the Commission ignored what people in those areas said. A lot of the rural areas stated that their county is/was their COI and the Commission balked at that idea while saying that three cities in three different counties was a COI; again, there was a lack of consistency. I must agree with a lot of the public comment when they said their COI is their county, especially in rural areas where the population is not as condensed. It is my opinion that it is no different than saying, for an example, a five-block radius in Detroit that might hypothetically have 20,000 people is a COI because they have the same issues as far as

economics, environmental, etc. It is no different for a county that has 20,000 people; the issues may be different, but the community still exists.

As for the criteria of favoring or disfavoring an incumbent, while I cannot speak for anyone but myself on this particular criteria, I can say that I did not look at any incumbent data as far as who represented what district in the old plans, were incumbents drawn out of new plans, etc. To make sure of this, I asked that Mr. Woods, the Communications and Outreach Director, not to send me any newspaper articles, at the advice of Legal Counsel Pastula, as it was said articles were being published that talked about incumbents and the districts they were in. I cannot speak to what other commissioners have or have not done regarding this criteria.

Criteria 6: Districts shall reflect consideration of county, city and township boundaries. As described in the subsections of this report in regards to each set of maps, I think I have more than shown in the few examples given that as far as Criteria 6 is concerned, the Commission did an extremely poor job of considering this criteria, especially in rural areas where being split multiple times for no constructive reason negatively affects their representation, and again most rural areas came to this Commission and specifically stated that their county was/is their COI and their voices were blatantly ignored.

Last Criteria: Districts will be reasonably compact. Again, just by looking at the examples I gave for each map, it is easy to see that this criteria was not met. I did a map that outperformed all other maps, including the current Legislative maps, when it came to this criteria that could have at least been considered for certain areas.

In closing, I would like to give my final perspective and opinion as it relates to the process, the work performed, and the concerns I have that I think could have influenced the maps as they were adopted.

First is the outreach. I was very vocal throughout this process on how I feel the outreach for the rural communities was not given as much commitment, time, or funds as the urban and more populous parts of the state. I repeatedly asked our Communications and Outreach Director to reach out to certain areas or groups, to which he said he would but never produced. I was told that there were lots of town halls done in rural communities, yet when the list circulated it was shown not to be the case. It is my opinion that there was extreme bias in the outreach. When it came to public hearings, I feel it was always quickly recommended to cut potential rural venues even though having only two for all of Northern Michigan, including the U.P., would make it harder for people to participate in person, especially in areas where internet could be considered spotty at best, which also limited access to participating online. The Commission approved funds requested by the Communications Director to hire an “influencer” to get more people to the Flint hearing because he felt turnout the first time around wasn’t great but did not give the same consideration to any other areas. It is my opinion that areas picked for public hearings were very politically biased and a better job could have been done to make sure it was more of an equal mix.

Next is transparency. I have grave concerns on this issue. It is my belief by things I saw, things I personally heard, and things that I read that transparency was lacking! I also believe the public comment portal was a mess. I asked repeatedly if there was a way to make it easier to navigate as a commissioner and print out public comment, and the use of “hashtags” to help search ... really? If you don’t know what the public is going to use for a hashtag for a particular area, how do you know what to search? Also, I had issues with not getting attachments that were uploaded to the portal in a timely fashion (I’m still waiting on recently uploaded material from January).

This whole process has honestly saddened me and proved to me what my concern was all along for this amendment and what is “fair.” I would dare ask is it “fair” that the African American population came out in strong numbers and told us what they wanted, and we didn’t provide that? Is it fair that rural communities came out and told us what they wanted (some driving long distance) and we ignored it? Is it fair that the only two considerations that were given to the U.P. were trying to combine two cities (again in different counties) to make a district and the second being looking to try not to split the Native American population — which don’t get me wrong, I am fine with that — but in turn didn’t listen to the other voices we heard from? Is it fair that organized groups’ voices were heard louder and dare I say drowned out the voices of lone citizens who took time off from work or drove long distances and sat for hours just to be heard? The list goes on and on. I realize we absolutely couldn’t make everyone happy but more serious and unbiased consideration should have been given to all.

While I think these maps are truly not representative of the entire state and the input we received, if anything good comes out of this I hope that future commissions really listen to the public not about politics but about the people’s needs, their communities, their beliefs, and that they don’t judge or show bias toward them for that because in the end I think all anybody really wants is to live their lives to the fullest the way they see fit.

This will conclude my report. While I can go on and on about my experiences and things I observed, heard, etc., this is not the place to do it, although on a personal privilege note, I know that commissioners do not particularly care for me and that’s OK. I volunteered for this Commission to do a job and if I feel something isn’t right I’m going to say it, regardless of if it goes against the views of others or the narrative, because I am a member of this Commission like it or not and my job was not to make the Commission happy and portray a narrative to the

media just to advance the career of someone or so some organization could win a Pulitzer or any of the other B.S. that was floated my way, stuff that I repeatedly said I could not care less about. The only reason I applied for this position was I wanted to make sure of two things and that was that the maps were fair for EVERYONE in the state from the very northern tip of the U.P. to the very SE corner of the Lower Peninsula and to make sure that everyone's voice was heard and considered EQUALLY! I feel that as a Commission we failed and for that I truly apologize to all the citizens of the State of Michigan.

Commissioner Rhonda Lange

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**DISSENTING REPORT**  
**Submitted by Commissioner**  
**Erin Wagner**

This serves as my dissenting report for the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission 2021 Final Proposed Maps.

From the start of my term on this commission, I have been interested in fair maps for ALL of Michigan's citizens, not just a few parties, or even the party that I affiliate with. I have read every public comment both on and off the portal and looked at every map submitted. At one point, I even asked General Counsel Pastula if the maps submitted by the citizens to the portal had been vetted by any of our "expert panel" of witnesses (specifically the Promote the Vote maps, in relation to VRA and the other criteria) so that I could use portions of those in relation to drawing my own and was told they had not been.

One of the main reasons I voted for EDS was because they offered to supply a QR code during the live mapping process where anyone could pull it up and see and comment upon exactly what we were doing at the time, yet when I brought that up, I was told that since MDOS had a contract with Professor Duchin, EDS would not be supplying a QR code.

I do not believe that these maps best serve the Citizens of Michigan and feel, as I stated a few times, that we should have spent more time than we allotted to come up with maps that were truly fair to everyone, while meeting all criteria. In my entire lifetime here in Michigan, we have been neither Red nor Blue, swinging between the two parties frequently in our voting decisions. To be fair is to slice up the "pie" so that everyone gets the same size piece. These maps do nothing of the kind. When we were mapping in relation to the importance of the criteria, I believe we were on the right path. When certain organizations started crying out about partisan fairness, I believe we then went off on a strictly partisan tangent and discounted most all the other work we had done, especially in relation to Communities of Interest (hereon referred to as COI's) as well as County boundaries.

When it came time to vote, we were forced to choose one of the subpar maps that were proposed. If we didn't agree that any of them be put forth to the public and the 45-day comment period, we should have been allowed to vote no confidence. I believe we should have taken more time, as numerous public commenters told us, to come up with maps that every Commissioner could confidently say were our best work.

Some examples as to why I voted against the proposed maps include, but are not limited to the following:

Chestnut:

Chestnut groups Grand Rapids with Grand Haven, Norton Shores and the like on the far west coast of Michigan, as well as extending into Muskegon. It divides three counties to make the 3<sup>rd</sup> Congressional

District and lumps different COI'S together. District 2 extends south beyond notable county boundaries to include 20 different counties, which are in NO way communities of interest. District 8 takes areas from five different counties to lump Midland with Bay City and Saginaw. District 7 includes six different counties encompassing rural areas such as Fowler, Charlotte, Olivet, Eaton Rapids, as well as Fowlerville, Howell and Brighton. Coming from this area, we have nothing in common with Howell, Brighton or the capitol of Lansing, aside from traveling there on occasion.

#### Linden:

The Linden map is laughable in that once again it groups rural areas with the capitol of Lansing in district 21 and places East Lansing, with rural Eagle, Westphalia and Williamston. Williamston and Webberville are a COI, yet it splits them to place Webberville in District 22 with Howell and Brighton. District 30 grabs from the west yet again. District 33 places northern areas, such as Baldwin and Sauble with areas such as Portland and Ionia which are in the middle of the State and much closer to Lansing, Grand Ledge and the like. Once again, Midland is grouped with Bay City and Saginaw, completely discounting a COI. Detroit areas seem to reach much farther north than Communities of Interest would warrant. Detroit's voice was by far the largest and loudest and yet we still seem to have allowed that voice to fall on deaf ears. District 36 extends from the Northeast tip of the lower peninsula down to the Huron Manistee National Forests on the Western side of the lower peninsula, dipping down to grab Pinconning in Bay County.

#### Hickory:

In the Hickory map, even though we heard numerous COI testimony to keep the Grosse Pointes in the same district as Harper Woods, Saint Clair Shores and nearby Detroit neighborhoods such as Morningside, East English Village, Jefferson-Chalmers, it slices Harper Woods from District 10 and includes it with District 11. Morningside is included in District 9, while District 10 extends beyond East Village to include everything southeast along the Detroit River and cuts off on the northeast side before St. Clair Shores.

Ann Arbor is split in to four districts, 47, 33, 23, and 49. Lansing's District 77 uses the Grand River along Moore's River Drive as most of its southern boundary, north to W. Cutler Road just north of Dewitt, then west and north again to include Westphalia and Eagle (areas which do not have the same interests as Lansing, and dips into Eaton County to grab Grand Ledge. District 76 includes the northeast tip of Eaton County, which is considered Lansing, grabs Vermontville (an area with a high concentration of Amish) yet leaves out Kalamo and Bellevue, with Bellevue being just west of Olivet about 5 minutes by car.

It splits Nashville, Hastings and Delton, all within Barry County into three separate districts and includes Bellevue in Eaton County with the Western portion of the State in District 43. Barry County is split three ways, and Eaton County is split in four ways.

As stated, these examples are not the ONLY problems I see in the proposed maps.

Another reason I dissented on these maps is because of the numerous times, as a Commissioner attending remotely, I watched the Commission take breaks and then come back to pass a motion regarding commission business, that was not part of the discussion that took place prior to said break and therefore remote Commissioners were not privy to any discussion. Unfortunately, this called into question the whole matter of “transparency “ for me.

I understand that we could not make everyone happy, however I believe had we spent more time in revising maps according to public comment, we could have done a much better job than what we put forth.

Sincerely,

Commissioner Erin Wagner

# **DISSENTING REPORT**

## **Submitted by Commissioner Rebecca Szetela**



## **DISSENTING REPORT: 2021 CHESTNUT CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING MAP**

**Authored by: Commissioner Rebecca Szetela**

***Chair: September 2021-March 2022***

***Vice-Chair: March 2021-September 2021***

### **Summary**

The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission adopted its final United States Congressional, Michigan State House, and Michigan State Senate maps on December 28, 2021. This approval was the culmination of over a year of challenging, and often intense, work, which was complicated both by the global COVID-19 pandemic and a four-month delay in release of data from the United States Census Bureau. For the first time in the State of Michigan, a group of randomly selected voters, in lieu of politicians, drew the U.S. Congressional, Michigan State House, and Michigan State Senate maps. These maps were drawn openly and with the ongoing participation, input, and observation of the public. Individual Commissioners, who were strangers to each other at the start of this process, bridged their partisan leanings and worked collaboratively, as a team, to compile maps. The Commission performed admirably under very challenging circumstances. There is much for the Commission to celebrate.

While celebrations are in order, all business processes, no matter how successful, should be subject to a frank evaluation process. There is always room for improvement. There are always insights to be gleaned and carried forward. Retrospective evaluations, where we look backward at what went right, what went wrong, and what can be improved, are (and should be) standard and expected. The redistricting process should be subject to no less scrutiny.

The intent of this Dissenting Report is to provide an honest and transparent account of areas where, due to a variety of intersecting factors, the Commission could have performed more faithfully to its Constitutional mandate in the creation, revision, and adoption of its U.S. Congressional, State House, and State Senate maps. This Report highlights deficiencies in adhering to several Constitutional criteria (Voting Rights Act Compliance, Respecting Communities of Interest, and Partisan Fairness) as well as an error in elevating a criterion that was not in the Constitution. This Report also notes that the Commission did not appropriately account for and consider the full body of public comment. As a

result, the Commission's process was not as data-driven, objective, or participatory as it should have been.

Because this Report is written with the intention toward improvements in the process, I have included many recommendations for future Commissions. For the reasons set forth below, I dissent to the adoption of Chestnut Congressional map by the Commission.

## Rationale

### OBJECTION 1 | CRITERIA #1 COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL LAW, INCLUDING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

*"Unfortunately we do not have sufficient information to anticipate what might happen in future Democratic primaries in the proposed districts. The reason is that we have only one statewide Democratic primary for which we can recompile results and minority voters were not cohesive in this primary. **We simply do not know what would happen in a primary in which minority voters are cohesive.**"*

*Ex. 1, Dr. Lisa Handley, December 27, 2021<sup>1</sup>*

In my opinion, the Commission cannot say with any degree of confidence whether any of the Commission's approved maps (the US Congressional ("Chestnut"), State Senate ("Linden"), and State House ("Hickory")) will provide minorities, particularly Black voters in the metropolitan Detroit area, with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice in **both** primary and general elections. This is a serious flaw in the Chestnut map. Thus, I dissent to its adoption.

### The Commission's Quantitative and Legal Analysis

In furtherance of its compliance with the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"), the Commission exclusively relied on quantitative analysis from Dr. Lisa Handley, legal analysis from its Voting Rights Expert (Bruce Adelson), and legal advice from its general counsel. The first step in this compliance process was a determination as to whether voting in Michigan was racially polarized. To determine this, Dr. Handley analyzed ten years' worth of general and primary election data from the State of Michigan. Ex. 2, Final Handley Report.<sup>2</sup> In conducting her analysis, Dr. Handley calculated that the majority of Michigan counties (95%, or 79 out of 83 counties) lacked sufficient Black voter populations to estimate voting behavior. Ex. 3, Sept. 2 Transcript, pp. 21-24. Thus, a racially polarized voting ("RPV") analysis could not

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<sup>1</sup> I would like to acknowledge the excellent analysis Dr. Lisa Handley performed for the Commission.

<sup>2</sup> For brevity, I have only attached portions of Exhibit 2 to this Dissent. The full report is available at: <https://www.michigan.gov/micrc/meeting-notices-and-materials> under the link titled "Racially Polarized Voting Analysis."

be performed in those counties. *Id.* However, Dr. Handley determined that four Michigan counties (Wayne, Oakland, Saginaw, and Genesee) contained sufficient Black voting-age populations to allow an RPV analysis to be conducted. *Id.* In each of those four counties where the RPV analysis was conducted, voting was racially polarized. Ex. 2, pg. 7; Ex. 3, pp. 21-24. Because voting was racially polarized, the Commission was required to structure districts that complied with the VRA in those counties. *Id.* Mr. Adelson correspondingly advised that the VRA did not require minority-majority districts (e.g., districts with greater than 50% Black voting age population); however, the Commission did need to create “opportunity to elect” districts. The Commission was advised by Mr. Adelson that an “opportunity to elect” district is one where the district contains the requisite number of minority voters needed to enable those voters an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. Dr. Handley’s analysis was intended to determine the minimum percentage of Black voting-age population (“BVAP”) necessary to create opportunity to elect districts in the four racially polarized counties (Wayne, Oakland, Saginaw, and Genesee).

To estimate these percentages, Dr. Handley evaluated the degree to which white voters supported Black-preferred candidates (the “White Crossover Vote”) in the four counties. As noted by Dr. Handley, “if a relatively consistent percentage of white voters support Black-preferred candidates, candidates preferred by Black voters can be elected in districts that are less than majority Black.” Ex. 2, p. 19. The White Crossover Vote can also compensate for depressed Black voter turnout. Ex. 2, p. 19. Alternately, “if voting is starkly polarized, with few or no whites crossing over to vote for the candidates supported by Black voters,” a district “that is more than 50% Black VAP” may be needed to elect Black-preferred candidates. *Id.* Thus, Dr. Handley’s analysis included the voting patterns of Black and white voters as well as data regarding variations in turnout rates.

After completing her analysis, Dr. Handley provided the Commission with a report stating that, for **general elections**, Black voters could elect candidates of choice in Wayne County with a BVAP as low as 35%. Ex. 2; Ex. 4, pp 13-18. In Oakland County, once again for **general elections**, Black voters could elect candidates of choice with a BVAP as low as 40%. Ex. 2; Ex. 4. Dr. Handley also stated that no county required districts with a BVAP of 50% or more in the general election. *Id.*

However, general election results were not the only relevant inquiry. As noted in Dr. Handley’s writings on this topic, **both primary and general elections must be considered**. Ex. 5, *Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence*, B. Grofman, L. Handley, and D. Lublin, North Carolina Law Review, Volume 79, Number 5, Article 12 (6-1-2001) p. 1410-1411. Moreover, map drawers need to be **most** focused on the **highest** percentages required because that is

the percentage needed to win both elections (primary and general). *Id.* Accordingly, if 52% is the proper number to allow minority voters an opportunity to elect in a primary, but 43% is needed in a general election, the map drawer's work should be governed by the higher primary percentage (52%). *Id.*

Accordingly, Dr. Handley also analyzed primary data. Ex. 2, p. 24-26. There was a single Statewide Michigan Democratic<sup>3</sup> primary with results that could be recompiled and applied to any district reconfiguration that the Commission desired to test. *Id.* That election was the 2018 Gubernatorial primary, in which three candidates were running: Gretchen Whitmer, Abdul El-Sayed, and Shri Thanedar. In analyzing this election, Dr. Handley determined that Black voters were not "cohesive" – meaning they did not support a single, identifiable candidate. *Id.* This lack of cohesiveness made it impossible to extrapolate the data from that election in a manner that could predict the election results for future districts. *Id.* at 24. Disappointingly, the 2018 Gubernatorial primary could not be used to determine the proper BVAP levels needed for Black voters to elect their candidates of choice in the primary elections in the recompiled districts.

In the absence of Statewide primary data for analysis and recompilation, Dr. Handley analyzed other primary election data. Dr. Handley produced two charts entitled "Threshold of Representation" for both the State Senate and State House (the "Threshold Tables"). Ex. 2, p. 24-26. Dr. Handley described these Threshold Tables as being a "useful check on the percent needed to win estimates" found in the general election tables. Ex. 2, p. 24. The Threshold Tables were "designed to identify the lowest minority percentage above which minority candidates are consistently elected." Ex. 2, p. 24. **For the State Senate, that threshold was 48%.**<sup>4</sup> For the State House, **the threshold identified was 36%** (*as described more fully in the footnote, it should have been between 47% and 52%*).<sup>5</sup> A Threshold Table

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<sup>3</sup> Because Michigan's BVAP population tends to vote overwhelmingly Democratic, Democratic primaries were Dr. Handley's area of focus.

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Handley's analysis showed there were no State Senate districts with BVAP levels between 36% and 44% (the very "target range" the Commission later confined itself to in drawing its maps). Ex. 2; Ex. 3, pp. 18-19. Of the single district with 45% BVAP (District 1), the Black candidate of choice (Alberta Tinsley Talabi) did not survive the primary, even though she received approximately 48% (and the majority) of the Black vote. Ex. 2, p. 26, 65. In comparison, Stephanie Chang, an Asian woman, won the primary with 49.8% of the vote, having received over 75% of the votes cast by white voters. *Id.* ***Thus, in a district with 45% BVAP, Black voters did not have the opportunity for their candidate of choice (Alberta Tinsley Talabi) to advance to the general election.*** As expected, as the Democratic candidate in the general election, Ms. Chang easily won the general election for Senate District 1, obtaining 72% of the vote and an estimated 95%+ of the BVAP vote. Ex. 2, p. 54.

<sup>5</sup> Using the same methodology Dr. Handley used in the Senate table, the Threshold for the House also should have been 47% BVAP or more. Similar to the State Senate, there were no State House districts with BVAP levels between 37% and 46%. Ex. 2, p. 25-26; Ex. 3, pp. 18-19. Dr. Handley's State House Threshold Table identifies 36% as the number needed to elect minority candidates of choice. Ex. 2. However, her analysis overlooked the fact that

was not provided for Congressional elections.

To summarize Dr. Handley's analysis, for Wayne and Oakland Counties, the election analysis showed that Black voters had the opportunity to elect candidates of choice in the **general election** with BVAP numbers ranging between 35% and 40%. Ex. 4, pp. 13-16. However, the Threshold Tables, which reflected **primary results**, suggested higher amounts were likely necessary (48% in the State Senate and between 47% and 52% in the State House) for Black voters to have an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice in primaries.<sup>6</sup> Ex. 4, p. 18-19. Because VRA compliance requires the ability to elect candidates of choice **in both elections**, the Commission should have taken a conservative approach by using higher BVAP numbers (approximately 48%) when constructing districts in all maps. Ex. 5, pp. 1410-1411. This approach would have been the most protective of the voting rights of Black voters.<sup>7</sup>

### The Commission's Directions From Counsel

Armed with Dr. Handley's report and data, the Commission began drawing maps following this approach and drew districts in the Metropolitan Detroit area with BVAP percentages around 50%. After completing districts in most of the Metropolitan Detroit area, the Commission's counsel intervened and began aggressively pushing the Commission to reduce the BVAP numbers to as close to the general election percentages (35% to 40%) as possible. Ex. 6, Sept. 13 Email. This pressure was most evident at

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the minority candidate elected at the 36% threshold was not the candidate of choice for Black voters. Although all districts above 36% elected **minority** candidates, and in State House District 29 (BVAP 36.04%) a Black candidate was elected, this candidate **was not** the candidate of choice for Black voters. Ex. 2, p. 25, 67. The Black voters' candidate of choice (Kermit Williams) did not survive the primary, even though he received approximately 50% of the Black vote. *Id.* In comparison, Brenda Carter, a Black woman, won the primary with 30.7% of the vote, having received over 59% of the votes cast by white voters. *Id.* **Thus, in a district with 36% BVAP, Black voters were not able to have their candidate of choice (Kermit Williams) survive the primary to be considered at the general election.** Once again, as expected, the winner of the Democratic primary, Brenda Carter, easily won the general election for House District 29, obtaining 72.9% of the vote and an estimated 95%+ of the BVAP vote. Ex. 2, p. 58. By comparison, in the 6<sup>th</sup> House District (53% BVAP), the candidate of choice favored by Black voters (Tyrone Carter – with approximately 70% of BVAP vote) was able to prevail in the primary, even though white voters did not prefer that candidate. Ex. 2, p. 25, 68. Dr. Handley did not provide estimates for Black voters for District 4, where Abraham Aiyash was elected, because so many candidates ran for election in that primary that Dr. Handley could not ascertain the minority-preferred candidate. Thus, the Threshold of Representation for State House districts should have been somewhere between the BVAP of Mr. Aiyash's district (47% BVAP in the 4<sup>th</sup> district) and the 53% BVAP in Mr. Carter's district (the 6<sup>th</sup> district).

<sup>6</sup> The variation in the target BVAP percentages was attributable to primary and general election disparities in both the White Crossover Vote and voter turnout.

<sup>7</sup> If the Commission had exercised its discretion to use BVAP percentages higher than the general election values, and those numbers proved to be too high, Black voters' candidates of choice would still have a reasonable chance of election and a future Commission would have the ability, based on a decade of data, to adjust the numbers further downward. On the other hand, if the general election BVAP thresholds adhered to by the Commission are too low, Black voters may spend a decade being injured by not having an opportunity to elect candidates of choice. The Commission should have had a careful discussion balancing the risks and benefits of both approaches. In lieu of having that discussion, the Commission yielded that decision-making to its counsel.

the September 30, 2021, Commission meeting in Rochester Hills, where the Commission was expressly directed to identify “anything that is higher than 40% for the black voting age population” and “those quote unquote fixes can be dealt with.” Ex. 7, Sept. 30, 2021, AM Meeting Transcript, pg. 21; See Ex. 7, p. 22. Despite Dr. Handley’s analysis showing that the required BVAP for primary elections was likely higher than the required BVAP for general elections, the Commission acquiesced to its counsel and redrew each of its existing maps in the Metropolitan Detroit area based on the general election BVAP “targets” of 35% to 40%.

### **The Public Response**

Having witnessed the low percentages of BVAP that the Commission was being directed to achieve, Metropolitan Detroiters appeared in force to question whether the Commission’s maps would provide Black voters in Metropolitan Detroit with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice in the primaries. See Ex. 8<sup>8</sup>, Detroit Hearing Transcript, Oct. 20, 2021. The Commission received hundreds of comments objecting to the low BVAP percentages in its draft maps. Ex. 8. Additionally, Jerome Reide, a legislative liaison from the Michigan Department of Civil Rights, and John E. Johnson, Jr., the Executive Director of the Michigan Department of Civil Rights, also both presented letters to the Commission indicting their belief that the Commission was violating the Voting Rights Act.

As voters testified, the Metropolitan Detroit area is solidly Democratic, with elections in Wayne County generally favoring Democrats by 20 percentage points or more. Ex. 8. Reliably, whoever wins the Democratic primary in Wayne County will win the general election. *Id.*, see Ex. 2. Thus, for Black voters to be able to elect their candidate of choice, that candidate of choice **must be able to succeed in the Democratic primary**. Ex. 8. The public asserted that general election results were neither reliable nor valid indicators of whether Black voters would be able to elect candidates of choice. *Id.* By ignoring the outsized role of the Democratic primaries in the Metropolitan Detroit area and focusing on the 35% and 40% range derived from general election data, the public stated that the Commission was poised to disenfranchise Black voters by denying them the opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. *Id.*

### **The Commission Declines to Correct Its Course**

Following several hearings and meetings, including the October 20 Detroit Public Hearing, some Commissioners began questioning the validity of its attorneys’ directives to draw districts using the

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<sup>8</sup> Due to its length, I have attached only a portion of the transcript from the October 20, 2021, public hearing in Detroit. The full transcript is available at: [https://www.michigan.gov/micrc/-/media/Project/Websites/MiCRC/Transcripts1/MICRC\\_Meeting\\_Transcript\\_10\\_20\\_2021.pdf?rev=a378536e31c446a494555afb9672b019&hash=0E0BEC4295A48C46AEB4689E2C0299D4](https://www.michigan.gov/micrc/-/media/Project/Websites/MiCRC/Transcripts1/MICRC_Meeting_Transcript_10_20_2021.pdf?rev=a378536e31c446a494555afb9672b019&hash=0E0BEC4295A48C46AEB4689E2C0299D4)

general election BVAP percentages supplied by Dr. Handley's report. The Commission's response to those concerns should have been to return to the expert who prepared the RPV analysis (Dr. Handley) to seek her opinion with respect to the concerns of the public. Instead, once again at the direction of counsel, the Commission held a closed session with its counsel (rather than Dr. Handley) to discuss the concerns of voters. Ex. 9, Oct. 20, 2021, Email. This meeting was merely a reiteration of the same legal advice that had resulted in the objections from Metropolitan Detroiters in the first instance. Closed Session Hearing, Oct. 27, 2021.<sup>9</sup> At this meeting, the concerns of Metropolitan Detroiters were cast as advocating "not to follow the law." *Id.* at 1:03:46. This messaging was repeated in email messages to Commissioners in advance of the meeting as well, where Commissioners were directed to disregard the comments as being "advanced by lobbyists and politicians driving emotion." Ex. 10, Oct. 18, 2021, Email. Commissioner comments during the closed-door meeting exemplify the adoption by some Commissioners of these recharacterizations of the concerns of voters. Closed Session Hearing, Oct. 27, 2021 (Commissioner at 1:01:50: "*I also reflected on the Detroit hearing...they were just wrong...their comments were not backed by anything other than their feelings*"; Commissioner at 39:13: "*I think...I hope we all recognize, at least I think, many of the many, many, many of the comments that we heard, while they were saying that it was a VRA issue, it's a partisan issue. They have an agenda. And we need to be able to spot that and weed that out and not fall for that.*"; Commissioner at 1:20:12: "*I just want to remind us all that...it was set up so that we hear from citizens, but, I think, at this point, we need to, kind of, shut out all the criticisms that are coming and all the pressure because these are all motivated.*"). In this echo chamber created by its counsel, Commissioners were dissuaded from making further adjustments to the maps. Acceding to these pressures, the Commission abandoned further inquiry into whether higher BVAP percentages were needed and, instead, deferred to the advice of counsel.

Although the Commission itself did not directly seek clarification from Dr. Handley, Dr. Handley attempted to alert the Commission of its impending error. Specifically, Dr. Handley warned Commission staff<sup>10</sup> on December 10, 2021, that the Commission's maps had BVAP levels too low to allow Black

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<sup>9</sup> The audio from this meeting is available at: <https://www.michigan.gov/micrc/additional-pages/MSC-163823-Materials> under the heading, "Closed Session Audio Recording, Oct. 27." A transcript of this hearing was not available at the time of the preparation of this Report.

<sup>10</sup> This information was not conveyed to the Commission by its general counsel and other staff members were directed by the general counsel not to share Dr. Handley's concerns with Commissioners. Uncomfortable with the general counsel's direction, staff members informed me of Dr. Handley's concerns and I relayed those concerns to several Commissioners on December 15, 2021. Ex. 11, December 15, 2021, Email. For clarification, I incorrectly stated in my December 15 email, based on my misunderstanding at the time, that Dr. Handley's analysis was flawed. The Commission's understanding of Dr. Handley's analysis was flawed, not the analysis itself.

voters the opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. Ex. 11, Email. Dr. Handley reaffirmed these concerns on December 27, 2021, noting that the Commission does not know if its maps will provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect candidates of choice in the Democratic primary:

*Unfortunately we do not have sufficient information to anticipate what might happen in future Democratic primaries in the proposed districts. The reason is that we have only one statewide Democratic primary for which we can recompile results and minority voters were not cohesive in this primary. **We simply do not know what would happen in a primary in which minority voters are cohesive.***

*Ex. 1, Dr. Lisa Handley, December 27, 2021*

Despite vigorous public comment, evidence from its own expert indicating that higher BVAP percentages were needed, and plenty of time to act to change the maps, the Commission instead voted on December 28, 2021 to not allow adjustments to the maps.<sup>11</sup> Ex. 16, p. 85. The Commission had no data or evidence to suggest that Black voters will have an opportunity to elect candidates of choice in the Democratic primary with BVAP percentages of 35%, 40%, or even 45%. Ex. 2, Ex. 3. Undeterred, the Commission approved the Chestnut map, with BVAP populations of 43.81% (District 12) and 44.70% (District 13).

## Conclusion

In conclusion, given the concerning data derived from primary elections and warnings from both the public and the Commission's RPV expert, the Commission's approach to compliance with the VRA was anything but data-driven, evidence-based, or participatory. The Commission's approach was to follow a will-o'-the-wisp and rely on the hope that general election thresholds will magically translate into Black voters' candidates of choice advancing past the Democratic primaries. Because the Commission did not have evidence or data to establish that these BVAP levels are sufficient to allow Black voters to have an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice in both the primary and general elections for either its Congressional, State Senate, or State House maps, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut Congressional Map.

## Recommendation for Future Commissions:

1. In determining the requisite minority voting populations necessary for minority voters to have an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice, future Commissions should utilize the higher of the general election or primary election results to establish "target" BVAP ranges.

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<sup>11</sup> Commissioners Kellom, Curry, Lange, Wagner, and I voted against precluding changes to the maps (i.e., those Commissioners were in favor of changing the maps).

2. To ensure full and complete understanding of expert reports, all discussions of data and analysis regarding the requisite level of minority populations necessary to permit minority voters an opportunity to elect candidates of choice should require the attendance of the data scientist who conducted the analysis (in this case, Dr. Lisa Handley). Staff and other consultants should not be permitted to interpret the recommendations or conclusions of data scientists for the Commission.
3. Expert analysis of draft map compliance with the Voting Rights Act (and other metrics) should be received before maps may advance to the 45-day public comment period.
4. To the extent there is ambiguity or uncertainty regarding what BVAP levels are appropriate, Commissioners should openly and publicly discuss any concerns fully and vote on recommendations. The Commission should not rely on non-analyst determinations of the appropriate percentage levels.
5. The Commission, not staff or consultants, should evaluate the validity and import of public comments.

## **OBJECTION 2 | CRITERIA #3 COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST**

I dissent to the Chestnut map to the extent it fails to take into consideration and accommodate the following seven communities of interest that were identified as significant by the Commission and incorporated into other Congressional, State Senate, and State House Maps.

### **Community of Interest 1: Bengali Community of Interest**

The Bengali community identified Hamtramck and portions of Warren and Macomb County as being a community of interest that should be kept together. This community of interest was divided into two in the Chestnut Congressional map. The Chestnut map is the only final proposed Congressional map published by the Commission that divides this community of interest.

See comments p1511 (Mariam Akanan), p4107 (Nada Alhanooti, Hamtramck), f1514 (Tufayel Reza, Warren), f1516 (Iqbal Hossain, Hamtramck City), f1460 (Nurun Nesa, Warren), f1459 (Nazmin Begum, Warren); w1456 (Sumon Kobir, Warren Township), w1398 (Muzadded Abdullan, Warren City), p1037 (Rebeka Islam, Hamtramck), Map submitted via Portal Comment by Hayg Oshagan, 9/8/2021

### **Community of Interest 2: Jewish Community of Interest**

Eighty percent of the Metropolitan Detroit-area Jewish community resides in the “core” Oakland County communities of Berkley, Commerce Township, West Bloomfield, Bloomfield Hills, Birmingham, Franklin, Farmington, Farmington Hills, Royal Oak, Oak Park, Huntington Woods, Walled Lake, and

Southfield. Seven percent of Jewish households live in the Southfield area and 12% of the population of Southfield is Jewish. Franklin also contains a significant Jewish population. Despite requests to keep Southfield and Franklin with the remainder of the Jewish community in the “core” area, the Chestnut map isolates and separates Southfield and Franklin from the remainder of the Jewish community of interest. The Chestnut map is the only final proposed Congressional map published by the Commission that divides this community of interest.

See comments w746 (Todd Schafer, Beverly Hills); c1803 (Menachem Hojda, Oak Park); c5247 (Judah Karesh, West Bloomfield Township); w1000 (Charlotte Massey, Royal Oak)

### **Community of Interest 3: Indigenous Population Community of Interest**

The Commission received many comments from members of Indigenous populations, who specifically identified their populations as communities of interest throughout the State. The Indigenous populations specifically identified the service areas for the Indian Health Services clinic run by the Nottawaseppi Huron Band of the Potawatomi and the American Indian Health & Family Services clinic in the Detroit area as communities of interest. In addition, Meredith Kennedy, the author of these comments and a representative for and member of the Indigenous populations, specifically identified the Birch map as being the map that best preserved these communities of interest. The Chestnut map does not preserve the community of interest of the Indigenous populations.

See comments p5531, p5527, and p5525

### **Community of Interest 4: LGBTQ+ Community of Interest**

The Commission also received many comments from members and allies of the LGBTQ+ community, who identified their community of interest as encompassing the communities of Southfield, Oak Park, Pleasant Ridge, Huntington Woods, Ferndale, Hazel Park, and the Detroit neighborhood of Palmer Park. The Chestnut map divides this community of interest into three separate districts.

See comments w1924 (Oscar Renautt, Oak Park), w5790 (Ivy Nicole), w5669 (Sarah, Ishpeming Township), w5473 (Troy, Detroit), w5471 (Kathy Randolph), f3493 (Michael Rowady), c777 (LGBT Detroit, Detroit), c819 (LGBT Detroit, Detroit), w1287 (Midge Cone, Ann Arbor), and w1306 (Sue Hadden, Ann Arbor).

### **Community of Interest 5: Sikh Community of Interest**

The Sikh community of Troy and Rochester Hills also identified their community as a community

of interest and requested that the Troy and Rochester Hills Sikh community of interest stay together. The Chestnut map divides this community.

Ex. 8, p. 16; Ex. 16, p. 19.

#### **Community of Interest 6: Asian Pacific Islander and Chaldean Populations in Oakland/Macomb Counties Community of Interest**

Members of the Asian Pacific Islander and Chaldean communities in eastern Oakland County and western Macomb counties also identified themselves as a community of interest. The Chestnut map divides these populations in two by following the township boundary between the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> districts for Oakland and Macomb County. Thus, the Chestnut map divides the Asian Pacific Islander and Chaldean community of interest.

See comments w8699 (Daniel G, Troy) and p7262 (Yousif, Troy).

#### **Community of Interest 7: Arab & Middle Eastern/North African Community of Interest**

Members of the Arab or Middle Eastern/North African (MENA) community in Wayne County also identified themselves as a community of interest. The Chestnut map divides these populations in two. Thus, the Chestnut map divides the Arab or Middle Eastern/North African (MENA) community of interest.

See comment c1510 (Mariam Akanan, Dearborn), with supporting comments from Jamie Kim (Dearborn) and Mariam Bazzi (Dearborn).

Although the Commission had the discretion to determine which communities of interest it would incorporate into its maps, it is striking that these seven communities of interest were specifically identified for inclusion in all other “collaborative” Commission maps yet excluded, without explanation, from the Chestnut map. The Commission did not assess whether these communities of interest could have been accommodated within the Chestnut map and did not explain why these communities of interest were abandoned by the Commission in the Chestnut map. Due to the unexplained failure to accommodate the seven above-referenced communities of interest, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut Congressional map.

#### **Recommendation for Future Commissions:**

1. Future Commissions should maintain records of communities of interest incorporated into various draft maps along with specific details as to why communities of interest were included in some maps but not others.
2. To the extent maps exclude communities of interest included in other maps, a full

accounting as to the rationale for that exclusion must be documented, along with a detailed explanation as to why the excluded community of interest could not be reasonably accommodated in the excluding map.

### **OBJECTION 3 | CRITERIA #4 PARTISAN FAIRNESS**

I dissent because each of the Commission’s Congressional, State Senate, and State House maps, including the Chestnut, could have achieved improved (i.e., closer to zero) partisan fairness metrics. Although the redistricting software licensed by the Commission, AutoBound Edge, contained a full complement of political and partisan data and tools, the Commission was directed by its general counsel that the Commission was precluded from considering election data and partisan fairness metrics when drawing its initial Statewide maps. Specifically, the Commission was advised by its general counsel that the Constitution “actually prohibits the Commission from considering the election results while they are mapping” and that the Commission was “legally prohibited from” considering election data in drawing maps. Ex. 7, Sept. 30, 2021, AM Transcript, pp. 66-67. As noted by members of the public, the Constitution contains no such restrictions. Ex. 12, Sept. 30, 2021, PM Transcript, p. 9.

To prevent Commissioners from viewing election data and partisan metrics during mapping, the Commission’s general counsel further directed the Commission’s mapping vendor, EDS, to disable and keep “hidden” the partisan fairness metrics, election data, and other political data and reporting features in AutoBound Edge. Ex. 13, Oct. 6 2021, Email. The Commission was unaware of this direction and did not consent to it. Handicapped by this lack of access, the Commission began drawing maps in August of 2021 without access to key functionality in the mapping software that it had paid for. These features were not re-enabled until after the completion of draft maps in October and required a software update. Ex. 14, October 3, 2021, Email from Kimball Brace (*“One of the things that staff and I need to discuss on Monday is how much of some of the additional reports do you want to unveil. Like this political fairness report there are a bunch of other data, tables and reports that are possible in EDGE, but we should talk about what do we want to release.”*)

The Commission’s lack of access to partisan fairness metrics until after maps were drawn resulted in rushed attempts to fix woefully non-compliant maps. Further, even after Commissioners were granted access to partisan fairness tools, Commissioners were repeatedly directed by the general counsel to “stop chasing zero” – meaning to cease trying to improve the partisan fairness metrics of the draft maps, even though improvements in such metrics were unquestionably achievable (and had been achieved by several Commissioners) without altering adherence to higher-ranked Constitutional

criteria.

Moreover, maps with improved partisan fairness metrics were hampered from public release by the Commission's counsel. For example, around September 30, 2021, a Commissioner produced what had been described by the general counsel as a "perfect" Congressional map. The general counsel described the map as having a "0%" efficiency gap and a "0%" mean-median measurement. The general counsel and other consultants decided that this Commissioner's map could not have been produced without improper outside influence. Thus, the general counsel accused the Commissioner of violating the Constitution and pressured the Commissioner to withhold the map from the public and his fellow Commissioners (*"Bruce and I remain steadfast in our recommendation to [REDACTED] that he not advance his map we discussed with him last week..."*). Ex. 15, October 4, 2021, Email. Because of this interference, the Commissioner did not present the map to the Commission or the public and, further, altered the map to **increase** the partisan fairness metrics, tilting the "perfect" map in favor of Republicans.<sup>12</sup> Ex. 15. This map – which deliberately inflated the partisan fairness metrics in favor of Republicans – was the predecessor to the Chestnut map. As a result of these pressures, the Chestnut map is a less-partisan-fair version of another map.

As evidenced by a Commissioner's supposedly "perfect" map and other maps,<sup>13</sup> the Commission could have produced Congressional, State Senate, and State House maps with better (meaning closer to zero) partisan fairness metrics, without compromising other Constitutional criteria. Because maps with better partisan fairness metrics were actually achieved yet hindered from public production, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut map.

#### **Recommendation for Future Commissions:**

1. Future Commissions should have access to all partisan fairness and political data and reporting functionality while drafting maps.
2. Commissioners, not staff or consultants, should make decisions regarding access to data, tools, and maps.

#### **OBJECTION 4 | INEQUITABLE ACCOUNTING AND TREATMENT OF PUBLIC COMMENTS AND INAPPROPRIATE ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC COMMENTS**

I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut Congressional map because it was not the map

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<sup>12</sup> Ironically, the general counsel's failure to be forthright with the full Commission with respect to her concerns about this Commissioner's map may have enabled the adoption of a revised version of the very map that she objected to.

<sup>13</sup> Similarly, the Szetela House map was a more-partisan-fair version of the Hickory, without deleterious impacts on higher-ranked Constitutional criteria.

preferred by the public. The Birch map, not the Chestnut map, was the Congressional map that the majority of the public supported. Due to the Commission's lack of an organized accounting system to track public comments and failure to equally weigh all comments, some Commissioners erroneously concluded that the Chestnut map had the greatest public support. Since the Birch map actually had the greatest public support, this was in error.

The Commission was tasked with soliciting "wide" and "meaningful public participation" as part of its Constitutional obligations. Const. 1963, Art. IV., §6(10). Accordingly, the Commission diligently solicited public feedback, resulting in the Commission receiving nearly thirty thousand public comments throughout the redistricting process.<sup>14</sup> After the approval and advancement of final proposed maps to the 45-day public comment period on November 1, the Commission received comments via public meetings ("In-Person Comments"), via the online public comment portal ("Portal Comments"), and via comments placed directly on the maps themselves on the Mapping Page ("Mapping Comments").<sup>15</sup> Unfortunately, the Commission lacked a systematic method of tallying, recording, and reporting public comments.

Recognizing this deficiency on the part of the Commission, members of the public attempted to fill the gap. For example, a woman named Nicole Bedi tallied Mapping and Portal Comments and reported the tallies. Ex. 16, December 28, 2021, Transcript, p. 19. Specifically, Ms. Bedi reported that the Birch map received the greatest number of positive comments (with 67% of comments positive). Ex. 16, p. 19. As further noted by Ms. Bedi, only 55% of the Chestnut map's comments were positive. *Id.* With 67% of its 819 comments positive, the Birch map received 548 positive comments. In contrast, the Chestnut map (with only 55% of its 828 comments being positive) received only 455 positive comments. Ex. 16, p. 19. Thus, the Birch map had over 20% more favorable comments than the Chestnut map. Other members of the public conducted similar examinations of the public record and provided their reports to the Commission. Each of those reports indicated that the Birch map was the most preferred.

Rather than relying on these or other mathematical tabulations, the Commission's evaluation of public comments was haphazard and inconsistent. Some Commissioners did not routinely read Portal or Mapping Comments. Other Commissioners did not read a single Portal or Mapping Comment. Some

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<sup>14</sup> The Commission's 2022 Communication and Outreach Report is available at: <https://www.michigan.gov/micrc/-/media/Project/Websites/MiCRC/MISC5/MICRC-CO-031022.pdf?rev=e1e5911a7d264fa997475f9270d6380a&hash=D6FB5458F97A8339A47E7FAAFE75AEAE>

<sup>15</sup> Portal Comments and Mapping Comments are available on the [www.michigan.gov/micrc](https://www.michigan.gov/micrc) website.

Commissioners weren't attentive to In-Person Comments. In contrast, at least one Commissioner seemed to value In-Person Comments more than Mapping or Portal Comments.<sup>16</sup> Ex. 16, p. 82-83, ¶15. Additionally, despite the fact that In-Person Comments in favor of the Birch were ubiquitous, some Commissioners appeared to inexplicably disregard those In-Person Comments. Ex. 16, p. 80-81, ¶1 and ¶3. Had the Commission created a recording and tracking system for public comments, many of these inconsistencies and discrepancies could have been avoided.

Lastly, at least one Commissioner attempted to sway public votes in favor of his preferred maps. Specifically, on December 20, 2021, prior to the Commission's final vote on the maps, a Commissioner individually met with two groups that had been particularly engaged during the redistricting process, ACCESS and APIAVote Michigan. It was the practice of the Commission that all public interactions be coordinated and publicly noticed through the Commission's staff and that Commissioners appear in groups. The rationale behind those practices was to prevent Commissioners from interactions with the public that could undermine the Commission's goals of transparency and openness. Disregarding those practices, the Commissioner individually arranged and attended this meeting. At the meeting, the Commissioner repeatedly suggested that the Chestnut map was the public's preferred map, informing both groups "you liked the Chestnut Congressional Map," and specifically advocating for both groups to submit "more comments like that."<sup>17</sup> To her credit, the representative from ACCESS corrected the Commissioner and stated that the Birch map was actually the map preferred by her group for the State of Michigan. Despite this Commissioner's efforts, the Chestnut map still received fewer favorable votes than the Birch map.

Using objective measures, in addition to receiving a greater number of favorable comments, the Birch, not the Chestnut, map had the greatest number of votes in favor of adopting the map between the dates the maps were published and the date the map was ultimately adopted. Between November 1, 2021, and December 28, 2021, **the Birch map received approximately 15% more votes in its favor of its adoption than the Chestnut map.**<sup>18</sup> Additionally, when considering votes in favor of the Birch prior to

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<sup>16</sup> One Commissioner mistakenly believed there were comments in favor of the Chestnut map at the "next five" public hearings, which were held between October 20 and October 26. Ex. 16, p. 82-83, ¶15. The Chestnut map was not created or named until November 1. Therefore, the Commission could not have received In-Person Comments in favor of the Chestnut map at October hearings/meetings because the Chestnut map did not exist at that time. This confusion illustrates the precise problem with relying upon memory rather than objective measures.

<sup>17</sup> This meeting was recorded and posted on APIAVote Michigan's Facebook page on December 27, 2021, but I was unaware of the existence of the video or its contents until after the Commission voted on the maps on December 28, 2021. As of the date of this Report, the video is available at: <https://www.facebook.com/apiavotemi/>.

<sup>18</sup> Although the Birch map received a great many comments urging its adoption before November 1, 2021, and

November 1, 2021, the Birch map was irrefutably the public’s preferred map, with substantially greater public support than the Chestnut.

Source	Support Birch	Support Chestnut
Mapping Comments	294	204
Portal Comments	98	81
In-Person Comments <sup>19</sup>	50	101
Total <sup>20</sup>	<b>442</b>	386

The Chestnut map **was not** the public’s preferred map by any measure.

The Commission was not obligated to adopt a particular map based solely on the weight of public opinion. However, because the Commission was required to solicit (and did solicit) public participation, the Commission should have accurately documented, analyzed, and given meaningful consideration the comments received from the public. It failed to do so. In part due to the failure to appropriately tally, measure, and account for public comments, the Commission failed to adopt the map preferred by the public and, instead, voted to approve a map the public did not prefer. For these reasons, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut map by the Commission.

#### **Recommendation for Future Commissions:**

1. Future Commissions should maintain a public, running tally of unique “votes” in favor of any maps published for the public’s consideration. This tally should include all unique votes received for a particular map during the duration of its publication to the public.
2. Multiple votes by the same individual should be counted as a single vote. The Commission should establish processes to prevent the same individuals from casting multiple votes.
3. In-person, written, and online comments should be weighted equally.
4. Vote tallies should quantify the percentage of positive and negative comments with respect

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those votes in favor are still relevant and important, I focused solely on the time period where both maps had been published for consideration. Considering votes before November 1, 2021, would have resulted in an even greater number of votes in favor of the Birch.

<sup>19</sup> In the November 1 through December 28 time frame, the Chestnut map received more support than the Birch map via In-Person Comments; however, the Birch map received significantly more support in writing via Portal and Mapping Comments. Commissioners who never or rarely read Portal and Mapping Comments incorrectly believed the Chestnut map had greater support, when, in fact, the Birch map was the public’s preferred Congressional Plan.

<sup>20</sup> I personally tallied the number of Portal, Mapping, and In-Person for the Birch and Chestnut maps to reach these results. In making these tallies, I only treated a comment as “in favor of adopting” of a map when the commentor specifically described one map as being superior to others using superlatives or other clear indicators of preference (e.g., “best map,” “fairest map,” “adopt this one,” etc.). I disregarded comments generally describing a map as “fair” or “balanced” as well as comments ranking two maps as equal (e.g., “either the Chestnut or Birch”). I also disregarded unfavorable comments. In addition, I only considered votes after the date the Chestnut was created (November 1, 2021).

- to a particular map.
5. Commissioners should not meet individually with groups or individuals to discuss redistricting matters.
  6. Commissioners should not be permitted to “steer” or direct public opinion toward particular maps. In interactions with the public and press, Commissioners should remain neutral with respect to their preferred maps until the date of deliberations.
  7. To enable the seamless incorporation of public mapping proposals, the Commission should verify that mapping tools used by the public to submit maps are compatible with mapping software used by the Commission.
  8. To the extent a future Commission elects to adopt a map in spite of the weight of public comment with respect to that map, the Commission should provide, at a minimum, a rationale for its decision.

#### **OBJECTION 5 | IMPROPER CONSIDERATION OF COMPETITIVENESS**

In addition to receiving fewer positive public comments and fewer favorable public votes than other maps, a significant percentage of positive comments favoring the Chestnut map did so due to the supposed “competitiveness” of the map. Competitiveness is not among the Commission’s seven ranked Constitutional criteria. Further, the Commission was repeatedly advised that it could not consider competitiveness as a factor (*“I have consistently stated that competitiveness is not a constitutional criteria in Michigan. Attempting to add this consideration as a criteria [sic] creates a significant legal problem and leaves the MICRC wide open to a court challenge. First, there is no legal basis for including competitiveness in the criteria that the MICRC is constitutionally mandated to follow. This would likely be viewed as arbitrary and capricious by a court, particularly after receiving legal advice against inserting competitiveness.”*) Ex. 17, Sept. 20, 2021, Email.

Although the Constitution does not list competitiveness as a factor, the Constitution does not prevent the Commission from considering other factors **after** verifying compliance with the seven ranked Constitutional criteria. However, several Commissioners stated during deliberations that they primarily favored the Chestnut due to its “competitiveness,” above consideration with respect to how the Congressional maps compared with respect to the seven ranked Constitutional criteria. Ex. 16, p. 77, p. 80 (¶1-2), and p. 81 (¶3). In so doing, the Commission elevated a non-Constitutional criterion above the seven ranked Constitutional criteria. Thus, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut map to the extent the Commission improperly considered “competitiveness” as a primary factor in adopting

the map.

**Recommendation for Future Commissions:**

1. Future Commissions should not consider non-ranked criteria above Constitutionally ranked criteria.
2. Future Commissions should evaluate how to treat comments promoting criteria not specified by the Constitution.
3. If future Commissions desire to consider non-Constitutional criteria, such consideration should only occur after an evaluation and ranking of potential plans compliance with non-Constitutional criteria.

**OBJECTION 6 | FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN OPEN AND TRANSPARENT DELIBERATIONS**

Lastly, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut map because the Commission failed to deliberate on the maps comprehensively, openly, transparently, and objectively. The Commission deliberated for a mere 20 to 25 minutes before commencing voting on the Chestnut map. Deliberations on the Linden and Hickory maps were similarly brief. The Commission did not evaluate, compare, or contrast plans for their compliance with each of the Constitutional criteria in any systematic or comprehensive manner. Additionally, no attempts were made to rank plans based on objective measures. This lack of meaningful analysis and discussion of which maps best conformed to the Constitutional and other criteria did not fulfill the Commission's mission of an open, transparent, objective, and data-driven process. Thus, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut Congressional map.

**Recommendation for Future Commissions:**

1. Future Commissions should schedule several open meetings to deliberate over proposed plans.
2. Evaluations of compliance with each Constitutional criteria should be conducted well in advance of final deliberations and voting.
3. Proposed maps should be compared, contrasted, scored, and ranked in accordance with their compliance with the Constitutional criteria.

**Conclusion**

In summary, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut map with respect to its compliance with Constitutional Criteria 1 (Voting Rights Act Compliance), 3 (Communities of Interest), and 4 (Partisan Fairness). I also dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut map because the Commission improperly weighed considerations of competitiveness in adopting the map. Additionally, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut map because the Commission neglected to consider and equally weigh all public

comment received in a support of the various Congressional maps and, as a consequence, adopted a map not preferred by the public. Finally, I dissent due to the lack of open, transparent, and data-driven deliberations regarding the maps.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Rebecca Szetela". The script is cursive and fluid, with the first letter of each word being capitalized and prominent.

Rebecca Szetela

Dated: June 24, 2022

# Exhibit 1

**From:** lrhandley@aol.com  
**Sent:** Monday, December 27, 2021 9:25 PM  
**To:** Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC)  
**Cc:** Rothhorn, MC (MICRC); Pastula, Julianne (MICRC); badelson1@comcast.net  
**Subject:** Re: MICRC Questions

**Follow Up Flag:** Follow up  
**Flag Status:** Completed

**CAUTION: This is an External email. Please send suspicious emails to [abuse@michigan.gov](mailto:abuse@michigan.gov)**

Dear Rebecca,

Both the threshold tables on 26 and 27 and the recompiled election results for Dillard are important tools for estimating whether minority candidates of choice can win in the proposed districts. The two approaches, at least in this instance, do not contradict one another with regard to the general election – the minority preferred candidate wins all of the general election above 35% in the state senate threshold table as well as the state house threshold table. It is the Democratic primary that is the stumbling block in the senate threshold table (I am referring to State Senate District 1 and the fact that the winner was not the candidate of choice of Black voters in the primary – she was, however, the minority candidate of choice in the general).

Unfortunately we do not have sufficient information to anticipate what might happen in future Democratic primaries in the proposed districts. The reason is that we have only one statewide Democratic primary for which we can recompile results and minority voters were not cohesive in this primary. We simply do not know what would happen in a primary in which minority voters are cohesive.

(The reason that recompiled election results are especially important is that they take into account the voting patterns of the actual voters that will reside in the newly proposed district.)

Best wishes,  
Lisa

Dr. Lisa Handley

—Original Message—

**From:** Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC) <SzetelaR@michigan.gov>  
**To:** SA HANDLEY <lrhandley@aol.com>  
**Cc:** Rothhorn, MC (MICRC) <RothhornM@michigan.gov>  
**Sent:** Mon, Dec 27, 2021 2:24 pm  
**Subject:** MICRC Questions

Good afternoon, Dr. Handley! I have some follow up question on your report to the MICRC. I understand you will be unavailable tomorrow, so Sue suggested I email a list of questions to you.

I am trying to reconcile the information contained on pages 26 and 27. My understanding is that the table on page 26 was intended to test the "breakpoint" between districts that are electing candidates of choice versus those that are not. Table 10 on page 26 indicates that for the Michigan State Senate, districts with BVAP of 47% or lower are not able to elect

candidates of choice. This is concerning since none of our currently proposed Senate maps (Palm, Cherry, Linden) exceed 45% BVAP. Based on this table alone, I read your report to suggest that our Senate maps need to be above 48% to create opportunity to elect districts and that revisions may be necessary.

However, when I read the text on the next page (re: bellweather elections, particularly the 2014 SOS race with Godfrey Dillard), I draw a different conclusion.

I wondered how our districts are performing looking at that election. To test the maps, I ran the Linden and Cherry election results for the Dillard election. I also edited the Linden to increase the BVAP to 45% and Linden/Cherry maps to increase the BVAP to 48% for comparison purposes. Comparing the election results for the 2014 SOS election, Dillard would have won handily in all five districts, regardless of whether the BVAP was as low as 35% or as high as 50%.

#### **Senate Maps - BVAP Percentages**

District No.	Linden Plan		Revised Linden 45%		Revised Linden/Cherry 48%	
	BVAP	Dillard Election	BVAP	Dillard Election	BVAP	Dillard Election
1	35.03%	71.74%	45.23%	79.97%	50.95%	84.53%
3	42.09%	76.23%	45.39%	78.54%	48.24%	80.45%
7	44.78%	63.19%	46.59%	64.89%	50.70%	66.74%
8	40.25%	65.15%	45.20%	68.40%	49.65%	70.81%
10	40.43%	62.57%	45.98%	66.49%	48.15%	68.25%

This reassures me that maybe our Senate maps are OK with their percentages as they stand? Or am I misunderstanding your analysis? If you could clarify I would appreciate it.

On a related note, I do think that part of the variation in results in current District 1 on Table 10 relates to the combination of communities. In the current district 1, you have very little of Detroit plus Harper Woods combined with Grosse Pointe Woods and Grosse Pointe Shores, which are both wealthy and white with high voter turnout. I suspect part of the variation in District 1 may relate to variations in voter turnout between the wealthier Grosse Pointes vs. the considerably less well-heeled Detroit and Harper Wood. I would expect the Grosse Pointes preferred candidate to be elected given the makeup of that district (which is part of the reason why we drew that district differently in our Senate maps).

Thank you so much for any clarification.

Rebecca Szetela

Commissioner

Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission

[szetelar@michigan.gov](mailto:szetelar@michigan.gov)

(517) 898-9366



## Exhibit 2

### Report to the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission

Dr. Lisa Handley

#### Preface

This report outlines the analyses I conducted on behalf of the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (MICRC) and relays my findings. I also briefly explain the partisan fairness measures I advised the MICRC to adopt as a component of the redistricting software and why I made these recommendations. The legal implications of my findings and the assessment of any proposed plans have been left to the MICRC legal team.

#### I. The Voting Rights Act and Racially Polarized Voting

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits any voting standard, practice or procedure – including redistricting plans – that result in the denial or dilution of minority voting strength. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was amended in 1982 to establish that intentional discrimination need not be proven (as the Supreme Court determined was required under the 15<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the Constitution). The U.S. Supreme Court first interpreted the amended Act in *Thornburg v. Gingles*,<sup>1</sup> a challenge to the 1982 North Carolina state legislative plans. In this case the U.S. Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must satisfy three preconditions to qualify for relief:

- The minority group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single-member district
- The minority group must be politically cohesive
- Whites must vote as a bloc to usually defeat the minority-preferred candidates

What do we mean when we say minority voters must be politically cohesive? And how do we know if white voters usually vote as a bloc to defeat the candidates preferred by minority voters? According to the Court, racially polarized voting is the “evidentiary linchpin” of a vote dilution claim. Voting is racially polarized if minorities and whites consistently vote for different candidates. More specifically, if minorities consistently support the same candidates, they are said to be politically cohesive. If whites are consistently *not* supporting these candidates, they are said to be bloc voting against the minority-preferred candidates.

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<sup>1</sup> 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

**Table 1: Number of Statewide Elections Analyzed that were Polarized**

	General Elections with Minority Candidates	All Statewide General Election Contests	Statewide Democratic Primary
Statewide	6/6	12/13	1/1
Genesee	5/6	9/13	1/1
Saginaw	6/6	11/13	1/1
Oakland	6/6	13/13	0/1
Wayne	3/6	7/13	1/1

Every statewide general election contest analyzed was polarized in Oakland County – only in the Democratic primary for Governor in 2018 did Black and white voters support the same candidate (Gretchen Whitmer). Voting in Saginaw County was nearly as polarized: two U.S. Senate contests (2012 and 2014) were not polarized, but the gubernatorial primary was polarized. Black and white voters agreed on the same candidates slightly more often in Genesee County – in addition to supporting U.S. senate candidates Debbie Stabenow in 2012 and Gary Peters in 2014, they both supported Barack Obama in 2012 and Democrat Mark Schauer for Governor in 2014.

Voting in Wayne County was considerably less racially polarized than statewide or in the other three counties studied. However, slightly more than half of the general election contests and the one statewide Democratic primary analyzed were polarized, with Black and white voters supporting the same candidates in 2012, disagreeing on the three statewide offices, but supporting the same U.S. Senate candidate in 2014, supporting different candidates for U.S. President in 2016 and 2020, and voting for most of the same candidates in 2018.

### **C. Congressional and State Legislative Election Results**

This section provides a summary of my racial bloc voting analysis of recent congressional and state legislative districts in the four-county area of Wayne, Oakland, Genesee and Saginaw. I analyzed 2018 and 2020 general elections, and the 2018 and 2020 Democratic primaries if at least one African American candidate competed in the election contest. However, for a number of state

only the first step in the process – it does not take into account the voting patterns of Black and white voters. If voting is racially polarized but a significant number of white voters typically “crossover” to vote for Black voters’ preferred candidate, it may be the case that crossover voting can more than compensate for depressed Black turnout.

***Incorporating Minority Cohesion and White Crossover Voting*** Even if Black citizens are turning out at lower rates than whites, and voting is racially polarized, if a relatively consistent percentage of white voters support Black-preferred candidates, the candidates preferred by Black voters can be elected in districts that are less than majority Black. On the other hand, if voting is starkly polarized, with few or no whites crossing over to vote for the candidates supported by Black voters, it may be the case that a district that is more than 50% Black VAP is needed to elect Black-preferred candidates. A district-specific, functional analysis should take into account not only differences in turnout rates, but also the voting patterns of Black and white voters.<sup>21</sup>

To illustrate this mathematically, consider a district that has 1000 persons of voting age, 50% of who are Black and 50% of who are white. Let us begin by assuming that Black turnout is lower than white turnout in a two-candidate general election. In our hypothetical election example, 42% of the Black VAP turn out to vote and 60% of the white VAP vote. This means that, for our illustrative election, there are 210 Black voters and 300 white voters. Further suppose that 96% of the Black voters supported their candidate of choice and 25% of the white voters cast their votes for this candidate (with the other 75% supporting her opponent in the election contest). Thus, in our example, Black voters cast 200 of their 210 votes for the Black-preferred candidate and their other 8 votes for her opponent; white voters cast 75 of their 300 votes for the Black-preferred candidate and 225 votes for their preferred candidate:

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Thus, for example, if 39.3% of the Black population turned out and 48.3% of the white population turned out,  $B = .483$  and  $A = .393$ , and  $M = .483 / (.393 + .483) = .483 / .876 = .5513$ , therefore a Black VAP of 55.1% would produce an equal number of Black and white voters. (For a more in-depth discussion of equalizing turnout see Kimball Brace, Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi, “Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice,” *Law and Policy*, 10 (1), January 1988.)

<sup>21</sup> For an in-depth discussion of this approach to creating effective minority districts, see Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and David Lublin, “Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence,” *North Carolina Law Review*, volume 79 (5), June 2001.

It is important to remember that winning office in the United States usually requires winning two elections: a primary and a general election. The tables above consider only general election contests. Producing a comparable set of tables for Democratic primaries is not possible. First, there was only one statewide Democratic primary – the 2018 primary contest for Governor. There were three candidates competing in this election and because 50% of the vote was not required to win the election, a mathematical equation setting the percentage needed to win 50% of the vote does not work. Second, Black voters were not cohesive in support of any one of these three candidates. In fact, the candidate preferred by even the plurality of Black voters was not the same in the four counties examined. Drawing a district that Black-preferred candidate could win this primary is not possible when there is no Black-preferred candidate.

In areas where most of the white voters are likely to vote in Republican primaries, the inability to calculate the percent needed to win in Democratic primaries is not particularly important. Black voters will dominate the Democratic primary unless they make up only a very small portion of the voters in the district. However, in the counties examined in Michigan, many white voters elect to participate in the Democratic primary, especially in Wayne County. As the percentage Black VAP of proposed districts decreases, it may become more challenging for Black-preferred candidates to win not only the general election but the Democratic primary – but only if voting in Democratic primaries is racially polarized. Unfortunately, it is not possible to ascertain exactly how much more difficult it would be – or even if it would be more difficult – given the lack of Democratic primary election data.

## **B. Threshold of Representation in the Current State House and Senate Districts**

A useful check on the percent needed to win estimates found in Tables 5-8 that can be done prior to drawing any districts is to produce what have been referred to by some political scientists as “threshold of representation” tables. These tables are designed to identify the lowest minority percentage above which minority candidates are consistently elected. Tables 9 and 10, below, report the BVAP of the current Michigan state house and senate districts with over 20% BVAP, and indicate the race and party of the candidate elected to represent the district.<sup>23</sup> Sorted

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<sup>23</sup> There are no African American state senators or representatives elected from districts that are less than 20% Black in VAP. However, there are other minority candidates (Hispanic, Asian, and Middle Eastern) elected to state house districts with considerably less than 20% BVAP.

by the percent BVAP, the tables can sometimes provide evidence of a clear breakpoint between those districts that are probably electing candidates of choice and those that are not.<sup>24</sup>

An examination Table 9 indicates that every Michigan state house district with a BVAP of at least 35% elects a minority representative to the state house. In fact, every district with a BVAP of more than 26.53% elects a minority to office with the exception of District 49 in Genesee County. And the racial bloc voting analysis of House District 49 indicates that the white incumbent, John Cherry, is the candidate of choice of Black voters, even in the 2018 Democratic primary when he faced several African American candidates.

**Table 9: Threshold of Representation for State House Districts, 2021**

State House District	Total VAP	Black VAP	Percent Black VAP	Name	Party	Race	Percent of Vote 2020
7	60347	57256	94.27%	Helena Scott	D	Black	93.00%
8	62448	58042	92.42%	Stephanie A. Young	D	Black	96.70%
3	54130	49536	90.93%	Shri Thanedar	D	Asian	93.30%
9	62529	46806	74.22%	Karen Whitsett	D	Black	94.20%
10	69209	46977	67.41%	Mary Cavanagh	D	Hispanic	84.80%
1	59788	38993	64.76%	Tenisha R. Yancey	D	Black	75.80%
35	78306	49325	62.50%	Kyra Harris Bolden	D	Black	82.90%
34	49491	30419	60.96%	Cynthia R. Neeley	D	Black	86.70%
2	57031	33142	57.70%	Joe Tate	D	Black	74.10%
5	49290	27190	54.12%	Cynthia A. Johnson	D	Black	93.40%
6	67505	36182	52.86%	Tyrone Carter	D	Black	100.00%
4	68749	32761	47.27%	Abraham Aiyash	D	ME	89.80%
29	72319	26621	36.04%	Brenda Carter	D	Black	72.90%
95	58640	21320	35.50%	Amos O'Neal	D	Black	70.10%
49	64844	19308	29.47%	John D. Cherry	D	White	68.90%
54	72426	21212	28.79%	Ronnie Peterson	D	Black	77.70%
12	73883	20207	26.97%	Alex Garza	D	Hispanic	62.40%
11	73586	19760	26.53%	Jewell Jones	D	Black	65.20%
92	66135	16957	25.34%	Terry J. Sabo	D	White	65.30%
27	73337	18051	24.35%	Regina Weiss	D	White	74.40%
16	74617	17556	23.25%	Kevin Coleman	D	White	62.50%
75	76956	18127	22.56%	David LaGrand	D	White	74.60%
68	71672	16808	22.44%	Sarah Anthony	D	Black	75.90%
18	75251	16519	21.76%	Kevin Hertel	D	White	60.30%
22	68758	14588	21.00%	Richard Steenland	D	White	59.90%
60	74176	15887	20.97%	Julie M. Rogers	D	White	71.40%

<sup>24</sup> Without the confirmation provided by a racial bloc voting analysis, it could conceivably be the case that the minority legislator is not the candidate of choice of minority voters.

Interpreting Table 10, for the Michigan state senate, is less straightforward. The four districts with BVAP percentages over 47% elect African Americans to office. However, Stephanie Chang, the state senator in District 1, which is 44.68% BVAP, was not the candidate of choice of Black voters in the 2018 Democratic primary, though she is the candidate of choice in the general election.

**Table 10: Threshold of Representation for State Senate Districts, 2021**

<b>State Senate District</b>	<b>Total VAP</b>	<b>Black VAP</b>	<b>Percent Black VAP</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>party</b>	<b>race</b>	<b>Percent of vote 2018</b>
5	203828	111418	54.25%	Betty Alexander	D	Black	77.4%
2	169357	86961	50.82%	Adam Hollier	D	Black	75.7%
3	186758	90737	48.14%	Sylvia Santana	D	Black	81.8%
4	180199	85691	47.00%	Marshall Bullock	D	Black	78.3%
1	193087	87075	44.68%	Stephanie Chang	D	Asian	72.0%
11	229870	82336	35.48%	Jeremy Moss	D	White	76.7%
27	175918	54071	30.42%	Jim Ananich	D	White	71.2%
9	219325	50800	22.95%	Paul Wojno	D	White	65.9%
6	217734	46997	21.29%	Erika Geiss	D	Black	61.4%

### **C. Recompiled Election Results**

As noted above, once draft districts have been drawn, there is a second approach available for ascertaining whether a proposed district is likely to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice to legislative or congressional office. This approach relies on recompiling election results from previous elections to see if the candidates preferred by minority voters would win in the draft district. This process entails (1) identifying “bellwether” elections, (2) disaggregating the precinct level results for these elections down to the census block level and then (3) re-aggregating the results up to conform to proposed district boundaries to determine if the minority-preferred candidate would win. This recompilation can only be done

MICRC

09/02/21-1300 Meeting

Captioned by Q&A Reporting, Inc., [www.qacaptions.com](http://www.qacaptions.com)

Exhibit 3

>> VICE CHAIR SZETELA: We will bring the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission to order at 1:06 p.m.

Greetings to Ann Arbor. We are happy to be here today. There are several groups that are making this meeting possible. I would like to thank Tom Ivako, Bonnie Roberts and Logan Woods of the center for local, state and urban policy here at the University of Michigan. Ellen Weisman and Nate Hall, campus election management project. Landon Meyers, campus vote project. It's gratifying that so many groups are here to assist the MICRC in engaging people in redistricting here in Michigan.

This Zoom webinar is being live streamed at YouTube at [www.YouTube.com/MICHSO](http://www.YouTube.com/MICHSO) office/videos.

For anyone in the public watching who would prefer to watch via a different platform than they are currently using, please visit our social media at Redistricting MI to find the link for viewing on YouTube.

Our live stream today includes closed captioning. Closed captioning, ASL interpretation, and Spanish and Bengali and Arabic translation services will be provided for effective participation in this meeting. Please E-mail us at [Redistricting@Michigan.Gov](mailto:Redistricting@Michigan.Gov) for additional viewing options or details on accessing language translation services for this meeting.

People with disabilities or needing other specific accommodations should also contact Redistricting at [Michigan.gov](http://Michigan.gov).

This meeting is also being recorded and will be available at [www.Michigan.gov/MICRC](http://www.Michigan.gov/MICRC) for viewing at a later date and this meeting is being transcribed and closed-captioned transcriptions will be made available and posted on [Michigan.gov/MICRC](http://Michigan.gov/MICRC) along with the written public comment submissions.

There is also a public comment portal that may be accessed by visiting [Michigan.gov/MICRC](http://Michigan.gov/MICRC), this portal can be utilized to post maps and comments which can be viewed by both the Commission and the public.

Members of the media who may have questions before, during or after the meeting should direct those questions to Edward Woods III, our Communications and Outreach Director for the Commission at [WoodsE3@Michigan.gov](mailto:WoodsE3@Michigan.gov) or 517-331-6309.

For the purposes of the public watching and for the public record I will now turn to the Department of State staff to take note of the Commissioners

The first and Foremost criteria are the U.S. Constitution and Federal law and the Voting Rights Act is Federal law.

And it applies everywhere in the country including Michigan.

It prohibits any voting standard practice or procedure including a redistricting plan that results in the denial or dilution of minority voting strength.

A redistricting plan that dilutes minority voting strength is one that either cracks or packs a geographically concentrated minority group.

A top example to the left is or to the right is an example of a District, a set of districts that cracks the minority community by dividing it among four districts, five districts so that they cannot elect a minority preferred candidate in any of those districts.

The lower example on the right is an example of a District or District center that packs minority voters so that they have an impact on only one District and no impact on any of the other districts despite the fact that you could probably have drawn two districts in which they had the ability to elect communities, to elect candidates of choice.

When the Voting Rights Act was amended in 1982 to make it clear that you did not have to show that the redistrictors intended to discriminate only that the plan that they drew actually resulted in discrimination.

The Supreme Court first considered this case in 1986 in a case called Thornburg versus Jingles and had to prove three conditions in order to satisfy Section Two and get a District drawn in which they could have the ability to elect a candidate of choice.

First is that the group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single member District.

This is in essence so there was actually a remedy available.

There is a solution to the problem of how do we elect candidates of choice.

The second is that the minority group must be politically cohesive.

That is, they must vote for the same candidates.

And, third, whites must vote as a bloc to usually defeat the minority-preferred candidates.

If they were not voting as a bloc to defeat these candidates, these candidates would win, and you wouldn't need to draw a minority District.

So how do we know how the minority group is voting? How do we know how whites are voting? What you do is conduct a racial bloc voting analysis.

And my job in this particular situation is to actually carry out what's called a racial bloc voting analysis that is analyze voting patterns by race to determine if voting is polarized. If whites are voting against a cohesive minority community.

I mentioned that first of all we have, of course, a secret ballot.

We don't know the race of the voters when they cast the ballot.

So, we have to use estimation techniques.

And the two most standard estimation techniques are ecological regression analysis and ecological inference analysis. Ecological simply means you are using aggregate data.

What we are going to do is we are going to look at precincts rather than individuals. And we are going to look to see if there are patterns across the precincts in which the demographic composition of the precinct is related to the voting patterns of those precincts.

So, on the left we see ecological regression each precinct in the jurisdiction has been placed on the scatter plot on the basis of the percent Black turnout this is the jurisdiction in the south where we actually know turn out by race.

And the vertical axis is vote for Warnock this is an election that occurred in January of 2021 it's the race for U.S. Senate in Georgia.

This is real data in a specific County.

You can see a pattern here and the pattern is the higher the percent Black across the precincts the more votes you see for Warnock that is the estimation technique we used to determine how whites and Blacks are voting in this particular jurisdiction.

This practice, this particular technique had one disadvantage associated with it and that voting was very polarized, you would get estimates that were outside the logical bounds and would find something like 105 Blacks vote 105% of Black voters voted for Warnock. And negative 5 white voters voted for Warnock.

So, in the 1990s Professor King developed ecological inference, that you see on the right side. And this process, each precinct is actually represented by a line rather than a point using more information about the precinct to get this line. And that is all the possible combinations of Black and white votes that could have produced the result for that particular precinct as represented by a line as opposed to a point.

And then the computer generates a best guesstimate of what the actual composition of the votes for the Black candidate were, was.

So, this is the analysis that I performed in Michigan.

Now you need a few pieces of information in order to perform this.

And that is that you need to have an area that has a sufficient number of minority voters to actually estimate voting behavior by race.

I looked at eight counties.

There were several counties in the west of Michigan that had growing minority population around Grand Rapids, Muskegon County and Kent County and it turns out there was not a sufficient number of minority votes to estimate behavior voting behavior on the basis of race in those two counties.

The same is true of I looked at six counties in the east.

I was able to produce estimates for Wayne, Oakland, Genesee and Saginaw Counties, I was not able to do so for Washtenaw and Macomb Counties there was not a sufficient amount of Black turn out to estimate Black and white behavior in those two counties so

what I'm going to give you is the results of analysis for statewide for the entire State of Michigan and for these four counties.

Because actually what you want to do you want to do an area specific analysis because it turns out that voting patterns are different depending where you are in the state.

For example, it may be the case using the example I gave you before of the Georgia election.

Turns out that in the rural areas of Georgia the election was very polarized while in the urban area around Fulton it was much less polarized.

In fact, it wasn't polarized at all in certain areas.

So, it matters where you are in the state as to how much polarization there is and when you're drawing districts it matters what it looks like in that specific area.

The Court is quite adamant about doing a District-specific and an analysis and this is why I looked at these counties.

I looked at 13 elections there have been 13 statewide and Federal elections over the decade.

These include U.S. Senate, U.S. president, U.S. Senate, and three statewide contests, the gubernatorial contests the Attorney General and Secretary of State and the treasurer.

Four statewide contests.

Now the courts have indicated that the most probative contest to look at are contests include minority candidates.

So, you've had four contests statewide contests over the last decade that included minority candidates.

These are the most probative.

You have also listed them here.

You had the 2012 race for U.S. president.

You had a 2014 Secretary of State contest.

You had the 2018 and 2020 U.S. Senate contests.

Then you had two contests that included minority candidates as running mates.

This is the 2018 gubernatorial contest and the 2020 Presidential contest.

So, these I looked at all 13 statewide contests, but these are the most probative according to the courts.

Ordinarily I would look at statewide democratic primaries as well.

I could not look at republican primaries there is not enough minority participation in republican primaries to actually analyze voting patterns by race.

So, I look at democratic primaries.

And in this case, you've only had one statewide democratic primary.

This entire decade and that was in 2018 for Governor.

So, I looked at that contest as well.

This is what the results look like.

And I'm going to explain how to read this table.

Every election that I looked at for every area has a table that looks like this.

So, this is statewide.

This is the election listed here, 2018 Governor.

And here are the candidates.

Here are the parties of the candidates.

Here are the races of the candidates.

Here is the votes that they received statewide.

Now, there are actually four estimates for Black voters and there are four estimates for white voters.

I talked to you about ecological regression and mentioned the problem you have with ecological regression and there sit 104 of Black voters supporting Whitmer.

I didn't mention homogenous precinct.

This is actual these are the actual results of precincts across the state that are overwhelmingly one race.

So these are precincts across the state that are 90% or more voting age population Black in composition.

So that's how I derived the homogenous and this is actual data so looking at 90% plus precincts 90 per cent plus Black age population precincts 95.6% of those voters supported Whitmer.

There are actually two different forms of ecological inference analysis.

One is called two by two.

And that is the one that was developed in the 1990s.

It's since been refined so that I can account for differential turn out and that's what is in the last column 95.3%.

Now all of these are derived from different techniques.

You wouldn't expect them to be exactly the same, but they are all telling a very similar story and that is overwhelming Black support for Whitmer.

On the other side of this table, we will get our estimates.

I report the estimates for the white voters.

So let me see if I can get this to work.

But it's not doing this.

Okay, so we've got 41.1% in the overwhelmingly white precincts, 41.1% of the voters supported Whitmer.

The AR estimate is 38.9.

The two by two is 40.6.

And let me see and the C is 44.8% so these are estimates.

Now I forgot to mention down here the votes for office this is the percentage of voting age population that actually turned out and cast a ballot for that particular office.

So, you can see there is a difference in turn out rates.

And that is around 35% of Black voting age population turned out and cast a ballot for the Governor in 2018.

While the number was higher almost double for white voters.

This contest is racially polarized.

If Blacks voting alone had voted alone Whitmer would have been elected.

She was.

And then of course if whites voted alone, it would have been the republican candidate who was elected.

Below I have the primary for this election.

I have the gubernatorial primary of 2018.

We have the three candidates listed here:

We have they are all democrats.

We have their race.

We have the percentage of votes they received.

And you will see that this contest is also polarized.

This contest you have a plurality of the Black voters supporting Thanedar and majority of the white voters supported Whitmer.

So, this contest is also polarized.

Okay, now I did this, and you will see tables in the report that I eventually produce for every election but I'm going to show you summaries of this in a little bit.

So, over all statewide in the 13 elections that I looked at, 12 were polarized.

And those elections that are most probative to the courts, that is those that included minority candidates, 6 out of the 6 were polarized in the democratic primary which there was only one it was polarized.

And I mean -- mentioned I looked at four counties and these are the results of the analysis in four counties in Genesee County we have nine of the 13 contests polarized with five of the six with minority candidates.

The democratic primary was polarized.

And Saginaw it's 11 out of 13 of the contests, six out of six of those contests with minority candidates.

And the democratic primary was polarized.

In Oakland all 13 of the general elections were polarized including the six with minority candidates but the democratic primary was not.

And finally in Wayne County where voting is less polarized you will see that 7 of the 13 contests were polarized, three of those were minority candidates and the democratic primary was polarized.

What this tells me is that voting is polarized in Michigan.

And what that means is the Voting Rights Act comes into play in districts that provide minority voters with the opportunity to elect their candidates must be drawn.

Okay, so voting is polarized.

# DETERMINING IF A REDISTRICTING PLAN COMPLIES WITH THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

Dr. Lisa Handley

1

## Redistricting Criteria Priority Pyramid: Voting Rights Act of 1965

- Section 2 prohibits any voting standard, practice or procedure, including a redistricting plan, that results in the denial or dilution of minority voting strength.
- All state and local jurisdictions are covered by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.




2

## Redistricting Plans that Violate the Voting Rights Act

Redistricting plans cannot:

- crack, or
- pack a geographically concentrated minority community across districts or within a district in a manner that dilutes their voting strength.



Plan that cracks minority community across 5 districts



Plan that packs minority community into single district

3

## *Thornburg v. Gingles*: Three-Pronged Test

U.S. Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must satisfy three preconditions to qualify for relief under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act:

- The minority group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single-member district
- The minority group must be politically cohesive
- Whites must vote as a bloc to usually defeat the minority-preferred candidates


A racial bloc voting analysis is used to ascertain whether minority voters are politically cohesive and if white voters bloc vote to usually defeat minority-preferred candidates.

4

## Analyzing Voting Behavior by Race

Two standard statistical techniques for estimating voting patterns of minority and white voters:

- Ecological regression analysis (ER)
- Ecological inference analysis (EI)



5

## Elections Analyzed to Date

- All federal and statewide general election contests, 2012-2020.
  - Four election contests included minority candidates:
    - 2012 U.S. President (Barack Obama)
    - 2014 Secretary of State (Godfrey Dillard)
    - 2018 U.S. Senate (John James)
    - 2020 U.S. Senate (John James)
  - Two contests included minority candidates as running mates
    - 2018 Governor (Gretchen Whitmer/Garlin Gilchrist)
    - 2020 U.S. President (Joseph Biden/Kamala Harris)
- Only Democratic primary for statewide office this past decade: 2018 race for governor

7

State of Michigan - Non-Hispanic Black Population (2020 Census PL)



## Area-Specific Analyses

- Wayne
- Oakland
- Genesee
- Saginaw

6

## Example of RBV Results: 2018 General and Democratic Primary for Governor

Statewide				Estimates for Black Voters						Estimates for White Voters					
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI ROC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI ROC				
2018 General															
Governor	D	W/AA	53.3%	95.6	104.3	98.6	95.3	41.1	38.9	40.6	44.4				
Whitmer/Gilchrist	R	W	43.9%	2.5	-6.4	-0.6	1.8	-56.0	-57.9	-56.2	-52.9				
Schuetz/Byons	R	W	43.9%	1.9	2.1	2.6	2.8	3.2	3.2	2.9	2.2				
Others				36.6	31.6	35.2	35.2	61.9	61.7	63.3	63.3				
votes for office															
2018 Democratic Primary for Governor															
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI ROC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI ROC				
STATEWIDE															
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	30.2%	21.0	24.2	23.5	26.0	25.7	27.1	30.2	28.5				
Shri Thanedar	D	A	17.7%	42.5	44.2	42.2	39.0	15.8	12.9	10.8	9.1				
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	52.0%	36.5	31.6	33.5	35.0	60.0	60.8	59.4	62.9				
votes for office				23.0	22.5	24.5	24.5	13.9	12.0	14.0	14.0				

- votes for office** = percentage of voting age population who turned out and cast a vote for the office
- HP** = vote percentages from homogeneous precincts
- ER** = estimates derived from ecological regression analysis
- EI 2x2** = estimates derived from standard EI (as developed by Prof. Gary King)
- EI RxC** = estimates derived from EI technique that takes into account differences in participation by race

8

## Number of Racially Polarized Elections

	General Elections with Minority Candidates	All Statewide General Election Contests	Statewide Democratic Primary
Statewide	6/6	12/13	1/1
Genesee	5/6	9/13	1/1
Saginaw	6/6	11/13	1/1
Oakland	6/6	13/13	0/1
Wayne	3/6	7/13	1/1

Number of polarized contests / total number of contests

9

## Drawing Minority Opportunity Districts

- Line drawers cannot simply set an arbitrary demographic target (e.g., 50% black voting age population) for all minority districts across the jurisdiction (*Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama*, 2015).
- A district-specific, functional analysis is required to determine if a proposed district will provide minority voters with the ability to elect minority-preferred candidates to office.

11

## Complying with the Voting Rights Act

- If, based on the racial bloc voting (RBV) analysis, it is determined voting is racially polarized, and candidates preferred by a politically cohesive minority group are usually defeated by white voters not supporting these candidates, a district(s) that offers minority voters an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice must be drawn.
- If such districts already exist, and minority-preferred candidates are winning only because these districts exist, then these minority districts must be maintained in a manner that continues to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates.

10

## District-specific, Function Approaches

- Estimates of participation rates, minority cohesion and white crossover voting for minority-preferred candidates derived from the RBV analysis can be used to calculate the percent minority population needed in a specific area for minority-preferred candidates to win a district in that area.
- Election results from previous contests that included minority-preferred candidates (“bellwether elections” as identified by the RBV analysis) can be recomputed to reflect the boundaries of the proposed district to determine if minority-preferred candidates would consistently carry this proposed district.

12

Michigan STATEWIDE Percent Black VAP needed to win	rate of BAP candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates				percent of vote BAP and would received if district was 55% black	percent of vote BAP and would received if district was 45% black	percent of vote BAP and would received if district was 40% black	percent of vote BAP and would received if district was 35% black			
		Black votes		White votes								
		votes cast for office	BAP all others	votes cast for office	BAP all others							
		GENERAL ELECTIONS										
2020 President	W	55.2	96.2	3.8	79.0	40.0	60.0	65.9	63.1	60.2	57.9	55.4
2020 US Senate	W	55.2	93.9	6.1	78.1	39.4	60.6	64.6	61.9	59.3	56.8	54.2
2018 Governor	W	35.2	95.3	4.7	63.3	44.9	55.2	65.2	62.6	60.8	58.0	56.4
2018 Secretary of State	W	35.1	95.6	4.4	62.2	43.9	56.1	65.0	62.6	60.2	58.0	55.3
2018 Attorney General	W	34.6	94.4	5.6	61.7	39.4	60.6	61.6	59.2	56.7	54.4	52.6
2018 US Senate	W	35.0	94.6	5.4	63.4	39.4	59.3	64.1	61.8	59.5	57.4	55.4
2016 Governor	W	34.1	97.6	2.4	67.6	39.4	65.7	65.5	62.6	59.3	56.3	53.4
2014 Governor	W	35.1	95.7	4.3	69.1	39.5	61.5	65.2	62.3	59.8	57.0	54.4
2014 Secretary of State	AA	34.8	95.8	4.2	47.8	33.5	66.5	62.8	59.7	56.8	53.9	51.0
2014 Attorney General	W	34.6	95.2	4.8	47.8	35.0	65.0	63.3	60.3	57.4	54.6	51.9
2014 US Senate	W	35.0	95.5	3.5	48.5	47.3	59.2	70.4	67.8	65.6	63.3	61.4
2012 President	AA	59.1	97.8	2.2	68.1	44.5	55.5	71.6	69.3	66.6	64.0	61.5
2012 US Senate	W	58.8	96.8	3.2	68.9	59.6	49.4	74.5	72.2	69.3	67.7	65.4

Statewide	Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters						
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	E 1x2	E 1x3	E 1x4			
	2018 General										
Governor	D	W/AA	33.3%	55.6	124.3	98.6	93.3	42.1	38.9	42.6	44.8
Whitmer/Gilchrist	R	W	43.8%	2.5	-6.4	0.8	1.8	54.0	57.9	56.2	52.8
Seawater/Loyon				1.9	2.1	2.6	2.9	3.9	3.2	3.9	2.5
others (for office)				33.6	4.6	35.2	39.2	63.9	63.7	63.2	63.3

Statewide		Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
Party	Race	Vote	HP	B12A2	B12C	HP	ER	B12A2	B12C
2018 General									
Governor	D	W/TA 53.3%	95.6	124.3	98.6	93.3	41.1	38.9	40.6
Whinner/Gibbs	R	W 43.8%	2.5	-6.4	0.6	1.8	56.0	57.9	52.8
Scueto/Hyatt			1.9	2.1	7.6	3.9	3.2	3.0	2.5
Notes for office			35.6	32.6	35.2	35.2	61.9	61.7	63.3

GENESEE COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for Black-preferred candidates						percent of vote BAP and would received if district was 55% Black	percent of vote BAP and would received if district was 45% Black	percent of vote BAP and would received if district was 40% Black	percent of vote BAP and would received if district was 35% Black	
		Black votes		White votes								
		votes cast for office	BAP all others	votes cast for office	BAP all others							
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	53.0	96.1	3.9	79.6	42.1	57.9	66.3	63.7	61.1	58.7	56.4
2020 US Senate	W	56.6	95.0	5.0	78.7	43.5	56.5	67.6	65.0	62.3	60.3	57.9
2018 Governor	W	45.1	95.3	4.7	59.6	46.2	53.8	67.6	64.9	62.3	60.3	57.9
2018 Secretary of State	W	44.9	95.2	4.9	58.6	48.0	52.0	70.8	68.5	66.2	64.0	61.8
2018 Attorney General	W	44.6	94.1	5.9	58.4	41.1	58.9	66.7	64.0	61.5	59.0	56.5
2018 US Senate	W	45.1	95.2	4.9	58.6	45.8	54.2	69.5	67.1	64.7	62.4	60.1
2014 Governor	W	50.0	96.4	3.6	67.3	37.4	62.6	67.9	65.0	62.0	59.5	56.3
2014 Secretary of State	AA	35.9	95.8	4.2	47.5	51.8	48.2	72.9	70.7	68.9	66.3	64.5
2014 Attorney General	W	35.9	95.6	4.4	46.1	46.2	53.8	70.3	67.8	65.4	62.8	60.3
2014 US Senate	W	35.1	95.6	4.4	47.1	58.9	41.1	76.3	74.0	71.8	69.4	67.0
2012 President	AA	61.0	97.6	2.4	68.4	53.7	46.3	76.6	74.4	72.9	70.1	67.4
2012 US Senate	W	60.7	96.7	3.3	67.5	60.2	39.8	79.3	77.5	75.7	73.8	71.1

SACRAMENTO COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for Black-preferred candidates				percent of vote BAP and would received if district was 55% Black	percent of vote BAP and would received if district was 45% Black	percent of vote BAP and would received if district was 40% Black	percent of vote BAP and would received if district was 35% Black			
		Black votes		White votes								
		votes cast for office	BAP all others	votes cast for office	BAP all others							
		GENERAL ELECTIONS										
2020 President	W	48.6	95.3	4.7	79.6	36.3	63.7	61.5	58.7	56.0	53.4	50.6
2020 US Senate	W	48.4	93.8	6.2	78.7	37.5	62.5	61.7	58.9	56.3	53.6	51.5
2018 Governor	W	37.7	93.6	6.4	63.0	40.9	59.1	63.2	60.6	58.2	55.9	53.7
2018 Secretary of State	W	38.0	93.7	6.3	61.4	39.7	60.3	62.7	60.0	57.5	55.1	52.8
2018 Attorney General	W	37.6	93.4	6.6	61.0	39.3	60.7	59.1	56.2	53.4	50.9	48.3
2018 US Senate	W	37.6	93.6	5.3	62.8	39.6	60.4	62.3	59.1	57.6	54.8	52.4
2016 President	W	52.3	95.0	5.0	70.2	39.6	60.4	61.3	58.1	55.3	52.0	49.3
2014 Governor	W	32.7	94.1	5.9	50.9	42.2	57.8	65.1	62.3	60.1	57.8	55.0
2014 Secretary of State	AA	32.6	94.4	5.6	49.2	36.3	63.7	62.3	59.5	56.7	54.1	51.5
2014 Attorney General	W	32.4	94.1	5.9	50.1	32.6	67.4	59.8	56.8	53.9	51.1	48.5
2014 US Senate	W	32.7	94.1	5.9	50.1	50.6	49.4	68.6	65.7	63.8	61.8	59.3
2012 President	AA	59.2	95.7	4.3	70.3	42.8	57.1	69.0	66.4	63.8	61.3	58.6
2012 US Senate	W	55.7	95.4	4.6	68.7	52.3	47.7	73.8	71.6	69.5	67.4	65.4

OAKLAND COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of P candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote BAP and would received if district was 55% Black	percent of vote BAP and would received if district was 45% Black	percent of vote BAP and would received if district was 40% Black	percent of vote BAP and would received if district was 35% Black
		Black votes		White votes							
		votes cast for office	BAP all others	votes cast for office	BAP all others	BAP all others	BAP all others				
		GENERAL ELECTIONS									
2020 President	W	71.6	93.4	6.0	86.4	45.9	54.1	69.8	67.4	65.1	60.9
2020 US Senate	W	71.4	92.1	7.9	85.4	43.5	56.5	68.1	65.6	63.3	58.9
2018 Governor	W	53.2	94.1	5.9	68.8	47.4	52.6	70.1	67.6	65.3	61.1
2018 Secretary of State	W	53.1	94.2	5.8	67.7	47.5	52.5	70.4	68.0	65.3	61.2
2018 Attorney General	W	52.5	93.8	6.2	67.2	43.2	56.8	65.3	62.8	60.4	56.1
2018 US Senate	W	53.9	93.0	7.0	85.1	45.5	54.5	68.6	65.9	63.6	59.5
2016 President	W	65.6	95.1	4.9	73.6	58.1	41.9	68.3	65.6	63.7	59.6
2014 Governor	AA	46.9	94.8	5.2	54.8	30.8	69.2	63.3	60.1	56.9	53.8
2014 Secretary of State	AA	45.9	94.6	5.4	53.1	28.4	71.6	61.4	58.2	54.7	51.3
2014 Attorney General	W	46.3	94.1	5.9	52.6	32.9	67.1	64.5	61.4	58.4	55.4
2014 US Senate	W	46.5	95.0	5.0	53.7	46.7	53.3	71.6	69.1	66.4	62.4
2012 President	AA	68.9	95.7	4.3	75.2	42.1	57.9	70.3	67.6	65.0	59.7
2012 US Senate	W	67.8	95.8	4.9	74.0	47.6	52.4	73.1	70.6	68.3	63.5





6-1-2001

# Drawing Effective Miority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence

Bernard Grofman

Lisa Handley

David Lublin

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# DRAWING EFFECTIVE MINORITY DISTRICTS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

BERNARD GROFMAN, LISA HANDLEY, AND DAVID LUBLIN\*

*When applying the Voting Rights Act, courts and commentators alike have too often fixated on the distinction between "majority-minority" districts and "majority-white" districts, while paying relatively little attention to the likely electoral outcomes that any given districting plan will actually generate. In this Article, three political scientists provide a conceptual framework for predicting minority electoral success, taking into account the participation rates and voting patterns of minority and white voters, as well as incorporating the multi-stage election process (primaries plus general elections, and sometimes runoff elections). The Authors also analyze empirical election data to demonstrate how the model can be applied to address voting rights disputes.*

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\* The listing of co-authors is alphabetical: Bernard Grofman, School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, C.A.; Lisa Handley, Frontier International Electoral Consulting, Washington, D.C.; David Lublin, Department of Government, American University, Washington, D.C. This research was partially funded by grant 99-6109, Program in Political Science, National Science Foundation (to Lublin) and grant SBR 97-30578 (to Grofman and Anthony Marley), Program in Methodology, Measurement and Statistics, National Science Foundation. Basic research for this Article was begun under an earlier grant to Grofman from the Ford Foundation. We are indebted to Clover Behrend and Annabel Azim for library assistance. Many of the ideas discussed in this Article, including the graphic representation of the formal model, originated in discussions between the co-authors and Sam Hirsch, an attorney with the Washington, D.C. office of Jenner & Block.

general election<sup>74</sup>—and sometimes the highest percentage is in the runoff, sometimes in the general election. Both Bishop and McKinney, for example, needed a higher percentage black to win the Democratic runoff than to win the general election in their districts in 1992.

**Table 6: Percent Black Needed for Black Candidate to Win, Incorporating Cohesion & Crossover: Selected Southern Congressional Primary, Runoff & General Elections with Black Candidates**

Congressional District	Year	% Black Participation	% White Participation	% Black Needed To Equalize Turnout	% Black Votes for Black Candidate* (Cohesion)	% White Votes for Black Candidate* (Crossover)	% Black Needed Given Both Cohesion & Crossover
<b>DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY</b>							
FL 3 (Brown)	1992 Primary	28.7	21.6	42.9	93.5	34.4	31.9
GA 2 (Bishop)	1992 Primary	39.8	44.4	52.7	84.4	31.2	43.7
GA 11 (McKinney)	1992 Primary	27.3	38.2	58.3	89.7	60.4	27.4
GA 4 (McKinney)	1996 Primary	30.5	12.8	29.6	93.3	24.6	27.0
<b>DEMOCRATIC RUNOFF</b>							
FL 3 (Brown)	1992 Runoff	24.0	14.5	37.7	92.0	15.8	36.7
GA 2 (Bishop)	1992 Runoff	35.3	30.3	46.1	79.0	25.5	45.7
GA 11 (McKinney)	1992 Runoff	20.9	34.5	62.3	90.8	26.5	49.3
<b>GENERAL ELECTION</b>							
FL 3 (Brown)	1992 General	57.8	68.6	54.3	97.1	25.6	41.7
GA 2 (Bishop)	1992 General	55.9	62.6	52.8	98.3	32.4	36.5
GA 11 (McKinney)	1992 General	60.3	57.8	48.9	96.7	36.0	33.0
GA 4 (McKinney)	1996 General	58.3	66.4	53.2	98.1	31.2	37.5

\* The estimates of % white & black votes for black candidates is the % of whites & blacks voting for any of the black candidates, not simply the winning black candidate.

The highest of the three percentages necessarily interests us most because it is the percentage needed for the black-preferred candidate to win all three elections—the Democratic primary, the Democratic runoff and the general election—and attain a seat in the legislature. The fact that the highest percentage black needed to win is not always found in the general election illustrates the importance of examining

74. The percent black needed to win the Democratic primary is somewhat misleading if more than one black candidate ran in the primary—the estimates for the percentage of whites crossing over and the percentage of blacks voting cohesively are a reflection of the percentage of whites and blacks voting for any of the black candidates, not simply the winning black candidate. For example, in the 1992 Democratic primary in the Georgia 11th, 60.4% of the whites voted for one of the four black candidates running, but not necessarily the black candidate (McKinney) who won.

all stages of the election process, and not simply relying on an analysis of the general election.

Before we conclude that black Democratic candidates can win in congressional districts that are not majority black, several cautionary notes must be added. First, black candidates may not have been persuaded to compete for congressional office in the South if majority black districts had not been created—and black candidates cannot win if they cannot be convinced to run. Second, black voters may not have turned out to vote in such high numbers if they did not think black-preferred candidates had a chance to win. Third, a district that was less than majority black may have attracted more experienced and well-funded white candidates, and that in turn could lower the level of white crossover voting and result in the defeat of black candidates. Fourth, white incumbents can play a major role in retarding the prospects for black electoral success. Only one of the congressional contests examined included a white incumbent; if white incumbents had run in more of these districts, the black electoral success rate almost certainly would have been much lower. For example, in the Georgia 10th, which is 38% black, a black Democratic candidate was easily defeated by the white Republican incumbent in the 1998 general election. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we must not over-generalize from the congressional data to other offices. As the data from state legislative districts in South Carolina demonstrate, sometimes legislative districts well in excess of 50% black are necessary to provide black voters with an equal opportunity to elect black candidates to office—a district-specific analysis is essential to make this determination.

*C. Factors that Affect the Opportunity to Elect Minority-Preferred Candidates: Data from South Carolina State Legislative Elections*

Our examination of the outcome of elections in black majority districts for the South Carolina House of Representatives during the 1990s reinforces the importance of a jurisdiction-specific analysis of the factors that affect the opportunity to elect minority-preferred candidates to office. Table 7 lists the election results for all majority black state house districts in South Carolina for the 1992, 1994, 1996 and 1998 elections.<sup>75</sup>

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75. Table 7 does not include results from special elections, including the round of special elections held in 1997 due to court-ordered redistricting.

## Exhibit 6

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**From:** Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)  
**Sent:** Monday, September 13, 2021 5:19 PM  
**To:** Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC); Rothhorn, MC (MICRC)  
**Cc:** Badelson1  
**Subject:** Privileged & Confidential: Significant Concerns from General Counsel and VRA Counsel

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Dear Chair Szetela and Vice Chair Rothhorn,

Bruce and I are very concerned and alarmed about the drafting of packed districts that is occurring during today's mapping session. While the work is preliminary and future steps can be taken to remediate - this will become much more difficult the more packed districts that are drawn. In addition to not being able to justify the numbers coming out of today to a court, these drafts also create expectations on behalf of the public that will also be difficult to address moving forward.

The disaggregated election data was not available last Thursday when the Commission first moved into areas where the VRA is implicated. This was the data Lisa highlighted during her presentation on Sept 2<sup>nd</sup> which is critical for the Commission (and Bruce) to move forward. Today, the data appears to be loaded but there was no coordination of a presentation by Kim (which he offered over the weekend) to introduce the data and orient the Commission to it in advance of your mapping work. It has been 2 weeks and the Commission still does not have the critical updates it needs to the software even scheduled. This cannot be accepted by Commission any longer.

This complete breakdown of communication and the lack of information the Commission needs to perform its work is unacceptable and will continue to negatively impact its work unless it is addressed. The Commission desires to create best practices which will be measured by a successful defense of its maps after all legal challenges are done not by any other metric. The complete opposite is being done by the lack of information and coordination. The Commission is running out of time and have an enormous amount of work to do. The current course of action is against the advice of counsel and your RPV expert.

Everyone is making personal sacrifices but there needs to be uniform emergency among a majority of the Commission and unanimous understanding of the law. The current environment is not allowing either to take center stage.

The Commission should consider extending its meeting time for Mon-Wed, consolidating locations (instead of driving 6 hours round trip for a 6 hour meeting) and consider adding Friday meetings in order for the work to get done.

I recommend we have a call to discuss this email as soon as possible and would be happy to coordinate it to accommodate everyone's busy schedules.

Sincerely,

**Julianne Pastula**  
*General Counsel*  
State of Michigan

Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission  
517.331.6318  
PastulaJ1@Michigan.gov

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DISCLAIMER: This is NOT a certified or verbatim transcript, but rather represents only the context of the class or meeting, subject to the inherent limitations of realtime captioning. The primary focus of realtime captioning is general communication access and as such this document is not suitable, acceptable, nor is it intended for use in any type of legal proceeding.

MICRC

09/30/21 10:00 am Meeting

Captioned by Q&A Reporting, Inc., [www.qacaptions.com](http://www.qacaptions.com)

## Exhibit 7

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHORN: As Vice Chair of the Commission, we will bring the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission to order at 10:02 a.m.

This Zoom webinar is being live streamed on YouTube at redistricting MI.

For anyone in the public watching who would prefer to watch via a different platform than they are currently using, please visit our social media at Redistricting MI to find the link for viewing on YouTube.

Our live stream today includes closed captioning. Closed captioning, ASL interpretation, and Spanish and Arabic and Bengali translation services will be provided for effective participation in this meeting. Please E-mail us at [Redistricting@Michigan.Gov](mailto:Redistricting@Michigan.Gov) for additional viewing options or details on accessing language translation services for this meeting.

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For the purposes of the public watching and for the public record I will now turn to the Department of State staff to take note of the Commissioners present.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Good morning, Commissioners. Please say present when I call your name. If you are attending the meeting remotely, please Announce during roll call you are attending remotely and disclose your physical location. I will call on Commissioners in alphabetical order starting with Doug Clark.

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Present.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Juanita Curry.

I understand that that may cause some level of uneasy and disappointment in people who are watching these hearings and are voters of Michigan.

But that's part of redistricting.

The Voting Rights Act and the U.S. Constitution say what they do.

And that has been my ongoing advice to the Commission.

Thank you.

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHORN: Commissioner Witjes? Then Commissioner Orton.

>> COMMISSIONER WITJES: Based on advice of General Counsel this needs to be finalized and be reviewed so we can quote unquote start fixing it I move that we stop working on the house map and let it go in for analysis over the next two days so we can fix it next week.

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHORN: Okay that was a motion and I just want to make sure that because I think the fixing there was a District 18 that I think needed to be quote unquote fixed.

>> MS. JULIANNE PASTULA: And 16.

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHORN: And 16.

>> MS. JULIANNE PASTULA: Pardon me 6 and 18 specifically.

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHORN: Yeah 6 and 18.

And then in District -- and I do think that Commissioner Eid pointed out there is a community of interest in Hamtramck in District 10 we might sort of try to pull into 2 just to comply and I don't think it's going to be a voting rights thing but that's meaning I think it's going to be okay but I just want to acknowledge that, that I think is where the spirit of fixing, it's in this map and it's District 18, District 16, and District 1.

No.

General Counsel please help.

>> MS. JULIANNE PASTULA: What I would recommend is that the Commissioner consider doing is for the active matrix to scroll starting with 1 and glance at the districts, anything that is higher than 40% for the Black voting age population and the population difference I mean just to glance at and just go down the list and then when we get to I anticipate number 6, number 18, and others that those quote unquote fixes can be dealt with and then this map can be ready for the partisan fairness analysis.

That would be my recommendation.

And if the Commission was desiring of having an alternate house map, then the map that is the product of this analysis could be used to start the clone for the new one.

But this would that changed.

Did you scroll John?

>> MR. MORGAN: Sorry I moved the two yesterday where we were comparing Commissioners Szetela's plan with the previously done plan and I was making this matrix show the combined so we could do what you described which is look at each individual District I can also bring it up in the active matrix.

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHORN: Thank you for that helpful direction General Counsel? It's Commissioner Curry's turn and so I want to acknowledge Commissioner Orton first and turn it back to you Commissioner Curry and direct of fixing 6 and 18 so yeah it will be your turn after Commissioner Orton Commissioner Curry.

>> COMMISSIONER ORTON: So General Counsel I guess, I can't see you guys over there but I think we have been asking for specifics and the specific that I heard is that 6 and 18 need to be further unpacked? And you gave a number and 1 through all of them and if it's over a certain percent we need to look at that. So can you tell me again what that number was.

>> MS. JULIANNE PASTULA: My suggestion was and Mr. Morgan was very helpful with it, however the data is best displayed but that the Commission start with the data chart and look at the list starting with one and I would recommend anything with a higher than 40% Black voting age population be looked at.

This will also give the Commission an opportunity to look at their population numbers at this time and that way by the time we get to District 110 we will know this map is okay for -- to have Dr. Handley run the partisan fairness measures.

So that would be my recommendation is just scrolling down the data and if there is anything, again, that looks percentages that look kind of high, the Commission can take a closer look.

But again with the modifications that the Commission has made, again, looking at the current data percentages would be what I would recommend and then when we see those districts, we can address them and make sure that all of them are addressed is my goal.

By going through the chart in this fashion.

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHORN: Okay so our Chair has returned. So I'm going to turn it over to Chair Szetela and.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Yep so, I will take over from here. First, I'd like to remind everyone, take it off? Commissioner Woods were you going to ask me to remind everybody?

>> MR. EDWARD WOODS: Yes.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: That is what I was about to do remind everybody we are required to wear masks in the building so if everybody could get their masks on, I would appreciate that.

This map we have open right now just so I'm oriented this is a full map we have of the full state with the changes I had suggested yesterday. Is that.

>> MR. MORGAN: Yes, that's correct. I made the changes as directed. We stipulated I would do that.

But it does bring our percentages down in most districts below 40% and we have a few like 53, 52, I think the highest is 53.

So I did send that over to John if you guys want to look at it.

I think it might be easier than having us do it individually.

Again I'm not vouching for these districts.

I just I tried.

I did what Mr. Adelson asked and tried to lower the numbers.

And we've got some crazy show string districts but if everybody wants to look at that, I think it might and have Mr. Adelson look at it and see if this is what you are thinking we might do to be compliant that might be helpful.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Is this draft distinct from the version submitted the day before yesterday?

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Yes.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Okay, per our process they must be submitted to the Secretary of State one day before so they can be publicly posted.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Okay

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHORN: Commissioner Clark I saw your hand and want to make sure General Counsel gets in while we are waiting for mapping for Commissioner Eid because I think partisan fairness was something we wanted to address Commissioner Clark do you have something quick?

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Rebecca.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Yes.

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Changes you made you just referred to are they just in the Detroit area?

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Yes.

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay thank you.

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHORN: Okay while we are waiting for our mapping software to boot up Commissioner or General Counsel would you like to address partisan fairness?

>> MS. JULIANNE PASTULA: I would thank you so much Vice Chair Rothorn. So very briefly I wanted to highlight again for the benefit of the public that partisan fairness according to subsection 13 of the Constitution, which sets forth the ranked criteria that the Commission is legally required to follow, the language regarding partisan fairness is districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party.

A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.

That language does not require and actually prohibits the Commission from considering the election results while they are mapping.

Accepted measures of partisan fairness and measures are run on statewide plan. Which the Commission run on statewide plans.

They cannot map in the manner in which the public is advocating.

They are legally prohibited from doing so.

The partisan fairness measures when run again the Commission's expert Dr. Lisa Handley will be here tomorrow to run those partisan fairness measures on the statewide plans.

And then the Commission will be able to make amendments, if necessary, based on those measures.

And again the language is shall not provide a disproportionate advantage.

This language is key.

This language is what must be followed and the Commission cannot vary this language or modify the Constitution or not follow the Constitution or else the entire map will be put in jeopardy.

In legal jeopardy.

So it really is critical I think for the public to understand and appreciate the position that the Commission is in.

And that they are required to follow the Constitution as adopted.

By the voters in Michigan.

Again, to the goal was to end partisan gerrymandering and not draw maps based on political considerations which is what this Commission has done to date and will continue to do, get the partisan fairness results and then their legal team can advise on appropriate next steps.

Thank you Mr. Vice Chair se Szetela thank you General Counsel so Anthony I think we will hand it over to you to direct the line drawers.

Looks like Mr. Morgan over there.

>> MR. BRUCE ADELSON: Madam Chair can I interject.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Yes.

>> MR. BRUCE ADELSON: Thank you for your ongoing efforts and there is something that occurred to me that I wanted to make clear.

One of the things that this Commission is doing, which is quite different than the typical approach to redistricting, you are essentially unpacking districts.

You are essentially leveling the playing field as the Voting Rights Act was intended when it was passed in 1965.

And the Supreme Court has said that is a more challenging process than just packing people of color together willy-nilly.

Frankly that is not difficult to do.

But you are doing the opposite.

And I think it's really important that everybody realize that.

And that, that is why the process is challenging and the process does involve many steps here and there, so I just wanted to make that clarification because I think it is a very salient one.

MICRC

10/20/21 1:00 pm Public Hearing

Captioned by Q&A Reporting, Inc., [www.qacaptions.com](http://www.qacaptions.com)

## Exhibit 8

>> CHAIR SZETELA:

Thank you, good afternoon I apologize in the delay, on getting started. As Chair of the Commission, we will bring the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission to order at 1:25 p.m.

This Zoom webinar is being live streamed on YouTube at the [www.Michigan.gov/MICRC](http://www.Michigan.gov/MICRC) Commission YouTube channel.

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For the purposes of the public watching and for the public record I will now turn to the Department of State staff to take note of the Commissioners present.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Good afternoon, Commissioners.

Please say present when I call your name. If you are attending the meeting remotely, please announce you are attending remotely and disclose your physical location where you are attending from.

I will call on Commissioners in alphabetical order starting with Doug Clark.

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Present.

Dispensing them in less compact districts that radiate out for the City of Detroit to suburban parts of Macomb and Oakland County.

As a result the maps feature 0 Black majority districts.

I'm asking Detroiters to stay and if we cannot consist have a consistent on the map I would recommend that we should look.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Your allotted 90 seconds has ended could you please conclude your statement.

Ma'am, out of respect for the fellow ma'am you are being disruptive we have a lot of people here who want to speak today so please honor the time limits.

Thank you.

Five, six, seven and eight.

>> Number five you can go ahead when you reach the podium.

>> Good afternoon, Commission and staff my name is Sharon Wilson.

I was born, raised and educated in the City of Detroit.

I now serve on the board of Delta manor which is a senior apartment complex located on the west side of the City.

I am vested.

Please note issues important to the African/American community have not been given sufficient attention.

Commissioners, now is the time to address these injustices via a correction of the proposed maps.

VRA districts must be created to allow Black voters to elect representatives of their choice.

Thus consideration of voting participation and election results must be taken into consideration.

Currently you have cracked multiple districts and have weakened our voice.

I support the promote the vote maps for Congress, map ID0615.

And the Michigan State University institute for social policy and public research recommendation that the MICRC reevaluate its approach towards compliance with the V RA.

No excuses.

We are demanding fair and equitable maps.

Thank you for listening.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number six.

>> Good afternoon my name is Christine Peck and I'm a resident of Birmingham I was also an active volunteer in the 2018 prop two ballot initiative.

I participated in the process and continue to be invested because I believe a basic requirement of a true democracy is the right for citizens to choose their elected officials by vote.

However, if the proposed map this Commission has published stands it's as if the democratic party and independents on this Commission had their voices completely silenced.

Primarily in the City of Detroit.

This proposed map spreads the African/American block into multiple districts where their voting influence is greatly diminished and probably violates what is left of the Federal Voting Rights Act.

By the Trump support Court it was supposed to protect a voting groups ability to elect candidates but this Commission proposed map will rob the African/American community of the biggest City the edge in the population of Detroit allowing carpet baggers from suburbs and Lansing to dictate policy where and how state and Federal funds are spent for so many necessary endeavors in our City.

For shame.

This is not what we sent you here to do.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 12.

>> My name is Marianne and live in hunting ton Woods Michigan.

I appreciate what you're doing Commissioners and as I delved into the maps, I cannot imagine the complexity of the work however today I want to focus on my State House District 21 on all of the maps.

The efficiency gap is between 5.7 and 7.4% this is definitely completely wrong.

If you keep in mind that many elections in our state are decided by less percentages than that, that needs to be reconsidered so first of all District 21 you drew part of 7 cities Detroit, Huntington Woods, Berkeley, Royal Oak, Oak Park, and Clawson, parts of all of these cities which amounts to an African/American population between 48-50% depending on the particular map. You have not drawn a majority minority District even though I believe that some of your work has been to do vertical as opposed to horizontal districts.

But this did not accomplish the goal of having any kind of minority majority districts so what I believe that you need to do is you need to create horizontal districts in the area between Woodward and green field north of 8 mile and the same thing, the same area south of 8 mile.

So this could give you a majority Black District.

Otherwise you will be totally disenfranchising the votes of Black Americans thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Commenters 13, 14, 15 and 16 may approach the microphone and number 13 when you reach the podium you are free to speak.

>> Good afternoon, Commission my name is Norman from Detroit.

I'm here today to ask you guys to make sure you are listening to the people out here in the community.

I understand that you guys have a tough job to do.

This is not my first time speaking to you guys.

And how you have done the districts using 35 percentage of how you are drawing is inaccurate based on the primary of what happened last year and Michigan has low primaries so I'm asking you to go back and redraw the maps not as fast as you can but as accurate as you can and increase it up to 50% and you get the accurate message you need out here.

Also think about the people you represent.

Hear what we are saying and not go by idly and hear what I say.

That is all I ask.

Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 14.

>> Hi can you hear? You got my thing on the screen.

Can you throw yours up Congressional up on the screen next to it before you start the clock.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: We are only able to share one map at a time.

>> Yeah, so this is the Congressional you know map I came up with.

It's not really the best option but at least it's something different this is Anthony in southwest Detroit and care about southwest and Down River.

Your Congressional maps have the same configuration throughout Apple, Birch, Cedar, Maple and V1RAS240 all use the same configuration for Congressional one and it's not the UP Commissioner Lange and Kellom when you were on the thing yesterday Congressional District one is right here in Detroit and they use the same for six out of your 7, 8 maps.

There was nothing methodical about it Commissioner Rothhorn and you said it was methodically drawn and we lean on the data and it drove us here.

I watched every meeting the data did not drive you to what you draw for Congressional District one for Detroit.

If I want to ride a bus from the bottom to the top, I have to make a transfer.

If I ride a bus from the bottom of mine where Down River is to the top, I can pick 3, 4, 5, 6 buses to take me all the way.

That is one basis by which I just came up with that.

And so you copied and pasted it.

Then Commissioner Eid you just switched out Warren for Romulus and that is different not really.

Commissioner Lange I appreciate you for at least trying to draw something different so please make wholesale change.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 15.

>> Nina from south Oakland.

In the State House and Senate maps two different communities of interest are being treated unfairly.

Specifically in District 110.

Every one of these maps divides.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Your 90 seconds is up.

Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 17, 18, 19 and 20 and number 17 when you reach the microphone you may begin speaking.

>> Hello Commissioners and thank you for your work.

I appreciate the effort to remove politics from the political process.

However, I also want to express my concerns of elimination of a District and possible of decreased representation of a minority community that needs it the most in Detroit.

My name is and my family and I live in the City of Rochester. I'm a member of the Sikh faith.

I'm here today to speak on behalf of my religious community in Oakland and Macomb Counties because we have not yet advocated for ourselves in this progress. As a smaller community we used to be together to amplify our voice and have our Congress person notice us as a constituency group.

Our concerns are not only for our own religious community, but the communities at large which we live in. That is why I'm supporting the Birch version of the draft map, which keeps the Sikh places of worship in Oakland, Macomb Counties together by keeping Troy, Rochester, Rochester Hills and Sterling Heights in one District.

We will see many comments from my community on the Birch map. I ask you to consider Michigan six of community of interest on the final Congressional map. Thank you for the opportunity to comment today.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 18.

>> This Commission was set up to prevent partisan fairness gerrymandering.

The members on this committee should be ashamed of the stacking cracking and packing these so called maps put forward and show.

People see through this.

How much influence has Alec had on Commissioners and the map, ALEC, how much influence have they had on you guys? Start over.

Those maps are garbage.

Go with the maps with the AFLCIO, promote the vote and the Showers, Schwartz maps. Start with those and start over.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 19.

>> Good afternoon, Commission my name is Yvette Anderson.

We need you to draw maps that are 51% Black.

We know that you can draw better maps for Black Michiganders.

Honor the Voting Rights Act to ensure Black people are able to elect leaders that look like themselves.

Let's not return to the Jim crow politics of old.

Going from 17 majority Black districts to 0 is unacceptable.

It's important to me that Detroit be able to elect its own representatives and I'm not sure your maps will guaranty that.

Look at the AFLCIO fair maps project for ideas on how to get to partisan fairness while respecting real communities of interest.

Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 23.

>> I am Susan.

I live in northwest Detroit in north Rosedale Park and I'm a proud member of Congressional District 13.

I've lived in Detroit since 1975.

I know you have a very difficult job and I know you're doing it to the best of your ability. However, the currently drawn map cracks my neighborhood and puts my neighborhood in a Congressional District combined with suburban Livonia which I think is 95 percentage white.

I and my neighbors in Detroit in this northwest Detroit are truly a community of interest and have different concerns and needs than suburban Livonia.

I know the intent of this map is not racist.

But it is functionally racist because it dilutes the Black vote.

And will decrease Black representation.

There are examples of maps that are fairer.

Check out the AFLCIO and one fair vote as possible guides.

I think it is incumbent upon you to draw maps that are fair for my neighbors or me and for all Detroiters.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 24.

>> My name is Rick blocker.

And excuse me.

I come today to ask again that you draw majority-minority maps and districts.

We have Black people in the State of Michigan representing 14% of the population.

We currently represent 12% of the people in the State Senate and the State House.

We represent six percent of people in the Congress of the United States.

Under your current proposal that number could be eliminated to no representatives in the Congressional and very few, if any, in the State House and State Senate.

You must do better.

We deserve fair representation.

The people in this area have fought hard.

We cannot go backwards.

We are sick and tired of being sick and tired.

We need fair maps now.

We need for you to stop, no excuses, draw fair maps.

Make sure we have Black representation.

If that current Congressional maps you have, neither one of them and I looked at all the maps on the portal goes to 50%.

If you have to go to other communities where Black people are to get 50%, you need to do so.

It is not acceptable for us to have the maps that does not reflect our community and does not protect Black people in this area.

Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Numbers 25, 26, 27, and 28 please approach the microphone and number 25 you can begin speaking. And just to orient people online watching proceedings, we are at 25 and at it for about 35 minutes.

We currently have 116 people signed up for in person public comment.

So it is likely that we will not get to online remote public comments before the 3:30 close and I think we are probably going to push a little past 3:30 to give people more time to speak so orient the people online we are 25 and have 116 in person.

Go ahead number 25.

>> Thank you, good afternoon, everyone my name is Michael and I'm here with my vice president Tonya Ray and Michelle Thomas and Pam Smith and other members of labor unions.

Michigan independent Redistricting Commission you are failing us.

Congress will not end the filibuster so John Lewis Voting Rights Act and freedom to vote act are laying in the waste land.

States right has been the excuse for not passing that legislation and it has been historically been the reason for the disenfranchise of Black Brown Jews and others and needs to focus on Michigan rights and do the right thing for the state and citizens.

Fair should be the benchmark your plan negates what fairness and voting democracy in the communities.

Your plan for the next ten years denies Black Brown in Michigan the opportunity to select representatives from their neighborhoods to send to Lansing, Washington or the school boards.

You can incorporate the AFLCIO maps project or the Michigan Black caucus or even come to the UAW or CBT and we will improve your product to present to the people that will provide racial justice and ensure nonpartisan fairness.

Do the right thing.

Do not put barriers on our boundaries and chains on our voting machines.

Please do not sell the citizens of Michigan by offering a youth that divides us and greatness and power of our democracy.

We all know the big lie.

We ask you today why.

We are asked to have maps on behalf of the politicians or the people in power.

**We must protect the voice of people.**

**Do the right thing.**

**Listen, think and act.**

**Thank you.**

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 26.

>> Good afternoon my name is Carla Meijer and I'm from Troy and Oakland County. New House District 32 which is all of Troy is perfect.

Thank you.

New Congressional District 6 not so much.

Troy and Oakland County share new districts with Macomb County.

I lived in Troy since the early 70s but I have always been employed in Oakland I'm sorry always been employed in Macomb County and I know we are not communities of common interest nor do we share common characteristics.

The new Congressional District 6 needs work.

It needs work.

As proposed currently proposed it weighs heavily republican.

Troy should be with Oakland County as proposed on the Juniper maps all other maps it's with Macomb and affiliates with Oakland County and school and library affiliations bus teams Commerce and our Oakland County water resource efforts and goes to Lake St. Clair and the City of St. Clair shores a Lake voting community with nothing similar to Troy.

My ask is that Troy and other Oakland cities that have been placed in CD6 be moved to neighboring CD3 it just makes sense.

Over all maps must be completely nonpartisan and must, must comply with the Voting Rights Act rules.

Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 27.

>> Good afternoon, Commissioners.

My name is Betty Edwards, I'm a lifelong Detroiters who has voted in every election since I was 18.

I'm a concerned citizen.

And also a member of Delta Sigma Theta sorority. It was created for Black people to elect representatives that look like them and of their choosing.

Your current maps crack Detroit and make this impossible by radically changing districts.

Today that means congresswoman Tali, Senator Stephanie Chang and Guise and rep Sarah Anthony's community should not be carved up into districts that do not keep their communities' interests together.

>> Good afternoon my name is Danielle Steven I'm a retired public servant, native Detroit and member of multiple civic including Delta significant that and Detroit alumni chapter and Detroit Branch NAACP.

I thank you for this opportunity to provide comment again.

But after review of the maps you submitted, I do not believe they best represent the interests of African/American voters and they're about to select other African/Americans to represent them.

A report recently issued by the Michigan State University's institute for public policy and social research concludes that the methodology used by the Commission, quote, breaks apart the geographical compact Black majority in the City of Detroit dispensing them with less compact districts.

That radiate outward from the City of Detroit towards suburban parts Macomb County and Oakland County.

As a result this engineered partial dilution of concentrated Black vote the maps future 0 Black majority districts.

The purpose of the Voting Rights Act was to ensure equity and the ability for African/Americans to fully participate and a state with African/American population of 13.79 percentage there should be some consideration of our community.

We also point out the majority of this percentage resides in Southeast Michigan and in Detroit furthering our argument.

We strongly recommend that the Commission look to the promote the vote maps.

I have my full statement in the portal.

Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for doing that.

And to clarify we welcome people to also submit their statements into the portal particularly if you feel you don't have time to complete it or just in general because it gives us a written record and you can access that outside the room here there are people there who can assist you or go to the website at [www.Michigan.gov/MICRC](http://www.Michigan.gov/MICRC). And you can submit your comments there as well.

Thank you, number 48.

>> Good afternoon Honorable Commissioner I'm Eddie McDonough and I think I'm your last speaker before we break.

I would just like to say I've been around for a little while.

70 years old.

I've had the opportunity of growing up in Pontiac.

But I have lived in Wayne County, I've lived in other parts of Oakland County and lived in Canton, I've lived in Farmington Hills, I've got a relatives all over Southeast Michigan.

The one thing that I know plain and simple is in all of my living whoever we chose to represent us were part of us from those various communities.

That needs to stay the same.

Speaking as respectfully and as candidly as possible we know the lawsuits are coming so why are we compromising on the integrity of this constitutional amendment.

I urge you not to compromise our chance at representation for the sake of numbers.

As you know because of the lack of census representation there is no Federal protections, no Federal Voting Rights Act, no grant funding or research no recognition for Arab Americans and the battle for basic equity will be even harder because all the current maps will restrict the only opportunity to gain legislative representation.

The only avenue we have left for a voice.

I'm frustrated because we are making history at the local level with record numbers of Arabs voting and running for office and done what we are told to do on the table instead we are put at the menus.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Your allotted 90 seconds is up please conclude your statement.

>> P6764 and P6762 which have been collectively drafted by our community thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. .  
Number 56.

>> Okay looks like we don't have 56 so 57 if you want to go ahead.

>> Hello, my name is Anthony Watkins.

And I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to share my important comments on the public hearing.

I would like to comment on how the Commission has gone from 17 majority Black districts primarily based in Detroit to 0.

That's a problem.

That is a serious problem.

The Detroit neighborhoods and communities should be drawn together.

Majority Black districts are important.

And we can draw them.

NAACP has drawn them.

Several community groups have drawn them.

Fellow Detroit citizens have drawn them.

But these maps need to be seriously looked at and seriously considered and not just request to be submitted.

So we are aware we can beat this and we are aware that we need to have this done.

Because districts do not have a majority of Blacks.

In large part having elected Black individuals.

Black issues are important.

And led by Black people.

And it's Black people continuously able to lead on these issues.

I thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Numbers 58, 59, 60 and 61.

>> What number are you sir?

>> 59.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: I don't see 58 so go ahead number 59.

>> I'm Percy Johnson, UAW cap chairman, Local 22.

I'm also a member of liberty temple Baptist church.

We were involved with getting the petitions for you guys to be able to have the position that you have today.

And I need you to get me out of the hot seat because right now the encouragement that I gave our voters in Detroit and people who signed the petition and were willing to participate and be in one of your you know we took names of people to also be a Commission in our church and union halls.

And they were encouraged this will give them a chance to have a fair vote to represent their communities.

And we, seriously I got over 8, 900 signatures on our petitions for this to be on the ballot.

And 90% of them were Detroiters.

So please I'm asking you to please give Detroiters a 50% or plus better to represent their vote when they vote.

So to weaken them and give them a weak vote would hurt them.

I'm from Troy but yet I know if I see -- when I see something that is not justly done or unfair, I'm going to speak up for them and represent them.

My heart and soul is in Detroit and Detroit deserves to have fair, good representation and they can't get it if you take away their strength of their vote.

Give them a 51 plus vote.

Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 60.

>> All right we will move on to 61, 62, 63, 64 and just in case there is in I confusion it's my understanding when people were first arriving that people who were higher than 50 were told we might not get to them.

So I'm keeping track of everyone who is not here so if those people happen to show up at 5:00 you will be given a chance to speak.

So I don't want people to think because they are not here, we won't give you a chance to speed because I know some people were given that guidance what number are you ma'am.

>> 64.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: 54.

>> No 64.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: 61, 62 or 63.

It has the second largest Asian community of any City and Township behind Troy which you basically kept whole in the State House and it's 28 percentage Asian and the number has risen significantly over the decade and projected to grow.

African/American voters which I agree with the folks in the room we need more of and better off there are few communities in Michigan that have large populations of color from different racial backgrounds like Hispanic and Asian community.

I want the Commissioner to consider Novi and Troy has significant Asian population and this community should be kept whole to keep it intact and elect districts that we can select a candidate of choice.

I think the map that has gone the most right direction is the one that is proposed by Commissioner Szetela for the State House.

But it's missing several Novi and precincts out to Livingston County and for Ann Arbor for partisan fairness and do not include it with Livingston County and I would take Commissioner Szetela and swap precincts in Livingston Township for remaining in Novi it does not deserve to be split three ways and have much with Livingston County border and increases the Asian share of population and fits within the population deviation I did double check.

Thank you for your time and being here to take comments.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. At this time I'll call up 66, 67, 68 and 69 and 66 as soon as you reach the microphone you can start speaking.

>> Good afternoon my name is Reno, 892 out of Saline Michigan and asking the Commission to withdraw the maps so it's fair for democrats and republicans the entire purpose of the independent redistrict Commission is making things fair. And their work is not complete until they have maps that are fair across the board. I'm also asking for the Ypsilanti centric districts Ypsilanti voters should not have their voices silenced by getting packed into the shadow of Ann Arbor. It's okay if they have Ypsilanti and only a portion of Ann Arbor share districts. But they should not have Ypsilanti and all of Ann Arbor packed together.

This is because Ypsilanti is a major population centered with different demographics than Ann Arbor.

Some newer maps made the split and hope they will follow through. Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 67.

>> Hello, my name is Yancey and representing 892 and concerned how you sliced Detroit into thin strips and put with heavy white areas in the suburban. The democratic Commissioners and in particular need to stay strong and veto any unfair maps until we get fairness. And under 13 Commissioners should approve any maps that has a boundless advantage to a particular party.

All of the maps so far have been approved by democrats of the Commission and all of them favor the republic party.

Where is the fairness in that? The fairness is a priority above all local boundaries and compactness.

Do not be afraid to unpack the City.

And by doing so it may make a weird shape in the map but that is okay.

What is not okay if the map does not represent Michigan, it's important Detroit be able to elect its own representative and I'm not sure your maps warrant that.

I believe Detroiters should be represented by Detroiters who understand their concerns.

Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 68 or 69. Do we have number 70, 71, 72 or 73? If you could just let me know your number, ma'am.

73 thank you.

>> Hi, I'm Sherri from Livingston County and while as I listen to the people speaking here today, I realize I don't have as much on the line as many of them.

So I'm hoping that you all take it to heart and listen to what these people are saying.

As a member of the League of Women Voters, I was very strong support of the independent redistricting committee.

And my -- I do live in a currently horribly gerrymandered District that has taken away my voice and my community.

And although the maps are significantly better than they were, they are still skewed in the U.S. Congress and the Senate to favor the GOP by 5-8%.

That's not good enough.

We want fair maps.

The partisan fairness is one of the criteria in the Michigan Constitution.

And I hope you all take that to heart.

Basic principle is that the party that receives the most votes statewide should receive the most seats in the Michigan legislature.

I would urge you to look again at the AFLCIO and the one fair vote maps.

And I'm requesting that you please make partisan fairness a priority in your map.

Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. A call for 70, 71 and 72 what number are you ma'am?

>> 74.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Go ahead.

>> My name is Ethyl.

I'm a resident of White Lake Michigan in northern Oakland County.

I want to mention that I appreciate the work you're doing.

>> I'm number 95 and I'm a republican and did not vote for proposal two but people of the state did and it's the law of the land and a process that has to go forward and so I commend you for doing work but your work needs work and the one thing you failed to do or at least not at the start but as you got going and sort of listened to your experts first of all Voting Rights Act expert I think I would fire your first order of business after these hearings should be to fire the voting rights expert because he has it dead wrong that is why this community here is dissected as bad as. It has been smashed like a toothpaste tube all over southeast Michigan and I think that is wrong. But you stopped looking at people and stopped looking at communities and started looked at numbers on a spreadsheet. And all you wanted to do is come up with numbers on the spreadsheet. From the partisan fairness you are. And you couldn't have over 40% African/American in any District, so on and so forth. And then you started dividing things up. And I just want to point out District 15 on the State House map, which begins Schoolcraft and Greenfield in Detroit, an area I grew up very close to. And goes through Oak Park, Berkley, Southfield Township, Bloomfield Township and Birmingham and ends at Long Pine and Loser. Schoolcraft and Greenfield have very little, if nothing in common with Long Pine and Loser, so get back to work and understand politics. I know you were not supposed to be involved, and it's clear you weren't. So get back to work and draw fair districts and draw African/American districts. It needs to be done.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Sir. If you would like to go ahead and speak and let me know what number you are as well, that will be helpful.

>> Hi. Excuse me. My name is Bruce.  
My number is 101.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: We can't hear you it's okay to take your mask off while speaking in the microphone.

>> With the mask.  
How you doing my name is Bruce I want to thank the Commission for letting me speak today and I'm blind and I see clearly what is going on with redistrict.  
And y'all can see but y'all are blind.  
My parents came here from Georgia and Tennessee.  
I represent Detroit and northwest area.  
And I'm going to speak for the kids that don't have a vote that we are supposed to represent they are our future and for y'all to have districts where I'm not represented by my color and my community, I hope y'all do the right thing and represent the minorities and people of Detroit and the people of my District to represent me and the kids who can't speak for themselves.  
I am grateful to see everybody coming out to let you all know how we feel about Districting stuff here.

**Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC)**

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**From:** Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 20, 2021 10:12 PM  
**To:** Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)  
**Subject:** Privileged & Confidential: VRA/Partisan Fairness

**Follow Up Flag:** Follow up  
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Dear Commissioners and Staff,

Congratulations on a very successful first public hearing! As expected, many of the comments centered around the VRA and partisan fairness. Many speakers advocated for strong consideration of the MDP backed AFL-CIO and Promote the Vote maps which are based on criteria and methodologies that are simply not in the MI Constitution (resulting in partisan fairness numbers so different from the MICRC maps which adhered to the MI Constitution and still score very well).

I circulated a privileged and confidential summary prepared by Bruce Adelson in regard to the Voting Rights Act on October 14<sup>th</sup>. Under MI law, this memorandum (which is an attorney-client communication) can serve as a basis to convene a closed session. This would enable the MICRC to have a frank and direct discussion with their legal counsel in regard to the memo and address the issues surrounding VRA compliance in more detail. This would benefit the MICRC by having one conversation where all members present hear the same information at the same time, benefit from hearing questions of your colleagues and, more importantly, receiving the answers and legal advice from your team. This is a far more effective communication option than one-on-one conversations which lack the depth or breadth of a collective conversation.

If the Commission would like to pursue this option, coordination of this conversation would be needed to facilitate participation of remote members and preparation of the appropriate script to satisfy the legal requirements of holding closed session in MI. This could be arranged in very short order.

Please do not hesitate to reach out with any questions or concerns.

Sincerely,

**Julianne Pastula**  
*General Counsel*  
State of Michigan  
Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission  
517.331.6318  
[PastulaJ1@Michigan.gov](mailto:PastulaJ1@Michigan.gov)

**Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC)**

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**From:** Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)  
**Sent:** Monday, October 18, 2021 10:07 AM  
**To:** Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)  
**Subject:** Privileged & Confidential Information and Update

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Good morning Commissioners and Staff!

Congratulations on all of your hard work to date. As we move into the second round of public hearings and the final deliberation/adjustment period I wanted to provide the following information and reminders:

- Please do not respond to comments in the portal. Similar to the presentations, this creates a record that will give your opponents the ammunition for your sworn deposition and trial testimony on your intent and rationale for your mapping selections and on whom you chose to engage.
- Some individual Commissioner maps were submitted after 10 am deadline on Thursday due to ongoing software and data issues. Given each of your individual constitutional rights to submit maps and the difficulty in resolving technical issues for some Commissioners, I strongly recommend any maps received after the deadline be welcomed by the Commission. In addition, the Constitution does not empower the Commission to reject these individual commissioner maps. All published collaborative and individual maps will receive feedback from the public and vetting by the Commission itself.
- Another language reminder:
  - The rationale provided during the deliberations and adjustment period must be very specific and provide the legal justifications your mapping decisions. The privileged and confidential document titled *Legal Considerations and Discussion of Justifications Re: Criteria* circulated on October 7<sup>th</sup> provides appropriate legal guidance. The compliance tracking form can also assist in capturing rationale and must be completed for each final map. This rationale is the basis for your decisions that will be highlighted in court (used to challenge or support your work), as has happened with other state commissions, such as in Arizona. Remember, Arizona's transparent, thorough compliance justifications enabled the Arizona Commission to successfully defend all its maps, achieve DOJ preclearance for the first time in state history, and win 9-0 before the US Supreme Court. Let's follow their lead and match their track record.
  - During the post public hearing deliberation and adjustment period (only 8 days) it is appropriate to highlight that you are responding to public comments, looking to unite/reunite communities of interest and/or increasing diversity. Statements about eliminating blacks or adding whites cannot be made at the table or placed on the public record. There is already too much on the record that can be used against the Commission's work taken out of context and without full appreciation of the MICRC's process.

- It is critical for compliance with the 5<sup>th</sup> criteria (districts shall not favor/disfavor incumbents or candidates) that Commissioners not consider, know, discuss, analyze, look at, listen to or otherwise allow incumbent information to infiltrate your process, deliberations or work product.
- I would urge the Commission to avoid hyperbole and personal attacks during deliberation and adjustment period. As expected, criticism and attempts to split the Commission into factions will be increasing, particularly during the public hearings.
- If you choose to speak to the media, please remember Friday's great PR training sessions by Edward and Mike (which also reinforced the Subsection 11 messaging that started in January). In addition to "I don't know" or "playing it by ear" and giving an answer that could potentially damage the ongoing work of the MICRC, an appropriate answer can reference legal advice given or redirect to your lawyers (Edward always reaches out to me and I anticipate Mike would not hesitate to as well). By design, the Commission is comprised of 13 regular citizens that should not be expected to have a command of a body of law dating back to the 1960s.
- If you would like to discuss the contents of the Privileged & Confidential VRA memo circulated on October 14<sup>th</sup> Bruce and I are available to you. We are concerned that the misinformed media narrative will result in additional complications in the Commission's compliance with the VRA. Remember the MICRC has been consistent in its data driven process. The draft proposed maps are based on RBV analysis and the law. Creating districts with overwhelmingly minority or "safe" districts is not supported by either the data or the law. This media narrative is being advanced by lobbyists and politicians driving emotion in a very sensitive and critical area.

**PLEASE consult with your lawyers if you have any questions, concerns, or uncertainties. Our job and ethical obligation is to advise and guide you through this final, more difficult mapping phase.**

Sincerely,

**Julianne Pastula**  
*General Counsel*  
 State of Michigan  
 Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission  
 517.331.6318  
 PastulaJ1@Michigan.gov

## Exhibit 11

---

**From:** Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 15, 2021 10:10 PM  
**To:** Pastula, Julianne (MICRC); Lett, Steven (MICRC); Rothhorn, MC (MICRC); Woods, Edward (MICRC); Hammersmith, Suann (MICRC); Clark, Douglas (MICRC); Kellom, Brittini (MICRC); Orton, Cynthia (MICRC)  
**Subject:** Re: P&C: Update on Proposed Legislation

Julianne:

I do not appreciate you attempting to put words in my mouth. I did not say I no longer have concerns. In fact, I have grave concerns regarding your conduct.

Specifically, I am deeply concerned to have learned that you personally became aware of critical issues with Dr. Handley's VRA analysis earlier this week and, in addition to not notifying the Commission about this alarming development, have also directed staff members, vendors, and the SOS not to alert Commissioners as to the issue until the week of December 28th - almost two weeks away. It's my understanding that Dr. Handley has informed you, staff, vendors, and members of the SOS that her analysis was deeply flawed and that, as a result of her flawed analysis, not a single one of our Senate maps are VRA compliant. Accordingly, the Commission will likely need to redraw and republish, at a minimum, our Senate maps with BVAP numbers closer to 45-48%, which will require significant map revisions. The alternative is for us to approve non-VRA compliant maps and let our lawyers attempt to defend them, which would be an affront to this entire process.

This information should have immediately been communicated to the Commission and certainly should have been placed on the agenda for tomorrow. The fact that you have instructed other staff members and the SOS to not disclose this information to the Commission for a further two weeks is outrageous and is a perfect example of you exceeding the scope of your duties and making decisions that should be made by the Commission. As an attorney, you have an ethical obligation to keep your client informed. Squirreling away critical information for weeks and hiding it from the client does not satisfy this obligation.

In addition, it's my understanding that you were hoping to conceal this information from the public by having yet another closed session the week of the 28th, which contradicts our mission, vision, and values.

I was planning on discussing this situation with you in person in the morning to encourage you to share this information immediately with Commissioners. Unfortunately, your email made me reconsider that path.

See you in the morning.

Rebecca

---

**From:** Pastula, Julianne (MICRC) <PastulaJ1@michigan.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 15, 2021 8:59 PM  
**To:** Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC); Lett, Steven (MICRC); Rothhorn, MC (MICRC); Woods, Edward (MICRC); Hammersmith, Suann (MICRC)  
**Cc:** Clark, Douglas (MICRC)  
**Subject:** RE: P&C: Update on Proposed Legislation

Dear Rebecca,

My offer to connect was in response to your statement during the Dec 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting that I had stepped outside of my role as General Counsel. I was confused by those allegations. I'm glad to hear it's no longer a concern and I look forward to seeing you in the morning.

Sincerely,

**Julianne Pastula**

*General Counsel*

State of Michigan

Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission

517.331.6318

PastulaJ1@Michigan.gov

---

**From:** Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC) <SzetelaR@michigan.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, December 13, 2021 11:57 AM

**To:** Pastula, Julianne (MICRC) <PastulaJ1@michigan.gov>; Lett, Steven (MICRC) <LettS@michigan.gov>; Rothhorn, MC (MICRC) <RothhornM@michigan.gov>; Woods, Edward (MICRC) <WoodsE3@michigan.gov>; Hammersmith, Suann (MICRC) <HammersmithS@michigan.gov>

**Cc:** Clark, Douglas (MICRC) <ClarkD32@michigan.gov>

**Subject:** RE: P&C: Update on Proposed Legislation

Julianne:

Thank you for your note. While I appreciate your offer to connect, I don't believe there are any issues we need to discuss at this time? If there is something in particular you are concerned about that I am unaware of, you are certainly free to reach out to me at my number below. Keep in mind I am back to working full time and may be tied up in meetings, so please leave a message if you call and I don't answer.

Rebecca Szetela

Commissioner

Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission

[szetelar@michigan.gov](mailto:szetelar@michigan.gov)

(517) 898-9366



MICRC

Exhibit 12

09/30/21 5:00 pm Meeting

Captioned by Q&A Reporting, Inc., [www.qacaptions.com](http://www.qacaptions.com)

>> CHAIR SZETELA: As Chair of the Commission, we will bring the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission to order at 5:00 p.m.

This Zoom webinar is being live streamed on YouTube at the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission on the YouTube channel.

For anyone in the public watching who would prefer to watch via a different platform than they are currently using, please visit our social media at Redistricting MI to find the link for viewing on YouTube.

Our live stream today includes closed captioning. Closed captioning, ASL interpretation, and Spanish and Arabic and Bengali translation services will be provided for effective participation in this meeting. Please E-mail us at [Redistricting@Michigan.Gov](mailto:Redistricting@Michigan.Gov) for additional viewing options or details on accessing language translation services for this meeting.

People with disabilities or needing other specific accommodations should also contact Redistricting at [Michigan.gov](http://Michigan.gov).

This meeting is also being recorded and will be available at [www.Michigan.gov/MICRC](http://www.Michigan.gov/MICRC) for viewing at a later date and this meeting also is being transcribed and those closed captioned transcriptions will be made available and posted on [Michigan.gov/MICRC](http://Michigan.gov/MICRC) along with the written public comment submissions.

There is also a public comment portal that may be accessed by visiting [Michigan.gov/MICRC](http://Michigan.gov/MICRC), this portal can be utilized to post maps and comments which can be viewed by both the Commission and the public.

Members of the media who may have questions before, during or after the meeting should direct those questions to Edward Woods III, our Communications and Outreach Director for the Commission at [WoodsE3@Michigan.gov](mailto:WoodsE3@Michigan.gov) or 517-331-6309.

For the purposes of the public watching and for the public record I will now turn to the Department of State staff to take note of the Commissioners present.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Good Evening, Commissioners.

Please say present when I call your name. If you are attending the meeting remotely, please disclose you are present and you are attending remotely.

I will call on Commissioners in alphabetical order starting with Doug Clark.

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Present.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Juanita Curry.

>> COMMISSIONER CURRY: Attending from Detroit Michigan.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Anthony Eid?

People are represented in our legislatures, not geography.

My second concern is about partisan fairness.

As was discussed before too.

We need you to reconsider the maps that are currently drawn to ensure that this principle is applied.

I understand that the current drafts are pretty much all leaning towards one party.

And that's the republicans.

This is contrary to the criteria established for the Commission and cannot stand.

Those elected from such districts whether they are one party or the other dominant will not feel as compelled to take into consideration conflicting sets of opinions and to be willing to compromise on legislation.

And that's what we have going on now.

Now, this is a major reason why many of us voted for the proposition, so we are asking you to please work harder on this point. Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission.

Number five.

>> Hi, can you hear me all right? Is this good? Hey, everyone, my name is Max and live in Wayne County and thank you to the Commission I know this task is complicated and difficult and thank you for your time and dedication on it.

I was here this afternoon and compelled to respond to something.

The Commission was told they cannot use partisan data while making the maps.

But I just want to say that is nowhere in our state Constitution.

That prohibits saying that you cannot use partisan data while making your maps.

I do understand there are some partisan fairness measures such as the efficiency gap that you need a full complete statewide map of districts to use.

But let's not kid ourselves.

The current draft maps as they stand are heavily favored towards one party over the other and tomorrow's analysis is going to show that.

So the question I have for the Commission is: How are we supposed to un-gerrymander the current draft maps if we are not able to use partisan data while you are actually making the maps themselves? I know there was a lot of fun metaphors earlier this afternoon I want to try one for myself.

This is like saying that the Constitution is requiring you to bake a cake and yet you are also being told the Constitution prohibits you from measuring ingredients or taste testing the batter that you simply are supposed to put it in the oven and hope it turns out great. Which it begs the question then what? Like what are you supposed to do for the next cake do you want to guess and check and do trial and error? To me it sound like a waste of cake baking and map drawing time.

Just like everyone else I want a delicious slice of fair constitutional cake.

## Exhibit 13

---

**From:** Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 6, 2021 7:12 PM  
**To:** kbrace@aol.com  
**Cc:** Hammersmith, Suann (MICRC); Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC); Rothhorn, MC (MICRC); Reinhardt, Sarah (MDOS); Badelson1  
**Subject:** Partisan Data/Partisan Fairness Measures  
**Importance:** High

Dear Kim,

We urgently need to have a telephone conference this evening to address this issue. The manner in which the partisan data is being presented does not assist the Commission in determining how and where to make focused adjustments to districts. The "trial and error" approach being employed today is far too time consuming and does not have any cognizable methodology. Even worse the time spent is not resulting in productive improvements. Given that the Commission only has 3 days left to finalize its draft proposed maps this must be addressed immediately.

On or about August 6<sup>th</sup>, I expressed concern with the display of partisan data as the Commissioners were focusing on the displayed political data and because we don't have competitiveness as a criteria, drawing with partisan data was inappropriate. At the time, you indicated it could be "hidden" leading me to believe it is in the active matrix. We need to discuss a more productive way forward so the Commission can interact with partisan data in a more meaningful and time efficient way.

I have taken the liberty of sending an invite for 8:30 pm. I acknowledge you are traveling to the East coast, please advise an alternate time this evening is needed.

Sincerely,

**Julianne Pastula**  
*General Counsel*  
State of Michigan  
Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission  
517.331.6318  
PastulaJ1@Michigan.gov

## Exhibit 14

---

**From:** Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)  
**Sent:** Sunday, October 3, 2021 9:49 PM  
**To:** Kim Brace  
**Cc:** Hammersmith, Suann (MICRC); Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC); jmorgan4@cox.net; wkstigall@gmail.com  
**Subject:** RE: Plan to Score

Dear Kim,

I am available to discuss tomorrow. I will be remote in the morning/early afternoon so it may be best to connect when I arrive in person or after the meeting - depending on Sue's availability of course!

Also, can you please confirm Polsby-Popper in the software. If so, does the report display individual district scores as well as the plan min/max/median/standard deviation?

Thanks,

**Julianne Pastula**  
*General Counsel*  
State of Michigan  
Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission  
517.331.6318  
PastulaJ1@Michigan.gov

---

**From:** Kim Brace <kbrace@aol.com>  
**Sent:** Sunday, October 3, 2021 9:22 PM  
**To:** Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC) <SzetelaR@michigan.gov>; jmorgan4@cox.net; wkstigall@gmail.com  
**Cc:** Kim Brace <kbrace@aol.com>; Hammersmith, Suann (MICRC) <HammersmithS@michigan.gov>; Pastula, Julianne (MICRC) <PastulaJ1@michigan.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Plan to Score

**CAUTION: This is an External email. Please send suspicious emails to [abuse@michigan.gov](mailto:abuse@michigan.gov)**

Rebecca – OK, your plan is uploaded and viewable by the public on the MyDistricting site..

Attached is also the report on political fairness that I ran on your plan.

**Sue & Julianne – One of the things that staff and I need to discuss on Monday is how much of some of the additional reports do you want to unveil. Like this political fairness report there are a bunch of other data, tables and reports that are possible in EDGE, but we should talk about what do we want to release.**

Thanks

Kimball Brace  
Election Data Services, Inc.  
6171 Emerywood Ct  
Manassas, VA 20112-3078  
(202) 789-2004 or (703) 580-7267 <-- landline  
Fax: 703-580-6258  
Cell: 202-607-5857  
[KBrace@aol.com](mailto:KBrace@aol.com) or [KBrace@electiondataservices.com](mailto:KBrace@electiondataservices.com)  
[www.electiondataservices.com](http://www.electiondataservices.com)

NOW AVAILABLE: 2020 Election Results Poster  
Order at [www.edsposters.com](http://www.edsposters.com)

-----Original Message-----

From: Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC) <[SzetelaR@michigan.gov](mailto:SzetelaR@michigan.gov)>  
To: Kim Brace <[kbrace@aol.com](mailto:kbrace@aol.com)>; [jmorgan4@cox.net](mailto:jmorgan4@cox.net) <[jmorgan4@cox.net](mailto:jmorgan4@cox.net)>; [wkstigall@gmail.com](mailto:wkstigall@gmail.com) <[wkstigall@gmail.com](mailto:wkstigall@gmail.com)>  
Cc: Kim Brace <[kbrace@aol.com](mailto:kbrace@aol.com)>  
Sent: Sun, Oct 3, 2021 7:20 pm  
Subject: Re: Plan to Score

Yes, unveil it

---

**From:** Kim Brace <[kbrace@aol.com](mailto:kbrace@aol.com)>  
**Sent:** Sunday, October 3, 2021 7:13:01 PM  
**To:** Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC) <[SzetelaR@michigan.gov](mailto:SzetelaR@michigan.gov)>; [jmorgan4@cox.net](mailto:jmorgan4@cox.net) <[jmorgan4@cox.net](mailto:jmorgan4@cox.net)>; [wkstigall@gmail.com](mailto:wkstigall@gmail.com) <[wkstigall@gmail.com](mailto:wkstigall@gmail.com)>  
**Cc:** Kim Brace <[kbrace@aol.com](mailto:kbrace@aol.com)>  
**Subject:** Re: Plan to Score

**CAUTION: This is an External email, Please send suspicious emails to [abuse@michigan.gov](mailto:abuse@michigan.gov)**

Hey Rebecca --

Will do, now that I'm in our Lansing hotel.

Dustin sent me a CD plan he worked on yesterday, and Sue wanted me to upload it to our MyDistricting site for the public. Are you ok with unveiling your plan?

Let me know.

Thanks

Kimball Brace  
Election Data Services, Inc.  
6171 Emerywood Ct  
Manassas, VA 20112-3078  
(202) 789-2004 or (703) 580-7267 <-- landline  
Fax: 703-580-6258  
Cell: 202-607-5857  
[KBrace@aol.com](mailto:KBrace@aol.com) or [KBrace@electiondataservices.com](mailto:KBrace@electiondataservices.com)  
[www.electiondataservices.com](http://www.electiondataservices.com)

NOW AVAILABLE: 2020 Election Results Poster  
Order at [www.edsposters.com](http://www.edsposters.com)

-----Original Message-----

From: Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC) <[SzetelaR@michigan.gov](mailto:SzetelaR@michigan.gov)>

To: Kim Brace <[kbrace@aol.com](mailto:kbrace@aol.com)>; John Morgan <[jmorgan4@cox.net](mailto:jmorgan4@cox.net)>; Kent Stigall <[wkstigall@gmail.com](mailto:wkstigall@gmail.com)>

Sent: Sun, Oct 3, 2021 6:38 pm

Subject: Plan to Score

Can you run this through the software and send back the spreadsheet reflecting the Partisan Balance scores? Thanks!

Rebecca Szetela

Commissioner

Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission

[szetelar@michigan.gov](mailto:szetelar@michigan.gov)

(517) 898-9366



## Exhibit 15

---

**From:** Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)  
**Sent:** Monday, October 4, 2021 7:23 PM  
**To:** Rothhorn, MC (MICRC); Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC)  
**Cc:** Badelson1  
**Subject:** P&C: Congressional Map Considerations  
  
**Importance:** High

Dear Rebecca and MC,

Bruce and I have reached back out to [REDACTED] in an effort to get context on his map submissions. Given that his initial map analyzed by Dr. Handley received near perfect scores, why should he try to better what is arguably incomparable, particularly if subsequent maps do not score as well as the initial analyzed map. Our concern is that the map was influenced by partisan data or considerations that are not allowed under MI criteria. While it is clear the AFL/CIO maps were drawn focused on partisan data (both competitiveness and proportionality by districts) to better their overall partisan fairness scores (also near perfect) – this cannot taint the Commission's collaborative work. A map that does not follow the criteria can never be "better" than those that do.

Bruce and I remain steadfast in our recommendation to [REDACTED] that he not advance his map we discussed with him last week and strongly encouraged him to submit any desired drafts as an individual Commissioner map, not insert it into the collaborative pool.

Please do not hesitate to reach out with any questions or concerns.

Sincerely,

**Julianne Pastula**  
*General Counsel*  
State of Michigan  
Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission  
517.331.6318  
PastulaJ1@Michigan.gov

MICRC

12/28/21 10:00 am Meeting

Captioned by Q&A Reporting, Inc., [www.qacaptions.com](http://www.qacaptions.com)

**Exhibit 16**

>> CHAIR SZETELA: As Chair of the Commission, I call the meeting of the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission to order at 10:06 a.m.

This Zoom webinar is being live streamed on YouTube at Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission YouTube channel.

For anyone in the public watching who would prefer to watch via a different platform than they are currently using, please visit our social media at Redistricting MI.

Our live stream today includes closed captioning. Closed captioning, ASL interpretation, and Spanish and Arabic and Bengali translation services will be provided for effective participation in this meeting. Please E-mail us at Redistricting.gov or details for language translation services for this meeting.

People with disabilities or needing other specific accommodations should also contact Redistricting at Michigan.gov.

This meeting is also being recorded and will be available at [www.Michigan.gov/MICRC](http://www.Michigan.gov/MICRC) for viewing at a later date and this meeting also is being transcribed and those closed captioned transcriptions will be made available and posted on Michigan.gov/MICRC along with the written public comment submissions.

There is also a public comment portal that may be accessed by visiting Michigan.gov/MICRC, this portal can be utilized to post maps and comments which can be viewed by both the Commission and the public.

Members of the media who may have questions before, during or after the meeting should direct those questions to Edward Woods III, our Communications and Outreach Director for the Commission at [WoodsE3@Michigan.gov](mailto:WoodsE3@Michigan.gov) or 517-331-6309.

For the purposes of the public watching and for the public record I will now turn to the Department of State staff to take note of the Commissioners present.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Good morning, Commissioners. please say present when I call your name. If you are attending the meeting remotely, please disclose you are attending remotely and as well as your physical location you are attending from. I will call on Commissioners in alphabetical order starting with Doug Clark.

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Present.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Juanita Curry.

>> COMMISSIONER CURRY: I'm present, attending remotely from Detroit Michigan.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Anthony Eid?

Brittini Kellom?

>> COMMISSIONER KELLOM: Present, attending remotely from Detroit, Michigan.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Rhonda Lange?

My name is mark Payne a resident of Detroit, I ask that the vote process you have established be adhered to on the actual vote so the public can witness a transparent conclusion to your work.

In addition these lines will last ten years and have a lasting impact.

You can still do better especially on the State House maps Hickory is least bad but you can do better for Michigan taking a little bit more time drafting.

Please take more time to additionally address our ability to elect candidates of choice and assure compliance with the voter rights act z, as a voting rights expert Handley says in 2C we compile election results where all draft districts can be used whether your proposed will provide minority voters with the opportunity to elect.

No mention of this however no mention of this being done is made.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Next in line is number 28, Nicole Bedi.

>> Hi everyone.

My name is Nicole Bedi from Birmingham I'm in support of the Birch Congressional map.

We are part of the congregation of a Sikh technical of Rochester Hills.

You heard a lot from my community earlier in the process we support the Birch map because it keeps together the neighborhoods of Sterling Heights Troy and Rochester Hills so that our religious community as well as the south Asian cultural community can be a constituency with member of Congress.

I've been following this process really closely and I've actually taken the time to tally the pins on the portal.

And I want you to pay attention to the fact that there are actually 1500 comments between the Birch and Chestnut maps where 67% of comments are positive on the Birch map where only 55% are positive on or green on the Chestnut map.

There has been a lot of T attention on these verbal comments like mine organized by groups but a ton of individuals do not have the luxury to take time away.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Next in line is number 29, Claudia Warren.

>> Good morning.

Good morning, Commissioners and thank you for your service in this extremely important process.

I am one of the many Voters Not Politicians volunteers residing in Midland County.

We collected 21,000 signatures to get proposal two on the ballot.

50-60% of Midland County voters approved proposal two.

50-60% of Midland County voters understood that Michigan's redistricting process was rigging the election in favor of one party.

In Midland County and in the rest of the state we all witnessed what happens when one party dominates with a closed mindset.

Comments, thoughts? Views? Cheerleading for your plan? Commissioner Eid?

>> COMMISSIONER EID: Well, in my opinion I think the Chestnut plan is the one we should adopt.

I see it as kind of a compromise between all of the plans that we have.

For example, you know we have Ottawa County and Apple it's not split at all.

And Birch it's split twice.

Chestnut there is a compromise and only split once with part of it going in the lower District and the other half going in the Grand Rapids-Muskegon District.

Likewise I see a compromise in Midland County.

And this map almost all of Midland is kept whole except for a few sparsely populated Townships that only have about 9500 people in them total.

Which is less than some single precincts in the more populated areas of the state.

And I see that as a compromise because most of that County is kept whole.

And finally I think the next biggest difference is the BVAP is a little bit higher on districts 12 and 13 in Metro Detroit.

They are at about I believe they are, I will find it out now, they are about 45 and 43.8%.

Which are just a couple of percentage points higher on Birch and Apple configuration.

And finally I think while it wasn't made to be this way, I would ends up shaking out is it also has more competitive districts than Apple or Birch.

So I think it's the best one.

I think that is what we should adopt.

And I also like Commissioner Szetela's individual map.

And I also like Birch.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Any additional discussion? Rhonda, I can't see you Commissioner Wagner I can't see you, miss Reinhardt?

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Thank you.

Per the Commission's adopted final vote procedure, if you're entering into step two for U.S. Congressional, the first step or step 2A states a motion will be made that each Commission shall state the top plans under consideration and then proceed into discussion after disclosure of your top two favorite plans.

Did you hear me okay? Do you want to repeat it.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for the reminder I would entertain a motion for Commissioners to state their top two favorites among the Congressional plans.

Motion made by Commissioner Eid and seconded by Commissioner Witjes is there any discussion or debate on the motion? Hearing none let's vote we have a motion by Eid and seconded by Commissioner Witjes to request that Commissioners identify their top two favorite Congressional plans all in favor please raise your hands and say aye.

Opposed raise your hands and say nay.

>> COMMISSIONER LANGE: Nay.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Commissioner Lange.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: No, we are not voting at this point, identifying the top two favorite maps and move into a discussion.

And per our planned document we are supposed to do it in alphabetical order so starting with collaboratives that would be in Apple.

Is there any discussion or debate on the Apple?

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Commissioner Wagner for your reference, in the voting procedure document, the final vote procedure we are moving into 2B which the Commission will discuss each published plan for the District type under consideration in alphabetical order.

>> COMMISSIONER WAGNER: Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: I'm not seeing any hands on the Apple.

Okay, do you want to talk about the Birch, any comments about the Birch? Commissioner Rothhorn?

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHORN: So I think the reason I'm choosing Birch is because there has been in the southeast Michigan area it's the most populated area. And I guess concerned about the way that and recognizing that Grand Rapids is our second most populated City.

But with I believe Detroit and then I think Warren and Sterling Heights it has the top four cities are the most populated area and I think Birch treats that area that the communities of interest that are preserved or the community of interest that we heard from during our process are most reflected in that Birch map.

I recognize that it's not perfect as many have said.

But that is why because it's the most populated area that has the most communities of interest, the most diverse communities of interest preserved that is why I'm leaning towards Birch.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Commissioner Witjes then Commissioner Clark then Commissioner Lett.

>> COMMISSIONER WITJES: I'm basing my decision I know we are talking about Birch here for a good second but going to hit two birds with one stone.

1 I'm taking my own personal beliefs here out of almost everything we are doing when coming to voting. There has been an overwhelmingly positive response to Chestnut. More so than Birch.

So that would be the reason why I put Chestnut above Birch however both maps are decent.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Commissioner Clark?

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yeah, and I'd like to talk about Birch and Chestnut together.

2 The reason I selected Chestnut was I felt it had more swing districts that depending who the candidates are I could go republican or democrat and that is one of the things we

heard from the public a lot, they used the word competitiveness and I just associated that word with the way Anthony configured this.

So I think that's a very positive thing and something the public talked about quite a bit.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Commissioner Lett?

>> COMMISSIONER LETT: Yeah, I agree with Commissioner Clark and Commissioner Witjes.

3 Clearly the sentiment from the public was for Chestnut.

Really without many reservations at all as I recall.

And it seems I recall that people would say you know Birch looks good but Chestnut looks better.

And number two I think our deliberations as we develop Birch and develop Chestnut, I think we made the corrections to the Birch that provided us with Chestnut and therefore I believe that is the one that should be voted in.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Okay, so I have some comments on this.

I think in terms of the public comment it's been frankly equal and actually favors the Birch and that was something I believe Chris Andrews mentioned today that when you tally that 67% of the comments related to the Birch are positive 55% of the comments related to Chestnut are so I think the Birch actually has more favorable comments. I think the Chestnut in particular it wasn't something that we drew as a collaborative map.

It was something this Commissioner Eid did on his own and adopting it and making it a collaborative map.

Unlike the Birch where we did draw it in live meetings and discussed at length what we were doing and why we were doing it we never had that sort of background with the Chestnut and I think you see that reflected in the communities of interest on the two maps because for the Birch we have particular configurations particularly Detroit and Oakland County where we have you know little jut outs here and there and done with a deliberate purple and we went through the communities of interest.

We were specifically discussing the Bengali and Asian and Chaldean, the Hispanic communities, the Arab and Muslim in Dearborn in particular and really trying to preserve those communities of interest and we ended up with the lines we drew.

Where I feel the Chestnut disease not preserve those communities of interest in the same way and I think from a defensibility perspective that makes it difficult to go in and say Yeah, we considered the Bengali in Birch we carved out its own District for it yet we completely threw that in the dumpster when it came to Chestnut.

If it was important for us to incorporate in the Birch it should have been incorporated in the Chestnut as well and a big weakness with the plan.

I feel that is a big weakness that a lot of people have identified with the Chestnut in particular including outside entities that have looked at both maps.

Have consistently rated the Chestnut as being the lowest on communities of interest in terms of taking those into account.

And I think that is concerning because we have the Birch which does well with communities of interest.

We have the Apple which does well with the communities of interest then we have the third ranked which is the Chestnut.

So I think if you are looking at all things being equal which they mostly are because the public impression of it is equal if slightly favoring Birch and we have different metrics we are looking at.

Whether it be population, whether it be efficiency gap, whether it be mean median. They are pretty equal.

And so the big differentiating factor for me is the COIs and we have one map that I think does a really good job of respecting the COIs and in addition to that was well documented as to why we were doing that.

And very open to the public then we have another map that frankly I think compromises COIs.

In favor of competitiveness which is not even one of our constitutional criteria.

Nowhere in our constitutional criteria is competitiveness and I'm sure our General Counsel will jump in on that point so that is not something we should be considering as a factor.

And when people are asking us to consider that they are asking us to deviate from the 7 ranked criteria we are supposed to be following.

So I think they are both good maps.

It's not going to kill me either way if we adopt one or the other but I definitely think in terms of complying with our constitutional mandate I think the Birch is superior.

And I would encourage everybody to think about that and consider whether we want to make sure that we are going with the map with better COIs versus the map that is more competitive.

Commissioner Witjes I think you had your hand up first then Commissioner Eid.

I'm sorry can we let Commissioner Curry go first thank you.

>> COMMISSIONER CURRY: I just want to reply that I agree with Madam Chair in her response to the Birch map.

I agree wholeheartedly with that.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you Commissioner Curry.

Commissioner Witjes then Commissioner Eid.

>> COMMISSIONER WITJES: Between the two I think communities of interest are represented both quite well in the Birch and the Chestnut map.

That being said when it came to percentages that were brought up today in public comment by the individual from Haslett I'm wondering if he went on to the actual public

comment not the portal but the website with the proposed maps where you can place the pins.

I'm taking it in account when we actually had our first maps to that we published and all of our public comments hearings we went on the next five plus everything that we've heard in our public meetings that we had every two weeks Chestnut is indeed superior out of the two in regards to what the public has said.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Commissioner Eid?

>> COMMISSIONER EID: A couple things.

One I just want to point out that the Detroit configuration that is in Chestnut was also in map Juniper that went on the second round of public comments which was a collaborative map and we came back and selected this map and made it a collaborative map on Chestnut based on what Commissioners said was the preferred Detroit configuration.

So that is the first thing.

Second, just looking at how people said their preferences, there were 7 preferences, 7 first place preferences for Chestnut.

And four for Birch.

And out of those for Chestnut there were more than -- there were two independents two republicans and one democrat and just wanted to point that out.

Finally I think the independent analysis actually shows the opposite.

I think independent analysis are good tools we should use but most of the ones I read specifically IPPSR report from MSU preferred the Chestnut map.

I looked at other things, the Princeton gerrymander project, which has the maps as A's, which are good.

And 538 also has them all being the same.

So I think from an independent analysis standpoint they are all pretty good all three of them.

As far as community of interest goes, I think the Chestnut map is better in supporting communities of interest because the biggest community of interest here is the you know the minority community in Detroit.

And the BVAP being higher I think it does a better job of having that community of interest being represented.

While we have the Bengali community of interest represented very well in other versions of maps.

You know we said all along that not everybody is going to get every single thing they want in every map but I think it's a good compromise.

There are other pluses to as far as Oakland and Troy is included with the Oakland County District which is something that at Oakland University the community made very clear to us, they want to be in with most of Oakland County.

There are negatives though, you know.

It's not a perfect map.

I don't like how Chestnut has upper Oakland County.

I think the Birch map is superior to Chestnut in that regard.

But overall looking at all things in totality, I prefer Chestnut and going by what most people said 7 people said Chestnut was their preference.

So I'm wondering if we can get any wiggle room, maybe have somebody change their mind so we can come to consensus something like that.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Commissioner Lange?

>> COMMISSIONER LANGE: This is why I have a problem of listing the top two it's like a round Robin and I don't think that this is how we should do it.

I don't think we should be forced to say which ones we are.

And put somebody on the spot saying oh, well, 7 Commissioners think this one is the way to go so we just need to swing the last one.

That is round Robin in my opinion and I don't like it.

I just want to put that out there.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for your comment, Commissioner Lange.

So I do want to address the MSU report because I did read that in full like I read everything.

And the primary reason why MSU tipped in favor of Chestnut is because number one they are of the opinion that we are required to have 50% BVAP in order to have voting rights compliance and they favored Chestnut because it has a slightly higher BVAP in District 12 and 13 so to me I disregard that entirely because I trust the expert opinion of Mr. Adelson and he what's said we do not have to have 50% so the fact they are favoring one map over another because it has a slightly higher BVAP when that is not what we are supposed to be -- that is not a goal we are trying to achieve, I disregarded that analysis entirely.

Otherwise their analysis was there was no difference between the Birch and Chestnut they were functionally the same in terms of every factor they looked at.

All right, I feel like we talked about Birch and Chestnut so do we want to talk about I think Lange would be next on the list.

Any discussion, comments about Lange? And anything about Szetela? Did you have a comment Commissioner Eid?

>> COMMISSIONER EID: I was going to say I like the Szetela version.

It would rank after Chestnut and Birch because I think the collaborative maps should be ranked first but just generally speaking, I think I saw what you are trying to do.

I saw you did a good job of trying to put together the best parts of both maps.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: All right so let's go back to our.

>> MS. JULIANNE PASTULA: Madam Chair.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Let's go to Clark.

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: I liked the Lange map and represented some of the areas that I think needed more representation than they have had.

I think she did a decent job on that.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Commissioner Witjes?

>> COMMISSIONER WITJES: Okay this is okay so we just discussed the Congressional maps now we are going to move on to Senate then the house basically do the same thing.

Does that make sense? Now we actually discussed the Congressional map, wouldn't it make more sense to go through the voting process now?

>> CHAIR SZETELA: I think Ms. Reinhardt wants to chime in and General Counsel probably wanted to chime in too.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Yes, Commissioner Witjes that is how what the voting plan contemplates is that we will go through all of the steps for each plan sequentially and then move on to the next District type.

So first we would go through all the steps for U.S. Congressional and then move on to the next set, which I believe is State Senate.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Just to clarify going through all the steps you are saying voting at this point.

Okay that is what I understood.

Commissioner Lange?

>> COMMISSIONER LANGE: There was the topic of potentially making changes to the maps.

At the beginning that said we would be coming back to after discussion.

So when do we come back to that?

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Commissioner Witjes?

>> COMMISSIONER WITJES: I'm going to make a motion right now that we do not make any changes to the maps.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Is that all maps or just these Congressional maps?

>> COMMISSIONER WITJES: All maps.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Okay so we have a motion by Commissioner Witjes seconded by Commissioner Vallette to oh, gosh, how do I want to say this not make any changes to the map I guess, any maps, just any District type maps any discussion or debate on the motion?

>> COMMISSIONER WAGNER: My hand has been up a while this is Commissioner Wagner.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: I can't see you.

Please go ahead.

>> COMMISSIONER WAGNER: Thank you I also wanted to get back to actually amending the maps because as everyone on the Commission is aware I've got a letter of demand out there.

## Exhibit 17

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**From:** Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)  
**Sent:** Monday, September 20, 2021 12:25 AM  
**To:** Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)  
**Subject:** Privileged & Confidential: Update

**Follow Up Flag:** Follow up  
**Flag Status:** Flagged

THIS EMAIL IS A PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION THAT CONTAINS LEGAL ADVICE.

OPEN MEETINGS ACT REMINDER: DO NOT "REPLY ALL" OR CREATE "CONSTRUCTIVE QUORUMS" AMONG A QUORUM OF THE PUBLIC BODY THROUGH CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER COMMISSIONERS OR THROUGH SHARED ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS. DELIBERATIONS BETWEEN A QUORUM OF COMMISSIONERS OR MEMBERS OF A COMMITTEE CAN ONLY OCCUR AT AN OPEN MEETING. PLEASE CONTACT JULIANNE AT 517.331.6318 WITH QUESTIONS.

Dear Commissioners and Staff,

I wanted to provide updates on the following issues:

**Competitiveness.** I have consistently stated that competitiveness is not a constitutional criteria in Michigan. Attempting to add this consideration as a criteria creates a significant legal problem and leaves the MICRC wide open to a court challenge. First, there is no legal basis for including competitiveness in the criteria that the MICRC is constitutionally mandated to follow. This would likely be viewed as arbitrary and capricious by a court, particularly after receiving legal advice against inserting competitiveness. To date, it has been included in the not only the drawing of districts but establishing it as part of the MICRC record as well as the rationale by which districts were evaluated. Second, as I indicated again during the second meeting last Thursday, the data in the active matrix is disaggregated election results utilized for VRA compliance analysis and is not an approved method to evaluate political advantage (competitiveness). The full election dataset is not currently included in the data cube. I acknowledge that the MICRC has received public comment advocating for competitiveness to be considered. Again, there is no legal basis for this and inserting it as a consideration undermines our legal risk management strategy. Political considerations are expressly excluded from diverse population/COI criteria so that argument would also fail and put the MICRC's work at risk. Political boundaries (county, city, townships) are a discrete criterion so attempting to align under diverse population/COI criteria absent demonstration of shared characteristics is also highly inadvisable as the MICRC will have to defend its' decision to identify entire counties or other political units as a COI when it is defending its maps. Other examples of redistricting principles that are not included in Michigan's criteria and therefore cannot be considered are nesting, establishing multi-member districts, and maintaining cores of districts.

In his prior work, Mr. Adelson evaluated political competitiveness in a state that has competitiveness as a specific constitutional redistricting criterion, He well understands the difference between complying with that state's requirements and Michigan's and will share those distinctions with the MICRC. Again, competitiveness is NOT in Michigan's constitution and cannot be included now by the MICRC in its drafting. Looking at VRA selected election results is NOT an approved method for evaluating "disproportionate advantage" and "fairness" and must be avoided.

**Partisan Fairness.** This is one of the constitutional criteria in Michigan but it cannot and should not be intertwined with competitiveness. The mathematical models accepted by the courts are employed on statewide plans to determine symmetry and measure partisan fairness by establishing whether a statewide seats to vote comparison and relevant statistical analysis demonstrate disproportionate advantage. As I indicated during the second meeting on Thursday, the

data in the active matrix is disaggregated election results utilized for VRA compliance analysis. Courts have held that election results cannot be used to demonstrate disproportionate advantage or competitiveness. The partisan fairness measures will require another update by EDS.

**Additional Analysis by Dr. Handley.** Dr. Handley is available to perform the partisan fairness analysis as well as additional evaluation of voting patterns by race and ethnicity to identify whether homogeneous populations that are too small for RBV analysis or are not a separate racial category in the census (i.e., concentration of Hispanic voters or MENA population being categorized as White in the census form). A draft Appendix to amend the EDS contract is being finalized for the Commission to discuss and consider.

**Incumbents.** The language of the 5<sup>th</sup> constitutional criteria “[d]istricts shall not favor or disfavor an incumbent elected official or a candidate” also demonstrates the intent of the constitutional amendment to remove partisan considerations from the MICRC’s work. The most effective way to accomplish this and shield the MICRC from individual requests of individuals stating where they intend to run is to not take into consideration any incumbent data and rely upon the partisan fairness measures in the 4<sup>th</sup> criteria. Any intentional actions taken by the MICRC relative to incumbents will need to be explained and rationale provided for the record. This will be almost impossible in heavily gerrymandered areas of Michigan allowing for a challenge of favoring out state candidates. Additionally, there is no meaningful way to gauge compliance with this criteria once that information is taken into consideration intentionally. Your legal team advises against incumbent considerations and has asked the Communications and Outreach Director to stop including articles outlining the impact of the MICRC’s work on current or prospective elected officials.

**Compactness.** The Polsby-Popper test is currently in the EDS software. This test is essential to evaluate legal compliance with the final constitutional criteria. Mr. Adelson has indicated it is a best practice method used across the country and compactness cannot be legally evaluated without it.

**Reconciliation of Legacy Data.** EDS has indicated that the reconciliation between the legacy data released August 12<sup>th</sup> and the PL 94-171 data released September 16<sup>th</sup> is complete and the data sets have been verified. As you recall, this was an important part of mitigating legal risk and demonstrating that the data set is accurate, particularly earlier this year when there was uncertainty about the releases.

**Another Michigan Supreme Court Order.** On Saturday, I received an Administrative Order from the MSC stating that until emergency rules are adopted, the MSC will be issuing case management orders for any lawsuits brought by or against the MICRC. A copy of the Order is attached for your convenience. These case management orders will set forth dates/deadlines and procedural requirements and will be extremely helpful. However, it does note the likelihood of shorter timeframes and “nonuniform” periods which underscores the need to secure local counsel as soon as practicable. The Baker Hostetler contract has been signed but the engagement letter has not been finalized. The proposed engagement letter was not consistent with the contract terms or the terms set forth in the RFP. I forwarded recommended edits so that process is ongoing and I am hopeful it will be concluded this week.

**Analysis of VRA Compliance.** Barring any travel delays, Mr. Adelson will arrive at tomorrow’s meeting about 1 pm which coincides with the end of the recess period for lunch. He has reviewed the Senate and Congressional plans drafted last week, is happy to address questions the Commissioners may have and he also has questions for the Commission. He will share his thoughts in regard to the draft districts drawn last week and discuss overall VRA compliance at the beginning of the afternoon session.

Lastly, another reminder to be thoughtful in your terminology to ensure it is not freighted as each of you are creating a record that you will need to defend not only collectively as a public body but also as individual Commissioners. Again, I urge that public engagement consist of active listening as opposed to talking. The MICRC has shifted into the mapping phase of its work, advocacy efforts have significantly increased, and the increased risk of creating a record that will undermine the MICRC’s work is too great.

As always, I remain committed to the work of the MICRC and each of you individually. Please do not hesitate to reach out to me.

Sincerely,

**Julianne Pastula**

*General Counsel*

State of Michigan

Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission

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# 2022 Commission

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**Douglas Clark (R)**



**Juanita Curry (D)**



**Anthony Eid (N)**



**Brittini Kellom (D)**



**Rhonda Lange (R)**



**Steven Terry Lett (N)**



**Cynthia Orton (R)**



**M.C. Rothhorn (D)**



**Rebecca Szetela (N)**



**Janice Vallette (N)**



**Erin Wagner (R)**



**Richard Weiss (N)**



**Dustin Witjes (D)**



**Edward Woods III**  
Executive Director

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