Pending rulings/statements

There are currently no pending rulings/statements.

Date of Request: 10/19/2025
Questions Presented: 

1. Does an endorsement convention constitute an election within the meaning of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, thereby subjecting candidates for endorsement to the acts reporting, disclosure, and contribution requirements?
2. Are delegates to an endorsement convention required to file any disclosure or reporting statements with the Department of State if they receive contributions or expend funds in furtherance of their candidacy to be a delegate or in the performance of their duties and responsibilities as a delegate?
3. May a political party restrict the eligibility of a person who has not been endorsed at an endorsement convention from seeking nomination at the post-primary state convention mandated under Mich. Const. art. V, § 21 and MCL 168.72?

Requestor: Dennis Lennox
Public comment
Preliminary response

Date of Request: 12/23/2025
Questions Presented:

1. Does the language in MCL 169.215(17) stating that criminal penalties "may only be enforced by the attorney general and only upon referral by the secretary of state" establish an exclusive state-level enforcement scheme that precludes a county prosecuting attorney from independently initiating criminal proceedings for any MCFA violation?
2. Upon receipt of a properly filed citizen complaint under MCL 169.215(5) that alleges specific, ongoing violations, does the Secretary of State have a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty under MCL 169.215(9) to investigate the allegations, or may the Secretary decline to investigate based on a policy of deferring to a local clerk's administrative actions?
3. For the purpose of triggering the enforcement mechanisms in MCL 169.215(10), does the "reason to believe" determination require the Secretary of State to conduct an independent, substantive evaluation of the evidence, or may the Secretary categorically refuse to make this determination whenever a local filing official is involved?
4. Is the Secretary of State's "reason to believe" determination under MCL 169.215(10) a mandatory and non-delegable statutory prerequisite that must occur before the Attorney General can lawfully initiate any criminal enforcement action for an MCFA violation?
5. Does a county clerk's ministerial act of sending a "Notice of Failure to File" under MCL 169.216(6) or reporting an uncorrected failure "to the attorney general" under MCL 169.216(8) satisfy, replace, or negate the Secretary of State’s separate and distinct duties to investigate under MCL 169.215(9) and to determine if there is "reason to believe" a violation occurred under MCL 169.215(10)?
6. Can a county clerk's administrative notice, which by law "is not a defense to a criminal action" per MCL 169.216(6), serve as the functional equivalent of or substitute for the Secretary of State's formal "determination" of a violation required to initiate enforcement?
7. Does the Secretary of State’s dismissal of a citizen complaint under MCL 169.215(10)—without making a "reason to believe" determination constitute a final administrative disposition of the alleged violations such that, under the exclusive enforcement scheme of MCL 169.215(17), no further civil or criminal enforcement action for those specific, alleged failures can be pursued by any entity?
8. Given that MCL 169.215(17) states there is "no private right of action" and that the Act's remedies are "the exclusive means" of enforcement, does a citizen complainant have any legal recourse to seek enforcement if the Secretary of State dismisses a complaint without making a "reason to believe" determination and no other entity has authority to act?
9. If the Secretary of State's consistent policy is to dismiss complaints and decline to make a "reason to believe" determination for habitual filing violations when a local clerk is involved, and if county prosecutors lack independent authority, does this create an enforcement void that nullifies the criminal penalties prescribed by the Act, contrary to legislative intent?
10. Does a citizen who files a successive complaint regarding new, ongoing violations by the same committee in a subsequent reporting period—after a prior complaint was dismissed without a determination—risk sanctions for filing a "frivolous" complaint or one with a "false certificate" under MCL 169.215(8) and (16), given the Department's stated standards in matters like Davis v. Fresard?
11. Do the provisions of MCL 169.215, specifically, the exclusive enforcement authority granted to the Attorney General "only upon referral by the secretary of state" under subsection (17), coupled with the Secretary of State's mandatory duties to investigate complaints under subsection (9) and to determine if "there may be reason to believe that a violation...has occurred" under subsection (10) establish a singular, state-level enforcement process that:

1. Precludes a county prosecuting attorney from independently initiating criminal proceedings for any MCFA violation;
2. Requires the Secretary of State to conduct an independent investigation and make a "reason to believe" determination upon receipt of a properly filed citizen complaint alleging specific, ongoing violations, and cannot be categorically negated by a county clerk's ministerial issuance of late-fee notices under MCL 169.216(6) or a report "to the attorney general" under MCL 169.216(8); and
3. Renders the Secretary of State's dismissal of a complaint without making such a determination a final administrative disposition that, under the Act's exclusive remedies, terminates all potential enforcement for the alleged violations, thereby creating an impermissible void in the law's application if the Secretary routinely declines to make such determinations for ongoing violations?

Requestor: Paul Kardasz