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Legal Update No. 170 (07/2026)
Material Support for an Act of Terrorism – Kidnapping as an Improper Predicate Offense
Summary of the Holding:
In People v. Morrison, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that because the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” is not an element of kidnapping under MCL 750.349, Kidnapping is not a “violent felony” within the definition of an “act of terrorism” under MCL 750.543b(a) of the Michigan Anti-Terrorism Act (MATA), and is incapable of serving as the predicate to an act of terrorism under MCL 750.543k(1)(b) of that Act.
Background and Facts
In 2020, federal authorities arrested and subsequently convicted Adam Fox and Barry Croft for conspiring to kidnap Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer. Defendant Morrison was the creator of the “Wolverine Watchmen" Facebook page who had supported Fox and Croft’s plot through encrypted communications, training activities, surveillance, and coordination efforts. After a two-week trial, Morrison was convicted of Providing Material Support for an Act of Terrorism (MCL 750.543k), felonies related to Gang-Membership (MCL 750.411u), and Felony-Firearm (MCL 750.227b).
Morrison moved for post-conviction relief, arguing that Kidnapping did not satisfy the statutory definition of "violent felony" under MCL 750.543b(h); therefore, it could not form the basis of the terrorism-related convictions. The trial court rejected this argument without reaching the issue of whether Kidnapping was a violent felony because the prosecution also presented evidence about plans to possibly kill the Governor, and “murder was unquestionably a violent felony.” Morrison appealed; the prosecution cross-appealed.
Rationale and Holding
The Court determined as a matter of statutory interpretation that the plain language of the Kidnapping statute, MCL 750.349, no longer contained an element of force following its 2006 amendment. The Court noted it must enforce statutes as written when the language is “clear and unambiguous” and that the MATA definition of a “violent felony” requires it contain an element involving “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against an individual.” Because the current version of the Kidnapping statute lacks this element, and the 2006 amendment explicitly removed all references to force, the Court found that Kidnapping is no longer a “violent felony” for purposes of the MATA, though it would have been prior to the 2006 amendment. The Court also noted that when the legislature removed all references to force in the Kidnapping statute in 2006, it concurrently created the offense of Unlawful Imprisonment (MCL 750.349b), which does currently contain the necessary force requirement for purposes of the MATA.
Based on a plain reading of statute, the Court agreed with the defendant that under Michigan law, Kidnapping is not a violent felony and cannot serve as a predicate act of terrorism. The jury instructions improperly allowed kidnapping to serve as such, requiring reversal.
Interestingly, the Court noted that as far back as 2016, another panel of the Court of Appeals had similarly reached the exact same conclusion in a per curium opinion by also focusing on the plain language of the MATA to find that “no matter how much evidence of kidnapping the
prosecution produced, the offense could not properly serve as the predicate felony for terrorism
because it is not a violent felony under the Act.” Though unpublished, the 2016 opinion in People v Quigley identified the charge of Unlawful Imprisonment under MCL 750.349b as one that could properly be asserted as a predicate felony under the MATA because it “requires an element of force, whereas kidnapping does not.”
Ultimately, while it may seem counterintuitive to state that kidnapping is not a violent felony, the Court once again undertook strict legal analysis of the relevant statutes in reaching its conclusion. The holding in this case would seem to have relatively narrow practical application. Nevertheless, for the purposes of supporting an arrest and subsequent conviction for a charge of Material Support of an Act of Terrorism, officers should be aware the act of terrorism itself cannot be Kidnapping.